

# On the leaked files from Conti ransomware group

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# Who we are?

Trellix

/newsroom/stories/research/conti-leaks-examining-the-panama-papers-of-...  
northwave Personal UTwente Threat Intel UFRGS UNISC

## Conti Leaks: Examining the Panama Papers of Ransomware

By John Fokker, Jambul Tologonov · March 31, 2022

### Introduction

It isn't often the whole world gets an inside look of the business operations of a top tier cybercriminal group. Very early on in the Russian-Ukrainian Crisis the predominantly Russian based ransomware group Conti made a public statement where they expressed their loyalty to the Russian Administration.

**"WARNING"**

The Conti Team is officially announcing a full support of Russian government. If any body will decide to organize a cyberattack or any war activities against Russia, we are going to use our all possible resources to strike back at the critical infrastructures of an enemy.

2/25/2022 55 0 [ 0.00 B ]

Figure 1. Conti expressing their support to the Russian Administration. Source: BleepingComputer

As a reaction to this statement and the current conflict, a Ukrainian researcher, operating by the twitter handle @contileaks decided to dump years of Conti's internal Jabber conversations online. The dumped span across several years consisted of thousands of internal messages making this the **"Panama Papers of Ransomware"**.

This wasn't the first time the Conti gang got hit, last summer an affiliate posted their attack playbook online, which was full of



Jambul



NORTHWAVE

HOME SERVICES ABOUT NEWS MARATHONS

## WHEN THE HACKERS GET HACKED – PART II

A BLOG SERIES UNVEILING THE CONTI RANSOMWARE FAMILY

In the previous blog, we presented the contents and origins of the leaked data related to Conti ransomware gang [1]. In addition to that, we translated the entire dataset and made it publicly available to the security community [2]. In this blog, we dive into details of the internal conversation among Conti gang actors. Our goal in this blog is to show what meaningful information we can subtract from the data. For this reason, we do not display all possible findings. Instead, we focus on the significant (most frequent) information. We acquired this information from an analysis of leaked files [3]: "Conti Chat Logs 2020.7z" and "Conti Jabber Chat Logs 2021 – 2022.7z". These two files compress hundreds of thousands of internal conversations from 2020 till 2022. The analysis in this blog is intended to provide answers to the following questions:

- What is in the data (an overview of the communication)?
- What roles are played by actors in the Conti gang?
- Can we identify the real identity of the Conti actors?
- What IP addresses and URLs (HTTP and HTTPS) are part of Conti's infrastructure?
- How many Conti victims are there and who are they?

Besides answering these questions, we explain how we arrived at those answers. Opposite to other blogs and webpages that performed analysis on the same data, we are one of the few in the context to the data, employing data enrichments and using our vast experience from numerous ransomware incidents.



Jair

# Timeline of events till the leak



**"WARNING"**

The Conti Team is officially announcing a full support of Russian government. If any body will decide to organize a cyberattack or any war activities against Russia, we are going to use our all possible resources to strike back at the critical infrastructures of an enemy.

2/25/2022 62 0 [0.00 B]

**conti leaks** @ContiLeaks Feb 27  
conti jabber leaks [anonfiles.com/...P6K6K5xc/1\\_t...](#)

16 140 295

**conti leaks** @ContiLeaks Feb 28  
Glory for Ukraine!

4 17 154

**conti leaks** @ContiLeaks Feb 28  
fuck russian invaders!

1 7 79

**vx-underground** @vxunderground Mar 1  
February 27th, a Conti member began leaking data from Conti ransomware group, after Conti released a message siding with the Russian government.

Today, February 28th, the Ukrainian affiliate has leaked more data. It is a lot.

Download it here: [share.vx-underground.org/Conti/](https://share.vx-underground.org/Conti/)

10 219 621

# Focus on Jabber Chat data

vx-underground

Go Back

Directory: Conti/

File Name ↓	File Size ↓	Date ↓
Parent directory/	-	-
Conti Chat Logs 2020.7z	2417273	2022-03-01 02:46:14
Conti Documentation Leak.7z	234714	2022-03-01 05:29:38
Conti Internal Software Leak.7z	3911885	2022-03-01 02:57:08
Conti Jabber Chat Logs 2021 - 2022.7z	1160294	2022-03-02 13:10:39
Conti Locker Leak.7z	6852466	2022-03-05 04:29:03
Conti Pony Leak 2016.7z	62014991	2022-03-01 02:51:14
Conti Rocket Chat Leaks.7z	3370574	2022-03-01 02:47:40
Conti Screenshots December 2021.7z	452894	2022-03-01 02:46:06
Conti Source Code Version 3.7z	619761	2022-03-20 09:34:51
Conti Toolkit Leak.7z	94186791	2022-03-01 02:42:15
Conti Trickbot Forum Leak.7z	8542211	2022-03-01 02:50:56
Conti Trickbot Leaks.7z	955850	2022-03-01 06:52:40
Training Material Leak	0	1969-12-31 18:00:00

544 .json files  
169k records  
2020-2022




What communication platform do you use at work?


---



What sort of things you  
tell your colleagues?



NOT our goal!



A word cloud on a black background featuring the text 'loC' and 'TTP' in white. The letters are in a sans-serif font. 'loC' is written with a lowercase 'l' and 'o' and an uppercase 'C'. 'TTP' is in all uppercase. The words are scattered across the image, with some being significantly larger than others, creating a sense of depth and repetition.



Help you to understand (with evidences)

# How mature is the ransomware ecosystem!

We think not everyone understands it.

This data is a unique piece of evidence.

*“If you know the enemy and know yourself,  
you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”*

*[Sun Tzu]*

Another **good** motivation



**REWARD**

OF UP TO

**\$10,000,000.00 USD**

FOR INFORMATION LEADING TO THE LOCATION, ARREST, AND/OR  
CONVICTION OF OWNERS/OPERATORS/AFFILIATES OF THE



**Conti**  
**Ransomware Group**

SUBMIT TIPS VIA TELEPHONE OR WEBPAGE:

**Follow-on contacts to be established through  
WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, or other platform  
of reporting party's choosing**

**1-800-CALL FBI      <https://tips.fbi.gov>**  
**(1-800-225-5324)**






How many are they?

---

465  
*\*distinct users*

But...

# What they do?



Who is the accountant?



bentley

*For salary write to  
**stern**@q3mcco35auwcstmt.onion*



azot

2020-10-01 15:33:52.025624

How many they are? How much they earn? How often they earn?



Mango

*Tomorrow is salary day:*

*main team - 97 447, 52 people (1873,98 p.p)*

*new team - 4000, 3 people, (1333,33 p.p)*

*one has not yet started the reverse team - 23,347; 16 people (1459,18p.p)*

*research team - 12,500; 6 people (2083,33 p.p)*

*team of OSINT intelligence - 9,000; 4 people (2250,00 p.p)*

*total 146 294 \ 2 = 73 147 for salary*

*+ 700 bucks will go to commissions for transfers from wallets /  
withdrawals from exchanges and*

*3-4k are needed for expenses on routers / servers / gaskets  
bc1q5aqs5hr1t3wj5xrnj0craykgsq6h8mse3cftf8*



Stern

2021-06-29 10:11:59.543976

**52+3+16+6+4 = 81 employees**

How many they are? How much they earn? How often they earn?



Mango

*Tomorrow is salary day:  
main team - 97 447; 52 people  
new team - 4000; 3 people,  
one has not yet started the reverse team - 23,347; 16 people  
research team - 12,500; 6 people  
team of OSINT intelligence - 9,000; 4 people  
total 146 294 \ 2 = 73 147 for salary  
+ 700 bucks will go to commissions for transfers from wallets /  
withdrawals from exchanges and  
3-4k are needed for expenses on routers / servers / gaskets*

*bc1q5aqs5hrlt3wj5xrnj0craykgsq6h8mse3cftf8*

**73k+0,7k+4k = ~78k**

2021-06-29 10:11:59.543976



Stern



Can we proof the transaction?

$73k + 0,7k + 4k = \sim 78k$

Blockchain.com

blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/bc1q5ac

BLOCKCHAIR

Search

Received

2.31436446 BTC

Confirmed

Jul 1, 2021, 12:46 PM UTC

Transaction hash: 9352c296624da8df90a532d2895498584d51ff93800aba642ab34456990b45ef

Senders 1

148ijM3EDLdpxzBqFMn2giinCNKyuoB9j4

4.94895590 BTC · 257177.44 USD

Recipients 2

bc1q5aqs5hrlt3wj5xrnj0craykgsq6h8mse3cftf8

2.31436446 BTC · 80993.5 USD

15GENCRdtwRiJET7EkGkhwNNBw4sD7CJ7M

2.63435149 BTC · 92191.766 USD

What happened 15 days later?



Mango

ZP bande here bc1qkmyv5860pe24h9ytadkzggltkjuuk9z9s027df

sum total 85k

99947 the main team is 62 people, (1112,04 p.p)

33847 - reverse team, 23 people (1471,60 p.p)

8500 - new team of coders, 6 people, only 4 salaries received so far (1416,66 p.p)

12500 reverses, 6 people (2083,33 p.p)

10000 OSINT department 4 people (2500,00 p.p)

3000 for expenses (servers pads tests for new people)

164.8k total per month



Stern

2021-07-16 10:28:56.793831

$62+23+6+6+4 = 101$  employees

Can we proof the transaction? again

$$100k + 34k + 8,5k + 12,5k + 10k = 165k / 2 = 82,5 + 3k = \sim 85,5k$$

**BLOCKCHAIR**

**+ Received** **2.71495582 BTC** **Confirmed** **Jul 19, 2021, 11:58 AM UTC**

Transaction hash: [43a893c90e20e53a4d3dcb734e26984c955f573b945560f28fe8cf0c363b759](#)

**Senders 1**

[1KeeHwaBeEJKzb6RJvHwdNVj61r5Sx9XiH](#)  
5.97711279 BTC · 341077.97 USD

**Recipients 2**

[bc1qkmyv5860pe24h9ytadkzgzqltkjuuk9z9s027df](#)  
2.71495582 BTC · 86645.1 USD

[1A6g8p4nhMxsN29xzpuduQQLpHUPShR37G](#)  
3.26214827 BTC · 104108.2 USD

Were those ~100 people the only ones in the payment?



Stern

*Hello. Create a payment*



Van  
Cosmos  
Elon  
Flip  
Ghost  
Globus  
Kaktus  
Bullet  
Price

22 people

2020-07-01 11:08:\*

65

...

# How the answer back to Stern looks like?



Kaktus

Hey!

0.106089

3MwHyMvY6Hs5mETfyv4bLbHZnaphZDngPa



Stern

+ Received

0.106089 BTC

Confirmed

Jul 1, 2020, 11:18 AM UTC

Transaction hash: 0fd3339e8b6dc41140fdf40b759d007987ea4d707945781a79de08af9b75755c

Senders 1	
1Cztn7QUNqfHYQhhbgorafiCoJ8Ho5DCjb	3MwHyMvY6Hs5mETfyv4bLbHZnaphZDngPa
4.61740000 BTC · 34576.016 USD	0.10608900 BTC · 969.60144 USD

+ Received

0.10635781 BTC

Confirmed

Jul 16, 2020, 2:09 PM UTC

Transaction hash: 944f20621537461ffcce0a7dc0a64ff7a5ff5ae3ac260522c1d4721b03815878

Senders 1	
1DrFokf3CZyiLpbUjS2SfNjorEz8fHXAGk	37TbY4gmR2y8zC614ZYyTrNJUzqNAX749B
4.89070178 BTC · 45224.61 USD	0.10635781 BTC · 978.4153 USD

2020-07-01 11:10:54.710649

+ Received

0.08398289 BTC

Confirmed

Aug 4, 2020, 9:11 AM UTC

Transaction hash: da3656257c842daf3bd5a7abf663448e14640ce0b16f7b9d92a98a34387c8f85

Senders 1	
1K2aDC5QkzJ8QafUv2w36GJFbxKoYHD1T4	35mqXfMwyNCGFPSzRTmcYCPWiZ73x6H5kG
5.20000000 BTC · 48408.41 USD	0.08398289 BTC · 942.7953 USD



# How the HR talks? What are the conditions to negotiators?



Viper

Hello, I want to offer you a job in our team that deals with ..... in self-isolation mode, our team offers you a current vacancy for a completely remote job for the position of .....

**Responsibilities :** Receiving calls and communicating with clients

**Required skills:** - Good knowledge of spoken English,  
- Age from 18 to 25

**Conditions:** - We offer you a timely salary in the amount of 450–500 (increase in salary by 100 - 200– 300, depending on positions of the Supervisor)

- Work is completely REMOTE, Work schedule 18:00 - 2:00 Moscow time. 5/2. Sat and Sun weekend.

- Paid vacation

- WITHOUT registration according to the TC

If you are interested in the offer, send your resume by replying to this email.

8:00 – 16:00 Los Angeles

12:00 – 20:00 São Paulo

17:00 – 01:00 Amsterdam



Derek

2020-08-31 12:20:30.838021

# How recruiter works?



Derek

Hello, I want to offer you a job in our team that is engaged in the maintenance of **an online store abroad.** in self-isolation mode, our team offers you a current vacancy for a fully remote job for the position of **a call center operator.**

Responsibilities: Taking calls and communicating with clients

Required skills: - Good knowledge of spoken English (level B2-C1)

- Age from 18 to 25

Conditions: -We offer you timely wages in the amount of 450-500 (Increase in salary by 100 - 200 - 300, depending on the success in the work of the call center)

- Work is completely REMOTE, Work schedule 18:00 - 2:00 Moscow time. 5/2. Sat and Sun weekend. - Paid vacation

- WITHOUT registration according to the Labor Code

If you are interested in the offer, send your resume by replying to this letter.



Salamandra

2020-10-05 09:47:08.925161

How does it sound a call center / negotiator?



Melissa



“Victim”

“Data recovery?!”

## How many offices they have?



Target

[...] 1) these are **operators** current expenses + expansion = **total 2 offices with large teams** - one main and one new for training

2) **hacker offices (3 pcs)** - interviews, equipment, rent, interviews, deposits, servers inside, equipment, hiring and assistance in hiring and a whole lot more, and in a week another salary will be added for those who will work there (20+ hackers)

3) **an office** with **programmers** and equipment for everything for them + a good team leader has already been hired and he is the team to collect there will be a pro, this is an important devops for a pro, a pro is happy with everything and he really needs it + we hire third-party specialists with a pro to speed up various processes [...]



Stern

2020-08-27 01:21:03.188115

$$2+3+1 = 6 \text{ Offices}$$

- 
- What is the connection to RU gov?
  - Do Conti act in RU gov's interests?
  - What is the involvement with other ransomware groups?
  - How do they cash out the money? How the money laundering is done?



What is the connection to RU gov?

---



target: Liteyny av. 4 is in charge the guys are asking how late we are going to be, should they order food or not, omar is not responding

...

professor: did you see stern today? any clue whether he will be or not?



What is the connection to RU gov?

---



angelo: may be S at the **ministers' reception**

hammer: or may be he is himself a minister

...

angelo: my personal opinion is that **he is close to FSB or other structures**



## What is the connection to RU gov?

---



elroy: Yes, smells bad indeed

angelo: I thought **S is almighty** as God

...

elroy: If he was not almighty, **we all would have ended up as Revil**

elroy: It is written there in the article, the only big organization in Russia

angelo: yes, I already figured that **S is in service of Pu**

angelo: I understand that everything is on a large scale ))

angelo: what orders we do and who sometimes our clients are



## What is the connection to RU gov?

---



target: [https://twitter.com/search?q=\[REDACTED\]&src=typeahead\\_click&f=live](https://twitter.com/search?q=[REDACTED]&src=typeahead_click&f=live)

...

troy: and all their backups were destroyed there

target: ok awesome

...

target: you will also get a reward/prize

...

target: in the Kremlin



## What is the connection to RU gov?

---



...

elroy: Or **are you from FSB?**

basil: I am not going to tell you where I am from (you understand that) **But I have very serious intelligence that on the border is not a training**





# Do Conti act in RU gov's interests?



professor: what do we need from [REDACTED] ?  
professor: is it **an office request, from one of the two**?  
...  
professor: what are we looking?  
stern: **chat**  
professor: **are they paying** or are we playing pioneers?  
stern: **contracts**  
professor: =)  
stern: **accounting**  
stern: yes fuck the money  
stern: we will play )  
professor: yes no probs  
professor: will wear a red tie then  
...  
professor: **Cozy Bears** already started down the list there



## Do Conti act in RU gov's interests?



troy: RU ru. [REDACTED].com

troy: not this one

troy: removing it

target: such idiots

...

target: is it an outsourcer from RU

...

target: that is a fucking enormous corporation

troy: what if I did not notice that?

troy: then would have been fucked

target: bitch and what a chance this freak is from RU internet space

target: yes good job!

target: listen, who would have known



## Do Conti act in RU gov's interests?



target: when I saw an OOO in the report my heart stop beating

Thanks god some pranker of yours translated LLC as OOO

...

troy: there is purely China

troy: 3 networks

target: big ones

target: I think

target: around 4.5 bln

...

target: do we have a stop on China?

troy: yes

...

target: China +



## Do Conti act in RU gov's interests?

---



professor: did you see how they fucked it up?

professor: regarding the affiliation?

professor: I fucking almost exploded

professor: they put a part of Trickbot's code which is responsible for the check on CIS

professor: into the build of Diavol

professor: Although I specifically asked do not touch the task with determining the geolocation at all

professor: and immediately the entire project is on the news as fully affiliated



## What is the involvement with other ransomware groups?



target: As for Ryuk - as of next week we will kick off and for 1-2 weeks my people from the office will work together with his people...

target: to sum up the next week:

- Ryuk and our people will learn how to interact with each other: will start slowly and little by little

...

from 10 to 20 September

- will be increasing Ryuk
- will give to prof's online team and less to do for the office

from 20 to 30 September

- Ryuk's people and my senior managers are interacting on their own
- slowly will start loading the office with prof's work

target: in October if everything works out as per prof's plan

- will load Ryuk
- will load our office hackers



## Conti-Ryuk

# What is the involvement with other ransomware groups?



target: troy also locked 2 very big firms

target: from 1 bln

target: and 3 bln

target: prof **said they paid us 1.5 mln**

target: fx1-16 | usa | server: 1200/1200 | computer: 3000/1000+ | memory: 380+tb | revenue: 3bill | Employees: 12000 | site: **<https://www.steelcase.com>**

...

target: fx3-16 | IP: 192.168.54.6 | USA, IT, ESP | server: 702/866 | computer: 1000+/2300 | memory: 243TB revenue: 1B | Employees: 7,000 | site: [REDACTED]

target: FX1-10 | usaserver:5000/3000+ | comps 50000/1000+ | revenue: 9 bill employees:50000 | website: **[www.soprasteria.com](http://www.soprasteria.com)** | **[www.soprabanking.com](http://www.soprabanking.com)**

...

target: fx2-12 | IP: 10.1.10.250 | USA | server: 5/5 | computer: 9/9 memory: 1 TB | revenue: 6b | Employees: 19,800 website: **[www.\[REDACTED\].com](http://www.[REDACTED].com)**



## What is the involvement with other ransomware groups?



stern: we will give them money, and let Carbon lay there, maybe it will be as of use later

mango: **why did not we need Carbon at the end?**

mango: nobody can work with it?";

mango: let's sell it then, there is a demand for it

stern: **it was Ryuk who needed it**

stern: they wanted to research it

stern: they wanted it for a long time

stern: and later they rejected it



## What is the involvement with other ransomware groups?



stern: [18:11:13] <professor> did the first one with **maze**, just a small random network - replied back within a day

...

stern: make that the **locker works better than maze**

reshaev: Will check now, check the reviews

reshaev: It is possible to send me the build?

reshaev: With the decryptor

stern: no decryptor at the moment

stern: for the build ask Prof

...

stern: We need to make it **not worse than maze**

stern: and even better



**"...Maze will take 25-30%..."**



# What is the involvement with other ransomware groups?



stern: and gain a foothold there  
revers: **all the others are there**  
revers: and indeed I already set a foothold there  
stern: and **contracts**  
stern: for the start  
revers: Target already has AD users from every domain  
revers: **name position**  
revers: **and mail address**  
revers: which are in the trusts  
revers: and we have already from the hq  
revers: in the weekend I am gonna have a look into the data  
revers: [REDACTED] domain is already taken  
revers: [REDACTED] we took it too  
revers: [REDACTED] AD is taken by us  
revers: also there in the network 1  
revers: **Maze has negotiations there**



# What is the involvement with other ransomware groups?



netwalker: Arma asked **300k**

netwalker: You said that you will give us **some bonus after the first lock!** We really need it bro.

...

stern: a guy gave some **citrix'es**, hors passed them to you, and you gave it to another person from whom they actually originated from) a kind of a circle )

netwalker: What ? I will find out who gets a slap on the forehead. Although everyone anyway knows each other.

...

netwalker: We figured things out. Apologized to each other.

My bad, **all I want is to show you more results because we are sitting here without any targets.**

And while everyone is busy with loading/analysing and exfiltrating, we asked the guy just to check, and he apparently passed it further. Funny. But the truth is nobody wanted to fool anyone that is the fact. **It is not going to happen again ever.**



## Conti-Netwalker

## What is the involvement with other ransomware groups?



netwalker: [REDACTED] DEV1 (\\PGMDC) [REDACTED]  
900k gave it to hors for further work I have all [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] 700k busy with. Don't forget please to pay to  
spamilka. He was so joyful.

netwalker: Bro ping.

netwalker: [21:44:35] <netwalker> )>  
16evvEiZ6HKkV9WAbysJfJG1Qa7DzJGUFp wallet. Please don't  
forget to send the motivation to the guy, he did his best. and we  
need to give him some incentive. We did not even pay him the  
whole base bro.

stern: sent 1BTC



## What is the involvement with other ransomware groups?



mango: We did not understand each other with **lockbit**... You wrote to give him networks for work, he is writing that he actually **needs troy**) And on what terms also not clear, I gave him your contact here, he said he will reach out to you himself

...

mango: On what terms in case we need to give him troy?

mango: I wrote him that usually we take a part of the botnet, but what part I do not know))

stern: say 20 percent

stern: let's try that

mango: 20% bots with the networks are ours

mango: ok

stern: **20 percent of revenue not the bots**



## How do they cash out the money? How the money laundering is done?



fire: I transfer **BTC into Monero**

fire: via the exchanger

fire: with **one time email address**

fire: **then to another Monero** wallet, **then either to USDT on ledger or to the card**

fire: but often I **exchange USDT to cash**

fire: less questions from the authorities to ask

snow: ok got it, but what is the USDT

fire: USDT - it is a cryptocurrency of Ethereum I store in it as the rate is always equals to 1 dollar

fire: stability compared to BTC



**BTC > Monero > Monero > USDT/Ledger/Cash/Card**

## How do they cash out the money? How the money laundering is done?



tramp: Take the **money through a mixer**

tramp: And **then withdraw**

tramp: It will be accurate in general

...

tramp: they will be searching only on money laundering

tramp: the most important is that the mixer won't fuck it up, mixer also adds weird shit

tramp:

<http://cryptmix4m5iunofa25mpmiihdb56oaqg57tvrebqatc6otn3w65qhlid.onion/>



# How do they cash out the money? How the money laundering is done?



bio: regarding BTC - Monero - Monero - cash how do you convert from BTC to Monero? or where?

fire: from **a dark/dirty PC via bestchange(.ru)**

bio: and where do you then do withdrawing from Monero and into what, you own card?

fire: Monero-Monero

fire: and then into cash

fire: I have a **connection in the exchanger in the neighbouring city**

fire: **guys there take Monero and then bring back a bag of cash**

fire: and **part of that cash into the card**

bio: got it, now I am thinking what shall I do...

fire: **if it is a large city, check out the exchangers in the city**

fire: **most of them exchange monero into cash**


bio: OK will look for those. thx.



# What happen when a ransomware group shuts down?

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Rebrand and/or disperse into other  
ransomware/partnership/affiliate programs



TTPs/tradecraft/knowledge gained remain



# On the leaked files from Conti ransomware group

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