



Security Issues in 802.11b WLANs - An Application Developers Perspective

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22nd January 2002

Workshop on Wireless Ad Hoc Networking, IISc

Agenda



- Communication Security Requirements
- 802.11b Security Architecture
- Security Issues in 802.11b
- Proposed Solutions for Enhanced Security

Communication Security Requirements



➤ Privacy

➤ Data Integrity

➤ Authentication

802.11b Security Architecture


- Link-layer security protocol
- Prevent link-layer eavesdropping
- Control network access
- WEP (Wired Equivalent Protocol)
- Essentially, equivalent to wired access point security

VEP Requirements




- Reasonably Strong (??)
- Self-synchronizing
- Computationally efficient
- Exportable
- Optional


WEP Encryption



VP Data Frame (Payload)



802.11b Shared Key Authentication



Security Issues



➤ War Driving / Sniffing

➤ Rogue Access Points

➤ MAC Address

➤ SSID

➤ WEP

War Driving




➤ War driving is one of the latest hacker fads

- <http://www.wardriving.com/>

➤ Involves driving around and scanning in search of unprotected 802.11 wireless networks

➤ Several War Driving tools are available

- NetStumbler
- AiroPeek
- MobileManager
- Sniffer Wireless
- THC-WarDrive





Rogue Access Points



- Employees install access points without the knowledge of IT departments
- Security is rarely enabled
- Network becomes vulnerable to war driving / sniffing attacks

MAC Address



- Can control access by allowing only defined MAC addresses to access the network
- Complicated and difficult to maintain list of valid MAC addresses
- MAC addresses can be spoofed

Service Set ID (SSID)



- Service Set ID (SSID) is the network name given to a wireless network
- Can be used to access a specific access point by name
- The more people that come to know about the SSID the more likely that it will be misused
- Changes in SSID requires communicating it to all people who access the network

Wired Equivalent Protocol (WEP)

- Not an “industrial strength” encryption protocol
- Vulnerable to attack
 - Passive attacks to decrypt traffic based on statistical analysis
 - Active attacks to inject new traffic from unauthorized mobile stations, based on known plaintext
 - Dictionary-building attack that, after analysis of a day’s worth of traffic, allows real-time automated decryption of all traffic
- All users share the same encryption key
- Data headers are not encrypted
- Initialization Vector (IV) Misuse
- Weakness in RC4’s Key Scheduling Algorithm

Attacks on WEP



Downloadable procedures

To crack the key

- AirSnort: <http://airsnort.sourceforge.net/>
- WEPCrack: <http://sourceforge.net/projects/wepcrack/>

To brute force enter into WLAN

- THC-RUT: www.thehackerschoice.com/releases.php

Proposed Solutions to Enhance Security



- Virtual Private Network (VPN)
- Secure LAN (SLAN)
- Remote Authentication Dial In User Services (RADIUS)
- IPsec
- 802.1x
- Proprietary WEP Implementations




Enables you to send data between two computers across a shared or public network in a manner that emulates the properties of a point-to-point private link

Provides a scalable authentication and encryption solution

Does require end user configuration and a strong knowledge of VPN technology


Users must re-authenticate if roaming between VPN servers

VPN Architecture



VPN Architecture (contd.)

Only allows authenticated VPN tunnels to pass to the Internal network. Could allow "guest" access to the Internet.




Secure LAN (SLAN)



- A GPL open-source “VPN” System
- Provides server authentication, client authentication, data privacy, and integrity using per session and per user short life keys
- Simpler and more cost efficient than a VPN
- Support for Windows and Linux
- Website: <http://slan.sourceforge.net/>

LAN Architecture





RADIUS



Several 802.11 access points offer RADIUS authentication

Clients can gain access to the network by supplying a username and password to a separate server

This information is securely sent over the network eliminating the possibility of passive snooping



Provides encryption and authentication services at the IP level of the network protocol stack

Can be used to secure nearly any type of Internet traffic

Legacy applications not implementing secure communications can be made secure using IPsec

Examples:

- Free S/WAN - <http://www.freeswan.org/>

Psec - Disadvantages



- Psec authenticates machines, not users
- Psec does not stop Denial-of-Service attacks
- Psec is not true end-to-end security
- Psec cannot be secure if your system isn't

802.1x



Provides enhanced security for users of 802.11b WLANs

Provides port-level authentication for any wired or wireless Ethernet client system

802.1x was originally designed as a standard for wired Ethernet, but is applicable to WLANs

It leverages many of the security features used with dial-up networking (RADIUS)

Also uses Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP, RFC 2284)


Built in support in Windows XP

802.1x Authentication

HOW IT WORKS

802.1X Authentication

802.1X authentication for wireless LANs provides centralized, server-based authentication of end users.



- 1** A client sends a "start" message to an access point, which requests the identity of the client.
- 2** The client replies with a response packet containing an identity, and the access point forwards the packet to an authentication server.
- 3** The authentication server sends an "accept" packet to the access point.
- 4** The access point places the client port in authorized state, and traffic is allowed to proceed.

Proprietary WEP Security



Dynamic Key Refresh instead of static keys

Use of 3DES/AES instead of RC4 (NetMotion Wireless)

Disadvantages:

- Interoperability Issues (non-WiFi Compliant)

Conclusion



Wireless LANs are very useful and convenient, but current security state not ideal for sensitive environments

Care must be taken before sensitive information is made available over Wireless LANs




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