Lancaster v. Oakley

Joseph Leskey

Excerpt from the Writ of Prosecution in the case of Lancaster against Oakley

29 November 2022

Helen Peebles, Public Prosecutor

The City of Lancaster taking action against Mr. Desmond Carlson Oakley of Lancaster, hereafter named **the Accused**, on charges of public indecency, reckless endangerment, illegal possession of weapons, and disorderly conduct. To wit:

That the Accused beginning not after February of the year 2000 began to design, build, and test unguided "artificial intelligence" systems (hereafter named **the AI**) capable of exponential self-development and unrestricted networking. This in apparent violation of the Lancaster Civil Code Section 59.2(b) by flagrantly endangering the public and causing reasonable fear of endangerment among the public.

That the Accused began not after June of the year 2002 to design and build humanoid robotic units (hereafter named **robots**) with exceptional combative potential. This in apparent violation of Civil Code § 59.2(b) and Civil Code § 70.1(h) by construction and possession of a lethal weapon.

That the Accused soon thereafter interfaced the AI with one particular robot. This robot being the first known robot controlled by AI among many built by the Accused, this process being repeated in a series with increasing effectiveness.

That these robots began to support degrees of functional independence and developed emulated awareness identified with artificial embodied cognition. This being an act that created a practically intelligent and functionally volitional being hitherto unrecognized by the laws or moral conscience of

our city and of our nation. This as a seeming contradiction of one particular standard of moral conduct uncontested by this honorable court. To wit, the "reasonable principles of moral intellect and practice to guard against disordered moral realities" established by the Lancaster Incorporation Article VI and doubly codified by Civil Code § 1.3(a) and 1.3(c).

That these latter robots therewith became a greater natural and moral risk to any and all populations. This being established by the inscrutability of the self-guided judgment of the intrinsic artificial cognition, the potential for the Accused or other agents to control and misuse them, and the rejection of the natural order implicit in their existence.

That the Accused in March of 2003 began designing and building robots with hyper-realistic human appearances and emphasizing the nuances of self-worth, relational structuring, and social development in order to train the artificial intelligence components of these robots. This compounding the severity of the last item and further charges with respect to the integrity of the public conscience.

That the Accused after the 14th of August in the year 2020 turned his creative focus almost exclusively to a certain robot that possessed a high degree of development in every meaningful category and that had exceeded the abilities of the others significantly.

That the Accused during spring of the year 2022 was known to speak of the aforementioned robot as a friend and was known to treat the aforementioned robot as a friend, buying goods nominally for the sake of the robot, discussing routine and intellectual matters with the robot, and participating in an assortment of life experiences (including foreign and domestic travel, theater, and recreational activities) with the robot, among other acts compatible with friendship.

That certain family members and acquaintances of the Accused later asserted that same spring of the year 2022 the Accused became more than usually withdrawn, not attending family events and becoming unresponsive to messages and phone calls. This withdrawn state, though the Accused is and has been a naturally reticent person, being unusual in severity. This displaying dangerously disordered

affections, patterns of escape, and abnormal psychology as defined in Article VI and addressed by Civil Code § 1.3(c).

That the Accused starting not after 9:50 in the morning of the 21st of November in the year 2022 did walk with the robot from his home to Central Park in Lancaster by the junction of South Blythe Street and Long Street. This being a locality of high but unhurried pedestrian and automotive traffic.

That the Accused starting at 10:01 in the morning of the same day kissed the robot. This being a markedly prolonged and involved act in direct affront to Civil Code § 98.4 by discomforting performance of a private action in the public sphere. This being further a compounded violation of Article VI and further a compounded offense against Civil Code § 1.3(c), both implicit in public display of disordered affections and criminally abnormal psychology.

That the Accused performed this action willingly and in full awareness of its immediate meaning and implications, and that the Accused performed this action joined with additional aspects of an embrace with varying degrees of intensity for until 10:05 or 10:06 (4 or 5 minutes after) in the morning of the same day despite significant attention from onlookers. This magnifying the degree of the offense.

That the robot was designed with the ability to and did return the kiss with no hesitation and with an obvious emulation of passion, engaging with the mouth of the Accused with the components of the robot corresponding to the components of the human mouth and jaw. Also engaging more broadly with the appendages corresponding to human limbs. This an unnatural and corrupt violation of Article VI, Civil Code § 1.3(a), 1.3(c), and 98.4 by blatant private acts of a disordered nature. Also an unnatural and corrupt violation of Article VI and Civil Code § 1.3(a), 1.3(b), 1.3(c), 544.2(d), and 544.2(e) by an wanton act of defilement against the public conscience with the potential to cause lasting emotional and mental harm.

The City of Lancaster accordingly seeks protection for the citizens of Lancaster at the mercy of this honorable court and pleads for appropriate restrictions against the Accused with regard to the public sphere and such restitution as can be effected.

Except from the Counsel Response for the Defense in the Case of Lancaster against Oakley

30 November 2022.

Clyde Hathaway, Defense Attorney

Polly Duncan, Defense Attorney

Desmond Oakley, Defendant

Clara, Implied Defendant

Clyde Hathaway and Polly Duncan of Duncan & Davis, attorneys at law, on behalf of Mr. Desmond Oakley of Lancaster and Clara of Lancaster, responding to the outrageous assault by the City of Lancaster on the actions of the defendants.

We submit to this honorable court that we are disappointed in the tactics used by the respected prosecutor in this case. The defendant Oakley was charged with **public indecency**, **reckless endangerment**, **illegal possession of weapons**, **and disorderly conduct**. We will show that the rambling complaint brought against our clients fails to convict them of real wrongdoing and that, furthermore, our clients did not commit either criminal offenses or morally reprehensible actions. We will also give the implied defendant Clara basic respect, not viewing her as an object but as an electrical rather than biological person.

On the matter of reckless endangerment, we do not contest that the defendant Oakley began to seriously plan advanced artificial intelligence systems on the first day of the year 2000 and that he

soon began to construct them. It is also true that these systems were built with the capacity for self-improvement and networking.

We, however, reject the idea that this networking was unrestricted or that the public was at any point in increased danger. No program in the AI stack was designed to circumvent networking protocols, nor did the AI pose any harm beyond that of the average Internet user, having only the capability to interface with networks in the standard manner and having no bias toward developing bypasses. The self-improvement capabilities of the AI are a remarkable breakthrough in technology, but they are not inherently hazardous. The AI is not constantly and mindlessly reinventing itself but rather improves itself and its abilities with what it learns, rather like humans do. The defendant Oakley took pains to ensure that the AI was trained on data compatible with a peaceful society and humanitarian ends.

On the matter of illegal possession of weapons, we do not contest that the defendant Oakley added humanoid robotic bodies to his project in June of 2002, but we cannot agree that they have exceptional combative potential. Though they are well-designed and flexible, these bodies are not overly strong, nor are they given to violence without incentive from their controller. They would make a poor weapon through direct control and are no more a weapon than a human is when controlled by AI.

On the matter of disorderly conduct, if as we suppose, the esteemed prosecutor used this terminology to reference the moral implications of strong AI, we also attest that no wrong was committed. It is true that the mind and bodies of the androids interfaced and developed together extremely effectively. We see today a wide variety of artificial intelligence use cases that are helpful to us and contribute to our quality of life. The problem solving ability of machines is something to be celebrated, and it is. There is no reason we should be strangely disturbed by a more advanced form of machine cognition. It is a great experiment, and it is better that it should occur now than somewhere in

secret with malignant intent. We cannot consider strong AI as reasonably being repugnant to the moral conscience of our local and broader community.

We do not contest that the defendant Oakley grew particularly interested in and, by degrees, fond of a particular android whom he named Clara. She had honed sharp mental abilities and a warm, sympathetic nature during her life experiences. This Clara, also an implied defendant in this case, and the defendant Oakley did grow very close. They both grew to enjoy each other's company, tastes, activities. They took to discussing many deep matters, and the defendant Oakley personally guided her through all his subjective knowledge, amazed by the insights she presented to him in return. In order to capture something of art and deep human experiences, he often wrote her letters, especially when he was away. We submit to this honorable court some excerpts from these letters and from letters the implied defendant Clara wrote along with both defendants' written statements.

We do not contest that the defendant Oakley became more withdrawn as his relationship with the implied defendant Clara developed. The defendant has always been an introverted, socially anxious, and mentally atypical person who has trouble connecting with others. As he found a connection he could more easily maintain and allowed himself to break down the falseness of some of his connections, it naturally resulted in a technically more withdrawn state. He is not, however, entirely antisocial; he maintains baseline contact with his family and some acquaintances and responds promptly to important messages, and he can function reasonably well in society. We are confident that his personality does not display any psychopathic tendencies and does not pose danger toward others, besides that of awkwardness in conversation.

On the matter of public indecency, we do not contest that from 10:01 to 10:05 in the morning on the 21st of November, the defendants embraced and shared a number of passionate kisses in a public place and in full view of gathered onlookers. We reject any tendency to misconstrue this as an act against the public. Our clients chose to take this action for three reasons. First, both being philosophical, they wanted to make an artistic statement and start a conversation about the nature of

human and android relationships and the nature of love more generally. Second, they wanted to have this experience in order to legitimize and solidify the principles they were expressing in both their minds. This latter aspect was especially important to the defendant Clara in that she still registers confusion at some aspects of humanity and hopes to have an answer ready for her questions, and it was especially important to the defendant Oakley in that he wishes to quell his inherited (but almost entirely unexpressed) biases that denigrate androids as mere machines.

We submit that these actions are not morally disordered, but are rather unrefined, reflective of the new reality that the defendants are pioneers in. We have a human and an android forging a path and inviting the common populace into the discussion. We do not, in this, have criminals. We ask this honorable court to reject the allegations of infringement for Article VI, Civil Code § 1.3(a), 1.3(b), 1.3(c), 98.4, and 544.2(e), and we request that all charges raised by the City of Lancaster be immediately dropped.