




NORTHWAVE
CYBER SECURITY


Revisiting a ⁺⁺⁺ Decade of DDoS Attacks

and telling the anti-ddos-coalition
history from my 5 turning points.



My 1st
Turning
Point!!

I've arrived here!



“Booter”



2013 (Mar.)



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The screenshot shows a Dutch court website. At the top left is the logo 'de Rechtspraak' with a scales of justice icon. The top navigation bar includes links for Home, Uw situatie, Uitspraken en nieuws (highlighted in blue), Registers, Organisatie en contact, Voor advocaten en juristen, and Inloggen. Below the navigation is a breadcrumb trail: Home > Uitspraken en nieuws. The main title 'Uitspraken' is displayed. A dark banner with yellow text 'zertijke R' and 'sterlijk M' is visible behind the content. A purple button at the top left says '< Nieuwe zoekopdracht'. Below it, a red box contains the ECLI code 'ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2013:9954'. To the right is a button 'Uitspraak delen ▾'. A table provides details of the judgment:

Instantie	Rechtbank Zeeland-West-Brabant
Datum uitspraak	20-12-2013
Datum publicatie	20-12-2013
Zaaknummer	C/02/273719 / KG ZA 13-759
Rechtsgebieden	Civiel recht
Bijzondere kenmerken	Kort geding
Inhoudsindicatie	"Minderjarige MBO'er geschorst in afwachting van definitieve verwijdering in verband met DDos-aanval op het netwerk van de school".
Vindplaatsen	Rechtspraak.nl Verrijkte uitspraak

"Underage MBO student suspended pending final removal in connection with DDos attack on the school's network".

2013





‘Detection’ or ‘Mitigation’

How to be innovative?
Who is my ideal target audience?
How to get data?

27/11/2024

2014(Jun.)



Characterizing and Mitigating The DDoS-as-a-Service Phenomenon

Jair Santana and Anna Sperotto
Design and Analysis of Communication Systems (DACS)
University of Twente
Enschede, The Netherlands
{j.j.santanna,a.sperotto}@utwente.nl

Abstract. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are an increasing threat on the Internet. Until a few years ago, these types of attacks were only launched by people with advanced knowledge of computer networks. However, nowadays the ability to launch attacks have been offered as a service to everyone, even to those without any advanced knowledge. *Booters* are online tools that offer *DDoS-as-a-Service*. Some of them advertise, for less than US \$ 5, up to 25 Gbps of DDoS traffic, which is more than enough to make most hosts and services on the Internet unavailable. Booters are increasing in popularity and they have shown the success of attacks against third party services, such as government websites; however, there are few mitigation proposals. In addition, existing literature in this area provides only a partial understanding of the threat, for example by analyzing only a few aspects of one specific Booter. In this paper, we propose mitigation solutions against DDoS-as-a-Service that will be achieved after an extensive characterization of Booters. Early results show 59 different Booters, which some of them do not deliver what is offered. This research is still in its initial phase and will contribute to a Ph.D. thesis after four years.

1 Introduction

On March 2013, a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack almost broke the Internet [1]. The attacker was able to control up to 300 gigabits per second (Gbps) of network traffic and exhaust the communication resources of several hosts and networks, by misusing several services on Internet. Historically, DDoS attacks can be launched only by using advanced technical skills of the attackers, such as computer programming and specific knowledge of computer networks. These skills allow attackers to control several hosts and services with vulnerabilities on the Internet and perform attacks.

However, nowadays, a phenomenon is becoming popular: DDoS attacks are offered as a service (i.e., *DDoS-as-a-Service*), allowing everyone, even those without any kind of advanced knowledge, to launch attacks. Referred to on the Internet as *Booters*, these online tools offer several types of DDoS attacks, with different firepower (network throughput), often by charging low prices, such as

```
graph LR; Customer((Customer)) -- "RQA.1" --> Booter[Booter]; Customer -- "RQB.1" --> Booter; Booter -- "RQA.2" --> Target[Target]; Booter -- "RQB.2" --> Target;
```

3 Early Results and Final Considerations

We have developed a crawler that uses Google's Custom Search [17] to find information related to the DDoS-as-a-Service phenomenon, such as blogs, videos, reports, and websites. We have used the following keywords: 'booter', 'ddoser', 'stresser', 'ddos-as-a-service', and 'ddos-for-hire'. Through our crawler and manual classifications, we found 59 Booters since October 2013. Among them, we have identified 34 Booters that are continuously reachable, while the other 25 appeared to be at times offline during the measurement period. The reachable Booters offer the most common DDoS attacks observed nowadays [18], which include: SYN floods, DNS amplification attacks, and attacks based on HTTP GET. In addition, experiments, performed against a dummy target at the University of Twente, seem to indicate that Booters do not always deliver what they advertise. For example, Rebel-security [19] offers 3 Gbps of attack traffic while we measured only 1 Gbps. Even worse, some Booters, such as Olympus Stresser [20] and Vdoss [21], charge money to deliver just a handful of ICMP packets, while was ordered amplification attacks based on UDP.


This research is still in its initial phase and the main goal of this work – as described previously – must be achieved within a period of four years, as the core of a Ph.D. research program.

2013



Northwave - All rights reserved - www.northwave-cybersecurity.com

2017



https://bit.ly/jjsantanna_thesis

TLP:AMBER+STRICT

What about AI/LLM??




Figure 1.1: Evolution of Internet-based attacks by Lipson [58].





Figure 1.2: Historical evolution of DDoS attacks by Radware [75].

Quiz:



Dec.2014: LizardSquad
(Sony+Microsoft)

Oct.2016: Mirai botnet (Dyn)

Jun.2020: (AWS)







Figure 1.3: Increase of DDoS attacks.



2015

Meeting (2-10)

PV

○ Pim van Stam <pim@nbip.nl>

Thursday, 24 September 2015 at 16:06

To: ☒ Cardoso de Santanna, J.J. (EWI)

Cc: Gerald Schaapman (NBIP) ^

Hi Jair,

We have a meeting planned for Oct 2nd.

My colleague Gerald (doing the project management) wants to join our meeting and certainly if your mentor/professor is/are coming too.

He is, however, not able to join at Oct 2nd.

Is it possible to shift to Tuesday Oct 6th in the afternoon?

--

With kind regards,

[Pim van Stam](mailto:pim@nbip.nl)

Stichting NBIP

pim@nbip.nl

PO Box 628

6710 BP Ede NL

Tel: [+31 318 489350](tel:+31318489350)

Fax: [+31 318 489351](tel:+31318489351)

WWW: <http://www.nbip.nl/>



Nationale Beheersorganisatie Internet Providers

My 2nd
Turning
Point!!



2015

The screenshot shows a news article from NOS Nieuws dated Sunday, November 29, 2015, at 13:08. The headline reads "Zwaarste DDoS-aanval op NPO ooit". The text discusses the severity of the attack, mentioning it was the most severe ever. It quotes the NPO stating they were prepared for such situations but had never seen anything like it. The NPO also mentioned they have extra measures in place and learned from the attack. The article also notes that the NOS website and app were temporarily unreachable.

Zwaarste DDoS-aanval op NPO ooit

De DDoS-aanval op websites van de NPO was de zwaarste aanval tot nu toe. "We zijn gewend aan grote groepen gebruikers bij groot nieuws, maar dit aantal overtrof alles", laat de publieke omroep in een reactie weten. "En allemaal op hetzelfde moment."

De NPO heeft voor dit soort situaties allerlei maatregelen voorbereid, maar erkent dat het toch fout ging. Daarom bezint de NPO zich op extra maatregelen. "In die zin leren we ook weer van deze aanval."

De NPO wijst erop dat de publieke omroep niet alleen te bereiken is via websites en apps. "De NPO heeft meerdere kanalen. Tv, radio en Twitter deden het nog gewoon."


Onbereikbaar

De site en app van de NOS waren gisteravond [een tijdlang onbereikbaar](#). Ook de sites van andere landelijke en regionale omroepen waren slecht bereikbaar.

Bij een DDoS-aanval wordt een computersysteem bestookt met extreem veel bezoeken. Wie achter de aanval zit, is onbekend.



2015



NOS Nieuws • Dinsdag 8 december 2015, 18:13

Scholen hebben dagelijks last van DDoS-aanvallen


Volgens Aiko Pras, docent aan de Universiteit van Twente, is het bestellen van een DDoS-aanval gemakkelijker dan het online boeken

Deze video komt voor in

DDoS-aanvallen treffen scholen: 'We haalden de boeken weer uit de kast'

<https://nos.nl/video/2073903-scholen-hebben-dagelijks-last-van-ddos-aanvallen>





The image shows a screenshot of a Europol news article. At the top, there's a blue header bar with the Europol logo and several navigation links: ABOUT EUROPOL, OPERATIONS, SERVICES & INNOVATION, CRIME AREAS, PARTNERS & COLLABORATION, CAREERS & PROCUREMENT, MEDIA & PRESS (in orange), PUBLICATIONS & EVENTS, and three icons for SEARCH, CONTACT, and LANGUAGE. Below the header, the main content area has a dark blue background. At the top left is a blue arrow pointing left, and at the top right is a blue arrow pointing right. In the center, the title 'Joint international operation targets young users of DDoS cyber-attack tools' is displayed in large white font. Above the title, 'Home / Media & Press' is written in smaller white font, along with a small circular icon. Below the title, 'The Hague, the Netherlands' is written in white. To the right of the title, a yellow circular badge contains the date '12 DEC 2016'. At the bottom left, there's a dark blue circle containing the year '2016'. The main text of the article starts with 'Read more about it on our [dedicated webpage](#). Download the research [Youth Pathways into Cybercrime](#).  From 5 to 9 December 2016, Europol and law enforcement authorities from Australia, Belgium, France, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States carried out a coordinated action targeting users of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) cyber-attack tools, leading to 34 arrests and 101 suspects interviewed and cautioned.'

'Operation Tarpit'



2017

Van: j.j.santanna@utwente.nl [mailto:j.j.santanna@utwente.nl]

Verzonden: donderdag 19 januari 2017 10:07

Aan: r.g.j.ruiter@nctv.minvenj.nl; Remco Ruiter

Onderwerp: Project proposal, help each other, and a cup of coffee?

Dear Remco,

We met in the D3 workshop at SURFnet in the end of 2016. I am the researcher that gave an enthusiastic presentation about Booters and DDoS attacks. Yesterday, after write a project proposal to SIDN fonds (attached) I thought about you. Would you have time to drink a cup of coffee and talk about the future of DDoS and how we can help each other? Just let me know when and where and I will be there.

Coffee and chat about the future of DDoS (Jair/Floor/Remco)

RR

○ Remco Ruiter <r.ruiter@betaalvereniging.nl>

Required: ○ Cardoso de Santanna, J.J. (EWI); A. F. Jansen; + 2 more

Friday, 17 February 2017 at 14:20

□ Wednesday, 22 February 2017 at 10:00 – 11:30. Wednesday, 22 February 2017 at 10:00 – 11:30
The Hague, Min. Safety and Justice (see signature), (Room N22-03 Terschelling) The Hague

⌚ This event occurs in the past.



My 4rd
Turning
Point!!



2017 (Jun.)

SIDNfonds

Projecten Over het fonds Nieuws Contact Aanvragen EN Q ≡

DDoSDB - Collecting, Transforming, Applying, and Disseminating DDoS Attack Knowledge

Universiteit Twente <https://www.utwente.nl/> Jair Santanna, Ramin Yazdani 2017

Wetenschappelijk onderzoek

Postdoc onderzoek om beschikbare kennis over DDoS aanvallen bijeen te brengen in een publieke database.



2017 (Oct.)



Public Service Announcement
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 17, 2017

Alert Number
I-101717b-PSA

Questions regarding this PSA should be directed to your local **FBI Field Office**.

Local Field Office Locations:
www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field

BOOTER AND STRESSER SERVICES INCREASE THE SCALE AND FREQUENCY OF DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS

Criminal actors offer distributed denial of service (DDoS)-for-hire services in criminal forums and marketplaces. These DDoS-for-hire services, also known as booters or stressers, are leveraged by malicious cyber actors, pranksters, and/or hacktivists to conduct largescale cyber attacks designed to prevent access to U.S. company and government Web sites. The FBI investigates these services as a crime if they are used against a Web site without the owner's permission (such as for a legitimate stress test).

DDoS attacks are costly to victims and render targeted Web sites slow or inaccessible. These attacks prevent people from accessing online accounts, disrupt business activities, and induce significant remediation costs on victim companies. They also can cause businesses impacted by DDoS attacks to lose customers.

For example, in October 2016, one of the largest DDoS attacks to date targeted a domain name service (DNS) provider and impacted more than 80 Web sites primarily in the United States and Europe, causing them to become inaccessible to the public. The attack used a botnet and was attributed to infected Internet of Things (IoT) devices like routers, digital video recorders, and Webcams/security cameras to execute the DDoS attack¹. Open source reports estimate the DNS provider lost approximately eight percent of its customers following the attack.

WHAT ARE BOOTER AND STRESSER SERVICES?

Booter and stresser services are a form of DDoS-for-hire--- advertised in forum communications and available on Dark Web marketplaces--- offering malicious actors the ability to anonymously attack any Internet-connected target. These services are obtained through a monetary transaction, usually in the form of online payment services and virtual currency. Criminal actors running botnet and stresser services sell access to DDoS botnets, a network of malware-infected computers exploited to make a victim server or network resource unavailable by overloading the device with massive amounts of fake or illegitimate traffic.

These services can be used legitimately to test the resilience of a network; however, criminal actors use this capability to take down Web sites. Established botnet and stresser services offer a convenient means for malicious actors to conduct DDoS attacks by allowing such actors to pay for an existing network of infected devices, rather than creating their own. Botnet and stresser services may also obscure attribution of DDoS activity.



● 2017 (Nov.)





December

THIS WEBSITE HAS BEEN SEIZED

This domain has been seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to a seizure warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Central District of California under the authority of 18 U.S.C. §1030(i)(1)(A) as part of coordinated law enforcement action taken against illegal DDoS-for-hire services.

This action has been taken in coordination with the United States Attorney's Office of the District of Alaska, the Department of Justice Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, and



For additional information, see the FBI Public Service Announcement I-101717b-PSA,
<https://www.ic3.gov/media/2017/171017-2.aspx>

April

THIS SITE HAS BEEN SEIZED

The domain name Webstresser.org has been seized by the United States Department of Defense, Defense Criminal Investigative Service, Cyber Field Office in accordance with a warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. This domain name has been seized in conjunction with Operation Power OFF

Operation Power OFF is a coordinated effort by law enforcement agencies from The Netherlands, United Kingdom, Serbia, Croatia, Spain, Italy, Germany, Australia, Hong Kong, Canada and the United States of America, in cooperation with Europol.

The operation is aimed at the takedown of the illegal DDoS-for-hire-service Webstresser.org.



2018

webstresser.org

anonsecurityteam.com
booter.ninja
bullstresser.net
critical-boot.com
defcon.pro
defianceprotocol.com

downthem.org
layer7-stresser.xyz
netstress.org
quantumstress.net
ragebooter.net
ragebooter.com

str3ssed.me
torsecurityteam.org
vbooter.org
request.rip



2018

“The embryo”



“NoMoreDDoS”
“Anti-DDos Coalition”
“DDoS Clearing House”

Technically:
DDoS Fingerprints
+
DDoSDB
+
Converters
+
Sharing!

2023

The image shows a screenshot of the CONCORDIA website. At the top, there is a dark blue header bar with the CONCORDIA logo on the left, which includes the text "Cyber security cOMPeteNCE fOr Research anD Innovation". To the right of the logo is a navigation menu with links: Home ▾, Downloads ▾, Workshops ▾, Events ▾, Publicity, News, Blog, and Assets ▾. Below the header is a large banner with a blue digital background featuring binary code and a circuit board pattern. Overlaid on this background is the text "DDoS Clearing House" in large white letters. At the bottom left of the banner is a white button with the text "#4 PILOTS" in black.



<https://www.concordia-h2020.eu/delivers/ddosclearinghouse/>



2019

DDoS Hide & Seek: On the Effectiveness of a Booster Services Takedown

Daniel Kopp
DE-CIX

Jair Santanna
University of Twente

Matthias Wichtlhuber
DE-CIX

Oliver Hohlfeld
Brandenburg University of
Technology

Ingmar Poese
BENOCS

Christoph Dietzel
DE-CIX / MPI for Informatics

2019

RE: Can we meet earlier?



 ewoud.smit@kpn.com <[ewoud.smit@kpn...](mailto:ewoud.smit@kpn.com)>

Friday, 22 March 2019 at 10:24

To:  Cardoso de Santanna, J.J. (EWI)

No problem, I just had to check if the room I booked was available. See you around 1230.

Ewoud

From: j.j.santanna@utwente.nl <j.j.santanna@utwente.nl>

Sent: vrijdag 22 maart 2019 10:20

To: Smit, Ewoud <ewoud.smit@kpn.com>

Subject: Can we meet earlier?

Hi Ewoud,

My first meeting ended before I expected. I could arrive in Hilversum around 12:30. Would you mind to see me earlier than at 14:00 (as in our appointment)?

See you later,

Jair

--

(José) Jair (Cardoso de) Santanna

Assistant Professor at University of Twente

(53)4892505



2019

"The baby" (2nd composition)



2019

"The baby" (2nd composition)



2020



My 5th
Turning
Point!!

1st kid
Wife with depression
COVID19



2020

DDOS-dag



Huisstede, Henrique van (H.J.) <henrique.van....>

Monday, 27 January 2020 at 08:48

To: 'jairsantanna@gmail.com' ^

Goedemorgen Jair,

Wij, het cybercrimeteam **van** Politie Midden Nederland, hebben DDOS als thema gadopteerd. Dat betekent dat wij nauw samen gaan werken met Rien Jansen en THTC.

Ik zie dat **jij** waardevol werk hebt verzet op het gebied **van** DDOS. Het lijkt mij heel zinvol een keer af te spreken. Sta **jij** daarvoor open?

Met vriendelijke groet,

Henrique van Huisstede
Operationeel Specialist B

Politie | Midden Nederland | Team Digitale Opsporing | Cybercrimeteam
Bezoek: Kroonstraat 25, 3511 RC Utrecht
Post: Postbus 8300, 3503 RH Utrecht
Tel: 0623375504

Werkdagen: Maandag, dinsdag, donderdag, vrijdag



2022



48: RoyalStresser.com, Astrostress.com, Booter.sx, Ipstressor.com, TrueSecurityServices.io



2023

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Infosecurity Magazine Home » News » [Operation Power Off: 13 More Booter Sites Seized](#)

NEWS 9 MAY 2023

Operation Power Off: 13 More Booter Sites Seized



Phil Muncaster

UK / EMEA News Reporter, Infosecurity Magazine

Email Phil Follow @philmuncaster



A long-running law enforcement operation continued this week after US authorities announced the seizure of 13 internet domains linked to DDoS-for-hire services.

The Department of Justice (DoJ) yesterday described the action as a "third wave" of disruption, aimed at so-called "booter" services that are designed to make the launching of DDoS attacks

relatively easy for any budding cyber-criminal.

[Read more on DDoS-for-hire: Booter Boss Banged Up for 13 Months.](#)

However, 10 of the 13 domains taken down by law enforcement were linked to previous ones [already seized](#) in a December 2022 sweep that took down 48 booter services. For example, "cyberstress.org" appeared to be the same service as that domain "cyberstress.us," which was seized in December.

You may also like

NEWS 14 MAY 2013

[DDoS-for-hire services turn to mainstream advertising](#)

NEWS 31 OCT 2022

[CISA, FBI, MS-ISAC Publish Guidelines For Federal Agencies on DDoS Attacks](#)

NEWS 23 JUL 2024

[Prolific DDoS Marketplace Shut Down by UK Law Enforcement](#)

NEWS 15 DEC 2022

[Feds Hit DDoS-for-Hire Services with 48 Domain Seizures](#)

RoyalStresser.com; SecurityTeam.io; AstroStress.com; and Booter.sx



3 Attacks

2022

<https://stop-russian-desinformation.near.page/>

Russia MUST BE STOPPED! Help Ukraine WIN!

English version

The "official" news in the Russian Federation is mostly fake and we believe it is better to shut them down and let people switch to truthful news.

Please, just open this page and let it be open on your devices. It will flood the Russian propaganda websites and pose a huge load on their infrastructure.

Your browser will be slow. It's ok, don't worry and keep it run.

A small contribution from each of us will save Ukraine 🙏

URL	Number of Requests	Number of Errors
https://lenta.ru/	1169	25
https://ria.ru/	180	0
https://ria.ru/lenta/	152	0
https://www.rbc.ru/	166	0
https://www.rt.com/	153	0
http://kremlin.ru/	159	159
http://en.kremlin.ru/	148	148
https://smotrim.ru/	172	0
https://tass.ru/	147	0
https://tvzvezda.ru/	123	74
https://vsoloviev.ru/	168	168
https://www.ltv.ru/	137	0
https://www.vesti.ru/	147	0
https://online.sberbank.ru/	154	0
https://sberbank.ru/	139	133
https://zakupki.gov.ru/	135	0
https://www.gosuslugi.ru/	156	141
https://er.ru/	173	0
https://www.rzd.ru/	135	0
https://rzdlog.ru/	161	152

https://github.com/jjsantanna/ddos_ukraine_russia

(D)DoS operations related to Russia and Ukraine 2022

The goal of this script is to automatically analyse (D)DoS attacks that are happening while Russia invades Ukraine in 2022.

- <https://stop-russian-desinformation.near.page/>

```
In [3]: import pandas as pd
```

=====
=====
Analysing: https://stop-russian-desinformation.near.page/

Todo:

- About
- DNS resolve (domain to IP)
- IP to ASN/location (IP to ASN)
- Whois (Creation)
- Alexa rank
- Fetch page frequently (every 1h?)
- Analyse the index.html (try to get the code of the attack AND a list of the targets)
- Analyse the .pcap
- Does the IP address of targets change?
- Can we check the status of the pages (up or down)? Evaluate how effective is this #ops

About

<https://cton-nicician-desinformation.near.page/>



2023

The screenshot shows a Google Cloud blog post titled "Google mitigated the largest DDoS attack to date, peaking above 398 million rps". The post is dated October 10, 2023, and features two authors: Emil Kiner (Senior Product Manager, Cloud Armor) and Tim April (Security Reliability Engineer). The text discusses the attack's use of HTTP/2 Rapid Reset and stream multiplexing. A sidebar on the left offers monthly updates from the Cloud CISO and information about Phil Venables.

Google mitigated the largest DDoS attack to date, peaking above 398 million rps

October 10, 2023

Emil Kiner
Senior Product Manager, Cloud Armor

Tim April
Security Reliability Engineer

The attack used a novel technique, HTTP/2 Rapid Reset, based on stream multiplexing

Hear monthly from our Cloud CISO in your inbox

Over the last few years, Google's DDoS Response Team [has observed](#) the trend that distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are increasing exponentially in size. Last year, we blocked the [largest DDoS attack](#) recorded at the time. This August, we stopped an even larger DDoS attack — 7½ times larger — that also used new techniques to try to disrupt websites and Internet services.

This new series of DDoS attacks reached a peak of 398 million requests per second (rps), and relied on a novel HTTP/2 “Rapid Reset” technique based on stream multiplexing

“Largest-recorded DDoS attack peaked at 46 million rps.”

“Zero-day”

CVE-2023-44487 with a CVSS score of 7.5



2024

External website breach

CERT-UT (LISA) <CERT@utwente.nl>

To: CERT-UT (LISA)

Thursday, 10 October 2024 at 11:21

Dear colleague,

The university received information about a recent security breach affecting the Internet Archive website ([archive.org](#)). Among other things, username and password data was leaked.

You're receiving this email because an account that was linked to your university e-mail address was present in the leaked data.

We would like to advise you to change the password for your Internet Archive account. In case you used the old password for other accounts you should change those as well, especially if this applies to your university account.

Kind regards,

Leon Haverkotte | CERT-UT | University of Twente | Library, ICT Services & **Archive (LISA)** | Campus building Spiegel, room 226 | T: [+31 \(0\)53 - 489 3016](tel:+310534893016) | l.m.c.haverkotte@utwente.nl | www.utwente.nl/lisa

j.j.santanna@utwente.nl

pwned?

Oh no — pwned!

Pwned in 3 data breaches and found no pastes (subscribe to search sensitive breaches)

[Donate](#)

Breaches you were pwned in

A "breach" is an incident where data has been unintentionally exposed to the public.

APOLLO **Apollo:** In July 2018, the sales engagement startup Apollo left a database containing billions of data points publicly exposed without a password. The data was discovered by security researcher Vinny Troia who subsequently sent a subset of the data containing 126 million unique email addresses to Have I Been Pwned. The data left exposed by Apollo was used in their "revenue acceleration platform" and included personal information such as names and email addresses as well as professional information including places of employment, the roles people hold and where they're located. Apollo stressed that the exposed data did not include sensitive information such as passwords, social security numbers or financial data. The Apollo website has a contact form for those looking to get in touch with the organisation.

Compromised data: Email addresses, Employers, Geographic locations, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Salutations, Social media profiles

Ticketcounter **Ticketcounter:** In August 2020, the Dutch ticketing service Ticketcounter inadvertently published a database backup to a publicly accessible location where it was then found and downloaded in February 2021. The data contained 1.9M unique email addresses which were offered for sale on a hacking forum and in some cases included names, physical and IP addresses, genders, dates of birth, payment histories and bank account numbers. Ticketcounter was later held to ransom with the threat of the breached being released publicly. The data was provided to HIBP by a source who requested it be attributed to redredred@riseup.net.


Compromised data: Bank account numbers, Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, IP addresses, Names, Payment histories, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

Internet Archive: In September 2024, the digital library of internet sites Internet Archive suffered a data breach that exposed 31M records. The breach exposed user records including email addresses, screen names and bcrypt password hashes.

Compromised data: Email addresses, Passwords, Usernames



2024



“Have you ever felt like the Internet Archive runs on sticks and is constantly on the verge of suffering a catastrophic security breach? It just . See 31 million of you on HIBP!”

2024

 **Brewster Kahle** ✅ @brewster_kahle · Oct 10 · ...
Sorry, but DDOS folks are back and knocked [archive.org](#) and [openlibrary.org](#) offline.

@internetarchive is being cautious and prioritizing keeping data safe at the expense of service availability.

Will share more as we know it.

325 1.1K 6.2K 1.1M ↗ ↑

 **Brewster Kahle** ✅ @brewster_kahle · ...
What we know: DDOS attack—fended off for now; defacement of our website via JS library; breach of usernames/email/salted-encrypted passwords.

What we've done: Disabled the JS library, scrubbing systems, upgrading security.

Will share more as we know it.

3:08 AM · Oct 10, 2024 · 1.3M Views

177 1.2K 8.4K 756 ↗ ↑



2024

NETSCOUT ASERT observed 24 DDoS attacks against the Autonomous System Number (ASN) 7941, the ASN used by the Internet Archive project.

The first attack event started on October 09, 17:02 UTC and continued until 20:23 UTC the same day--at least 3 hours, 20 minutes of active DDoS activity.

During the attack campaign, at least three distinct IP addresses used by archive.org received DDoS attack traffic.

TCP RST floods and HTTPS application layer attacks


Peak ~5Gbps

Mirai variant; from South Korea, China, and Brazil

Some Reflections



2021



An official website of the European Union How do you know? ▾

European Commission | English | Search

Shaping Europe's digital future

Home | Policies | Activities | News | Library | Funding | Calendar | Consultations | AI Office

Home > News & Views > CONCORDIA: DDoS Clearing House designated high potential innovation

PROJECTS STORY | Publication 20 May 2021

CONCORDIA: DDoS Clearing House designated high potential innovation

The DDoS Clearing House has been designated a 'key innovation' by the European Commission and selected for the Commission's Innovation Radar.

The DDoS Clearing House is a system that enables organisations targeted by DDoS attacks to measure attack characteristics and share the information with other member organisations. The system is being developed by SURF, University Twente, and other members of the European CONCORDIA project. In the Netherlands, the clearing house will be used by the National Anti-DDoS Coalition, whose members include the Dutch National Internet Providers Management Organization, internet service providers, internet exchanges, the Dutch Payments Association, various government bodies and Digital Infrastructure Netherlands.

Fingerprints

The DDoS Clearing House is a collaborative system that enables participating service providers to



CONCORDIA
Cyber security cOMPeteNce for Research and Innovation

CONCORDIA



<https://www.nomoreddos.org/en/>

Anti-DDoS-Coalitie No More DDoS

Actual Presentations FAQ About the coalition

National Anti-DDoS-coalition

The national anti-DDoS coalition is an alliance against DDoS attacks. The coalition consists of twenty-five organisations including governments, internet service providers, internet exchanges, academic institutions, non-profit organizations and banks. The aim of the coalition is to investigate and combat DDoS from different perspectives.

About the coalition

Collaborative DDoS Mitigation Event 27 November

Collaborative DDoS mitigation event 2024
15 October 2024
We cordially invite you to the annual Collaborative DDoS Mitigation event on Wednesday 27 November at the beautiful castle De Hooge Vuursche near Baarn. This





Black Hat Europe 2022
25 October 2022
December 5-8, the Anti-DDoS Coalition will be at Black Hat Europe 2022! Coalition members Karl Lovink (Belastingdienst) and Mieke Van Ulden (ECP) will give a

Read More »

DDoS Clearing House designated high potential innovation by European Commission
6 April 2021
Contributing to internet security and stability in the Netherlands, Europe and beyond The DDoS Clearing House has been designated a 'key innovation' by the European



Is there a database with DDoS fingerprints?

--
Give me an example of a DDoS fingerprint.

A screenshot of a Google search results page. The search query 'booter' is entered in the search bar. The results are filtered under the 'All' tab, showing various links from sources like Cloudflare, Akamai, myrasecurity.com, and University of Twente Student Theses. On the right side of the results, there is a sidebar titled 'Stresser' which provides a brief definition and a link to Wikipedia.

Google

booter

All Images Videos News Web Books Finance Tools

Cloudflare
https://www.cloudflare.com › learning › ddos-booter-ip... :: What is a DDoS booter/IP stresser? | DDoS attack tools
An IP stresser is a tool for testing a network's robustness. However, IP stressers are often used as DDoS attack tools and advertised as DDoS 'booter' ...

Akamai
https://www.akamai.com › glossary › what-is-a-ddos-bo... :: What Is a DDoS Booter?
DDoS booters are known as on-demand DDoS attack services offered by cybercriminals. Learn more about DDoS booters and how to prevent them.

myrasecurity.com
https://www.myrasecurity.com › knowledge-hub › ip-st... :: IP stresser/booter: definition and functioning - Myra
IP stressers or booters are services that can be used with no technical expertise and for little money to carry out overload attacks on websites, web ...

University of Twente Student Theses
https://essay.utwente.nl › ... :: Booters (black)list
by JJ Chromik · 2015 · Cited by 2 — Abstract: Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are a continuously growing threat of the present Internet. Without proper protection, any machine ...

University of Twente Student Theses
https://essay.utwente.nl › ... :: The Generation of Booter (black)lists

Stresser :: Stresser services provide denial-of-service attack as a service, usually as a criminal enterprise. They have simple front ends, and accept payment over the web.
[Wikipedia >](#)

Feedback

NO single Booter in the first page!



450 Booters!

LIST OF URLs FROM THE Booter Blacklist Initiative

ddosapi.co.uk	dream-stresser.com	hexstresser.net
ddos-block.com	dreamstresser.com	hoodstresser.xyz
ddosbouncer.com	dstresser.net	horizon-stresser.eu
ddosbreak.com	ebolastresser.com	hornstress.m
ddos.click	ebooter.com	hydrostress.com
ddosclub.com	elite-booter.net	hydrostress.net
ddoscover.com	elyxa-stresser.net	hyperstresser.com
ddosemine.com	emai stresser.net	iceberg-stresser.com
ddoser.pw	emo-stresser.com	idios.net
ddoser.xyz	epic-stresser.com	illuminati-products.net
ddos-fighter.com	equinoxstresser.net	imbeingdosed.com
ddos-him.com	equivalent-stresser.net	imsocool.info
ddos-ip.com	eraservices.co	inboot.me
ddosit.net	erast.pw	infectedstresser.com
ddosit.us	eternal-stresser.com	infectedstresser.net
ddos.kr	eternalstresser.pw	instabooter.com
ddos-monitor.ru	exclusivestresser.com	instinctproducts.com
ddosnow.com	exclusivestresser.net	ionbooter.com
ddospower.com	exhilebooter.net	ipstresser.co
ddos-service.so	exitus.to	ipstresser.net
ddossite.com	exstress.in	ipstressertest.com
ddospace	exotic-stresser.net	iridiumstresser.com
ddostest.me	expedientstresser.com	isitdownyet.net
ddostheworld.com	exploitstresser.org	jedistresser.com
ddos.tools	exresolver.jouwweb.nl	jetbooter.com
deadlyboot.net	fagstresser.net	jitterstresser.com
dedicatedstresser.net	fatal-stresser.com	kappastresser.nl
defcon.pro	fbl-stresser.eu	kenkastresser.com
dejabooster.com	flashstresser.net	kidstresser.com
deluxestresser.com	foreverinfamous.com	kryptonic.pw
demonstresser.eu	formalystresser.com	kryptonestresser.com
denialstresser.com	fpsstress.info	k-stress.pw
destressbooter.com	frankgigiang.nl	kth-stress.tk
desstressnetworks.com	freebooter4me	kushbooter.org
devicestresser.net	freebooter.co	layer-4.com
devilstresser.net	free-boot.xyz	legendboot.tk
diablastresser.info	freestresser.net	legionboot.com
diamond-stresser.com	freestresser.xyz	legionbooter.info
diamond-stresser.net	frozentrresser.nl	lexsk-stresser.fr
diamond-stresser.pw	getsmack.de	lifetimeboot.com
diebooter.com	ghoststresser.com	lifetimes.pw
diebooter.net	gigabooter.com	logicstresser.com
divinestresser.com	globalstresser.net	luckystresser.net
divinestresser.info	grimbooter.com	lunarstresser.com
dmbooter.net	grimbooter.com	mafiastresser.com
dns-ddos.net	h4x-stresser.us	magnastresser.com
downboot.xyz	hazebooter.com	masterboot.net
downloadddosgamesfree.com	heavystresser.com	masterstresser.com
down-stresser.com	heddos.net	maximumstresser.com
downthem.org		

List of URLs From the Booter Blacklist Initiative

APPENDIX B

In this appendix we present the list of URLs retrieved from booterblacklist.com on 16-July-2017.

Table B.1: List of Booter URLs retrieved from booterblacklist.com
1606-stresser.net
9yrbfyd.es
absolut-stresser.net
acidstresser.net
agonyproducs.com
alien-stresser.com
alphastresser.com
ambushproducts.com
ambushstresser.info
america-stresser.us
animebooter.net
anonymitystresser.com
anonclan-stresser.net
anonmalfastresser.com
anonymousbooter.com
anonymousmousdou.eu
anonymous-stresser.com
anonymousestresser.net
apocalypse-solutions.com
apocalypsestresser.webs.com
apocalypsestresser.webs.com
asylumstresser.com
aurastresser.com
avanzatostresser.com
avengestresser.com
baby-booster.com
battle.pw
bemybooster.eu
bestresser.com
booter.com
booter.net
booter.org
bootybooter.com
buzzbooter.com
buzzbooter.fr
campingwithkiddos.com
booter.tw
booter.xy
boot.ln
boot.ml
booty.org
bootyxyz.com
bullystresser.com
bullystresser.ovh
buybooters.com
buz.bugs3.com
buzzbooter.info
darkstresser.org
darkstresser.weebly.com
darkunison-booster.net
databooter.com
cstress.net
cyber-sst.com
cyberstresser.org
darkalbooter.net
darkbooter.com
darkbooter.fr
darkbooter.org
darkmethods.info
darkstresser.info
darkstresser.net
darkstresser.nl
darkstresser.org
darkunison-booster.net
databooter.com

LIST OF URLs FROM THE Booter Blacklist Initiative


v3rmillionbooster.info	webstresser.co	xplodestresser.pw
vastresser.ru	westsidebooster.com	xr8edstresser.com
vbooter.com	wickedstresser.com	xrshellbooster.com
vbooter.org	wifistruggles.com	xrstresser.net
vdos-s.com	wifistruggles.org	xtremebooster.com
vdoss.net	wifistruggles.us	xtreme.cc
vengeancestresser.com	wifistruggles.pw	yakuzastresser.com
vex-stresser.net	wifistruggles.us	youboot.net
wnddos.com	wrtu-stresser.com	z7inc.com
wrtu-stresser.com	vpstresser.com	zenstresser.net
xbolawz.info	xboot.net	zstress.info
webbooter.com	xenon-stresser.us	zynenstresser.us

ALL DOWN!



Final Reflection





Revisiting a ⁺⁺⁺ Decade of DDoS Attacks

and telling the anti-ddos-coalition
history from my 5 turning points.

