J. Kenneth Jung

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics

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Research Interests

Primary Fields: Industrial Organization, Environmental and Resource Economics

Education

Yale University, New Haven, CT
Ph.D., Economics 2025-2026 (expected)
M.Phil., Economics 2022
M.A., Economics 2021

University of Chicago, Chicago, IL
B.A., Economics 2017

Dissertation

Title: Essays in Industrial Organization and Resource Economics

Comprehensive Examinations

Oral: Industrial Organization, Political Economy
Written: Microeconomics, Macroeconomics

Research

Job Market Paper

"Moral Hazard in Resource Extraction: Evidence from the Mountain Pine Beetle Outbreak"

Work in Progress

"Additionality and Leakage in Equilibrium" *with Andrew Vogt*
"Aircraft Leakage under Cap and Trade" *with Meichen Chen and Miho Hong*

Teaching Experience

Yale College

Teaching Assistant Spring 2025
Introduction to Data Science and Econometrics (Prof. John Eric Humphries)

Teaching Assistant Fall 2023–Spring 2024
The Senior Essay (Prof. Rebecca Toseland)

Teaching Assistant Spring 2023
Intermediate Econometrics (Prof. Edward Vytlacil)

Teaching Assistant Fall 2022
Environmental Economics (Prof. Robert Mendelsohn)

Teaching Assistant Spring 2022
Industrial Organization (Prof. Philip Haile)

Teaching Assistant Fall 2021
Intermediate Microeconomics (Prof. Evangelia Chalioti)

Research Experience

Research Assistant Summer 2023
Yale University (Prof. Nicholas Ryan)

Research Assistant 2017–2019
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Prof. Amy Finkelstein)

Presentations

Conference and Seminar Presentations: London School of Economics and Political Science, Environment Camp 2025
University of Colorado at Boulder, Environmental and Resource Economics Workshop 2023

Professional Service

Referee Service: American Economic Review

Additional Information

Languages: English (native), Korean (intermediate), French (beginner)

References

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Moral Hazard in Resource Extraction: Evidence from the Mountain Pine Beetle Outbreak [Job Market Paper]

Abstract. Natural resource owners often design and auction the rights to extraction contracts not only to raise revenue, but also to achieve other resource management goals of interest. I study the tradeoff between revenue and the timing of extraction in the context of the mountain pine beetle outbreak, a climate-induced shock that increased the urgency of timely harvests in infested forests and eventually killed about half of British Columbia's merchantable timber supply. I show that the use of a negligible fixed price for the harvest of low-grade timber succeeded in ensuring the salvage of beetle-killed trees, but also made it profitable for loggers to delay the harvest of attacked forests. This delay ran counter to the province's goals by allowing pupating beetles to mature, posing an externality by threatening to neighboring forests. A regression discontinuity for payment formats in timber auctions reveals that harvests in tracts that charge low-grade logs at the fixed price are 3.6 months more delayed. To measure the effects of counterfactual pricing schemes, I estimate (in progress) a dynamic resource extraction model and show how the timing of harvests depends on tract characteristics, including the severity of beetle attack. I use the model to quantify the delay reduction and revenue loss from counterfactual pricing and term length policies. I show that the province's contract designs were frequently interior of the optimal frontier between revenue and delay, indicating substantial gains to alternative pricing policies targeted toward beetle-infested tracts.