


# INTEGRACIÓN DE IDEMIX EN ENTORNOS DE IOT

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José Luis Cánovas Sánchez: *Integración de Idemix en entornos de IoT*

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## ABSTRACT

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Short summary of the contents in English...a great guide by Kent Beck how to write good abstracts can be found here:

<https://plg.uwaterloo.ca/~migod/research/beck00PSLA.html>



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## ACRONYMS

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IoT Internet of Things

ZKP Zero-Knowledge Proof

P2ABCE Privacy-Preserving Attribute-Based Credentials Engine

PoC Proof of Concept

APDU Application Protocol Data Unit

BLOB Binary Large OBject

CoAP Constrained Application Protocol



## INTRODUCTION

---

The Internet of Things ([IoT](#)) is a term with a wide range of interpretations [1], briefly, we can think of it as a set of devices, mainly resource constrained, that are interconnected between them in order to achieve a goal. For example, a network of lampposts with proximity sensors that talk to each other so they light up part of the street when a passerby walks by, but save energy when not; greenhouses with automated irrigation to balance costs and quality vegetables; or cars exchanging traffic data to reduce city pollution from traffic jams or avoid accidents.

Many of this objectives require the use of a great amount of data, and thanks to organizations like [WikiLeaks](#), people are aware of the implications of their data on the Internet, demanding more security and privacy for it. This includes not only the data shared with others, where one must trust they will keep it safe, but it's also the data collected about us and that we don't have direct control over it. The attack Sony suffered in 2011 to PSN<sup>1</sup> is an example of the trust people had in Sony to store their billing information, and because the security of that information depended on both them and Sony, people found themselves compromised unable to do anything about it.

With the proliferation of IoT devices gathering as much information as they can with their sensors, the amount of data gathered about anyone can be immense. And IoT has proved to not address neither security nor privacy, with recent events like the Mirai botnet DDoS attack on October 2016, considered the biggest DDoS in history [17], or the multiple vulnerabilities affecting house devices, like baby monitors [21].

To address this problem of privacy in the Internet, a recent approach is the concept of *strong anonymity*, that conceals our personal details while letting us continue to operate online as a clearly defined individuals [11]. To achieve it, we must address a way to perform authentication and authorization in the most privacy-friendly approach. Attribute-based credentials and *selective disclosure* allow to control what information we reveal, under a trusted environment.

Intuitively, an attribute-based credential can be thought of as a digital signature by the Issuer on a list of attribute-value pairs, e.g. the list (fname=Alice, lname=Anderson, bdate=1977-05-10, nation=DE) [18]. The most straightforward way for the User to convince a Verifier of her list of attributes would be to simply transmit her credential

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
<sup>1</sup> 2011 PlayStation Network outage - [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011\\_PlayStation\\_Network\\_outage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_PlayStation_Network_outage)

to the Verifier. With anonymous credentials, the User never transmits the credential itself, but rather uses it to convince the Verifier that her attributes satisfy certain properties – without leaking anything about the credential other than the shown properties. This has the obvious advantage that the Verifier can no longer reuse the credential to impersonate Alice. Another advantage is that anonymous credentials allow the User to reveal a selected subset of her attributes. Stronger even, apart from showing the exact value of an attribute, the User can even convince the Verifier that some complex predicate over the attributes holds, e.g. that her birth date was more than 18 years ago, without revealing the real date.

With usual symmetric and asymmetric cryptography it seems impossible to create such credentials, without an explosion of signatures over every possible combination. That's why current solutions rely on Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), cryptographic methods that allow to proof knowledge of some data without disclosing it.

To understand how ZKPs work, in 1990 Guillou, Quisquater and Berson published in *How to Explain Zero-Knowledge Protocols to Your Children* [15] a story about how Ali Baba proved that he knew the magic words to open the cave, but without revealing those words to anyone. Here we present a brief version highlighting the properties of ZKPs.

Imagine a cave, where the path forks in two passages, and at the end of each one, they join again, with the shape of a ring. In the point the paths meet, there is a magic door, that only opens when someone pronounces the magic word.




The cave [16].

Peggy takes randomly A or B.  
Victor awaits outside.

Peggy knows the secret word and wants to prove it to her friend, Victor, but without revealing it. Peggy and Victor meet at the entrance of the cave, then Victor awaits while Peggy goes inside the cave, taking one of the passages, that we will name A and B. Victor can't see which way Peggy went.

When Peggy arrives at the door, Victor enters the cave, and when he arrives to the fork, stops and yells which path, A or B, he wants Peggy to come back, to verify she knows how to open the door.



The cave. Victor chooses randomly the returning path for Peggy.

If Peggy actually knows the secret, she always can take the requested path, opening the magic door if needed. But if Peggy doesn't know the magic word, she had a chance of 50% to guess correctly what passage Victor was going to ask. That means she had a chance to fool Victor.

To read more about ZKPs, refer to my Mathematics thesis [23].

Victor then asks to repeat the experiment. With 20 repetitions, the chances Peggy fools Victor in all of them is only  $2^{-20}$ ,

Eve, curious about what Victor and Peggy were doing in the cave, eavesdrops Victor during the process. The problem is that Eve doesn't know if Peggy and Victor agreed on what paths to choose, because they wanted to prank her for being busybody. Only Victor is confident he is choosing the returning passage randomly.

Later, Victor is convinced that the door can be opened and Peggy knows the word, but he can't prove it to Eve because he can't open the door.



*The cave. Peggy returns by the requested path.*

Based on ZKP properties, IBM has developed the Identity Mixer<sup>2</sup>, Idemix for short, protocol suite for privacy-preserving authentication and transfer of certified attributes. It allows user authentication without divulging any personal data. Users have a personal certificate with multiple attributes, but they can choose how many to disclose, or only give a proof of them, like being older than 18 years-old, living in a country without revealing the city, etc. Thus, no personal data is collected that needs to be protected, managed, and treated.

*"If your personal data is never collected, it cannot be stolen."*

The goal of this project is to integrate Idemix with the IoT. It will be done using the ABC4Trust's Privacy-Preserving Attribute-Based Credentials Engine ([P2ABCE](#)), a framework that defines a common architecture, policy language and data artifacts for an attribute based ecosystem, cryptographically based on either IBM's Idemix or Microsoft's U-Prove<sup>3</sup>. This gives us a standardized language to exchange Idemix's messages between IoT devices and any other P2ABCE actor.

### 1.1 OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS

This document is structured as follows: In [Chapter 2](#) we show a state of the art analysis through the history of Idemix and related works, analysing what is of the most interest for the IoT perspective; then, in [Chapter 3](#) we outline the project's objectives and analyse in depth the existing solutions that we are going to deal with; in [Chapter 4](#) we describe the formal design of the IoT and Idemix solution, and describe the PoC implementation developed; after an implementation, it is a

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<sup>2</sup> Identity Mixer - <https://www.research.ibm.com/labs/zurich/idemix/>

<sup>3</sup> P2ABCEngine <https://github.com/p2abcengine/p2abcengine>

must to validate it, as showed during the performance tests in [Chapter 5](#); finally, our conclusions and lines for future work are described in [Chapter 6](#).

# 2

## STATE OF THE ART

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In this project we will study Identity Mixer as an Attribute-Based Credentials (ABC) solution for privacy-preserving scenarios, but there exist other solutions competing to give the best performance and capabilities as possible. The two most notable alternatives to Idemix are Microsoft's U-Prove and Persiano's ABC systems.

Persiano and Visconti presented a non-transferable anonymous credential system that is multi-show and for which it is possible to prove properties (encoded by a linear Boolean formula) of the credentials [14]. Unfortunately, their proof system is not efficient since the step in which a user proves possession of credentials (that needs a number of modular exponentiations that is linear in the number of credentials) must be repeated times (where is the security parameter) in order to obtain a satisfying soundness.

Stefan Brands provided the first integral description of the U-Prove technology in his thesis [4] in 2000, after which he founded the company Credentica in 2002 to implement and sell this technology. Microsoft acquired Credentica in 2008 and published the U-Prove protocol specification [3] in 2010 under the Open Specification Promise<sup>4</sup> together with open source reference software development kits (SDKs) in C# and Java. The U-Prove technology is centered around a so-called U-Prove token. This token serves as a pseudonym for the prover. It contains a number of attributes which can be selectively disclosed to a verifier. Hence the prover decides which attributes to show and which to withhold. Finally there is the token's public-key, which aggregates all information in the token, and a signature from the issuer over this public-key to ensure the authenticity [19].

Jan Camenisch, Markus Stadler and Anna Lysyanskaya studied in [7], [5] and [6] the cryptographic bases for signature schemes and anonymous credentials, that later became IBM's Identity Mixer protocol specification [20].

Luuk Danes in 2007 studied theoretically how Idemix's User role could be implemented using smart cards [9], identifying what data and operations should be kept inside the device to perform different levels of security. The User role was divided between the smart card, holding secret keys, and the Idemix terminal, that commanded operations inside the smart card, or read the keys in it to perform the instructions itself. The studied sets were:

- The smart card gives all information to the terminal.
- The smart card only keeps the master key secret.

- The smart card only gives the pseudonym with the verifier to the terminal.
- The smart card keeps everything secret.

Later, in 2008 Víctor Sucasas also studied an anonymous credential system with smart card support [13], equivalent to a basic version of Idemix, using a simulator to test the PoC and pointing out some crucial implementation details for performance. The researching tendency starts to show that smart cards are the best solution to hold safely the User's credentials.

In 2009, some Java smart card PoC for Idemix were developed in [2] and [22], but they weren't optimal and didn't include some Idemix's functionalities, like selective disclosure.

Later, in 2013, Vullers and Alpar, implemented an efficient smart card for Idemix [24], aiming to integrate it in the IRMA<sup>1</sup> project, and comparing the performance with U-Prove's smart cards. This new implementation was written in C, under the MULTOS platform for smart cards, and describes many decisions made during the development to improve the performance on such constrained devices. The terminal application was written in Java and used an extension of the Idemix cryptographic library to take care of the smart card specifics.

Extending the concept of smart cards, physical or logical, as holders of the credentials, the ABC4Trust's project, P2ABCE<sup>2</sup>, was created as a unified ABC system for different cryptographic engines, currently supporting U-Prove and Idemix. The Idemix library was updated to support P2ABCE and the last version is interoperable with U-Prove. Therefore, the smart card specification from the P2ABCE project could be considered the official version to work with.

Related to the IoT, the P2ABCE project has been used to test in a VANET<sup>3</sup> scenario how an OBU (On Board Unit), with constrained hardware, could act as a User in an P2ABC system [10]. However, after the theoretical analysis, the paper only simulates a computer with similar performance as an OBU, without adapting the existing Java implementation of P2ABCE to a real VANET system. In our project, we can consider ourselves as part of their *future work*, because our PoC will execute on hardware actually used in VANET systems, although the OS may not be the same.

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<sup>1</sup> The IRMA project has been recently included in the Privacy by Design Foundation: <https://privacybydesign.foundation/>

<sup>2</sup> Privacy-Preserving Attribute-Based Credentials Engine - <https://github.com/p2abce/p2abce>

<sup>3</sup> Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network

# 3

## OBJECTIVES AND ANALYSIS

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In this chapter we describe the project objectives, and the methodology followed during its development. We continue then describing the privacy-preserving attribute based credentials and the ecosystem surrounding it, from the P2ABCE's perspective, as it is the starting point of our project. We finish with an introduction to all the technologies involved in our development, from P2ABCE's code, to how smart cards work.

### 3.1 PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The purpose of this project is the integration of IBM's privacy preserving solution, Idemix, in the environment of the Internet of Things. The objective is to design a general solution for the existing IoT devices and systems, without compromising any feature of Idemix, and provide a working PoC in a real IoT environment, even though it isn't the most constrained scenario. The project is aimed to be used in privacy-preserving environments, providing security for IoT, controlling what data is being disclosed and to whom.

In a smart city project, citizens' data can be privatized and at the same time continue to offer the benefits of the sensors around. Authorized personnel can disclose the information when required, like fire-fighters accessing a building's sensors to check how many people there are and what conditions they are in, in case of an emergency; but keep such invasive data private to other non-critical services, for example, only giving a proof that there are people in a floor of the building, to activate or deactivate the air-conditioning system.

We will divide the project in various objectives:

1. Idemix and the IoT

This is our main objective, integrating IBM's privacy-preserving system in the IoT environment.

2. Study of the Idemix ecosystem

Study the state of the art of Idemix and the IoT, analysing the related projects and papers with similar approaches. Once we know as much as we can from the existing ecosystem, we will be able to deliver the most fitting solution to our project.

3. Design of the IoT+Idemix solution

A formal description of the IoT architecture that will use Idemix.

#### 4. Implementation of a functional PoC

##### Software objectives

A maintainable, structured and extensible solution, from the IoT and original project perspectives, that is, the IoT solution must be interoperable with other non-IoT solutions, now and in the future, given new IoT systems or changes in the cryptographic protocols.

##### Hardware objectives

Be compatible with devices as constrained as possible, considering the multiple IoT platforms existing.

#### 5. Validation of the PoC

Deploy a Proof of Concept ([PoC](#)) in a real scenario, without the need of simulators, checking that it works as expected.

#### 6. Evaluation of performance

Measure and compare the solution's performance against the existing ones.

#### 7. Integrate the IoT+Idemix as a security solution for other projects

The IoT+Idemix project is a solution for the privacy threads in the IoT environment, and does not work on its own, but as part of other projects.

### 3.2 METHODOLOGY

Giving the vast range of IoT devices, a one-for-all solution must take in consideration multiple requirements and limitations. We will break down the original system, Idemix and P2ABCE, analyze every part of it and categorize them. We will consider what components are mandatory to be executed in the target device that wants to act as User or Verifier, and which components the devices would actually be able to execute.

Devices with equivalent processing power to smart phones are capable of running the current Java implementations of P2ABCE with Idemix, but the most constrained IoT devices can not handle the entire system, only the mandatory cryptographic operations.

Using the technique known as *Computation Offloading* we can design an IoT architecture where the most constrained targets can keep their private keys and certificates secure within the device, and act as any other actor in the P2ABCE system. Studying the original P2ABCE architecture and implementations we will identify the key operations to be executed in the constrained device, and how to communicate efficiently during the delegation.

After the technical design, we will implement the PoC, using known software designs patterns, that will improve the maintainability of

the project. Taking advantage of this practices, we can document the immediate steps for future developers, how to reimplement certain interfaces when porting the application to a new system, or where the core logic lies, to implement future protocol changes.

Finally, the PoC will be evaluated to assert that we achieved our goals, and measure its performance, judging if it can indeed be suitable for a IoT deployment.

### 3.3 ANALYSIS OF P2ABCE

There are several cryptographic systems for dealing with attribute-based identities. Typically these systems distinguish credentials and attributes. Informally, a credential is a cryptographic container of attributes, where an attribute has a type and a value [24].




Figure 1: A first look at an attribute-based credential with four attributes.

The Privacy Preserving Attribute Based Credentials system is composed by several actors, each one of them with different roles. One entity could act with more than one role, e.g., in a M2M (Machine To Machine) scenario, a device could act as both User and Verifier to other peers; but one can assume each actor acts with one role at a time.

The roles are:

- **Issuer**

In the ABC infrastructure, the Issuer is a trusted entity responsible for issuing credentials, vouching for the correctness of the information contained. Each Issuer generates a secret key and publishes the Issuer parameters that include the corresponding public verification key.

- **User**

Entities that collect credentials from various Issuers. They can decide between all their credentials which attributes and values to present when making assertions about their identity to service providers.

- **Verifier**

A service provider that protects access to a resource by imposing restrictions on the credentials that users must own and the




Figure 2: Entities in a P2ABC System

information from these credentials that users must present in order to access the service.

- **Revocation Authority (optional)**

This entity is responsible for revoking issued credential, preventing their further usage to generate a presentation token. Each revocation authority generates and publishes its revocation parameters.

- **Inspector (optional)**

The Inspector's duty is to de-anonymize the user's presentation token under specific circumstances (e.g. misuse or liability). At setup, each inspector generates a private decryption key and a corresponding public encryption key. Usually, the capability of inspection should be bonded to privacy protection laws.

Zero-knowledge proofs used in Idemix allow a user to prove ownership of a credential without revealing the credential itself. Since the verifier does not see the credential, verification instances are unlinkable and they also cannot be related to the issuing procedure. The privacy of users is protected by these unlinkability properties, even if the credential issuer and all verifiers collude. We can identify the following key features of the Idemix system [10]:

- **Issuance unlinkability:** the issuer cannot link an issued credential to the presentation of such credential.
- **Multi-show unlinkability:** a credential can be used multiple times without the resulting evidence becoming linkable.

- **Selective disclosure of attributes:** allows users to prove only a subset of attributes to a verifier.
- **Predicate proof:** it consists of statements that allow to prove a property of an attribute without disclosing its actual value. Example of these statements are the logical operators > or <.
- **Proof of holdership:** a cryptographic evidence for proving ownership or possession of a credential without disclosing the attributes contained in that credential.
- **Non-transferability:** key binding can be used to bind one or more credentials of a user to the same secret.
- **Scope-exclusive pseudonyms:** a certified pseudonym unique for a specific scope and secret key, i.e. a single pseudonym can be created for each credential.
- **Carry-over attributes:** it relies on the assumption that the user already possesses a credential, from which a given attribute can be carried over into the new credential without disclosing the attribute value to the Issuer.
- **Cross-credential proofs:** it allows users to prove relations between attributes from two or more credentials without revealing them to the verifier. For instance, that the name contained on a credit card and on a passport match.
- **De-anonymization:** it is an optional feature that allows an Inspector, either alone or in cooperation with other entities, to reveal the identity of users in cases of accountability and non-repudiation.
- **Revocation:** in case of misuse, it allows the revocation of issued credentials to (misbehaving) users. Thus, revoked credentials can no longer be used to generate Presentation Tokens.

To sum up, an attribute-based credential contains attribute-value pairs that are certified by a trusted Issuer. A credential can also specify one or more Revocation Authorities who are able to revoke the credential if necessary. Using her credentials, a User can form a presentation token that contains a subset of the certified attributes, provided that the corresponding credentials have not been revoked. Additionally, some of the attributes can be encoded in the presentation token so that they can only be retrieved by an Inspector. Receiving a presentation token from a User, a Verifier checks whether the presentation token is valid w.r.t. the relevant Issuers and Inspector's public keys and the latest revocation information. If the verification succeeds, the Verifier will be convinced that the attributes contained in the presentation token are vouched by the corresponding Issuers.

In the P2ABCE repository<sup>1</sup> there is available the project's code, divided in two solutions: a complete P2ABCE implementation in Java and a MULTOS smart card implementation as PoC for the project.

### 3.3.1 P2ABCE Code Structure and REST Services

The Java code is managed by a Maven project, structured using various known design patterns, but not of our interest. The part we are actually interested in are the *REST Services* and their use of the *Components* classes, where the smart card's logic and use are defined.

P2ABCE project is based on the concept of smart cards, virtual or physical, to store the credentials. An interface is defined to communicate with these smart cards, and then different implementations allow to use either *Software Smartcards* or *Hardware Smartcards*.

The *SoftwareSmartcard* class implements the interface in Java, suitable for applications using P2ABCE self-storing digital smart cards, like a virtual wallet.

The *HardwareSmartcard* class uses the standard APDU messages (3.4.1) to interact with smartcards. P2ABCE defines the necessary APDU instructions for the smart card needed to implement each method of the interface. It relies on `javax.smartcardio` abstract classes (implemented by Oracle in their JRE) to communicate the smart card reader and the smart card. This way, it doesn't matter what manufacturer issues the smartcard, or if it's an Android device with NFC, if they support the APDU instructions, P2ABCE will work with them.




Figure 3: Basic P2ABCE structure

The project also provides a set of REST services to control each role of the P2ABCE system (User, Issuer, Verifier, Inspector, etc.). The methods implemented include the creation of *Software* smart cards

<sup>1</sup> <https://github.com/p2abcengine/p2abcengine>

within the User Service, and store them in a data base for future REST calls that may need them.

The services receive parameters like the length of the cryptographic keys, IDs, or XML files to parse. The REST API is not meant for a User Service to communicate with an Issuer Service, for example, but for the User actor to call the Engine through the User Service, to perform specific actions, and then the Service returns the response XML. Those XML files are the way to communicate two different actors. The transmission method to exchange the XML depends on the specific scenario.

### 3.3.2 ABC4Trust Card Lite

As a PoC the P2ABCE project includes a smart card reference implementation, the ABC4Trust Card Lite [8]. It supports device-bound U-Prove and Idemix, and virtually any discrete logarithm based pABC system.

Version 1.2 is written for ML3-36K-R1 MULTOS smart cards, with approximately 64KB of EEPROM (non-volatile memory), 1KB of RAM and an Infineon SLE 78 microcontroller, a 16-bit based CPU aimed for chip cards.

The card stores the user's private key  $x$  and any Binary Large Object (**BLOB**) that the P2ABCE may need (like user's credentials). Then P2ABCE delegates the cryptographic operations on the smart card, that operates with  $x$ .




Figure 4: ABC4Trust Card Lite

The cryptographic operations performed by the smartcard are the modular exponentiation and addition used by ZKPs based on the discrete logarithm problem.

The code is available from the P2ABCE's repository and has some good and bad points to have in count:

The best asset of this code is that it's written in C aiming to a very constrained device, with very limited memory and similar computational power to many other IoT devices.

The code uses some good practices when programming for constrained devices, also explained in the first implementation of Idemix in smart cards [24]. Aside the implementation in assembly code of

some operations to accelerate the execution, most techniques aim to reduce the memory usage. They define union data types to join variables never used at the same time, so they can be stored on the same data location. Instead of function parameters, most variables are made global, reducing the space on the stack used when calling other functions. If parameters are needed, they are pointers to shared buffers with fixed sizes, avoiding the use of any dynamic memory allocation.

Although, among the many drawbacks, we could highlight the *awful* coding style, the strong dependency on MULTOS framework and many bugs found.

The code is structured in two files, *main.h* and *main.c*, with around 550 and 5200 lines of code, respectively.

The file *main.h* is mostly a reimplementation in assembly MEL code of some MULTOS functionality already offered by their API.

The *main.c* consists on nearly 600 lines of variables and data structures declarations; followed by the *main()* function, a 2600 lines long *switch-case* expression, with practically no comments; and to conclude, the implementation of thirty functions called *Subroutines* at the end of the file, around other 2000 lines of code.

At this stage, we have two options to implement our IoT device compatible with P2ABCE:

- Implement in C the *Smartcard* interface used by P2ABCE architecture, and use some communication protocol to remotely call the methods from the machine running the P2ABC Engine.
- Present the IoT device as a hardware smart card, using the APDU protocol (already defined, standard and with minimal overload). Providing a *javax.smartcardio* “IoT implementation” to communicate with the IoT device through a transmission protocol, making the already existing *HardwareSmartcard* class compatible with the new *IoTSmartcard* running in the IoT device.

Even with the problematic to maintain or even understand the code of ABC4Trust Card Lite, once one studies MULTOS framework in deep and applies many refactoring techniques to the code, it becomes the best starting point for the IoT version, making us opt for the second option.

### 3.4 PRELIMINARIES ABOUT SMART CARDS

In this section we will introduce a brief description of the APDU standard protocol, and the MULTOS framework used by the ABC4Trust Card Lite.

### 3.4.1 Smart Card Communication Protocol

To communicate the smart cards and the reader the ISO/IEC 7816-4 [12] specifies a standardized protocol .

The messages, also known as Application Protocol Data Units ([APDUs](#)), are divided in APDU Commands and APDU Responses.

**APDU Commands** consist in 4 mandatory bytes (CLA, INS, P<sub>1</sub>, P<sub>2</sub>), and an optional payload.

- CLA byte: Instruction class. Denotes if the command is interindustry standard or proprietary.
- INS byte: Instruction code. Indicates the specific command.
- P<sub>1</sub>, P<sub>2</sub> bytes: Instruction parameters.
- Lc, 0-3 bytes: Command data length.
- Command data: Lc bytes of data.
- Le, 0-3 bytes: Expected response data length.

This way, minimal number of bytes are needed to transmit commands to the smart card, allowing manufacturer's personalization of the smart card behavior and capabilities along with standard operations.



Figure 5: APDU Command

**APDU Responses** are generated inside the smart card, always as an answer to an APDU Command. They consist on an optional payload and two mandatory status bytes.

- Response data: At most Le bytes of data.
- SW1-SW2 bytes: Status bytes. Encode the exit status of the instruction.




Figure 6: APDU Response

The transmission protocol varies between different types of readers and smart cards (e.g. chip, contact-less), but what is common between every smart card interaction, is the *APDU Command-Response Dialogue*. As long as the smart card has a power supply, it can maintain the memory in RAM between APDU Commands, what allows to do in two or more steps complex operations, transmit more bytes than a single APDU can admit, etc.




Figure 7: APDU Command-Response Dialogue

Originally, the Lc and Le bytes had only 1 byte, if present, restricting the payload data to be at most 256 bytes long. An extension to the protocol changed the meaning of a Lc or Le oxoo byte (256 bytes long payload), so when the byte corresponding to Lc or Le started with oxoo, the next two bytes were the real length. With this, an Extended APDU lets up to 65536 bytes of data.

The problem here, is that not all readers or smart cards support extended APDUs. Originally, to send more than 256 bytes of data in an APDU Command, a *Put Data* instruction is defined, so the smart card stores the payload in a buffer, until other APDU Command indicates how to use it.

To send more data in an APDU Response, the status bytes are set to: SW1=ox61 and SW2 to the remaining bytes to send. Because a smart card can't send APDU Commands, the card terminal must send a GET RESPONSE, a special APDU Command, with Le set to the number of bytes specified in SW2. Iterating this process, the smart card can send as many bytes as it wants as Response.

With the introduction of Extended APDUs, this technique is no longer needed.

### 3.4.2 MULTOS

MULTOS is a multi-application smart card operative system, which provides a custom developing environment, with rich documenta-

tion<sup>2</sup>. MULTOS smart cards communicate like any other smart card following the standard, but internally offers a very specific architecture, affecting the way one must code applications for it.

In this section we will present the main characteristics of a MULTOS smart card that shaped the ABC4Trust Card Lite code and that we had to be aware of when adapting it to IoT devices.

**MULTOS PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES** A native assembly language called MEL, C and, to a lesser extent, Java, are the available languages to code for MULTOS. In our case, ABC4T Card Lite uses MEL and C.

**EXECUTION MODEL** Applications on a MULTOS card are executed in a virtual machine, called the Application Abstract Machine (AAM). The AAM is a stack machine that interprets instructions from the MULTOS Executable Language (MEL).

The transmission and communication process is done by MULTOS core, and it then selects, based on the CLA byte of the APDU, the application to load. This application is what most developers will only worry about, and is where their compiled `main()` function will start.




Figure 8: MULTOS Workflow

Now the developer is in charge of checking what instruction was sent, handle it with regard to his domain logic, write in the specific data space the APDU Response bytes, and call `multosExit()`, a MULTOS API function that will be in charge to send the APDU Response. In summary, our application starts with all data loaded in memory and exits without worrying how the answer is sent back.

<sup>2</sup> MULTOS technical library - [http://www.multos.com/developer\\_centre/technical\\_library/](http://www.multos.com/developer_centre/technical_library/)

As we can see, MULTOS is a comfortable framework to develop smart card applications, and now we must adapt and implement it for our IoT devices, if we want to port ABC4Trust Card Lite's code.

**MULTOS MEMORY LAYOUT** Each application in MULTOS has access to a specific memory layout, divided in different categories:





Figure 9: MULTOS Memory Layout

The Code Space is where the application code is stored. The Data Space is divided in Static memory, Public memory and Dynamic memory.

**Static memory** are the application variables declared after the specific `#pragma melsstatic` compiler directive. These variables are stored in the non-volatile secure EEPROM, and any write is assured to be saved because they are not loaded into RAM.

**Public memory** can be seen as the input/output buffer for applications and MULTOS system. The APDU header appears at the top of Public, and command data at the bottom. The application writes then the APDU Response bytes in Public, at specific position (see [Figure 10](#)). To declare variables in this data space, the `#pragma melpublic` directive is available.

**Dynamic memory** works like usual program memory, with Session Data storing global variables and the Stack. The limited size of RAM in IoT devices and smart cards makes the use of dynamic memory not advisable. The compiler directive to use Session Data is `#pragma melsession`.



With regards to primitive types, to avoid confusion with their sizes, MULTOS defines and uses the following data types specified in [Figure 11](#). It's important to notice that MULTOS is Big Endian and when storing structures there is no padding between defined variables, un-

Address	Name	Description
PT[-1]	SW2	Byte 2 of the Status Word
PT[-2]	SW1	Byte 1 of the Status Word
PT[-4]	La	Actual length of response data
PT[-6]	Le	APDU expected length of response data
PT[-8]	Lc	APDU length of command data sent
PT[-9]	P3	If required, temporary buffer for 5th byte, if any, of APDU header
PT[-10]	P2	APDU Parameter byte 2
PT[-11]	P1	APDU Parameter byte 1
PT[-12]	INS	APDU Instruction byte
PT[-13]	CLA	APDU Class byte
PT[-14]	GetResponseSW1	Byte 1 of Status Word to be used in Get Response command
PT[-15]	GetResponseCLA	CLA to be used by Get Response command
PT[-16]	Protocol Type	Transport protocol type
PT[-17]	Protocol Flags	Bit flags indicating status of protocol values
PB[0]	Start of Data Area	Command data and response data start

Figure 10: MULTOS Public Memory Data Map

like modern compilers that perform data structure alignment<sup>3</sup> for performance.

Data Type	Definition
BOOL	boolean (byte)
BYTE	unsigned byte (byte)
SBYTE	signed byte (byte)
WORD	unsigned word (2 bytes)
SWORD	signed word (2 bytes)
DWORD	unsigned double word (4 bytes)
SDWORD	signed double word (4 bytes)

Figure 11: MULTOS Data Types

**MULTOS STANDARD C-API** A collection of more than a hundred functions are provided for arithmetic, cryptography, memory and smart card operations. The *multos.h* interface provides access to these functions, that ultimately call their respective primitive instructions in assembly code. The primitive instructions are but a system call with an operation code, loading data in the needed registers. Therefore, no implementation for these tools is available, nor in C, nor in assembly code.

Nevertheless, the C-API documentation<sup>4</sup> provides rich description for each function.

### 3.5 DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT

For almost every IoT device in the market, there exists a C compiler and many frameworks available to build firmware binaries, like Ar-

<sup>3</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data\\_structure\\_alignment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_structure_alignment)

<sup>4</sup> [http://www.multos.com/developer\\_centre/technical\\_library/](http://www.multos.com/developer_centre/technical_library/)



ATmega328P

duino Core, Contiki, Mongoose OS, ThreadX OS, OpenWrt, LEDE, proprietary SDKs, etc. Each firmware targets a specific range of devices, depending on processing power and memory limitations. For example, Arduino and Contiki aim for very constrained microcontrollers, like Atmel's ATmega or TI's MSP430, but can also be used in ESP8266, a more powerful device, with WiFi capabilities.

Starting a big project development for IoT, aiming the most constrained devices may not be a good idea. The lack of usual OS tools, like POSIX, threads, or minimum I/O, like a terminal, can make debugging a tedious task. With good programming practices, one can start from the top and slowly end with more constrained devices and reliable code.

For this reason, the current PoC is developed on LEDE<sup>5</sup> using the Onion Omega2 development board. Although the Omega2 uses LEDE, its microcontroller is also listed as compatible with ThreadX<sup>6</sup>, therefore, the performance measured in our PoC can be relevant to real scenarios with similar hardware.

The PoC will take advantage of the Linux system using mainly files and sockets like in any other Linux desktop distribution, so we can focus on the project itself rather than the specific platform APIs for storage and connectivity.

The project development is divided between the IoT device code and the P2ABCE services. To ease the setup of new developing machines, we will use Docker to deploy containers ready to compile the code.

P2ABCE is already written in Java and uses Maven to manage dependencies. The project needs some minor changes to work with our IoT architecture. Any text editor or Java IDE is suitable for the development, because the compilation is done through the terminal, with Maven commands.

We compile the project inside a Docker container, with OpenJDK 7, Maven 3 and Idemix 3.0.36, following the project [instructions](#) to use Idemix as the Engine for P2ABCE.

We can assume all IoT devices have a C cross-compiler, some even a C++ cross-compiler. The worst case scenario is that one must write assembly code, and that code will be specific of that target, so we won't consider them. If now we focus on the most constrained devices, we could find out that for some we can't use C++, some may not have many usual libraries, moreover, the memory limitations they

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<sup>5</sup> Linux Embedded Development Environment - <https://lede-project.org/>

<sup>6</sup> THREADX Real-Time Operative System for embedded devices - <http://rtos.com/products/threadx/>

face make practically impossible to use dynamic memory, if we want to avoid many execution malfunctions.

For that reason, the developed code for IoT devices should be written with standard C, without using dynamic memory or third party libraries.

To manage the PoC code we chose CMake, providing many advantages over Makefiles:

- Cross-platform. It works in many systems, and more specifically, in Linux it generates Makefiles.
- Simpler syntax. Adding a library, files to compile, set definitions, etc. can be done with one CMake command, with rich documentation on the project's [website](#).
- Cross-compilation. With only a **CMAKE TOOLCHAIN** file, CMake sets up automatically the cross-compilation with Makefiles and the C/C++ cross-compiler provided.

Although the ideal final code is written in pure C, without external libraries or dynamic memory, the PoC uses three major libraries:

- OpenSSL: Provides reliable and tested AES128, SHA256 and random number generator implementations.
- LibGMP: Provides multiprecision integer modular arithmetic.
- cJSON: Provides a JSON parser to store and read the status of the device, in a human readable way.

These three libraries are used to implement different interfaces in the project, and C implementations of these interfaces should replace the external libraries in the future.

Finally, we use Docker to deploy the compilation environment. Our container includes CMake and the LEDE SDK [[ledeproject](#)], configured for the Omega2 target, the device chose for the PoC.



# 4

## DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

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In this chapter we will describe the process for defining how a constrained IoT device may be integrated in a system like P2ABCE. We will also describe the PoC implementation carried out to test a realistic deployment.

### 4.1 DESIGN

In this section we will define how an IoT device may be integrated in the P2ABCE architecture, being totally compatible with any other system using P2ABCE, addressing the power and memory constraints many IoT devices face.

We decided to use P2ABCE with the Idemix as its Engine, because it is officially supported by the Idemix Library, it has the most up-to-date implementation, as we saw in the state of the art, and adds capabilities to Idemix like the Presentation Policies, or interoperability with U-Prove, not available without the P2ABCE project.

Our main goal is to make an IoT device capable to act as a User or Verifier in the P2ABCE architecture. For this, the device should be able to **communicate** with the Verifier or Prover with which it is interacting, manage the P2ABCE complex **XML schemas** transmitted, and perform the **cryptographic operations** required.

The communication between actors depends on each IoT scenario, it can be achieved with many existing standard solutions, e.g. an IP network, a Bluetooth M2M connection, RF communication, etc.

Our real concerns are, on one side, parsing the XML data, based on the P2ABCE's XML schema, that specifies the data artifacts created and exchanged during the issuance, presentation, revocation and inspection of pABCs; and on the other side, the cryptographic operations, that involve the use of secret keys, stored privately in the IoT device.

After the analysis done in the previous sections to the P2ABCE architecture, emphasizing that the logic of smart cards gathers the cryptographic operations independently from how the data is exchanged between P2ABCE actors.

Using the *computation offloading* technique to our scenario, our design consists on implementing the smart card logic inside the IoT device, keeping secure our master key and credentials, and for the rest of the P2ABCE system, if the device can not run the complete Engine, it may delegate to a server running it, indicating how to send APDU Commands to the *IoT smart card*.

Even in the case we were to implement all P2ABCE inside an IoT device, we would have to implement the support for software smart cards, to keep the secret inside the IoT device. Therefore, we can begin implementing the smart card logic inside the IoT device, and later, if the device resources admit it, other components of the P2ABCE project.

Computation offloading is not new to IoT deployments. For example, IPv6 involves managing 128 bits per address and other headers, and many IoT scenes only need to communicate inside a private network, making only the last 64 bits in an address relevant. To reduce that overhead, instead of IPv6 they use 6LoWPAN to compress packets and use smaller address sizes. To communicate a 6LoWPAN with the Internet or other networks, the IoT devices delegate the networking workload on a proxy that can manage the 6LoWPAN and IPv6 stacks. In the scope of consumer devices, smart bands or watches can install applications, but many of them delegate on the user's phone to accomplish their task.

Therefore, the IoT device now has a **duality** in its functions, because it is the User that starts any interaction with other actors, and it's also the smart card that a P2ABCE server must ask for cryptographic operations. It can also be seen as a **double delegation**. The IoT device delegates on the external P2ABCE server to manage the protocol, and the P2ABCE server delegates on the IoT, acting now as a smart card, for the cryptography.

#### 4.1.1 System architecture

The system will be compounded by the IoT device, the P2ABCE delegation server and the third party P2ABCE actors.

- **IoT device**

In [Figure 12](#) the IoT device is represented with two interfaces, physical or virtual. One allows external communications to other machines, including other P2ABCE actors, that could be on the Internet, a corporate LAN, a M2M overlay network, etc. Through this interface, the P2ABCE XML messages are exchanged as in any other deployment. This allows an IoT device to interact with other actors without special adaptations to the protocol. The other interface allows a secure communication with the delegation server. Both the delegation messages and the APDU Dialogue are transmitted over this interface, making it a point of attack to the system, and we will talk about its security in the delegation process.




Figure 12: IoT in P2ABCE Architecture.

The scheme also shows the *P2ABCE IoT Toolkit*. This piece of software includes the IoT Smart Card, and the API for other processes that want to use the P2ABCE system.

The IoT Smart Card is the implementation of a software smart card, listens for APDU Commands from the secure interface and stores securely the credentials and private keys within the device's memory.

The P2ABCE API is an interface for other processes that wish to use the private-preserving environment of P2ABCE. It provides access to every operation available, hiding the delegation process. In the future, if for example the Verification Service is implemented for the IoT device, i.e., there's no need to delegate to other machine to act as a Verifier, then any program using the API won't need to change anything, the toolkit conceals the transition from delegating to native execution.

- **P2ABCE actors**

If we recall from [Section 3.3](#), the possible roles in the system were the Issuer, the User, the Verifier, the Revocation Authority and the Inspector. All of them use the P2ABCE XML schema in the specification to communicate to each other. Any third party actor will be unaware of the fact that the device is a constrained IoT device that delegates on the P2ABCE server.

- **P2ABCE Delegation Server**

The machine in charge of receiving authorized IoT devices' commands to parse the XML files exchanged and orchestrate the cryptographic operations the IoT smart card must perform.

### **Delegation process**

Here we describe the computation offloading carried out by the IoT device. In [Figure 13](#) we show an example of the IoT acting as a User, Proving a Presentation Policy to a third party Verifier.

1. Communication with P2ABCE actor.

The IoT device starts an interaction with another actor, e.g. an Issuer or Verifier, receiving a P2ABCE XML file.

2. Delegation to the P2ABCE Server.

Depending on what role the IoT device is acting as, it will delegate in the corresponding service, e.g. User Service. The delegation message must include the XML file, and any parameter required to accomplish the task, like the information on how to communicate with the IoT smart card (listening port, security challenge, etc.).

3. APDU Dialogue (if necessary).

The server may need to send APDU Commands to the IoT smart card to read the credential information or perform cryptographic operations involving private keys.

4. Server response.

The server may return a status code or a XML file if the first one required an answer from the IoT device, in which case, it will send as response to the third party actor, resuming the communication.

Transmissions over the *Server-IoT* channel must be secured in order to avoid attacks like: impersonate the P2ABCE delegation server, having access to the IoT smart card sending the APDU Commands the attacker wishes; delegate as a device on the server but giving the parameters of another device, making the delegation server send the APDU Commands to a victim IoT smart card.

We could use a corporative PKI to issue certificates to the server and devices and configure policies for access control; design a challenge-response system combined with the smart card PIN, like a password




Figure 13: IoT Delegation in P2ABCE for Proving.

and TOTP<sup>1</sup> in a 2FA<sup>2</sup> login. We also could connect physically the delegation service through RS-232 serial to the IoT device, securing both physically as we would do with the IoT device on its own, isolating the delegation system from any network attack. This last idea is an approximation to the Arduino Yún<sup>3</sup>, a development board that integrates two microcontrollers, one a typical Arduino with very low resources, and another one running a fork of OpenWrt. The Arduino microcontroller can control the terminal of the more powerful one, using the serial pins as commented before.

As we can see, there are many state of the art solutions for all this threads, therefore, we can assume a secure channel without mentioning a specific solution, providing freedom to choose the most fitting one in a real deployment.

**NOTES FOR MORE CONSTRAINED DEVICES** Our architecture is designed for devices that could in a future run a reimplemented version of P2ABCE, that means, the devices could perform more tasks than only running the smart card software and their main purpose process, e.g. recollecting sensor data. But if our target devices are so constrained that can barely run the smart card, they may not be able to handle the XML files because of memory restrictions, like a

<sup>1</sup> Time-based One-time Password

<sup>2</sup> Two-factor authentication

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.arduino.cc/en/Main/ArduinoBoardYun>

MSP430<sup>4</sup> running Contiki-OS, the microcontroller has between hundred of bytes to tens of kilobytes of memory, making impossible to store multiple XML files in the size range of tens of kilobytes.

In these cases, the delegation in the server goes a step forward, making the server a proxy to communicate with other P2ABCE actors, and the IoT device only acts as a smart card. The IoT device would still act as the User, or any other P2ABCE, role because it orchestrates when and how an interaction with other actor is executed, but the communications would be between the proxy and the third party actor.

## 4.2 PROOF OF CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION

In this section we present the first PoC implementation, introducing the IoT system where we are going to work, then we will describe the delegation protocols, one for the computation offloading of the IoT device on the P2ABCE server, and another for the transmission of APDU Commands, and finally, we will describe the IoT smart card implementation.

### 4.2.1 *IoT system*

We will develop our PoC in Linux based systems in order to avoid complications with firmware specific issues that we are not familiar with. Even so, the linux systems used are aimed for the IoT environment and serve as a starting point for future implementations in more constrained devices or different systems.

In our delegation server we will run Raspbian OS, a distribution based on Debian for the Raspberry Pi. We will talk more about the hardware specifications in the benchmark chapter. We chose this system because it has a great package repository support, including the Java Runtime Environment, needed to run the P2ABCE Services.

For our IoT device, we will use LEDE, Linux Embedded Development Environment, a distribution born from OpenWrt, aimed for routers and embedded chips with low resources requirements. It offers the ash command interpreter, or shell, and the opkg package manager, that allows an easy installation of some libraries and tools needed during the early development.

### 4.2.2 *PoC Delegation*

As we explained in the design section, the delegation has two steps, the IoT device calling the P2ABCE server to offload the parsing of the

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.ti.com/lsds/ti/microcontrollers-16-bit-32-bit/msp/overview.page>

XML data, and the P2ABCE server sending APDU Commands to the IoT smart card in the device.

#### 4.2.2.1 PoC Delegation to the P2ABCE Server

Currently P2ABCE offers multiple REST web services to run different roles in P2ABCE system: User Service, Issuer Service, Verification Service, etc. Any third party application that integrates P2ABCE with their system can make use of these services or implement the functionality using the library written in Java, the tool that the REST services actually use.

Our PoC machine, the Omega2, can make REST calls easily with the curl command, but other devices may use Constrained Application Protocol ([CoAP](#)), but in that case, the P2ABCE REST services should be adapted to offer CoAP support. The commands needed to delegate to the P2ABCE server would be the same that those defined now to operate with the REST services, but with the modifications needed to pass the parameters on how to communicate with the IoT smart card.

In this PoC the only P2ABCE Service that needed to be modified was the User Service. We added the following REST call

```
/initIoTsmartcard/issuerParametersUid?host=&port=
```

where we communicate the P2ABCE server that an IoT Smart Card is accessible via *host* and *port*. Then a new *HardwareSmartcard* object is stored in the P2ABC Engine, but instead of the *javax.smartcardio* Oracle's *CardTerminal* implementation, we use our own *IoTsmartcardio* implementation for the *HardwareSmartcard* constructor, that we will discuss in the following section.

In a real deployment, we would offer a full library with an API for other processes that want to use the P2ABC Engine, which automatizes the boot of the IoT smart card and handles the security policies, like the one we presented in the deployment diagram [12](#) of the *P2ABCE IoT Toolkit*.

Now we show some examples of the PoC curl commands, run in the device's terminal, or from a shell script for automation:

```
$ curl -X POST --header 'Content-Type: text/xml' "http://$DelegationServerIP:9200/user/initIoTsmartcard/http%3A%2F%2FTicketcompany%2FMyFavoriteSoccerTeam%2Fissuance%3Aidemix?host=192.168.3.1&port=8888"

$ curl -X POST --header 'Content-Type: text/xml' -d @firstIssuanceMessage.xml "http://$DelegationServerIP:9200/user/issuanceProtocolStep/" > issuanceReturn.xml
```

The IoT device will only manage XML as data files to exchange between the third party actor and the P2ABCE delegation service,

attaching them in the body of the REST call. In the parameters of the first call we can see the IP and port where the IoT smart card will be listening.

#### 4.2.2.2 APDU Dialogue Transmission

To transmit the APDU messages in our PoC we use a simple protocol, that we will refer as BIOSC (Basic Input Output Smart Card), consisting in one first byte for the instruction:

0x01	APDU Command or Response: Read 2 bytes for the length and then as many bytes as said length.
0xff	Finish connection: close the current TCP socket and end the IoT smart card execution.

In the first instruction, we read two header bytes with the length of the APDU Command or Response to receive, followed by said APDU bytes. The message is sent over TCP for a reliable transmission (concept of session, packet retransmission, reordering, etc.). The second instruction serves for closing the TCP socket in the IoT device when the smart card is no longer needed.

We lack any security (authentication or authorization) that a real system should implement. It is vital to authenticate the delegation service, to authorize it to make APDU Commands, and the same with the IoT device, to prevent attacks. But using this method for the transmission of the APDU messages, with only 3 bytes of overhead, helps us in the benchmarks to measure the real performance of the system.

The implementation of this simple protocol is done in both Java and C, one for the P2ABCE server and the other one for the IoT smart card.

As we mentioned in the analysis of P2ABCE's code, the `HardwareSmartcard` class implements the `Smartcard` interface using the package of abstract classes `javax.smartcardio` to communicate with the physical smart cards. The Oracle JRE implements these package for the majority of smart card manufacturers. For our PoC, we implement the `javax.smartcardio` package so it transmits the APDUs with BIOSC, making the use of a physical or IoT smart card totally transparent to the `HardwareSmartcard` class, enhancing maintainability, and following the *expert pattern* from the known GRASP guidelines.

**TODO :** diagrama secuencia de la reimplementación de `javax.smartcardio` y su uso por `HardwareSmartcard`

In the PoC IoT device, we implement in `BIOS.c` the `main()` function, that reads from a Json file the previous status of the smart card,

and then opens the TCP socket in the 8888 port, and loops listening for BIOSC transmissions until an 0xff is received. When an APDU Command is sent, it calls the APDU Handler, that we will talk about in the next section.

#### 4.2.3 IoT Smart Card Implementation

After many design decisions in the process to adapt the original ABC4Trust Card Lite code to pure C, working on a MIPS architecture, in this section, we present the current PoC code, most important decisions taken and the execution workflow in the form of sequence diagrams.

##### 4.2.3.1 Code structure

We divide the project in three different sections with the objective of enhancing maintainability, improving future changes, ports, fixes, etc.

In [Figure 14](#) we show the project's structure. The first section is what could be called as the core of the smart card, the second one the interface for those tools the core needs and that may depend on the target's platform, and finally, the third party libraries, that may be empty if the interfaces implementation doesn't require any.

##### CORE SMART CARD

The smart card logic lies in this section, the concepts of APDU Commands, what instructions are defined for P2ABCE smart cards, and how to process them and generate proper APDU Responses.

If the APDU protocol defined for P2ABCE smart cards changed, with the consequence of having to update all smart cards in use, the changes to adapt the IoT smart card should be applied in this part of the code. This also implies that if the P2ABCE Java code changes their Smartcard interface, something more probable, the IoT smart card will still work as intended.

Most of the original ABC4Trust Card's code has been reused in this section, e.g., all the global variables and custom data type definitions, the APDU Command handling and auxiliary subroutines.

However, the ABC4Trust's code heavily depended on the MULTOS platform for the input and output of data, modular arithmetic, memory management, and AES128 and SHA256 cryptographic operations. Therefore, we reimplement the used MULTOS functions following the documentation, adapting it in some cases.

A characteristic of MULTOS C-API is that every function name starts with "multos", so we changing their names from `multosFoo()` to `mFoo()` for readability and to emphasize that they were no longer MULTOS functions.




Figure 14: IoT Smart Card Code Structure.

The `main.h` file, from the original ABC4Trust project, also implemented some functions that were equivalent to the ones available in `multos.h`. We replaced them for the standard functions in the C-API, checking that the MEL code did the same as the documentation specified. This last detail is very important, because in [24] they noted that MULTOS' `ModularExponentiation` function does not accept exponents larger than the modulus size, so they implemented `SpecialModularExponentiation`, dividing the exponentiation in two that MULTOS could perform. After this analysis, when those particularities appeared, our reimplementation of the MULTOS API accepts the *expanded functionality*.

Because of the inherited code, many particularities of the internals of the MULTOS platform had to be addressed.

One was the different memory zones, where the variables in `static` were read and written directly from the secure EEPROM, defining the status of the smart card between executions. We keep those variables in RAM, but save them in a Json file, deserializing them at the smart card boot up, and serializing always before an APDU Response is sent. From the MULTOS documentation, the `static` variables are

read and written atomically, and if power source is lost during any process, memory won't get corrupted. This also means that if a MULTOS smart card sends an APDU Response, every variable that had to change, is saved in the EEPROM. Our PoC uses Json for human readability during debugging, but a real deployment should apply secure reads and writes on the file, preventing data corruption and undesired access, for example, ciphering the file with a key derived from the smart card PIN. It is also desirable another data serialization method, reducing the size of the file to store in memory constrained devices.

Another of the mentioned particularities is that the MULTOS compiler does not apply padding between variables in the data structures. For example, in an X86 machine, where a `short` is stored in 2 bytes, in the following code<sup>5</sup>

```
struct MyData
{
    short Data1;
    short Data2;
    short Data3;
};
```

each member of the data structure would be 2-byte aligned. `Data1` would be at offset 0, `Data2` at offset 2, and `Data3` at offset 4. The size of this structure would be 6 bytes. But if we defined the following structure

```
struct MixedData
{
    char Data1;
    short Data2;
    int Data3;
    char Data4;
};
```

where a `char` is 1 byte, and an `int` uses 4 bytes, although the total bytes used are 8 bytes, the compiler will align them in memory adding padding, like if we defined the following:

```
struct MixedData /* After compilation in 32-bit x86 machine */
{
    char Data1; /* 1 byte */
    char Padding1[1]; /* 1 byte for the following 'short' to
                       be aligned on a 2 byte boundary
                       assuming that the address where structure begins is an
                       even number */
    short Data2; /* 2 bytes */
    int Data3; /* 4 bytes - largest structure member */
    char Data4; /* 1 byte */
    char Padding2[3]; /* 3 bytes to make total size of the
                       structure 12 bytes */
};
```

---

<sup>5</sup> From [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data\\_structure\\_alignment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_structure_alignment)

In MULTOS, to reduce the memory usage, there is no padding, and this affects the inherited ABC4Trust's code because of the use of `memcpy` to copy zones of memory from one address to another. The problem is the code copies multiple variables in one `memcpy` call, because, for example, the APDU Command payload includes multiple data, and instead of copying one variable at a time, the struct is defined with the same order and copies everything at once.

An example taken from the parsing of instruction SET\_PROVER:

```
typedef struct
{
    BYTE prover_id;
    unsigned int ksize;
    unsigned int csize;
    BYTE kx[MAX_SMALLINT_SIZE];
    BYTE c[HASH_SIZE];
    BYTE proofsession[PROOFSESSION_SIZE];
    BYTE proofstatus;
    BYTE cred_ids[NUM_CREDS];
    BYTE cred_ids_size; // also called 't' in the
                        documentation
    BYTE exists;
} PROVER;
/********/
PROVER provers[NUM_PROVIDERS];

/********/
case INS_SET_PROVER:
// [...]
memcpy(&(provers[temp_prover_id-1].prover_id), &(apdu_data.
    set_prover_in.prover_id), 5); // under the hood, this also
                                initializes ksize and csize
```

This is the only case where a comment showcases that it is copying more than one byte.

The temporal solution is to use `struct __attribute__((__packed__))` to ask a GCC compiler to not use padding in the structs, but this is not standard, neither a good practice. A deeper refactorization of the code is needed where the hidden copies of variables are made explicit, letting the compiler manage the memory layout.

An internal alarm should always warn us when we see raw memory copy from serialized data, that is, the APDU Payload. We mentioned in the MULTOS introduction that the platform is Big Endian. The serialized data is also typically represented in Big Endian, and our APDU Payloads do so. In our code we added a new Subroutine to check whether the device is Big or Little Endian, and to rectify the Endianness from those variables, with 2 or more bytes (the only

ones affected by the Endianness), copied from or written to APDU Payloads.

Finally, we must talk about the `multosExit` function. In a MULTOS application, to finish the execution and send the APDU Response, the programmer can call in any moment to `multosExit`, and the MULTOS OS will continue the execution, not returning to the application again.

Think about how we all have, at least once, used an `if` and `return` to avoid the `else`, like in this example:

```
if(condition)
    return a;
return b;
```

The use of `multosExit` in ABC4Trust code is similar, but used in almost every function. This leads to a sequence execution with many possible interruptions, leaving a full stack behind with *unReturned* function calls, i.e., parameters stored in memory after a function call that never returns. In MULTOS, this memory won't affect future executions, because with the next APDU Command, the stack will be loaded with the clean application, and the Session memory stays untouched between APDU Commands, during an APDU Dialogue.

To adapt the code, the reimplemented `mExit` function can not end the program execution, because we would lose the variables in RAM needed during the APDU Dialogue, as well as that the TCP socket would close. The solution is to refactor every use of `multosExit` in a way that, if it is called from a Subroutine, the function returns a success or error code, and the only functions that can call `mExit` are the ones handling an specific instruction.

Nevertheless, there is one exception, the `output_large_data()` Subroutine, which is a tool to send large data payloads without Extended APDU support. We talked about this in [3.4.1](#), mentioning the special instruction GET RESPONSE.

Summarizing, every Subroutine must return from its execution, as well as every instruction handler, which must call either `mExit` or `output_large_data()` before returning. After the instruction has been handled, the execution returns to the listening loop of BIOSC.

## INTERFACES

To reimplement some of the MULTOS functions, we needed to use some libraries, so we defined a facade to isolate the implementation of the core smart card from our different options, that could vary depending on the hardware or the system used by the IoT device.

The use of a facade lets us, for example, change the implementation of modular arithmetic with a hardware optimized version, or a future more lightweight library, or our very own software implementation using the same data types that the core uses, minimizing the data usage.

Taking a step forward, we make the core smart card totally independent of any library, only dependant of our interfaces. This means that typical C libraries, like the standard *stdlib.h*, or *string.h* are also behind the facade, in case some IoT system doesn't support them. The main goal we go after with this decision is that future developers adapting the code to a specific platform need to make no change to the *core smart card's* code, only to the interfaces implementation.

The interfaces defined can be organized in 5 groups (see [Figure 14](#)), depending on their purpose: Modular Arithmetic, Cryptography, Memory Management, Serialization, APDU Parsing.

#### EXTERNAL UTILITIES

If the IoT system offers well tested libraries that could aid in the interfaces implementation, for example, a assembly optimized code for the AES128 and SHA256 operations, these third party libraries belong to this section.

In our PoC, we use two ANSI C libraries, for base64 and JSON, and two shared libraries available in as packages in LEDE, GMPLib and OpenSSL. These libraries use dynamic memory and offer more functionality than we need, although they are a good tool in this PoC, future versions should use more lightweight solutions.

For example, Atmel's ATAES132A<sup>6</sup> offers a serial chip for secure key storage, AES128 execution and random number generation. Another serial chip like ESP8266 offers WiFi connectivity, typically used with Arduino, and can also perform AES encryption. For random number generation, a technique used with Contiki devices is to read from sensors aleatory data and use it as seed.

All these alternatives depend on the target device, but are all valid, and would substitute OpenSSL with only a Serial communication library, so we can talk to the dedicated chips.

The *interfaces* and *external utilities* sections allow that the project is easily ported to specific targets without modifying the smart card logic.

##### 4.2.3.2 Execution workflow

The sequence diagram from [Figure 15](#) shows the execution of the PoC IoT smart card.

The program starts with the `main` function in BIOSC, that deserializes the status from the Json file, and listens on a loop for APDU Commands from the delegation server.

Every time an APDU Command arrives, it calls the function `handle_APDU()` with the raw APDU bytes. The Handler calls the APDU I/O interface to parse the bytes, storing in global variables the APDU



Atmel's cryptography chips.

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<sup>6</sup> ATAES132A 32K AES Serial EEPROM Datasheet - <http://ww1.microchip.com/downloads/en/DeviceDoc/Atmel-8914-CryptoAuth-ATAES132A-Datasheet.pdf>




Figure 15: IoT Smart Card Sequence Diagram.

structure. Using a switch-case expression on the INS byte, the Handler calls an *Instruction handler* function.

Inside this function, it may call multiple functions from the Subroutines, that may call MULTOS C-API functions, Which in turn may use an interface to perform its functionality.

As we mentioned, every instruction handler must end, before the return; expression, with `mExit` or `output_large_data()`, that will use `mExit`. This reimplemented MULTOS function will save the current status of the smart card, with the help of the serialization interface, and once the file is saved, it outputs the APDU Response back to the delegation server.

After returning from `mExit`, the instruction handler and the APDU handler functions, the program listens again from the socket, until an `0xff` byte is received.



## VALIDATION AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

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In this chapter, we will describe the deployment of three testing scenarios: a laptop, a Raspberry Pi 3, and a Omega2 IoT device with the Raspberry Pi 3 as the delegation server. We will measure and compare the results to determine if the proposed solution is feasible or must be submitted to revision.

### 5.1 TESTBED DESCRIPTION

First, we shall describe the example Attribute Based Credential system in use. Then, the hardware we will use in our benchmarking.

#### 5.1.1 *P2ABCE setting*

To test the correct execution of the *IoT smart card*, we will use the ABC system from the tutorial in the P2ABCE Wiki<sup>1</sup>. It is based on a soccer club, which wishes to issue VIP-tickets for a match. The VIP-member number in the ticket is inspectable for a lottery, ie. after the game, a random presentation token is inspected and the winning member is notified.

First the various entities are **setup**, where several artifacts are generated and distributed. Then a ticket credential containing the following attributes is issued:

First name: John  
Last name: Dow  
Birthday: 1985-05-05Z  
Member number: 23784638726  
Matchday: 2013-08-07Z

During **issuance**, a *scope exclusive pseudonym* is established and the newly issued credential is bound to this pseudonym. This ensures that the ticket credential can not be used without the smart card.

Then **presentation** is performed. The *presentation policy* specifies that the member number is inspectable and a predicate ensures that the matchday is in fact 2013 – 08 – 07Z. This last part ensures that a ticket issued for another match can not be used.

The ticket holder was lucky and his presentation token was chosen in the lottery. The presentation token is therefore inspected.

---

<sup>1</sup> <https://github.com/p2abcengine/p2abcengine/wiki/>

### 5.1.2 Execution environment

First we will execute the test in our development machine (laptop). After asserting that the services work as expected, we then run the test in a Raspberry Pi 3, exactly like in the laptop. Finally, we will deploy the IoT smart card in a Omega2 and the delegation services in the Raspberry Pi 3. After every test, we checked that the issuing and proving were successful, in case a cryptographic error appeared in the implementation.

Lets have a closer look at the hardware of each device:



*DELL XPS 15*

**DEVELOPMENT LAPTOP** Our device is a DELL XPS 15, with a Core i7-6700HQ at 3.5GHz quad core processor and 32GB of DDR4 RAM, running Ubuntu 16.10.

This is a powerful machine that can simulate the performance of many servers and clients that would implement P2ABCE in a real environment, giving a reference point for performance comparisons.



*Raspberry Pi 3*

**RASPBERRY PI 3** A familiar environment, powerful enough to debug and hold the delegated P2ABCE Java services of P2ABCE with its 1GB of RAM, and with two network interfaces, perfect to work as the gateway for the IoT devices to the Internet.

Only a microSD with enough space to burn the OS is needed to plug&play with the Raspberry Pi. We use Raspbian, a stable Debian based distro, recommended by the Raspberry Pi designers, and ready to use with the P2ABCE compiled *self-contained .jar* services.

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CPU	ARMv8 64bit quad-core @1.2GHz
RAM	1GB
Storage	microSD
Firmware	Raspbian (Debian based distro)
Connectivity	Wifi n + Ethernet
Power	5V 2A

---

Table 1: Raspberry Pi 3 Specifications.



*Onion Omega2+*

**ONION OMEGA2** A device that falls inside the category of IoT, powerful enough to run a Linux environment, LEDE, where we can develop and debug the first PoC without troubling ourselves with problems not related to the project itself.

Nonetheless, the Omega2 needs fine tuning to start operating, and basic knowledge of electronics to make it work. The two main things to begin with Omega2 are:

MCU	Mediatek MT688 <sup>2</sup>
CPU	MIPS32 24KEc 580MHz
RAM	64MB
Storage	16MB
Firmware	LEDE (OpenWRT fork distro)
Connectivity	Wifi b/g/n
Power	3.3V 300mA

Table 2: Onion Omega2 Specifications.

- A reliable 3.3V with a maximum of 800mA power supply, e.g. a USB2.0 with a step-down circuit, with quality soldering and wires to avoid unwanted resistances. The Omega2 will usually use up to 350mA, when the WiFi module is booting up. The mean consumption is about 200mA.
- A Serial to USB adapter wired to the TX and RX UART pins to use the Serial Terminal, to avoid the use of SSH over WiFi.

A downside of using LEDE and the Omega2 is the lack of hardware acceleration for cryptographic operations, unlike the MULTOS applications, because the smart cards hardware and MULTOS API include support for such common operations in smart cards.

**THE NETWORK** In our third scenario, the Raspberry Pi 3 and the Omega2 will talk to each other over TCP. This implies possible network delays depending on the quality of the connection. The Raspberry Pi 3 is connected over Ethernet to a switch with WiFi access point. The Omega2 is connected over WiFi n to said AP. To ensure the delay wasn't significant, we measured 6000 APDU messages, and the results show that the mean transmission time is less than half a millisecond per APDU. As we will see in the results section, this network time is negligible.

**FUTURE WORK FOR TESTS** The lack of a physical MULTOS smart card precludes us to load and test the ABC4Trust Card Lite's code and measure the time P2ABCE would need when using the *HardwareSmartcard* class. This would be really interesting because for a single method from the *Smartcard* interface, *HardwareSmartcard* implementation needs to send multiple APDU Commands, but *SoftwareSmartcard* can perform the operations immediately, with the full computer's resources. Also, physical smart cards benefit from hardware acceleration in most of the cryptographic operations, unlike our software implementations in the PoC.

## 5.2 THE TEST CODE

In this section we present the scripts and binaries used during the tests.

There are three pieces of software that conform the test: the P2ABCE services, the IoT smart card, and shell scripts automatizing the REST calls, from the terminal.

### P2ABCE SERVICES

This is a common part to our three sets. The services are compiled in a self-contained Jetty web server, or in WAR format, ready to be deployed in a server like Tomcat. We use the same JAR files with the embedded Jetty web server for the PC and Raspberry Pi.

We modified the User Service code to measure the execution elapsed time for each REST method. We don't measure the time the web server spends processing the HTTP protocol and deciding which Java method to call.

### IOT SMART CARD

Our C implementation of the P2ABCE smart card, compiled for the Omega2, with BIOSC listening on port 8888 for the APDU messages.

We tested the execution in two modes, a full logging where every step was printed in terminal, and another one with no logging. With the first mode, we can check a proper execution, every byte exchanged, and with the second one, we measure the execution without unnecessary I/O.

### SHELL SCRIPT

To orchestrate all the services we use a simple script that performs the REST calls using *curl*. Here we perform the mentioned steps: setup of the P2ABCE system, issuance of the credential and a prove for the presentation policy.

In the setup, the system parameters are generated, indicating key sizes of 1024 bits, the ones currently supported by the ABC4Trust and IoT smart cards. Then the system parameters and public keys from the services (issuer, inspector, revocation authority) are also exchanged.

In the issuance, a two step protocol is performed by the User. The Issuer and the User send each other the XML data with the cryptographic information, and finish the protocol with a credential issued inside a smart card, software (Java) or hardware (physical or IoT).

Finally, a Verifier sends the User a *presentation policy*. The User generates a *presentation token* for the Verifier and Inspector.

There are two script versions, one where every REST call is done from the same machine, therefore avoiding the exchange of the XML files by other means (like *scp*); the other one is ready to be executed

on a real setup, two scripts, one for the Omega2, where the REST calls are the delegation on the Raspberry Pi 3, and other for the PC, running the Issuer and Verifier as third party entities. The XML files generated by each service can be sent with the same protocol the IoT device and the Verifier, for example, would communicate in the real world. This way it's clearer that the *curl* commands are the delegation protocol for the IoT device, and then the IoT device can send the XML as it wishes, over the Internet, Bluetooth, NFC, etc.

### 5.3 RESULTS

After 20 executions for each scenario (laptop, RPi3, Omega2+RPi3), we take the means and compare each step of the testbed.

It is worth noting that during the test, the measured use of the CPU showed that P2ABCE does not benefit of parallelization, therefore, it only uses one of the four cores in the laptop and Raspberry Pi 3.

To test the network, we sent six thousand APDUs to the Omega2, but instead of calling the *APDU handler*, the Omega2 responded with the same bytes back. This way, the Omega2 only performed the simple BIOSC protocol, reading from and writing to the TCP socket. The APDUs had multiple sizes, taken from the most common APDUs logged in during a successful execution. The test showed that our network speed was around 0.014 ms per byte.

#### THE SETUP

The first step of our testbed. The Omega2 doesn't intervene until the creation of the smart card, therefore, the times measured in the second and third scenarios are practically identical.

As we can see in [Figure 16](#), the laptop is about ten times faster than Raspberry Pi 3, but considering that the highest time is less than two and a half seconds, and that the setup is done only once, this isn't a worrisome problem.

#### CREATION OF THE SMART CARD


Here we create a *SoftwareSmartcard* or a *HardwareSmartcard* object that the User service will use in the following REST calls.

The REST method to create a *SoftwareSmartcard* is `/createSmartcard`, and to create a *HardwareSmartcard*, using the *IoTsmartcardio* implementation, we use `/initIoTsmartcard`.

From [Figure 17](#) we see that the RPi3 is about 16 times slower than the laptop in the creation of the *SoftwareSmartcard*, but almost 9 times faster than the setup of the smart card in the Omega2 using APDUs. This gives us that the laptop is 145 times faster than the combination of RPi3 and Omega2 in our IoT deployment. But looking at the times, this process lasts up to 20 seconds, making it something feasible.

	storeCredentialS	storeSystemPar	storeRevocation	storeInspectorP	storeIssuerParar
Laptop (ms)	139.23	222.08	5.05	5.62	5.75
RPi3 (ms)	1395.12	2278.85	35.38	33.76	56.10
Omega2 (ms)	1412.29	2244.54	38.61	33.59	44.77
Laptop over RPi3	10.02	10.26	7.01	6.01	9.75

(a) Times and relative speedup



(b) Comparison graph

Figure 16: Setup times (milliseconds)

Again, this operation is done only once per device, and includes commands from the creation of the PIN and PUK of the smart card, to storing the system parameters of P2ABCE, equivalent to the previous setup step.

This is the first interaction between the RPi3 and the IoT smart card running in the Omega2. To setup the smart card **30 APDU Commands**, and their respective Responses, are exchanged, as shown in [Appendix B, Figure 23](#), with a total of 1109 bytes. From our network benchmark, using TCP sockets, the delay in the transmission is only around 15 and 20 ms, negligible, as we said, compared to the almost 20 seconds the operation lasts.

#### ISSUING OF THE CREDENTIAL

The issuance is done in three steps for the User service, shown in [Figure 18](#) with a red note showing the start of each step for the User delegation, in green for the interactions between Issuer and User, and the darker red is the Identity service, choosing the first available identity to use. The arrows in the figure show the REST calls performed during the test, where the IoT device acts as User, the RPi3 hosts the P2ABCE delegation services and the laptop is the Issuer.




Figure 17: Create smart card times (seconds)

The three delegation steps and the REST method called are:

First issuance protocol step	/issuanceProtocolStep
Second issuance protocol step	/issuanceProtocolStepUi
<i>(end of first step for the User)</i>	
Third issuance protocol step	/issuanceProtocolStep
<i>(second step for the User)</i>	

As we can see, the three REST calls to the delegation User service involve communication with the smart card. We show in [Appendix B, Figure 24](#), the APDU Commands used for each REST call in the issuance. There are 45 APDU Commands in total, 3197 bytes exchanged, that would introduce a latency of 45ms in the network, negligible.

In [Figure 19](#) we have the times spent in each REST call. The laptop shows again to be many times faster than the other two scenarios, but the times are again feasible even for the IoT environment.

Lets compare the Raspberry Pi 3 and the Omega2 executions. There is a correlation between the number of APDU Commands needed in each step with the increment in time when using the IoT smart card, that is, how much the delegation server.

The first one only involved one APDU, with 33 bytes total (Command and Response), and times are almost identical. The second call needed 34 APDUs, with 1623 bytes, and the increase in time is around tree times slower than the RPi3 on its own. The third call used 20 APDUs, 1541 bytes, and makes the IoT scenario almost 7 times slower.

The analysis shows where there are more cryptographic operations involving the Omega2, and because the amount of data exchanged is minimal, the difference in processing power between Omega2 and Raspberry Pi 3 is clear.




Figure 18: Issuance interaction.

The final step of the test involves a Prove, or Presentation in P2ABCE, where the Verifier sends the User or Prover the Presentation Policy, and the User answers with the Presentation Token, without more steps. In [Figure 20](#), using the same colors as in the Issuance interaction, we can see the delegation messages done by the Omega2.

To ensure that all the process was successful, it's enough to check if the Verifier and the Inspector returned XML files, accepting the prove, or an error code. Of course, every execution measured in the test was successful.


In [Appendix B, Figure 25](#), we provide the APDU Commands for each step, 28 in total, with 1939 bytes, giving us about 27ms of delay in the network transmission.

Again, as shown in [Figure 21](#), there is a correlation between the number of APDU Commands used, the work the IoT smart card must perform, and the time measured. The 20 APDU Commands in the first call make the IoT deployment almost 8 times slower than the Raspberry Pi 3; but with only 8 APDU Commands, the second one is less than 1.5 times slower.

Nonetheless, it's significant the difference in performance between the laptop and the Raspberry Pi 3 in the last REST call, more than 40 times slower, even using the *SoftwareSmartcard*.

	issuanceProtocolStep	issuanceProtocolStepUi	issuanceProtocolStep
Laptop	298.79	377.84	916.32
RPi3	2327.18	6905.93	2150.90
Omega2	2818.64	19307.44	14354.24
Laptop over RPi3	7.79	18.28	2.35
RPi3 over Omega2	1.21	2.80	6.67
Laptop over Omega2	9.43	51.10	15.67

(a) Times (ms) and relative speedup



(b) Comparison graph

Figure 19: Issuance times (milliseconds)

Unlike the previous steps, the Presentation or Proving is done more than once, being the key feature of ZKP protocols. The laptop performs a prove in less than one second, the RPi3 needs 15 seconds, but our P2ABCE IoT deployment needs 15 seconds for the first step, and 18s for the second step, 33 seconds total to generate a Presentation Token.

#### MEMORY USAGE ON THE OMEGA2

Using the tool `time -v` we can get a lot of useful information about a program, once it finishes. In our case, the binary with BIOSC and the smart card logic starts as an empty smart card, goes through the described process, and then we can stop it, as the User Service won't use it anymore.

After another round of tests, now using `time -v`, the field named *Maximum resident set size (kbytes)* shows the **maximum** size of RAM used by the process since its launch. In our case, this involves the use of static memory for the *global variables* of the smart card logic, and the dynamic memory used by the third party libraries, like GMPlib, OpenSSL and cJSON.

GMP and OpenSSL always allocate the data in their own ADT, what involves copying the arrays of bytes representing the big modular integers from the cryptographic operations. cJSON, used in the serialization of the smart card for storage, and debug being human




Figure 20: Proving interaction.


readable, stores a copy of every saved variable in the JSON tree structure, then creates a string (array of char) with the JSON, that the user can write to a file.

Understanding the many bad uses of memory done in this PoC is important for future improvements and ports. A custom modular library using the same array of bytes that the smart card logic, a binary serialization, and many improvements, are our future work.

With all that said, the mean of the maximum memory usage measured is 6569.6 kbytes. Compared to the 64MB of RAM available in the Omega2, our PoC could be executed in more constrained devices, given the system is compatible.

	createPresentationToken	createPresentationTokenUi
Laptop	209.78	301.66
RPi3	1993.11	12505.80
Omega2	14836.33	18003.75
Laptop over RPi3	9.50	41.46
RPi3 over Omega2	7.44	1.44
Laptop over Omega2	70.72	59.68

(a) Times (ms) and relative speedup



(b) Comparison graph

Figure 21: Proving times (milliseconds)



# 6

## CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

---

To finish this document, we sum up some conclusions from the work done, and results obtained. We will also enumerate some future lines of research.

### 6.1 CONCLUSIONS

In the memory of this project we try to show the work done from the beginning, but we only showed our right decisions, and the information that is significant for the final result. The truth is that, aside from the information included in this paper, we have worked with other systems that ended up discarded. This isn't a negative aspect, because if we didn't, for example, study the Contiki OS, Cooja simulator and the hardware used, we could not be sure the development of the first PoC for that system would be impossible in the time given.

With regard to the work presented, the flexibility of the computation offloading technique, identifying the key operations that can be delegated, and those ones that can't, has allowed us to define a general solution for the vast world of the Internet of Things. The IoT devices can operate as individual actors in the P2ABCE ecosystem, and when in need of performing computation offloading, the delegation server can also be a device considered into the IoT class.

During the development, we had to investigate a lot of concepts related to IoT, smart cards, and even the insides of P2ABCE's code, to fix many existing bugs in the original project and minimize the amount of changes it had to undergo, in order to work with the IoT devices. In the implementation chapter we give guidelines to port MULTOS applications, considering the particularities we encountered, that's why we can't consider it an *instruction manual to port MULTOS apps*, but an interesting reading on how to confront a similar project. For example, if we wanted the Idemix implementation from [24], previous to P2ABCE, in a IoT device, we could apply almost the same steps, obtaining a core functionality of Idemix for constrained devices in C.

Our PoC implementation demonstrates that this project is actually feasible, not by performing a simulation of an IoT device, like in [10]. However, the use of third party libraries and no hardware acceleration support, makes the PoC too slow for certain cases, e.g., a Real-Time system requires almost immediate operations, like a car warning that another one is approaching too fast. There is a long path of

research before we can see this design in production, as many decisions depend on the specific deployment in consideration.

Recalling the objectives listed in [Section 3.1](#), we think we accomplish them, except the implementation of a PoC in the most constrained device possible, where we used LEDE to ease our development, and the last objective, where we could have given a use to the PoC, and we leave as part of the future work.

## 6.2 FUTURE WORK

Due to the nature of the project, there exist many options to continue researching in this area. We list below a collection of the tasks we couldn't accomplish but would have been our next steps:

- Second PoC for Arduino systems

We have already developed a working PoC for Linux based systems, and from our objective of using the most constrained devices available, we can follow an iterative process, building for devices a little more constrained than the last one. The next natural step, after building with LEDE/OpenWrt, is to aim for Arduino.

The critical changes to the actual PoC are:

The transmission channel, if the device has no TCP/IP stack, it could use a Serial connection to transmit BIOSC and delegation messages.

The use of a Json file to store the smart card status depends on whether the device has enough space or a file system. The current Json parser also uses too much dynamic memory. At this stage the serialization should be performed in a binary format, in a file or writing variables directly to the EEPROM memory.

GMPLib and OpenSSL libraries must be replaced by others with similar capabilities, or special implementations for the particular device in use.

All these changes affect only the *external utilities* and *interfaces* sections of the code, leaving the *core* untouched, because the smart card logic doesn't change.

- Implement more P2ABCE functionality in the device

If instead of aiming for more constrained devices, we work with similar devices to the Omega2, the computational power of the device could assume all the functionality of P2ABCE, at least for some roles. In a M2M (machine to machine) environment, the devices could act as Provers and Verifiers in the same interaction, and the verifying logic could be implemented entirely in

the device (generate a Presentation Policy and checking a prove in a Presentation Token is valid), reducing the need of a delegation server.

- Improve the *core smart card* code

From the simple refactoring of removing the MULTOS reimplemented API for direct calls to the *interfaces*, to identify all the *memcpy* copies of multiple variables with one call, removing the compiler directive for not using memory padding in the defined structures, letting the compiler manage the memory automatically.

- Support Extended APDUs

Currently, the APDU instruction handlers use the GET RESPONSE command to send large APDU Response Payloads, but we can reduce the number of APDUs exchanged supporting the Extended APDU format. Because the P2ABCE already sent some Extended APDUs, the APDU I/O interface in the PoC has support for Extended APDU Commands, but not for Extended Responses.

- Integrate the IoT+Idemix solution in other system

Our seventh objective, that we couldn't get to design in depth. The original idea was to integrate in a FIWARE<sup>1</sup> environment the Fiware Keyrock and Idemix Issuer, so both, users and IoT devices' identities are managed in the IdM<sup>2</sup> system. The Issuer generates credentials based on the user's attributes held in the Keyrock, and IoT devices can authenticate against Fi-ware services (using Idemix), or authenticate against other IoT devices (M2M).




Figure 22: IoT+Idemix Fi-Ware integration.

<sup>1</sup> FIWARE <https://www.fiware.org/>

<sup>2</sup> Identity Management - KeyRock <https://catalogue.fiware.org/enablers/identity-management-keyrock>



## APPENDIX



# A

## DOCKER AND CMAKE FILES

---

Listing 1: Dockerfile for P2ABCE

```
SET(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME Linux)
SET(CMAKE_SYSTEM_VERSION 1)

# specify the cross compiler
SET(CMAKE_C_COMPILER /lede/staging_dir/toolchain-
    mipsel_24kc_gcc-5.4.0_musl/bin/mipsel-openwrt-linux-gcc)
SET(CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER /lede/staging_dir/toolchain-
    mipsel_24kc_gcc-5.4.0_musl/bin/mipsel-openwrt-linux-g++)

# where is the target environment
SET(CMAKE_FIND_ROOT_PATH /lede/staging_dir/toolchain-
    mipsel_24kc_gcc-5.4.0_musl)

# search for programs in the build host directories
SET(CMAKE_FIND_ROOT_PATH_MODE_PROGRAM NEVER)
# for libraries and headers in the target directories
SET(CMAKE_FIND_ROOT_PATH_MODE_LIBRARY ONLY)
SET(CMAKE_FIND_ROOT_PATH_MODE_INCLUDE ONLY)

# Use the commands:
# mkdir build
# cd build
# cmake -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=Toolchain-omega2-mipsel.cmake ..
# make
```

---

Listing 2: Dockerfile for P2ABCE

```
FROM openjdk:7

COPY idemix-3.0.36-binaries/ /idemix/

RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y maven && rm -rf /var/lib
    /apt/lists/*

RUN      cd /idemix/com/ibm/zurich/idmx/com.ibm.zurich.idmx.3_x_x
    /3.0.36 && \
        mvn install:install-file      \
        -Dfile=com.ibm.zurich.idmx.3_x_x-3.0.36.jar   \
        -DpomFile=com.ibm.zurich.idmx.3_x_x-3.0.36.pom && \
        cd /idemix/com/ibm/zurich/idmx/com.ibm.zurich.idmx.
            interfaces/3.0.36 && \
```

```

mvn install:install-file      \
-Dfile=com.ibm.zurich.idmx.interfaces-3.0.36.jar \
-DpomFile=com.ibm.zurich.idmx.interfaces-3.0.36.pom && \
cd /idemix/com/ibm/zurich/idmx/pom/3.0.36      \
mvn install:install-file      \
-Dfile=pom-3.0.36.pom        \
-DpomFile=pom-3.0.36.pom

# docker run -it --name p2abce_dev_env -v /p2abcengine/source/
#   code:/usr/src/mymaven -w /usr/src/mymaven/Code/core-abce
#   p2abce_env bash
# docker start p2abce_dev_env
# docker attach p2abce_dev_env

```

---

Listing 3: Dockerfile for Omega2 SDK

```

# Linux dev environment for LEDE project
# Based on borromeotlhs' dockerfile

FROM ubuntu:14.04

LABEL maintainer="joseluis.canovas@outlook.com"
LABEL description="Dockerfile for Onion Omega2 SDK environment.
It can be modified for Omega2+."

RUN apt-get update && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get
    install -y \
    subversion g++ zlib1g-dev build-essential git python libncurses5-
    dev gawk gettext unzip file libssl-dev wget \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

# Install CMake 3.7.2
RUN mkdir ~/temp && \
cd ~/temp && \
wget https://cmake.org/files/v3.7/cmake-3.7.2.tar.gz && \
tar xzvf cmake-3.7.2.tar.gz && \
cd cmake-3.7.2/ && \
./bootstrap && \
make && \
make install && \
rm -rf ~/temp

RUN git clone https://github.com/lede-project/source.git lede

RUN adduser omega && echo 'omega:omega' | chpasswd && chown -R
    omega:omega lede
WORKDIR lede

```

```
USER omega

RUN ./scripts/feeds update -a && ./scripts/feeds install -a

# Set SDK environment for Omega2
# For Omega2+ change the third echo line with: (notice the 'p'
# for plus)
# echo "CONFIG_TARGET_ramips_mt7688_DEVICE_omega2p=y" > .config
# && \
# RUN echo "CONFIG_TARGET_ramips=y" > .config && \
# echo "CONFIG_TARGET_ramips_mt7688=y" >> .config && \
# echo "CONFIG_TARGET_ramips_mt7688_DEVICE_omega2=y" >> .config &&
# \
# make defconfig

RUN make tools/install
RUN make toolchain/install

ENV PATH "$PATH:/lede/staging_dir/toolchain-mipsel_24kc_gcc-5.4.0
_musl/bin"
ENV STAGING_DIR "/lede/staging_dir"
ENV CFLAGS=-I/lede/staging_dir/target-mipsel_24kc_musl/usr/
include
ENV LDFLAGS=-L/lede/staging_dir/target-mipsel_24kc_musl/usr/lib

# Use this command to run with shared directory:
# docker run -it --name omega2-sdk-app -v /my_host_dir:/remote
# omega2-sdk bash
```

---



# B

## TEST: APDU COMMANDS EXCHANGED

---

In this appendix we provide 3 sequence diagrams highlighting the APDU Commands exchanged during our testbed. The first one is the setup of the IoT smart card, storing the system parameters needed to work in the deployed P2ABCE system. The second one is the issuance of the credential, divided in the three REST calls needed in the delegation. The last one is the proving for the Presentation Policy from the Verifier, using two REST calls.




Figure 23: Init IoT Smart Card APDU Commands exchanged.




Figure 24: Issuance APDU Commands.




Figure 25: Proving APDU Commands.

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---

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## DECLARACIÓN DE ORIGINALIDAD

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Yo, José Luis Cánovas Sánchez, autor del TFG INTEGRACIÓN DE IDEMIX EN ENTORNOS DE IOT, bajo la tutela de los profesores Antonio Fernando Skarmeta Gómez y Jorge Bernal Bernabé, declaro que el trabajo que presento es original, en el sentido de que ha puesto el mayor empeño en citar debidamente todas las fuentes utilizadas.

*Murcia, Junio 2017*

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José Luis Cánovas Sánchez