

# Game-Theoretic Modeling of OODA Decision Cycles in Air Combat

Jason L. Lind - jason@groundbreaker.solutions

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## Introduction

In modern military operations, decision-making speed and adaptability have become as critical as firepower. The **OODA loop**—*Observe, Orient, Decide, Act*—is a conceptual model, first articulated by Col. John Boyd, that captures this reality. In essence, each side in a conflict continuously observes the situation, orients by interpreting information, decides on a course of action, and then acts. Boyd’s insight was that warfare can be seen as a *time-competitive decision cycle*: if one actor can cycle through OODA faster than the opponent, they can “get inside the opponent’s loop,” forcing the enemy into a reactive stance and eventually into confusion or paralysis. This emphasis on tempo is now embedded in NATO doctrine—as one Marine Corps manual states, “whoever can make and implement decisions consistently faster gains a tremendous, often decisive advantage.” In other words, the side with a faster *decision cycle* gains increasing leverage over time.

While the OODA loop has been widely discussed in strategic literature, there have been fewer attempts to **formalize it in a rigorous mathematical game-theoretic framework**. Game theory provides tools to model adversarial interactions and optimal decision-making, suggesting that we can model the duel of OODA loops as a strategic game. Recent research has integrated OODA dynamics with formal models of combat. For example, efforts to combine Boyd’s OODA concept with Lanchester’s classic attrition equations have led to the so-called *Boyd–Kuramoto–Lanchester (BKL) model*, representing each side’s OODA cycle as a cyclic *oscillator* influencing combat effectiveness. Such models treat conflict as a set of coupled nonlinear differential equations and can exhibit complex dynamics including synchronization and chaos. Solving games on these dynamics has required advanced computational methods, highlighting the need for tractable frameworks to guide decision-makers.

This paper builds a formal game-theoretic framework for **air combat decision-making** that incorporates OODA loop dynamics and **non-linear effectiveness models**. We focus on a hypothetical high-intensity air war scenario pitting a NATO-led coalition (including Ukraine) against a China–Russia coalition. This scenario provides a rich example—combining modern 5th-generation fighters and 4th-generation jets with varied training levels—and featuring coalition dynamics. We will use it as a detailed worked example to illustrate the framework’s application. However, the framework itself is general and intended as a **decision-analytic tool** for any competitive environment where rapid decision cycles and information processing play a central role.

We proceed as follows. **Section 1 defines the scenario** assumptions, forces, and context for the NATO+Ukraine vs China+Russia air war example. **Section 2 describes the core game mechanics** at both the strategic level (overall campaign choices) and the tactical level (within engagements), establishing how OODA-based decisions are made. **Section 3 develops the mathematical backbone** of the model, presenting equations for OODA dynamics, non-linear pilot effectiveness, and modified Lanchester attrition. **Section 4 walks through the decision-cycle game flow**, showing how the OODA loops of each side interact over successive observe–orient–decide–act cycles. **Section 5 defines victory conditions and metrics** for outcomes, and **Section 6 discusses player aids and tools** that can help practitioners apply this framework (e.g. simulation interfaces or analytical visualizations). **Section 7 outlines a plan for calibration and validation** of the model against real-world data and historical cases. We then explore **extensions in Section 8**, including the impacts of electronic warfare, cyber operations, cognitive factors, and coalition coordination. **Section 9 highlights use-cases** of this framework in wargaming, training, and concept development. Throughout, we emphasize mathematical clarity, using equations and tables to formalize concepts, and cite related work to position this framework in the context of existing theory. The

ultimate goal is to provide a generalizable decision-analytic model that quantitatively connects *decision cycle dynamics* to combat outcomes, offering insights for military strategists beyond this specific scenario.

## 1. Scenario Definition

To ground the discussion, we consider a hypothetical large-scale air war scenario between two coalition forces:

- **Blue Coalition:** A NATO-led air component, bolstered by Ukrainian forces. Fields both *5th-generation fighters* (e.g., F-35A Lightning II) and *4th-generation fighters* (e.g., F-16, Eurofighter Typhoon), with well-trained NATO pilots and moderately trained Ukrainian pilots.
- **Red Coalition:** A combined China–Russia air component. Fields *5th-generation fighters* (e.g., J-20, Su-57) and *4th-generation fighters* (e.g., J-10, Su-30/35), with Chinese elite pilots on newer jets and seasoned Russian pilots on older platforms.

Table 1 summarizes a notional force composition and qualitative pilot effectiveness:

Side	Pilot Group	Aircraft	Qty.	Training Level
Blue (NATO)	5th-Gen Pilots	F-35A Lightning II	40	Superior (extensive training)
Blue (NATO)	4th-Gen Pilots	F-15E, Typhoon, F-16	40	Superior (experienced)
Blue (Ukraine)	4th-Gen Pilots	Su-27, MiG-29	20	Moderate (some combat experience)
Red (China)	5th-Gen Pilots	J-20 Mighty Dragon	30	High (elite training)
Red (China)	4th-Gen Pilots	J-10, J-11, J-16	50	Lower (adequate training)
Red (Russia)	5th-Gen Pilots	Su-57 Felon	10	Lower (new platform)
Red (Russia)	4th-Gen Pilots	Su-30SM, Su-35S	40	High (veteran experience)

Table 1: Notional force composition and pilot quality.

Operational victory may be achieved by attrition to the point of air superiority or by decision-superiority collapse of the opponent’s OODA loop. Strategic and tactical layers interact through nested decision cycles.

## 2. Core Mechanics: Strategic and Tactical Layers

We conceptualize the conflict as a *hierarchical game*:

**Strategic Layer:** Campaign-level allocation—decisions about force commitments, posture (aggressive vs defensive), and support assets (AWACS, EW, drones). Modeled as a repeated/sequential game where each move sets context for engagements.

**Tactical Layer:** Engagement-level OODA competition—pilots choose OODA tempo and orientation effort under time pressure. Modeled as a simultaneous-move or differential game where timing and effectiveness determine attrition.

Strategic directives set tactical parameters (e.g., rules of engagement), while tactical outcomes feed back into strategic state, enabling adaptive dynamic play.

## 3. Mathematical Backbone: Equations and Model Dynamics

### 3.1 OODA Loop Timing as an Exponential Race

Let  $\lambda_B, \lambda_R$  be Blue’s and Red’s OODA rates (inverse of mean cycle times  $\bar{T}_B, \bar{T}_R$ ). The probability Red acts first in a cycle is

$$P(\text{Red first}) = \frac{\lambda_R}{\lambda_R + \lambda_B} = \frac{\bar{T}_B}{\bar{T}_R + \bar{T}_B}.$$

### 3.2 Non-Linear Effectiveness Models

Each pilot group allocates effort  $(O, R, D, A)$  with  $O + R + D + A = 1$ . Effectiveness is

$$E = \alpha_O O^{p_O} + \alpha_R R^{p_R} + \alpha_D D^{p_D} + \alpha_A A^{p_A},$$

with distinct parameters for NATO, Ukraine, China 5G/4G, Russia 5G/4G as detailed in Section 3.

### 3.3 Modified Lanchester Attrition

Force levels  $R(t), B(t)$  evolve by

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = -\alpha B(t) F(\Delta\omega(t)), \quad \frac{dB}{dt} = -\beta R(t) F(-\Delta\omega(t)),$$

where  $\Delta\omega = \omega_R - \omega_B$  is OODA speed advantage and  $F(\Delta\omega) = 1 + k \Delta\omega$ . Effectiveness ratios  $E_B/E_R$  may further scale attrition.

## 4. Decision-Cycle Game Flow

Each engagement proceeds:

1. **Setup:** Initialize  $R_0, B_0, \lambda_R, \lambda_B, E_R, E_B$ .
2. **Observe/Orient:** Update situational awareness; apply EW/cyber effects.
3. **Decide:** Timing game—exponential race determines who acts first.
4. **Act:** Resolve first strike, apply attrition  $\Delta R, \Delta B$ .
5. **Feedback:** Update  $\lambda, E$  based on outcomes (momentum/confusion).
6. **Repeat** until disengagement or destruction.

Momentum yields self-reinforcing initiative; equilibrium arises when neither side can improve by unilaterally changing tempo.

## 5. Victory Conditions and Metrics

- **Operational Victory:** Force attrition to threshold (e.g.,  $R(t) \rightarrow 0$  before  $B(t)$ ).
- **Decision Superiority:** Sustained OODA collapse (e.g., one side acts first  $> 90\%$  of cycles).
- **Metrics:** Force Exchange Ratio, OODA Tempo Ratio, orientation accuracy, time to outcome, resource expenditure, morale/shock indices.

## 6. Player Aids and Tools

- **Analytical Dashboard:** Real-time plots of  $R(t), B(t)$ , tempo ratio, initiative.
- **Decision Tables:** Lookup tables (e.g., probability of first-act vs relative speed).
- **Tabletop Tokens:** Simplified card-based OODA tokens for training.
- **Oscillator Visuals:** Phase diagrams of OODA loops to depict initiative.
- **Simulation Suite:** Monte Carlo engine for parameter sweeps and outcome distributions.
- **Calibration Interface:** Sliders for  $k, \bar{T}, \alpha, \beta$  to explore sensitivities.

## 7. Calibration and Validation Plan

- **Parameter Calibration:** Use historical air combat data (e.g., F-86 vs MiG-15 kill ratios) and training exercise outcomes to set  $\alpha, \beta, k, \lambda, E$ .
- **Effectiveness Fit:** Elicit SME judgments and simulator data for  $E$  coefficients/exponents.
- **Validation:** Compare model outcomes to historical case studies, modern Red-Blue exercises, and expert reviews; perform limit and stability tests.

## Extensions and Generalizations of the OODA Framework

**8.1. Electronic Warfare (EW)** Electronic Warfare directly influences OODA cycle timing and effectiveness by degrading situational awareness and communication.

$$T_{\text{Effective}} = T_{\text{Baseline}} + T_{\text{EW}}, \quad (1)$$

$$E_{\text{EW}} = \alpha_O (1 - \eta_{\text{EW}}) O^{p_O} + \alpha_R (1 - \eta_{\text{EW}}) R^{p_R} + \alpha_D D^{p_D} + \alpha_A A^{p_A}. \quad (2)$$

**8.2. Cognitive Warfare (CW)** Cognitive Warfare manipulates opponent perception and decision-making through deception, fatigue, and morale degradation.

$$R_{\text{Effective}} = R (1 - U_C), \quad (3)$$

$$T_{\text{Effective}} = T_{\text{Baseline}} e^{\gamma M}, \quad (4)$$

$$E_{\text{Cognitive}} = E (1 - P_{\text{deception}}). \quad (5)$$

**8.3. Coalition Dynamics** Coordination among multiple sub-players introduces synchronization challenges.

$$T_{\text{Coalition}} = \max_i (T_i) + \sum_{i \neq j} c_{ij} |T_i - T_j|, \quad (6)$$

$$E_{\text{Coalition}} = \rho \sum_{i=1}^n w_i E_i. \quad (7)$$

**8.4. N-sided Conflicts (Multi-Player)** Extending to  $n$  actors competing simultaneously:

$$P(i \text{ acts first}) = \frac{\lambda_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_j}, \quad \lambda_i = \frac{1}{T_i}, \quad (8)$$

$$\frac{dX_i}{dt} = - \sum_{j \neq i} \beta_{ji} X_j(t) F(\omega_j - \omega_i), \quad F(\Delta\omega) = 1 + k \Delta\omega, \quad (9)$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[\text{Payoff}_i]}{\partial \lambda_i} = 0 \quad \forall i. \quad (10)$$

## 8.5 Integrated Summary

$$T_{i,\text{eff}} = (T_{i,\text{base}} + T_{i,\text{EW}}) e^{\gamma M_i} + \sum_{j \neq i} c_{ij} |T_i - T_j|, \quad (11)$$

$$E_{i,\text{eff}} = \rho_i (1 - \eta_{\text{EW},i}) (1 - P_{\text{deception},i}) (1 - U_{C,i}) E_i, \quad (12)$$

$$\frac{dX_i}{dt} = - \sum_{j \neq i} \beta_{ji} X_j(t) F(\omega_j - \omega_i). \quad (13)$$

## 9. Wargaming: Adjudicate engagements by OODA model, enabling explicit tempo factors

This section expands upon how the developed game-theoretic OODA loop framework can directly facilitate more realistic and strategically insightful wargaming, particularly emphasizing the explicit representation of **tempo** (decision-cycle speed).

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### 9.1. Introduction to OODA-Based Wargaming

Traditional wargaming often abstracts decision-making cycles into discrete turns, overlooking nuanced temporal factors crucial to real-world operations. Integrating the *Observe–Orient–Decide–Act* (OODA) framework explicitly into wargames addresses this limitation by providing a quantitative basis to model how decision-making tempo affects combat outcomes.

Adjudicating engagements through OODA dynamics means decisions are no longer simplistically turn-based but dynamically determined by relative decision-cycle speeds and effectiveness of actors involved.

### 9.2. Explicit Representation of Tempo

**Tempo as Strategic Advantage** Tempo, or decision-cycle speed, is modeled quantitatively via the mean OODA cycle time:

$$\lambda_B = \frac{1}{\bar{T}_B}, \quad \lambda_R = \frac{1}{\bar{T}_R}.$$

A side with a faster cycle (larger  $\lambda$ , smaller  $\bar{T}$ ) gains systematic advantages:

- Increased probability of acting first.
- Greater control over operational initiative.
- Ability to force adversaries into reactive postures.

**Tempo Dynamics in Game Adjudication** Adjudicating tempo within an engagement follows an exponential race model:

$$P(\text{Red acts first}) = \frac{\lambda_R}{\lambda_R + \lambda_B} = \frac{\bar{T}_B}{\bar{T}_R + \bar{T}_B}.$$

Thus tempo directly affects the flow of each game round, replacing arbitrary initiative rules with a strategic, tempo-based process.

### 9.3. Integration into Wargaming Mechanics

#### Continuous vs. Discrete Mechanics

- *Continuous-Time:* Actions occur at intervals drawn from exponential inter-arrival times, yielding a fluid combat rhythm.
- *Discrete-Time with Probabilistic Initiative:* Traditional turns are retained, but turn order each cycle is determined by tempo probabilities.

#### OODA Tokens for Tabletop

- Players hold tokens for **Observe, Orient, Decide, Act**.
- Token deployment modifies OODA cycle times and effectiveness.
- Adjudication uses token states and the exponential-race rule to resolve initiative and outcomes.

#### 9.4. Tempo and Operational Momentum

Tempo integration reveals *operational momentum*:

- Successes boost morale and clarity, increasing  $\lambda$ .
- Setbacks degrade clarity, decreasing  $\lambda$  and compounding disadvantage.

Explicit tempo modeling makes morale, shock, and psychological factors visible and quantifiable.

#### 9.5. Strategic Insights from Tempo-Adjudicated Wargaming

- **Optimal Tempo Calibration:** Identifies diminishing returns on OODA speed, guiding resource allocation.
- **Dynamic Equilibrium Analysis:** Finds tempo settings where neither side gains by unilaterally changing speed.
- **Concept and Doctrine Testing:** Enables quantitative experiments with EW/CW and new technologies.

#### 9.6. Practical Tools and Player Aids

- **Analytical Dashboards:** Visualize tempo ratios, attrition, and effectiveness trends.
- **Decision Tables:** Precomputed tempo-impact and first-act probability tables.
- **OODA Tempo Trackers:** Visual or digital trackers for evolving decision speeds during play.

#### 9.7. Application and Training Utility

Tempo-based wargaming enhances realism by:

- Teaching the critical importance of decision speed and adaptability.
- Developing skills in managing momentum and initiative.
- Providing quantitative feedback on tempo consequences.

#### 9.8. Example Scenario: NATO vs. China–Russia Air War

1. **Initialization:** Set  $\lambda_B, \lambda_R$ , effectiveness, morale.
2. **Engagement Cycle:**
  - Compute first-strike probabilities via the exponential-race model.
  - Apply outcomes and update morale/effectiveness.
  - Recalculate tempo for the next cycle.
3. **Outcome Analysis:** Victory emerges from tempo management and momentum, not just attrition.

### 9.9. Conclusions and Strategic Recommendations

Integrating explicit tempo into wargaming transforms abstract decision cycles into realistic tools, enabling:

- Emphasis on rapid, adaptable decision practices.
- Continuous manipulation of operational tempo to disrupt adversaries.
- Prioritization of speed-enhancing capabilities (EW, CW, C2 systems).

Thus, OODA-based tempo adjudication enriches wargames, training, and doctrine by accurately modeling the temporal dynamics of modern conflict.