

CHAPTER 2

Portents of a Sectional Rift

If a climax in the early growth of American nationalism was symbolized by the treaty which made the United States a transcontinental republic, the emergence of the sectionalism which almost destroyed the nation was symbolized by an amendment to an appropriation bill which was never enacted. Both symbols appeared unexpectedly as the work of obscure men—a repudiated emissary who had previously been a clerk in the State Department, and a freshman representative from Pennsylvania named Wilmot. The curious overlap and interplay of the national and sectional forces is suggested by the fact that Wilmot's amendment, which raised the curtain on the sectional drama, came on August 8, 1846, almost two years before Trist's treaty signalized an apogee of nationalism that sectional forces had already begun to threaten.

The eighth of August was a Saturday. The first session of James K. Polk's first Congress had voted to adjourn on the following Monday, and both houses were in the usual end-of-session turmoil. At this eleventh hour, Polk made a belated decision to swallow an unpalatable necessity. For many weeks, even before the Mexican War had begun in the preceding May, he had been maneuvering to obtain funds to be used in negotiating a treaty by which the United States would acquire territory from Mexico. Not wishing to reveal his objectives prematurely, he had first sought to arrange for an appropriation to be voted in secret executive session by the Senate, after which it could be sent to the House and adopted without debate. But the Whigs had at last made it clear that publicity would

be the price of their support. Thereupon, Polk decided to disclose his intentions, and about noon on August 8 he sent to the House a public message, expressing the hope that "a cession of territory . . . may be made" by Mexico, for which "we ought to pay them a fair equivalent," and requesting an appropriation of \$2 million with which to negotiate.¹

Thus the president avowed a purpose which everyone had privately understood but no one had publicly known.² By delaying the avowal until the eve of adjournment, he left only a few hours in which protest might be expressed, but also a minimum of time for getting his measure enacted. The time factor, however, did not daunt the Democratic floor leaders. They set the machinery of party control into motion at once, and the House voted to take up the proposed appropriation that very evening, under a rule which would limit debate to two hours altogether with no member allowed more than ten minutes.³

When the House reassembled after dinner, the members—some partially intoxicated—straggled in reluctantly, only half reconciled to the idea of a hard session on one of Washington's sultriest August nights. Ice water and fans were in heavy requisition, and there were no bevies of ladies to grace the House as they did on days when major oratorical displays were anticipated. But an air of expectancy began to develop as the session got under way.⁴

Seasoned political practitioners perhaps sensed that some sort of upset might occur. For seven months, the administration had been driving its measures through Congress with an extremely firm rein, and with little regard for the feelings of rank-and-file members. The declaration of war with Mexico, the measures for supporting the war, the Oregon treaty, the tariff reduction drafted by Secretary of the Treasury Robert J. Walker, the president's veto of a river and harbors bill which would have provided pork dear to many congressmen—all had been accompanied by the cracking of the whip of party discipline, all had

1. Milo Milton Quaife (ed.), *The Diary of James K. Polk* (4 vols.; Chicago, 1910), II, 70-73; James D. Richardson (ed.), *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (11 vols.; New York, 1907), IV, 456.

2. There had, of course, been constant speculation about Polk's annexationist plans; e.g., see *Baltimore American*, July 9, 1846.

3. *Congressional Globe*, 29 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 1211-1213.

4. *New York Herald*, Aug. 11, 1846.

aroused resentment in various quarters, and all had been assailed in speeches on the floor. On some divisions, northern Democrats had broken party ranks to vote against the administration. No major opposition had yet materialized within the party, but the mood of many Democrats was angry, and the question of territorial acquisitions remained touchy.

As the session opened, Hugh White, a Whig from New York, launched the debates by assailing the expansionist plans of the administration, suggesting that the ulterior purpose was to extend the area of slavery, and challenging the northern Democrats to amend the bill so as to exclude slavery from any newly acquired area. Next came Robert C. Winthrop of Massachusetts, one of the big guns of the Whig battery, who predictably spoke in opposition. Two other speakers defended Polk, and then David Wilmot, still in his first term from Pennsylvania's Bradford District, joined the clamor of those seeking the floor.⁵

With debate so stringently limited, the chairman of the Committee of the Whole must have wondered whether to recognize Wilmot or some other claimant. If he did, he may have recalled that the Pennsylvanian had been an exceptionally faithful administration man. Wilmot had voted for measures to carry through the annexation of Texas, already decided by the previous Congress; he had supported the Oregon compromise with its embarrassing retreat from demands for the boundary at 54° 40'; and most important, he had gone down the line for the administration's tariff reduction when every other Democrat from Pennsylvania crossed party lines to vote against it.⁶ The chair recognized Mr. Wilmot.

Within the allotted ten minutes, Wilmot made a place for himself in history. His very first sentence unexpectedly condemned Polk for not acting more openly. As for expansion, Wilmot approved of it, and where it involved a region like Texas in which slavery already existed, he had not protested against it. But if free territory were acquired, "God forbid that we should be the means of planting this institution upon it."

Thus far, Wilmot had merely complained vocally against the administration, and a little such protest could always be condoned by

5. *Congressional Globe*, 29 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 1213-1214.

6. Charles Buxton Going, *David Wilmot, Free Soiler* (New York, 1924), pp. 61-93; Richard R. Stenberg, "The Motivation of the Wilmot Proviso," *MVHR*, XVIII (1932), 535-541.

party regulars if a congressman needed to strengthen his position in his home district in an election year. But Wilmot now turned from discussion to action. Invoking the language of the Northwest Ordinance, he offered an amendment to the appropriation: "that, as an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition of any territory from the Republic of Mexico . . . neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of said territory, except for crime, whereof the party shall first be duly convicted." This was the Wilmot Proviso.⁷

The word spread quickly that Wilmot had raised the standard of

7. *Congressional Globe*, 29 Cong., 1 sess., p. 1217; Chaplain W. Morrison, *Democratic Politics and Sectionalism: The Wilmot Proviso Controversy* (Chapel Hill, 1967), pp. 16-18. The authorship of the Proviso was later questioned. Jacob Brinkerhoff, an Ohio Democrat, in a letter of Sept. 16, 1846, in the *Columbus Statesman*, Oct. 2, 1846, claimed that he had written the draft of the Proviso (cited in Stenberg, "Motivation of Wilmot Proviso") and later renewed this claim even more emphatically in a letter to Henry Wilson, April 4, 1868 (*New York Times*, April 23, 1868), less than three weeks after Wilmot's death. It was also asserted that a copy of the Proviso in Brinkerhoff's handwriting was deposited in the Library of Congress after his death in 1880 but disappeared about 1890. William Henry Smith, *A Political History of Slavery* (New York, 1903), I, 83, 84. According to this story, a group of northern Democrats including Preston King, Hannibal Hamlin, Gideon Welles, Brinkerhoff, and Wilmot consulted on free-soil strategy and chose Wilmot to be their spokesman because he was more likely to gain recognition from the chair, since he had regularly supported administration measures.

For a long period, historians accepted the Brinkerhoff claim (von Holst, McMaster, A. B. Hart, G. P. Garrison, Channing), but Milo Milton Quaife, *The Doctrine of Non-Intervention with Slavery in the Territories* (Chicago, 1910), pp. 13-16, and Going, *David Wilmot*, pp. 117-141, have shown that Wilmot made detailed statements concerning his authorship in speeches at Tioga, Pennsylvania, and Albany, New York, Oct. 21 and 29, 1847, which were never challenged although there were certain men who were in position to have recognized false statements on this subject; and that the original manuscript of the resolution introduced in Congress is in the files of the 29th Congress and is in Wilmot's own hand, with corrections also in his own hand. It appears that neither Brinkerhoff nor anyone else had a better claim to the authorship than Wilmot. Yet Eric Foner, "The Wilmot Proviso Revisited," *JAH*, LVI (1969), 264, points to evidence that each of the antislavery congressmen in the planning group wrote out his own copy of the Proviso, and that each tried to get the Speaker's recognition. The language of the Proviso, after all, was that of the Northwest Ordinance, and thus in a sense Wilmot, as he himself later declared, "was but the copyist of Jefferson." *Congressional Globe*, 30 Cong., 1 sess., appendix, p. 1076. However it was that Wilmot came to be the front man, the strategy was the work of a group, and according to Foner, p. 265, "It is hard to resist the conclusion that the New York Van Burenites, and especially [Preston] King were the leading spirits of the group." It was King and not Wilmot, Foner adds, who reintroduced the Proviso in the next session of Congress. For the political background of the Proviso, with emphasis on Democratic factionalism, see also Charles Sellers, *James K. Polk: Continentalist, 1843-1846* (Princeton, 1966), pp. 476-484.

revolt, and members of the administration hastened to the lobby of the House. Soon, no fewer than three cabinet members were in attendance. But despite the growing excitement, debate was still rigorously limited, and within less than two hours, the House voted. As it did so, William W. Wick, an Indiana Democrat, tried to substitute a different amendment which would have applied the Missouri Compromise line of 36° 30' to any new territory, but this was defeated 89 to 54. Wilmot's amendment then passed by a vote of 80 to 64, with every negative vote except three coming from the slave states. Now it developed that the southern members, who had been the bill's warmest supporters, would rather have it killed altogether than to accept it with its exclusion of slavery, and they moved to table. On this motion, an ominous development occurred. The roll call produced a division not between Whigs and Democrats, but between northerners and southerners. Seventy-four southerners and four northerners voted to table; ninety-one northerners and three southerners voted against tabling. The bill itself, as amended, was then carried by a vote of 85 to 80, with the two sides again divided almost wholly on sectional lines, and was sent to the Senate.⁸

Since the next day was Sunday, the Senate did not take up the measure until August 10, the last day of the session, and in fact did not get to it until an hour before the time set for adjournment. Time now became the critical factor in the strategy of administration leaders. They planned to strike Wilmot's amendment out of the House bill and rush the measure back to the House, where the shortage of time would force the representatives to take it without the amendment. But timing is a game at which two can play, and Senator John Davis of Massachusetts, a Whig and a friend of the amendment, apparently conceived of the idea of talking until it would be too late to return the bill, whereupon the senators would be forced to take it as the House offered it—with the amendment. But if this was indeed his purpose, he miscalculated, and taking the floor on the motion to strike out the House's amendment, he kept on talking until the clock showed eight minutes left in the session. At that point he was interrupted by the information that the House, whose clock was faster, had already adjourned, and the session had expired.⁹

8. *Congressional Globe*, 29 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 1217–1218; *New York Herald*, Aug. 11, 1846; Quaife, *Doctrine of Non-Intervention*, p. 16.

9. *Congressional Globe*, 29 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 1220–1221. The question of why Davis, who favored the amended bill, should have talked it to death has been a subject of

The Two-Million Bill had expired too, and Mr. Wilmot's amendment had apparently expired with it, but in fact the brief resolution had already begun to realign the structure of American politics. The Boston *Whig* correctly observed, "As if by magic, it brought to a head the great question which is about to divide the American people."¹⁰

The episode had occurred so suddenly and ended so abortively that its full significance was not perceived until much later. But in that age of fairly strict party discipline, it must have been shocking to see northern Democrats deserting the administration, not in detachments, but as a solid body.

It could not have happened, of course, without a background of antagonism within the Democratic party. In retrospect, it was evident that incipient divisions had existed for a long time. Ever since the days when Martin Van Buren had jockeyed to displace John C. Calhoun in the favor of Andrew Jackson, there had been northern and southern wings within the party, but Jackson himself had warned sternly against such divisions, and Calhoun's defection to the Whigs had largely destroyed his sectional influence among southern Democrats. The party had remained well united under the adroit leadership of Van Buren, and its defeat in 1840 had only sharpened the determination to reestablish Democratic control in 1844. But then the question of Texas annexation came to the fore, and as it did, three fateful things happened to the Democratic party. First, the southern Democrats sabotaged the renomination of Van

minor disagreement among historians. James G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress* (2 vols.; Norwich, Conn., 1884–86), I, 68, suggested that Davis intended to defeat the whole measure, but the fact is that he was in favor of the bill as amended. H. E. von Holst, *Constitutional and Political History of the United States* (8 vols.; Chicago, 1877–92), III, 287–288, thought that Davis was merely foolish and that his "unseasonable loquacity" defeated his own purposes. But Going, *David Wilmot*, p. 103, shows that Davis himself explained his strategy, as it is described above, in a speech on Feb. 25, 1847. See *Congressional Globe*, 29 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 508–509. A different result would have changed the course of American history, and there has been much speculation as to whether the measure could have passed, with the Proviso in it, if it had come to a vote. Wilmot himself (*ibid.*, appendix, p. 315) said it would have. Henry Wilson, *History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America* (3 vols.; Boston, 1872–77), II, 17, discusses the belief of Salmon P. Chase and of Jacob Brinkerhoff that it would have passed, but Wilson then proceeds to an analysis indicating that Brinkerhoff's calculations were wrong. Polk said that it would have been defeated (Quaife [ed.], *Polk Diary*, II, 75–76), and his overall policy indicates that he would have vetoed it if Congress had passed it.

10. Boston *Whig*, Aug. 15, 1846, quoted in Frank Otto Gatell, *John Gorham Palfrey and the New England Conscience* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 130–131.

Buren and did this in circumstances that left great bitterness. Before the Texas question became ascendant, many southern delegates to the Democratic convention had already been chosen and had been pledged to Van Buren in a way that left them no option but to vote for him. Then, when Van Buren came out against annexation, they sought a means to block his nomination and found it in the application of a rule, used in the convention of 1832, requiring the vote of two-thirds of the delegates for a nomination. This strategy not only blocked the will of the majority, but what was worse, it meant that a number of men pledged to Van Buren were voting for a rule designed to prevent his nomination. In their eyes this seemed a legitimate means of recovering the freedom of action they had lost by a premature pledge. But to the friends of Van Buren it appeared that the leader of the party was being treacherously slain in the house of his friends, and that the sinister force at work was something coming to be called the Slave Power. Many northern Democrats never forgot or forgave, as the party regulars would learn when Van Buren ran as a third-party candidate four years later.¹¹

The only thing holding the party together in this crisis was the fact that the nomination itself appeared to be less a victory for Van Buren's enemies than a compromise between his enemies and his friends. The prize did not go to Lewis Cass, Van Buren's chief rival in the balloting; nor did the platform endorse the annexation of slaveholding Texas alone. Instead the convention nominated a dark horse, James K. Polk of Tennessee, and this southern candidate's southern managers had wit enough to arrange that his name should first be brought forward by delegations from Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. Also, the convention balanced the objective of expansion in Texas with that of expansion in Oregon. Thus, new free territory would offset new slave territory, and the nationwide impulses of expansion could be fulfilled without arousing sectional

11. For the disruptive effects of the revolt against Van Buren and of the question of the annexation of Texas, see especially James C. N. Paul, *Rift in the Democracy* (Philadelphia, 1951). Also, Charles M. Wilse, *John C. Calhoun, Sectionalist* (Indianapolis, 1951), pp. 60-186; Justin H. Smith, *The Annexation of Texas* (New York, 1911), pp. 234-257; James P. Shenton, *Robert John Walker: A Politician from Jackson to Lincoln* (New York, 1961), pp. 22-50; Foner, "Wilmot Proviso Revisited," pp. 267-273. In the long run, the two-thirds rule was Calhoun's doctrine of the concurrent majority applied within the Democratic party, and it accounted for the peculiar relationship between the South and the Democratic party not only in the antebellum era but until the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, when southern leaders, temporarily forgetful of their historic status as a minority section, permitted it to be repealed. See David M. Potter, *The South and the Concurrent Majority* (Baton Rouge, 1972).

jealousies. With a disingenuous claim that both areas properly belonged to the United States already, the platform called for "the Re-occupation of Oregon and the Re-annexation of Texas—the whole of the territory of Oregon." Running on this platform, Polk gained close but decisive majorities in every state of the lower South, carried every state of the Northwest except Ohio, and also won Maine, New Hampshire, New York, and Pennsylvania, thus capturing the presidency with well-distributed bisectional support.

The Oregon question did not receive any great emphasis in this campaign, and the use of the aggressive slogan "Fifty-four forty or fight," which many historians have attributed to the campaign, actually came later.¹² But northern Democrats had every reason to expect that Polk would push for free territory in Oregon as vigorously as he would for slave territory in Texas. As matters developed, however, they saw the claim to all of Oregon sidetracked while Texas annexation was voted in February 1845, troops were sent to the farthest edge of the disputed zone between the Nueces and the Rio Grande in January 1846, and war with Mexico was declared in May. They supported these steps with great solidarity, but in June Polk submitted to the Senate a treaty dividing the Oregon country about equally between Britain and the United States, along the 49th parallel. At this point the pent-up resentments of the northern Democrats burst out in a flood of bitter incrimination. "Texas and Oregon were born the same instant, nursed and cradled in the same cradle—the Baltimore Convention," and no one hesitated about Oregon until Texas was admitted, exclaimed Senator Hannegan of Indiana; but then "the peculiar friends of Texas turned, and were doing all they could to strangle Oregon!" Representative John Wentworth of Illinois took note of predictions, then circulating, that the South, "having used the West to get Texas, would now abandon it, and go against Oregon." On the question of ratification, the northern Democratic senators, then, for the first time, openly rebelled against the administration. Twelve of them voted against the treaty and only three voted in favor. Their vote was barely offset by that of slave-state Democrats, sixteen of whom voted in favor and two of whom opposed. The Democratic president secured the desired ratification only because every Whig in the Senate supported him, and the final vote was 41 to 14. But it was a dearly

12. Edwin A. Miles, "'Fifty-four Forty or Fight'—An American Political Legend," *MVHR*, XLIV (1957), 291-309.

bought victory, as Polk soon learned. The Oregon Compromise left many northern Democrats with a sense of betrayal; it signaled the first open breach in Congress between southern and northern wings of the Democratic party; and it destroyed the bisectional basis for expansion. Thus it was the second fateful cause of rift in the Democracy.¹³

The third apple of discord was the tariff. Here again, Polk's excessively adroit campaign methods made trouble for his administration. During the campaign he had written an ambiguous letter to John K. Kane of Philadelphia in which he did not quite say that he favored a protective tariff, but did express approval of "protection to all the great interests of the whole Union . . . including manufactures." With this document in hand, Pennsylvania Democratic leaders had been able to convince the voters, and perhaps even themselves, that Polk would not reduce duties, and they had carried the state for him against Clay. But when he appointed Robert J. Walker, a man of free-trade convictions, as his secretary of the treasury, and when Walker produced an administration-sponsored measure that was one of the few real tariff reductions in American history, northern Democrats again felt betrayed. In July 1846, Walker's bill passed the House by a vote of 114 to 95 with seventeen northern Democrats joining the Whigs who voted solidly against it. In the Senate,

13. *Congressional Globe*, 29 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 110, 460 (Hannegan); 205-206 (Wentworth), cited in Avery O. Craven, *The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848-1861* (Baton Rouge, 1953), pp. 30-32. See also Morrison, *Democratic Politics*, pp. 11-13. On the Oregon settlement generally, see Frederick Merk, *The Oregon Question* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); and the preceding volume in the New American Nation series, Glyndon G. Van Deusen, *The Jacksonian Era, 1828-1848* (New York, 1959), pp. 209-213. Clark E. Persinger, "The 'Bargain of 1844' as the Origin of the Wilmot Proviso," *AHA Annual Report, 1911*, I, 189-195, stated the thesis that Texas and Oregon had been quid pro quos in a "bargain" in 1844, and that the revolt against the Oregon Treaty and the move to ban slavery in the Southwest were reactions by northerners to the violation of the agreement. This argument reflected an important underlying truth, but was stated too restrictively in two ways: First, evidence is scant of an explicit agreement by either section to support annexation in one area in return for annexation in another; for instance, Ohio could not have been party to such a deal, for she did not vote for Polk either in the nomination or in the election; for Ohio, there was no quo for which to expect a quid. Probably Texas and Oregon were linked simply in the sense of giving expansion a balanced bisectional character, instead of skewing it to the advantage of one section. Second, Persinger suggests that the Wilmot Proviso was not motivated by antislavery ideals, but simply by a desire to retaliate on the southerners for compromising in Oregon. Yet the evidence is clear that most antislavery men were antislavery before Polk ever agreed on the 49th parallel. Persinger oversimplifies a very complex motivation.

it passed by a single vote, 28 to 27, with three northern Democrats in opposition and one Whig, under the duress of instructions from his state legislature, in support. Northern opponents were quick to note that the measure could not have passed without the votes of the two new senators from Texas.¹⁴

Twenty-six months after the defeat of Van Buren in the Baltimore convention, seven weeks after the adoption of the Oregon compromise, scarcely more than a week after the enactment of the Walker Tariff, David Wilmot offered his proviso. The reaction of the northern Democrats showed that many of them had scores to settle. In this sense, the Wilmot Proviso may be explained in terms of party politics, as the climax to a series of intraparty rivalries which took a sectional form within the Democratic organization.

In the perspective of more than a century, however, these party squabbles seem less important in themselves than as indications of a deep rift among the American people. If politicians chose to revolt on the slavery issue rather than the tariff issue or the Oregon boundary issue, this in itself reflected their awareness that there was a public opinion on the slavery question which would make it a strategic focus for their action. A sharp division was developing along sectional lines, and this division was finding expression in the alignments of national politics. This politicizing of sectionalism may seem too obvious to be worth formal analysis, but it is important to recognize that at an earlier time, important sectional dissimilarities had existed without taking a chronic political form, and sectional division always could and sometimes did take other forms, such as the economic rivalry between New Orleans and Buffalo for the trade of the upper Mississippi Valley, or the later cultural separatism by which southerners sought to develop a literature, a publishing industry, and an educational system independent of those of the North. But instead of developing primarily in an economic or cultural context, the sectionalism of the mid-century expressed itself primarily in political strife. The sectional leaders were party chief-

14. Stenberg, "Motivation of Wilmot Proviso," makes a good statement of the importance of the tariff issue. See also Edward Stanwood, *American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century* (2 vols.; Boston, 1903), II, 75-77; Shenton, *Walker*, pp. 52-53; and especially Sellers, *Polk*, pp. 116-123, 451-468. Polk's letter to Kane was published in *Niles' Register*, LXVI (June 22, 1844), 259. For a case history of another northern Democrat who broke with the administration see Don E. Fehrenbacher, *Chicago Giant: A Biography of "Long John" Wentworth* (Madison, 1957), chap. IV: "The Making of an Insurgent."

tains; the sectional battles took place in Congress and in conventions and in legislatures; the power they fought for was political control; and their objectives were measures political, such as acts of Congress, the organization of territories, the admission of states. The fact that the sectional impulse operated within a political medium is significant, for it meant that the conditions and circumstances of the medium had an important effect upon the way in which the sectional force worked itself out. For instance, the frequency of American elections meant the constant exploitation of sectional tensions for the purpose of arousing the voters; a system with fewer appeals to the ballot box might have seen a less chronic practice of sectional agitation. Another political feature which conditioned the operation of the sectional force in a significant way was the dissimilarity of the bases of representation in the Senate and in the House. This system tended to make southern influence dominant in one branch and northern in the other, which in turn meant that deadlocks tended to develop in Congress, thus prolonging situations of sectional strife. Also, the interplay between sectionalism and the party system was of vital importance. It is commonly supposed that the existence of two national parties, each with both a northern and a southern wing, exercised a unifying effect which offset the disruptive tendencies of sectionalism. In a sense, this may be true: certainly it is true that each sectional wing tried to cooperate with the other wing of its own party. The extremism of both northern and southern Democrats, for instance, was tempered by their association with one another. But on the other hand, the intrasectional rivalry of parties caused each sectional wing to compete against the other party's corresponding sectional wing in expressions of sectional zeal: southern Democrats and southern Whigs tried to exceed one another in their proofs of devotion to slavery; northern Democrats and northern Whigs in their commitment to free soil. And each tried to discredit its rival within the section by suggesting that this rival had sold out to its counterpart in the other section. Southern Whigs insisted that the southern Democrats were allied with free-soilers; when Taylor ran for the presidency in 1848, northern Democrats capitalized on the fact that northern Whigs had accepted a Louisiana slaveholder as their leader.

Another crucial feature of the political system which also shaped the operation of sectionalism was the prevailing acceptance of the

concepts of the negative state and of strong constitutional limitations on the power of the central government. These limitations meant, in effect, that Congress could do little about slavery except to talk about it. While serving as a sounding board for ceaseless sectional recrimination, Congress lacked power to act as an effective arbiter of sectional disputes, and in fact could not even address itself directly to the question of slavery.

Since the sectional impulse took a political form and the circumstances of politics conditioned the operation of sectionalism, this book, a study of sectional conflict, will deal primarily with political events. But as a preliminary, it is well to recognize that sectionalism was not initially or intrinsically a political phenomenon, and it is important to consider sectionalism in its prepolitical form. What originally differentiated North from South? How did dissimilarities become sources of tension? What part was played by cultural disparities, by economic rivalry, by ideological disagreement? And above all, what was the role of slavery in producing sectional conflict?

Viewing sectionalism in its most general terms, one may observe that in a country with the extent and the physical diversity of the United States, regional differentials necessarily exist, and they may lead to dissimilarities that clearly distinguish one region from another, or to conflicts of interest that bring regional groups into rivalry with one another. Such a process is always at work, more or less, and is usually balanced by other, unifying forces, so that the sectional tendencies do not become disruptive. But sectionalism has been chronic in American history. At times, the divisions between East and West have seemed even deeper and more serious than those between North and South. In this sense, it can be argued that the North-South division which ended in the Civil War was nothing unique, but was only the most acute manifestation of a phenomenon which has appeared again and again.¹⁵

There remains, however, the problem of why the sectionalism of the 1850s was so much more disruptive than any other sectional

15. On the general concept of sectionalism, see Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Significance of Sections in American History* (New York, 1932); Merrill Jensen (ed.), *Regionalism in America* (Madison, 1951); David M. Potter and Thomas G. Manning (eds.), *Nationalism and Sectionalism in America, 1775-1877* (New York, 1949); Potter, "The Historian's Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa," in Potter, *The South and the Sectional Conflict* (Baton Rouge, 1968).

strife in American history. Here was the one instance where the unifying forces failed to counterbalance the divisive tendencies, where the intensity of sectional feeling was scarcely mitigated in any way. What accounts for this unique failure?

Explanation of the uncontrolled growth of sectionalism during the 1850s has been one of the major problems of American historical scholarship. The refinements of interpretation have been endless, but broadly speaking, there has been one school of thought which regards the presence of Negro slavery in the South and its absence in the North as the essence of the sectional controversy, with the result that the term "sectional conflict" becomes little more than a euphemism for a fight about slavery. Opposing this view, other historians have argued that the commitment of the North to Negro equality was minimal, that the prolonged struggle over slavery in the territories scarcely touched the vital question of the servitude of more than 3 million human chattels, and therefore that there was not enough antislavery in the "antislavery" movement to justify an explanation of the sectional conflict primarily in terms of the slavery issue. Such writers have offered two alternative explanations—one which sees the struggle as a clash of profoundly dissimilar cultures, whose disparities transcended the difference over slavery; the other which sees it as a clash between economic interests of an emerging industrialism on the one hand and of plantation agriculture on the other.

Proponents of the cultural explanation of sectionalism argue essentially that the people of the North and the people of the South were at odds not merely because they disagreed about the servitude of the Negro, but because they lived in different cultural worlds. As they see it, the cotton and tobacco plantations, the isolated backwoods settlements, and the subsistence farms of the South were all part of a rural and agricultural way of life, static in its rate of change, decentralized and more or less primitive in its social and economic organization, and personal in its relationships. Southerners placed a premium on the values of loyalty, courtesy, and physical courage—these being the accustomed virtues of simple, agricultural societies with primitive technology, in which intelligence and skills are not important to the economy. By contrast, the North and West, although still agricultural and rural by statistical measurement, had begun to respond to the dynamic forces of industrialization, mass transportation, and modern technology; and to anticipate the mo-

bile, fluid, equalitarian, highly organized, and impersonal culture of cities and machines. Their values of enterprise, adaptability, and capacity to excel in competition were not the values of the South. In the eyes of some scholars, the sum of these differences was so great that North and South had become, in fact, separate cultures, or, as it is said, distinct civilizations. Any union of the two, lacking a basis of homogeneity, must be artificial and, as it were, fictitious. If North and South clashed politically, it was because of this general incompatibility and not because of disagreement over slavery or any other single, specific issue. The two cultures still would have clashed even if all the Negroes had been free. As for slavery, of course the southern system of chattel labor was static and archaic, while the northern system of wage labor was fluid and competitive. But each, in its own way, could be brutally exploitative, and the dissimilarities between them did not, in themselves, separate the two societies but were merely reflections or aspects of a broader and deeper duality. Further, the cultural explanation asserts, slavery was not itself the determinative fact in the life of the Negro. The controlling feature—the thing that made him what he was—was not his legal status as a chattel but his economic status as a hoer and picker of cotton. He was an unskilled worker in the production of a raw material for the world market, and all such workers, whether slave or free, led lives of deprivation. Exponents of this view point out that even after emancipation, the daily life of the Negro did not change appreciably for nearly seventy years, and indeed it never did become very different until he ceased to work in the cotton fields.¹⁶

16. For sharp, unqualified statements of the cultural antithesis of North and South, see Edward Channing, *A History of the United States* (6 vols.; New York, 1905-25), VI, 3-4; James Truslow Adams, *The Epic of America* (Boston, 1931), pp. 250-255. To offset the image of the South as a purely aristocratic society, see Thomas J. Wertenbaker, *Patrician and Plebeian in Virginia* (Charlottesville, Va., 1910), which refuted the idea that the Virginia planters were of noble English families and that the cavalier origins of Virginia presented a contrast with Puritan New England; Fletcher M. Green, "Democracy in the Old South," *JSH*, XII (1946), 3-23; Frank Lawrence Owsley, *Plain Folk of the Old South* (Baton Rouge, 1949). The latter two show how effectively the planters were challenged within the South politically and how limited their social control was.

There are many treatments which describe southern antebellum society, some of them specifically contrasting it with northern society, but without specifically evaluating the effect of the distinctive features in causing sectional strife: see William E. Dodd, *The Cotton Kingdom* (New Haven, 1919); Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, *Life and Labor in the Old South* (Boston, 1929); Arthur Charles Cole, *The Irrepressible Conflict, 1850-1865* (New York, 1934); W. J. Cash, *The Mind of the South* (New York, 1941); Avery

The outstanding weakness of this cultural interpretation is that it exaggerates the points of diversity between North and South, minimizes the similarities, and leaves out of account all the commonalities and shared values of the two sections which have been discussed in the preceding chapter. These features had proved their reality and their importance by nourishing the strong nationalism which was in full vigor by the 1840s. Further, any explanation which emphasizes the traditionalism of the South is likely to lose sight of the intensely commercial and acquisitive features of the cotton economy.

The economic explanation of sectionalism avoids this difficulty, for it does not emphasize dissimilarities, and instead of attributing conflict to unlikeness, explains it as a result of the collision of interests. Deriving as it does from a vein of economic determinism, it argues that two regions with dissimilar economies will develop diverse economic objectives, which will lead in turn to a conflict over policies. When such conflict occurs in a repetitive pattern, along geographical lines, the phenomenon is sectionalism.

Concretely, the southern economy, which was based on cotton and tobacco, shipped its produce by river and ocean to be sold in a world market, and it needed generous credit terms to operate. The northern and western economy of manufacture, diversified agriculture, and grain production, shipped by turnpike or canal to domestic markets, and its mercantile interests had accumulated enough capital to be wary of inflationary, cheap credit. As a result of these differences, the South, with no domestic sales to protect, opposed protective tariffs, while the North and West supported them. The South opposed public appropriations to improve the means of transport, while the landlocked Northwest consistently supported them. The South opposed controls on banking by a central authority, while the centers of capital favored such controls. These points of rivalry and others like them made for chronic fric-

Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War* (New York, 1942), chaps. 1-5; Allan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union* (2 vols., New York, 1947), I, 412-544; John Hope Franklin, *The Militant South, 1800-1861* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956); J. G. Randall and David Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction* (3rd ed.; Boston, 1969), chaps. 1-3; Clement Eaton, *The Growth of Southern Civilization, 1790-1860* (New York, 1961); William R. Taylor, *Cavalier and Yankee: The Old South and American National Character* (New York, 1961). For the view that economic circumstances were more important than legal status (slavery) in shaping the conditions of life of the Negro, see Craven, *Coming of Civil War*, pp. 74-93.

tion which divided the opposing forces along lines that recurred with enough regularity to harden into barriers of sectional division.¹⁷

So long as the opposing sections were evenly balanced, and their growth rate was stabilized, they might have gone on peaceably, it is argued, in the equilibrium of a union where neither need fear domination by the other. Indeed, North and South had been fairly evenly balanced when the states of both regions had ratified the "more perfect union" of 1787. But scarcely more than a generation later, the economic transformations of the industrial age set the North upon a more rapid rate of growth than the South, with the result that the North drew steadily further ahead of the South in population, wealth, and productivity. This was reflected by an increasing northern preponderance in Congress. Soon the South began to show, psychologically, the signs of fear that it would be overpowered. This awareness of minority status stimulated the southern sense of solidarity, apartness, and defensiveness, and caused the elaboration of the perennial southern political doctrines of states' rights.¹⁸ At the same time, the unforeseen thrust of American expansion westward, first to the Rockies and then to the Pacific, opened the prospect of a race between the sections to dominate the new regions and to create states which would either perpetuate or upset the balance that still endured in the Senate between the two sections. When this occurred, the South began to resent northern success in the race for physical growth, and the North to resent the determination of the South to preserve its political parity although it had lost the numerical basis for a claim to equality. According to this analysis, the sectional conflict was really a struggle for power.

The flaw in the economic explanation, when it is rigidly applied, is that history can show many instances in which economic diversities and conflicts existed without producing the separatist tendencies of acute sectionalism. Economic dissimilarities may, in just the

17. A classic formulation of this interpretation is in Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization* (2 vols., New York, 1927), II, 3-7, 36-38, 39-41, 105-106. See also Robert R. Russel, *Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, 1840-1861* (Urbana, Ill., 1924); Frederick Jackson Turner, *The United States, 1830-1850* (New York, 1935).

18. On the sectionalizing effect of differential growth rates, see Jesse T. Carpenter, *The South as a Conscious Minority, 1789-1861* (New York, 1930), pp. 7-33. Before 1850, the northern preponderance in Congress was limited to the House of Representatives.

opposite way, promote harmony between two regions, if each supplements the other, and if their combined resources can give them self-sufficiency.¹⁹ For example, in the United States, the Middle West and the East have had very dissimilar economies, and their interests have often clashed violently, but since the diverse economies could be made to supplement one another in important ways, a separatist sectionalism never developed in the Middle West. Could not the economy of the South have been drawn into some similar interdependence? In the United States in the forties, the South's cotton exports paid for the imports of the entire country, and it is an arbitrary theory which would deny that North and South might have found roles, to some degree complementary, in an economy of national self-sufficiency.

It is possible to join the cultural and the economic explanations in one overall analysis that begins by demonstrating the existence of social dissimilarities which, in themselves, do not necessarily cause friction, and then goes on to show how these dissimilarities are translated into specific conflicts of interest. But though the two may be treated as complementary in this way, they differ basically in emphasis. At bottom, the cultural explanation assumes that people quarrel when they are unlike one another; the economic explanation assumes that no matter how much alike they may be, they will quarrel if the advantage of one is the disadvantage of the other. One argues that important cultural dissimilarities cause strife; the other that strife causes the opposing groups to rationalize their hostility to one another by exaggerating unimportant dissimilarities. One explains sectionalism as a conflict of values; the other, as a conflict of interests. One sees it as a struggle for identity; the other as a struggle for power.

Both explanations agree in minimizing slavery as a cause of sectional division, but again they differ in their reasons for doing so. The cultural explanation denies that the difference between chattel and wage labor systems was enough to produce the immense disparity that developed between North and South, and it argues instead that the broad cultural difference between two societies—one stressing status and fixity, the other equality and fluidity—was reflected in the divergence of their labor systems. In short, the pro-

19. J. G. Randall develops this point in "The Civil War Restudied," *JSH*, VI (1940), 441–449.

found cultural division between two fundamentally dissimilar systems transcended slavery. The economic approach, on the other hand, questions the primacy of the slavery factor on quite a different basis. It approaches the problem with deterministic assumptions that men are motivated by interests rather than ideals, that they contend for power rather than principles, and that moral arguments are usually mere rationalizations or secondary "projections," used by contending interest groups to convince themselves or the public that they have right on their side. With such assumptions, spokesmen of the economic explanation have measured very skeptically the exact differences between northern and southern attitudes toward slavery and the Negro, and they have questioned the intensity of sectional disagreement on these subjects. Such terms as "free" and "slave," "antislavery" and "proslavery," suggest a complete antithesis, but at the level of concrete policy and conduct, the people of the North did not propose to emancipate the slaves, and they did not themselves accord equality to the Negro.

The "free" Negro of the northern states of course escaped chattel servitude, but he did not escape segregation, or discrimination, and he enjoyed few civil rights. North of Maryland, free Negroes were disfranchised in all of the free states except the four of upper New England; in no state before 1860 were they permitted to serve on juries; everywhere they were either segregated in separate public schools or excluded from public schools altogether, except in parts of Massachusetts after 1845; they were segregated in residence and in employment and occupied the bottom levels of income; and at least four states—Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Oregon—adopted laws to prohibit or discourage Negroes from coming within their borders.²⁰

Ironically, even the antislavery movement was not in any clear-cut sense a pro-Negro movement but actually had an anti-Negro aspect

20. Leon F. Litwack, *North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790–1860* (Chicago, 1961). There was a certain amount of proslavery sentiment in the North—see Howard C. Perkins, "The Defense of Slavery in the Northern Press on the Eve of the Civil War," *JSH*, IX (1943), 501–503. But the real point is that even antislavery men showed some anti-Negro sentiment. Louis Filler, *The Crusade Against Slavery, 1830–1860* (New York, 1960), pp. 224–225; Eugene H. Berwanger, *The Frontier Against Slavery: Western Anti-Negro Prejudice and the Slavery Extension Controversy* (Urbana, Ill., 1967); James A. Rawley, *Race and Politics: "Bleeding Kansas" and the Coming of the Civil War* (Philadelphia, 1969), pp. 11–15, 258–274. Rawley offers the thesis that racism rather than slavery was the fundamental cause of the Civil War.

and was designed in part to get rid of the Negro. For several decades, the chief agency which advocated emancipation also advocated "colonization," or as it might now be called, deportation. When the militant abolitionists came on the scene in the 1830s, they launched a bitter fight against the colonizationists, but to the general public this seemed merely an intramural, doctrinal dispute. Most antislavery men were colonizationists, as were Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln advocated colonization throughout his career and actually put it into operation on an experimental basis by sending a shipload of Negroes to an island off the coast of Haiti in 1863. In 1862, Lincoln had told a delegation of Negroes that "it is better for us to be separated," and that they ought to emigrate.²¹ The prevalence of attitudes like these even among anti-slavery men seems to justify the conclusion that while slavery was sectional, Negrophobia was national.

Historians who question the real primacy of the slavery issue in the sectional conflict have found their clinching argument in the peculiar focus and objectives of the free-soil movement, which came to overshadow the abolition movement politically in the North. Instead of dealing with slaves where they were in bondage—in the southern states—the free-soil movement dealt with them where they did not exist—in the territories; instead of proposing to free them, it proposed to keep them (and free Negroes as well) out of the new areas where they might compete with white settlers. Only a handful of militant abolitionists proposed to free any of the several million Negroes who were held in slavery, and these few were persecuted and reviled for their uncompromising zeal or extremism; they failed to build a popular movement such as a large political party, and they remained, to the end, a tiny minority. The vast majority of "antislavery" Whigs or Democrats or, later, Republicans, even including men like Lincoln, concentrated all their effort on keeping slavery out of the new territories, while proclaiming that they never would interfere with slavery in the states. Their attitude

21. On colonization, P. J. Staudenraus, *The African Colonization Movement, 1816-1865* (New York, 1961); Frederic Bancroft, "The Colonization of American Negroes, 1801-1865," in Jacob E. Cooke, *Frederic Bancroft, Historian* (Norman, Okla., 1957), pp. 145-258; Brainerd Dyer, "The Persistence of the Idea of Negro Colonization," *Pacific Historical Review*, XII (1943), 53-65. On Lincoln's views on colonization, J. G. Randall, *Lincoln the President* (4 vols.; New York, 1945-55), II, 137-148; Benjamin Quarles, *Lincoln and the Negro* (New York, 1962), pp. 108-123; Roy P. Basler (ed.), *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* (8 vols.; New Brunswick, N.J., 1953), V, 370-375.

has lent itself to the contention that the northern motive was more one of hostility to slaveowners than of humanitarian concern for the slaves, and that slavery was objectionable—to paraphrase Macaulay—not because it gave pain to the slaves but because it gave pleasure to the slaveowners. It enabled the planters to keep up an aristocratic tone which was invidious and offensive to plain American democrats. Through the three-fifths clause in the Constitution, it gave the planters extra representation and therefore extra strength in Congress.²² When the time came for opening new territories, northern whites did not want to share these either with slaveholders or with slaves—did not want to compete with slave labor or to permit any further extension of the political power of the planters. If this meant keeping slaveholders out and also keeping Negroes out, it would be hard to say which exclusion the free-soilers would welcome more. David Wilmot himself made it brutally clear in 1847 that, in waging his campaign for free territories, his concern was entirely for the free white laborers of the North and not at all for the fettered Negro slaves of the South.²³

These anomalies in the antislavery movement and these profound differences between the moral position of free-soilers and that of abolitionists deserve emphasis if a complex position is to be realistically understood.²⁴ But while a recognition of the paradoxical ele-

22. Albert F. Simpson, "The Political Significance of Slave Representation, 1787-1821," *JSH*, VII (1941), 315-342; Glover Moore, *The Missouri Controversy, 1819-1821* (Lexington, Ky., 1953), p. 11. Representative George Rathbun of New York complained that the representation of slaves gave undue political power to the South and asserted that if the South would give up this advantage, he would be willing to give up his free-soilism. This led David Kaufman of Texas to say that the objection to slavery was "not because it was a sin; not at all; but simply because it was to the South an element of political power." *Congressional Globe*, 29 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 364-365; appendix, p. 152, cited in Craven, *Growth of Southern Nationalism*, pp. 39-40.

23. *Congressional Globe*, 29 Cong., 2 sess., appendix, pp. 315-317. See also Berwanger, *The Frontier Against Slavery*; Going, *David Wilmot*, p. 174 n.; Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War* (New York, 1970), pp. 261-300.

24. Jefferson Davis said in the Senate in 1860, "What do you propose, gentlemen of the Free-Soil party? Do you propose to better the condition of the slave? Not at all. What then do you propose? You say that you are opposed to the expansion of slavery. . . . Is the slave to be benefited by it? Not at all. It is not humanity that influences you. . . . it is that you may have an opportunity of cheating us that you want to limit slave territory. . . . It is that you may have a majority in the Congress of the United States and convert the Government into an engine of Northern aggrandizement. . . . you want by an unjust system of legislation to promote the industry of the New England states at the expense of the people of the South and their industry." Quoted in Beard and Beard, *Rise of American Civilization*, II, 5-6.

ments is necessary, there remains much tangible evidence that the people of the North did differ profoundly from those of the South in their attitudes toward slavery, if not toward the Negro. This difference had been increasing ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and it had grown to major proportions.

During the Colonial period, there had scarcely been any difference in sectional opinions concerning the morality of slavery, though there had been a vast difference in the degree to which the northern and the southern colonies depended upon slave labor. Eighteenth-century morality had hardly regarded slavery as presenting an ethical problem,²⁵ and the institution had existed with legal sanction in all the colonies. Later, when the War of Independence came, and with it the revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality, and the rights of man, both North and South had moved in unison to condemn slavery as an evil. The upper South had witnessed a formidable movement for the voluntary manumission of slaves by their masters, and societies for the emancipation and colonization of slaves had flourished in the South for more than a generation after the Revolution. Southern and northern congressmen alike had joined in voting to abolish the importation of slaves after the year 1808. Slavery was barred from the Old Northwest by the Ordinance of 1787; it was confined, even within the South, mostly to the limited areas of tobacco culture and rice culture, both of which were static. At this point, it seemed to many men in both sections only a question of time until the institution would wither and die.²⁶

25. Lawrence W. Towner, "The Sewall-Saffin Dialogue on Slavery," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd series, XXI (1964), 40-52, concludes that slavery as such "experienced little opposition until the decades of the Revolution." For the intellectual origins of antislavery, David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966), chaps. 10-14; for the Revolution as a turning point in attitudes toward slavery, Winthrop D. Jordan, *White Over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro* (Chapel Hill, 1968), chap. 7.

26. On the development and character of the early antislavery movement and its strength in the South see Stephen B. Weeks, "Anti-Slavery Sentiment in the South," *Southern History Association Publications*, II (1898), 87-130; Mary Stoughton Locke, *Anti-Slavery in America, 1619-1808* (Boston, 1901); Alice Dana Adams, *The Neglected Period of Anti-Slavery in America, 1808-1831* (Boston, 1908); Robert McColley, *Slavery and Jeffersonian Virginia* (Urbana, Ill., 1964); Donald L. Robinson, *Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765-1820* (New York, 1971); Arthur Zilversmit, *The First Emancipation: The Abolition of Slavery in the North* (Chicago, 1967); Clement Eaton, *Freedom of Thought in the Old South* (Durham, N.C., 1940), pp. 1-26; Gordon E. Finnie, "The Antislavery Movement in the Upper South before 1840," *JSH*, XXXV (1969), 319-342.

But despite the presence of a certain amount of antislavery sentiment in the post-Revolutionary South, there is considerable reason to doubt that the antislavery philosophy of the Age of Reason ever extended very far beyond the intellectuals in the South or very deep into the lower South even among the intellectuals. In any case, as the cotton economy, with its demand for slave labor, fastened itself upon the region, and as the center of southern population and leadership shifted southward from Virginia to South Carolina, a reaction set in. By 1832, the southern antislavery movement had vanished and the South had begun to formulate a doctrine that slavery was permanent, morally right, and socially desirable. As the abolitionists grew abusive, the South became increasingly defensive. When David Walker in 1829 published a pamphlet advocating insurrection, and when the bloody uprising of Nat Turner followed in 1831, many southerners interpreted it as proof that such advocacy was taking effect. The South reacted by adopting the proslavery doctrine as a matter of creed, not subject to doubt. Open discussion of slavery fell under a taboo, and the South established what has been called an "intellectual blockade."²⁷

Meanwhile, the states north of Maryland and Delaware had abolished slavery, either by immediate or by gradual steps. These states showed a consistent aversion to slavery long before the militant abolition movement began. But in the 1830s there arose a group of reformers—the abolitionists—who made an issue of slavery and aroused a widespread public sentiment against it. Where previous critics of slavery had been content with gradualism, with voluntary manumission by slaveholders, and with persuasion as a method, the

27. Eaton, *Freedom of Thought*, pp. 27-161; Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, *American Negro Slavery* (New York, 1918), pp. 132-149, on early defense of slavery in the South; Theodore M. Whitfield, *Slavery Agitation in Virginia, 1829-1832* (Baltimore, 1930); Joseph Clarke Robert, *The Road from Monticello: A Study of the Virginia Slavery Debate of 1832* (Durham, N.C., 1941); Kenneth M. Stampp, "The Fate of the Southern Anti-slavery Movement," *JNH*, XXVIII (1943), 10-22; Russel B. Nye, *Fettered Freedom: Civil Liberties and the Slavery Controversy, 1830-1860* (East Lansing, Mich., 1949); Joseph Cephas Carroll, *Slave Insurrections in the United States, 1800-1865* (Boston, 1938); Herbert Aptheker, *American Negro Slave Revolts* (New York, 1943); William Sumner Jenkins, *Pro-Slavery Thought in the Old South* (Chapel Hill, 1935); Richard N. Current, "John C. Calhoun, Philosopher of Reaction," *Antioch Review*, III (1943), 223-234; William W. Freehling, *Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836* (New York, 1965), which develops the thesis that the Nullification movement, "although ostensibly aimed at lowering the tariff, was also an attempt to check the abolitionists" (p. xii).

abolitionists demanded immediate action by coercive means, and they resorted to unbridled denunciation of slaveowners. Abolitionism was nourished by a pervasive humanitarianism which made this whole era a period of reform; it was stimulated by the fervor of a great evangelical revival; and it was encouraged by the British abolition of West Indian slavery in 1837. The abolitionists preached their cause from hundreds of pulpits, flooded the mail with pamphlets, sent numerous lecturers into the field, and organized scores of local antislavery societies, as well as two national associations. The militant William Lloyd Garrison is best remembered of the abolitionists, together with his supporters, Wendell Phillips, John Greenleaf Whittier, and Theodore Parker, but the more moderate Tappan brothers in New York, the talented ex-slave Frederick Douglass, and the dedicated and eloquent preacher Theodore Dwight Weld in the Ohio region, supported by James G. Birney and the Grimké sisters, all helped to galvanize public opposition to slavery on moral grounds. At times, the abolitionists were denounced and persecuted, but by the 1840s they had found a few voices in Congress, including no less a person than former President John Quincy Adams, and by 1845, they had been able to force repeal of the "gag rule" which prevented the discussion of antislavery petitions on the floor of Congress. Thus the antislavery movement by the mid-forties had proven itself a powerful force in American life.²⁸ This

28. On the antislavery movement in general, and for an excellent bibliography of the copious literature, see Filler, *Crusade Against Slavery*. Also the following not cited by Filler or published subsequently: Benjamin P. Thomas, *Theodore Weld, Crusader for Freedom* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1950); Ralph Korngold, *Two Friends of Man: The Story of William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips* (Boston, 1950); Russel B. Nye, *William Lloyd Garrison and the Humanitarian Reformers* (Boston, 1955); John L. Thomas, *The Liberator: William Lloyd Garrison* (Boston, 1963); Walter M. Merrill, *Against Wind and Tide: A Biography of William Lloyd Garrison* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963); Aileen S. Kradior, *Means and Ends in American Abolitionism: Garrison and His Critics on Strategy and Tactics, 1834-1850* (New York, 1969); Irving H. Bartlett, *Wendell Phillips, Brahmin Radical* (Boston, 1961); Tilden G. Edelstein, *Strange Enthusiasm: A Life of Thomas Wentworth Higginson* (New Haven, 1968); Bertiam Wyatt-Brown, *Lewis Tappan and the Evangelical War Against Slavery* (Cleveland, 1969); Merton Dillon, *Benjamin Lundy* (Urbana, Ill., 1966); Gerda Lerner, *The Grimké Sisters from South Carolina* (Boston, 1967); Martin Duberman, *James Russell Lowell* (Boston, 1966); Milton Meltzer, *Tongue of Flame: The Life of Lydia Maria Child* (New York, 1965); James Brewer Stewart, *Joshua R. Giddings and the Tactics of Radical Politics* (Cleveland, 1970); Gatell, *John Gorham Palfrey, Edward Magdol, Owen Lovejoy, Abolitionist in Congress* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1967); David Donald, *Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War* (New York, 1961); Richard H. Sewell, *John P. Hale and the Politics of Abolition* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); Dwight Lowell Dumond, *Antislavery: The Crusade for Freedom in America* (Ann Arbor,

had happened partly because it was increasingly clear that slavery was not in the process of extinction and the issue would not take care of itself. More fundamentally, it had happened because so many people sensed that slavery presented a giant contradiction to the two most basic of American values—equality and freedom—and to the Christian concept of the brotherhood of man. The reaction against slavery in terms of these values cannot be dismissed as a mere rationalized defense of northern industrial interests, for some of the harshest critics of slavery also opposed the exploitative elements in the northern system of factory labor, while some of the northern industrial magnates, such as the "cotton Whigs" of the Massachusetts textile industry, were conciliatory toward the South in their attitudes concerning slavery.²⁹

Thus, from this point of view, a conflict of values, rather than a conflict of interests or a conflict of cultures, lay at the root of the sectional schism.

These three explanations—cultural, economic, and ideological—have long been the standard formulas for explaining the sectional conflict. Each has been defended as though it were necessarily incompatible with the other two. But culture, economic interest, and values may all reflect the same fundamental forces at work in a society, in which case each will appear as an aspect of the other. Diversity of culture may naturally produce both diversity of interests and diversity of values. Further, the differences between a slaveholding and a nonslaveholding society would be reflected in all three aspects. Slavery presented an inescapable ethical question which precipitated a sharp conflict of values. It

Mich., 1961), an important work of vast erudition, but of deficient perspective; Lawrence Lader, *The Bold Brahmins: New England's War Against Slavery, 1831-1863* (New York, 1961); Martin Duberman (ed.), *The Antislavery Vanguard: New Essays on the Abolitionists* (Princeton, 1965); Clifford S. Griffin, *Their Brothers' Keepers: Moral Stewardship in the United States, 1800-1865* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1960); Benjamin Quarles, *Black Abolitionists* (New York, 1969); Hans L. Trefousse, *The Radical Republicans: Lincoln's Vanguard for Racial Justice* (New York, 1969); Gerald Sorin, *Abolitionism: A New Perspective* (New York, 1972). On the gag rule, Robert P. Ludlum, "The Anti-Slavery 'Gag Rule,' History and Argument," *JNH*, XXVI (1941), 203-243; Nye, *Fettered Freedom*, pp. 32-54; Samuel Flagg Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Union* (New York, 1956), pp. 326-383, 416-448; James M. McPherson, "The Fight Against the Gag Rule: Joshua Leavitt and Antislavery Insurgency in the Whig Party, 1839-1842," *JNH*, XLVIII (1963), 177-195.

29. Philip S. Foner, *Business and Slavery: The New York Merchants and the Irrepressible Conflict* (Chapel Hill, 1941), pp. 1-168; Thomas H. O'Connor, *Lords of the Loom: The Cotton Whigs and the Coming of the Civil War* (New York, 1968).

constituted a vast economic interest, and indeed the Emancipation Proclamation was the largest confiscation of property in American history. The stakes were large in the rivalry of slavery and freedom for ascendancy in the territories. Also, slavery was basic to the cultural divergence of North and South, because it was inextricably fused into the key elements of southern life—the staple crop and plantation system, the social and political ascendancy of the planter class, the authoritarian system of social control. Similarly, slavery shaped southern economic features in such a way as to accentuate their clash with those of the North. The southern commitment to the use of slave labor inhibited economic diversification and industrialization and strengthened the tyranny of King Cotton. Had it not done so, the economic differentials of the two sections would have been less clear-cut, and would not have met in such head-on collision.

The importance of slavery in all three of these aspects is evident further in its polarizing effect upon the sections. No other sectional factor could have brought about this effect in the same way. Culturally, the dualism of a democratic North and an aristocratic South was not complete, for the North had its quota of blue-bloods and grandes who felt an affinity with those of the South, and the South had its backwoods democrats, who resented the lordly airs of the planters. Similarly, the glib antithesis of a dynamic "commercial" North and a static "feudal" South cannot conceal the profoundly commercial and capitalistic impulses of the plantation system. But slavery really had a polarizing effect, for the North had no slaveholders—at least, not of resident slaves—and the South had virtually no abolitionists. Economically, also, the dualism was not complete, for the North had shipping interests which opposed protection, prairie farmers who wanted cheap credit, and Boston merchants who did not want to pay for canals and roads for the benefit of their rivals in New York. Northern politicians, while supporting the primary interests of their section, had also to heed these secondary interests, and to avoid antagonizing them unduly. But nowhere north of the Mason-Dixon line and the Ohio River were there any slaveholding interests, at least in a direct sense, and northern politicians found more to gain by denouncing slaveholders than by conciliating them. Conversely, the South had Charleston and New Orleans bankers who wanted conservative credit policies, landlocked Appalachian communities that yearned for subsidized roads, and aspiring local manufacturers who

believed that the South had an industrial future which the tariff would help to realize. Southern politicians had to accommodate themselves to these secondary interests. But the South after 1830 had few white inhabitants who did not shudder with alarm at the thought of the servile insurrection which antislavery might produce, and southern politicians found that they gained many votes and lost few by stigmatizing as an abolitionist anyone who entertained any misgivings about slavery.

Thus in cultural and economic matters, as well as in terms of values, slavery had an effect which no other sectional factor exercised in isolating North and South from each other. As they became isolated, instead of reacting to each other as they were in actuality, each reacted to a distorted mental image of the other—the North to an image of a southern world of lascivious and sadistic slavedrivers; the South to the image of a northern world of cunning Yankee traders and of rabid abolitionists plotting slave insurrections. This process of substituting stereotypes for realities could be very damaging indeed to the spirit of union, for it caused both northerners and southerners to lose sight of how much alike they were and how many values they shared. It also had an effect of changing men's attitudes toward the disagreements which are always certain to arise in politics: ordinary, resolvable disputes were converted into questions of principle, involving rigid, unnegotiable dogma. Abstractions, such as the question of the legal status of slavery in areas in which there were no slaves and to which no one intended to take any, became points of honor and focuses of contention which rocked the government to its foundation. Thus the slavery issue gave a false clarity and simplicity to sectional diversities which were otherwise qualified and diffuse. One might say that the issue structured and polarized many random, unoriented points of conflict on which sectional interest diverged. It transformed political action from a process of accommodation to a mode of combat. Once this divisive tendency set in, sectional rivalry increased the tensions of the slavery issue and the slavery issue embittered sectional rivalries, in a reciprocating process which the majority of Americans found themselves unable to check even though they deplored it.³⁰

30. This polarizing effect of the slavery issue was clearly recognized and very often mentioned by contemporaries. E.g., James K. Polk wrote on Jan. 22, 1848, "It [the slavery question] is brought forward at the North by a few ultra Northern members to advance the prospects of their favourite [candidate for the Presidency]. No sooner

From this viewpoint, the centrality of the slavery issue appears clear. Slavery, in one aspect or another, pervaded all of the aspects of sectionalism. But the recognition of this fact has often been obscured by fallacies in the prevailing analysis of northern attitudes toward slavery. Noting the conspicuous hostility of the northern public toward the abolitionists, the northern acceptance of slavery in the southern states, and the northern emphasis on keeping slaves out of the territories, historians have tried to understand northern attitudes by asking a simple question: Did the people of the North *really* oppose slavery? rather than a complex one: What was the rank of antislavery in the hierarchy of northern values?

If the question is posed in the simple form, as it usually is, the difficulty of an affirmative answer is obvious. There were too many situations in which the northern public would not support antislavery activism. This inescapable fact has been emphasized both by prosouthern historians, eager to demonstrate the lack of northern idealism, and by liberal historians, disillusioned that nineteenth-century antislavery falls far short of twentieth-century expectations. But if the question is posed in the complex form—that is, as an inquiry into the relationship between antislavery and other values—it will give room for recognition of the often-neglected truth that politics is usually less concerned with the attainment of one value than with the reconciliation of a number of them. The problem for Americans who, in the age of Lincoln, wanted slaves to be free was not simply that southerners wanted the opposite, but that they themselves cherished a conflicting

it is introduced than a few ultra Southern members are manifestly well satisfied that it has been brought forward, because by seizing upon it, they hope to array a Southern party in favour of their favourite." Quaife (ed.), *Polk Diary*, II, 348, also II, 457-459; IV, 39-34. Stephen A. Douglas, addressing Henry S. Foote of Mississippi in Congress on April 20, 1848, said that Senator Hale, a free-soiler, "is to be upheld at the North, because he is the champion of abolition; and you are to be upheld at the South, because you are the champions who meet him; so that it comes to this, that between those two ultra parties, we of the North who belong to neither are thrust aside." *Congressional Globe*, 30 Cong., 1 sess., appendix, pp. 506-507. Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri almost made a career of accusing Calhoun of using the slavery question to array section against section. Noting the antithesis of the abolitionist opposition to slavery in all territories and Calhoun's claim that slavery could go into any territories, Benton said, "So true it is that extremes meet, and that all fanaticism, for or against any dogma, terminates at the same point of intolerance and defiance." Speech at St. Louis, 1847, *Niles' Register*, LXXII (June 5, 1847), 222-223. See Frank L. Owsley, "The Fundamental Cause of the Civil War: Egotistic Sectionalism," *JSH*, VII (1941), 3-18.

value: they wanted the Constitution, which protected slavery, to be honored, and the Union, which was a fellowship with slaveholders, to be preserved. Thus they were committed to values that could not logically be reconciled.

The question for them was not a choice of alternatives—antislavery or proslavery—but a ranking of values: How far ought the harmony of the Union to be sacrificed to the principle of freedom, how far ought their feeling against slavery to be restrained by their veneration for the Union? How much should morality yield to patriotism, or vice versa? The difference between "antislavery men" and "conciliationists" in the North was not a question of what they thought about slavery alone, but of how they ranked these priorities.³¹ A few took the position that Union was not worth saving unless it embodied the principle of freedom, and thus they gave the slavery issue a clear priority. They agreed with John P. Hale of New Hampshire when he declared, "If this Union, with all its advantages, has no other cement than the blood of human slavery, let it perish." A few others took the clear-cut view that the Union was infinitely more important than the slavery issue and must not be jeopardized by it. Like John Chipman of Michigan, they would have said, "When gentlemen pretending to love their country would place the consideration of the nominal liberation of a handful of degraded Africans in the one scale, and this Union in the other, and make the latter kick the beam, he would not give a fig for their patriotism."³² But

31. The confusion in thinking about both northern and southern attitudes has been reflected in a lack of precision in the terminology which is applied to political groups. Those who gave a priority to Union are often designated as "moderates," with connotations of approval; those who gave a priority to the slavery issue, either as antislavery men or as vigorous defenders of the southern system, are designated as "extremists," with connotations of disapproval. In a strictly logical sense, this approaches absurdity, for those who were "moderate" about slavery were "extreme" about the Union, quite as much as those who were "moderate" about the Union were "extreme" about slavery. When there are two reference points—the Union and slavery—it is purely arbitrary to make one, rather than the other, the measure of extremism.

On the other hand, there is a good logical case for calling men who try to reconcile opposing values "moderates" (e.g., Lincoln in the North and the proslavery Unionists in the South), while defining "extremist" to mean a person who pursues one value to the exclusion of all others (e.g., Garrison in the North or "fire-eating" secessionists in the South). In this book, the two words are used sparingly, and always with reference to a plurality or a singularity of values, and not with reference to whether the Union value or the slavery value received the priority.

32. *Congressional Globe*, 30 Cong., 1 sess., p. 805 (Hale, May 31, 1848); 29 Cong., 2 sess., appendix, p. 322 (Chipman, Feb. 8, 1847).

most people were profoundly unwilling to sacrifice one value to the other.

Functionally, there is a standard way for preserving two or more values which cannot coexist logically in the same context: they must be kept in separate contexts. And this is what the northern public had learned to do, thus finding a way both to oppose slavery and to cherish a Constitution and a Union which protected it.³³ They placed their antislavery feelings in a context of state action, accepting personal responsibility for slavery within their own particular states. By abolishing slavery in each northern state, they had been true to antislavery principles in the state context. Meanwhile they placed their patriotism in a context of inherited obligation to carry out solemn promises given in the Constitution as an inducement to the South to adhere to the Union. By emphasizing the sanctity of a fixed obligation, they eliminated the element of volition or of personal responsibility for slavery at the federal level, and thus were true to the value of Union in this context.

In both contexts, the circumstances made their treatment seem realistic. Their concept of the Union as a rather loose association of states, each with a high degree of autonomy, was historically accurate, and made it easier for them to disclaim personal responsibility for slavery in distant states which had adopted it before they were born. This attitude was so deeply rooted that, on the eve of the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln, who thoroughly disapproved of slavery, was willing to amend the Constitution to guarantee its protection in states which chose to retain it. While thus convincing themselves that they were not responsible for slavery in the South, antislavery people also persuaded themselves—again plausibly—that in countenancing slavery in the South they had not betrayed the long-range goal of freedom, but that if they merely kept slavery from spreading into new areas it would eventually die out—as Lincoln hopefully expressed it, it would “be put in the course of ultimate extinction.” At the federal level, their concept of the Constitution as an exchange of promises, by which each party made great

33. Dumond, *Antislavery*, pp. 174, 294–295, 367–370, argues that the Constitution did not protect slavery. The abolitionists were divided on this question, but Garrison and Phillips thought that it did (Filler, *Crusade Against Slavery*, pp. 205–207). Regardless of what anyone may now conclude, the point here is that the northern public believed (correctly in my opinion) that the Constitution protected slavery, and it was the belief that was operative.

concessions in return for great advantages, was also historically realistic. But the constitutional obligations not only inhibited them from attacking slavery in the southern states; it also gave a perfect excuse to those who did not really want to attack it because they knew that such an assault would endanger the Union. This constitutional obligation proved a psychological lifesaver to a man like John Quincy Adams, who was genuinely both a great antislavery leader and a great champion of the Union. Adams was too much a Protestant to realize that he was taking absolution from the Founding Fathers for his sin of temporizing with slavery, when he declared that protection of the institution was “written in the bond,” and that while lamenting the fact he must nevertheless “faithfully perform its obligations.”³⁴

By these means, the people of the North who disliked slavery but felt patriotic devotion to the Union under the Constitution found a way to be antislavery men and Unionists at the same time. One had only to keep the two contexts apart. If leaders in the North did not overtly recognize this fact, many of them sensed it, and it is significant that the man who ultimately became the greatest figure in the antislavery movement was not one who was most ardent, but one who most successfully kept the two contexts apart. Abraham Lincoln could say that “if slavery is not wrong then nothing is wrong,” but he could also pledge himself to enforce the fugitive-slave clause of the Constitution and to defer the goal of emancipation into the remote future.

Anything that tended to expose the incompatibility of these values by bringing them to the same level and forcing them to confront one another in the same context was, of course, extremely threatening to the tranquillity of the northern mind. This was why the abolitionists incurred so much hostility. It is often supposed that their unpopularity stemmed from their opposition to slavery, but they were disliked in fact because they insisted upon the necessity to choose between the principle of antislavery and the principle of Union. Garrison, perhaps the most hated of the abolitionists, was also the one who asserted this necessity most explicitly. He admitted that the Constitution protected slavery, but instead of going on to the usual conclusion that this fact justified inaction, he contended

34. [Thomas Hart Benton], *Abridgment of the Debates of Congress . . .* (New York, 1860), XIII, 33.

that it damned the Constitution. To ensure that no one would misunderstand what he meant, he burned a copy of the Constitution in public, denouncing it as "a covenant with death and an agreement with Hell."³⁵ Garrison frankly, almost gladly, proclaimed the inescapability of choosing either slavery or disunion. The northern public hated him as much for his insistence that these were necessary alternatives as they did for the alternative which he chose.³⁶

When Garrison exposed the people's dilemma at the ideological level, they could still evade it by ostracizing him, placing a taboo on his ideas, and clinging to the devices by which they had kept the principle of antislavery and the principle of Union from colliding either in the realm of public affairs or in their own minds. But it was a precarious intellectual arrangement, and when Polk's Two-Million Bill exposed the dilemma at the operative level, the fragile adjustment broke down. Once the question of acquiring land from Mexico was raised, the threat of the antislavery principle to a Union which joined nonslaveholders with slaveholders, and the threat of such a Union to the ideal of antislavery, could no longer be evaded.

The slavery problem, which had been so carefully diffused and localized, could not now be kept from coming to a sharp focus as a national issue when it was presented in terms of a question whether the American flag would carry slavery to a land which had been free under the flag of "benighted" Mexico. It could no longer be sequestered behind constitutional sanctions and inhibitions when it arose in an area where most northerners believed that Congress had the power and an obligation to act. Men who had comforted themselves with the thought that they were not implicated by slavery in the southern states could not escape a sense of personal responsibility for slavery in the common territories.

Thus slavery suddenly emerged as a transcendent sectional issue in its own right, and as a catalyst of all sectional antagonisms, politi-

35. Filler, *Crusade Against Slavery*, pp. 178, 205-206, 216, 258-259, cites substantial evidence for his conclusion (p. 303) that "disunion sentiments were not a Garrisonian vagary but a popular Northern view" and that this fact "has been obscured for decades."

36. Perhaps one of the most serious deficiencies in the historical literature of this period is the lack of an analysis of the growth of a popular dislike of slavery, as distinguished from the growth of an abolitionist willingness to take steps against it. Nearly all histories of "antislavery" are in fact histories of the abolitionist movement, which never enjoyed the support of a public that nevertheless heartily disliked slavery.

cal, economic, and cultural. By removing the frail devices which had kept this issue from coming to a head, Polk's bill and Wilmot's amendment opened the floodgates of sectionalism, for now all the pent-up moral indignation which had been walled in by the constitutional inhibition could be vented into the territorial question.³⁷ As this happened, the slavery question would grow to dominate national politics, and Congress would become for fifteen years the arena of a continuous battle watched by millions of aroused sectional partisans. No other issue in American history has so monopolized the political scene. As early as 1848, the ubiquity of the slavery question reminded Thomas Hart Benton of the plague of frogs described in the Bible. "You could not look upon the table but there were frogs, you could not sit down at the banquet but there were frogs, you could not go to the bridal couch and lift the sheets but there were frogs!" So, too, was it with "this black question, forever on the table, on the nuptial couch, everywhere!"³⁸ Benton survived for ten years after this statement, but he did not live to see the end of the plague.

Thus, in circumstances which have puzzled so many Americans of the twentieth century, the slavery question became the sectional question, the sectional question became the slavery question, and both became the territorial question. By this transposition, they entered the arena of politics and there became subject to all the escalation and intensification which the political medium could give to them. By this transposition, also, the slavery question became cryptic. Instead of being fought out on the direct and intelligible alternatives of emancipation versus continued servitude, it became a contest over the technicalities of legal doctrine concerning the relation of Congress and the states to territories, organized or unorganized. Instead of being challenged where it prevailed, slavery was challenged where it did not exist. Instead of proclaiming the goal of emancipation, the opponents of slavery began the long battle in a way which prevented them from admitting the goal even to them-

37. On the function of the territorial question in providing an outlet for antislavery impulses which were otherwise inhibited by constitutional sanctions, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Causes of the Civil War: A Note on Historical Sentimentalism," *Partisan Review*, XVI (1949), 969-981, reprinted in Schlesinger, *The Politics of Hope* (Boston, 1963), pp. 34-47; Potter and Manning (eds.), *Nationalism and Sectionalism*, pp. 215-216.

38. *Congressional Globe*, 30 Cong., 1 sess., appendix, p. 686.

selves. Certainly it was not dreamed of in the philosophy of David Wilmot. But from the sultry August night in 1846 when Wilmot caught the chairman's eye, the slavery question steadily widened the sectional rift until an April dawn in 1861 when the batteries along the Charleston waterfront opened fire on Fort Sumter and brought the vigorous force of American nationalism to its supreme crisis.

CHAPTER 3

Forging the Territorial Shears

IF American sectionalism entered a new phase in 1846, it was neither because North and South clashed for the first time nor because the issue of slavery for the first time assumed importance. As early as the Confederation, North and South had been at odds over the taxation of imports and exports, over the degree of risk to be run in seeking navigation rights at the mouth of the Mississippi, and over the taxation of slave property. Once the government under the Constitution went into effect, bitter sectional conflicts raged over the assumption of state debts, the chartering of a central bank, and other matters. This sectional rivalry tended to become institutionalized in the opposing Federalist and Jeffersonian Republican organizations, and it became so serious that Washington issued a solemn warning against sectionalism in his Farewell Address. Later, as the Jeffersonians enjoyed a quarter-century of domination in national politics, they became more nationalistic in their outlook, while Federalist nationalism withered. But no matter which region embraced nationalism and which particularism, sectional conflict remained a recurrent phenomenon.¹

1. For sectionalism before 1820, see John Richard Alden, *The First South* (Baton Rouge, 1961); Edmund Cody Burnett, *The Continental Congress* (New York, 1941), pp. 28, 78, 237-240, 248-258, 433-438, 595-706; Glover Moore, *The Missouri Controversy, 1819-1821* (Lexington, Ky., 1953), pp. 1-32; Staughton Lynd, "The Abolitionist Critique of the United States Constitution," in Martin Duberman (ed.), *The Anti-slavery Vanguard* (Princeton, 1965), pp. 209-239; Donald L. Robinson, *Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765-1820* (New York, 1971).