

Discourse Structure in Dialogue

Lecture 2: Discourse and Coherence

Julian J. Schlöder

DRT

The Syntax–Semantics Interface (simple)

- "x is P" $\rightsquigarrow P(x)$
- "x is y" $\rightsquigarrow x = y$
- "an x is P" $\rightsquigarrow \exists x.(P(x))$
- "all x are P" $\rightsquigarrow \forall x.(P(x))$
- "all P are Q" $\rightsquigarrow \forall x.(P(x) \rightarrow Q(x))$
- "If p, then q" $\rightsquigarrow p \rightarrow q$

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- "all P are Q" $\rightsquigarrow \forall x.(P(x) \rightarrow Q(x))$
- "If p, then q" $\rightsquigarrow p \rightarrow q$
- "If x is y and x is P, then y is P" $\rightsquigarrow (x = y \wedge P(x)) \rightarrow P(y).$
- "If all x are P and a y is Q, then an x is P and Q"
 $\rightsquigarrow (\forall x.(P(x)) \wedge \exists y.(Q(y))) \rightarrow \exists x.(P(x) \wedge Q(x)).$

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- BUT:

(2) Every farmer who owns a donkey (also) owns a pig.

✓ $\forall x.(\text{farmer}(x) \wedge \exists y.(\text{donkey}(y) \wedge \text{own}(x,y))$
 $\rightarrow \exists y.(\text{pig}(y) \wedge \text{own}(x,y))$

Donkey Sentences (today)

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– There's really no end to this.

(4) If a donkey is not beaten, it's happy.

A farmer beats his donkeys.

If someone loves something, he won't beat it.

Storyboard Again

- The idea:
- “If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it” is a bit like **Whenever a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.**
- Better yet, write *Whenever the situation [the current scene in the story] is such that it contains a farmer, a donkey and the farmer owns the donkey, then the situation [scene] is such that the farmer beats the donkey.*
- Or *for every situation...*

Discourse Representation Theory

- The sentence “He beats it” does not really have truth-conditions.
- Rather, it is **embedded in a discourse** and only has definite truth-conditions when interpreted **in** that discourse.

Discourse Representation Theory

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- Rather, it is **embedded in a discourse** and only has definite truth-conditions when interpreted **in** that discourse.
- Information states K are structures *representing* the contents of a discourse under interpretation.
- And these *representations* can be *evaluated* (truth-conditionally, if you like).
- If we **cannot construct a representation**, then the discourse is **incoherent**.

DRT Architecture



where:

\rightsquigarrow := the discourse representation *construction algorithm*,

\mapsto := a truth-conditional model-theoretic *evaluation*.

Discourse Representation Structures

- Discourse representation structures (DRSs) function as **partial descriptions** of particular situations/scenes.
- They consist of a universe of things and a set of conditions attributed to them.
→ $K := \langle U, \text{CON} \rangle$.

x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n
φ_1
φ_2
\vdots
φ_n

← the things we talk about

← what we say about these things

The Language of DRSs

for $x \in \text{VAR}$, $N \in \text{NAME}$, $P^k \in \text{REL}$,

$\text{Con} := N(x) \mid P^k(x_1, \dots, x_k) \mid x_i = x_j \mid \neg K \mid K \vee K \mid K \Rightarrow K$,

$$K := \boxed{\begin{array}{c} x_1, \dots, x_n \\ \hline \text{Con}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \text{Con}_m \end{array}}$$

$(= \langle \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}, \{\text{Con}_1, \dots, \text{Con}_m\} \rangle)$


A Simple DRS

- "A farmer beats a donkey."
- $\langle \{f, d\}, \{\text{farmer}(f), \text{donkey}(d), \text{beat}(f, d)\} \rangle$.

	f,d
-	farmer(<i>f</i>) donkey(<i>d</i>) beat(<i>f</i> , <i>d</i>)


A Less Simple DRS

- "If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it."




every vs some

"A man walks."



"Every man walks."



Accessibility (not as bad as it looks)

A DRS K is **immediately accessible** to a DRS K' iff:

1. K contains the condition $\neg K'$; or
2. K contains a condition of the form $K' \vee K''$ or $K'' \vee K'$.
3. K contains a condition of the form $K' \Rightarrow K''$.
4. There is a DRS K'' that contains the condition $K \Rightarrow K'$.

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
K is **accessible** to K' if K' is connected to K via immediate accessibility ("up or left in conditionals").

That is, if there is a chain $K' = K_1, K_2, \dots, K_{n-1}, K_n = K$ where for all i , K_i is immediately accessible to K_{i-1} .

- Now, a pronoun in K' can access referents in the universes of all DRSs K that are accessible to K' .


Accessibility (Negation)

(5) It is not the case that a man is running. #He takes his time.



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


– This is actually fine, but for different reasons (later!):

(6) It is not the case that John is running. He takes his time.


Accessibility (Negation)

(7) A man is not running. He takes his time.



Accessibility (Negation)


(8) Not every man is running. #He takes his time.



Accessibility (Disjunction)

- Can't go left or right in disjunction (controversial).


(9) Either a man is having tea or ?he is having coffee.



Accessibility (Disjunction)

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- This is actually fine, but for different reasons:

(10) Either John is having tea or he is having coffee.

Interpretation of DRSs: Referent Extension

- The idea is this: DRSs tell us something about **who's who**.
- Every DRS can **introduce new referents** and **impose conditions on (new or previous) referents**.

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Referent System Extension

Let $M = (D_M, I_M)$ be a FOL model. Let $f, g : \text{VAR} \rightarrow D_M$ be partial functions (**referent systems**). Let $K = \langle U, \text{Conds} \rangle$ be a DRS.

- $f[K]_M g$ iff $\text{dom}(g) = \text{dom}(f) \cup U$; and
 $\forall x \in \text{dom}(f) : f(x) = g(x)$.

Interpretation of DRSs: Truth 1

- The **conditions** on the referents impose **tests**.

DRS Semantics

By simultaneous recursion:

1. $f[\llbracket U, Cons \rrbracket]_{Mg}$ iff $f[\langle U, Cons \rangle]_{Mg}$ and $M, g \models_{DRT} C$ for all $C \in Cons$.

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 - a. $M, f \models_{DRT} x = y$ iff $f(x) = f(y)$.
 - b. $M, f \models_{DRT} N(x)$ iff $M, f \models N(f(x))$.
 - c. $M, f \models_{DRT} R(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ iff $M, f \models R(f(x_1), \dots, f(x_n))$.

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
DRS Semantics

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 - a. $M, f \models_{DRT} x = y$ iff $f(x) = f(y)$.
 - b. $M, f \models_{DRT} N(x)$ iff $M, f \models N(f(x))$.
 - c. $M, f \models_{DRT} R(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ iff $M, f \models R(f(x_1), \dots, f(x_n))$.
2. $M, f \models_{DRT} \neg K$ iff there is no g with $f[K]_M g$.
3. $M, f \models_{DRT} K_1 \vee K_2$ iff there is a g with $f[K_1]_M g$ or $f[K_2]_M g$.
4. $M, f \models_{DRT} K_1 \Rightarrow K_2$ iff for every g with $f[K_1]_M g$ there is a h with $g[K_2]_M h$.

Donkey Sentences

- "If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it."



- \approx Whenever we have a farmer and we have a donkey and the farmer owns the donkey, then the farmer beats the donkey.

Interpretation of DRSs: Truth 2

- DRT embeds into classical (Tarskian) First Order Semantics.

DRT embeds into FOL

Define recursively:

$$\begin{aligned} - \quad (P^k(x_1, \dots, x_k))^{\text{FOL}} &= P^k x_1, \dots, x_k; \\ (x_i = x_j)^{\text{FOL}} &= (x_i = x_j); \\ (\neg K)^{\text{FOL}} &= \neg K^{\text{FOL}}; \\ (K_1 \vee K_2)^{\text{FOL}} &= (K_1^{\text{FOL}} \vee K_2^{\text{FOL}}); \end{aligned}$$

- If $K_1 = \langle \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}, \{\text{Con}_1, \dots, \text{Con}_m\} \rangle$, then

$$\begin{aligned} K_1^{\text{FOL}} &= \exists x_1 \dots \exists x_n (\text{Con}_1^{\text{FOL}} \wedge \dots \wedge \text{Con}_m^{\text{FOL}}); \\ (K_1 \Rightarrow K_2)^{\text{FOL}} &= \forall x_1 \dots \forall x_n ((\text{Con}_1^{\text{FOL}} \wedge \dots \wedge \text{Con}_m^{\text{FOL}}) \rightarrow K_2^{\text{FOL}}). \end{aligned}$$

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 $(x_i = x_j)^{\text{FOL}} = (x_i = x_j);$
 $(\neg K)^{\text{FOL}} = \neg K^{\text{FOL}};$
 $(K_1 \vee K_2)^{\text{FOL}} = (K_1^{\text{FOL}} \vee K_2^{\text{FOL}});$

- If $K_1 = \langle \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}, \{\text{Con}_1, \dots, \text{Con}_m\} \rangle$, then

$$K_1^{\text{FOL}} = \exists x_1 \dots \exists x_n (\text{Con}_1^{\text{FOL}} \wedge \dots \wedge \text{Con}_m^{\text{FOL}});$$
$$(K_1 \Rightarrow K_2)^{\text{FOL}} = \forall x_1 \dots \forall x_n ((\text{Con}_1^{\text{FOL}} \wedge \dots \wedge \text{Con}_m^{\text{FOL}}) \rightarrow K_2^{\text{FOL}}).$$

- For all f : $M, f \models_{\text{DRT}} K$ iff $M, f \models_{\text{FOL}} K^{\text{FOL}}$.

DRS Construction Algorithm (Kamp and Reyle 1993)

DRS-Construction Algorithm

Input: a discourse $D = S_1, \dots, S_i, S_{i+1}, \dots, S_n$
the empty DRS K_0


Keep repeating for $i = 1, \dots, n$:

- (i) add the syntactic analysis $[S_i]$ of (the next) sentence S_i to the conditions of K_{i-1} ; call this DRS K_i^* . Go to (ii).
- (ii) **Input:** a set of reducible conditions of K_i^*
Keep on applying construction principles to each reducible condition of K_i^* until a DRS K_i is obtained that only contains irreducible conditions. Go to (i).

- (It's a *shift-reduce* algorithm, in case that means something to someone.)

DRT-style discourse

S-DRT will do away with this simple construction!





- If this stops before all S have been dealt with, the discourse is **uninterpretable**.

DRS Construction Algorithm: Names

CR.PN

**Triggering
configuration**
 $\gamma \subseteq \bar{\gamma} \in \text{Con}_K$:




**Introduce into the universe
of the main DRS:**

new discourse referent **u**

Introduce into the con-

dition set of the main DRS: new conditions $\alpha(u)$, $Gen(u) = \beta$

Substitute in $\bar{\gamma}$:



Example: Names

Julian smiled. He saw a cat.

\rightsquigarrow

—

 \oplus Julian smiled \oplus He saw a cat.

\rightsquigarrow

—
Julian smiled.

 \oplus He saw a cat.

Example: Names

Julian smiled. He saw a cat.

$$\rightsquigarrow \boxed{\text{—}} \oplus \text{Julian smiled} \oplus \text{He saw a cat.}$$

$$\rightsquigarrow \boxed{\begin{array}{c} \text{—} \\ \text{Julian smiled.} \end{array}} \oplus \text{He saw a cat.}$$

$$\rightsquigarrow \boxed{\begin{array}{c} j \\ \text{—} \\ \text{Julian}(j) \\ \text{Gen}(j) = m \\ j \text{ smiled.} \end{array}} \oplus \text{He saw a cat.}$$

DRS Construction Algorithm: Pronouns



CR.PRO	
<p>Triggering configuration $\gamma \subseteq \bar{\gamma} \in \text{Con}_K$:</p>	<div> $\begin{array}{c} S \\ \swarrow \quad \searrow \\ \text{NP}_{Gen=\beta} \quad \text{VP}' \\ \\ \text{PRO} \\ \\ \alpha \end{array}$ </div> <div> <p>or :</p> $\begin{array}{c} \text{VP} \\ \swarrow \quad \searrow \\ V \quad \text{NP}_{Gen=\beta} \\ \quad \\ \quad \text{PRO} \\ \quad \\ \quad \alpha \end{array}$ </div>
<p>Choose suitable antecedent v,</p>	<p>such that v is accessible and $Gen(v) = \beta$</p>
<p>Introduce in U_K:</p>	<p>new discourse referent u</p>
<p>Introduce in Con_K:</p>	<p>new conditions $u = v, Gen(u) = \beta$</p>
<p>Substitute in $\bar{\gamma}$:</p>	<div> $\begin{array}{c} \text{NP}_{Gen=\beta} \\ \\ \text{PRO} \\ \\ \alpha \end{array}$ <p>u for</p> </div>

Example: Pronouns


j
Julian(j)
Gen(j) = m
smile(j)

\oplus He saw a cat.

Example: Pronouns




Example: Pronouns



DRS Construction Algorithm: Indefinites


CR.ID

**Triggering
configuration**
 $\gamma \subseteq \bar{\gamma} \in \text{Con}_K$:



Introduce in U_K : new discourse referent u
Introduce in Con_K : new condition $[N](u)$, $\text{Gen}(u)=\beta$

Substitute in $\bar{\gamma}$:



Example: Indefinites

j,u
Julian(<i>j</i>)
Gen(<i>j</i>) = m
smile(<i>j</i>)
u = j
Gen(<i>u</i>) = m
u saw a cat.

Example: Indefinites

j, u
Julian(j)
Gen(j) = m
smile(j)
$u = j$
Gen(u) = m
u saw a cat.

\rightsquigarrow

j, u, v
Julian(j)
Gen(j) = m
smile(j)
$u = j$
Gen(u) = m
Gen(v) = n
[cat](v)
u saw v .

Example: Indefinites

j, u
Julian(j)
Gen(j) = m
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$u = j$
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u saw a cat.


\rightsquigarrow

j, u, v
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Gen(u) = m
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[cat](v)
u saw v .

\rightsquigarrow


j, u, v
Julian(j)
Gen(j) = m
smile(j)
$u = j$
Gen(u) = m
Gen(v) = n
cat(v)
u saw v .

DRS Construction Algorithm: Negation




Example: Negation

(11) A man is not seeing a cat. He smiles, #it does not.




DRS Construction Algorithm: Conditionals




Example: Conditionals


(12) If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.



Quantifier Constructions (Schematic)



Quantifier Constructions (Schematic)



DRS Construction Algorithm: 'Every'

CR.EVERY	
<p>Triggering configuration $\gamma \subseteq \bar{\gamma} \in \text{Con}_K$:</p>	
<p>Introduce in Con_K:</p>	<p>new condition $K_1 \Rightarrow K_2$ with $K_1 = K_2 = \langle \{\}, \{\} \rangle$</p>
<p>Introduce in U_{K_1}:</p>	<p>new discourse referent u</p>
<p>Introduce in Con_{K_1}:</p>	<p>new condition $N(u)$</p>
<p>Introduce in Con_{K_2}:</p>	<p>new condition γ', where</p>
<p>γ' results from $\bar{\gamma}$ by substituting:</p>	<p>u for</p>
<p>Delete $\bar{\gamma}$ from Con_K</p>	

Event Anaphora

(13) John screamed. That scared Max.

- Include *event indexes* in the referents, and have verb phrases denote events.

$$j, m, e^{\text{scream}}, e^{\text{scare}}, e$$

John(j)

scream(e^{scream}, j)

Max(m)

scare(e^{scare}, e, m)

$e = e^{\text{scream}}$

Tense

- Add referents for *times* and a special constant n (*=now*)

(14) It is sunny now, but it will be raining.

(15) It was sunny.

e_1, e_2, t_1, t_2
$\text{sunny}(e_1)$
$\text{at}(e_1, t_1)$
$t_1 = n$
$\text{raining}(e_2)$
$\text{at}(e_2, t_2)$
$n < t_2$

e_1, t_1
$\text{sunny}(e_1)$
$\text{at}(e_1, t_1)$
$t_1 < n$

DRT


DRT to SDRT

DRT

DRT to SDRT


From DRT to SDRT

(16) IF a farmer has a donkey, THEN **he** beats it.




From DRT to SDRT

(16) IF a farmer has a donkey, THEN **he** beats it.




From DRT to SDRT

(16) IF a farmer has a donkey, THEN **he** beats it.



From DRT to SDRT

(16) IF a farmer has a donkey, THEN **he** beats it.



Segmentation

- What just happened?
- We have taken the **units** of the DRS and assigned **labels** to them.
- Then we stated how the labels **relate**.

- Let DRSs denote the set of well-formed DRSs..
- Let Rel be a set of coherence relations.
- An SDRS is a super-DRS describing the rhetorical structure of many normal DRSs (aka the “microstructure”).

Segmented Discourse Representation Structure

An *SDRS* is a tuple (Π, \mathcal{F}, L) with

- Π a set of labels,
- Let REL^Π be the set $\{R(\alpha, \beta) \mid R \in \text{Rel} \wedge \alpha, \beta \in \Pi\}$ closed under conjunction.
- \mathcal{F} is a function, $\Pi \rightarrow \text{DRSs} \cup \text{REL}^\Pi$.
- $L \in \Pi$ (the *last* label).

Example

(17) IF a farmer has a donkey, THEN **he** beats it.

$K = (\Pi, \mathcal{F}, L)$, where:

- $\Pi = \{\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi\}$

- $\mathcal{F} = \left\{ \pi_1 \mapsto \begin{array}{|c|} \hline f, d \\ \hline \text{farmer}(f) \\ \text{donkey}(d) \\ \text{own}(f, d) \\ \hline \end{array}, \pi_2 \mapsto \begin{array}{|c|} \hline \\ \hline \text{beats}(f, d) \\ \hline \end{array}, \pi \mapsto \text{Consequence}(\pi_1, \pi_2) \right\}$

- $L = \pi_2$


Bigger Example

- (18) π_1 : John had a great day.
 π_2 : He had a great lunch .
 π_3 : He had soup.
 π_4 : Then he had salmon.
 π_5 : Afterwards, he visited his girlfriend.

- $\Pi = \{\pi_0, \pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_3, \pi_4, \pi_5, \lambda, \rho\}$.
- $L = \pi_5$.
- $\mathcal{F}(\pi_1), \dots, \mathcal{F}(\pi_5)$ are (microstructure) DRSs.
- $\mathcal{F}(\lambda) = \textit{Elaboration}(\pi_2, \rho) \wedge \textit{Narration}(\pi_2, \pi_4)$
- $\mathcal{F}(\rho) = \textit{Narration}(\pi_3, \pi_4)$
- $\mathcal{F}(\pi_0) = \textit{Elaboration}(\pi_1, \lambda)$

Boxes and Boxes

- (19) π_1 : John had a great day.
 π_2 : He had a great lunch .
 π_3 : He had soup.
 π_4 : Then he had salmon.
 π_5 : Afterwards, he visited his girlfriend.



What about the Right Frontier?

- Some more definitions:

Outscoping

- Note that \mathcal{F} induces an order on Π .
- Say that $\alpha < \beta$ iff α occurs in $\mathcal{F}(\beta)$.
- Let \prec denote the reflexive transitive closure of $<$.
- Call this relation “outscoping”.

Interpretable SDRS

- A SDRS (Π, \mathcal{F}, L) is **well formed** if:
- There is a unique outscoping-maximal label in Π (“root”).
- \prec is anti-symmetric (in particular, then, it has no circles)

The Right Frontier (formally)

- Let (Π, \mathcal{F}, L) be a well-formed SDRS.

SDRT-Accessibility

Accessibility is defined recursively:

- L is accessible.
- If α is accessible and $\alpha < \beta$, then β is accessible.
- If (i) α is accessible, and
 (ii) $R(\beta, \alpha)$ occurs in some $\mathcal{F}(\gamma)$, and
 (iii) R is subordinating
 then β is accessible.

Summary

- Elementary Discourse Units are Discourse Representation Structures.
- Segmented Discourse Representation Structures are narrative structures on top of these EDUs
- EDUs (microstructure) are constructed by the DRS construction algorithm.
- Within EDUs, anaphora are guided by DRT-accessibility.
- *Across* EDUs, anaphora are guided by the right frontier.
- Next week: *interpretation* of SDRSs and *construction* of SDRSs.