

Cryptography and Cryptanalysis

Introduction

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
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Administrivia

- Office hours: M 2:00-4:00 (and by appointment)
- Grading
 - Take-home exam: 50%
 - Class project: 50%, selected with instructor
- Web page:

Basic Setup

The wiretap channel: “In the beginning”



Message sent is:

$$C = E_{K_1}(P)$$

Decrypted as:

$$P = D_{K_2}(C)$$

P is called plaintext.

C is called ciphertext.

Symmetric Key: $K_1 = K_2$

Public Key: $K_1 \neq K_2$

K_1 is publicly known

K_2 is Bob's secret

Cryptography and adversaries

- Cryptography is computing in the presence of an **adversary**.
- An adversary is characterized by:
 - Talent
 - Nation state: assume infinite intelligence.
 - Wealthy, unscrupulous criminal: not much less.
 - Access to information
 - Ciphertext only, probable plaintext attacks, known plaintext/ciphertext attacks, chosen plaintext attacks, adaptive interactive, chosen plaintext attacks (oracle model).
 - Computational resources

Computational strength of adversary (edging towards high class version)


- Infinite - Perfect Security
 - Information Theoretic
 - Doesn't depend on computing resources or time available
- Polynomial
 - Asymptotic measure of computing power
 - Indicative but not dispositive
- Realistic
 - The actual computing resources under known or suspected attacks.
 - This is us, low brow.

Information strength of the adversary (high class version)


- Ciphertext only (Yikes!)
 - Rare these days
- Corresponding Plaintext/Ciphertext attack
- Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA, offline attack)
 - The adversary can only encrypt messages
- Non-adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA1)
 - The adversary has access to a decryption oracle until, but not after, it is given the target ciphertext
- Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA2)
 - The adversary has unlimited access to a decryption oracle, *except that the oracle rejects the target ciphertext*
 - The CCA2 model is very general – in practice, adversaries are much weaker than a full-strength CCA2 adversary.
 - Yet, many adversaries are too strong to fit into CCA1

Adversaries and their discontents

Wiretap Adversary (Eve)



Man in the Middle Adversary (Mallory)



Dramatis persona

Users

- Alice (party A)
- Bob (party B)
- Trent (trusted authority)
- Peggy and Victor
(authentication participants)

Users Agents

- Cryptographic designer
- Personnel Security
- Security Guards
- Security Analysts

Adversaries

- Eve (passive eavesdropper)
- Mallory (active interceptor)
- Fred (forger)
- Daffy (disruptor)
- Mother Nature
- Users (Yes Brutus, the fault lies in us,
not the stars)

Adversaries Agents

- Dopey (dim attacker)
- Einstein (smart attacker --- you)
- Rockefeller (rich attacker)
- Klaus (inside spy)

It's not just about communications privacy

Users want:

- Privacy/Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Authentication
- Non-repudiation
- Quality of Service


Adversaries want to:

- Read a message
- Get key, read all messages
- Corrupt a message
- Impersonate
- Repudiate
- Deny or inhibit of service

Cryptographic toolchest


- Symmetric ciphers (includes classical ciphers)
 - Block ciphers
 - Stream ciphers
 - Codes
- Asymmetric ciphers (Public Key)
- Cryptographic Hashes
- Entropy and random numbers
- Protocols and key management

Symmetric ciphers



- Encryption and Decryption use the same key.
 - The transformations are simple and fast enough for practical implementation and use.
 - Two major types: Stream ciphers and block ciphers.
 - Examples: DES, AES, RC4, A5, Enigma, SIGABA, etc.
 - Can't be used for key distribution or authentication.

Asymmetric (Public Key) ciphers



Encryption and Decryption use different keys.

- P_k is called the public key and p_k is the private key. Knowledge of P_k is sufficient to encrypt. Given P_k and C , it is infeasible to compute p_k and infeasible to compute P from C .
- Invented in mid 70's –Hellman, Merkle, Rivest, Shamir, Adleman, Ellis, Cocks, Williamson
- Public Key systems used to distribute keys, sign documents. Used in https:. Much slower than symmetric schemes.

Cryptographic hashes, random numbers

- Cryptographic hashes ($h: \{0,1\} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{bs}$). bs is the output block size in bits--- 160, 256, 512 are common)
 - One way: Given $b=h(a)$, it is hard (infeasible) to find a .
 - Collision Resistant: Given $b=h(a)$, it is hard to find $a' \neq a$ such that $h(a')= b$.
- Cryptographic random numbers
 - Not predictable even with knowledge of source design
 - Passing standard statistical tests is a necessary but not sufficient condition for cryptographic randomness.
 - Require “high-entropy” source.
 - Huge weakness in real cryptosystems.
- Pseudorandom number generators
 - Stretch random strings into longer strings
 - More next quarter

Algorithm Speed

Algorithm	Speed
RSA-1024 Encrypt	.32 ms/op (128B), 384 KB/sec
RSA-1024 Decrypt	10.32 ms/op (128B), 13 KB/sec
AES-128	.53 ms/op (16B), 30MB/sec
RC4	.016 ms/op (1B), 63 MB/sec
DES	.622 ms/op (8B), 12.87 MB/sec
SHA-1	48.46 MB/sec
SHA-256	24.75 MB/sec
SHA-512	8.25 MB/sec

Timings do not include setup. All results typical for a 850MHz x86.

Mechanisms for insuring message privacy

- Ciphers
- Codes
- Stegonography
 - Secret Writing (Bacon's "Cipher")
 - Watermarking
- We'll focus on ciphers which are best suited for mechanization, safety and high throughput.

Codes and Code Books

- One Part Code
 - A 2
 - Able 8
- Two Part
 - In first book, two columns. First column contains words/letters in alphabetical order, second column has randomly ordered code groups
 - In second code book, columns are switched and ordered by code groups.
- Sometimes additive key is added (mod 10) to the output stream
- Code-book based codes are “manual.” We will focus on ciphers from now on.
- “Codes” also refers to “error correcting” codes which are used to communicate reliably over “noisy” channels. This area is related to cryptography. See, MacWilliams and Sloane or van Lint.

Basic Ciphers

- Monoalphabetic Substitution
 - Shift
 - Mixed alphabet
- Transposition
- Polyalphabetic Substitution
 - Vigenere
- One Time Pad
- Linear Feedback Shift Register

Kerckhoffs' Principle

- The confidentiality required to ensure practical communications security must reside solely in the knowledge of the key.
- Communications security cannot rely on secrecy of the algorithms or protocols
 - We must assume that the attacker knows the complete details of the cryptographic algorithm and implementation
- This principle is just as valid now as in the 1800's.

Cipher Requirements

- WW II
 - Universally available (simple, light instrumentation) – interoperability.
 - Compact, rugged: easy for people (soldiers) to use.
 - Security in key only: We assume that the attacker knows the complete details of the cryptographic algorithm and implementation
 - Adversary has access to some corresponding plain and ciphertext
- Now
 - Adversary has access to unlimited ciphertext and lots of chosen text.
 - Implementation in digital devices (power/speed) paramount.
 - Easy for computers to use.
 - Resistant to ridiculous amount of computing power.

“Simple” attacks

- Exhaustive search of theoretical key space.
- Exhaustive search of actual key space as restricted by poor practice.
- Exploiting bad key management or storage.
- Stealing keys.
- Exploiting encryption errors.
- Spoofing (ATM PIN).
- Leaking due to size, position, language choice, frequency, inter-symbol transitions, timing differences, side channels.

Paper and pencil ciphers --- “In the beginning”

Transposition

- A transposition rearranges the letters in a text.
- Example: Grilles
 - Plain-text: BULLWINKLE IS A DOPE
 - Written into a predefined rectangular array

```
B U L L
W I N K
L E I S   →  BWLAEUINEDLNIOLKSP
A D O P
E
```

$c_i = p_{s(i)}$ where

$s = (1) (2, 5, 17, 16, 12, 11, 7, 6) (3, 9, 14, 4, 13, 15, 8, 10)$

- Another example: Rail fence cipher.

Breaking filled columnar transposition

Message (from Sinkov)

EOEYE GTRNP SECEH HETYP SNGND DDDDET OCRAE RAEMH
TECSE USIAR WKDRI RNYAR ABUEY ICNTT CEIET US

Procedure

1. Determine rectangle dimensions (s, w) by noting that message length= $m = s \times w$. Here $m=77$, so $s=7, w=11$ or $s=11, w=7$
2. Anagram to obtain relative column positions

Note a transposition is easy to spot since letter frequency is the same as regular English.

Anagramming

- Look for words, digraphs, etc.
- Note: Everything is very easy in corresponding plain/ciphertext attack

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
E	E	G	A	E	R	C
O	C	N	E	U	N	N
E	E	D	R	S	Y	T
Y	H	D	A	I	A	T
E	H	D	E	A	R	C
G	E	D	M	R	A	E
T	T	E	H	W	N	I
R	Y	T	T	K	U	E
N	H	O	E	D	E	T
P	S	C	C	R	Y	U
S	N	R	S	I	I	S



3	6	1	5	7	2	4
G	R	E	E	C	E	A
N	N	O	U	N	C	E
D	Y	E	S	T	E	R
D	A	Y	I	T	H	A
D	R	E	A	C	H	E
D	A	G	R	E	E	M
E	N	T	W	I	T	H
T	U	R	K	E	Y	T
O	E	N	D	T	H	E
C	Y	P	R	U	S	C
R	I	S	I	S	N	S

Alphabetic substitution

- A *monoalphabetic* cipher maps each occurrence of a plaintext character to a cipher-text character (the same one every time).
- A *polyalphabetic* cipher maps each occurrence of a plaintext character to more than one cipher-text character.
- A *polygraphic* cipher maps more than one plain-text character at a time
 - Groups of plaintext characters are replaced by assigned groups of cipher-text characters

Et Tu Brute?: Substitutions

- Caesar Cipher (Shift)

Message: B U L L W I N K L E I S A D O P E

Cipher: D W N N Y K P M N G K U C F Q S G

$c = pC^k$, $C = (\text{ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ})$, $k = 2$
here

$k = 3$ for classical Caesar

- More generally, any permutation of alphabet

Attacks on substitution

- Letter Frequency

A	.0651738	B	.0124248	C	.0217339	D	.0349835
E	.1041442	F	.0197881	G	.0158610	H	.0492888
I	.0558094	J	.0009033	K	.0050529	L	.0331490
M	.0202124	N	.0564513	O	.0596302	P	.0137645
Q	.0008606	R	.0497563	S	.0515760	T	.0729357
U	.0225134	V	.0082903	W	.0171272	X	.0013692
Y	.0145984	Z	.0007836	sp	.1918182		

- Probable word.
- Corresponding plain/cipher text makes this trivial.

Inter symbol information

- Bigraphs

EN	RE	ER	NT	TH
ON	IN	TE	AN	OR
ST	ED	NE	VE	ES
ND	TO	SE	AT	TI


- Trigraphs

ENT	ION	AND	ING	IVE
TIO	FOR	OUR	THI	ONE

- Words

THE	OF	AND	TO	A
IN	THAT	IS	I	IT
FOR	AS	WITH	WAS	HIS
HE	BE	NOT	BY	BUT
HAVE	YOU	WHICH	ARE	ON

Letter frequency far graph



Breaking a mono-alphabet substitution

LB HOMVY QBF TFIL EON LWO HFLLBY SDJVYM FNADPZI

Ch	#	Freq	Ch	#	Freq	Ch	#	Freq	Ch	#	Freq
L	5	0.125	F	4	0.100	O	4	0.100	B	3	0.075
Y	3	0.075	D	2	0.050	M	2	0.050	N	2	0.050
H	2	0.050	V	2	0.050	I	2	0.050	E	1	0.025
P	1	0.025	Q	1	0.025	S	1	0.025	T	1	0.025
A	1	0.025	W	1	0.025	J	1	0.025	Z	1	0.025

40 characters,

index of coincidence: 0.044.

LB HOMVY QBF TFIL EON LWO HFLLBY SDJVYM FNADPZI

to begin you must keep the button facing upwards

Breaking a mono-alphabet substitution

FMGWG OWG O XQJYGW UI YOEE YGOWLXPH LXHLRG FMG LHLH
FMOF KOX YG MGOWR

Ch	#	Freq	Ch	#	Freq	Ch	#	Freq	Ch	#	Freq
G	9	0.161	O	7	0.125	L	5	0.089	W	5	0.089
M	4	0.071	H	4	0.071	F	4	0.071	X	4	0.071
Y	4	0.071	R	2	0.036	E	2	0.036	Q	1	0.018
I	1	0.018	U	1	0.018	J	1	0.018	K	1	0.018
P	1	0.018									

56 characters, index of coincidence: 0.071.

FMGWG OWG O XQJYGW UI YOEE YGOWLXPH LXHLRG FMG
there are a number of ball bearings inside the

LHLH FMOF KOX YG MGOWR
isis that can be heard

Using probable words

- From Eli Biham's notes (127 characters)

UCZCS NYEST MVKBO RTOVK VRVKC ZOSJM UCJMO MBRJM
VESZB SMOSJ OBKYE MJTRV VEMPY JMOMJ AMVEM HKOVJ
KTRVK CZCQV EMNMV VMJOS ZHVER OVEMP BSZTM MSOKN
PTJCI MZ

C-letter	# Occur	Pletter	ExpOcc
M	19	e	15
V	15	t	12
O	11	a	10
J	10	o	10
S	9	n	9
E	8	i	9
K	8	s	8
Z	7	r	8
C	7	h	7
R	6	l	5
T	6	d	5
B	5	c	4
N	3	U	4

C-letter	# Occur	Pletter	ExpOcc
Y	3	u	4
P	3	p	3
H	2	f	3
U	2	m	3
A	1	y	2
I	1	b	2
Q	1	g	2
D	0	v	1
F	0	k	1
W	0	q	0
L	0	x	0
G	0	j	0
X	0	z	0

Breaking mono-alphabet with probable word

- From Eli Biham's notes (127 characters)

UCZCS NYEST MVKBO RTOVK VRVKC ZOSJM UCJMO MBRJM
VESZB SMOSJ OBKYE MJTRV VEMPY JMOMJ AMVEM HKOVJ
KTRVK CZCQV EMNMV VMJOS ZHVER OVEMP BSZTM MSOKN
PTJCI MZ

- By frequency and contact VEM is likely to be the and thus P is likely y or m.
- Playing around with other high frequency letters UCZCA could be “monoa” which suggests “monoalphabet” which is a fine probable word. The rest is easy.
- Word structure (repeated letters) can also quickly isolate text like “beginning” or “committee”

Breaking mono-alphabet with probable word

UCZCS NYEST MVKBO RTOVK VRVKC ZOSJM UCJMO MBRJM
monoa lphab etics ubsti tutio nsare mores ecure
VESZB SMOSJ OBKYE MJTRV VEMPY JMOMJ AMVEM HKOVJ
thanc aesar scsph erbut theyp reser vethe distr
KTRVK CZCQV EMNMV VMJOS ZHVER OVEMP BSZTM MSOKN
ibuti onoft helet tersa ndthu sthey canbe easil
PTJCI MZ
ybrok en

Word breaks make it easier

Vigenere polyalphabetic cipher

6 Alphabet Direct Standard Example (Keyword: SYMBOL)

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ

PLAIN: GET OUT NOW

KEY: SYM BOL SYM

STUVWX**Y**ZABCDE**F**GHIJKLMNOPQR

CIPHER: YCF PIE FMI

YZAB**C**DEFGHIJKL**M**NOPQRSTUVWXYZ

MNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDE**F**GH**I**JKL

BCDEFGHIJKLMNOP**P**QRSTUVWXYZA

OPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHI**I**JKLMN

LMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDE**E**FGHIJK

Initial Mathematical Techniques

Matching distributions

- Consider the Caesar cipher, $E_a(x) = (x+a) \pmod{26}$
- Let $p_i = P(X=i)$ be the distribution of English letters
- Given the text $\mathbf{y} = (y_0, \dots, y_{T-1})$ with frequency distribution, q_i , where \mathbf{y} are the observations of n ciphertext letters, we can find a by maximizing
$$f(t) = \sum_{j=0}^{25} p_{j+t} q_j.$$
- $f(t) = a$, thus maximizes $f(t)$.

Correct alignments

- Here we show that $\sum_{i=1}^n p_i q_i$ is largest when the ciphertext and plaintext are 'aligned' to the right values.
 - Proof: Repeatedly apply the following: If $a_1 \geq a_2 \geq 0$ and $b_1 \geq b_2 \geq 0$ then $a_1 b_1 + a_2 b_2 \geq a_1 b_2 + a_2 b_1$. This is simple: $a_1(b_1 - b_2) \geq a_2(b_1 - b_2)$ follows from $a_1 \geq a_2$ after multiplying both sides by $(b_1 - b_2) \geq 0$.
- A similar theorem holds for the function $\sum_{i=1}^n p_i \lg(p_i)$ which we'll come across later; namely, $\sum_{i=1}^n p_i \lg(p_i) \geq \sum_{i=1}^n q_i \lg(p_i)$.
 - Proof: Since $\sum_{i=1}^n p_i = 1$ and $\sum_{i=1}^n q_i = 1$ by the weighted arithmetic-geometric mean inequality, $[\sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i a_i \geq \prod_{i=1}^n a_i^{\lambda_i}]$.
 - Put $a_i = q_i/p_i$. $1 = \sum p_i a_i \geq \prod (q_i/p_i)^{p[i]}$. Taking \lg of both sides gives $0 \geq \sum p_i \lg(q_i) - \sum p_i \lg(p_i)$ or $\sum p_i \lg(p_i) \geq \sum p_i \lg(q_i)$.

Statistical tests for alphabet identification

- Index of coincidence (Friedman) for letter frequency

- Measure of roughness of frequency distribution.
- Can choose same letters f_i choose 2 ways

$$IC = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{f_i(f_i-1)}{n(n-1)}, \text{ so } IC \approx \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2$$

- For English Text $IC \cong .07$, for Random Text $IC = \frac{1}{26} = .038$.
- IC is useful for determining number of alphabets (key length) and aligning alphabets.
- For n letters enciphered with m alphabets:

- $IC(n, m) = \frac{1}{m} \frac{n-m}{n-1} \cdot .07 + \frac{m-1}{m} \frac{n}{n-1} \cdot .038$

- Other Statistics

- Vowel consonant pairing.
- Digraph, trigraph frequency.

Statistical estimation and mono-alphabetic shifts

- Solving for the “shift” using the frequency matching techniques is usually dispositive.
- For general substitutions, while frequency matching maximization is very helpful, it is scarcely adequate because of variation from the “ideal” distribution.
- Inter-symbol dependency becomes more important so we must use probable words or look for popular words. For example, in English, “the” almost always helps a lot.
- Markov modeling (next topic) can be dispositive for general substitutions. We introduce it here not because you need it but the mono-alphabet setting is a good way to understand it first time around.
- In more complex situations, it can be critical.

Group Theory in Cryptography

- Groups are sets of elements that have a binary operation with the following properties:
 1. If $x, y, z \in G$, $xy \in G$ and $(xy)z = x(yz)$. It is not always true that $xy = yx$.
 2. There is an identity element $1 \in G$ and $1x = x1 = x$ for all x in G
 3. For all, $x \in G$ there is an element $x^{-1} \in G$ and $xx^{-1} = 1 = x^{-1}x$
- One very important group is the group of all bijective maps from a set of n elements to itself denoted Σ_n or S_n .
- The “binary operation” is the composition of mappings. The identity element leaves every element alone.
- The inverse of a mapping, x , “undoes” what x does.

Operations in the symmetric group

- If $s \in S_n$ and the image of x is y we can write this two ways:
 - From the left, $y = \sigma(x)$. This is the usual functional notation you used to where mappings are applied “from the left”. When mappings are applied from the left and σ and δ are elements of S_n , $\sigma\delta$ denotes the mapping obtained by applying δ first and then σ - i.e. $y = \sigma(\delta(x))$.
 - From the right, $y = (x)\sigma$. For them, $\sigma\delta$ denotes the mapping obtained by applying σ first and then δ - i.e. $y = ((x)\sigma)\delta$.

Element order and cycle notation

- The smallest k such that $\sigma^k=1$ is called the *order* of σ .
- G is finite if it has a finite number of elements (denoted $|G|$).
 - In a finite group, all elements have finite order
 - *Lagrange's Theorem*: The order of each element divides $|G|$.
- Example. Let $G = S_4$.
 - $\sigma = 1 \rightarrow 2, 2 \rightarrow 3, 3 \rightarrow 4, 4 \rightarrow 1, \delta = 1 \rightarrow 3, 2 \rightarrow 4, 3 \rightarrow 1, 4 \rightarrow 2$.
 $\sigma^{-1} = 1 \rightarrow 4, 2 \rightarrow 1, 3 \rightarrow 2, 4 \rightarrow 3$
 - Applying mappings “from the left”, $\sigma\delta = 1 \rightarrow 4, 2 \rightarrow 1, 3 \rightarrow 2, 4 \rightarrow 3$.
 - Sometimes s is written like this:

$$\begin{array}{cccc} \sigma & = & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 \\ & & 2 & 3 & 4 & 1 \end{array}$$
 - Sometimes permutations are written as products of cycles: $\sigma = (1234)$ and $\delta = (13)(24)$.

William Freidman

Vignere -polyalphabetic cipher

6 Alphabet Direct Standard Example (Keyword: SYMBOL)

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ

STUVWX**Y**ZABCDE**F**GHIJKLMNOPQR

YZAB**C**DEFGHIJKL**M**NOPQRSTUVWXYZ

MNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDE**F**GH**I**JKL

BCDEFGHIJKLMNOP**P**QRSTUVWXYZA

OPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHI**I**JKLMN

LMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDE**E**FGHIJK

PLAIN: GET OUT NOW

KEY: SYM BOL SYM

CIPHER: YCF PIE FMI

Constructing Vigenere Alphabets

Direct Standard:

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ

Reverse Standard:

ZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

Keyword Direct (Keyword: NEW YORK CITY):

NEWYORKCITABDEFGHJLMPQRSUVZ

Keyword Transposed (Keyword: CHICAGO):

CHIAGO

BDEFJK

LMNPQR

STUVWX

YZ

CBLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRX

Mathematical description of Vigenere

- Suppose we have a sequence letters (a message), s_0, s_1, \dots, s_n .
- The transposition cipher, $\sigma \in S_m$, works on blocks of m letters as follows. Let $j = um + v$, $v < m$, $C(s_j) = s_{um+s(v)}$ where the underlying set of elements, S_m , operates on is $\{0, 1, 2, \dots, m-1\}$.
- If the first cipher alphabet of a Vigenere substitution is $\sigma \in S_{26}$ where the underlying set of elements, S_m , operates on is $\{a, b, \dots, z\}$ then $C(s_j) = \sigma^{P(i \bmod k)}(s_j)$ where P is the cyclic permutation (a, b, c, \dots, z) . Sometimes $k=26$ or could be the size of the codeword.
- Mixing many of these will obviously lead to complicated equations that are hard to solve.

Solving Vigenere

1. Determine Number of Alphabets
 - Repeated runs yield interval differences. Number of alphabets is the gcd of these. (Kasiski)
 - Statistics: Index of coincidence
2. Determine plaintext alphabet
3. Determine ciphertext alphabets

Example of Vigenere

- Encrypt the following message using a Vigeniere cipher with direct standard alphabets. Key: JOSH.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

- We'll calculate the index of coincidence of the plaintext and cipher-text.
- Then break the cipher-text into 4 columns and calculate the index of coincidence of the columns (which should be mono-alphabets).

Message as “five” group and IC

ALLPE RSONS BORNO RNATU RALIZ EDINT HEUNI TEDST ATESA NDSUB JECTT
OTHEJ URISD ICTIO NTHER EOFAR ECITI ZENSO FTHEU NITED STATE SANDO
FTHES TATEW HEREI NTHEY RESID ENOST ATESH ALLMA KEORE NFORC EANYL
AWWHI CHSHA LLABR IDGET HEPRI VILEG ESORI MMUNI TIESO FCITI ZENSO
FTHEU NITED STATE SNORS HALLA NYSTA TEDEP RIVEA NYPER SONOF LIFEL
IBERT YORPR OPERT YWITH OUTDU EPROC ESSOF LAWNO RDENY TOANY PERSON
NWITH INITS JURIS DICTI ONTHE EQUAL PROTE CTION OFTHE LAWS

Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq
E	49	0.129	T	42	0.111	I	32	0.084	O	29	0.077
S	28	0.074	N	28	0.074	R	26	0.069	A	25	0.066
H	18	0.047	L	16	0.042	D	13	0.034	U	11	0.029
F	10	0.026	C	9	0.024	P	9	0.024	Y	8	0.021
W	7	0.018	B	4	0.011	M	3	0.008	J	3	0.008
Z	3	0.008	V	2	0.005	G	2	0.005	K	1	0.003
Q	1	0.003	X	0	0.000						

379 characters, index of coincidence: 0.069, IC (square approx): 0.071.

IC for cipher-text

JZDWN FKVWG TVABG YWOLB AODPI SVPWH ZLDBA ANRKA JHWZJ BVZDP BLLHL
VCVWQ DFAZM WUARC FAQSJ LXTSY NQAAR NWUBC XAQSM URHWK BHSAN GSUMC
XAQSK AJHWD QSJLR BLONM JLBWV LWCKA JHWZQ ODSVO CLXFW UOCJJ NOFFU
OODQW UOBVS SUOTY RRYLC VWWAW NPUSY LBCJP VAMUR HALBC XJRHA GNBKV
OHZLD BAANR KAJHW ZWCJZ QODSJ BQZCO LLMSH YRJWH WMHLA GGUXT DPOSD
PKSJA HCJWA CHLAH QDRHZ VDHVB NDJVL SKZXT DHFBG YMSFF CCSUH DWYBC
FDRHZ PWWLZ SIJPB RAJCW GUCVW LZISS YFGAN QLPXB GMCVW SJKK

Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq
W	29	0.077	A	28	0.074	S	23	0.061	L	23	0.061
J	22	0.058	H	22	0.058	C	20	0.053	B	20	0.053
D	18	0.047	V	17	0.045	O	15	0.040	Z	15	0.040
R	14	0.037	U	13	0.034	N	12	0.032	Q	12	0.032
F	11	0.029	K	11	0.029	P	10	0.026	G	10	0.026
Y	9	0.024	M	9	0.024	X	8	0.021	T	5	0.013
I	3	0.008	E	0	0.000		0	0.000			

379 characters, index of coincidence: 0.045, IC (square approx):
0.048

Cipher-text broken into 4 columns with IC

JNWAW AIWDN JJDL C DMRQX NRBQR BNMQJ QRNBW JQVXO
NUQBU RCAUB VRBRN ODNJW QJCMR WAXOK HAARD NLXFM
CHBRW SBCCZ YNXCJ

Column 1: 95 characters, index of coincidence: 0.058, IC (square approx): 0.068.

ZFGBO OSHBR HBPHV FWCST QNCSH HGCSH SBMWC HOOFC
OOWVO RVWSC AHCHB HBRHC OBOSJ MGTSS CCHHH DSTBS
CDCHW IRWVI FQBVK

Column 2: 95 characters, index of coincidence: 0.077, IC (square approx): 0.087.

DKTGL DVZAK WVBLW AUFJS AWXMW SSXKW JLJVK WDCWJ
FOUST YWNYJ MAXAK ZAKWJ DQLHW HGDDJ JHQZV JKDGF
SWFZL JAGWS GLGWK

Column 3: 95 characters, index of coincidence: 0.060, IC (square approx): 0.070.

WVYB PPLAA ZZLVQ ZAALY AUAUK AUAAD LOLLA ZSLUJ
FDOSY LWPLP ULJGV LAAZZ SZLYH LUPPA WLDVB VZHYF
UYDPZ PJULS APMS

Column 4: 94 characters, index of coincidence: 0.081, IC (square approx): 0.090.

Breaking a Vigenere

- Break the Vigenere based cipher-text below. Plaintext and cipher-text alphabets are direct standard. What is the key length? What is the key?

IGDLK MJSGC FMGEP PLYRC IGDLA TYBMR KDYVY XJGMR TDSVK ZCCWG ZRRIP
UERXY EEYHE UTOWS ERYWC QRRIP UERXJ QREWQ FPSZC ALDSD ULSWF FFOAM
DIGIY DCSRR AZSRB GNDLC ZYDMM ZQGSS ZBCXM OYBID APRMK IFYWF MJVLY
HCLSP ZCDLC NYDXJ QYXHD APRMQ IGNSU MLNLG EMBTF MLDSB AYVPU TGMLK
MWKGF UCFIY ZBMLC DGCLY VSCXY ZBVEQ FGXKN QYMIY YMXKM GPCIJ HCCEL
PUSXF MJVRY FGYRQ

Look for repeats

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
<u>IGDLK</u>	MJSGC	FMGEP	PLYRC	<u>IGDLA</u>	TYBMR	KDYVY	XJGMR	TDSVK	ZCCWG	<u>ZRRIP</u>	1
<u>UERXY</u>	EEYHE	UTOWS	ERYWC	<u>QRRIP</u>	<u>UERXJ</u>	QREWQ	FPSZC	ALDSD	ULSWF	FFOAM	2
DIGIY	DCSRR	AZSRB	GNDLC	ZYDMM	ZQGSS	ZBCXM	OYBID	<u>APRMK</u>	IFYWF	MJVLY	3
HCLSP	ZCDLC	NYDXJ	<u>QYXHD</u>	<u>APRMQ</u>	IGNSU	MLNLG	EMBTF	MLDSB	AYVPU	TGMLK	4
MWKGF	UCFIY	ZBMLC	DGCLY	VSCXY	ZBVEQ	FGXKN	QYMIY	YMXKM	GPCIJ	HCCEL	5
PUSXF MJVRY FGyrQ											

First Repetition: 20, Second: 25. Third: 35. $(20, 25, 35) = 5$

ALDSD	FFOAM	IFYWF	NYDXJ	UCFIY	ZBCXM
APRMK	FGXKN	IGDLA	OYBID	UERXJ	ZBMLC
APRMQ	FGYRQ	IGDLK	PLYRC	UERXY	ZBVEQ
AZSRB	FMGEP	IGNSU	PUSXF	ULSWF	ZCCWG
DCSRR	FPSZC	KDYVY	QREWQ	UTOWS	ZCDLC
DGCLY	GNDLC	MJSGC	QRRIP	VSCXY	ZQGSS
DIGIY	GPCIJ	MJVLY	QYMIY	XJGMR	ZRRIP
EEYHE	HCCEL	MJVRY	QYXHD	YMXKM	ZYDMM
EMBTF	HCLSP	MLDSB	TDSVK	YVPU	
ERYWC		MLNLG	TGMLK		
		MWKGF	TYBMR		

IC study of 5 alphabet hypothesis

Full Cipher

Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq
Y	23	0.079	M	21	0.072	C	19	0.066	R	18	0.062
G	17	0.059	L	16	0.055	D	16	0.055	S	15	0.052
F	13	0.045	I	12	0.041	P	11	0.038	E	11	0.038
X	10	0.034	Z	10	0.034	Q	9	0.031	B	8	0.028
K	8	0.028	U	8	0.028	W	7	0.024	A	7	0.024
J	7	0.024	V	7	0.024	N	5	0.017	T	5	0.017
H	4	0.014	O	3	0.010		0	0.000			

290 characters, index of coincidence: 0.044, IC (square approx): 0.047.

Column 1 of 5

Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq
Z	8	0.138	M	6	0.103	A	5	0.086	U	5	0.086
F	5	0.086	I	4	0.069	Q	4	0.069	T	3	0.052
D	3	0.052	E	3	0.052	H	2	0.034	P	2	0.034
G	2	0.034	O	1	0.017	K	1	0.017	V	1	0.017
X	1	0.017	Y	1	0.017	N	1	0.017	S	0	0.000
B	0	0.000	C	0	0.000	J	0	0.000	W	0	0.000
L	0	0.000	R	0	0.000		0	0.000			

58 characters, index of coincidence: 0.059, IC (square approx): 0.075.

IC of columns

Column 2 of 5

Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq
G	7	0.121	Y	7	0.121	C	6	0.103	L	5	0.086
P	4	0.069	R	4	0.069	J	4	0.069	E	3	0.052
B	3	0.052	M	3	0.052	F	2	0.034	D	2	0.034
Q	1	0.017	N	1	0.017	S	1	0.017	T	1	0.017
U	1	0.017	W	1	0.017	I	1	0.017	Z	1	0.017
O	0	0.000	K	0	0.000	V	0	0.000	H	0	0.000
X	0	0.000	A	0	0.000		0	0.000			

58 characters, index of coincidence: 0.058, IC(square approx): 0.074.

Column 3 of 5

Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq
D	8	0.138	S	7	0.121	R	6	0.103	C	6	0.103
Y	6	0.103	V	4	0.069	G	4	0.069	B	3	0.052
X	3	0.052	M	3	0.052	O	2	0.034	N	2	0.034
F	1	0.017	E	1	0.017	K	1	0.017	L	1	0.017
P	0	0.000	Q	0	0.000	A	0	0.000	T	0	0.000
U	0	0.000	H	0	0.000	W	0	0.000	I	0	0.000
J	0	0.000	Z	0	0.000		0	0.000			

58 characters, index of coincidence: 0.071, IC (square approx): 0.087.

IC of columns continued

Column 4 of 5

Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq
L	9	0.155	I	7	0.121	W	6	0.103	X	6	0.103
S	5	0.086	M	5	0.086	R	5	0.086	E	3	0.052
H	2	0.034	V	2	0.034	G	2	0.034	K	2	0.034
A	1	0.017	P	1	0.017	T	1	0.017	Z	1	0.017
C	0	0.000	Q	0	0.000	D	0	0.000	J	0	0.000
U	0	0.000	F	0	0.000	B	0	0.000	N	0	0.000
Y	0	0.000	O	0	0.000		0	0.000			

58 characters, index of coincidence: 0.075, IC (square approx): 0.091.

Column 5 of 5

Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq	Ch	Count	Freq
Y	9	0.155	C	7	0.121	F	5	0.086	M	4	0.069
P	4	0.069	Q	4	0.069	K	4	0.069	J	3	0.052
R	3	0.052	D	3	0.052	G	2	0.034	S	2	0.034
U	2	0.034	B	2	0.034	A	1	0.017	N	1	0.017
E	1	0.017	L	1	0.017	H	0	0.000	O	0	0.000
T	0	0.000	I	0	0.000	V	0	0.000	W	0	0.000
X	0	0.000	Z	0	0.000		0	0.000			

58 characters, index of coincidence: 0.063, IC (square approx): 0.079.

Since the alphabets are standard study most likely slides

Side normal alphabet against input alphabet and check distance:

$D_i = \sum_{i=0}^{25} (d_i - d'_{((i+s) \bmod 26)})^2$. d_i is the cipher alphabet frequency,
 d'_i is the normal alphabet frequency.

Alphabet 1			Alphabet 1			Alphabet 2			Alphabet 2		
Slide		Distance	Slide		Distance	Slide		Distance	Slide		Distance
00	(A)	0.0656	13	(N)	0.0707	00	(A)	0.0724	13	(N)	0.0494
01	(B)	0.0556	14	(O)	0.0791	01	(B)	0.0733	14	(O)	0.0724
02	(C)	0.0703	15	(P)	0.0723	02	(C)	0.0540	15	(P)	0.0636
03	(D)	0.0753	16	(Q)	0.0603	03	(D)	0.0795	16	(Q)	0.0689
04	(E)	0.0704	17	(R)	0.0621	04	(E)	0.0712	17	(R)	0.0691
05	(F)	0.0775	18	(S)	0.0736	05	(F)	0.0649	18	(S)	0.0693
06	(G)	0.0616	19	(T)	0.0700	06	(G)	0.0730	19	(T)	0.0702
07	(H)	0.0619	20	(U)	0.0693	07	(H)	0.0645	20	(U)	0.0446
08	(I)	0.0401	21	(V)	0.0440	08	(I)	0.0785	21	(V)	0.0752
09	(J)	0.0896	22	(W)	0.0679	09	(J)	0.0625	22	(W)	0.0777
10	(K)	0.0899	23	(X)	0.0704	10	(K)	0.0701	23	(X)	0.0732
11	(L)	0.0666	24	(Y)	0.0816	11	(L)	0.0404	24	(Y)	0.0135
12	(M)	0.0163	25	(Z)	0.0553	12	(M)	0.0784	25	(Z)	0.0754

Slides continued

Slide normal alphabet against input alphabet and check distance:

$D_i = \sum_{i=0}^{25} (d_i - d'_{((i+s) \bmod 26)})^2$. d_i is the cipher alphabet frequency,
 d'_i is the normal alphabet frequency.

Alphabet 3		Alphabet 3		Alphabet 4		Alphabet 4	
Slide	Distance	Slide	Distance	Slide	Distance	Slide	Distance
00 (A)	0.0764	13 (N)	0.0647	00 (A)	0.0711	13 (N)	0.0929
01 (B)	0.0901	14 (O)	0.0599	01 (B)	0.1091	14 (O)	0.0839
02 (C)	0.0841	15 (P)	0.0763	02 (C)	0.1079	15 (P)	0.0734
03 (D)	0.0836	16 (Q)	0.0838	03 (D)	0.0672	16 (Q)	0.1000
04 (E)	0.0744	17 (R)	0.0799	04 (E)	0.0231	17 (R)	0.0759
05 (F)	0.0823	18 (S)	0.0907	05 (F)	0.0829	18 (S)	0.0577
06 (G)	0.0849	19 (T)	0.0871	06 (G)	0.0878	19 (T)	0.0508
07 (H)	0.0960	20 (U)	0.0741	07 (H)	0.0751	20 (U)	0.0782
08 (I)	0.0966	21 (V)	0.0752	08 (I)	0.0675	21 (V)	0.0949
09 (J)	0.0718	22 (W)	0.1086	09 (J)	0.0893	22 (W)	0.0971
10 (K)	0.0338	23 (X)	0.0919	10 (K)	0.0924	23 (X)	0.0860
11 (L)	0.0755	24 (Y)	0.0494	11 (L)	0.0896	24 (Y)	0.0832
12 (M)	0.0917	25 (Z)	0.0426	12 (M)	0.1074	25 (Z)	0.0876

Slides concluded

Side normal alphabet against input alphabet and check distance:

$D_i = \sum_{i=0}^{25} (d_i - d'_{((i+s) \bmod 26)})^2$. d_i is the cipher alphabet frequency,
 d'_i is the normal alphabet frequency.

Alphabet 5		
Slide		Distance
00	(A)	0.0900
01	(B)	0.0696
02	(C)	0.0624
03	(D)	0.0871
04	(E)	0.0888
05	(F)	0.0598
06	(G)	0.0763
07	(H)	0.0732
08	(I)	0.0833
09	(J)	0.0663
10	(K)	0.0593
11	(L)	0.0539
12	(M)	0.0599

Alphabet 5		
Slide		Distance
13	(N)	0.0684
14	(O)	0.0759
15	(P)	0.0846
16	(Q)	0.0613
17	(R)	0.0724
18	(S)	0.0806
19	(T)	0.0889
20	(U)	0.0466
21	(V)	0.0833
22	(W)	0.0781
23	(X)	0.0661
24	(Y)	0.0215
25	(Z)	0.0699

Vigenere Table

Vigenere Tableau

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ

MNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKL

YZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWX

KLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJ

EFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCD

YZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWX

The answer is...

WITHM ALICE TOWAR DNONE WITHC HARIT YFORA LLWIT
HFIRM NESSI NTHET IGHITA SGODG IVESU STOSE ETHER
IGHTL ETUSS TRIVE ONTOF INISH THEWO RKWEA REINT
OBIND UPTHE NATIO NSWOU NDSTO CAREF ORHIM WHOSH
ALLHA VEBOR NETHE BATTL EANDF ORHIS WIDOW ANDHI
SORPH ANTOD OALLW HICHM AYACH IEVEA NDCHE RISHA
JUSTA NDLAS TINGP EACEA MONGO URSEL VESAN DWITH
ALLNA TIONS

Key Length: 5

Key: MYKEY

- Cipher only < 25k [assuming 25 letters are required to identify one letter with high certainty, a pretty conservative assumption. You could argue it was as small as about 8k.].

Probable Word Method

- $c_i = p_i S C^{i-1}$,
 $S = (A J D N C H E M B O G F) (I R Q P K L) (Z) (Y) (W) (V) (U) (T) (S)$
- Placing a probable word gets several letters.
- Equivalent letters (in the different cipher alphabets) can be obtained by applying C or C^{-1} .

Differencing

Sliding Components

L	J	T	Z	G	X	V	Y	V	T	Q	G	K	S	Y	X	S
B	U	L	L	W	I	N	K	L	E	I	S	A	D	O	P	E
J	O	H	N	J	O	H	N	J	O	H	N	J	O	H	N	J

Cipher Text

Probable Text

Difference

Vigenere Cipher Solutions

- If the alphabets are direct standard, after determining number, just match frequency shapes.
- $MIC(x, y) = \sum_{i=1}^k \frac{f_i f'_i}{nm}$ is used to find matching alphabets
- For both plain and cipher mixed, first determine if any alphabets are the same (using matching alphabets test: $IC = \sum (f_i + f'_i)^2$. The only term that matters is $\sum (f_i f'_i)$.)
- Use equivalent alphabets or decimation symmetry of position to transform all alphabets into same alphabet, then use mono-alphabetic techniques.

Equivalent alphabets

- Suppose a message is sent with a mixed plaintext alphabet (permuted by σ) but a direct standard cipher text alphabet.
- Each position of the message represents the same plaintext letter.
- The Vigeniere table looks like this:

$\sigma(A)$	$\sigma(B)$	$\sigma(C)$	$\sigma(D)$	$\sigma(E)$	$\sigma(F)$	$\sigma(G)$	$\sigma(H)$...

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	...
B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	...
C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	...
D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	...
...

Equivalent alphabets - continued

- If the message bits are m_1, m_2, m_3, \dots and there are k alphabets used, the message is enciphered as $\sigma^{-1}(m_1), \sigma^{-1}(m_2)+1, \sigma^{-1}(m_3)+2, \dots$ or in general, $(\sigma^{-1}(m_i)+(i-1)(\bmod k)) (\bmod 26)$.
- Note that the “columns” retain the correct order of the k enciphering alphabets.
- By substituting the letters (B for A in the second cipher alphabet, etc.), the cipher-text becomes a mono-alphabet which can be solved the usual way.

Mixed plaintext and cipher-text alphabets

- In general, this is harder but may still be solvable with a shortcut. Suppose, for example, we encrypt the same message two different ways (say with k_1 and k_2 mixed plain/cipher alphabets).
- Example from Sinkov. The same message with two different keys.

WCOAK TJYVT VXBQC ZIVBL AUJNY BBTMT JGOEV GUGAT KDPKV GDXHE WGSFD
XLTMI NKNLF XMGOG SZRUA LAQNV IXDXW EJTKI TAOSH NTLCI VQMJQ FYYPB
CZOPZ VOGWZ KQZAY DNTSF WGOVI IKGXE GTRXL YOIP

TXHHV JXVNO MXHSC EEYFG EEYAQ DYHRK EHHIN OPKRO ZDV FV TQSIC SIMJK
ZIHRL CQIBK EZKFL OZDPA OJHMF LVHRL UKHNL OVHTE HBNHG MQBXQ ZIAGS
UXEYR XQJYC AIYHL ZVMQV QGUKI QDMAC QQBRB SQNI

Mixed plain and cipher alphabets

- The Vigenere table looks like this:

$\sigma(A)$	$\sigma(B)$	$\sigma(C)$	$\sigma(D)$	$\sigma(E)$	$\sigma(F)$	$\sigma(G)$	$\sigma(H)$	$\rho...$

$\rho(A)$	$\rho(B)$	$\rho(C)$	$\rho(D)$	$\rho(E)$	$\rho(F)$	$\rho(G)$	$\rho(H)$...
$\rho(B)$	$\rho(C)$	$\rho(D)$	$\rho(E)$	$\rho(F)$	$\rho(G)$	$\rho(H)$	$\rho(I)$...
$\rho(C)$	$\rho(D)$	$\rho(E)$	$\rho(F)$	$\rho(G)$	$\rho(H)$	$\rho(I)$	$\rho(J)$...
$\rho(D)$	$\rho(E)$	$\rho(F)$	$\rho(G)$	$\rho(H)$	$\rho(I)$	$\rho(J)$	$\rho(K)$...
...

- If the message bits are m_1, m_2, m_3, \dots and there are k alphabets used, the message is enciphered as $\rho(\sigma^{-1}(m_1)), \rho(\sigma^{-1}(m_2)+1), \rho(\sigma^{-1}(m_3)+2), \dots$ or in general $\rho(((\sigma^{-1}(m_i)+(i-1)) \pmod k) \pmod{26})$.

Mixed plain and cipher example

- Plain

NEWYORKCITABDFGHJKLMPQSUVZ

- Cipher

CHIAGO

BDEFJK

LMNPQR

STUVWX

YZ

→ CBLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRX

NEWYORKCITABDFGHJKLMPQSUVZ

CBLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRX

Alphabet rewritten

NEWYORKCITABDFGHJLMPQRSUVZ

CBLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRX
BLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXC
LSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXC
SYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBL
YHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBL
HDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBL
DMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBL
MTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBL
TZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBL
ZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBL
IENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBL
ENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBL
NUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBL

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNPOQRSTUVWXYZ

IENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZ
ENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZ
NUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZ
UAFPVGJQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZ
AFPVGJQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZ
FPVGJQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZ
PVGJQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZ
VGJQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZ
GJQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZ
JQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZ
QWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZ
WOKRXCBLSYHDMTZ
OKRXCBLSYHDMTZ

Alphabet rewritten

NEWYORKCITABDFGHJLMPQRSUVZ

UAFPVGJQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZIEN
AFPVGJQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZIENU
FPVGJQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZIENUA
PVGJQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZIENUAF
VGJQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZIENUAFP
GJQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZIENUAFPV
JQWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVG
QWOKRXCBLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJ
WOKRXCBLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQ
OKRXCBLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQW
KRCBLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWO
RXCBLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOK
XCBLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKR

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ

KRCBLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWO
RXCBLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOK
XCBLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKR
CBLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRX
BLSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXC
LSYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXC
SYHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBL
YHDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBL
HDMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBLSY
DMTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBLSYH
MTZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBLSYHD
TZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBLSYHDM
ZIENUAFPVGJQWOKRXCBLSYHDMT

Letter identification and alphabet chaining

- Using IC, we determine first uses 6 alphabets, the second, 5. Same letters at the following positions:

X	C	D	V	Z	A	Q	Q	G	I
12	15	42	45	72	75	102	105	132	135

- Msg1, alphabet 5 = Msg2, alphabet 2. Msg1, alphabet 3 = Msg2, alphabet 5. Can confirm with IC test.
- If we have two rows separated by k (3, in our example):

Plain:	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
Cipher 1:	I	E	M	N	B	U	A	F	T	P	D	V	G	C	Y	J	Q	H	W	Z	O	K	L	R	S	X
Cipher 2:	U	A	I	F	Y	P	V	G	E	J	Z	O	W	S	M	O	K	T	R	N	X	C	H	B	D	L

Alphabet Chaining

Plain: A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Cipher 1: I E M N B U A F T P D V G C Y J Q H W Z O K L R S X

Cipher 4: U A I F Y P V G E J Z Q W S M O K T R N X C H B D L

The decimated interval is:

I U P J O X L H T E A V Q K C S D Z N F G W R B Y M

Rearranging by decimation:

A F J P U Z W R I B G L Q V N Y K T D H M S X E O C

I U P J O X L H T E A V Q K C S D Z N F G W R B Y M

Rearranging we get the original sequence.

Review of attacks on poly-alphabet

- Letter Frequency, multi-gram frequencies, transition probabilities
- Index of coincidence
- Alphabet chaining
- Sliding probable text
- Limited key-space search
- Long repeated sequences in cipher-text
- Markoff like contact processes
- Decimation of sequences
- Direct and indirect symmetries

More sophisticated mathematical technique
(Possible project)

Maximum Likelihood and Hidden Markov models

- Suppose we have Markov state machines characterized by three distributions, $\lambda = (\pi, P, q)$. Given λ :
 1. $\pi(i)$ is the probability that the Markov chain starts in state i .
 2. $P(j|i)$ is the probability that there is a transition from state i to state j .
 3. $q(o|i)$ is the probability that symbol o is emitted in state i .
- The state machine is observed to emit an output sequence of T symbols, $\mathcal{O} = (o_0, o_1, \dots, o_{T-1})$. The states are $S = \{s: 0 \leq s \leq n-1\}$ and the output symbols are $O = \{o: 0 \leq o \leq m-1\}$. S^T is the set of all T state tuples.
- In experiments, only output symbols are observed. The underlying states are unobserved (or “hidden”), giving rise to the name Hidden Markov Model (HMM).

The three problems

- **Problem 1:** Given $\lambda = (P, q, \pi)$, N , a number of states, $\langle 0, 1, \dots, N - 1 \rangle$, M , a number of observed outputs, $\langle 0, 1, \dots, M - 1 \rangle$, and $\mathcal{O} = (o_0, o_1, \dots, o_{T-1})$, a set of observations, compute $P(\mathcal{O}|\lambda)$
- **Problem 2:** Given $\lambda = (P, q, \pi)$ sequences of observations, \mathcal{O} , compute the most likely set of “hidden states” $\langle s_0, s_1, \dots, s_{T-1} \rangle$ producing \mathcal{O} .
- **Problem 3:** Given a set of sequences of observations, \mathcal{O} , N and M , find the most likely model, $\lambda = (P, q, \pi)$.

Problem 1

- $P(\mathcal{O}|\lambda) = \sum_{S=(s_0,s_1,\dots,s_{T-1})} P(\mathcal{O}, S|\lambda)$
- $P(\mathcal{O}, S|\lambda) = \frac{P(\mathcal{O} \cap S \cap \lambda)}{P(\lambda)}$
- $P(\mathcal{O}|S, \lambda)P(S|\lambda) = \frac{P(\mathcal{O} \cap S \cap \lambda)}{P(S \cap \lambda)} \cdot \frac{P(S \cap \lambda)}{P(\lambda)} = \frac{P(\mathcal{O} \cap S \cap \lambda)}{P(\lambda)} = P(\mathcal{O}, S|\lambda)$
- $\Pr(\mathcal{O} = \mathbf{o}, S = \mathbf{s}|\lambda) = \pi(s_0)q(o_0|s_0) \prod_{k=1}^{T-1} P(s_k|s_{k-1})q(o_s|s_k)$
- So $P(\mathcal{O}|\lambda) = \sum_{S=(s_0,s_1,\dots,s_{T-1})} \pi(s_0)q(o_0|s_0) \prod_{k=1}^{T-1} P(s_k|s_{k-1})q(o_s|s_k)$
- A straightforward computation of $P(\mathcal{O}|\lambda)$ using this last formula requires $2TN^T$ multiplies which is generally infeasible

α and an efficient procedure to solve Problem 1

- Define $\alpha_t(i) = P(o_0, \dots, o_t, s_t = i | \lambda)$. Then:
 - $\alpha_0(i) = \pi_i q(o_0 | i)$, $i = 0, 1, \dots, N - 1$
 - For $t = 1, 2, \dots, T - 1, i = 0, 1, \dots, N - 1$, $\alpha_t(i) = \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \alpha_{t-1}(j) P(i | j) q(o_t | i)$
 - $P(\mathcal{O} | \lambda) = \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} \alpha_{T-1}(i)$
- Computing $P(\mathcal{O} | \lambda)$ this way requires $N^2 T$ multiplies which is much better.

Problem 2 with β and γ

- Define
 - $\beta_{T-1}(i) = 1, i = 0, 1, \dots, N-1$
 - For $t = 1, 2, \dots, T-1, i = 0, 1, \dots, N-1,$
 - $\beta_t(i) = \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} P(i|j)q(o_{t+1}|j)\beta_{t+1}(j)$
- Now define, for $t = 1, 2, \dots, T-1, i = 0, 1, \dots, N-1,$
 - $\gamma_t(i) = P(s_t = i | \mathcal{O}, \lambda),$
- Then $\gamma_t(i) = \frac{\alpha_t(i)\beta_t(i)}{P(\mathcal{O}|\lambda)},$ we compute $P(\mathcal{O}|\lambda)$ using the result from problem 1.
- $P(s|\mathcal{O}, \lambda) = \gamma_t(i),$ which is the answer to problem 2.
- Now define, for $t = 1, 2, \dots, T-1, i = 0, 1, \dots, N-1, j = 0, 1, \dots, N-1,$
 - $\gamma_t(i, j) = \frac{P(s_t=i, s_{t+1}=j | \mathcal{O}, \lambda)}{P(\mathcal{O}|\lambda)}$
- We have, $\gamma_t(i) = \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \gamma_t(i, j)$

Problem 3

- We solve problem 3 by guessing at λ and iteratively “re-estimating” λ . This produces a series of guesses of $\lambda^{(0)}, \lambda^{(1)}, \dots$. We stop when this sequence converges.
- The re-estimation formulas are, for $i = 0, 1, \dots, N - 1, j = 0, 1, \dots, N - 1$,
 - $\pi_i = \gamma_0(i)$
 - $P(i|j) = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{T-2} \gamma_t(i,j)}{\sum_{j=0}^{T-2} \gamma_t(j)}$
 - $q(k|j) = \frac{\sum_{t \in \{0,1,\dots,T-2\}, o_t=k} \gamma_t(j)}{\sum_{j=0}^{T-2} \gamma_t(j)}$
- This works because of Baum’s theorem
- **Baum:** Let $Q(\lambda, \lambda^s) = \sum_s \ln(\Pr(\mathcal{O}, s|\lambda)) \Pr(\mathcal{O}, s|\lambda^s)$, $\lambda^r = (\pi^r, P^r, q^r)$ and $S: \lambda^r \rightarrow \lambda^{r+1}$ be the re-estimate given by the formulas above. Then:
 1. Either λ^r is a fixed point or $\Pr(\mathcal{O}|\lambda^{r+1}) > \Pr(\mathcal{O}|\lambda^r)$.
 2. If $Q(\lambda^{r+1}, \lambda^r) > Q(\lambda^r, \lambda^r)$ then $\Pr(\mathcal{O} = \mathbf{o}|\lambda^{r+1}) > \Pr(\mathcal{O} = \mathbf{o}|\lambda^r)$
 3. λ^r is a critical point of $\Pr(\mathcal{O}|\lambda^r)$ iff λ^r is a critical point of $R(\lambda^{r+1}, \lambda^r)$.
 4. For an HMM with a finite number of states, there is a single critical point that is the global maximum for $\Pr(\mathcal{O}|\lambda^r)$.

Derivation of Baum Welch re-estimation

- Put $Q(\lambda, \lambda^s) = \sum_s \ln(\Pr(\mathcal{O}, s|\lambda)) \Pr(\mathcal{O}, s|\lambda^s)$ and $\lambda^{s+1} = \operatorname{argmax}_{\lambda} (Q(\lambda, \lambda^s))$
- Let $\mathcal{L}(\lambda, \lambda^s) = Q(\lambda, \lambda^s) - \xi_1 (\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \pi(j) - 1) - \xi_2^{(i)} (\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} P(j|i) - 1) - \xi_3^{(i)} (\sum_{k=0}^{m-1} q(k|i) - 1)$
- We apply the Lagrange multiplier maximization process. First, recall that $\Pr(\mathcal{O} = \mathbf{o}, S = \mathbf{s}|\lambda) = \pi(s_0)q(o_0|s_0) \prod_{k=1}^{T-1} P(s_k|s_{k-1})q(o_s|s_k)$

Derivation of Baum Welch re-estimation

- $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}(\lambda, \lambda^{(s)})}{\partial \pi(i)} = \sum_{s=(i, s_1, \dots, s_{T-1})} \frac{1}{\pi(i)} \pi^{(s)}(i) q^{(s)}(o_0|i) P^{(s)}(s_1|i) q^{(s)}(o_1|s_1)$
- $\prod_{j=2}^{T-1} P^{(s)}(s_j|s_{j-1}) P^{(s)}(s_j|s_{j-1}) q^{(s)}(o_j|s_j) - \xi_1 = 0$
- Bringing ξ_1 to one side of the equation and multiplying by $\pi(i)$, we get $\pi(i)\xi_1 = \sum_{s=(i, s_1, \dots, s_{T-1})} \frac{1}{\pi(i)} \pi^{(s)}(i) q^{(s)}(o_0|i) P^{(s)}(s_1|i) q^{(s)}(o_1|s_1)$
- $\prod_{j=2}^{T-1} P^{(s)}(s_j|s_{j-1}) P^{(s)}(s_j|s_{j-1}) q^{(s)}(o_j|s_j).$
- Now summing over the i , we get
- $\xi_1 = \pi(s_0) q^{(s)}(o_0|s_0) \prod_{j=1}^{T-1} P^{(s)}(s_j|s_{j-1}) P^{(s)}(s_j|s_{j-1}) q^{(s)}(o_j|s_j),$ and finally
- $\pi^{(s+1)}(i) = \frac{\sum_{s=(i, s_1, \dots, s_{T-1})} \pi^{(s)}(i) q^{(s)}(o_0|i) P^{(s)}(s_1|i) q^{(s)}(o_1|s_1) \prod_{j=1}^{T-1} P^{(s)}(s_j|s_{j-1}) P^{(s)}(s_j|s_{j-1}) q^{(s)}(o_j|s_j)}{P(\mathcal{O}|\lambda)} =$

$$\gamma_0(i) = \frac{\alpha_0(i) \beta_0(i)}{\sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \alpha_{T-1}(j)}$$

Derivation of Baum Welch re-estimation

- $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}(\lambda, \lambda^{(s)})}{\partial P(i|j)} =$

$$\sum_{s=(s_0, s_1, \dots, s_{T-1}), s_0=j, s_1=i} \frac{1}{P(i|j)} \pi^{(s)}(s_0) q^{(s)}(o_0|s_0) P^{(s)}(s_1|s_0) q^{(s)}(o_1|s_1)$$
- $\prod_{j=2}^{T-1} P^{(s)}(s_j|s_{j-1}) P^{(s)}(s_j|s_{j-1}) q^{(s)}(o_j|s_j) - \xi_2^{(i)} = 0$
- We get, as before:
- $\xi_2^{(i)} = \sum_{s=(s_0, s_1, \dots, s_{T-1}), s_0=j, s_1=i} \frac{1}{P(i|j)} \pi^{(s)}(s_0) q^{(s)}(o_0|s_0)$
- $\prod_{j=2}^{T-1} P^{(s)}(s_j|s_{j-1}) P^{(s)}(s_j|s_{j-1}) q^{(s)}(o_j|s_j)$
- We sum over j, solve for $\xi_2^{(i)}$ and then find
- $P^{(s+1)}(i|j) = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{T-2} \gamma_t(i, j)}{\sum_{t=0}^{T-2} \gamma_t(i)}$

Derivation of Baum Welch re-estimation

- $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}(\lambda, \lambda^{(s)})}{\partial q(k|j)} = \sum_{s=(s_0, s_1, \dots, s_{T-1}), o_0=k, s_0=i} \frac{1}{q(k|i)} \pi^{(s)}(s_0) q^{(s)}(o_0|s_0)$
- $\prod_{j=1}^{T-1} P^{(s)}(s_j|s_{j-1}) P^{(s)}(s_j|s_{j-1}) q^{(s)}(o_j|s_j) - \xi_3^{(i)} = 0$
- $\xi_3^{(i)} = \sum_{s=(s_0, s_1, \dots, s_{T-1}), o_0=k, s_0=i} \frac{1}{q(k|i)} \pi^{(s)}(i) q^{(s)}(o_0|i)$
- $\prod_{j=1}^{T-1} P^{(s)}(s_j|s_{j-1}) P^{(s)}(s_j|s_{j-1}) q^{(s)}(o_j|s_j)$
- Again we sum over k, solve for $\xi_3^{(i)}$ and then solve to get
- $q^{(s+1)}(k|j) = \frac{\sum_{0 \leq t \leq T-2, o_t=k} \gamma_t(j)}{\sum_{t=0}^{T-2} \gamma_t(j)}$

Scaling

- Carrying out Baum Welch re-estimation often results in underflow which restricts the accuracy. We can scale quantities to avoid this.
- $\tilde{\alpha}_0(i) = \alpha_0(i)$
- $c_0 = \frac{1}{\sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \tilde{\alpha}_0(j)}$
- $\hat{\alpha}_0(i) = c_0 \tilde{\alpha}_0(i)$
- $\tilde{\alpha}_t(i) = \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \hat{\alpha}_{t-1}(j) P(i|j) q(o_t | i)$
- $c_t = \frac{1}{\sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \tilde{\alpha}_t(j)}$
- $\hat{\alpha}_t(i) = \prod_{m=0}^t c_m \alpha_t(i) = \frac{\alpha_t(i)}{\sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \alpha_t(j)}$
- $\sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \hat{\alpha}_{T-1}(j) = 1$
- $P(\mathcal{O}|\lambda) = \frac{1}{\prod_{m=0}^{T-1} c_m}$
- We usually compute and optimize $\ln(P(\mathcal{O}|\lambda))$

EM example

- $m=4$, $T=48$ observations

p : 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25

P :

.2	.2	.5	.1
.333	.333	.167	.167
.2	.4	.1	.3
.5	0	.25	.25

i :	0	1	2	3
$q(i 0)$:	1	0	0	0
$q(i 1)$:	0	0	1	0
$q(i 2)$:	0	1	0	0
$q(i 3)$:	0	0	0	1

50th re-estimation settles on:

i	$j \rightarrow$	0	1	2	3
0		1.000000	0	0	0
1		.0000004	.0000001	.906980	.093015
2		.0000023	.998303	.001667	0
3		.0000023	0	0	.999977

Example from Konheim

Other paper and pencil systems

Polygraphic Substitution

- Playfair di-graphic substitution
 - Write alphabet in square.
 - For two consecutive letter use other two letters in rectangle
 - If letters are horizontal or vertical, use letters to right or below.

O H N M A

F E R D L

I B C G K

P Q S T U

V W X Y Z

TH → QM

- Hill's multi-graphic substitution
 - Convert letters into numbers (0 → 25).
 - Multiply 2-tuples by encrypting 2x2 matrix.
 - Better have inverse in multiplicative group mod 26.

Identifying Playfair

- Rare consonants j, k, q, x, and z will appear in higher frequencies than plaintext and digraphs containing these consonants will appear more frequently
- There are an even number of letters in the cipher-text
- When the cipher-text is broken up into di-grams, doubled letters such as SS, EE, MM, . . . will not appear.

Hill Cipher

- Each character is assigned a numerical value
 - $a = 0, b = 1, \dots, z = 25$
- for $m = 3$ the transformation of $p_1p_2p_3$ to $c_1c_2c_3$ is given by 3 equations:

KEY

$$c_1 = (k_{11}p_1 + k_{12}p_2 + k_{13}p_3) \bmod 26$$

$$c_2 = (k_{21}p_1 + k_{22}p_2 + k_{23}p_3) \bmod 26$$

$$c_3 = (k_{31}p_1 + k_{32}p_2 + k_{33}p_3) \bmod 26$$

Slide by Richard Spillman

Hill Matrix


- The Hill cipher is really a matrix multiplication system
 - The enciphering key is an $n \times n$ matrix, M
 - The deciphering key is M^{-1}
- For example, if $n = 3$ one possible key is:

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} 17 & 17 & 5 \\ 21 & 18 & 21 \\ 2 & 2 & 19 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$M^{-1} = \begin{pmatrix} 4 & 9 & 15 \\ 15 & 17 & 6 \\ 24 & 0 & 17 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\text{Encrypt 'n o w'} \quad \begin{pmatrix} 17 & 17 & 5 \\ 21 & 18 & 21 \\ 2 & 2 & 19 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 13 \\ 14 \\ 22 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 23 \\ 20 \\ 4 \end{pmatrix} \text{ mod } 26$$

x u e



Slide by Richard Spillman

Breaking Hill

- The Hill cipher is resistant to a cipher-text only attack with reasonable message size.
 - In fact, the larger the matrix, the more resistant the cipher becomes.
- It is easy to break using a known plaintext attack.
 - The process is much like the method used to break an affine cipher in that the known plaintext/ciphertext group is used to set up a system of equations which when solved will reveal the key.

Hill Cipher

- The Hill cipher is a block cipher with block size is 2 over the “normal” alphabet.
- Assign each letter a number between 0 and 25 (inclusive)
 - For example, a = 0, b = 1, . . . , z = 25 (z is used as space)
- Let p_1p_2 be two successive plaintext letters. c_1c_2 are the cipher-text output, where:

$$c_1 = k_{11}p_1 + k_{12}p_2 \pmod{26}$$

$$c_2 = k_{21}p_1 + k_{22}p_2 \pmod{26}$$

- Apply the inverse of the “key matrix” $[k_{11} \ k_{12} | k_{21} \ k_{22}]$ to transform ciphertext into plaintext
- Works better if we add space (27=3³ letters) or throw out a letter (25=5²) so there is an underlying finite field

Breaking Hill

- The Hill cipher is resistant to a cipher-text only attack with limited cipher-text.
 - Increasing the block size increases the resistance.
- It is trivial to break using a known plaintext attack.
 - The process is much like the method used to break an affine cipher. Corresponding plaintext/ciphertext are used to set up a system of equations whose solutions are the key bits.

End