

American Political Behavior¹

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1. These notes were developed based on Chloe Wittenberg's reading notes for MIT's American Politics general exam.

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Micro Public Opinion

Ideology and Opinion Formation

Philip E Converse. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent*, Free Press, edited by David Apter

- **Research Question:** Do all members of the public have "belief systems"? - No, most people do not have strong belief systems, and they do not interpret politics through an ideological lens.
- **Argument/Terminology:**
 - Uses term "belief system" instead of ideology: "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence." (p.207) "...[C]onstraint" may be taken to mean the success we would have in predicting, given initial knowledge that an individual holds a specified attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes." (p.207)
 - Most people do not have strong belief system; they do not know what left-right ideology is, they answer differently to issue preferences in time and not consistent across items, and belief system of elites different than that of the masses.
 - "Black and white" model of opinion change that partitions public on any particular issue into two groups; one composed of citizens who are quite indifferent to it and when pressed, either admit ignorance or invent a "non-attitude", the other possess genuine opinions and hold onto them tenaciously. Real opinion holders are greatly outnumbered.
- **Data/Methods:**
 - Analysis of survey data from 1950's-60's and longitudinal interviews every 2 years to understand change over time.
 - Respondents were asked their familiarity with ideological concepts. Discuss the good and bad points of the two major political parties and comment on major presidential candidates. Asked to assign liberal and conservative labels to parties and candidates in following wave of survey,
 - Also interview elites (candidates for the United States Congress in the off-year elections of 1958) to compare mass public opinion with elite public opinion
 - Classify voters into typology based on ideological content of their responses, then 4 years later ask about recognizing and understanding liberal-conservative dimension.
- **Findings:**
 - The ideology of elites is not mirrored by the masses; public has attitudes that are less related (on the same/similar issues) than elites. Mass public and elites have higher correlations within vs. across domestic and foreign policy. For public, party preference seems to be set off in a belief system of its own, relatively unconnected to issue positions.
 - Responses to survey questions are not consistent (either across items or over time) even on salient issues. Many people respond to issue positions randomly and do not have meaningful beliefs.
 - Level of conceptualization in belief systems:
 - ★ Ideologues (3.5%): rely actively on abstract conceptual dimension when evaluating political objects – tend to be high-income/well-educated
 - ★ Near-ideologues (12%): mention abstract dimension but do not depend on it for evaluation

- ★ Group interest (45%): do not invoke ideological continuum but evaluate parties/candidates in terms of expected treatment of different social groups. Lack competency to react unless very clearly benefits or punishes their social group or they are told by elites who they trust.
- ★ Nature of the times (22%)
 - Temporal: parties/candidates evaluated based on association with times of war/peace, economic prosperity/depression
 - Single Issue: judge based on one single policy for which have strong feelings (e.g., Social Security – link to Campbell 2002/03)
- ★ No issue content (17.5%): no idea what parties stand for, and no interest
- When ask 4 years later find that both measures (level of conceptualization and capability to recognize and understand liberal-conservative dimension) highly correlated.
- Correlation between conceptualization and political sophistication and participation in grass roots politics.

● Critique:

- See Ansolabehere et al. (2008) — Need more survey items to measure issue positions.
- Measure: Hakeem Jefferson has a cool R&R at POQ on how Black Americans do not know/understand the ideological scale. Many Black Americans claim to be conservative but vote for Democratic party. Thus, this highlights need for caution when using concepts that vary in their meaningfulness across social groups (e.g. ideological scales).
- Lane (1962, 69, 73) biggest critique to Converse. Claims that Converse is creating definition of ideology and that Americans may be driven by ideology but express their political beliefs on their own terms. Explores instead everyday notions of freedom, equality and democracy. So Converse and Lane simply have different definitions of ideology. Converse would argue that more politically engaged have more consistent policy beliefs because they are more apt to follow well-placed leaders. Whereas, Lane turns the attention to individuals repackaging their individual political ideas and following their needs and self interest.

● Relevant Literature:

- Campbell et al. (1960): Builds off of the American Voter and rational choice theory.
- Goes against democratic theory; people in Mass Public DO NOT hold clear ideological values, which allow them to make decisions based on the position candidates hold.
- Zaller (1992): Seek to explain why the inconsistencies in attitudes that Converse discovers occur. Updates Converse's theory; competing considerations and our response at any given time is a weighted average of those considerations that happen to be in our minds at the time.
- Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1979) respond to Converse and argue that Americans more ideologically aligned in 1964 (during Johnson and Goldwater). In that sense, they argue that american public can think ideologically under right circumstances. Kinder (1983) bashes this because Nie et al. used different survey items, and did not use direct transcripts of interviews but rather expert coding of the interviews.

Donald R Kinder. 2003. "Belief Systems after Converse." In *Electoral democracy*, edited by Michael MacKuen and George Rabinowitz, 13–47. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** Revisit Converse (1964) and argues that Converse's finding that citizens organize their opinions on policy based on the sentiment they feel towards the social group the policy appears to benefit or harm is still relevant today. (ethnocentrism)

- **Argument:**

- Argues that important point about Converse (1964) that is often forgotten, is optimistic perspective that citizens organize their opinions on policy based on the sentiment they feel towards the social group the policy appears to benefit or harm.
- This argument falls in line with Kinder's work on racial resentment.
- Ethnocentrism is important today: Unlike prejudice, has to do not only with numerous groups toward which the individual has hostile opinions and attitudes but, equally important, with groups toward which he is positively disposed.
- What role does ethnocentrism have on policy position on immigration? Strongly correlated using data from his published work.
- Argue that changes in opinions in surveys is due to changes in emotions at the time taking survey. Emotions are from ethnocentrism.

- **Data/Methods:**

- Essentially summary of two existing studies providing evidence that ethnocentrism affects views on immigration and on the war.

- **Findings:**

- The effect of ethnocentrism on policy position is strongest among individuals with greatest political knowledge.

Michael Barber and Jeremy C. Pope. 2019. "Does Party Trump Ideology? Disentangling Party and Ideology in America." *American Political Science Review* 113, no. 1 (February): 38–54

- **One Sentence Summary:** Shows that partisanship primes over ideology using a survey experiment in context of Trump election.

- **Argument:**

- Group loyalty is the stronger motivator of opinion than are any ideological principles. Ideology is closer to a social identity than it is to a reasoned statement about one's constraint or policy preferences or issue consistency.
- Trump adopts liberal and conservative positions so good opportunity to see whether people support liberal or conservative policy with or without Trump cue. Allows authors to divorce the ideological direction of issue endorsements from the party that typically takes those positions.
- Less knowledgeable respondents will adopt opposite position from their ideology when receiving trump-cue.

- **Data/Methods:**

- Survey experiment whereby respondents were presented with a policy statement and then asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the policy statement they had just read.
- Experimental treatment is Donald Trump position or no Donald Trump position.

- **Findings:**

- Low-knowledge respondents, strong Republicans, Trump-approving respondents, and self-described conservatives are the most likely to behave like party loyalists by accepting the Trump cue—in either a liberal or conservative direction.

- **Critique:**

- Don't do same experiment with a Democrat leaning cue-giver.

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Aligns with Converse (1964) and Achen and Bartels (2016) stating that respondents don't have left-right ideology that drive their policy preferences.
- Americans still lack ability to have truly polarized, constrained opinions today (Bafumi and Herron 2010; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2004; Hill and Tausanovitch 2015)
- Finding paints picture of partisans who emphasize group attachment over issue positions (see Green, Palmquist, Shickler (2002)
- Tied to polarization literature – group attachment to PID is more important than issues themselves

Anthony Fowler et al. 2023. "Moderates." *American Political Science Review* 117, no. 2 (May): 643–660

- **Key Takeaway:** There are real, single-dimension moderates in the US and they are a politically meaningful group responsive to candidates
- **Arguments:** Measuring prevalence of centrist positions is difficult because patterns of opinion can produce appearance of ideological moderation (see Broockman (2016))

- Separate respondents classified as moderate into three groups:
 - ★ Genuinely centrist views well summarized by single ideological dimension
 - ★ Inattentive to politics or the survey
 - ★ Hold genuine views that are not well summarized by a single ideological dimension

- **Data/Methods:** IRT Model within a mixture model of survey respondents. Aggregate CCES data from 2012-2018 which includes more than 280,000 respondents and across many policy questions

- Estimate probability of each respondent falling within each of the three "types" of moderates
- Three "types" of voters
 - ★ Downsian or Spatial Respondents: Have preferences along a single liberal/conservative dimension (See Downs (1957)
 - ★ "unsophisticated" or inattentive respondents: Appearance of no real policy preferences due to response patterns
 - ★ Idiosyncratic or "Conversian" respondents: Neither random nor single dimension. Appear to lack coherent ideology (See Converse (1964)

- **Findings:**

- A large portion of America is neither consistently liberal nor conservative but this inconsistency is not because views are random or incoherent (as per Converse). Instead, many hold mix of views in the middle of the same dimension of policy ideology that explains views of consistent lib/cons. A small number give a mix of liberal and Conservative views not well described by one dimension. Even fewer appear to be guessing or inattentive.
- Moderates appear to be central to electoral change and accountability. More responsive to features of candidates than standard ideologues. Four to five times more responsive to candidate ideologies, also more responsive to incumbency and candidate experience

- 7 out of 10 Americans appear to be downsians, 1 in 5 are Conversionian, around 6% are inattentive
- **Contributions:** While research on aggregate electoral behavior shows that vote choices are highly partisan, the moderate subset of the electorate responds to moderation and to candidate experience

Values and Norms

Stanley Feldman. 2003. “Values, ideology, and the structure of political attitudes.” In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, edited by David O Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, 477–508. 1992. Oxford University Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** What are the sources of structure for political attitudes? - Values more so than ideology
- **Argument:** Public opinion is structured around personal values (e.g. economic efficiency, social equality, individual freedom, crime control, national security, and racial purity), instead of ideology.
 - Why are values better source of belief systems than ideology?
 - ★ Stable but can slowly change through time
 - ★ Ideology only has 1 dimension, and people can have multiple values, but less values than issue opinions.
 - ★ Values are structurally organized
 - Definition of values: “value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence” (Rokeach 1973).
- **Findings:**
 - Mostly a lit review on importance of values.
- **Critique:**
 - Little theory to explain why certain values should map onto certain political attitudes
 - Values can also be constructed in response to attitudes – reverse causality.
 - Recent work (e.g., Connors 2019) suggests that values aren’t so stable – may be situationally or socially determined.
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Engages mostly with work of Schwartz (1992) and Rokeach (1973), but also Hochschild.
 - Zaller (1992): relationship between values and political attitudes will depend on levels of political sophistication. Those who are less sophisticated will be unable to connect the cues in the political messages they receive with their values and thus will fail to form strong relationships between their values and attitudes

Jennifer L. Hochschild. 1981. *What’s fair? American beliefs about distributive justice*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** Book argument: Using interviews, author shows that attitudes about redistribution come from individuals' norms about distributive justice used in specific circumstances. Section argument: Views about distribution vary and the emotional response, proposed policy suggestion, and perception of one's environment varies from one respondent to the next.
- **Argument:** Ambivalence (discordance) about attitudes towards redistribution, and some individuals have no views; differences in *framing* can activate different considerations
 - Case: Why the poor do not always demand or support movements for economic redistribution, even though it is in their best interests?
- Book argument: Respondents apply different norms to different circumstances, hold underlying principles of equality or acceptance of differences and sometimes reject normative analysis completely.
 - People tend to follow egalitarian norms in socializing domain (home, family, school, neighborhood, etc.)
 - Differentiating norms in the economic domain (work, marketplace, social structure)
 - Egalitarian norms in political domain (tax, social policy, etc)
 - Some people don't follow these patterns and consistently use one norm
 - People have varying emotions with regards to their beliefs, and are oftentimes ambivalent.
- **Data/Methods:**
 - Qualitative interviews comparing 28 rich and poor respondents in New Haven
 - Topics like beliefs about income, property, justice, etc. are complex and "slippery" → require in depth conversations
- **Findings:** Some respondents are *ambivalent*: hold contradictory opinions about one subject, and these views are associated with confused and unhappy emotions.
 - Neither rich nor poor seek redistribution of the wealth
 - Some hold different opinions about different subjects; *disjunction* rather than ambivalence; these views are less likely to be related to confused or unhappy emotions.
 - The level of opposition to redistribution varies depending on respondent, and this strength does not depend on economic position.
 - Respondents vary in their interpretation of their environment.
 - While some respondents agree on equalizing incomes, *rationale* for support may vary
 - Some respondents are indifferent to redistributive politics
 - People have different emotional responses to their own beliefs about redistribution
- **Critique/Comment:**
 - What is the consequence of conflict of norms and positions between the different domains (economic, social, political)? Is it possible that this leads to a lack of participation?
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Contribution to the literature would be that many people are not consistent in their beliefs and ambivalent, and interviews allow us to better understand why and thus critique against survey work. Norms applied to certain circumstances seem to better help explain this ambivalence.

- Price (1983) review of the book suggests that it serves as critique to Converse (1964) because author sees that respondents do have consistent ideology within domains although they are ambivalent as a whole.

Donald R Kinder. 1983. “Diversity and Complexity in American Public Opinion.” In *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, edited by Ada Finifter, 389–425. Washington DC: APSA Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** Field of political behavior has focused too much on how Americans form political beliefs from abstract ideological principles. Look into other factors such as personal needs, self-interest, group identifications, core values, inferences from history, etc.
- **Argument:**
 - Serves as a review piece. Summarizes the literature on ideology and opinion formation, and summarizes the debate between Converse (1964) and Lane discussed in summary of Converse above.
 - Sources of political belief are “pluralistic”; badges of social membership (class and race), ethnicity, religion, gender, etc. Don’t really always seem to be driven by self-interest as the poor don’t necessarily support redistributive policy.
 - Political beliefs also reflect the values people have toward race, welfare, affirmative action etc. But most importantly egalitarian vs. individualism.
 - Lessons of history such as war and recession can have effect on how people evaluate their party and president.
 - As a summary Americans may not have clear wide-ranging ideologies, but their ideas do seem to reflect in complex ways preferences. Public opinion is a mix of partisan attachments, social relations, values and personality.
 - Future work should look into role of emotions and affect in shaping public opinion and focus on schemas (theories people hold about the world, about other people and groups in society and about sequences of events).
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Speaks a lot to Converse (1964).

Measuring Public Opinion

Christopher H. Achen. 1975. “Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response.” *American Political Science Review* 69, no. 4 (December): 1218–1231

- **One Sentence Summary:** Unlike Converse (1964) who believes that opinion change = lack of strong opinions or uncertainty in respondent preferences, Achen argues that instabilities in survey responses are due to measurement error because citizens have underlying true attitudes that are stable.
- **Argument:** Measurement error is surprisingly not associated strongly with education or political engagement. Thus, since unreliability is spread so evenly across the public, it should be ascribed not to citizen confusion but rather to questionnaire imperfection.
- **Data/Methods:** re-analysis of Converse’s 1956-60 NES panel data (N = 1132), correcting within-subject correlation coefficients to allow for attenuation due to measurement error

- Tests assumption about consistency in measurement error across citizens using regression models (regressing measurement error variance on background traits)
- The idea is that when a voter is stable in his views and all observed variability is measurement error, correlations should be equal across ALL time periods. When a voter is unstable and there is NO measurement error, correlations should become smaller at a predictable rate as time periods become more distant from each other.
- DV: estimated error variance
- IV: political/social characteristics (e.g., education, political interest, involvement) that should increase likelihood of response instability if Converse is right
- **Findings:** post-correction, much more stability in survey responses → “sharply increased estimate of the stability and coherence of voters’ political thinking” (1229)
 - Background variables explain little variance in estimated measurement error – only minimal differences across subgroups
 - “Measurement error is primarily a fault of the instruments, not of the respondents” (1229)
- **Critique:**
 - Mostly focused on temporal stability
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Direct response to Converse (1964), interpreting response instability as a function of measurement error vs. presence of “non-attitudes”
 - Link to Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder (2008), who argue for the use of scaling techniques to combine multiple responses → more stability/constraint
 - Contrary findings to Zaller (1992), who finds that political aware respondents show less random instability in their survey responses

Stephen Ansolabehere, Jonathan Rodden, and James M. Snyder. 2008. “The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting.” *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 2 (May): 215–232

- **One Sentence Summary:** Can issue preferences explain vote choice? - Yes, when using multiple survey items.
- **Argument:** To reduce measurement error of issue preferences must use multiple survey items and create scales. Note: Measurement error is the random error induced by vague question wording/response categories, survey inattentiveness, or typos in responses. Assume true underlying preference, plus some additive, random error in translating those latent beliefs into responses.
- **Data/Methods:**
 - Data: 4 ANES panel studies
 - First, determine measurement error by looking at: (1) correlations among survey questions; (2) correlations over time of a single survey item.
 - Then, use factor analysis and average survey responses from several survey items that measure same underlying concept.
- **Findings:**

1. Inter-temporal stability: Issue scales are much more highly correlated over time than are individual items. With enough questions, some issue scales are as stable as party identification. Adding more questions the scales become more stable over time, in a manner consistent with the simple measurement error model analyzed above”.
2. Within-survey stability: If combine associated measures and divide into two scales, the two scales are more strongly correlated than individual measures. The more items used, the better the correlations.
3. Issue voting: Though individual items are rarely associated with presidential voting preferences or candidate evaluations (esp. relative to party ID), issue **scales** are associated with voting behavior and preferences. NOT driven by education.

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Policy preference stability: Converse (1964) argues that voters exhibit little consistency in their attitudes over time and little ideological constraint from one issue to the next. This paper finds that measurement error means that we under estimate the extent to which the electorate holds and relies on their policy preferences (more constraint and stability).
- Issue voting: Strong evidence of issue voting. Contrary to Zaller (1992) and Converse (1964)
- Political sophistication: Models such as Converse (1964) and Zaller (1992) find that correlation of policy preference scales are less consistent through time for individuals with low education and low political information. However, this paper finds that even low sophistication respondents are consistent and neither education nor political information magnifies the extent of issue voting.

Adam J. Berinsky. 1999. “The Two Faces of Public Opinion.” *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (4): 1209–1230

- **One Sentence Summary:** Aggregate public opinion may be a poor reflection of collective public sentiment. Many respondents may avoid answering sensitive/controversial questions in surveys and answer “don’t know”, resulting in a selection bias.
- **Argument:** Opinions that respondents express in surveys may not be the same as those that they construct when coming to grips with a survey question. Sensitive topics may lead respondents to abstain and answer “don’t know” in surveys. Therefore, aggregate opinion polls may provide inaccurate picture of true public sentiment. Thus, researchers must be careful and consider how the social climate might affect opinion distribution on different issues when conducting a survey.

- **Data/Methods:**

- Data: NES 1992 data
- Survey question about school integration is good question to test, because racist views are socially unacceptable. More specifically, the National Election Study (NES) school integration question, asked if respondents support government intervention to ensure that black and white children go to the same school.

- **Findings:**

- Public opinion polls overstate support for school integration. Unmeasured factors which lead someone to reveal their answer to the survey interviewer also lead them to take a more supportive stance on the integration issue.
- Results of the racially charged 1989 New York City mayoral election are more accurately explained when considering selection bias in survey responses, than the marginals of the pre-election polls taken in the weeks leading to the election.

- **One Sentence Summary:** How can we best gauge the political opinions of the citizenry? Whom to interview? What questions to ask them, and to what level of specificity?
- **Argument:** Berinsky argues that we should study public opinion at a medium level of specificity. Not too specific that people do not have opinions and not too general that answers are irrelevant.
- **Findings:**
 - Solutions for sampling issues: Weighting respondents, clustering and stratification:
 - ★ Weight techniques
 - Raking matches cell counts to the marginal distributions of the variables used in the weighting scheme
 - Regression weighting
 - Propensity score weighting
 - Changing landscape of polling:
 - ★ Respondents are becoming harder to contact
 - People have moved to the use of cellphones only vs. landlines. Individuals who only have cellphones are different from individuals with landlines and thus there is no easy sampling fix
 - Online interviewing: The practice of internet surveying, so far, lacks the statistical theory and common understandings regarding data collection practices that would allow internet sampling to approximate SRS. Research over the internet is often conducted using nonprobability samples (although just as non-online polls are not inherently probability samples, online polls do not necessarily have to be nonprobability samples). Some companies use pools of volunteers and then use quota sampling
 - Declining cooperation: Increasing concerns about privacy and confidentiality and increased distrust of pollsters. Lifestyle changes, people are busier.
 - What to ask?
 - ★ Two facts:
 - Most people do not pay attention to politics most of the time.
 - Once in a survey interview, citizens are compliant (most people will try to give a reasonable answer)
 - ★ What does an answer to a survey question reveal about people’s political views ?
 - Survey responses should be seen as constructed preferences:
 - RAS (Zaller, 1992): individuals answer survey questions off the top of their head by “averaging across the considerations that are immediately salient to them” due to their personal characteristics and political experiences at the time of the survey interview. Wording can change considerations that are on peoples mind. “Attitude statements” as called by Zaller are still relevant and reveal preferences
 - Researchers should measure opinion at a medium level of specificity: balance where survey responses are general enough to reflect the respondent’s distribution of considerations but are not so general as to lack relation to political controversies
 - How to target the appropriate level of specificity?
 - ★ Questions should be not so general as to be empty of content and not so specific that they measure opinion where opinion does not exist.

★ Two complimentary approaches:

- Single-question approaches: Goal is to get mezzo-level opinion with a single item. If a researcher desires to measure public opinion with a single question, framing questions at a broader level of generality may make it possible to accurately gauge public sentiment.
- Aggregation approach: Aggregating multiple items into a single measure at the individual level and then aggregating across individuals to get a measure of public opinion. Corrects for measurement-error. Others propose need to aggregate survey responses across both individuals and across issues (Simson).

Devin Caughey, Tom O’Grady, and Christopher Warshaw. 2019. “Policy Ideology in European Mass Publics, 1981–2016.” *American Political Science Review* 113, no. 3 (August): 674–693

- **One Sentence Summary:** Introduces a way to study policy preferences comparatively (across countries and time). Develop the first survey based time-series–cross-sectional measures of policy ideology in European mass publics.
- **Argument:** Ideology should be measured with more than one dimension in Europe. They find that the four measures of ideology: economic conservatism, relative economic conservatism, social conservatism, and immigration conservatism exhibit contrasting cross-sectional cleavages and distinct temporal dynamics.
 - Treat ideology as a latent trait whose distribution can be inferred from aggregate data on citizens’ political preferences.
 - do not assume a priori that mass ideology is unidimensional, but rather allow it to differ across issue domains.
- **Data/Methods:** Estimate the domain-specific policy conservatism of men and women in three age categories and twenty-seven European countries in each biennium between 1981–82 and 2015–16. 27 countries, 36 years and contains nearly 2.7 million survey responses to 109 unique issue questions
 - Unlike prior approaches, do not assume a priori that mass ideology is unidimensional, but rather allow it to differ across issue domains.
 - Item response theory (IRT Model): In an IRT model, subjects’ responses are jointly determined by their score on the latent trait—in this case, their domain-specific conservatism—and by the characteristics of the particular question.
 - Groups defined by the cross-classification of country, gender, and age categories. These population groups were chosen because they are measured in a standardized way across countries and surveys and because their population proportions are available from census data
- **Findings:**
 - Validated measures against individual issue questions, time series of domain-specific policy mood, and policies themselves
 - since the 1980s, European publics have moved markedly leftward on social issues and modestly so on immigration.
 - men have consistently taken more conservative positions than women, but only recently has any sign of an analogous gender gap emerged on social and immigration issues
 - negative relationship between economic conservatism and social and immigration conservatism indicates that cross-national variation in European mass ideology cannot be captured with a single left–right dimension

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Ties with literature measuring macro public opinion: Stimson (2012) who by measuring the policy mood aggregates across issues and individuals

Anthony Heath, Stephen Fisher, and Shawna Smith. 2005. “The Globalization of Public Opinion Research.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 8, no. 1 (June): 297–333

- **Argument:** Annual Review piece although cross-national surveys have grown, there is a lack of public opinion surveys in non-established democracies.
 - Flag issue of questions being interpreted differently in different contexts
 - State often used as unit of analysis but do not study independence movements sepe (e.g. Quebec).
 - European Social Survey (ESS) example of good survey for standardizing questions

Cognition, Information, Knowledge

Anthony Downs. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper / Row

- **One Sentence Summary:** Introduces rational calculus of voting model and argues that a rational voter should almost never bother to vote or get informed to vote.
- **Argument:**
 - Chapter 11: The Process of Being Informed
 - ★ Decision-maker (“rational voter”) uses marginal cost-return principle of economics. 1) Must weight the importance of making right instead of wrong decision on ballot. 2) Need to determine probability that acquiring bit of information will be useful in making decision. 3) Then determine the cost of acquiring this information. The decision-maker will continue to acquire information until the marginal return equals the marginal cost to him.
 - ★ Making decision on vote choice is costly (time + other scarce resources):
 - Only select part of total available information, so all information is biased in nature.
 - Rationally decision-maker should get information from someone that has same principles of selecting data as them (aka same point of view, e.g. NYT for liberal). Must check other sources occasionally to validate that this is best source.
 - Chapter 12: How Rational Citizens Reduce Information Costs
 - ★ Should not be misconstrued as model that replicates the real world.
 - ★ Free information stream provides some individuals with more politically useful information than others
 - ★ Some specialists reduce data costs to focus citizen attention on the areas most relevant for decision-making. Information providers = professional data gatherers and publishers, interest groups, political parties, and government.
 - ★ Citizens can reduce information costs by obtaining info from people instead of mass media + accept subsidized info
 - ★ Even if returns from making right decision are infinite, rational men delegate part or all decision making to others and therefore may be totally uninformed about politics.
 - ★ Men will not be equally well-informed about politics
 - Chapter 13: The Returns from Information and Their Diminution

- ★ Citizens acquire info to decide how to vote, and to form opinions with which they can influence government policy
 - ★ Citizens who care most about which party wins election have the least need for info, and those who do not care about who wins election most need information
 - ★ Acquisition of non-free and free information is irrational for most, because voice of voter is only one among many that make the decision (likelihood of voter changing election results is tiny). Thus most voters rely on free information obtained accidentally.
 - ★ Most people DO NOT vote on the basis of their true political views
 - ★ only a few citizens can rationally attempt to influence the formation of each government policy
- **Data/Methods:** Theoretical model.
 - **Critique:** If irrational for voters to vote, why do they do so? - Blais (2000) argues that it is because there is an additional variable which is the sense of civic duty that voters have to vote.
 - **Relevant Literature:**
 - Cost of voting lit: See especially Riker and Ordeshook 1978

John Zaller. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** People form political preferences and respond to survey responses by averaging “top of the mind” considerations, based on cues received from elites (including the mass media), attention to this information, and individual differences in political values.
- **Research Question:** How do people form political preferences?
- **Argument:**
 - RAS (Receive, Accept, Sample) Model
 - ★ People do not have true underlying opinions on every issue. Instead, every opinion = information + predispositions. Thus opinions are developed by variations in information in elite discourse + individual differences in attention to this information + individual differences in political values.
 - ★ People fill their minds with partially consistent ideas, arguments and considerations (most people are uncritical of the information that they internalize). When answering a survey question, respondents call to mind ideas that are immediately accessible in memory (1 or 2 considerations), and average them to make choices among the options available to them. The flow of information in elite discourse determines which information is salient in ones mind (more recent or repeated considerations are more accessible in ones mind). Response instability is caused because different information is salient at different times. People with greater political awareness, are more selective in the information that they internalize and more likely to reject information that is inconsistent with their values, and thus they appear to be more consistent in their survey response.
 - Reception axiom: greater political awareness = greater likelihood of being exposed to and understanding a message
 - Resistance axiom: people resist messages that are inconsistent with their political predispositions – but only if they can sense this tension
 - Accessibility axiom: more recent considerations take less time to recall from memory and are thus more likely to be top of mind

- Response axiom: individuals answer survey questions by “averaging” over all considerations that are immediately accessible or salient
- Elite discourse: Persuasive messages (argument) + cueing messages (link arguments to candidate or party). Public tends to see politics through the lens of elites. Most attentive members of the public most likely to adopt elite position. When elites have different views, people usually follow the elites sharing their general ideological or partisan predisposition. Most politically attentive mirror most sharply the ideological divisions among the elite.
- Political awareness: Most people know very little about politics, but there is significant variation across the population in level of political attentiveness. Those that pay most attention to politics (most politically sophisticated) are most likely to be exposed by campaign arguments, but least influenced by them because they have more capability of being critical and evaluate new information. Those with lowest level of political awareness are not exposed to new political information. Thus, the moderately aware are most influenced by new political information.
- Values: The effect of values on public opinion, depends to what extent people are aware of contextual information to translate values into support for policies or candidates.
- Survey responses:
 - ★ Overtime instability: Non-attitudes (Converse, 1964) + Measurement error (Achen, 1975)
 - ★ Random and systemic survey error.
 - ★ People can answer questions in surveys based on ideas that are salient to them from the questions: response effects (Context in which question is asked, order of answer options, etc.) and question-wording effects
- Final Chapter: Elite DOMINATION of public opinion
 - ★ Note this chapter’s argument is the one that Zaller revisits in his 2012 article
 - ★ Journalists prioritize publishing accurate information or information that elites will deem to be accurate. Thus, they rely on science-driven experts and elites to get “accurate” information. In that sense, elites very much shape the discourse. Example of how homosexuality was previously seen as a disease, but then changed based on expert opinion and reframing of the issue in the media.
 - ★ Experts can be ideologically mixed on certain issues (libs and conservatives), and thus when there are tensions between experts, the media reports expert opinion that fits with their predispositions. Instead of knowing the details about disputes between elites, citizens only need to follow the cue from elites that have the same predispositions as them.

• Definitions:

- Information in elite discourse: stereotypes, framing, and elite leadership cues that enable citizens to form conceptions, and not just pure factual information.
- Political awareness: “...extent to which an individual pays attention to politics *and* understands what he or she has encountered” (p.21) (Attention alone is not enough) Use classic political knowledge factual questions to tap this concept.
- Political Predispositions: “...stable, individual level traits that regulate the acceptance or non-acceptance of the political communications the person receives...” (p.22) (e.g. interests, values, and experience) Elites don’t shape predispositions, but predispositions mediate the information that people receive from elites.
- Ideology: left-right scheme capable of organizing a wide range of fairly disparate concerns (e.g. values or issue dimensions). Thus, one should use domain specific political values when possible, but one can use general omnibus ideology measures to capture peoples’ left-right tendencies given that values are to a certain extent shaped by ideological orientation.

- Consideration: Any reason that might lead an individual to decide a political issue one way or the other. Compound of cognition and affect — belief in object (information) and evaluation of the belief (favorable or not).
- **Data/Methods:**
 - Survey data: NES (especially 1986-87), Center for Political Studies (CPS - UMich), and ICPSR data.
 - Ask respondents to list their considerations when answering the question (half before answering, other half after answering)
- **Critique:**
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Opposes on-line model of information processing whereby individuals' attitudes are formed in real time, at the moment of information exposure by updating an affective integrator as new information is encountered. The memory based models like that of Zaller suggest that individuals form their opinions at the time of judgment, retrieving relevant information from longterm memory. Similar in its predictions to Lodge and Taber (2013)'s JQP model of online processing, but Zaller is based on conscious memory, whereas JQP views this process as largely automatic, with reported opinions justifying affective response.

John Zaller. 2012. "WHAT NATURE AND ORIGINS LEAVES OUT." *Critical Review* 24, no. 4 (December): 569–642

- **One Sentence Summary:** Update to Zaller (1992) arguing that RAS is valid but overestimated the role of elites in shaping predispositions.
- **Argument:** there are aspects of public opinion that are not driven by ideology, nor influenced by political elites
 - Latent opinion: link to V.O. Key 1961; "opinions that may not be visible in polls, but are likely to emerge and become important at some later point" (571)
 - ★ In particular, politicians are attentive to potential opinions that might exist at some point in the future in response to their actions. Thus, the public may influence elite opinion and discourse, and therefore there is endogeneity — do elites influence the mass public or does the mass public influence elites?.
 - Politicians care less about current opinion than latent opinion that might manifest in future elections after policy effects have been observed.
 - ★ Politicians often follow, rather than lead, latent opinion, meaning that cues from partisan leaders are endogenous to perceptions of future opinion
 - ★ In particular, politicians are unable to lead group-focused opinion (e.g., Kinder 2003 on ethnocentrism)
 - Response to Chapter 12:
 - ★ Science-driven elites are NOT the principal initiators of new partisan policies; more important are interest groups, political intellectuals and ambitious politicians.
 - What appears to be following the opinion of elites and ideologically consistent opinions, may simply be policies that partisans are willing to accept in exchange for getting allies on the issues they care about. Thus, partisans may not be swayed by elites, but may just not care about the issue.

- Parties: following Bawn et al. 2012, defines parties as coalitions formed by “policy demanders” (interest groups and activists)
 - ★ Parties offer policies to please these activists and appeal to their primary voting blocs, instead of being attentive to public opinion writ large
 - ★ Party change occurs because “issue publics” (who care primarily about a single issue) sort into parties after issue activists pressure parties into taking clear positions on that issue
 - Then, opinion leadership kicks in, and members of issue publics take cues on secondary issues
- **Data/Methods:**
 - Re-evaluation of evidence for the RAS model
 - Case study: of Kennedy and Johnson’s positions on the Vietnam War
- **Findings:**
 - a large amount of elite-driven opinion remains in the United States – but there are other forms of public opinion that elites can’t influence
 - constraint: finds more evidence of ideological constraint in 2012, with far greater partisan polarization across issues – but particularly among the best informed
 - case study: at the time, many voters did not want the United States to go to war, but Kennedy and Johnson anticipated that, if they did not go to war, they could be punished for appeasing communism.
 - ★ Both Kennedy and Johnson personally believed that the Vietnam War would be unsuccessful.
 - ★ However, they also believe that, if they failed to intervene, Republicans would attack them (and voters would follow suit)
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Evidence of leaders influencing public opinion: Lenz (2012)
 - Revisits Converse (1964) typology and emphasizes the importance of “group interests” and “nature of the times” voters who dismiss ideology in favor of narrow issue concerns, group-based evaluations, or pocketbook evaluations
 - Latent opinion as a form of “pandering” (Canes-Wrone 2006) – leaders may pursue policies that they themselves do not want, in order to avoid possibility of future sanctioning

Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans know about politics and why it matters*. 3. [pr.] New Haven: Yale Univ. Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** members of the public by and large lack factual knowledge about politics, with little change in political knowledge over time
- **Argument:** argue that “a broadly and equitably informed citizenry helps assure a democracy that is both responsive and responsible” (1):
 - Political knowledge: “range of factual information about politics that is stored in long-term memory” (10) – separate from attitudes or opinions

- political knowledge is not only influenced by cognitive or psychological traits (Luskin, 1990; Highton, 2009), but also shaped by systemic factors (Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Rasmussen, 2016; Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry, 1996). “political knowledge results from the interaction of ability, motivation and opportunity”. (p.8). Individuals require both the inherent cognitive capacity to process, comprehend, and retain political information, as well as the necessary opportunities to be exposed to such information.
 - ★ However, knowledge is systematically concentrated in certain circles (older, white, educated, high-income citizens), leading to uneven participation and representation of interests.
- Four propositions that contribute to the argument:
 1. “the American political system is based on an amalgam of often inconsistent normative theories. This results in a polity that provides many opportunities for civic participation, that requires an often underestimated amount of citizen input if it is to operate democratically, but that makes few formal demands on citizens.” (p.3)
 2. “factual knowledge about politics is a critical component of citizenship, one that is essential if citizens are to discern their real interests and take effective advantage of the civic opportunities afforded them.” (p.3)
 3. “how much citizens know about politics, what they know, and how knowledge is distributed among different groups and classes of citizens is the product of both individual characteristics and systemic forces” (p.3)
 4. “the varied opportunities to participate; the centrality of information to effective participation; and systematic biases in the ability, opportunity, and motivation to learn about politics combine to produce a stratified political system that affords different access to political power—and thus one that is more or less democratic—depending on where in the knowledge hierarchy one falls.” (p. 3-4)
- **Data/Methods:** survey data of citizens’ knowledge of particular facts.
 - Measurement: PK is assessed by measuring the number of objective political questions that a respondent answers correctly.
- **Findings:** many members of the public are not informed about politics, and knowledge has changed very little over 50 years
 - Citizens are generalists, not specialists; people who are informed about one topic are more likely to be informed about another topic
 - However, knowledge is roughly normally distributed; little evidence for a “small knowledgeable elite and a vast ignorant public” (18)
- **Critique:** Downs (1957) and Lupia (1994) suggesting that might not be rational for voters to be informed
- **Relevant Literature:** contrary to Lupia (1994), who argue that citizens can use information shortcuts to act as if fully informed.
 - Democratic theory: based on assumption that democracy functions best when citizens are politically informed, and when this knowledge is evenly distributed
 - Also counters Downs who argues that irrational for voters to get informed.

Arthur Lupia. 1994. “Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections.” *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 1 (March): 63–76

- **One Sentence Summary:** uninformed voters can use information shortcuts to act as if they were informed
- **Argument:** well-informed voters not necessary for electoral responsiveness; low-info voters can use widely available information shortcuts to emulate high-info voters
 - Information shortcuts: use social or elite cues to infer own preferences (e.g. preferences or opinions of friends, coworkers, political parties or other groups)
 - Signaling games: information provider can affect decision maker’s behavior by sending “signals” about the consequences of different actions
 - ★ However, decision makers’ ability to draw inferences from signals depends on prior beliefs about information providers’ credibility
- **Data/Methods:** exit poll of insurance reform voters (N = 339).
 - Case: five complicated insurance reform ballot initiatives in California. In this case no partisan cue, nor past performance/retrospective voting.
 - DV: binary vote for/against a proposition
 - IVs: knowledge of issue of insurance reform, as well as their perceptions of different groups’ preferences (insurance industry, trial lawyers, Nader)
- **Findings:** low-info respondents who knew shortcuts (knowledge of industry preferences) behaved differently from those who lacked this knowledge – and behaved similarly to high-info respondents.
- **Critique:** small, non-representative survey focused on voters in a single type of (non-partisan) election, rather than a highly salient, competitive race.
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Different findings than Bartels (1996), who finds that relatively uninformed voters behave, in the aggregate, very differently from fully informed voters
 - Contrary findings to Lau and Redlawsk (2001), who find that heuristic use is prevalent but decreases the probability of a “correct” vote among low-info voters
 - ★ Suggests that the successful use of heuristics relies on at least a baseline level of information.

Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk. 2001. “Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making.” *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 4 (October): 951

- **One Sentence Summary:** Challenges the assumption that cognitive “heuristics” improve the decision-making abilities of everyday voters. Reliance on political heuristics makes decision making less accurate among those low in political sophistication.
- **Argument:** Most voters use heuristics, but only helpful in improving voting decisions among political sophisticates and makes voting worse among individuals with low levels of political sophistication. Those with greater political sophistication know how to get the most out of the knowledge they do possess.
 - Summary of 5 classic heuristics:
 1. Candidate’s party affiliation
 2. Candidate’s ideology
 3. Endorsements (e.g. who does interest group endorse)

4. Polls
5. Candidate appearance

–

- **Data/Methods:** Experiments with "dynamic process-tracing methodology". Essentially mock elections where participants can get information about candidates running by clicking on tabs.
- **Findings:**
 - Cognitive heuristics are at times employed by almost all voters and they are particularly likely to be used when the choice situation facing voters is complex
 - Heuristic use generally increases the probability of a correct vote by political experts but decreases the probability of a correct vote by novices (low political sophistication).
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - In line with Bartels (1996).

Markus Prior. 2010. "You've Either Got It or You Don't? The Stability of Political Interest over the Life Cycle." *The Journal of Politics* 72, no. 3 (July): 747–766

- **One Sentence Summary/argument:** Political interest is stable in the short and long term. Therefore, suggesting that to increase political interest should do it at a young age.
- **Data/Methods:** 11 panel surveys in 4 countries in time span of over 40 years (up to 23 interviews per respondent). Look at aggregate trends, measurement model and dynamic panel model.
- **Findings:** Political interest is stable in the short and long term (only exception Germany in post reunification)

Adam J. Berinsky. 2007. "Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict." *The Journal of Politics* 69, no. 4 (November): 975–997

- **One Sentence Summary:** elite cue theory; foreign policy opinion follows patterns of elite conflict, with members of the public drawing on cues from trusted elites (or opposing elites!) as a heuristic
- **Argument:** when elites disagree about intervention, the public will divide along party lines, but when elites are in consensus, the public will largely follow suit
 - Event response theory: wartime events directly influence public support for war by inducing a cost/benefit analysis about conflict
 - ★ Casualties hypothesis: the public is average to war deaths, so will only support the war if the benefits outweigh the costs of military action
 - ★ Critiques:
 - Members of the public have minimal knowledge about politics, including relevant facts
 - Event response theory neglects the role of partisanship in shaping opinions toward war
 - Elite cue theory: public responds to the balance of elite discourse, using cues from elites as a heuristic for their likely support
 - Hypotheses:
 - ★ knowledge of wartime events will be limited amongst public, and correcting misperceptions of these events will do little to affect war support

- ★ Instead, patterns of elite discourse will serve as reference points for the public, even without a balanced flow of information from both parties

- **Data/Methods:**

- War in Iraq: (1) survey experiment in 2004 (Iraq War Casualty Survey), (2) follow-up experiment in 2005
 - ★ 2004: nationally representative survey asking respondents to identify how many soldiers had been killed
 - 2 x 2: whether asked to estimate casualties, whether provided with information about correct number of casualties
 - ★ 2005: follow-up experiment with six conditions
 - (1) baseline (whether war worth fighting), (2) standard question (considering costs/benefits, no info), (3) generic casualty info, (4) specific casualty info, (5) generic operational cost info, (6) specific operational cost info
 - ★ DV: support for the war
 - ★ IV: provision of information about casualties
- World War II: series of polls by different outlets between 1939-44

- **Findings:**

- War in Iraq: although the average estimate of casualties was fairly accurate, there was high variability, depending on both political engagement and partisanship
 - ★ In neither experiment were there significant differences in war support based on whether people received information about casualties
 - ★ Instead, as attention to politics increases, respondents began to adopt more polarized positions on the war, regardless of condition
- World War II: find patterns of polarization in line with elite cue theory prior to the conflict; anytime where there were one-sided information flows, polarization diminishes
 - ★ However, once the war began and elite discourse unified, consensus in public support emerges, with more engaged individuals more supportive of the war, regardless of party

- **Relevant Literature:** argues for the importance of elite cues in shaping foreign policy opinion – especially among the most engaged respondents

- Link to Zaller 1992, who uses the Vietnam War as a case for arguing that the balance of persuasive elite messages determines the balance of opinions, particularly amongst highly sophisticated citizens
 - ★ Berinsky 2007 extends this framework to note that individuals may follow cues from elites even in the absence of contradictory cues from the other side, as they can infer where they stand vis-à-vis elites in polarized times
- The prevalence of elite cue-taking among engaged respondents suggests that more information is not a panacea, if most informed are most likely to adopt the opinions of their preferred cue-givers

Gabriel S. Lenz. 2012. *Follow the leader? how voters respond to politicians' policies and performance*. Chicago studies in American politics. Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** Do citizens lead politicians by judging them on the basis of their policy stands and performance, or do citizens align their views to match those of politicians they favor?

- **Argument:** Mixed results for the quality of democracy: People do punish and reward politicians for their past performance. However, they do not evaluate candidates for their policy positions. In fact, they change their policy positions to match those of their preferred party or candidate.
- **Data/Methods:** More than a dozen case studies in USA and Europe (wars, campaigns, economic booms, tragedies, etc.)
 - Panel survey data: Previous work uses cross-sectional data but when attitudes are measured at the same time as outcomes such as vote choice and presidential approval, one cannot determine which came first. In using panel data, Lenz can measure whether prior attitudes can influence later changes in presidential approval, vote choice, etc. Thus, can measure whether people bring their support for politicians in line with their previous stated views (“leading”), or whether they change their policy opinions to match their candidate preferences or PID.
 - Three-wave test: looks to see whether there was a change of policy views between time 1 and time 2, and then to see whether there was a concomitant shift in candidate evaluations between time 2 and time 3.
 - Only looks at Presidents and Prime Ministers.
- **Findings:**
 - Easy test for democracy, do people evaluate candidates based on their past performance? For performance judgement (e.g. the economy), People lead politicians because economic perceptions have greater effect on candidate evaluations following increase in media attention on the economy. Punish Carter (1980) and Bush (1992) but reward Clinton in 1996.
 - Harder test for democracy, do people evaluate candidates based on their policy positions? For policy issues this is not the case. Voters are not more likely to judge candidates on issues after period of time, thus they are not rewarding or punishing candidates that take different or same policy position as them.
 - Across wide range of topics people change their policy views to be in line with their candidate or party.
- **Critique:**
 - Measuring public opinion in panel is not the best, because might be influenced by media priming or persuasion before the following wave BUT better than previous cross-sectional approach.
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Fiorina literature on retrospective voting.
 - Campbell et al. (1960) *The American Voter* suggesting that PID is developed at an early age and then rarely changes.

Evan S. Lieberman, Daniel N. Posner, and Lily L. Tsai. 2014. “Does Information Lead to More Active Citizenship? Evidence from an Education Intervention in Rural Kenya.” *World Development* 60 (August): 69–83

- **One Sentence Summary:** Develop theoretical framework to explain why providing parents with information on test scores of their children in Kenya + information on how to improve child education had null effects.
- **Argument:**

- For information to generate citizen action it must be understood; it must cause people to update their prior beliefs in some manner; and it must speak to an issue that people prioritize and also believe is their responsibility to address. People must know how to address problem and must have the skills to do so. They must believe that authorities will respond to their actions; and, to the extent that the outcome in question requires collective action, they must believe that others in the community will act as well.

- **Data/Methods:**

- Randomized educational intervention in 550 households in 26 matched villages in two Kenyan districts
- intervention provided parents with information about their children’s performance on literacy and numeracy tests, and materials about how to become more involved in improving their children’s learning.

- **Findings:**

- Provision of such information had no discernible impact on either private or collective action.

- **Critique:** Two treatments that cannot be isolated. Effect of providing test scores + the materials to improve learning.

Emotion and Affect

George E. Marcus, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. 2000. *Affective intelligence and political judgment*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** Moods or emotions are best understood as the product of two separate subsystems that operate largely below people’s levels of conscious awareness: the disposition and surveillance systems. Without anxiety, citizens would rely on political habits.

- **Argument:**

- Disposition system deals with execution of habits and produces enthusiasm or frustration.
- Surveillance system looks for new events and threats. If enables cognitive analysis and produces anxiety or calmness.
- Affective system (disposition and surveillance system) helps people to manage information by evaluating incoming sensory inputs and by providing information about whether people can safely rely on established habits or instead need to modify their behavior in some way.
- Positive affective responses, which the authors label enthusiasm, indicate to people that they can safely rely on previously learned habits. Negative affective responses, labeled anxiety, lead people to rely less on habit and to be motivated to pay closer attention to information, learn, and engage in more careful consideration of different choices, behaviors, and outcomes.
- implications of the theory for voting choice, candidate evaluation, policy support, and political participation and learning.
- Greater levels of anxiety = increase peoples likelihood of reconsidering their habits, to collect more information and to change their attitudes. Enthusiasm may be a crystallizing agent on preferences.

- **Data/Methods:**

- ANES questions whereby respondents must reply whether yes or no they have experienced X emotion with reference to political event, issue or person.

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Valentino et al. (2008); Experimentally induce emotions directly and find that while anger, enthusiasm, and anxiety can lead people to claim they will pay attention to the campaign, anger actually depresses total information seeking. Examine the impact of realistic political threats and find that exposure triggers several emotions but that only anxiety boosts information seeking and learning.
- Ladd and Lenz (2008): use cross-sectional and panel survey data to test affective intelligence theory against two simpler alternatives: (1) that emotions directly influence candidate evaluations and (2) that candidate evaluations directly influence emotions. Find little support for AI, some evidence that emotions directly influence candidate evaluations, and strong evidence that candidate evaluations directly influence emotions.
- In the camp that affective comes before cognitive.
- Huddy et al. (2005): Differentiate between threat and anxiety. Using survey data find that anxiety about terrorists was negatively related to military action. They explained that anxiety was related to uncertainty and risk aversion, and when anxiety was high, people tended to view military action as risky, and support waned. Whereas threat increases animosity and retaliation.

Milton Lodge and Charles S. Taber. 2013. *The rationalizing voter*. Cambridge studies in public opinion and political psychology. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** Online processing model of motivated reasoning; “true” public opinion doesn’t exist, and reported attitudes are just rationalizations of unconscious affect
- **Argument:** affect-driven, dual-process model of political information processing
 - There is an important literature on how heuristics can help people make political choices (See Mondak (1994) - polls, elite opinion, etc. and party identification (Bartels (2000); Lau and Redlawsk (2006)))
 - BUT Lodge and Taber argue that there is an even faster heuristic that provides quicker and better candidate evaluations — System I (*likeability heuristic* - See summary of dual-process reasoning in relevant literature section).
 - ★ This “likeability heuristic” essentially means that people have implicit attitudes that unconsciously drive preferences in accord with the citizens history of information processing. Implicit attitudes about individuals, policies, etc. can exist outside of subjective awareness. Affective tallies capture the evaluative implications of prior conscious and unconscious thinking about these objects, and these feelings come spontaneously to mind when their associated objects become targets of thought. (page 4)
 - Online processing model: People evaluate information at the moment they are exposed to it. Feelings arise automatically within milliseconds of exposure to the attitude object or event. This evaluation is integrated in a rolling evaluation. The information that contributed to the judgement is quickly forgotten. When one is asked to evaluate, the initial affective judgement is what drives the evaluation. The judgement is constantly updated. every new message or piece of information is affectively evaluated, and the evaluation is – within milliseconds – integrated into the overall impression of the object. The running tally of online evaluation is thus a sum of all prior evaluations related to the given attitude object, and is restored to long-term memory where it is available for later retrieval and subsequent evaluation.
 - The conventional way to think of political reasoning is (c-g-h (see figure below)). Event triggers the retrieval of cognitive considerations from memory, from which conscious deliberations are

constructed, yielding reasoned evaluations. Taber and Lodge note that this is possible but it is not the main way people make political decisions.

- Rationalization hypothesis: People do not construct evaluations (candidates, parties, and policy) from well-reasoned arguments. Instead, automatic, unconscious affective evaluations → attitudes, which then people rationalize.
- John Q. Public model: all beliefs and attitudes are constructed in real time based on whatever cognitive, affective, behavioral associations are available from long term memory (LTM)
 - ★ **Automaticity**: information processing is largely automatic and unconscious. Affect arrives first in the stream of processing.
 - ★ **Hot cognition**: all political concepts are affect-laden; if different aspects of an issue encoded with different affective charge then there is opinion instability.
 - ★ **Somatic embodiment**: affect connected to attitudes, goals, and behavior, driven by physiological processes
 - ★ **Primacy of affect**: feelings precedes cognition
 - ★ **Online updating**: people automatically integrate new appraisals into prior evaluations = running tally (summary evaluation) stored in LTM
 - Different from Bayesian processing, in that information is processed in a directionally motivated way
 - Remember the evaluation, but don't remember what informed it
 - ★ **Affect transfer**: current affective states become associated with currently activated objects (even if incidental)
 - ★ **Affect contagion**: info in LTM that is congruent with current affect will be favored in memory retrieval. Thus, reinforcement of initial reactions
- **Motivated reasoning**: Reasoning is motivated, and people have precision objectives and partisan objectives which counter each other. Reasoning is biased as prior affect biases attention and processing of information that favors acceptance of affectively congruent arguments
- Suggests no valid measures of “real” public opinion
- **Data/Methods**: lab-based experiments on political science students, focused on affirmative action and gun control
- **Relevant Literature**:
 - Dual-process modes of thinking from cognitive science: According to this theory, intuitive and deliberative processes compete to shape judgments and decision-making (Kahneman, 2011; Evans and Stanovich, 2013; Chaiken and Trope, 1999). The first system, System I, operates rapidly, in parallel, and automatically. Its processes occur without conscious awareness, and only the final product is brought to consciousness (Evans, 2003). This system is characterized by intuitive and instinctive responses. On the other hand, System II is a unique feature of human cognition. It involves slower and sequential thinking, abstract reasoning, and hypothetical thinking (Evans, 2003; Stanovich and West, 2000; De Neys, 2018).
 - Contra Hochschild (1981), open-ended responses may not be all that informative: “Highly skeptical of the ability of citizens to reliably and veridically access the sources of their beliefs, the reasons for their attitudes, their past, present, future intentions, and actions” (26)
 - Affective vs. emotive model of political behavior (see: Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT) scholars – MacKuen et al. 1993; Markus, Newman and MacKuen (2000), Gadarian and Albertson 2014; Valentino et al. 2008) – see emotions as secondary appraisal, following initial encoding of valence

- Goes against memory-based models of information processing: which assumes that it is the information that people actually store in their long-term memories (Zaller and Feldman 1992)




FIGURE 1.4. A Dual Process Model of Political Evaluation

Shana Kushner Gadarian and Bethany Albertson. 2014. "Anxiety, Immigration, and the Search for Information: Anxiety, Immigration, and the Search for Information." *Political Psychology* 35, no. 2 (April): 133–164

- **One Sentence Summary:** Anxiety causes individuals to not only seek out more information but to also pay closer attention to and agree with threatening information. (Look at the case of immigration)
- **Data/Methods:** Experiment in which they manipulated anxiety about immigration and provided subjects with a mock news website.
 - measured information processing at three stages: They first track subjects' information seeking by monitoring which stories they read (threatening immigration, non-threatening immigration, or stories unrelated to immigration). Measured attention by asking subjects what they remember, and finally they measured engagement by asking what they thought about the stories (measured by level of agreement with the stories)
 - Treatment: They utilized a bottom-up anxiety induction to simulate anxiety in respondents in the treatment condition; they asked respondents to focus on what made them worried about immigration, a strategy used by social psychologists. In the control condition, respondents were asked to simply list everything that came to mind when they thought about immigration.
- **Findings:**

- Anxiety triggers biased learning about immigration, but anxiety also biases the type of information that people prefer. Individuals made anxious about immigration are attracted to threatening information. This bias is apparent in information seeking, attention, and engagement.
- attention to threatening information was not costless; when citizens turn their attention toward the object of their anxiety, they are less able to devote time to other issues.

- **Relevant Literature:** Marcus et al. (2000)

Steven W. Webster, Elizabeth C. Connors, and Betsy Sinclair. 2022. “The Social Consequences of Political Anger.” *The Journal of Politics* 84, no. 3 (July): 1292–1305

- **One Sentence Summary:** When people are politically angry, less likely to create new social ties, more likely to cut off those from the opposite party.
- **Argument:** Because emotion cannot be compartmentalized, anger should extend to social life, outside of politics
- **Data/Methods:**
 - ANES data since 1980
 - Experiment:
 - ★ Lucid 2020
 - ★ Emotional recall technique to elicit anger: asked individuals to write about a time they were very angry with the opposing political party. The control group asked individuals to write about what they ate for breakfast in the morning.
 - ★ asked a series of questions about various social settings with out partisans. Looked whether people would ask out-partisans to house sit, go to a party if they were there, what if they are family members, go out on dates, how they read fake news
 - measure of “self monitoring” (trait that captures one’s tendency to misrepresent one’s self to appease others) to show that experimental findings are not the result of strategic answering on the part of survey respondents.
- **Findings:**
 - anger causes individuals to be less likely to engage with their out partisan neighbor in three out of the four scenarios that we measured
 - effect of political anger on social polarization not moderated gender or race
 - those in treatment group wrote 2.9% more angry words (16)
 - Increasing amount of respondents have reported feeling anger at opposing party’s presidential candidate
 - anger causes individuals to engage in social polarization when talking with an outpartisan supporter; when considering whether to accept an offer to have coffee, a meal, or a drink with an out partisan supporter; when deciding whether to accept an invitation to go on a date with an out partisan supporter; when thinking about whether to attend a social gathering or club that is likely to be heavily populated by supporters of the opposing party; and when pondering the ramifications of a child marrying a supporter of the opposing party”
 - Explain that this is not just a reflection of distaste for politics in general because people are turned off by all social interactions with out partisans → if they just didn’t like politics, they would avoid political situations only

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Respond to Albertson and Gadarian concern that emotions come in bundles (anger with anxiety and society) but they look at text analysis and show that’s not a problem)
-

Self Interest vs Symbolic Politics

Andrea Louise Campbell. 2002. “Self-Interest, Social Security, and the Distinctive Participation Patterns of Senior Citizens.” *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 3 (September): 565–574

- **One Sentence Summary:** lower-income senior citizens are mobilized to participate in politics at unusually high levels, due to self-interest brought on by dependence on Social Security
- **Argument:** despite generally higher rates of participation at higher income levels, see a negative relationship between income and participation for senior citizens
 - Case: political participation on Social Security by low-income senior citizens
 - Thesis: low-income senior citizens engage in self-interested participation directly related to Social Security (self-interested participation)
 - ★ Examples: letter-writing about program, as well as Social Security-focused voting/contributions
 - ★ The resource challenges typically experienced by lower-income citizens are offset for senior citizens, who have more time and are more frequently mobilized by political parties
 - Conditions: self-interested participation occurs when stakes are (1) visible, (2) tangible, (3) large, and (4) certain – see Citrin and Green (1990, 18)
- **Data/Methods:** (1) 1981 Roper poll, (2) 1990 Citizen Participation Study, (3) 1996 NES
 - DVs: political interest, participation, and mobilization
 - ★ Roper: interest in Social Security relative to other issues
 - ★ CPS: Social Security-based participation (contact elected officials about Soc. Sec., voted on basis of Soc. Sec., made donations based on Soc. Sec.)
 - ★ NES: whether someone from pol. party contacted them during the election
 - IVs: income, education, gender, race, marital status, work status, and age
 - Model: OLS/logistic regressions encoding a curvilinear relationship between income and DV by including a quadratic term
- **Findings:**
 - Interest: curvilinear relationship between income and interest in Social Security – with interest falling at higher levels
 - Participation: income has a negative influence on contacting elected officials (highest contact rates for low-income seniors, then declines)
 - ★ Curvilinear relationship between income and voting/contributing on the basis of Social Security – first rises, then decreases at higher income levels
 - Mobilization: low-income seniors as likely as high-income seniors to be contacted by a political party (asked to participate)
- **Relevant Literature:** contrary to previous findings about the generally positive relationship between income and voting (see: Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, VSB 1995)

- The VSB model of participation suggests three reasons why higher-income citizens would be more engaged: (1) resources (incl. leisure time), (2) mobilization targeted to high-status individuals/neighborhoods, and (3) engagement (e.g., higher perceived stake on economic policy)
- Critique: while the results are convincing for contact, how many seniors are at high levels of income where curve changes direction?
 - ★ Suggests that most seniors behave as standard models would predict – with higher levels of Social Security-based voting/contributing at higher income levels.

Robert S. Erikson and Laura Stoker. 2011. “Caught in the Draft: The Effects of Vietnam Draft Lottery Status on Political Attitudes.” *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 2 (May): 221–237

- **One Sentence Summary:** Under extreme conditions, self-interest can have a powerful and permanent effect on policy attitudes and party identification. Suggests that self-interest has an effect when a policy directly touches individuals’ lives.
- **Argument:** Mechanisms:
 - Self-interest: visibility, tangibility, size, and certainty of conscription (Citrin and Green 1990) – if likely to be drafted in Vietnam war, more likely to oppose war to avoid having to serve
 - Attention to issues: fear/anxiety, combined with personal stake in the issue, led to greater attention, realization that war was a failed effort
- **Data/Methods:** natural experiment of 1969 random assignment of draft numbers to dates, using 1973 data from the Political Socialization Panel Study
 - DV: support for the war, partisanship/ideology (measured over time)
 - IV: assignment of draft number
- **Findings:** males who had low lottery numbers became more anti-war, more liberal, and more Democratic in their voting than those with high numbers
 - Effects were not due to actual military service, but rather to the emotional anticipation of the prospect of service
 - Effects (for both party ID and support for the Vietnam War) are also detectable in later interviews in the 1990s, suggesting changes in party ID and attitudes were long-lasting and, perhaps, permanent
- **Relevant Literature:** Though self-interest may not have a generally large effect (see: Sears et al. 1980; Sears and Funk 1990), when policies directly impinge on daily lives and can be connected back to gov’t, self-interest may profoundly restructure political views.

Jens Hainmueller and Dominik Hangartner. 2013. “Who Gets a Swiss Passport? A Natural Experiment in Immigrant Discrimination.” *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 1 (February): 159–187

- **One Sentence Summary:** Do natives discriminate against particular types of immigrants, and if so, which immigrants are welcomed and which immigrants are rejected? Discrimination against specific immigrant groups responds dynamically to changes in the groups’ relative size. Country of origin determines naturalization success more than any other applicant characteristic. Origin based discrimination steeply increases with the xenophobic preferences of the local population.

- **Context:** In Switzerland, some municipalities used to use closed ballots referendums to decide on naturalization requests (stopped in 2003). Essentially, locals would determine whether an immigrant should obtain naturalization status (right to vote and permanently stay in the municipality). They would secretly vote, “yes” or “no” on each application. If an applicant received a majority of “yes” votes, they would obtain Swiss citizenship. Voters get official leaflet with resumes of the applicants before casting their ballot (5)
- **Theory:**
 - Statistical discrimination: “If the average integration level of immigrants varies by origin group, then voters, even if all they care about is that applicants are sufficiently well integrated, find it optimal to place some weight on an applicant’s origin to make a better guess about her true integration level.” (3)
 - Taste for discrimination: “directly enters the utility function of voters who are assumed to hold xenophobic animus against immigrants from particular origin groups”
- **Data/Methods:**
 - Solving methodological problems:
 - ★ Measurement problem: anonymous ballots guards from social desirability effects
 - ★ Causal identification: applicants received leaflets 2-6 weeks before the election, which authors had access to.
 - 44 ballot box municipalities (use secret ballot naturalization referendums and send voters leaflets with info about applicants)
 - Time period between 1970-2003 in each municipality, with vote counts and leaflets
 - Sample: 2,429 naturalization referendums
 - Dependent variable: proportion of “no” votes, which for each applicant is defined as the fraction of “no” votes to total valid votes.
- **Findings:**
 - Descriptives:
 - ★ Average no vote is 37%, but can vary strongly from one municipality to the next
 - Regression: regress proportion of no votes on the applicant characteristics and a full set of municipality fixed effects
 - ★ Outcomes vary dramatically across and within municipalities.
 - ★ Country of origin most important determinant of naturalization success
 - ★ On average individuals from former Yugoslavia and Turkey receive 40% higher proportion of no votes in comparison to individuals from richer northern and western European countries.
 - ★ Voters systematically prefer applicants with better econ credentials (occupational skill, education, prior unemployment), born in Switzerland, applicants with longer residency. But effects very small in comparison to the origin effect.
 - ★ Language skill almost no effect on naturalization success. So do age, gender, marital status, attractiveness, or children.
 - Proof for both statistical and taste-based discrimination:
 - ★ o Voters will reward an applicant more strongly for additional observable credentials that are informative about her integration status, if the applicant belongs to an origin group that is believed to have a lower average integration level.

- ★ Origin based discrimination steeply increases with the xenophobic preferences of the local population
- ★ 60% taste based discrimination and 40% statistical based discrimination
- ★ Preferences are not static but vary over time

Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox. 2010. "Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment." *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 1 (February): 61–84

- **One Sentence Summary:** Economic self-interest, at least as currently theorized, does not explain voter attitudes toward immigration.
- **Argument:**
 - Theory: Two critical economic concerns that appear to generate anti-immigrant sentiment among native citizens: concerns about labor market competition and concerns about the fiscal burden on public services.
 - Find that concerns among poor natives about constraints on welfare benefits as a result of immigration are more relevant than concerns among the rich about increased taxes
- **Data/Methods:** Original survey experiment embedded in a nationwide U.S. survey
- **Findings:**
 - both low-skilled and highly skilled natives strongly prefer highly skilled immigrants over low-skilled immigrants
 - rich and poor natives are equally opposed to low-skilled immigration
 - states with high fiscal exposure, poor (rich) natives are more (less) opposed to low-skilled immigration than they are elsewhere. This indicates that concerns among poor natives about constraints on welfare benefits as a result of immigration are more relevant than concerns among the rich about increased taxes

David O. Sears et al. 1980. "Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting." *American Political Science Review* 74, no. 3 (September): 670–684

- **One Sentence Summary:** symbolic politics more influential than self interest on political behavior and attitudes
- **Argument:** measures of self interest have little effect on policy preferences on voting behavior, whereas symbolic attitudes have major effect.
 - Self-interested attitudes: attitudes that are instrumental to the attainment of individual goals
 - but usually defined as material well-being in the short-term
 - Symbolic politics: ideology, party identification, racial resentment/prejudice
- **Data/Methods:** 1976 CPS presidential election survey (nationally representative)
 - DV: (1) attitudes toward government policy on four issues (unemployment, health insurance, busing, and law and order), (2) issue voting in these policy areas
 - IVs: (1) self-interest, (2) symbolic attitudes (party ID, ideology, racial prejudice)

- ★ Created indices of self-interest for each policy area (e.g., personal economic conditions for unemployment, whether personally victimized by crime for crime)
 - Controls: age, education, family income, gender, race, Southern dummy
- **Findings:** self-interest has little effect on voters' policy preferences, whereas symbolic attitudes have a major effect
 - No evidence that self-interest depends on political sophistication, efficacy, etc. In fact, sophistication strengthened symbolic attitudes, suggesting that symbolic attitudes are not just a heuristic for self-interest used by disengaged citizens.
 - ★ Demographic variables do explain some of policy preferences (could be “ideology by proxy” – see Campbell et al. 1960), but symbolic attitudes remain independently predictive of attitudes
 - Issue voting is primarily driven by symbolic attitudes, with self-interest, policy attitudes, and demographic variables only marginally increasing predictive power.
 - Note: not just about multicollinearity; short-term self-interest very weakly correlated with symbolic attitudes
- **Relevant Literature:** response to rational choice theories (Downs (1957)) that focus on utility maximizing voters acting on self-interest
 - Critique: Fiorina (1981) (“running tally hypothesis”) would likely take issue with the definition of self-interest as short-term; symbolic attitudes (namely, PID) reflect the long-term cumulation of small changes in short-term self interest
 - Link to economic voting: self-interest tied to egotropic models, but these find very little support (relative to macro-level models, e.g., Kramer 1971, Tufte 1978)

David O Sears, Jim Sidanius, and Lawrence Bobo. 2000. *Racialized politics: The debate about racism in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** Edited book which summarizes debates on role of prejudice, social structure and ordinary politics on the public opinion of white people on race.
- **Findings:**
 - Jim Crow: Based on three components: 1) Blacks inferior to whites because of their race 2) Formal pattern of social distance and segregation. Blacks suppose to stay in their place separate and subordinate to whites, especially in public. 3) Legalized pattern of discrimination, such that blacks were not allowed to vote and were provided with separate and inferior schools, while whites were given preference in employment and elsewhere. Increasing opposition to Jim Crow in surveys.
 - Three main categories for theories on white racial opinion:
 1. Grows out of the long tradition of sociopsychological analysis of racial prejudice. Assumption of early-life socialization of prejudice and social values and also rely on contemporary theories of cognitive processing.
 2. Grows out of the sociological focus on social structure, emphasizing group differences in power, status, and economic resources as the prime movers. Ideology is often treated as a justification for such group interests.
 3. Focuses particularly on the politics of race. It suggests that public opinion on racial policy is now primarily motivated by values and ideologies that are race-neutral. As a result, whites' opinions are strongly influenced by the exact nature of the policy proposals under consideration.

Macro Public Opinion

Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson. 1990. *Issue evolution: race and the transformation of American politics*. 1. Princeton paperback print. Princeton paperbacks Political science, American history. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Issues get on the public agenda because either strategic politicians seek to take advantage of winning issues, new problems emerge, or older issues repackaged to new contexts; there is an emphasis on *easy* issues that can be incorporated into how everyday citizens think about politics.
- **Argument:** Explain the origin of political issues, why some issues survive in a highly competitive contest for public attention, and how some issues transform politics. Issues gain importance and attention because (1) strategic politicians draw attention to what seem to be “winning” issues and issues that can draw contrasts; (2) as new problems emerge, public debates about best way to solve them; (3) older issues may be applied to a new context and new issues may develop and evolve.
 - Issues can result in three outcomes: (1) *organic extensions* (new issues fit into older conflicts, a continuation of older debates, unlikely to shift politics); (2) *unsuccessful adaptations* (new issues fail to capture public attention or fade quickly, unlikely to change politics); (3) *issue evolutions* (capable of changing politics, introduce tensions into the party system, inconsistent with the continued stability of old patterns, remain salient for longer period of time, cut across party lines and lead to vote defections).
 - *Easy issues* likely to become issue evolutions – become so ingrained over a long period of time that it structures voters’ “gut responses” to candidates and political parties. Gut responses require little conceptual sophistication so most people can vote based on them. In contrast, for *hard issues* it is unclear how to apply existing political prejudices to these them.
 - Issues evolutions can be *cataclysmic adaptations* (rapid, discontinuous change, rare in politics), *Darwinian pure gradualism* (slow, gradual, incremental), punctuated equilibrium (change from stable equilibrium by some critical moment, then slow, continuous change)
- **Process of issue evolution:**
 1. Elite reorientations on contentious issues (e.g., shift of party elites to concentrate on racial issues in the 1960s)
 2. Delayed, more inertial reaction in the mass electorate: often led by party activists who see change in elite orientations, begin to support various political contenders → masses begin to see parties taking different positions on issue
 3. Party images change: voters have strong, emotional responses, through “clustering” of beliefs see a “gut” issue as associated with a number of other party issues (*issue bundling*)
 4. Creates party realignment
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Realignment theory/critical elections:
 - ★ Key 1955: critical elections creates durable new groupings of voters, revealing a sharp alteration in a “pre-existing” cleavage in the electorate – focuses specifically on 1896 and 1928 elections
 - ★ Burnham 1970: critical realignment (an abrupt coalitional change among the mass-based electorate) vs. secular realignment (gradual change in voter coalitions). First to push for a “punctuated equilibrium” model. Leans into view that parties are broad-based interest aggregators and coalition builders, adjust positions to maintain coalitions. Steps for critical realignments include:

1. Constituencies coalesce around certain critical issues; tensions arise in society because mobilizations not adequately organized/controlled by status quo party system
 2. “Third party revolt” demonstrates the incapacity of regular parties to integrate issues within their platforms
 3. Flashpoint; parties adjust to resolve the tension
 4. Significant transformation in policy; post-adjustment, institutional elites change behavior.
- ★ Mayhew 2002: should think of realignment as a gradual process, not a punctuated equilibrium/tipping point model – this because events matter (explaining partisan change) and many political issues are valence issues
 - Application to racial politics: Schickler 2016

Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1992. *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Collective public opinion is “real, stable, and sensible”, though not immovable; when opinion changes occur, they are for good reasons (changes in the political world, elite leadership).
- **Abstract:** Collective public opinion is rational – it is “real, stable, and sensible”, though not immovable; when opinion changes occur, they are for good reasons (changes in the political world, elite leadership). Specifically, while individual-level opinion might fluctuate, argue that public as a whole, so long as these errors are randomly distributed, will make use of all available information (primarily from mass media) and choose the appropriate policies – this is called *collective deliberation*.
- **Argument:** the American public collectively holds real, stable, and sensible opinions about public policy, and these opinions develop and change in a reasonable fashion (in response to changing environments and information)
 - Take a looser definition of rationality: (1) argues that voters collectively are able to make distinctions and (2) public opinion can be organized in coherent patterns; reasonable, based on the best available information; adaptive to new info or circumstances, responding in similar ways to similar stimuli
 - Collective opinion can change either because (1) opinions stay the same and population changes or (2) many individuals change minds at same time (from shared experiences or info about events) – this work focuses on (2)
 - Statistical aggregation: when combine individual-level public opinion into a collective measure, the average of these responses cancels out the distorting effects of random measurement error, random changes in individual opinions
 - ★ Because these errors cancel out/are randomly distributed, measurement of collective opinion is far less riddled with error than measurement at the individual-level (which can fluctuate even if people have long-term true preferences).
 - ★ Tied to Condorcet’s jury theorem: juries as collective bodies do much better than a single juror alone
 - Social processes: stable opinions can form in the aggregate despite a lack of full information, as citizens can use heuristics/information shortcuts
- **Data/Methods:** aggregate data across all published surveys of policy preferences from 1935-1990, with a total pool of 10,000+ survey items (1,128 of which were identical across surveys, helping to avoid sampling error and wording effects); model opinion change (with significant change measured as ≥ 6 pp)

- **Findings:** collective opinion is relatively stable and slow to change, even if individual opinion is not
 - Shifts that do occur manifest in an understandable manner, reflecting current events and information
 - Temporal stability: in 58% of questions, there is no discernable change in public attitudes → collective preferences quite stable
 - ★ If there are changes, they are mostly gradual; abrupt changes seem to happen more for *foreign* policy issues; if there are reversals, often just shifting reference points
 - Collective opinion change: gradual social, economic, and technological trends (ones that noticeable and reported) alter the composition of the population, people’s understanding of the world
 - large changes from politically consequential shifts (e.g., civil rights, desegregation, abortion)
 - ★ Larger social, economic, technological trends have some unmediated impact but are often filtered through interpretations by experts, commentator, and public officials (who are themselves influences organized interests, corporations, mass movements), as reported in the mass media (shapes both awareness and interpretation of events as agenda-setter, helps individuals connect events to values/beliefs).
 - ★ Sources of information matter: credibility determines whether public accepts a source’s interpretation and change views accordingly
 - ★ Notable patterns: (1) social issue opinions have slowly liberalized, become more tolerant, more egalitarian over time; (2) economic opinions relatively stable 1930-1980s and changes reflect reality (e.g., inflation, oil crisis); (3) foreign policy opinions relatively stable, but when they change, do so rapidly because of specific events
 - Parallel publics: although different groups of people changes in these opinions are parallel; rates and magnitudes of changes very similar; people tend to respond in perceived group interests, not just individual self-interest.
 - Opinion may be manipulated by elites – particularly prevalent in foreign affairs, where the executive branch has a monopoly on information.
 - ★ Focuses on *misleading* the public (providing incorrect, biased, selected information – because formal schooling might not provide relevant political info, look at educating the public through mass media. Given that experts/officials and politicians share info that is oversimplified or limited, social movements try to draw attention to certain problems, market forces ultimately result in American public being exposed to misleading information
 - ★ Despite the fact that info available overwhelmingly false, misleading, or biased (though still good, useful, and educational), public still able to make rational calculation about public policy alternatives, “surprisingly resistant to being fooled”
- **Critiques:**
 - Work like that of Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995, Wlezien 1995 suggests a “public mood” and where collective opinion changes undergo snapbacks → voters can be capricious
 - Errors in voting don’t cancel – when voters are mislead, others likely are too (Bartels 1996)
 - Overlooks fact that attitude strength depends on attitude’s nature (extremeity), accessibility, personal importance, salience or connection to relevant experiences, and repeated exposure repeatedly to same information such as due to continuous media coverage → macro studies likely over-state the extent of stability due to relying on publicly available data that over-represent issues that receive substantial media coverage and on which individuals possess strong opinions (Druckman and Leeper 2012)

- Since the political elite can manipulate the collective public, it is questionable whether the public’s ignorance plays a role in their susceptibility – might be that they appear collectively rational due to elite cue-taking (would follow Bartels’ 1996 and Lupia’s argument that cue-taking can close the gap between informed and uninformed).
- Insistence on identically worded questions suggests public opinion can be substantially different given changes in question wording; doesn’t seem rational
- **Relevant Literature:** body of literature focused on the ignorance/inattention of citizens (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Achen and Bartels 2016, etc.); similar to the micro-level work of Popkin (1991), Lupia and McCubbins (1998) finding voters are capable of complex, rational judgements given limited information available

Larry M. Bartels. 1996. “Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections.” *American Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 1 (February): 194

- **Key Takeaway:** Previous work suggested that cues, informational shortcuts, and statistical aggregation can allow uninformed citizens (individual or as a group) to act as if they are fully informed. Bartels says this would suggest deviations from being fully informed roughly cancel out – this is not the case.
- **Argument:** cues/information shortcuts, statistical aggregation do not lead uninformed electorate’s to approximate those of a fully informed, rational electorate – argues that psychological/social processes that create voting “errors” are likely *correlated* (e.g., a rhetoric that dupes one voter, likely gets others in same direction). This would not be the case if— following Condorcet (1785)’s “jury theorem”—voting errors were “truly” random, independent across voters
- **Data/Methods:** impute hypothetical vote choices for presidential candidates under full information based on social and demographic characteristics, via NES
- **Findings:** individual votes deviate from fully informed votes by ≈ 10 pp, and these deviations are not wholly eliminated through aggregation – aggregate deviations are about $\frac{1}{3}$ as big, but systematically favor incumbents and Democrats). Low-info voters (who do vote differently than high-info voters, but are otherwise similar) do “significantly better than they would by chance, [they do] significantly less well than they would with complete information”
- **Critiques:** single operationalization of voter information (using NES interviewer ratings of whether respondents have “very high“ \rightarrow “very low“ general information about politics/public affairs; as opposed to political knowledge tests, measures of consistency across attitudes, etc.), with minimal theorizing about link between information and people’s “true” preferences
- **Related literature:**
 - Voter information: as in Campbell et al. 1960, Converse 1964, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and MacPhee 1954, electorate assumed to know very little about politics, though effects of information may differ by demographic traits, based on whether issues are “easy” or “hard,” a la Carmines and Stimson 1980
 - Pierce (2014) suggests imputation model requires two assumptions likely not met: (1) respondents arrive at preferences from info they receive, (2) preferences of low-informed will be corrected when get new info – overlooks fact that attitudes shaped by personality, values, psychological disposition (omitted variable bias)

- Fowler and Margolis (2014): when uninformed citizens receive political information, they systematically shift their political preferences toward the Democrats; lack of policy knowledge hinders the ability of low-socioeconomic-status citizens to translate their preferences into partisan opinions and vote choices

Robert S. Erikson, Michael B. Mackuen, and James A. Stimson. 2001. *The Macro Polity*. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, January

- **Key Takeaway:** Among the *electorate* (macro-polity), as opposed to individual voters (micro-polity), shifts are orderly and responsive to real political events. These shifts are largely driven by the informed part of the electorate. Places a focus on *macropartisanship* (national division of Ds and Rs) and *public mood*, showing that demand for liberal/conservative policies vary over time (and predictably responds to conditions) and translates into relative macropartisanship.
- **Argument:** macro-level analyses often differ from micro-level because (1) larger N reduces variance; (2) when electorate changes in aggregate, it's the informed who shift; and (3) small micro-level changes can appear large in the aggregate. Because aggregate movement is driven by the informed, movement is orderly and responsive to real political events.
 - What are apparently random choices of uninformed voters “cancel out” in the aggregate → more informed, thoughtful, and attentive citizens contribute disproportionately to aggregate movement
 - No variation in *uninformed* voters – random answers produce flat lines over time, not affected by changes, so all randomness results yields a constant effect. There is variation, however, in *informed* voters which drives changes in collective public opinion
- **Data/Methods:** Panel methods using economic performance (consumer sentiment) and content of existing policies as independent variables; presidential approval, public mood, and balance of partisanship as dependent variables
- **Findings:** voters are “bankers,” not “peasants” → individuals learn info about nation’s probable economic future and respond accordingly (i.e., they are prospective, not retrospective); form expectations and evaluations using rational expectations, weighting past performance and available information
 - Largely because individuals can get a sense of economic conditions with little cost
 - While individual partisanship is relatively stable, aggregate partisanship (macropartisanship) varies systematically over time, responds to presidential approval and public evaluations of the economy → importantly, these changes are from shifts in allegiances, not generational replacement
 - ★ Notably while shifts in approval are stationary series (i.e., shortlasting, not predictive), shifts in macropartisanship are long lasting (i.e., collective partisanship is a function of past events) though random walks (one cannot forecast direction of change from current levels)
 - Public mood also shows considerable movement and move opposite party of POTUS (wins office when mood benefits them, as their agenda is enacted, demand for their agenda decreases)
 - ★ Macropartisanship and public mood really aren’t correlated over time → likely because macropartisanship is driven by performance while mood driven by policy (favoring out party when demand for president’s legislation wanes)
 - Preview for collective representation: shifts in public mood do correspond to policy changes (but impact is delayed since mood precedes elections which shift balance of power in government)

- **Critiques:** hard pressed to say voters are actually changing partisan identification, resulting in changes in macropartisanship given work of Green et al. (2002); there is a larger back and forth between Erikson et al. and Green et al. about whether including president-dummies inflates macropartisanship shifts (though probably important to account for POTUS-level variation)
- **Relevant Literature:** work related public mood and thermostatic models of public opinion (Stimson et al. 1995, Wlezien 1995); rationality of voters in the aggregate (Page and Shapiro 1992); stability of partisanship (Green et al. 2002)

James A. Stimson. 2004. *Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics*. Second edition. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Argues that opinion flows (patterns of opinion change), not stability demonstrate an attentive and engaged public. Suggests that aggregate public opinion can be represented as a “policy mood,” relative to a dynamic reference point.
- **Argument:** aggregate public opinion will change in response to different events; even if only a small number of citizens pay attention, their attitude change will have spillover effects to other members of the public
 - Attitude change: change happens around the margins, led by those who pay some attention to politics and move in a systematic way. Three key groups:
 - ★ Passionate: highly attentive, ideological, and engaged – but have fixed opinions about what gov’t should do, therefore least likely to change
 - ★ Scorekeepers: are politically engaged enough to keep track of government performance and adjust their views
 - ★ Uninvolved: inattentive, non-ideological, with little systematic change in opinions due to a lack of “receipt” of new information
 - Opinion dynamics:
 - ★ Aggregation: when sum up patterns of responses, random responses cancel each other out, such that opinion change reflects cumulative movement in a single direction
 - ★ Opinion leadership: just a few people paying attention can increase the structure/orderliness of public opinion
 - Thermostatic model: following Wlezien (1995), people don’t have concrete policy preferences but identify when want more/less of
- **Data/Methods:** survey data from 1956-2000, including the ANES
- **Findings:** “one plus” dimensions structure attitudes of voters – one ideological dimension, plus one dimension containing issues that haven’t yet been sorted
 - Many issues cluster together, even across disparate domains, despite no logical reason for a connection (“issue bundles”)
 - Short-term change: presidential campaigns matter, as induce people to pay attention to politics → period of “intense political learning”
 - Long-term change: aggregate public opinion as relative to current government activity, with policy changes gradually occurring due to shifts in public opinion
 - ★ When new issues arise that don’t fit within dominant party cleavages, they eventually become incorporated into existing system

- Generally, there is a “public mood” – public opinion is responsive (thermostatic) to what government is doing in the moment (e.g., opinion moves against the party in the White House → makes sense b/c POTUS elected when mood favors them, they enact their agenda, and demand for that agenda ↓)
 - ★ Creates an incentive for elites to be on the right side, not advocate positions that do not have majority public support
 - ★ Find this pattern in health care, environment, racial issues between 1960-1990s
- **Critiques:** The public mood view aims to identify an underlying construct that captures people’s general political predilections – this essentially assumes that public opinion falls on a single dimension. Even some of Stimson’s later work now thinks about economic vs. social issues
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Representation: government may be most responsive to the groups whose opinions change in common direction (not the most informed, whose opinions are stable, or the least informed, whose noisy opinion cancels out)
 - Political information: as in Zaller 1992, middle-information citizens are the most prone to attitudinal change – though Stimson adds an aggregate flair, noting that this means that collective shifts in public opinion reflect this group

Party Identification

Main Theories of Partisanship

Campbell et al. 1960

- **Key Takeaway:** *Michigan Model* of political behavior, arguing that most voters cast their ballots primarily on the basis of party ID, with Independents least involved in and attentive to politics, PID is a *perceptual screen*
- **Argument:** Party Party ID is the primary influence on voters perceptions of politics and their vote choice. Serves as a **perceptual screen**
 - Party identification: a stable psychological attachment to a political party, based on socialization by family and other social influences formed early in life. Stable, and tends to strengthen over time
 - ★ Voting and other forms of political participation only serve to reinforce party ID
 - Parties serve as suppliers of cues by which individuals may evaluate elements of politics and has influence across a range of issues
 - Funnel model: political socialization (esp. parents) → PID → attitudes → behavior
 - ★ PID serves as a **perceptual screen** through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to their partisan orientation
 - ★ PIT tends to influence attitudes toward politics and issues more than those attitudes shape PID
 - ★ There are limits to PID, elections are a “time for change”
 - Fluctuations in PID: two primary forces:
 - ★ **Personal forces**: Move individuals selectively and in uncorrelated ways (changes in social context, personal lives)
 - ★ **Social forces**: Move large portions of the population simultaneously, influence a lot of people in the say way and can produce substation realignments (Civil War, New Deal)
 - Issue voting: issues tend to have little impact on vote choice, and argue that issue voting requires three (necessary but not sufficient) conditions:
 - ★ **Familiarity**: must be aware of issue, have an opinion (“cognized”)
 - ★ **Intensity**: at least minimally care about an issue, tied to values
 - ★ **Perceived party differences**: know what the parties say about issues and perceive a difference between them
 - Unclear whether people will perceive some issues as partisan in the first place
 - People may not know the contents of the party platform but may infer from their own attitudes → little consensus
 - Ideology: Predates Converse (1964); ideological sophistication is not widespread in the public, but people can use other cues as if ideological
 - ★ **Levels of conceptualization**: tied to education, interest in politics
 - Ideologues (3.5% and near ideologues (12%)) some conception of abstract ideological dimensions, even if don’t explicitly invoke then
 - Ideology by proxy (45%): focus on short-term group interests
 - Nature of the times (23%): retrospect based on the “goodness” or “badness” of the times, connected to the party in power

- Non-issue voters (17.5%): focused on parties, candidates, or have no interest in politics at all
- **Data/Methods:** cross-sectional NES surveys from 1948, 1952, and 1956, based on interviews with voters
 - Based on *national survey samples* (versus case studies in Elmira, NY or Erie, OH, as in the Columbia model studies)
 - Measurement: measure party ID in terms of self-classification, instead of inferring from behavior (e.g., voting, evaluation of issues)
 - ★ Party ID as a continuum, with both strong and weak partisans
- **Findings:** Party ID accounts for much, but not all, of observed variation in political attitudes and behavior
 - Origins of PID: party ID of parents and kids matches more closely when at least one parent was politically active
 - Behavioral effects: partisan preferences are highly stable between elections, even with changes in candidates or in the nature of salient issues
 - ★ Strong party identifiers tend to be the ones who are most likely to vote for the same party across elections
 - ★ Monotonic shift in attitudes about national politics as move across five point PID scale (strong/weak partisans/ independents)
 - ★ Stronger sense of attachments to one of the parties → greater political involvement; Independents are less involved in/attentive to politics than others
 - Link to ideology: partisan consistency increases as move from lower to higher levels of typology of voters, but ideologies are less adherent to party than near-ideologues, given their attentiveness to changes in party politics
 - ★ People who pay less attention to politics contribute disproportionately to partisan change
- **Contributions/connections**
 - **Columbia model**: Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1948, 1954) focus on *sociological* vs. *psychological* context as primary influence on preferences and vote choice
 - ★ Although family is considered a primary force in voting decisions, voting patterns vary based on (homogeneity of) social context (**cross-pressures**)
 - ★ Focus on group membership (e.g., religion, workplace, social networks) as cause of vote switching
 - Two-step flow of communication from relatively attentive, well-informed “opinion leaders” to the public
 - ★ Similarities: : assume public (1) not knowledgeable about or interested in politics, (2) unaware of where gov’t stands on policy
 - ★ Differences: party ID less fixed in Columbia school, depending on social groups, whereas in Michigan school, party is a social group itself
 - Social forces condition voting/attitudes, as discuss politics with friends and families and adopt their views (esp. when in homogeneous env’t), in contrast to party ID “perceptual” screen through which interpret issues.
 - **Rochester Model**: economic/rational choice paradigm of issue voting (Downs 1957), focused on spatial models of electoral competition

- ★ Voters have unidimensional “ideology,” arrayed in common space.
- ★ Parties choose policies based on dist. of voters within this space.
- ★ Voters choose parties on the basis of ideological proximity.
- **Retrospection:** subset of RC school, where voters use retrospection as a short-cut to reduce the costs of voting
 - ★ Even uninformed citizens know what life has been like during the incumbent administration (Fiorina 1977/1981) and can use this as a shortcut for voting
- Critiques:
 - ★ **Voter rationality:** V.O. Key (1966) in Responsible Electorate argued that “voters are not fools,” – more rational than Campbell et al. assume
 - Even if party ID is central to voting, voters without a strong PID are those who are more likely to switch their votes (“switchers”)
 - ★ **Cross-sectional:** by just focusing on a particular period in time, just find a time when party ID was particularly strong. Not true in all time periods!
 - For instance, in the mid-1970s, there was a resurgence of an ideology- and issue-based focus

Morris P. Fiorina. 1981. *Retrospective voting in American national elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** party ID as a “running tally of retrospective evaluations of party promises and performance” (84), responsive to short-term forces but also anchored by past PID and socialization
- **Argument:** contrary to view of party ID as a stable attachment (Michigan model), panel studies show that party ID fluctuates over time (both 3- and 7-point)
 - Definition: party ID as the sum of *retrospective evaluations* and a factor representing *socialization influences*
 - ★ Difference between an individual’s past political experiences with the two parties, impacted by factor that represents effects not included directly in an individual’s political experience
 - ★ Explicitly political: over time, PID will more and more reflect political events (if initially outweighed by socialization factors)
 - ★ Mechanism for change: identification can continuously wax and wane as new evaluations form – compared to Michigan school where after certain cutpoint (step fcn), change affiliation
- **Data/Methods:** SRC Panel Study (1956-58-60) and CPS Panel Study (1972-74-76), both examining how retrospective evaluations predict partisanship
- **Findings:** “party ID responds to the recent performance of the party in power via a citizen’s formation of retrospective judgments” (96)
 - o However, in 1950s panel, party ID changed in response to general conditions (e.g., national security, economy), whereas in 1970s, in response to personal evaluations of politicians (e.g., pres. approval, views of Nixon)
 - Nevertheless, present party ID is strongly related to past party ID (“standing decision”); party ID is not just a summary of issue preferences
 - 7-point scale is not an equal interval scale, and categories are not invariant over time

- **Contributions/Related Literature** Response to Michigan school Michigan School and others who claim that party is a stable attachment; argues that party ID is more variable than previously thought
 - ADD CRITIQUE FROM ACHEN AND BARTELS
 - CAN PEOPLE ATTRIBUTE BLAME?

Donald P. Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. *Partisan hearts and minds: political parties and the social identities of voters*. Yale ISPS series. New Haven London: Yale University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Partisanship is a strong social identity, similar to religious or ethnic identity that persists or changes only very slowly over time
- **Argument:** Party ID is a *social identification* that involves comparing a judgement about oneself with one's perception of a social group. PID is stable, even with changes in party fortunes and assessments of party merits over time
 - Central Hypothesis: Partisan self-conceptions much more closely resemble ethnic or religious self-conceptions than they do evaluations of political leaders, opinions about party platforms, or vote intentions
 - ★ Evaluations of party capabilities are different from partisan identities → can assimilate new info about parties without changing who you root for
 - ★ Learning: partisanship may change as people acquire new information about the social imagery of the parties → no backlash effect
 - Public responds to political events, but the environment rarely changes enough to cause Democrats or Republicans to re-label themselves
 - Little evidence of biased learning – groups have different baselines but respond similarly to new info (e.g., economy, Watergate, Lewinsky)
 - ★ Party Change: party politics generally have little effect on PID, unless change stereotypes about which groups belong to which party.
 - Example: black Southerners → Democratic Party after VRA of 1965
 - Response to two views on PID: Revisionist interpretation and Biased learning hypothesis
 - ★ Revisionist: “Running tally” view of PID; Based on work such as Downs (1957) and Fiorina (1981); Achen (1992) builds on this and develops prospective model where PID is evaluations of what parties will do when in office
 - **Critique:** PID stability is only possible under very specific conditions: (1) parties never change (2) voters receive little new information about party performance
 - Find differences b/w PID and prospective performance evaluations – over time evaluations change but PID steady
 - ★ Biased learning: Based on “perceptual screen” introduced by Michigan School
 - **Critique:** Evaluate for multiple areas where this would matter (incumbent evaluations, debate performances, etc); find public opinion evolves but PID does not
- **Data/Methods:** combination of aggregate ,individual survey data across many years
 - Important to account for measurement error in standard PID questions
 - Stability: Measured as (1) *relative position* (location of individuals relative to population mean) (2) a *fixed point* how individual's location at any point compares to individual long-term average
 - ★ **Tethered partisans:** fluctuate around an equilibrium value, only straying if political environment favors one party, but return long-run

- ★ **Running Tally:** disturbances favoring one party accumulate, with no return to equilibrium
- **Findings:** reports of party ID are relatively stable across different measures/time, and people who belong to parties also tend to identify as members of these groups
 - Partisans are more engaged in politics than Independents, suggesting “real attachments to social groups” (46), undergirded by emotional attachment
 - Stability: PID is captured relatively consistently by multiple measures, which also align with measure of social identification. These identities tend to persist over time and are resistant to context effects
 - Stability: Partisan identities are largely stable or change slowly over time for reasons not directly connected to political events
 - ★ PID is largely unresponsive to changes in the environment
 - ★ Presidential evaluations do not seem to produce large and lasting changes in PID
 - Transmission: though there is a connection between child and parent PID, this influence fades over time as young people are exposed to other influences
 - ★ Contrary to religion, which is strongly transmitted intergenerationally
 - Voting: issue positions and party attachments as distinct factors affecting vote choice, as issue positions vary wildly within parties
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Similar to Campbell et al 1960, but builds on PID as psychological attachment and critiques “perceptual screen” – partisans can assimilate new information
 - Also response to PID as ‘running tally’
 - Linked to the literature on party “brands” (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2005); parties are motivated to sustain their brands, including group stereotypes

Shaun Bowler, Stephen P. Nicholson, and Gary M. Segura. 2006. “Earthquakes and Aftershocks: Race, Direct Democracy, and Partisan Change.” *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 1 (January): 146–159

- **Key Takeaway:** Ballot initiative can shape electoral agendas but also alter party allegiances
- **Argument:** CA ballot initiatives explicitly targeting Latino immigrants had strong racial and partisan dimensions and are “easy” issues, leading some Latinos and whites to shift PID
 - Latinos are often not socialized in the US following a michigan-style model. Latino PID is more explicitly political
 - Late entrance to political arena may be reflected in adopting the political sentiments of time of naturalization
 - Explicitly racial nature of initiatives expected to result in backlash among whites
- **Data/Methods:** Pool 23 CA polls from 1980-2002
 - **Outcome** self-reported PID (3-point scale)
 - Look at 3 ballot propositions
 -
- **Findings:** Partisan change among Latinos in CA accumulated across a series of contentious ballot propositions that targeted Latinos.

- Effects not limited to Latinos, long term consequence for white voters was a meaningful shift toward Democrats
 - **Contributions/Related Literature:** Racialized ballot initiatives can influence partisan identifications. PID is not just socialization and running tally, but can be endogenous to the issue advocacy of parties
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Independents

Bruce E. Keith, ed. 1992. *The Myth of the Independent voter*. Berkeley: University of California Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Independents are not a homogeneous bloc. Pure independents are very different from partisan leaners, who tend to be more partisan and engaged than self-reported weak partisans.
 - **Argument:** When measuring part identification, the classic two-part question includes a follow up probing self-reported independents on their partisan lean. Independent learners are not the same as pure independents. In fact, independent learners may be more partisan than weak partisans.
 - Pure independents are much less interested in politics and less informed compared to leaners. Leaners are more involved and interested in politics than weak partisans.
 - Pure independents show volatility in their vote patterns. Leaners, however, are often more loyal to their party than weak partisans. While leaners are not always more engaged than weak partisans, they are still distinct from pure independents and cannot be treated the same way.
 - Believe learners vote as they do because they are partisan, not neutral, about both parties. Evident due to voting patterns, participation in primaries, and attitude toward parties.
 - Little evidence that rise in partisanship is due to rejection of the political system
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Samara Klar and Yanna Krupnikov. 2016. *Independent politics: how American disdain for parties leads to political inaction*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Self-identifying as an independent is tied to voters' dislike for partisanship and desire to not be seen negatively by others → this leads to hiding PID
- **Argument:** People avoid partisanship when two conditions collide. First they want to make a positive impression on others (Self-monitoring). Next, when they believe that being partisan portrays a negative image. Confronted with negativity about partisan disagreement and concerned about the way others see them, they “go undercover”
 - Portrayal of independents of free thinkers (media) or undercover partisans (Keith et al 1994) are both wrong. Rather than political judgement, selecting independent on a survey can be motivated by a desire to avoid labels due to social values of independents
 - ★ People may have stable and consistent partisan identities and preferences but their willingness to express these identities can fluctuate
 - ★ Presence of independents tied to negative evaluations of partisans
 - People who misrepresent their partisanship do so because they believe that openly identifying as partisan will make a negative impression on others, importance of self-monitoring
 - ★ The more people are exposed to information that portrays partisans negatively, the more likely they will “go undercover”
 - ★ The higher people are in self-monitoring, the more likely they will go undercover

- ★ The motivation to avoid partisanship may lead people to go undercover when doing so can take on the form of identifying as an independent or avoiding political actions that are openly partisan

Political Socialization

Zoltan Hajnal and Taeku Lee. 2011. *Why Americans don't join the party: race, immigration, and the failure (of political parties) to engage the electorate*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press

- **Research Question:** Why do the pathways to partisanship or non-partisanship vary among whites, African Americans, and immigration-based groups such as Latinos and Asian Americans?
- **Argument:** Two central claims: (a) partisanship is defined by one's information, ideology and identity and that (b) these three factors interact in distinct ways for African Americans, immigration-based groups, and white Americans. The modal non-partisan in each group arrives at their non-partisanship in distinct ways
 - Build on the the Michigan School and Downsian models of partisanship. Argue that these models are ineffective in explaining partisanship among portions of the electorate.
 - **Michigan model:** Fails to explain how political socialization occurs when parents are immigrants and do not have prior partisanship. Also does not account for how PID may not be exclusive of other social group identities. Non-partisanship may also not just be the middle of a unidimensional scale
 - **Downs:** Cannot explain partisanship when people have little information about party positions. Also fails to account for situations where issues do not fit comfortably on the liberal/conservative spectre
 - **Key Argument:** Partisan choices of all racial and ethnic groups share three factors: the primary social identity and ideological commitments that individuals bring and the information environment that individuals negotiate in deciding whether to affiliate with a party and which party to affiliate with
 - ★ Ideology and identity are long term factors while information is a short term, running tally like factor
 - ★ **Information:** Not all newcomers to the US come with fully formed views on politics. Incomplete political socialization and unequal information can apply across generations. As a result, lack of PID may be a rationally adaptive strategy
 - ★ **Ideology:** Attention to the liberal-conservative dimension that divides parties and drives partisanship is uneven among racial minorities and immigrants
 - ★ **Identity:** One's primary political identity is often linked to one's primary social group identity
 - Whether we identify with a political party and, if so, which party we identify with is a function of our prior political dispositions—specifically our primary social group identities and ideological orientations. These political predispositions may be multiple and interactive. Predispositions may not be equally constant and durable across groups and circumstances
 - **Blacks:** Black partisan choices often do not fit neatly into the ideological divide of classic models. The relationship between ideology and PID is not linear. Race remains the central factor for black partisan decision-making. African Americans may differ from other groups not only in what determines their PID but in the structure of their choices. Rather than a uni-dimensional spectrum, AAs might have a multidimensional spectrum of partisan choices

- **Latinos and Asian Americans:** Partisan choice is a process of sequential choice: First, whether to think in terms of America's two party system or not. Second, whether to remain an Independent or align with either party. First have to decide if they possess a sufficient feel for the system and rules of engagement. If they do not, may choose to not identify. If they do, then they need to pick a party or Independent. For these groups, partisan choice is analogous to their incorporation into politics. **Whites:** White Americans identify as independents for a range of reasons that include ideological extremism and mixed or conflicting views.
- **Related Literature:** Extends classic theories of partisanship by Campbell et al (1960) and Downs (1957) to non-white groups in the US.
 - A recent study by (Hopkins, Kaiser, and Perez 2023) finds evidence of partisan stability among Latinos and Asian Americans between 2016-2018. Evidence of stabilized partisan IDs indicate there may be more partisan crystallization coinciding with polarization. On the other hand, may be due to these groups paying more attention to politics than previously thought.

Michele F. Margolis. 2018. *From politics to the pews: how partisanship and the political environment shape religious identity*. Chicago studies in American politics. Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press

- **Research Question:** What explanations account for the religious-political landscape in the US? Does religion push voters in the direction of certain parties as is commonly assumed? Or might politics explain voters' levels of religiosity and commitment to religion?
- **Argument:**
 - Argues against the idea that religion, particularly the strength of religious affiliation and involvement in religious community, is itself impervious to politics. Instead, argues that partisan identities can profoundly shape identification with and engagement in the religious sphere
 - Distinct timing of religious and political socialization processes create a window during which partisanship can influence decisions related to religion. Partisan identities typically crystallize in adolescence and early adulthood, which is the time when many people have distance themselves from religion. As young people reach adulthood, they then decide whether and how involved they want to be in a religious community. At this juncture, partisan identity, which has already solidified for many, can shape religious identities.
 - Because religious identification and practices are often stable after these initial decisions are made, partisanship's impact on religious decisions can persist for decades
- **Data/Methods:** Survey data
- **Findings:**
 - Involvement in a religious community is strongly associated with partisan identity with Dems less likely to be involved and GOP more likely to be involved. This gap appears across religious traditions and is relatively new
- **Relevant Literature:** This argument is tied to both the partisanship literature along with the identity and politics literature. In terms of partisanship, it pushes back against traditional theories of political socialization where religion is assumed to be antecedent to partisanship. In terms of identity, it highlights how identity, in this case religion, can be treated as an outcome and influenced by partisanship.

Roberto F. Carlos. 2021. "The Politics of the Mundane." *American Political Science Review* 115, no. 3 (August): 775–789

- **Research Question:** What roles do social class and immigration status play in the political socialization process?
 - **Argument:**
 - Children of Latino immigrants develop the non-cognitive skills associated with higher rates of participation when they are tasked with taking on "adult" responsibilities on behalf of their households. These "mundane" experiences help lower the costs associated with political participation despite the lack of traditional resources said to play a role in political engagement
 - "Adult responsibilities" measured as "language brokering"
 - **Data/Methods:** Two cross sectional surveys and a 10-year longitudinal study of Latinos. Examine second-generation Latinos because they are less likely to have access to the parental resources considered essential for participation by resource based theories
 - **Related Literature** Response to traditional resource-based theories of political participation and socialization such as Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995).
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Partisanship and Economic Evaluations

Larry M. Bartels. 2002. "Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions." *Political Behavior* 24 (2): 117–150

- **Key Takeaway:** PID is more than a running tally and partisan biases shape perceptions of politics and economics among partisans
- **Argument:**
 - Gerber and Green argue that Bayesian learning implies "new information moves people with different partisan affinities in the same direction" → empirical evidence of parallel opinion shifts among partisans would count in support of hypothesis that info processing is unaffected by partisan biases
 - ★ Argue that it is difficult to produce parallel opinion shifts *unless* partisan bias is built into different groups' selection or interpretation of political information → empirical evidence of parallel opinion shifts should be counted *against* unbiased information processing
 - ★ Pattern of opinion change suggested by Bayesian model is one of converging opinion among people with different prior views; strength of convergence depends on weight of new info → it is *failure* to converge that requires explanation
- **Data/Methods:** Panel data
- **Findings:** Partisan loyalties have pervasive effects on perceptions of the political world; in some cases partisan biases produce divergences in the views of Republicans and Democrats over time
 - More often, partisan biases inhibit what would otherwise be a strong tendency toward a convergence in political views in response to shared political experience
 - Partisanship is not just running tally of political assessments → pervasive force shaping citizens' perceptions of and reactions to the political world

- Validates emphasis of PID as “enduring partisans commitments in shaping attitudes toward political objects” (Campbell et al 1960)

- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Response to conceptualization of PID as a running tally

Alan S. Gerber and Gregory A. Huber. 2009. “Partisanship and Economic Behavior: Do Partisan Differences in Economic Forecasts Predict Real Economic Behavior?” *American Political Science Review* 103, no. 3 (August): 407–426

- **Research Question:** Do partisan differences in perceptions of current and future economic performance translate to *real world* spending behavior?
- **Argument:** Partisan differences in economic evaluations should predicted differences in individual economic behavior and spending
 - Previous work relies on survey evidence confirming the role of partisanship in influencing economic perceptions. But does this translate *outside* of the survey context? Do these differences in perception lead to different behavior or are they a survey artifact?
 - Present a model of how partisan expectations lead to different consumption patterns: (1) local consumption will increase more after an election when local partisanship and post-election partisan control of the presidency align than when they are in conflict and (2) changes in consumption will occur immediately after the election
 - Two assumptions: (1) partisans believe their income will be higher when their party holds the presidency and (2) consumption is based on expected lifetime income
- **Data/Methods:** Merged information about local sales with local political and demographic information in 26 states for different periods.
 - **IV:** Local partisanship via Democratic share of two-party presidential vote interacted with presidential winner
 - **Outcome:** Changes in taxable sales - logged taxable sales in 1st quarter post-election, divided by sales in the 3rd quarter of the previous, pre-election year
- **Findings:** Changes in actual consumer spending following a presidential elections is correlated with a county’s partisan composition.
 - These changes begin immediately – there is no difference in consumption in the 1st vs 3rd quarter of the post-election year
 - The relationship between partisanship and economic expectations is only partially explained by different distributional assumptions related to demographics
- **Contribution:** Partisanship affects behaviors outside of realm of politics
 - Support for Michigan School’s argument about partisanship being a “perceptual screen”
 - Citizens respond quickly to political events and alter their consumption behavior in anticipation of policy and economic changes they expect to occur – alter behavior in anticipation of events that may occur

Martin Bisgaard. 2015. “Bias Will Find a Way: Economic Perceptions, Attributions of Blame, and Partisan-Motivated Reasoning during Crisis.” *The Journal of Politics* 77, no. 3 (July): 849–860

- **Research Question:** Are there limits to partisan rationalizations of government performance/economic evaluations?
 - **Argument:** Citizen perceptions of the national economy are related to whether their favored party is in office → partisan disagreement stems from an individual's motivation to make real-world conditions reflect well on their own part. But what happens when people are confronted with undeniable reality? Two predictions:
 1. Party identifiers are expected to formulate more optimistic perceptions of the national economy if they identify with the opposition
 2. Partisans of different stripes are expected to converge in how they perceive national economic conditions when the real economy has clearly changed
 3. While a clear economic change will cause convergence in how partisans evaluate the state of the economy, it will conversely lead partisans to polarize in their attributions of responsibility
 - **Data/Methods:** Panel survey data from 2004-2010 in the UK
 - **Findings:** Partisans tend to change their perceptions of the strength of the economy based on who is in power (i.e. more likely to say the economy is bad when the other party is in power), perceptions of the economy will converge when economic conditions get objectively bad. At that point, perceptions of responsibility will diverge—with partisans aligned with the government blaming outside forces, while partisans not aligned with the government blaming the government.
 - **Contribution:** Additional evidence that partisanship serves as a “perceptual screen” (see Campbell et al (1960), Bartels (2002), but there are limits. Even then, attribution of blame is still polarized.
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Polarization

Mass and Elite Polarization

Alan I. Abramowitz and Kyle L. Saunders. 2008. "Is Polarization a Myth?" *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 2 (April): 542–555

Adding the Abramowitz vs Fiorina back and forth for context. It's probably a bit dated now, but thought it would be useful to still include.

- **Key Takeaway:** Mass ideological polarization has increased since the 1970s, with large differences between parties and by religion
- **Argument:** Rebuttal of five claims made by Fiorina et al (2006):
 - **Moderation:** public is moderate (closely, but not deeply divided)
 - **Partisan polarization:** differences between Democrats, Republicans are only slightly greater than in the past (mostly contained to elites/activists)
 - **Geographic polarization:** only small cultural differences between red/blue states
 - **Social cleavages:** economic divisions more predictive of PID, voting behavior than social characteristics
 - **Participation:** elite polarization turns off voters and depresses turnout
- **Data/Methods:** data from ANES and national exit polls which test whether ideological polarization within the American public is a myth
 - Moderation: create indices of liberal/conservative positions based on responses to multiple survey items
 - Partisan polarization: correlation between ideology and PID
 - Geographic polarization: compare red and blue states based on vote margins, competitiveness, and social/political attitudes (exit polls)
 - Religious polarization: national exit poll, look at freq. of religious observance
- **Main findings:** large differences in opinion between Dems/GOP, red/blue state voters, and religious/secular voters
 - Moderation: increase in polarization since the 1980s, particularly among better educated, more politically engaged
 - Partisan polarization: increase in correlation between PID, ideology since the 1970s – again larger increase for more engaged citizens
 - ★ Correlations between PID and issue positions have also increased over time
 - Geographic polarization: red states redder, blue states bluer, and there are large differences in social characteristics/political attitudes of these voters
 - Religious polarization: biggest difference between red/blue states relates to religion and religiosity
 - ★ Religiosity highly correlated with *political attitudes*, more correlated with *vote choice* than economic variables
 - Participation: polarization energizes the electorate, increased engagement/turnout
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Response to Fiorina et al's argument raising skepticism about the rise in mass polarization, rather than just sorting. Similar logic to Converse (1964) who views the public as uninformed and non-ideological.

- Following Broockman, is this evidence of polarization of constraint?

Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel A. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope. 2008. “Polarization in the American Public: Misconceptions and Misreadings.” *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 2 (April): 556–560

Summary of *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America*: voters only appear polarized (link between voting and party ID) because the political arena primarily offers polarized choices. Voter preferences remain moderate, have not moved farther apart over time – even on salient, moral issues – and are increasingly tolerant of political differences.

- **Key takeaway:** Response to Abramowitz and Saunders (2008)
- **Argument:** vote reports, election returns, and approval ratings cannot be used as evidence of polarization as centrist voters can register polarized *choices* even without holding polarized *preferences*
 - Moderation: using same issue items, only find evidence of polarization in one place
 - Party polarization: party sorting has occurred, but there seems to be variation issue-by-issue (with parties not so far apart even on moral/cultural issues)
 - Geographic polarization: if geographically sorted, should see increasing convergence between presidential and other forms of voting
 - Religious polarization: other studies find that economic factors remain more important in voting than religion

Morris P. Fiorina and Samuel J. Abrams. 2008. “Political Polarization in the American Public.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (June): 563–588

- **Key Takeaway:** review of literature on mass polarization, arguing that elite polarization has not led to mass polarization
- **Argument:** beginning in early 1990s, popular conception of mass polarization (culture war narrative) was based on little empirical evidence
 - Definition: polarization marked by bimodal distribution, where two modes lie at the extremes rather than near the center of the distribution
 - ★ In addition, trends in polarization involve moves from the center towards the extremes (easier to judge trends than levels)
- **Data/Methods:** five types of evidence
 - Sociocultural differences: assumption that social differences between parties translate to differences in issue positions, but this evidence is weak with correlations varying over time
 - Differing worldviews: assumption that parties divided along moral lines, but don’t find polarization even on highly moralized issues (eg abortion, gay rights)
 - Opposing positions: no aggregate change in distribution of ideological self-placement
 - ★ Also examine policy views across a number of dimensions and find polarization on only one issues: guaranteed jobs/standard of living
 - ★ While less people select the middle of the scale, this is not because people are moving to both extremes (some evidence of right or leftward shifts)
 - Polarized choices: *vote* polarization (as evidence by link between party ID and vote choice) is not evidence of *voter* polarization – depends on candidates too

- Geography: more homogeneous communities, evidenced by spatial polarization of PID, ideology
 - byt voting has always been geographically oriented
- **Main Findings:** conflation of changing relationships within subgroups (sorting) with a changing distribution (polarization)
 - Issue polarization: citizens' issue positions show little to no indication of increased polarization over the past several decades
 - Partisan sorting: clearer evidence of partisan sorting, as evidenced by an increasing correlation between policy views and partisan identification
 - ★ Parties have become better sorted on moral and cultural issues, likely due to homogenization of elites/party activists, who then cued the public
 - Geographic polarization: open question about whether like-minded people tend to cluster together geographically

Marc J. Hetherington. 2009. "Review Article: Putting Polarization in Perspective." *British Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 2 (April): 413–448

- **Research Question:** Is polarization an elite or mass phenomenon?
- **Argument:** On issues, evidence that elites are polarized but not the masses. Elites are not punished for polarization because partisan cues override the public's desire for moderate politicians
 - Elites: though elites are not clustered at the poles, GOP and Dems have totally separate distribution of DW-Nominate scores
 - ★ Distance between mean GOP and Dem in the house has grown over time, but is comparable to the late 19th century
 - ★ **Non-institutional causes:** changes in party preferences explained by replacement versus adaptation (sorting after VRA → increasing intra-party homogeneity)
 - Other factors: income inequality, as GOP moved to the right on issues like redistribution without getting pushback from most voters
 - ★ **Institutional causes:** revitalized party caucuses, strengthened whips, majority party leaders with resources
 - **Mass:** little evidence of *popular* polarization, defined as movement toward the poles of a distribution
 - ★ Important to capture *salience* as this may deepen divisions even if absolute distance is small
 - ★ **Partisan sorting:** if just focus on distance between average GOP and Dem, without requiring clustering, clear evidence of sorting → intra-party homogeneity, inter-party divergence
 - ★ **Causes:** (1) *elite polarization* driving sorting of electorate (2) more adversarial *mass media*
 - ★ **Consequences:** partisan sorting has led to increased importance of partisanship and has potentially allowed elites to polarize further without concerns about electoral sanctioning
- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Similar to Fiorina et al (2008), argue that mass polarization is less prevalent than some argue, instead there is more sorting. Pushes back against narrative of polarization. Does not account for *social identity* component of polarization (see Iyengar et al (2012) and how it may be separate from issue-based polarization (Mason 2015))

Matthew Levendusky. 2010. *The partisan sort: how liberals became Democrats and conservatives became Republicans*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Voters have become more sorted through an elite-led process in which ideology aligns with PID
- **Argument:** Party ID and ideology are more aligned than they were a generation ago and party voting has increased → these changes are driven by increasing elite polarization
 - Elite level shifts clarify partisan cues → voters use these clearer cues to align their partisan and ideological beliefs. Note: while sorting can lead to more polarization, sorted does not equal polarized
 - Levendusky sits somewhere between Fiorina and Abramowitz
 - Elite polarization has transformed voters, but not by increasing mass polarization, instead elite polarization caused voters to adopt the ideological outlook of their same-party elites through **sorting**, an **elite-driven** process that has two primary sources
 1. **Conversion:** existing voters aligning their partisanship and ideology with one another
 2. **Replacement:** newer voters more likely to enter the electorate already sorted
 - Elites polarize → party/ideology mapping clarified → ordinary voters see the clarification → voters sort
 - ★ Voters learn about party positions through the media, campaigns
- **Findings:** Find that the American public is more ideologically *sorted*, but the majority of the electorate remain closer to the center of the ideological distribution. There has been a decline in centrist voters, however, they have not become extremists.
 - Finds that voters tend to shift their *ideology* to align with their PID → largely a **party-driven** phenomenon
 - Sorting can lead to more party loyalty, decline in affective evaluations of out-partisans, greater ideological consistency on issues
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Clear ties to future work on affective polarization. Notes how sorting is a *elite-led* process, specifically noting how people shift their *ideology* to align with their *PID*, not the other way around.

Matthew H. Graham and Milan W. Svolik. 2020. “Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States.” *American Political Science Review* 114, no. 2 (May): 392–409

- **Research Question:** Is support for democracy in the US robust enough to deter undemocratic behavior by elected politicians?
- **Argument:** Democracy may be “self-enforcing” when politicians anticipate that, were they to behave undemocratic, their own supporters would punish them by voting for a competitor in large enough numbers so they lose
 - In polarized societies, this check may fail, even among voters who value democracy for its own sake → voters may put partisan ends above democratic principles
- **Data/Methods:** Experimental and observational components.
 - **Candidate choice experiment:** Infer Americans’ commitment to democratic principles from their choices of candidates in hypothetical election scenarios
 - **Natural experiment:** Leveraging 2017 MT election (Gianforte assault) as real world example of democratic norm violation

- **Findings:**

- Americans value democracy, but not by much. Candidate who considers adopting undemocratic position can be expected to be punished by losing only about 11.7 percent of vote share. Can drop to even 3.5 percent.
- Support for democracy is highly elastic. When the price of voting for a more democratic candidate is policy distance, even most centrist voters tolerate at most 10-15 percent increase in distance
- Centrists are a pro-democratic force. More likely to punish undemocratic behavior than “extremist” voters
- Most voters are partisans first and democrats second. Only 13.1 percent of respondents willing to defect from co-partisan for violating democratic principles
- Supporters of both parties employ a partisan “double standard”. More willing to punish opposing party
- Platform polarization is bad for democracy. Greater differences between policy platforms, weaker punishment for undemocratic behavior
- Sensitivity to the menu of manipulation varies. Voters most punishing of undemocratic positions that undermine free press and rule of law. Less punishing on restrictions on the freedom of assembly and executive aggrandizement
- Americans have a solid understanding of what democracy is and is not

- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Emphasizes the fragility of American democracy due to growing partisan polarization. While the public does serve as a check against undemocratic forces, it is a relatively weak check and voters are increasingly willing to forgo support for small-d democratic norms when it conflicts with partisan loyalty

Erik Peterson and Shanto Iyengar. 2021. “Partisan Gaps in Political Information and Information-Seeking Behavior: Motivated Reasoning or Cheerleading?” *American Journal of Political Science* 65, no. 1 (January): 133–147

- **One Sentence Summary:** Do partisan disagreements over politically relevant facts, and preferences for the information sources from which to obtain them, represent genuine differences of opinion or insincere cheerleading?
- **Argument:** assess two competing interpretations of polarized responses to information questions:
 - Motivated reasoning: partisan divides reflect genuine differences in factual beliefs. Partisans’ willingness to ignore or counterargue with credible facts that cast aspersions on their party, and to uncritically accept false information that reflects favorably on their side
 - Insincere partisan cheerleading: partisans knowingly distort their responses to survey questions to signal support for their side. Partisans are in fact well informed, but they prefer to act misinformed in surveys.
- **Data/Methods:** YouGov survey experiments with modified incentive design
 - Stage 1: randomize incentives for correctly answering political knowledge questions (for comparing the magnitude of the partisan divide in factual beliefs across the treatment conditions)
 - Stage 2: allow respondents to search for information before answering each question (to examine whether the availability of incentives changes individuals’ preferences for information sources)

- Stage 3: respondents answered the political information question and indicated how confident they were
 - **Findings:** find more support for motivated reasoning rather than the cheerleading interpretation of partisan divides in information and information-seeking behavior.
 - While incentives reduce partisan divides in information, substantial partisan gaps—on the order of 60 to 70% of the initial unincentivized divide—persist even when incentives are present
 - The provision of incentives has no bearing on information selection. Partisans seek out information from copartisan media sources to the same extent whether incentives are available or not.
 - The divides in information search we observe in the survey context mirror partisan divides in online news consumption registered by the same individuals outside the survey setting
 - **Critique:**
 - **Relevant Literature:**
 - Political knowledge: the distinction between the informed and the uninformed (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), systematic partisan bias in answers to factual questions (Bartels 2002, pessimistic view of Democrats about the Reagan presidency, despite significant economic improvements)
 - Motivated reasoning and misinformation:
 - ★ confirmatory bias and motivated skepticism that allow individuals to protect their identity from dissonant information
 - ★ cognitive consistency (Festinger 1957): selective exposure limits the public’s encounters with information at odds with their beliefs (Kim and Kim 2021)
 - ★ the adoption of party-congenial misinformation (Flynn, Nyhan, and Reifler 2017; Kraft, Lodge, and Taber 2015; Lodge and Taber 2013)
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Affective Polarization

Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2012. “Affect, Not Ideology.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76, no. 3 (September): 405–431

- **Key Takeaway:** Re-framing debate on mass polarization to be about social identity instead of issue positions. Growing polarization driven by growing social distance between partisans
- **Argument:** As opposed to policy or ideological based divisions, an alternative indicator is the extent to which partisans view each other as a disliked out-group (affect, not ideology)
 - SIT based argument → group membership triggers both positive in-group feelings and negative out-group feelings → reinforced by media-based campaigns
 - *Political campaigns* have become more antagonistic, visible over time (TV ads, news media coverage)
 - Builds on past debates over the extent of mass polarization in the US
 - ★ **Maximalists:** partisan views on policies have become more extreme over time
 - ★ **Minimalists:** majority of Americans are still centrist, with movement reflecting *partisan sorting*

- **Data/Methods:** Six national and cross national surveys (ANES, YouGov) between 1960-2010 to assess partisans' dislike of one another over time. Compares the US to UK, where party and class are strongly aligned (suggesting greater likelihood of party affect, since parties mirror multiple relevant cleavages)
 - **Measures:** partisan affect, social distance, party ID
 - ★ **Partisan affect:** feelings thermometer ratings of parties, partisans, and ideological groups
 - ★ **Social distance:** intermarriage, stereotyping of party supporters
 - ★ **Issue Positions:** based on a factor analysis of items
 - **Explanations:**
 - ★ **Spillover:** look at differences in thermometer ratings from sorted vs unsorted partisans, attitudes about social welfare and cultural issues
 - ★ **Campaigns:** look at battleground vs. non-battleground states, volume of attack ads, as well as panel data over course of campaign
 - ★ **Information environment:** selective exposure, access to one-sided information streams → congruence between priors, new information
- **Findings:** Partisan ratings of the opposing party have become more negative over time
 - **Partisan affect:** trends in in-group affect relatively stable, but steep downturn in thermometer ratings of out-group over time
 - ★ Number of "activists" defined by participation in campaigns has grown
 - ★ Partisan cleavage is larger than racial or religious divisions
 - **Social Distance:** between 1960-2008, growing negativity in US in terms of intermarriage, whereas trends in UK much smaller
 - ★ Similarly, in 1960, relatively minimal differences in in- vs. out-group stereotyping, which increases exponentially by 2008.
 - **Issue polarization:** no difference in affect for "sorted" vs. "unsorted" partisans. Moderate to weak effects of policy preferences on partisan affect
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** one of the earliest works on affective polarization, focused on the social distance between Democrats and Republicans as the driver of party differences (in contrast to issue polarization)

Shanto Iyengar et al. 2019. "The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States." *Annual Review of Political Science* 22, no. 1 (May): 129–146

- **Key Takeaway:** Review piece tracing origins of affective polarization to power of partisanship as a social identity
- **Argument:** Conceptualize polarization as rooted in affect and identity, contrasting from tradition of polarization as difference between policy positions
 - Partisanship is a salient and powerful identity because (1) acquired at young age and rarely changes over life cycle and (2) political campaigns recur frequently and last long
 - Measuring affective polarization:
 - ★ **Survey self-reports:** feeling thermometer, social distance measures – though issues with these (see Klar et al (2018), Levendusky and Malhotra (2016))
 - ★ **Implicit Measures:** IATs (see Iyengar and Westwood (2015))

- ★ **Behavioral Measures:** economic games, extensions to non-political settings (job apps) (see Iyengar and Westwood (2015))
- Origins and Causes:
 - ★ Greater partisan sorting (Levendusky (2010)) can lead to less exposure to out-partisan, facilitating misperceptions of outpartisans (see Levendusky and Malhotra (2016), Ahler and Sood (2018)) → decline in cross cutting identities is at root of affective polarization (Mason (2015))
 - ★ Ideological polarization may also still play a role
 - ★ High-choice media environment and rise of partisan news outlets, though evidence mixed due to who selects into partisan news and whether people actually have preferences for this type of news
 - ★ Partisan commentary and political campaigns may play role
- Consequences: may be wide and non-political: extend to romantic relationships, social relationships, economic behavior, perceptions of objective conditions, professional decisions
- Decreasing Affective Polarization: Correcting misperceptions of out-partisans may reduce animus, shifting salience of partisan identities

Shanto Iyengar and Sean J. Westwood. 2015. “Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization: FEAR AND LOATHING ACROSS PARTY LINES.” *American Journal of Political Science* 59, no. 3 (July): 690–707

- **Key Takeaway:** Affective polarization, measured using social identity, has increased and can potentially influence non-political inter-personal evaluations (ex. hiring)
- **Argument:** Unlike race, gender perceptions of members of the opposing party are not subject to the same social constraints/respectability norms → as a result partisanship influences decisions outside of politics
 - **Affective polarization:** the tendency of people identifying as GOP or Dem to view the opposing partisans negatively and co-partisans positively
 - Lack of egalitarian norms precluding explicit discrimination
 - ★ Parties are designed to be oppositional, normalizing hostile rhetoric
 - ★ Individuals choose PID, so may be held responsible for that choice
- **Data/Methods:** Four studies:
 - **Study 1:** Use IAT to see if partisan affect appears in an implicit measure. Then compare to race
 - **Study 2:** Assess behavioral implications of partisan affect outside politics using scholarship applications. Compare to race. Manipulate level of qualification
 - **Study 3:** Examine behavioral implications of out-group discrimination, when there are material consequences for such discrimination, using *trust* and *dictator* games
 - **Study 4:** attempt to separate in-group favoritism from out-group derogation by running same trust/dictator games, but with a control for no partisanship
- **Findings:**
 - **Study 1:** hostile findings for the opposing are ingrained/automatic in voters’ minds; see evidence of implicit partisan affect. IAT measures aligned with explicit measures with greater cognitive processing *increasing* polarization

- ★ Partisan polarization may *exceed* racial polarization
- **Study 2:** party cue exerted strongest impact on selection for most participants, with no significant effect of qualification
 - ★ Example: Democrats likely to select fellow Democrat, even when Republican more qualified
 - ★ Race manipulation showed much weaker effects. If anything, slight bias in favor of African-Americans when candidates equally qualified.
- **Study 3:** subjects allocated non-trivial amounts to other players (rather than maximize profits)
 - with particular generosity to co-partisans vs. co-ethnics
- **Study 4:** co-partisan bonus in both games, with opposing partisan penalty – partisanship acts as a signal of trustworthiness
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** documents prevalence of affective polarization not just in explicit survey measures but in implicit and behavioral cases – including cases outside the realm of politics

Lilliana Mason. 2015. ““I Disrespectfully Agree”: The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue Polarization.” *American Journal of Political Science* 59, no. 1 (January): 128–145

- **Key Takeaway:**
- **Argument:** Social polarization is increasing, driven by partisan and identity alignment, without requiring issue polarization. The decline in cross cutting social identities among the parties creates greater social distance between parties
 - Social polarization: the increasing social distance between Democrats and Republicans. This is made up of: increased partisan bias, increased emotional reactivity, and increased activism
 - ★ **Bias:** evaluate own party more positively, even if no logical difference
 - ★ **Activism:** more likely to take action on behalf of power
 - ★ **Anger:** react with stronger emotions in response to party status
 - In recent decades, sorting has brought our ideological and partisan identities into agreement, increasing the strength of those identities. As a result, fewer cross-pressured voters.
 - ★ People with cross-cutting identities tend to be more tolerant
 - ★ An increase in the strength and alignment of partisan and ideological identities does not require equivalent increase in the extremity of issue positions held
 - partisan-ideological sorting increases political bias, activism, and anger, even when issue positions are moderate
 - ★ Effect of sorting on social polarization is greater than its effect on issue proximity
- **Data/Methods:** ANES cumulative data (1972-2004)
 - Identity Strength: ideological and partisan strength
 - Sorting: absolute difference between 7-point party ID, ideology, multiplied by the identity strength scores to account for strength of identity in addition to alignment
 - Issue position extremity: index of six political issue items, available consistently from 1980-2004
 - Partisan bias: thermometer ratings, number of likes/dislikes mentioned
 - Anger: if report feeling anger at outgroup presidential candidate
 - Activism: count of number of activities engaged by a respondent

- **Findings:** Both identity strength and sorting affect thermometer ratings/like bias, activism, anger, while issue position extremity has minimal effect
 - Partisanship without strong ideological identity far less potent effect on these measures of in-group bias – need interaction of both
 - Based on matching, sorting can affect social polarization even when respondents agree completely on issue positions (thus, independent constructs)
- **Contributions/Related Lit:** Builds on theories of Party ID as a social identity (see Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002). Also expands on extent of affective polarization (see Iyengar et al (2012).
 - Dias and Lelkes (2021) provide additional evidence that affective polarization is driven by partisan identity not policy disagreement.
- **Critiques:** Mason uses individual-level issue position extremity to evaluate whether there is an issue component to this social polarization. Instead, should we look at *perceived* disagreement between parties? Or *perceptions* of out-group issue positions? In that case, issues might matter.

Lilliana Mason. 2018. *Uncivil agreement: how politics became our identity*. Chicago, Illinois ; London: The University of Chicago Press

- **Key Takeaway:**
- **Argument:**
 - Building on previous work on the growing alignment of social and partisan identities, this alignment can directly affect the degree of anger with which individuals respond to identity threats
 - ★ Anger and enthusiasm are natural reactions to group-based competition and threats that partisans face on a regular basis
 - ★ According to Intergroup Emotions Theory – strongly identified group members react with stronger emotions, particularly anger and enthusiasm, to group threats
 - Strong group identities and intergroup divisions facilitate increasingly angry and enthusiastic responses to group threats → anger and enthusiasm are primary drivers of political action and not drivers of thoughtful processing of information
- **Data/Methods:** ANES Panel Data and Experiments
- **Findings:**
 - Among people who become increasingly sorted between 1992 and 1996, they reported a 28 point increase in anger toward an out-group candidate NOTE: seems to be increase in anger across levels of sorting, but most sorted have highest level
 - Combination of strong partisanship AND lack of cross cutting identities is key – presence of cross cutting identities decreases anger among strong partisans
 - Using vignette experiment, find that strong partisans are significantly angrier than weak partisans when the party is threatened but not when policy success is threatened
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Explanation for growing animosity in politics today. Social polarization drives growing anger toward out-partisans. While not directly testing campaign context, some initial evidence for why a candidate like Trump may succeed even though he was very uncivil

Matthew S. Levendusky and Neil Malhotra. 2016. “(Mis)perceptions of Partisan Polarization in the American Public.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 80 (S1): 378–391

- **Key Takeaway:** Americans perceive more polarization with respect to policy issues than actually exists
- **Argument:** Argue for the existence of *false polarization* or people’s tendency to overestimate the degree of polarization between two groups.
 - False polarization is the difference between two quantities: (1) distance between perceived positions of Group A and Group B and (2) the distance between the *actual positions of these groups*
 - Mechanism behind this phenomenon is the psychology of classification - when people view themselves as part of groups and believe the identities are salience, perceived differences between groups are accentuated
- **Data/Methods:** Nationally representative survey
 - Ask about a series of issues (taxes, immigration, free trade, and public financing):
 - ★ Self placement on issue scale
 - ★ Placement of the typical Dem/GOP voters on scale
 - ★ Issues:
- **Findings:**
 - Perceived divide between Republicans and Democrats on every issues is larger than the actual divide. Averaging across issues on a normalized scale, perceived difference is 0.38, real difference is 0.18.
 - Perceive members of own party extreme, but members of the opposing party even more extreme
- **Contributions:** In a way, is tied to Mason’s (2015) argument about social sorting. Mis-perceptions about out-partisans can help perpetuate this sorting, facilitating greater affective polarization between groups.

Yphtach Lelkes and Sean J. Westwood. 2017. “The Limits of Partisan Prejudice.” *The Journal of Politics* 79, no. 2 (April): 485–501

- **Research Question:** Are there limits to partisan prejudice?
- **Argument:** While there is clear evidence that partisanship factors into the behavior of Americans in both political and nonpolitical situations, there are still limits—specifically when it comes to intentional harm.
 - Build on Allport’s (1954) framework of prejudice. There are three relevant levels: (1) promotion of negative speech (2) avoidance of out-group members and (3) actual discrimination
 - Distinguish between in-group favoritism and out-group hostility to disentangle effects of polarization
- **Data/Methods** Five experiments
 - **E1:** Respondents shown opinion piece, assigned Fox or MSNBC blaming parties for gridlock. Asked to endorse the article for inclusion on website
 - **E2 + 3:** Test partisan avoidance using a team formation tests

- **E4 + 5:** Test how partisan biases affect responses to the suppression of political demonstrations
 - key democratic norms. Also evaluate tolerance for political corruption
 - Measure affective polarization using difference in feeling thermometers between parties
- **Findings:** Affective polarization is prevalent, but there are limits. Despite growing partisan animosity and co-partisan favoritism, those most polarized are no more willing to discriminate against the opposition than those less polarized
 - **First Experiment:** As polarization increases, participants more willing to suppress rhetoric hostile to own party but not more willing to promote rhetoric that criticizes the out-party
 - **Second and Third:** Higher levels of affective polarization increase the avoidance of opposition partisans.
 - **Fourth and Fifth:** Affectively polarized partisans favor co-partisans even when such favoritism violates democratic norms. These co-partisan preferences are not mirrored by opposing partisan biases
- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Affective polarization is related to some prejudicial behavior, but is more about in-group love than out-group hate. As a result, affective polarization is nuanced tends to be more related to benefit co-partisans than intentionally harming out-partisans
 - Westwood et al. (2019) revisit the question following the 2016 election and find that despite a hostile political campaign, the limits on partisan prejudice remain in place.

Douglas J. Ahler and Gaurav Sood. 2018. “The Parties in Our Heads: Misperceptions about Party Composition and Their Consequences.” *The Journal of Politics* 80, no. 3 (July): 964–981

- **Key Takeaway:** People make large, systematic errors when judging partisan composition, considerably overestimating the extent to which partisans belong to party-stereotypical groups. These misperceptions then affect partisans’ beliefs about and feelings toward the parties.
- **Argument:** People tend to think about parties in terms of other, longer-standing groups. When picturing these “groups,” people tend to fixate on prototypical characteristics and ignore other relevant information such as the prevalence of those characteristics. This leads to “distorted distributions” of beliefs about group composition.
 - Three reasons for misperceptions: (1) political discussions through the mass media; (2) Most informed may be most likely to process information about parties in a schema-consistent manner; (3) partisan homophily and lack of exposure to out-groups

Data/Methods: Surveys

- For both parties, respondents estimated the percentage of supporters belonging to four party-stereotypical groups (rich/working class, race, religion, LGBT)
-
- **Findings:**
 - People’s perceptions of party composition contain large, systematic errors. People overestimate the share of party-stereotypical groups in the parties. Republicans may have more biased perceptions than Democrats.
 - ★ Perceptual bias about party composition increases with political interest
 - Robust to concerns over expressive responding, innumeracy, and ignorance of group base rates

- Overestimating shares of party-stereotypical groups is related to seeing the parties as ideologically sorted, can affect perceptions of where opposing-party supporters stand on the issues
- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Evidence of possible mechanism driving affective polarization related to Mason (2015). Misperceptions of groups can drive affect toward opposing parties. Note: effects are small, but still important.

Samara Klar, Yanna Krupnikov, and John Barry Ryan. 2018. “Affective Polarization or Partisan Disdain?” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 82, no. 2 (June): 379–390

- **Key Takeaway:** Widely used measure of affective polarization (marriage) likely overstates the amount of affective polarization by conflating it with partisan disdain
- **Argument:** Measure asking how people feel about their child marrying someone from the opposing party likely measures negative affect toward partisans from either side of the aisle and political discussion generally rather than affective polarization
 - Studies measuring affective polarization often measure two distinct concepts: (1) dislike for out-party; and (2) dislike for partisanship in general
 - To measure affective *polarization*, need to identify those who *dislike the out-party* and *like the in-party*. Only asking about out-party risks overestimating polarization
 - Common measures lack *informational equivalence* and some respondents will assume that partisanship is an important identity for the hypothetical child-in-law if the question only mentions partisanship in describing the individual
 - Measuring affective polarization in the context of a larger political survey can prime partisan considerations
- **Data/Methods:** Two survey experiments.
 - Asked classic social distance measure about child marrying out-partisan. Included additional information about level of political engagement. Also varied whether partisan prime was local or national.
- **Findings:**
 - Introducing information about level of political engagement influences baseline level of happiness around notion of their child marrying someone from out party (30% happy). Rarely talks politics drops unhappiness by 5 points, frequently increases it by 10 points
 - Big differences between strong and weak partisans – weak/leaners in the control are about 30 points less unhappy about partisan intermarriage than strong partisans
 - Most people do not care if their child marries someone from their own party – only 35% would be happy if this occurred
 - Across both waves of the survey, about 25 percent of respondents were affectively polarized – happier when their child married someone from in-party compared to out-party
 - ★ Looking at the *rarely* treatment important – if partisan gives polarized responses even when they know they will rarely have to engage in political discussing, then affective polarized. Only 15 percent of respondents are truly affective polarized
 - argue that measures of affective polarization often capture dislike for the partisan politics seen in news rather than citizens who are D or R

- **Contributions/Related Literature:** While affective polarization is real, some measures of affective polarization are likely inflated for two reasons: (1) Informational equivalence violated and people infer out-partisan is also highly engaged (2) people evaluate national partisans (see Druckman and Levendusky (2019))

James N Druckman and Matthew S Levendusky. 2019. “What Do We Measure When We Measure Affective Polarization?” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 83, no. 1 (May): 114–122

- **Research Question:** How are different polarization measurement strategies related? What do respondents think about when answering them?
- **Argument:** Popular affective polarization measures are not comparable: thermometers, trait ratings, and trust measures capture general attitudes about broad groups (parties), while social distance items capture attitudes about particular behavioral outcomes. Additionally, it is unclear whether respondents think of elites or citizens when responding to first set. **Data/Methods:** Survey data
-
- Measure polarization using the following measures:
 - Feeling thermometer
 - Traits that describe the opposing parties
 - Trust other parties
 - Social distance measures
- Experimental component to understand who respondents think about when answer questions about parties
- **Findings:**
 - All the items are strongly correlated except the social-distance items → supports idea that behavior outcome measures capture something else
 - Across all measures, respondents are more negative toward elites of the other party than they are toward voters (though not by much)
 - Respondents tend to think more about elites than voters when responding to affective polarization measures
- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Researchers need to be careful about how they measure affective polarization – group evaluations are different than behavioral outcomes. Additionally, evaluations of political *elites* are different than voters who are members of the out-party (see Levendusky and Malhotra (2016))

Nicholas Dias and Yphtach Lelkes. 2022. “The Nature of Affective Polarization: Disentangling Policy Disagreement from Partisan Identity.” *American Journal of Political Science* 66, no. 3 (July): 775–790

- **Research Question:** Does partisan identity or policy disagreement drive interparty animus?
- **Argument:** Policy preferences signal partisan identity when the parties’ stances on issues are well known. Partisan identity is the principal mechanism of affective polarization and preferences factor into affective polarization by signaling partisan identity
 - Party-Over-Policy Hypothesis: Introduced by Iyengar et al (2012), argues that affective polarization reflects the increasing salience of partisan identities, not growing policy disagreements

- Policy-Over-Party Hypothesis: Critique of observational equivalence is key–partisanship’s influence on interpersonal affect explained (confounded) by policy disagreement.
 - ★ Introducing policy preferences may erase the relationship between PID and affect because doing so controls for a *mediator*, not a confounder
 - ★ Because party-branded preferences give info into whether a person is loyal or disloyal partisan, controlling for these preferences amounts overcontrol bias
- Existing research struggles to disentangle because it relies on measures of policy preferences that strongly correlate with partisanship
- **Data/Methods**: Three Experiments. First experiment used to identify salience, non-party branded issues.
 - **Study 2 + 3**: Vignette experiments. Varied information about PID and policy positions.
 - ★ Partisan identity index measuring how important party is to social identity
 - ★ Outcome: measured affect using (1) feeling thermometer rating of vignette subject and (2) index of social closeness measures
- **Findings**: Relationship between partisanship and interpersonal affect is not confounded by policy disagreements. Rather, policy preferences drive affective polarization largely by signaling partisan identity.
 - Policy preferences only erase the effect of partisanship in interpersonal affect when preferences are party branded
 - Party branded preferences mediate the partisanship-affect relationship by signaling partisan identity and party disloyalty
- **Contributions/Related Literature**: Highlights how previous work on affective polarization likely overestimates the role of policy disagreement in driving polarization by relying on issues that signal partisan identity. Partisan identity is the principal mechanism of affective polarization, supporting arguments like Mason (2015)

David E. Broockman, Joshua L. Kalla, and Sean J. Westwood. 2022. “Does Affective Polarization Undermine Democratic Norms or Accountability? Maybe Not.” *American Journal of Political Science* (August): ajps.12719

- **Key Takeaway**: Affective polarization may have downstream effects on inter-personal relations, but less clear whether it actually influence political judgements related to Democratic norms
- **Argument**: We should not expect affective polarization to influence all judgements somewhat related to party, but principally those judgements where individuals do not have other, more relevant consideration. Additionally, there are trade offs – for abstract survey questions about inter personal topics, affective polarization may have an effect because there are no trade-offs. When it comes to political judgements, there are other considerations.
 - Theories of affect conceptualize it as representing an “overall summary evaluation”, collapsing judgement to a single dimension, but literature has not laid out strong argument for why. Two reasons to be skeptical
 - ★ When making judgements individuals use heuristics that are both easily accessible and as relevant to the judgement as possible, as a result partisan affect may not always be central determinant of survey response

- ★ It is costly for voters to allow affective polarization to influence judgements, often implies serious trade-offs that may not be captured in abstract questions

- **Data/Methods:** 4 surveys with total N=12,341

- Induced variations in affective polarization with a trust game. Affective polarization increased across multiple measures (feeling therm, social distance)
- Evaluate downstream effects of affective polarization across multiple outcomes:
 - ★ Apolitical interpersonal items (social distance measures)
 - ★ Political accountability through *divergence* (increase in party loyalty) and *desensitisation* (weakening responses to information about incumbent actions). Showed respondents congressional votes

- **Findings:**

- Increasing affective polarization has large downstream effects on general *interpersonal* questions
- Across political domains: electoral accountability, adopting one's party's policy positions, support for legislative bipartisanship, support for democratic norms, and perceptions of objective conditions causal effects of reducing affective polarization are consistently null

- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Pushes back on much of the affective polarization literature, arguing for more detailed model on *when* affective polarization might influence judgements. Additionally, use of large samples allows for precise estimates of null effects

Campaign Effects

Emotional Appeals

Ted Brader. 2005. "Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions." *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 2 (April): 388–405

- **One Sentence Summary:** Can politicians use campaigns to manipulate emotions and thereby cause changes in political behavior? Political ads motivate and persuade voters by appealing to emotions of enthusiasm or fear. Ads that ignite fear are better at persuading voters.
- **Argument/Theory:** Emotional appeals cause changes in how citizens respond to political messaging, in ways that can stimulate democratically desirable behavior (e.g., voting, reasoned choice). "Cueing emotions with images and music can dramatically influence responses to campaign ads" (389).
 - 1) Cueing enthusiasm motivates participation and activates existing loyalties; and (2) cueing fear stimulates vigilance, increases reliance on contemporary evaluations, and facilitates persuasion.
 - Theory based on affective intelligence: Marcus (2000)
 - ★ Dual system (disposition vs. surveillance // enthusiasm vs. fear)
 - ★ Anxious citizens → attentiveness, reasoned choice
 - ★ Enthusiastic citizens → relying on party predispositions and habits.
 - ★ Fear-based campaigns more effective at changing behavior if provide recipients with something to do to mitigate perceived danger (e.g., voting)
 - ★ Positive moods → top-down processing (existing beliefs/heuristics), whereas negative moods → bottom-up processing (systematic thinking)
 - ★ Enthusiasm appeals: (content/imagery linked to success/good times) will increase desire to participate and reinforce prior beliefs in candidate choice.
 - ★ Fear appeals (content/imagery associated with threat) will motivate search for information, decrease salience of prior beliefs, and motivate reconsideration of past evaluations.
- **Data/Methods:** Two experiments based on Democratic primary race for governor in Massachusetts in 1998
 - All subjects saw the same pre-recorded local news program, into which one of several campaign ads had been inserted.
 - Look solely at imagery and music, since verbal content can provide information beyond just the valenced components.
 - A relatively negative script serves as the baseline for testing the impact of fear cues, while a positive script serves as the baseline for testing the impact of enthusiasm cues. The enthusiasm and fear cues are induced with images and music.
 - DVs: motivation to get involved in campaign, attention/information-seeking, persuasion/candidate choice.
 - ★ Motivation linked to campaign interest and vote intention
 - ★ Vigilance linked to correct recall of ad, recall of related/unrelated news, and desire for new information (as well as scope- number of relevant issues selected)
 - ★ Persuasion linked to change in candidate preference (stable vs. preference toward ad sponsor), compare candidate choice to prior preferences.
- **Findings:**

- Enthusiasm results: expect to increase interest and vote intention but not vigilance or persuasion (rely on previous beliefs)
 - ★ Exposure to enthusiasm cues → higher vote intention, interest in campaign, but no sig. difference in vigilance. Candidate choice remains stable, with little effects of persuasion.
 - “Voters exposed to [enthusiastic] appeals show greater interest in the campaign, are more willing to vote, and rely more on pre-existing preferences to choose a candidate” (397).
 - ★ Compare to results from 2000 NES survey, which collects data on voting intentions and enthusiasm for candidates (with sets of controls) → enthusiasm predicts voting
- Fear results: expect to increase vigilance and persuasion
 - ★ Limited evidence that exposure to fear cues stimulates interest or voting
 - Evidence in support of hypotheses about vigilance is also mixed—all evidence relatively consistent, but only recall of related news reaches significance
 - ★ Relatively effective at persuasion: big differences between conditions in terms of persuading to choose the sponsor of the ads
- **Critique:**
 - How lasting are these impacts? See: Gerber et al. (2011)
 - How do competing cues interact? How do previous attitudes of viewers matter?
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - See affective intelligence lit: Marcus (2000)
 - Lau et al. 2007 meta-analysis show that negative ads are not effective: reduce support for the target, but they also reduce support for the attacker by at least as much

Kim Fridkin Kahn and Patrick J. Kenney. 1999. “Do Negative Campaigns Mobilize or Suppress Turnout? Clarifying the Relationship between Negativity and Participation.” *The American Political Science Review* 93 (4): 877–889

- **One Sentence Summary:** Negative campaigning can motivate turnout if it touches on relevant topics and is conducted in an appropriate way.
- **Argument:**
 - Risk averse voters might be drawn to turnout when campaigns highlight controversial policy positions, an incumbent’s inability to provide for constituents, and the personality flaws of opponents.
 - However, these messages must emphasize legitimate issues or relevant personality characteristics, and they must be delivered in a suitable manner OR ELSE voters may feel alienated and stay home. In fact, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) find that political attacks suppress turnout.
- **Data/Methods:**
 - 1990 NES Senate Election Study: Senate campaigns ideal because more cases than presidential elections
 - develop measures of tone to capture the negativity of information emanating from the candidates’ campaigns (content analysis of ads) and from press coverage (newspapers and content analysis),.

- identified mudslinging races by interviewing campaign managers, who were asked to characterize the opponent’s campaign as well as the media’s portrayal of both campaign

- **Findings:**

- people are more likely to vote as the proportion of negative information in the candidates’ ads increases and as the proportion of media criticism of the candidates escalate
- When managers perceive the opponent as a mudslinger and believe that the media are focusing excessively on mudslinging, turnout declines

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Goes against Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) that find that negative or attack advertising suppresses turnout as voters perceive both candidates to be undeserving of office.
- See also Mondak 2000

George E. Marcus and Michael B. MacKuen. 1993. “Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement During Presidential Campaigns.” *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (September): 672–685

- **One Sentence Summary:** Anxiety and enthusiasm play an important role during election campaigns. Enthusiasm increases turnout and anxiety increases learning.

- **Argument:**

- Anxiety, responding to threat and novelty, stimulates attention toward the campaign and political learning and discourages reliance on habitual cues for voting.
- Enthusiasm powerfully influences candidate preferences and stimulates interest and involvement in the campaign.
- people use emotions as tools for efficient information processing and thus enhance their abilities to engage in meaningful political deliberation.

- **Data/Methods:** Survey interviews about presidential candidates.

- **Relevant Literature:** Emotions do not prevent people from making rational voting decisions.
-

Televised Advertisement

Gregory A. Huber and Kevin Arceneaux. 2007. “Identifying the Persuasive Effects of Presidential Advertising.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 4 (October): 957–977

- **One Sentence Summary:** Presidential advertisements are persuasive but do not mobilize voters to turnout.

- **Argument:**

- previous observational studies have not documented the persuasive effects of political advertisements due to limitations of data and research design. Need to isolate fact that ads occur in competitive areas, other campaign strategies like GOTV, and are chosen by the campaign etc.
- In taking advantage of natural experiment find that presidential television advertisement slightly informs voters, are effective in persuading voters but do not increase turnout.

- **Data/Methods:** Natural experiment during 2000 presidential election
 - nonbattleground states, thereby breaking the link between political preferences and advertising and isolating the effects of campaign commercials from other campaign activities
 - “accidental” treatment during the 2000 campaign of some individuals in nonbattleground states to high levels of, or one-sided partisan streams of, presidential advertising simply because they lived in a media market adjoining a battleground state.
 - Data: Campaign Media Analysis Group’s (CMAG) record of ratings-adjusted advertising broadcast. Can see how many viewers of the show when ad ran. Measure of advertising exposure is then merged with individual-level survey data collected by the National Annenberg Election Survey
 - measure effects of advertising on changes in opinions and to examine the effects of changes in those opinions on candidate preference
- **Findings:**
 - Campaign ads have minimal effect on voter information level, only slightly increase information of really salient issues
 - But effect of campaign ads on candidate support and moderately aware individuals are most susceptible to advertising-induced opinion change (in line with Zaller 1992)
 - campaign ads do not increase turnout but persuade voters to vote for candidate

Alan S. Gerber et al. 2011. “How Large and Long-lasting Are the Persuasive Effects of Televised Campaign Ads? Results from a Randomized Field Experiment.” *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 1 (February): 135–150

- **One Sentence Summary:** Televised ads have strong but short lasting effects on vote choice which is consistent with models of priming rather than online-processing.
- **Argument:**
 - Given that campaign ad effects diminish through time but that they have immediate effect is in support of priming thesis as the ad alters the mix of considerations that are salient for the respondent at the moment that the respondent is asked to state their opinion.
 - The online-processing theory of Lodge and Taber (2013) would instead posit that opinion change occurs slowly.
 - Previous studies look at self-reported media exposure with voter opinions (e.g. Baum 2002), lab experiments that are hard to generalize to real world or fail to isolate fact that campaign ads may be televised in selected media markets.
- **Data/Methods:** Television and radio ads randomly deployed during 2006 gubernatorial race.
 - In addition, telephone interviews with 1000 registered voters each day and follow up 1 month after the end of the televised campaign.
- **Findings:**
 - maximum dosage of television advertising boosted Perry’s relative standing by approximately six percentage points.
 - radio ads had minimal effects, but maybe because there were less ads

- TV ads have an effect the week of, a smaller but significant effect the week after and are null after two weeks

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Goes against Columbia school Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1944) of minimal effects thesis.
- Support for priming (Iyengar and Kinder) over online-processing model (lodge and taber 2013).

John Sides, Lynn Vavreck, and Christopher Warshaw. 2022. “The Effect of Television Advertising in United States Elections.” *American Political Science Review* 116, no. 2 (May): 702–718

- **One Sentence Summary:** Televised broadcast campaign advertising are effective in persuading but not mobilizing voters with effects being larger in down-ballot elections than in presidential elections.

- **Argument:**

- Lit focuses mostly on presidential or House elections.
- Persuasion = changing views about candidates, and mobilization = encourage voters to turnout
- If advertising affects election outcomes mainly through persuasion at the individual level, it should have larger effects in down-ballot races than in presidential races. This is because voters know less and have weaker opinions about down-ballot candidates relative to presidential candidates.
- If advertising works mainly through mobilization, potentially altering the partisan composition of the electorate, voters’ decisions to stay home or turn out should affect all races on the ballot similarly

- **Data/Methods:**

- Examine the effects of broadcast television advertising on election outcomes in the five presidential elections from 2000 to 2018 and also in 331 US Senate elections, 226 gubernatorial elections, 3,859 US House elections, and 237 other state-level elections during this period.
- To address the possibility that campaigns may place ads in media markets where they expect to do well, employ time-series cross-sectional models with a difference-in-differences design and a border-discontinuity design.
- surveys of hundreds of thousands of voters across eight election cycles for vote choice and information results
- administrative data from six election cycles for turnout effects

- **Findings:**

- Apparent effect of an individual airing is two to four times larger in gubernatorial, US House, and US Senate elections and 10 to 19 times larger in other statewide races, compared with presidential elections.
- Priming proof: voters have less information and weaker opinions about the candidates in down-ballot races than about presidential candidates and that in these down-ballot races television advertising is more strongly associated with voters’ knowledge of the candidates, evaluations of the candidates, and ideological congruence with the candidates than it is in presidential races.
- Lack of mobilization proof: advertising is not consistently associated with the relative turnout of Democrats and Republicans. Ads for one race do not substantially “spill over” and affect outcomes at another level of office, as would be true if advertising altered the partisan composition of the voters in any election year.

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Result about down-ballot elections: Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996 show, Americans are more familiar with national political figures, such as the president and vice-president, than with figures like US Senators.

Canvassing

Alan S. Gerber and Donald P. Green. 2000. “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment.” *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 3 (September): 653–663

- **Key Takeaway:** Door-to-door canvassing mobilizes voters most efficiently, direct mail slightly increases turnout, and telephone calls have no effect.
- **Argument:** Voter mobilization increasingly impersonal, messages often delivered through mass marketing techniques with lesser involvement from nonpartisan organizations (e.g., Lions, Kiwanis Clubs). Claim is that personal canvassing mobilizes voters more effectively than other modes of contact and that previous research with similar designs had small sample sizes and are old.
- **Data/Methods:** Field experiment on 30,000 registered voters in New Haven, CT deploying nonpartisan get-out-the-vote messages through personal canvassing, direct mail, and phone calls (from professional phone banks) before November 1998 election. A $2 \times 2 \times 4$ design: contact mode, varying message (civic duty, election is close, neighborhood solidarity)
- **Findings:** Face-to-face interaction has large positive effect on turnout, direct mail and professional telephone calls less effective.
- **Critiques:** Messages were only nonpartisan leaving unanswered question about what campaigns should expect; does it hold in other contexts?
- **Relevant Literature:** Critique of Rosenstone and Hansen 1993 and other who use reported contact with campaigns/parties to look at effects – this is problem since campaigns often target those more likely to turnout/committed partisans.
 - Link to turnout lit: falling rates of voter turnout may reflect a decline in face-to-face political activities.

Alan S. Gerber, Donald P. Green, and Christopher W. Larimer. 2008. “Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment.” *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 1 (February): 33–48

- **Key Takeaway:** Previous research overlooked “extrinsic” benefits of adhering to social norms when voting: when the D term is manipulated, see large effects in a very large field experiment.
- **Argument:** Rational choice models of voter turnout often suggest voters factor in civic duty and benefits of voting when deciding to turnout – argue that previous research overlooked “extrinsic” benefits of adhering to social norms when voting. For norms to work, need: awareness, internalization, enforcement – noting behavior monitoring to individuals has a “shaming” effect that encourages compliant behavior.
- **Data/Methods:** Field experiment from August 2006 primary (GOP Senate, plus other proposals and local races) in Michigan, $N = 180,002$ households. Treatments are direct mailings to voters:

1. *Civic duty*: reminded recipients that voting is a civic duty (so priming intrinsic benefits)
 2. *Hawthorne*: told researchers would be studying their turnout based on public records
 3. *Self*: show record of turnout in their own household
 4. *Neighbors*: shown record of turnout in their household and of their neighbors
- **Findings:** Exposing a person’s voting record to neighbors is an order of magnitude more effective than conventional pieces of partisan/nonpartisan direct mail, as strong as door knocking, most cost effective strategy tested as of 2008. Overall treatment effects on voter turnout: *Neighbors* > *Self* > *Hawthorne* > *Civic Duty*
 - **Critiques:** Is it replicable in more salient, competitive contexts?
 - **Relevant Literature:** Formal theory’s “calculus of voting” conception (Riker and Ordeshook 1970, Downs 1957); observational work on effect of social networks (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995)
 - See also Bond et al. (2012) on Facebook social pressure and turnout
-

Campaigns and Political Information

Andrew Gelman and Gary King. 1993. “Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable?” *British Journal of Political Science* 23, no. 4 (October): 409–451

- **One Sentence Summary:** How can campaign events affect vote intentions but not election results? News media have important effect on outcome of elections by conveying candidate’s effects on important issues.
 - **Argument:** Response to pollsters during campaign are not informed nor rational. Respondents vote based on their enlightened preferences as formed from the information they learn during the campaign as well as other cues such as ideology and partisanship.
 - **Data/Methods:** 67,000 individual-level responses from forty-nine commercial polls during the 1988 campaign and many other aggregate poll results from 1952-92 campaigns
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Andrew Gelman et al. 2016. “The Mythical Swing Voter.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (April): 103–130

- **One Sentence Summary:** There are NO swing voters, contrary to what previous work would argue is an information effect or a response to campaign events (Gelman and King 1993; Hillygus and Jackman, 2003; Kaplan et al., 2012).
- **Argument:** the apparent swings in vote intention represent mostly changes in sample composition — not changes in opinion — and these “phantom swings” arise from sample selection bias in survey participation.
 - MRP is suggested to correct for selection bias
- **Data/Methods:** (1) traditional cross-sectional surveys; (2) a novel large-scale panel survey; and (3) the RAND American Life Panel
- **Findings:** In 2012, campaign events were more strongly correlated with changes in survey participation than with changes in vote intention.

- **Relevant Literature:** Gelman and King 1993

Thad Dunning et al. 2019. “Voter information campaigns and political accountability: Cumulative findings from a preregistered meta-analysis of coordinated trials.” *Science Advances* 5, no. 7 (July): eaaw2612

- **One Sentence Summary:** No evidence overall that typical, nonpartisan voter information campaigns shape voter behavior.
- **Argument:** Additional information on incumbent performance does not affect vote choice nor turnout.
- **Data/Methods:** seven randomized controlled trials to be fielded in six developing countries by independent research teams and conduct a meta-analysis.
 - Field experiments randomized exposure to objective, nonpartisan performance information privately to individual voters within 2 months prior to an election.
 - Outcomes: binary variable that takes a value of 1 if a citizen reported voting for the incumbent candidate or party; a secondary dichotomous outcome measures individual voter turnout
- **Findings:**
 - Exploratory and subgroup analyses suggest conditions under which informational campaigns could be more effective.
 - Effect of information on vote choice is null regardless of whether the information is positive or negative.
 - No evidence that the impact of treatment assignment interacts with the gap between prior beliefs and the information
 - Null results on turnout
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Does information lead voters to hold elected officials accountable? See accountability literature.

Lynn Vavreck. 2009. *The message matters: the economy and presidential campaigns*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** Why do incumbents in good economies sometimes lose? What matters is not just the state of the economy but how candidates campaign around it.
- **Argument:** When the economy is doing well incumbents must highlight this, and when the economy is doing poorly they must try to focus their elections on non-economic issues.
 - Existing literature implies that if you are a candidate advantaged by the economy, prime that. If not, then prime an issue you “own”
 - Candidates can engage in three behaviors to affect voter assessments: agenda setting, persuasion, and clarification
 - ★ Agenda Setting: attempt to refocus the election or change weights associated with issues
 - ★ Persuading: attempt to educate voters that a candidate holds a specific position, regardless of whether the candidate actually does
 - ★ Clarification: clarifying positions in important issues

- ★ Link to Retrospective voting: candidates and campaigns can prime voters to think retrospectively about objective, fundamental conditions such as the economy (agenda setting) and *what those conditions are* (persuasion)
- ★ Campaign effects are likely also constrained by strength of PID (Michigan School) as well as information level (Zaller)
- Typology of Campaigns
 - ★ Clarifying Campaign: Candidates who are helped by the state of the economy should run campaigns in which they clarify positions or their role in getting the good economic times or lack of role in bringing about bad economic times
 - Economy is clarifying issue, easy issue people tend to associated with elections
 - ★ Insurgent Campaigns
 - Candidates not helped by the state of the economy will find something else to talk about
 - refocus the election on some other issues from which they can benefit
 - Leverage conditions and opinions on issues that will benefit them to the detriment of opponent
 - Issue must be one in which the candidate benefits from
 - Campaign types are determined *before* the election by the state of the economy and *not* by the behavior of candidates once they start to campaign
- **Data/Methods:** data from presidential elections since 1952
- **Relevant Literature:** Economic voting and persuasion effects

Are Campaign Effects Minimal?

Gary C. Jacobson. 2015. “How Do Campaigns Matter?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 18, no. 1 (May): 31–47

- **One Sentence Summary:** Review of literature casts NO DOUBT that campaigns do matter, the question is when, where, how and for who.
- **Lit Review:**
 - Minimal effects school: Lazarsfeld et al. 1944 and Berelson et al. 1954 concluded that presidential campaigns had little effect on voting decisions, which were determined by real experiences between elections and by enduring loyalties to parties and other social groups.
 - Fundamentals affect election outcomes; economy, distribution of partisans in the electorate, and ideological locations of the candidates before the campaigns had even taken place (e.g., Tufte 1978, Rosenstone 1983, Lewis-Beck & Rice 1992, Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2014)
 - Campaigns are important to inform voters about the fundamentals: Gelman and King 1993. Vavrek 2009
 - Role of Money
 - Effect on turnout: Gerber and Green GOTV and Bond et al. 2012 FB campaign
 - Effect on vote choice: raise voters’ awareness of candidates (Jacobson 2006)
 - For who do campaigns matter: Those that are at a middle level of sophistication as they access information and do not have too strong predispositions. Also, voters for lower levels of office.

Joshua L. Kalla and David E. Broockman. 2018. “The Minimal Persuasive Effects of Campaign Contact in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments.” *American Political Science Review* 112, no. 1 (February): 148–166

- **One Sentence Summary:** Campaign contacts and advertisements have NO effects on vote choice. Only short lived effects many months before election or when candidates take unusually unpopular positions and opposing campaigns invest unusually heavily in identifying persuadable, cross-pressured voters whom they can inform about these positions.
- **Argument:**
 - persuasive effects of campaign contact and advertising—such as mail, phone calls, and canvassing—on Americans’ candidate choices in general elections is zero
 - ★ when a partisan cue and competing frames are present, campaign contact and advertising are unlikely to influence voters’ choices.
 - ★ By the time election day arrives, voters are likely to have already absorbed all the arguments and information they care to retain from the media and other sources
 - ★ Correlations between voters’ partisan predispositions and their racial and issue views have increased dramatically. Dwindling number of voters have conflicting considerations that would lead them to abandon their party.
 - ★ Salience-raising effects of communication diminish in the presence of clear cues (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013) and when individuals are exposed to competing arguments and information (Druckman 2004a)
 - When campaigns contact voters long before election day and measure effects immediately, campaigns often appear to persuade voters. Early persuasion decays before election day and the very same treatments usually cease working close to election day.
 - Persuasive effects only occur in rare occasions:
 - ★ When candidates take unusually unpopular positions and campaigns invest unusually heavily in identifying persuadable voters
 - ★ when campaigns contact voters long before election day and measure effects immediately—although this early persuasion decays
 - ★ In primary and ballot measure campaigns, when partisan cues are not present.
 - Previous lit: Research suggests two broad reasons why campaign advertising and contact might have effects on voters’ candidate choices nevertheless: providing voters new considerations and heightening the salience of existing considerations.
- **Data/Methods:**
 - meta-analysis of 40 field experiments estimates an average effect of zero in general elections
 - nine original field experiments on the persuasive effects of personal contact
- **Findings:**
 - campaign persuasion is extremely rare in general elections; the best estimate of the size of persuasive effects in general elections in light of our evidence is zero
 - Only find evidence of short lasting effects long before election and when candidates take extreme positions and the opposition microtargets audience with information
 - also do not find clear evidence of generalizable subgroup effects
- **Relevant Literature:**

- Literature on political elites influence on citizens’ judgments
- Argument is NOT that campaigns, broadly speaking, do not matter. Candidates can determine the content of voters’ choices by changing their positions, strategically revealing certain information, and affecting media narratives— dynamics which are outside the scope of the analysis.
- Provide support for often criticized “minimal effects” thesis of campaign interventions (e.g., Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Klapper 1960; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948)
 - ★ A common critique of the original literature on “minimal effects” was that campaigns may not appear to have aggregate effects because any advertising they engage in is immediately reciprocated with responses from their opponents that “cancel out” in aggregate.

David E. Broockman and Joshua L. Kalla. 2022. “When and Why Are Campaigns’ Persuasive Effects Small? Evidence from the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election.” *American Journal of Political Science* (August): ajps.12724

- **One Sentence Summary:** Not only partisan loyalty but bayesian updating help explain why campaigns have minimal effects.
- **Argument:**
 - voters are more persuadable with information about candidates they know less about
 - persuasive messages change both candidate evaluations and vote choices and induce partisan defection
 - messages with more informational content are more persuasive.
- The marginal effects of campaign advertisements are smaller in partisan elections and closer to elections because voters react to information from campaigns in a manner analogous to Bayesian reasoning, putting less weight on new information when their prior beliefs are stronger.
- This opposes the “partisan intoxication” hypothesis that claims that voters in partisan elections resist information contrary to their partisan loyalties and are not motivated to form accurate beliefs about candidates.
- **Data/Methods:** four surveys conducted from January to May 2020
 - exposed participants in a randomized treatment group to (usually) two statements about either Joe Biden or Donald Trump that were either positive or negative.
 - At the time voters knew more about Trump than Biden because he was in office for 4 years.
 - informational interpretation would predict larger effects on vote choice when voters are provided with information about the candidate about whom they have weaker prior beliefs (Biden) than about the candidate about whom they have stronger prior beliefs (Trump)
 - partisan intoxication interpretation would predict equally limited effects regardless of which candidate the appeals considered, and no persuasive effect from appeals that run contrary to one’s partisan viewpoints
- **Findings:**
 - Positive and negative messages about Biden have significantly larger effects on stated vote choice than either positive or negative messages about Trump, suggesting that this is an information effect
 - respondents’ favorability ratings of Biden change dramatically in response to information about Biden, but that changes in Trump favorability are significantly smaller

- inconsistent with the partisan intoxication account, persuasion results to a great extent from voters crossing party lines (Republicans are persuaded to vote for Biden after reading pro-Biden information)
- voters are more persuaded when exposed to campaign messages that contain richer informational content.
- The information we gave respondents about Trump was often novel to them and changed their views of Trump’s performance in the specific domain relevant to that information, even if didn’t change global views about trump

- **Relevant Literature:** Explains findings from Brockman and Kalla 2018

Alexander Coppock, Seth J. Hill, and Lynn Vavreck. 2020. “The small effects of political advertising are small regardless of context, message, sender, or receiver: Evidence from 59 real-time randomized experiments.” *Science Advances* 6, no. 36 (September): eabc4046

- **Key Takeaway:** One commonly offered explanation for small campaign effects is heterogeneity: Persuasion may only work well in specific circumstances. Find that heterogeneity with large offsetting effects is not the source of small average effects.
 - **Argument/Findings:** At least in hard-fought campaigns for the presidency, there is limited evidence of heterogeneity in the size of treatment effects for campaign ads
 - Both attack and promotional ads work equally well
 - Effects are not substantially different depending on which campaign produced the ads or in what electoral context they were presented
 - **Data/Methods:**
 - Repeated an experiment weekly in real time using 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign advertisements.
 - tested 49 political advertisements in 59 unique experiments on 34,000 people.
 - investigate heterogeneous effects by sender (candidates or groups), receiver (subject partisanship), content (attack or promotional), and context (battleground versus non-battleground, primary versus general election, and early versus late).
-

Campaign Targeting

Ben M. Tappin et al. 2023. “Quantifying the potential persuasive returns to political microtargeting.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 120, no. 25 (June): e2216261120

- **One Sentence Summary:** Under favorable conditions, microtargeting strategies produce a relatively larger persuasive impact compared to several alternative messaging strategies.
- **Argument:**
 - The effectiveness of microtargeting depends on contextual factors; it is effective when campaigns advocate for or against a specific policy proposal. However, no evidence that targeting different issue attitudes for different people is more impactful than simply distributing to every-one a single, high-quality (pretested) ad that speaks to the same issue.

- Microtargeting may not require the collection of vast amounts of personal data to uncover complex inter-actions between audience characteristics and political messaging

- **Data/Methods:**

- Implemented a microtargeting strategy, by combining machine learning with message pretesting to determine which advertisements to show to which individuals to maximize persuasive impact. Custom machine learning procedure and pretesting data from survey experiments to identify the particular sets of covariates (e.g., age, gender) by which to target messages, as well as determine which messages to show to which individuals.
- compared the performance of this microtargeting strategy against two other messaging strategies using survey experiment (randomize which message people get, or use most effective message on everyone)

- **Findings:**

- microtargeting strategy outperformed these strategies by an average of 70% or more in a context where all of the messages aimed to influence the same policy attitude
- no evidence that targeting messages by more than one covariate yielded additional persuasive gains
- microtargeting was primarily visible for one of the two policy issues under study
- when microtargeting was used instead to identify which policy attitudes to target with messaging (Study 2), its advantage was more limited

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Coppock 2023: Political microtargeting relies on treatment effect heterogeneity—that is, different groups of people responding in different ways to different messages. Coppock argues that everyone reacts the same way to persuasive information.

Eitan D. Hersh. 2015. *Hacking the Electorate: How Campaigns Perceive Voters*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, June

- **Key Takeaway:** How and the success with which campaigns are able to perceive and target their voters is a function of the data/public record laws available within states. For example, if records have race of individual voters or their party affiliation, enables campaigns to better focus mobilization efforts on voters of color, partisans than in broad areas where they might be, resulting in less accidental contact.
- **Argument:** There is an information gap between what campaigns know about voters and what voters know about themselves – this poses problems for survey-based research of campaign strategy. This is the essence of the “Perceived Voter Model:” campaigns must decide which voters their appeals would work for and this targeting only as good as the info they have. In the interests of their own election efforts, elected officials (predominately in state legislatures) put in place public record laws that provide them with better to data to use for political campaigns. These efforts were helped by NVRA and HAVA which pushed states to create centralized registration databases. Vendors like Catalist important because they perform necessary data cleaning and aggregating services for campaigns, create scores for other useful attributes of voters that campaigns might want not found in public records. Overall, whether a campaign focuses on increasing turnout among its known supporters or identifying and persuading undecideds is a decision influenced by their ability to *perceive* which voters are supportive or not.

- **Perceived Voter Model:** In first step to mobilization efforts, campaigns need to determine who they ought to prioritize and what messages different voters should receive. To create these targets, need to identify who will show up, which candidate voters will support. Data and modeling is getting better but who these *perceived voters* are might differ objective indicators or self-reported attributes. Thus, this theory underscores the *uncertainty* elites have in who they actually campaign to: “even if politicians know what policy will attract a winning coalition, they still might not know how to mobilize that coalition”
- **Data/Methods:** Catalist’s national voter file, matched with CES data; Ground Campaign Project with Ryan Enos which is a survey of campaign field workers; interviews with vendors and campaign strategists
- **Findings:**
 - Perceived partisans: availability of party affiliation on voter file depends on primary rules – if campaigns don’t have this data, forced to use geography combined with previous election results (think “reelection constituency” from Fenno, but this has real risks of mistargeting) or use commercial microtargeting models → no party data often means campaigns think conversations with voters aren’t going as well; in non-party states, self-reported party ID less correlated with turnout (b/c campaigns can’t really mobilize based on party), but turnout higher in overwhelmingly partisan precincts
 - Without race on file, use geography, networks (e.g., churches), or vendor race scores → when race is on file, more important focus of voter engagement strategies, racial groups are targeted differently, turnout higher (as a result of not relying on geographic-based strategies which result in different cohort of voters being targeted), voter who don’t have race on file in states that offer it are less likely to be contacted and less likely to vote
 - Perceived persuadable voters are not actually persuadable: data campaigns use different from the types of data political science uses to label “swing” or “persuadable” voters – don’t often have access to survey items about issue positions, partisan loyalties, measures of undecidedness → campaigns typically focus on “regular-voter targets” (those who almost always show up, but whose partisan leanings are undetermined or independent), “surge targets” (those whose party is undetermined/independent and only show up for POTUS elections), and “new voter targets”
 - ★ Bottom line: voters who are targeted for campaign persuasion unlike those who appear on surveys as susceptible to persuasion → focus of efforts on regular voters without partisanship though ideologically committed; voters who are cross-pressured, independent, or have low awareness of politics tend to be ideologically moderate; voters who according to surveys should be persuaded more likely to change vote choice over course of campaign compared to voters who according to campaigns are persuadable
- **Critique:** Campaigns are not on their own, they contract with consulting firms and research groups that do in fact run the type of survey questions political scientists ask – they most likely have a better view of persuasion as PS defines it of their voters than Hersh gives credit for or that this analysis is able to identify (at least at the national-level).
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Rosenstone and Hansen 1995: fail to understand that campaigns act on knowledge of *perceived* voters, so RH represent more about what campaign *want* to do than what they *actually* do
 - Persuadability: Zaller (1992) says opinion change about political awareness, predispositions, intensity of message campaigns; Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) says responsiveness to advertisements a function of partisanship with uniformed partisans most affected by negative ads;

Chong and Druckman (2007) say those with strong values less susceptible to change, Lenz (2009) movement of opinion concentrated on those who did not know competing sides before campaign; Campbell (1960) those who show for high-intensity surge elections; Campbell (2008) lack attachments to political parties; Hillygus and Shields (2008) those who are cross-pressured on issues

Race and Campaigning

Tali Mendelberg. 2001. *The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality*. Princeton University Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** there are strong incentives for candidates to employ racial appeals to build support among white voters, but they must do so implicitly
- **Argument:** candidates are incentivized to capitalize on racial cleavages in order to win support from conservative white voters
 - However, norms of racial equality preclude explicit displays of racism, meaning that candidates will touch on racial rhetoric in subtle terms
 - Prediction: candidates will benefit electorally when they make implicit racial appeals, but their support will diminish if these appeals are made explicit as they are breaking norms of equality.
 - ★ Racism will only be influential in politics when it is activated by elites (made salient through appeals) – but its effect will be diminished if these appeals are called out as racist
 - ★ That is, norms constrain the strategies that elites can use to appeal to moderate white voters.
- **Data/Methods:** divided NES sample based on when people were interviewed (either in the “implicit” or “explicit” phase of the Willie Horton story)
 - DV: evaluations of and support for Bush vs. Dukakis
 - IV: racial resentment, message phase (implicit/explicit)
 - Follow-up experiment: varied whether appeals were (1) explicitly racial, (2) implicitly racial, or (3) counter-stereotypical
 - ★ Set-up: video of a Republican gubernatorial candidate critiquing welfare provision by suggesting recipients are a burden
 - ★ Treatment: whether voiceover verbally targeted blacks (explicit), whether image of black (implicit) or white (counter-stereotypical) recipients
 - ★ IV: racial resentment (interacting with treatment)
 - ★ DV: support for race policy
- **Findings:** racial resentment was predictive of candidate evaluations during the implicit message phases of the Willie Horton, but not the explicit phase
 - Those who were racially resentful supported Bush over Dukakis, regardless of party identification, when exposed to implicit appeals
 - ★ Not explained by general conservatism or attitudes toward crime
 - Experiment: implicit appeals interacted with racial resentment to shape opinion on race policy, whereas explicit and counter-stereotypical appeals do not change the effect of racial resentment on racial attitudes

Nicholas A. Valentino, Vincent L. Hutchings, and Ismail K. White. 2002. "Cues that Matter: How Political Ads Prime Racial Attitudes During Campaigns." *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 1 (March): 75–90

- **Key Takeaway:** Implicit racial cues can prime racial considerations by increasing cognitive accessibility
- **Argument:** Build on Mendelberg (2001) and explore three sets of questions:
 - Does racial priming extend to issues other than crime and welfare, such as wasteful government spending and taxation
 - What types of cues most powerfully prime racial attitudes? Distinction between explicit and implicit is important, though there is likely variation within implicit cues
 - ★ Sometimes implicit involves an image but not verbal cue, some might emphasize certain groups with regards to scarce resources
 - ★ Expect more salient, yet still implicit racial cues to produce larger priming effects
 - What is the mechanism? Past work assumes that cognitive accessibility moderates media-based priming effects but no evidence
 - ★ Argue that racial priming **must** be mediated by the cognitive accessibility of racial attitudes in memory; people are motivated to suppress outward expression of racist attitudes and behavior
 - ★ Expect that racially counter-stereotypical cues to undermine priming by stimulating conscious processing of the racial content of the message
- **Data/Methods:** Experiments
 - Constructed campaign ads and varied racial cues. Varied visuals, race comparison, presence of black stereotype and narrative
 - Measures of racism: racial resentment, classic racism, perceived influence of blacks
- **Findings:**
 - Language of government spending and taxation has become racially “coded” such that its invocation in political appeals primes racial considerations even in the absence of racial imagery; more powerful effects emerge when the imagery links blacks to narrators comments about undeserving groups
 - Racial priming is mediated by the accessibility of race in memory, not the self-reported importance of group representation
 - Counter-stereotypic black cues suppress racial priming, while violating positive stereotypes of whites has, if anything, a positive racial priming effect
 - Different cues primed *different* racial attitudes. Racial comparison primed attitudes about resource competition more strongly than direct resentment toward blacks
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Results are consistent with Mendelberg (2001) and add more nuance. Caution, though, that suppressing racial priming will not necessarily lead to vote switching. Making people realize the racial prime might make the ad less persuasive, but does not imply they will abandon candidate support

Nicholas A. Valentino, Fabian G. Neuner, and L. Matthew Vandenbroek. 2018. “The Changing Norms of Racial Political Rhetoric and the End of Racial Priming.” *The Journal of Politics* 80, no. 3 (July): 757–771

- **Key Takeaway:** More recent evidence showing that even *explicit* racial messaging may now be politically effective for some groups
- **Argument:** Following election of Obama and Trump, appears to be increase in *explicitly* hostile racial rhetoric
 - Partisan realignment shifted party coalitions → as GOP became less diverse, less risky for candidates to overtly signal positions on racial issues
 - Whites’ perceptions of their groups’ racial distinctiveness and disadvantage has risen; growing strength of white identity
- **Data/Methods:** Multiple survey experiments
- **Findings:** Across studies, racial attitudes powerfully predict opinions on a wide variety of policies and political figures, regardless of how race is invoked in communications
 - While explicit racial rhetoric was one risky, these messages are no longer as widely rejected
 - Racial conservatives recognize the hostile and conflicts content in explicit messages but are not angered or disgusted by it
- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Updated test of the Implicit/Explicit model from Mendelberg (2020). Original model predicts that explicit discussions of race and racial conflict in any domain will be rejected, reducing the impact of racial attitude on public opinion. Find evidence against this—explicit cues no longer reduce predictive power of racial attitudes.

Michael Tesler and David O. Sears. 2010. *Obama’s race: the 2008 election and the dream of a post-racial America*. Chicago studies in American politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** racial predispositions were especially important in explaining behavior in the 2008 election, as Obama’s race made racial considerations perpetually salient
- **Argument:** “Barack Obama’s identity as an African American made his race chronologically accessible to the vast majority of Americans throughout the 2008 campaign. That is, the simple perceptual salience of his race insured that racial predispositions would be unusually central to voters’ evaluations of him.” (16)
 - Symbolic racism: interchangeable with racial resentment, reflecting four themes
 - ★ Blacks no longer face much discrimination
 - ★ Disadvantage mainly reflects poor work ethic
 - ★ Blacks demand “too much too fast” (18)
 - ★ Blacks have gotten more than they deserve
 - Two sides of racialization: (1) racial conservatives oppose, (2) racial liberals support
- **Data/Methods:** cross-sectional time-series analysis of the ANES, as well as election-year panel data from 2007-2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project
 - DV: voting in 2008 election (both general and primary)
 - IV: racial resentment, measured using four-question additive scale
 - Controls: age, education, gender, race, Southern (though also limit sample to whites and find same results)
- **Findings:** close link between racial resentment, evaluations of Obama

- Racial predispositions go in two directions – on one hand, more racially resentful respondents were more opposed to Obama, but more racially liberal respondents were more supportive of Obama, even after controlling for ideology
- In the primaries, as Obama gained momentum, white racial liberals became more likely to support (as he proved his viability as a candidate)
 - ★ Voting for Obama in primaries as “symbolic,” given the few substantive, ideological differences between Obama and Clinton → expressive support
- **Relevant Literature:** suggests that the impact of racial resentment doesn’t need to be cued by candidates (as in Mendelberg 2001) when a candidate’s race primes racial predispositions

Ashley Jardina. 2019. *White identity politics*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: New York, NY, USA : Cambridge University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** White identity and consciousness is an important predictor of white opposition to Obama and support of Trump that is independent of racial resentment
- **Argument:** Explores the relationship between white identity and support for Obama and Trump
 - As a dominant identity, white racial solidarity’s association with political preferences is in part a function of perceived group threat
 - **Obama:** Serves as the most symbolic displacement of whites’ political power. Many whites were not exclusively driven by racial animus, also independently motivated by a desire to protect their in-group and its status. Many whites might also oppose Obama because of worries that he would favor his own racial group at the expense of whites, doubt Obama would treat all groups equally
 - **Trump:** Specifically capitalized on white identity because white voters saw him as restoring and protecting their group’s power and status. White racial identity should also be tied to support for political candidates white see as maintaining or restoring their political power Trump took positions that powerfully appeal to white identifiers.
- **Data/Methods:** ANES data
- **Findings:**
 - White Identity and Obama
 - ★ Whites with higher levels of racial identity were much more likely to vote for Romney over Obama
 - ★ Some evidence that part of what motivates white identifiers in their negative evaluations of Obama is belief that Obama will favor blacks, possibly at the expense of whites
 - ★ Negative response extends beyond Obama and to a hypothetical Latino President as well; whites with high identity or consciousness are least satisfied with Latino President
 - ★ White racial solidarity is *not* associated with greater support for the Tea Party; support for TP may come from disaffected whites who are angry at racial changes but not through in-group anxieties, more racial resentment
 - White Identity and Trump
 - ★ White identity was a significant predictor of affect toward Trump in January 2016 (pre-primary). Applies even more strongly to white consciousness; these respondents also more likely to prefer him in the primary
 - ★ Trump was unique in his appeal to racially conscious whites when compared to other Republicans, Hillary, and Bernie

- **Contributions/Related Literature:** See Jardina (2021) for additional results.
 - Also tied to work on racial resentment; extends this to show that white racial attitudes are not just driven by out-group affect, but also in-group attachment.

Antoine J. Banks and Heather M. Hicks. 2019. “The Effectiveness of a Racialized Counterstrategy.” *American Journal of Political Science* 63, no. 2 (April): 305–322

- **Key Takeaway:**
- **Argument:** Re-evaluate counter-strategy component of racial priming theory; Idea that a politician calling out a candidate’s racially coded message as racist should make it less effective
 - Argue that a politician calling a political candidate’s subtle racial appeal racist should not persuade racially conservative whites to lower their support for the candidate; instead, the counter-strategy should persuade white racial liberals to view the candidate unfavorably
 - Building on *motivated reasoning theory*, argue that whites are motivated to arrive at conclusions consistent with existing racial attitudes
- **Data/Methods:** Focus on 2016 election to test theory, three experiments
 - Two wave experiment to minimize effects of racial priming when asking pre-treatment
 - Experimental manipulation is a news article that varies political party and race of politicians accusing Trump’s implicit appeal as racist
 - IV: racial resentment
 - DV: batter of questions to evaluate candidates, vote choice
- **Findings:** Show that racial animus played an important role in whites’ decision to support Trump, even though politicians called his campaign rhetoric racially offensive
 - Across three studies, results show that persuading racially conservative whites to abandon support for a Republican accused of race baiting is tough
 - ★ Evidence for small backlash effect; also no difference between race and partisanship of politician making accusation
 - White liberals **are** persuaded by charges of racism, especially those who self-identify as independent

Hopkins (2021)

- **Key Takeaway:**
- **Argument:**
 - **Priming**, narrowly defined, is an automatic process through which communication might activate attitudes. **Issue voting**, a psychological process through which successive choices are constructed differently and activate different attitudes, entails a conscious response to the nature of the choice.
 - Observationally equivalent as both involve activation of pre-existing attitudes, but differ in that one is conscious and the other is automatic
 - Three competing hypotheses:

- ★ racially or ethnically charged political rhetoric has the capacity to activate attitudes toward various out-groups
- ★ rhetoric focusing on latinos or the associated issue of immigration will activate attitudes specifically related to Latinos
- ★ rhetoric which highlights inter-group conflicts will activate attitudes associated with Blacks, even if they are not targeted rhetorically
- **Data/Methods:** Survey panel from 2007 to 2017
- **Findings:**
 - White respondents were no more likely to report prejudice attitudes in 2016 than in earlier panel waves
 - Evidence points to the resilience of anti-Black prejudice: accounting for lagged partisanship and candidate preference, anti-Black prejudice and pro-Black esteem meaningfully associated with shifting toward or away from Trump
 - ★ Anti-Latino prejudice is not strongly predictive of shifting to Trump and immigration attitudes lose much of their predictive power when modeled alongside anti-Black prejudice
 - ★ In the face of rhetoric that partly targets other groups, anti-Black prejudice remains a stable, crystallized predisposition and central division underpinning White’s political attitudes
 - Mechanism: Priming vs Issue voting
 - ★ Find that anti-Black prejudice proves a stronger predictor of backing Trump than of backing other GOP contenders – even within the same information environment voters align their preferences with their prejudices only for choices involving Trump
 - ★ Effects of anti-Black prejudice do not vary with media consumption, additional evidence in favor of issue voting

Political Communication and Media Effects

Agenda-Setting, Priming and Framing

Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder. 1987. *News that matters: television and American opinion*. Paperback ed., 5. [print.] American politics and political economy. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** Media can change expressed opinions without necessarily changing underlying attitudes through framing, priming, and agenda-setting.
- **Argument:** Television news shapes what issues the public sees as “important”. By priming certain aspects of national life while ignoring others, television news sets the terms by which political judgments are rendered and political choices made (Zaller-esque argument).
- **Theory:**
 - Agenda-Setting: “Those problems that receive prominent attention on the national news become the problems the viewing public regards as the nation’s most important.”
 - Priming: “By calling attention to some matters while ignoring others, television news influences the standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and candidates for public office are judged” Priming refers to changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations.
 - ★ By calling attention to some issues while ignoring others, television news can influence the standards by which government is judged. This is contingent on people viewing the problem as something over which government has direct control/responsibility.
 - Framing: News influences the references that are used by the public to evaluate an issue. Hypothesis that the more television coverage interprets events as though they were the result of the president’s actions, the more influential such coverage will be in priming the public’s assessment of the president’s performance.
- **Data/Methods:**
 - Experiments following one of two main designs:
 - ★ Sequential experiments: participants were exposed to a sequence of unobtrusively altered network newscasts for 30 mins every day for one week on Yale campus. Before and after they are asked to rate the countries most important problems, and to evaluate the president’s performance. Variation in the amount and nature of coverage given national problems.
 - ★ Assemblage experiments: participants viewed a collection of news stories taken from the three networks at a single sitting, but these new stories were prepared ahead of time, so although is less generalizable, this design allows for more manipulation.
 - DV: Most important issues for country + evaluation of president performance
 - Issues: defense preparedness, inflation, pollution, arms control, civil rights, unemployment (not all manipulated in the same experiment)
- **Findings:**
 - Agenda-setting:
 - ★ In both sequential and assemblage experiments and time-series data, participants who saw more coverage of an issue came to view that issue as more important. The only exception was inflation, which was already viewed as highly important prior to the survey.
 - ★ Persistence of effect: still strong and present after one week — when television news focuses on a problem, the public’s priorities are altered, but altered again as television news moves on to something new. Likely even stronger IRL, if media devote continuous, repeated coverage to a single issue.

- ★ Moderators:
 - Vividness: no evidence that agenda-setting is strengthened by vividness, such that more emotive appeals increase perceived issue importance.
 - Position: earlier (“lead”) stories tend to be seen as more important
 - Personal experience: exposure to problems that personally affect you are more likely to be deemed important for the nation overall.
- Priming: In both sets of experiments, increased media coverage leads to more weight placed on those issues in presidential approval ratings.
 - ★ News doesn’t just affect judgments of presidential performance but also evaluations of presidential character
 - ★ Whereas agenda-setting more powerful for less politically engaged, no differences in priming by political involvement.
 - ★ Test alternative theory of projection: Idea that television coverage of a particular problem causes viewers to adjust their ratings of the president’s performance on that problem to become consistent with their overall evaluation of the president. Don’t find evidence of this.
- Framing: Stories implying that the president is responsible for a national problem are more powerful in two respects: they lead viewers to greater certainty about his performance on that problem, and they induce viewers to attach greater importance to that performance in evaluating the president overall.
 - ★ Both these effects appear to be stronger for problems that are relative newcomers to the American political agenda, for which the public’s understanding is still in formation

● Relevant Literature:

- response to the “minimal effects” hypothesis, which holds that media and campaign coverage do not change people’s opinions – agenda-setting and priming can occur without attitude change.
- Link to campaigns literature: campaigns don’t change minds, but they prime considerations that lead you to support one candidate over another. Response to “minimal effects” hypothesis forwarded by Berelson et al. 1954, who argue campaigns bring voters back to their original views – they don’t change minds, they just reinforce pre-existing views
- Role of information: media effects are diminished for citizens who are deeply engaged, informed about politics. As a result, in a high-choice media environment (Prior 2007), agenda-setting and priming may be less operative. This is particularly true if there is not a consensus across programs or networks about which topics are of primary importance.
- “New era of minimal effects” (Bennett and Iyengar 2008) induced by selective exposure based on partisan preferences.
 - ★ “The increasing level of selective exposure based on partisan preference thus presages a new era of minimal consequences, at least insofar as persuasive effects are concerned. But other forms of media influence, such as indexing, agenda setting, or priming may continue to be important” (725)
- Updated 2010 version:
 - ★ Three New Contributions Post “News that Matters”:
 - Application of priming to political campaigns: See Petrocik 1996 and issue ownership.
 - Link between agenda-setting and policy change: See Baumgartner and Jones (1993; Jones 1994; Jones and Baumgartner 2005) on how media attention is important factor in policy change.

- New development on psychological processes underlying agenda-setting, priming, and framing: debate with regards to whether these processes operate outside of conscious awareness (e.g., Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002) or whether individual chooses which of the available considerations are relevant, and how important each consideration should be (e.g., Chong 1996; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; for another interpretation entirely, see Lenz 2009).
- ★ New environment:
 - Argues that today's media environment is more fragmented, allowing for people to avoid consuming the news.
 - Agenda-setting effects are greatest among viewers who know the least, but now those who consume the news know most.
- ★ Update: More observational data to make more realistic for priming and framing.
- Zaller (1992) when it comes to priming.

Shanto Iyengar, Mark D. Peters, and Donald R. Kinder. 1982. "Experimental Demonstrations of the "Not-So-Minimal" Consequences of Television News Programs." *American Political Science Review* 76, no. 4 (December): 848–858

- **One Sentence Summary:** Article version of "News that Matters Argument". media coverage influences political behavior via agenda-setting (shaping the importance of issues) and priming (changing standards for evaluating politicians)
- **Argument:** media coverage is crucial in determining which issues the public finds important, as well as what criteria the public uses to evaluate politicians.
 - Agenda-setting hypothesis: viewers adjust their beliefs about the importance of political problems in response to the amount of media coverage issues receive
 - ★ "The mass media may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but the media are stunningly successful in telling their audience what to think about" (Cohen 1962, 16)
 - ★ Possible mechanisms: (1) information recall, (2) covert evaluation (counter-arguing)– find evidence for latter, but not former.
 - Priming hypothesis: by focusing on certain issues and ignoring others, the media may alter the standards by which individuals evaluate government
- **Data/Methods:** pair of lab-based experiments, manipulating content of "nightly news" broadcast, shown in small group setting meant to mimic a family room.
 - Study 1: pilot (N = 28), focused on alleged weaknesses in US defense capabilities
 - ★ Control: no defense-related stories
 - ★ Treatment: four defense-related stories over four days of broadcasts
 - Study 2: more elaborated/expanded replication of study 1 (N = 44), focused on three different issues
 - ★ Control: no coverage of any of the three issue areas
 - ★ Treatments: multiple stories about either (1) defense preparedness, (2) environmental pollution, or (3) inflation
 - DV 1: political priorities (tied to agenda-setting), as measured by an additive index of "adjusted change" per issue

- ★ Measures: (1) rating of importance, (2) perceived need for government action, (3) level of personal concern, and (4) extent of discussion of issue with friends
 - DV 2: presidential evaluations (tied to priming), based on perceived competence, integrity, and overall performance
- **Findings:** television news has a strong effect on the issues that individuals find to be important, with these issues given greater weight in evaluating presidential performance
 - Agenda-setting: found support for agenda-setting, in that respondents exposed to more media coverage of an issue rated it a higher priority on the additive index
 - Priming: considerable, though somewhat inconsistent, evidence for priming, with the agenda altering the standards by which presidents are evaluated
 - Heterogeneity:
 - ★ Issues: in study 2, only found effects for defense and pollution - perhaps because inflation was already viewed as a high-importance issue
 - ★ Mediators: higher knowledge individuals were less susceptible to media effects, given their ability to counter-argue
- **Critique:**
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - one of the first large-scale lab-based experiments on media effects - article version of News That Matters (Iyengar and Kinder 1987)
 - Response to Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954, who argue for the "minimal effects" hypothesis (media/campaigns just reinforce pre-existing attitudes)

Gabriel S. Lenz. 2009. "Learning and Opinion Change, Not Priming: Reconsidering the Priming Hypothesis." *American Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 4 (October): 821–837

- **One Sentence Summary:** Previous studies incorrectly attribute media effects (on both vote choice, presidential approval) to priming, instead of learning and opinion change.
- **Argument:** Campaign and media attention to an issue creates the appearance of priming through a two-part process: Exposing individuals to campaign and media messages on an issue (1) informs some of them about the parties' or candidates' positions on that issue. Once informed, (2) these individuals often adopt their preferred party's or candidate's position as their own.
 - Priming hypothesis: effect of campaign/news media messages on the importance individuals place on an issue when evaluating politicians. BUT, priming doesn't just make one issue more salient than others but provides information about the issue being primed.
 - ★ To study priming previous studies: regress presidential approval or vote choice on a series of policy attitudes.
 - Two-step process:
 - ★ Learning effects: campaigns/media inform voters about parties'/candidates' issue positions
 - ★ Opinion change: once informed, individuals adopt the position of their preferred party/-candidate
- **Data/Methods:**

- Reanalyze four cases of alleged priming, using panel or repeated cross-sectional data to test priming effects against alternatives.
- European integration (1997 UK election): largely ignored in 1992 but key issue in 1997, with shifts in parties' positions from previous patterns
 - ★ Data: 1992-1997 British Election Panel Study
 - ★ DV: vote (for or against Labour)
 - ★ IV: classification of voters based on knowledge of each party's position before/after became salient: (1) knew before, (2) learned from, (3) partially learned, (4) never learned, (5) forgot
- US cases: Social Security in 2000, public works jobs in 1976, and defense spending in 1980 - all presidential elections
 - ★ Data: Annenberg survey, study of voters in LA/Erie, and ANES panel
 - ★ DV: presidential vote
 - ★ IV: same classification of voters
- Opinion change: cross-lagged approach to understand whether prior issue attitudes or vote choice explain current vote choice/issue attitudes.
 - ★ Learning effect: earlier issue attitudes explain later changes in vote choice among learners (attitudes → vote choice)
 - ★ Learning-induced opinion change: earlier vote choice explains later change in issue attitudes (vote choice → attitudes)
- **Findings:** no evidence of priming in response to media messages
 - Apparent priming effects only occur among voters who learn about candidates' respective positions on an issue.
 - These changes largely reflect the fact that these “learners” adopt their preferred party or candidate's position as their own.
 - European integration: increase in “issue weight” primarily for those in the “learned from” group, suggesting that effect of media on vote is about learning party positions. Those who knew the positions before were unmoved, potentially because they are more knowledgeable.
 - US cases: in all four cases (and in meta-analysis), the difference in support comes primarily from the learned from, rather than knew before group.
 - Opinion change: find evidence of learning - induced opinion change, not learning effects, except for defense spending.
- **Relevant Literature:** Article-length treatment of Follow the Leader. Suggesting that, contrary to normative theories of democracy, policy support proceeds from candidate support, rather than the other way around.
 - Response to Iyengar and Kinder (1987)

James N. Druckman. 2001. “The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence.” *Political Behavior* 23 (3): 225–256

- **One Sentence Summary:** Contrary to previous literature that claim that citizens base their preferences on arbitrary information and/or are subject to extensive elite manipulation, the authors find that citizens use frames in a competent and well-reasoned manner.
- **Argument:** Druckman assesses the implications of framing effects for citizen competence.

- Traditional view: (1) framing effects imply that citizens base their political preferences on arbitrary information, and (2) elites often use framing to manipulate citizens' judgments. (Bartels, 1998; Entman, 1993; Riker, 1986)
- Raises importance of distinguishing between two types of framing effects: which is the process of shaping frames in thought
 - ★ Equivalency framing effects: Examines how the use of different, but logically equivalent, words or phrases causes individuals to alter their preferences (e.g. 97% fat free, vs. 3% fat). See work of Tversky and Kahneman.
 - ★ Emphasis framing effects: by emphasizing a subset of potentially relevant considerations, a speaker can lead individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions.
- **Data/Methods:** More of a lit review/theory building article.
- **Findings:**
 - Equivalency framing: people base their preferences on arbitrary information.
 - ★ Moderators: Less likely to occur when respondent is a male, has high cognitive ability (Stanovich and West, 1998), has strongly held attitudes or high personal involvement in the issue at hand or briefly thinks about his or her decision. Framing effects tend to disappear when a decision maker provides a rationale for his or her decision.
 - ★ Limit to equivalency framing:
 - Occur less likely than we think + overall evidence for them is “mixed”.
 - The availability of simple cues, such as party endorsements, prevents people from being framed. Thus, context can facilitate competent decision making.
 - Emphasis framing:
 - ★ People's preferences do not change because a single piece of information is described positively or negatively (or in otherwise equivalent terms), but rather because a substantively different consideration is brought to bear on the issue at hand.
 - ★ Emphasis framing effects do, however, raise concerns about elite manipulation. BUT citizens appear to consciously weigh the considerations suggested by elite frames, compare these considerations to their predispositions and information, and contemplate about the source of the frame. This all suggests that citizens deal with elite frames in a relatively competent and well-reasoned manner.
 - ★ Limits: people do not simply base their preferences on recently and frequently heard elite frames. Rather, they evaluate elite frames in light of their existing predispositions (Brewer 2000, Berinsky and Kinder 2000). Kinder and Sanders (1990) better informed people “are more likely to be in possession of a frame of their own [and thus] will be less likely to be influenced by any particular frame imposed from the outside”. BUT Nelson et al. 1997 suggest that most informed are more affected by framing because framing works by altering the weight attached to different considerations held in long-term memory, and only the better informed people have this information in long-term memory.

Adam J. Berinsky and Donald R. Kinder. 2006. “Making Sense of Issues Through Media Frames: Understanding the Kosovo Crisis.” *The Journal of Politics* 68, no. 3 (August): 640–656

- **One Sentence Summary:** How stories are framed, in terms of their narrative structure, affects both what people remember and their subsequent opinions

- **Argument:** people understand complicated sequences of events by organizing information in the form of a structure of a story.
 - People better understand political events when news media frames events in narrative structure.
 - Good stories: frames that organize events chronologically, contain information about causes/effects, and set out explicit macrostructure (e.g., section headings)
 - Framing definition: how elites compete to define issues their way and how such definitions—or “frames in discourse”—are disseminated to the general public through the news media.
- **Data/Methods:**
 - Case study Kosovo crisis 1998
 - Series of experiments presenting subjects with a series of five articles about the Kosovo crisis. The manipulation is the framing of the stories. In the control conditions, information was presented as it would be in a typical daily newspaper. In the experimental conditions, the same information was presented, but now organized to conform to the structure of a good story.
 - ★ Framing; one emphasizing the need to intervene in Kosovo, the other highlighting the importance of staying out of that conflict.
 - ★ Used exact same raw text for each article, but reorganized sentences and added headers for the framing conditions—maximizes clarity of treatment
 - DV: (1) what people remember, (2) how they structure their memories, and (3) what opinions they express.
- **Findings:** framing news about Kosovo crisis as a story affected what people remembered, how they structured what they remembered, and their opinions
 - Study 1: although factual recall varied as expected, there were limited attitudinal differences in perceptions of U.S. intervention
 - Study 2: when asked new questions about US policy (both past and future policy in Kosovo), find much clearer differences in opinion.
- **Contribution:** even if the content of media stays stable, the media can still exert a substantial influence over what/how people remember facts, as well as their subsequent opinions—suggesting a framing effect independent of literal content.

Emily P. Diamond. 2020. “The Influence of Identity Salience on Framing Effectiveness: An Experiment.” *Political Psychology* 41, no. 6 (December): 1133–1150

- **One Sentence Summary:** Effectiveness of framing depends on priming identity salience (partisan and parent identity).
 - Can priming a parental identity improve the effectiveness of a future-generations frame at increasing concern about climate change, likelihood to undertake pro-environmental behaviors, and support for climate change mitigation policies?
 - Are climate change frames less effective in environments when partisan identities are highly salient?
- **Argument:**
 - Past findings: Framing fails among highly polarizing issues because partisan identities are highly salient (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001).

- Argument: Priming different identities may affect effectiveness of framing.
 - ★ Increasing the salience of a parental identity (and therefore decreasing the salience of a partisan identity) increases the effectiveness of a future-generations environmental frame, particularly among Republicans.
 - ★ increasing the salience of one’s partisan identity accentuates polarization on climate change, leading to more climate change concern, proenvironmental behaviors, and policy support among Democrats and less among Republicans.
- **Data/Methods:**
 - Four-condition survey experiment with U.S. parents fielded online in spring 2018
 - ★ Pure control: just measure outcomes
 - ★ Frame only: Impact of climate change on future generations
 - ★ Frame + parent prime
 - ★ Frame + partisan prime
- **Findings:**
 - Among Republican parents, receiving a message about the impact of climate change on future generations increased climate change concern and intended proclimate political behaviors, but this framing effect disappeared when a partisan identity was first primed.
 - Among Democrat parents, framing had no significant effect until a partisan identity was first primed
 - Republicans whose parental identity was primed reported higher levels of support for a carbon tax after reading the frame compared to Republicans whose partisan identity was primed.
 - Democrats whose parental identities were primed had levels of carbon tax policy support that were lower than Democrats whose partisan identity was primed.
 - polarized responses to climate change frames increase when partisan identities are salient and decrease when nonpartisan identities are salient.
- **Critique:** Only look at liberal issue (climate change), what about conservative issue.
- **Contribution:** political communication on polarized issues is likely to be more effective at building bipartisan agreement when nonpartisan identities are salient.
- **Relevant Literature:** Link between framing and identity theory

Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman. 2007. “Framing Theory.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 10, no. 1 (June): 103–126

- **One Sentence Summary:** Review on how framing effects work, what are the moderators and future avenues for research.
- **Review:**
 - Frames in communication: the key considerations emphasized in a speech act
 - Framing effect: how frames in the communications of elites (e.g., politicians, media outlets, interest groups) influence citizens’ frames and attitudes.
 - How do framing effects work?

- ★ In order for a framing effect to occur, a given consideration—say free speech in the evaluation of a hate group’s right to rally—needs to be stored in memory to be available for retrieval and use. So if don’t understand framing effect won’t work.
 - ★ The consideration must be accessible (increases with recent considerations and frequency).
 - ★ Out of the set of accessible beliefs, only some are strong enough to be judged relevant or applicable to the subject at hand.
 - ★ Framing effects depend on a mix of factors including the strength and repetition of the frame, the competitive environment, and individual motivations (Chong and Druckman 2007)
 - What are the moderators to framing effects?
 - ★ Individuals who have strong values are less amenable to frames that contradict those values
 - ★ conflicting results for knowledge but after controlling for prior attitudes, knowledge enhances framing effects because it increases the likelihood that the considerations emphasized in a frame will be available or comprehensible to the individual (Druckman and Nelson 2003)
 - ★ Impact of competing frames
 - **Future Research:**
 - Future studies should examine the impact of framing across longer durations of time
 - Do people experience long term learning?
-

Traditional Media

Polarization of Traditional Media

Markus Prior. 2007. *Post-broadcast democracy: how media choice increases inequality in political involvement and polarizes elections*. Cambridge studies in public opinion and political psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** Cable TV and the Internet have increased media choice, leading to a compositional change in the electorate because entertainment-seekers voluntarily opt out of political news
- **Argument:** content preferences are key to understanding political learning, participation in a high-choice media env’t where politics competes with entertainment.
 - Into the 70s/80s, almost half of Americans watched nightly news, as this was their only choice → incidental exposure to political news.
 - Now that there are more available choices, people can more easily avoid political information if they are not interested.
 - Increasing media choice therefore leads to less political knowledge, participation among those who are not motivated to follow politics.
 - The consequence is greater polarization because those who are involved in politics are stronger partisans.
 - Summary: greater media choice allows citizens to select into their preferred content → those who prefer entertainment now avoid political news → less likely to learn about politics and vote → those who participate are more polarized and polarization increases.
- **Data/Methods:** Survey data from N&E and NES, and aggregate data on market media penetration.

- Panel survey: news and entertainment survey, with two waves (2002, 2003)
 - ★ DV: turnout in 2002 House elections, political knowledge
 - ★ IV: media preference (translated to relative entertainment preference)
 - ★ Moderators: cable subscribers, Internet users
- Cross-sectional survey: using NES, Pew datasets to replicate panel results
- **Findings:** media content preference is a better predictor of political knowledge and turnout as the amount of choice increases.
 - Leads to a gap in knowledge and turnout between people who prefer news and people who prefer entertainment.
 - As cable penetration increases, variations in presidential vote shares from one election to the next decline significantly
 - Panel survey: media preferences strongly predict both political knowledge, voter turnout
 - Polarization: changes in the media environment preceded the polarization of Congress – discounting other stories that focus on elite polarization as source of mass polarization.
- **Critique:**
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Literature on polarization — Goes against the idea that elites led to mass polarization.
 - Guess work, people are still exposed to media from both parties

Markus Prior. 2013. “Media and Political Polarization.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 16, no. 1 (May): 101–127

- **One Sentence Summary:** review piece examining the effects of partisan media on political polarization, arguing that there isn’t evidence that partisan media make Americans more partisan
- **Argument:** increase in media choice has changed the composition of the electorate by lowering the share of less interested, partisan voters, resulting in greater partisanship within the electorate (rather than in the full population)
 - Motivating question: “whether the emergence of more partisan media has contributed to political polarization and led Americans to support more partisan policies and candidates” (101)
 - Main argument: evidence for a causal link between more partisan media, changing attitudes/behaviors is mixed
 - ★ Most voters are centrist, avoid partisan media (or mix and match), and those who follow partisan media closely (“activists” vs. masses) were already strong partisans to begin with
 - Media polarization: longstanding media outlets don’t seem to have become more partisan, but cable/Internet outlets that entered market later don’t have same incentives for political moderation
 - Partisan media effects: two avenues through which partisan media could increase attitude polarization: persuasion and selective exposure
 - ★ Persuasion: slanted news should move everyone in the same direction, particularly when audience lacks political knowledge or strong priors
 - ★ Selective exposure: whether people, when given a choice between news reports with different partisan slants, seek out like-minded news

- **Findings:** no evidence that partisan media are making ordinary Americans more partisan; consumption of these media is largely contained to already-strong partisans
 - Research to date does not offer compelling evidence that partisan media have made Americans more partisan. Most voters are centrist. Most voters avoid partisan media altogether or mix and match across ideological lines. And those who follow partisan media closely and select mostly one side are already partisan.(119)
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Zaller (1992): Receive-Accept-Sample Model: Politically sophisticated individuals less likely to be swayed. Less politically sophisticated individuals do not access political information. Thus, moderately sophisticated individuals are the most influenceable.

Kevin Arceneaux, Martin Johnson, and Chad Murphy. 2012. “Polarized Political Communication, Oppositional Media Hostility, and Selective Exposure.” *The Journal of Politics* 74, no. 1 (January): 174–186

- **One Sentence Summary:** Examines effects of partisan news on media perceptions and find that counter-attitudinal programming erodes trust in media – but the ability to tune out this content attenuates this effect.
- **Argument/Theory:** New form of oppositional media hostility, in contrast to hostile media effect, driven by a partisan media environment. Suggests that partisan media have the potential to erode trust in media, as exposure to counter-attitudinal media decreases trust both in the content viewed and in the media in general.
 - Hostile media effect: partisans who identify with one side of political conflict feel that stories are biased against them, despite being objective
 - Oppositional media hostility: increased suspicion of the news media, driven by reactions to media outlets that represent counter-attitudinal viewpoints
 - Main argument: counter-attitudinal news programming is more likely to induce hostile media effects than pro-attitudinal programming.
 - ★ However, the presence of choice attenuates the effects of partisan media on oppositional media hostility.
- **Data/Methods:** six laboratory-based experiments using different methodologies.
 - Forced-exposure: Student/adult samples, randomized to view “opinionated” talk shows (e.g., Fox News, MSNBC).
 - ★ Treatment: randomized respondents to either view pro- or counter-attitudinal talk shows, with no choice over their content
 - ★ DV: agreement/disagreement with show, perceptions of show as fair/unfair, hostile/friendly, balanced/skewed, etc.
 - ★ Also looked at trustworthiness of different types of reporters (TV, newspaper)
 - Selective exposure: Student samples, randomized to either forced or choice over pro-attitudinal, counter-attitudinal, and entertainment clips
 - ★ Treatment: add experimental condition in which people are allowed limited range of choice over what to watch, how much time to spend
 - ★ DV: same as forced-exposure studies
 - Patient preference: Randomly assigned to forced exposure vs. entertainment

- ★ Treatment: ask people for their preferences in advance to identify groups of watchers, non-watchers of different media
- ★ DV: completed thought-listing task to understand how people process information
- ★ Coded for affective content (positive vs. negative) and measured balance of positive vs. negative thoughts

- **Findings:**

- Forced-exposure: people who viewed pro-attitudinal content found it more fair, friendly, good, cooperative than people who viewed counter-attitudinal content.
 - ★ Pro-attitudinal shows viewed as more balanced, even-handed, American.
 - ★ Exposure to counter-attitudinal media reduced trust in news media in general, as well as TV
- Selective exposure: replicate previous studies– those forced to watch counter-attitudinal programming are more distrusting of the media. However, those in choice condition not significantly different from placebo.
- Patient preference: people who would’ve rather watched entertainment respondent negatively to both clips, whereas subjects who wanted to watch a news clip had a far more muted effect.

- **Critique:** subjects in the experiments may have been responding to the network moniker at the bottom of their television screen more than the message in these shows.

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Fragmentation of the television news media (Prior 2007)

Matthew S. Levendusky. 2013. “Why Do Partisan Media Polarize Viewers?” *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 3 (July): 611–623

- **One Sentence Summary:** Partisan media polarize the electorate by taking extreme citizens and making them more extreme.
- **Argument:** Partisan media polarize viewers, but the effects are confined only to those individuals who watch partisan media in the real world. However, though partisan media only directly affect a small group of viewers, their exposure has a ripple effect, because this group plays an outsized role in politics.
 - Hypotheses:
 - ★ Exposure to like-minded partisan media will polarize attitudes (increased extremity)
 - ★ Cross-cutting media will also polarize attitudes (disconfirmation bias), but the effects will be contained to those with strongest priors (who have the ability to counter-argue)
 - Main Argument: Polarizing effects of counter-attitudinal media are contained to those who have strong prior attitudes– and thus ability to counter-argue. However, the effects of pro-attitudinal media are unconditional, as don’t need resources to counter-argue.
- **Data/Methods:** three experiments (one laboratory-based, two online)
 - DV: polarization, measured by attitude magnitude (issue polarization)
 - IV: exposure to like-minded, cross-cutting, or balanced programming
 - Study 1: view like-minded, cross-cutting, or neutral media program (PBS, Fox, MSNBC), each discussing four issues

- Study 2: to increase external validity, use patient preference trial, to allow to condition on preferences for like-minded, cross-cutting, or neutral news sources
- Study 3: to investigate the time horizon of the effects, assess effects of partisan media after several days post-exposure

- **Findings:**

- Study 1: like-minded media seem to make subjects more extreme, though there are no main effects for cross-cutting media (only interact with strong prior beliefs)
- Study 2: the effect of partisan media is conditional on preferences. Like-minded media primarily polarizes those who want to watch, crosscutting media preferences moderates attitudes for those who want to watch
- Study 3: effects of like-minded media can still be detected two days later

- **Relevant Literature:**

- suggests the polarizing effects of partisan media are relatively contained - to those who actually prefer to watch these media and who already have strong attitudes
- However, even if only a small group are affected, this can have wide-ranging effects, as partisan media mobilize those already active and engaged citizens, who can then pressure elites to become more extreme → elite polarization.

James N. Druckman et al. 2019. “How Incivility on Partisan Media (De)Polarizes the Electorate.” *The Journal of Politics* 81, no. 1 (January): 291–295

- **Key Takeaway:** Studies of partisan media need to focus on the level of *incivility* in addition to partisan slant
- **Argument:** Explore the moderating effect of the level of incivility on the polarizing effect of partisan media:
 - When partisan media comes from an in-party sources, incivility *depolarizes*: partisans feel less close to and trusting of their party (relative to those watching more civil program)
 - ★ Uncivil partisan media perceived as norm violating, when this violation comes from the in-party people may want to distance themselves from the party
 - When individuals watch out-party sources, the opposite happens and incivility polarizes respondents
 - ★ When incivility comes from the opposing party, norm violation will generate anger and leads people to reinforce beliefs
 - Incivility is defined as violations of politeness that include slurs, threats of harm, and disrespect, with a focus on the out-party
 - Response to incivility will also be moderated by people’s aversion to conflict
- **Data/Methods:** Experiments

James N. Druckman, Matthew S. Levendusky, and Audrey McLain. 2018. “No Need to Watch: How the Effects of Partisan Media Can Spread via Interpersonal Discussions.” *American Journal of Political Science* 62, no. 1 (January): 99–112

- **Key Takeaway:** While partisan media may only directly impact a small proportion of the population, this influence can spread more broadly via interpersonal discussions
- **Argument:** Propose a two-step flow of information for contemporary partisan media
 - What happens when individuals who are exposed to partisan media interact with those who are not? Depends on the nature of the discussion group; homogeneous vs heterogeneous groups (in terms of party)
 - In a homogeneous group, expect that those who did not watch partisan media will polarize relative to those who were exposed to neither media nor discussion. They should then hold opinions that largely match the opinions of those who were exposed to partisan media
 - In heterogeneous group, expect people to find arguments from their own partisan perspective persuasive. Generate polarization relative to those exposed to neither media nor discussion. Given the existence of cross-cutting discussion, polarization should be lower
- **Data/Methods:** Lab experiment
- **Findings:** Those who watch and are impacted by partisan media talk to and persuade others who did not watch. The result is that partisan media influences non-watcher via a two-step communication flow (similar idea to Columbia School)
 - Individuals who did not watch partisan media, but talked with those who did, formed opinions that match those who watched
 - The two-step effects may be *larger* than the direct effects of exposure itself → suggesting past work might be underestimating the effect of partisan media

Justin De Benedictis-Kessner et al. 2019. “Persuading the Enemy: Estimating the Persuasive Effects of Partisan Media with the Preference-Incorporating Choice and Assignment Design.” *American Political Science Review* 113, no. 4 (November): 902–916

- **One Sentence Summary:** Does media choice cause polarization, or merely reflect it? Introduce Preference-Incorporating Choice and Assignment (PICA) design, that incorporates both free choice and forced exposure and find that partisan media can polarize those who are regular consumers + those who inadvertently exposed to partisan media. Opposing media can also reduce polarization.
- **Argument:** partisan media can polarize both regular consumers and inadvertent audiences who would not otherwise consume it
 - Hard to detangle whether people self-select into partisan media and thus polarization leads to media fragmentation, or whether the media persuade the public in one direction which leads to polarization. Include forced choice and self selection component of experiment. For both control for media preferences of people. This approach allows researchers to estimate the persuasiveness of partisan media, conditional on media preferences, while also accounting for any mismatch between individuals’ preferences and their choice of media within the experiment.
 - Partisan media have the largest persuasive effect on consumers of entertainment content - even after just one instance of exposure.
 - However, ideologically opposing media can also ameliorate existing polarization between consumers; exposure to oppositional media partially reduces polarization of attitudes between groups.
 - Takeaway: amount of persuasion caused by partisan media depends on existing preferences for media (entertainment, Fox, or MSNBC)

- **Data/Methods:** Preference-Incorporating Choice and Assignment (PICA) design, incorporating both free choice and forced exposure to partisan media, via SSI
 - Expands on the patient preference trial (PPT) framework (see: Arceneaux et al. 2012, Levendusky 2013) by integrating both free and forced choice
 - Enables inference about the impact of partisan media on people who would normally never choose to come it.
 - Estimand: average choice-specific treatment effect (ACTE); average effect of exposure to one story vs. another, among those who would prefer Fox, MSNBC, or entertainment
 - Treatment: randomize into free choice or forced exposure arms, though all respondents report their stated media preferences
 - DVs: attitudinal index, sharing index
 - Sensitivity analysis: to estimate extent to which divergence between stated and actual preferences biases naïve estimates of ACTEs
- **Findings:** “partisan media are most likely to persuade individuals who would choose to consume entertainment media rather than partisan media” (2)
 - However, individuals who prefer partisan media are also persuadable; exposure to Fox increases attitudinal conservatism, even for respondents who prefer Fox.
 - Suggests that exposure to more partisan news can sway opinions of respondents who are already exposed to some degree of news.
 - Effects on attitudes were in opposite direction as sharing, with exposure to Fox vs. MSNBC reducing willingness to share content
 - “Forcing people to read news from the ‘other side’ generally moderates the opinions of partisan media consumers, thereby reducing polarization” (9)
 - However, selective exposure may limit exposure of ideological extremists to media that would cause them to moderate their opinions
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - partisan media can contribute to polarization via persuasion – especially among entertainment seekers but also strong partisans.
 - Response to Prior (2007), Arceneaux et al. (2012) and Levendusky (2013)

Chloe Wittenberg et al. 2023. “Media Measurement Matters: Estimating the Persuasive Effects of Partisan Media with Survey and Behavioral Data.” *The Journal of Politics* (March): 724960

- **One Sentence Summary:** Measure the effect of persuasion effects of partisan media by contrasting survey-based indicators of stated preferences with behavioral measures of revealed preferences. Find that self-reported evidence of media consumption results in more media polarization effects from cross-cutting sources, whereas behavioral measures of preferences result in less evidence of polarizing beliefs.
- **Argument:** Individuals are bad at self-declaring their media preferences and media consumption, and thus important to compare the effect of media persuasion using both types of media preference measures. Differing conclusions about the nature of media persuasion depending on how media preferences are measured.

- Find that self-declared measure of media preference suggests that being exposed to oppositional media results in less polarized attitudes, this evidence is not observed with the revealed preference measure.
- Partisan media have minimal impact on the policy attitudes of citizens with more extreme media diets
- partisan media may, under certain conditions, contribute to polarization due to one-sided persuasion by ideologically aligned sources
- **Data/Methods:** Integrate individual-level web-browsing data with a survey experiment and respondents self-declared media preferences
 - contrast survey-based indicators of stated preferences with behavioral measures of revealed preferences, based on the relative volume and slant of news individuals consume
 - Panelists explicitly agree to have their online web-browsing behavior tracked via a “software meter” program that they install upon enrolling in the panel
 - 3513 respondents participate in two-arm survey experiment
 - ask media consumption preferences then randomly assigned respondents to either a free- or forced-choice group. Forced choice either see news from MSNBC, Fox or Food Network.
 - Focus on respondents assigned to the forced-choice group (n = 1757), as the use of random assignment allows for more robust causal inference. Use other group for validation.
 - Topic of news articles was education.
 - Outcome: asked respondents twelve questions about their opinions on education policy, which we formed into an attitudinal index, and four questions about actions they might take in response to the articles (e.g., discuss with friends, post on social media), which we combined into a sharing index
- **Findings:**
 - Prefer entertainment:
 - ★ Both conservative and liberal sources can persuade individuals who generally prefer entertainment over news—regardless of whether this preference is registered via survey self-reports or behavioral indicators
 - Avid Partisan Media Consumers:
 - ★ stated preference measure suggests that exposure to oppositional outlets can meaningfully shape public opinion among individuals who report a preference for partisan media
 - ★ BUT revealed preference measures suggest limited attitude change among individuals with more polarized media diets
 - ★ when attitude change does occur within group that consumes partisan media, it seems to mostly reflect persuasion by ideologically aligned sources; that is, MSNBC tends to persuade consumers with more liberal media diets, and Fox News tends to persuade consumers with more conservative media diets
 - ★ these measures indicate that partisan media have minimal impact on the policy attitudes of citizens with more extreme media diets
- **Critique:** Don’t have the power to differentiate liberals and conservatives
- **Relevant Literature:** Persuasion effects

Alexander Coppock. 2022. *Persuasion in parallel: how information changes minds about politics*. Chicago studies in American politics. Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** Does information polarize people’s attitudes? People update their beliefs in response to new information. Rather than rejecting counter-attitudinal information, people are persuaded by it. Consistent pattern that occurs with issue after issue, with little evidence of heterogeneity throughout the public.
- **Argument:**
 - the effects of persuasive information on attitudes are “small, positive, and durable for everyone.”
 - ★ Small in the sense that they only add a handful of considerations from the mix that people already have in their mind.
 - ★ Durable in the sense that they last at least 10 days.
 - ★ For everyone in the sense that they are similar across population subgroups. Homogenous effects by race, gender, partisanship, ideology, age, and education.
 - ★ Positive means that people move in the direction of the information provided, regardless of their prior belief. Example: That is, if supporters of the death penalty and opponents see new information indicating that the death penalty reduces crime, they both will become more favorable toward the death penalty.
 - **Data/Methods:**
 - ★ Measures the effect of persuasive information (e.g. arguments) and NOT group cues such as partisan cues.
 - ★ 23 different experiments that vary whether people get information, and what kinds of information they receive
- **Critique:**
 - From Levendusky 2023 review: Once people can select receive messages or not, or at least pay less attention to them, we might see more variable effects of information.
 - Should not be so quick as to reject motivated reasoning theory for information processing: testing motivated reasoning implies that we can determine, manipulate and measure motivations, which coppock does not do. One objection to manipulating motivations is that priming motivations might also then inadvertently prime other factors, as Tappin, Pennycook, and Rand argue.
 - In the real world, political information does not arrive in a vacuum; instead, it largely comes from political elites, delivered through journalists and the mass media. So coppock’s book does not cover all the information that people receive which is outside the scope of his study, but should be highlighted. Missing what Zaller would call cueing messages which help voters link information with their predispositions. Motivated reasoning tends to happen when a person’s core value or identity is challenged (Lodge and Taber 2006)... Thus, before we conclude motivated reasoning is not valuable, we need to see that it fails not just in one particular case but more broadly.
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Motivated reasoning when exposed to persuasive information is WRONG: Goes against backfire effect literature (Nyhan and Reifler 2010) or attitudinal polarization (Lodge and Taber 2006) — where seeing a piece of counter-attitudinal information makes people “double down” on their original view.
 - Lodge and Taber find that attitudinally congruent arguments are evaluated as stronger than attitudinally incongruent arguments. When reading pro and con arguments, participants (Ps) counterargue the contrary arguments and uncritically accept supporting argument. Confirmation and disconfirmation biases lead to attitude polarization especially among those with the strongest priors and highest levels of political sophistication.

- ★ Coppock argument: information itself does not generate attitudinal polarization, contrary to what one might expect from theories of motivated reasoning. Rather than generating polarization, counter-attitudinal information generates persuasion—often only a little bit, but persuasion nonetheless.
- ★ this helps us make sense of the modest effect sizes of campaign communications and advertisements and framing
- ★ micro-foundational argument for Page and Shapiro’s classic work about public opinion changes over time

Traditional Media and Persuasion

S. DellaVigna and E. Kaplan. 2007. “The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122, no. 3 (August): 1187–1234

- **One Sentence Summary:** Take advantage of variation in the availability of the Fox News Channel across cable systems and find that exposure to Fox News created one half of a percentage point shift toward George W. Bush in the 2000 presidential election.
- **Argument:**
- **Data/Methods:** natural experiment induced by the timing of the entry of the Fox News Channel in local cable markets.
 - assemble a new panel of town-level data on federal elections and match it with town-level data on cable programming
 - compare the change in the Republican vote share between 1996 and 2000 for the towns that had adopted Fox News by 2000 with those that had not
 - Argue randomization because: “Conditional on a set of geographic and cable controls, the availability of Fox News is uncorrelated with town-level demographic controls and with town-level voting patterns in 1996 and before 1996”
 - Placebo: availability of Fox News in 2000 did not affect the vote share between 1992 and 1996 or between 1988 and 1992, when Fox News did not yet exist.
- **Findings:**
 - Entry of Fox News increased the Republican vote share in presidential elections by 0.4 to 0.7 percentage points, depending on the specification
 - effect was smaller in towns with more cable channels, which is consistent with a moderating effect of competition
 - if effect driven by shift in vote choice or greater mobilization? : Fox News significantly increased voter turnout, particularly in the more Democratic districts. The impact of Fox News on voting appears to be due to the mobilization of voters and particularly conservative voters in Democratic-leaning districts.
 - Fox News convinced between 3 and 8 percent of its non-Republican viewers to vote Republican, depending on the specification
- **Critique:**
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Unlike Prior 2007 measure the effect of persuasion and not just general trend of introduction of cable news on turnout.

Alan S Gerber, Dean Karlan, and Daniel Bergan. 2009. "Does the Media Matter? A Field Experiment Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on Voting Behavior and Political Opinions." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 1, no. 2 (March): 35–52

- **One Sentence Summary:** Field experiment to measure the effect of exposure to newspapers on political behavior and opinion. Find that media exposure but not media slant increases Democratic vote share.
- **Argument:**
 - Previous lit: biased reports of media exposure and to selection bias from the tendency for individuals to seek out information that agrees with their pre-existing views
 -
- **Data/Methods:** Field experiment before the 2005 Virginia gubernatorial election
 - Randomly assign individuals to Washington Post (Liberal leaning) free subscription treatment, a Washington Times (Conservative leaning) free subscription treatment, or a control treatment.
 - Excluded from study those that said already received one of two papers.
 - Outcome: political knowledge, turnout (self-reported + administrative data), vote choice or preference (self-reported).
- **Findings:**
 - no effect of receiving either paper on knowledge of political events, opinions of those events, or on voter turnout in the 2005 gubernatorial election
 - receiving either paper led to more support for the Democratic candidate suggesting that media slant mattered less in this case than exposure to media
 - some evidence of increased voter turnout in the 2006 election among those receiving either paper
- **Critique:**
 - Weird result that exposure to news has no effect in 2005 election but small effect in turnout in 2006 election.
 - Examining the effect of exposing individuals who, on average, are less exposed to the media than the average individual.
 - Cannot be sure newspapers were read, so would not say that reading news has absolutely no effect. Conservative test.
- **Relevant Literature:**

Jonathan McDonald Ladd and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2009. "Exploiting a Rare Communication Shift to Document the Persuasive Power of the News Media." *American Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 2 (April): 394–410

- **One Sentence Summary:** under certain (rare) conditions, news media can have large-scale persuasive effects on voting behavior
- **Argument:** difficult to identify the persuasive effects of media, given the lack of variation in message over time (most media outlets maintain similar stances over time)

- Need to rule out alternative explanations (e.g., selective exposure to congenial media, media pandering to audience’s politics)
- **Data/Methods:** exploit a rare change in communication flows (switch in endorsement to Labour Party) by several prominent British newspapers before the 1997 general election
 - Data: 1992 British Election Panel Study (1992 - 1997), with 1992, 1994, 1995, and 1996 the pre-period and 1997 the post-period
 - Method: quasi-experimental difference-in-differences design, correcting for non-random selection on observables via parametric techniques, matching
 - ★ Compare readers vs. non-readers in 1997 vs. 1992
 - DV: support for Labour party
 - IV: exposure to unexpected shift in media stance (endorsement)
- **Findings:** newspapers persuaded a considerable share of their readers (10-25%) to vote for Labour Party, via a shift in endorsements
 - Difference in increase in Labour support for readers vs. non-readers in 1997 vs. 1992 was nearly 9pp—a massive shift
 - Not a result of newspapers adapting to changing attitudes of readership; persuasion effects only emerge in 1997, after the switch in endorsement.
- **Critique:**
- **Relevant Literature:**

Gregory J. Martin and Joshua McCRAIN. 2019. “Local News and National Politics.” *American Political Science Review* 113, no. 2 (May): 372–384

- **One Sentence Summary:** What drives decline in resources dedicated to coverage of local politics in the US news media? Supply-side role in the trends toward nationalization and polarization of politics news, with negative implications for accountability of local elected officials and mass polarization.
- **Argument:** Acquisition of local newspapers by national corporation leads to more coverage of national politics at the expense of local politics and lower viewership.
- **Data/Methods:** Analyze the content and viewership of 743 local news stations over the latter two-thirds of 2017, a period that saw the acquisition of a set of local television stations by a large conglomerate owner, the Sinclair Broadcast Group
 - differences-in-differences design that compares the Sinclair-acquired stations with other stations operating in the same markets
- **Findings:**
 - find that the acquisition led to a roughly three percentage point increase in the share of programming devoted to coverage of national politics, a roughly 25% increase relative to the average level in the sample.
 - this increase came largely at the expense of coverage of local politics
 - text-based measures of ideological slant shifted to the right at Sinclair-acquired stations following the acquisition, relative to other stations in the same market

- measure the change in viewership attributable to the change in ownership. Consistent with a supply-driven story, the differences-in-differences estimate of short-term viewership changes at the Sinclair-acquired stations is negative, though small enough to be statistically indistinguishable from zero

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Methodology

Donald P. Green, Brian R. Calfano, and Peter M. Aronow. 2014. “Field Experimental Designs for the Study of Media Effects.” *Political Communication* 31, no. 1 (January): 168–180

- **One Sentence Summary:** Piece on experimental designs to study media effects
 - **Argument:**
 - To randomize real-world messaging: identify relatively low-cost mass media markets—cable TV zones, ethnic radio, FMradio—and these units can form the basis of between-subjects clustered designs
 - need to take full advantage of the opportunities for field experimentation in the developing world
 - Field experiments and tailor experiment to fit with constraints from private firms.
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Social Media

Jaime E. Settle. 2018. *Frenemies: how social media polarizes America*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** Social media and particularly Facebook amplified affective polarization. Thus, Facebook users are more polarized than non-FB users.
- **Argument:** Defining characteristics of political communication on FB facilitate psychological polarization: Identity formation and reinforcement, Biased information processing, social inference and judgement
 - the communication ecosystem on fb facilitates negative and stereotypes evaluations of americans with whome people disagree.
 - Creates polarization for both the politically engaged and disengaged
- **Data/Methods:**
 - Political Discussion Survey (N=3,030) → Selection into FB use is unrelated to the factors that drive political behavior. Follow up survey with those that have fb: End Framework Survey
 - Inference studies: set of 3 studies. Respondents were randomly assigned to assess between six and ten stimuli that were formatted to look like typical Facebook content. After each stimulus, they answered a set of questions about the user supposedly posted the content to Facebook. At the end of the study, respondents answered a set of questions about their own Facebook usage.
 - Accuracy study: people write their own posts and then other respondents rate those posts, to validate that the posts in previous study were representative.
 - Final study: people see the feedback that “respondents” give their post. However, this is manipulated by researchers to be high or low level of social feedback.

- **Findings:**

- Facebook users not only recognize the partisan identity of other users based on what they post, but also evaluate and judge members of their out-group in a manner consistent with the processes suggested by social identity theory.

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Social identity theory

Christopher A. Bail et al. 2018. “Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 115, no. 37 (September): 9216–9221

- **One Sentence Summary:** Exposure to opposing views on social media (following a bot that posts opposing ideological content) results in an increase in polarization.

- **Theory:**

- people who are exposed to messages that conflict with their own attitudes are prone to counter argue them using motivated reasoning, which accentuates perceived differences between groups and increases their commitment to preexisting beliefs (backfire effects)
- backfire effects will be more likely to occur among conservatives than liberals. This hypothesis builds upon recent studies that indicate conservatives hold values that prioritize certainty and tradition, whereas liberals value change and diversity.

- **Data/Methods:**

- Survey + Field experiment: separate field experiments for Democratic and Republican respondents
- Respondents are randomly assigned to treatment where they are asked to follow a bot on twitter that posts counter-attitudinal content (retweet 24 messages each day for 1 mo.)
- key outcome variable: change in political ideology during the study period via a 10-item survey instrument that asked respondents to agree or disagree with a range of statements about policy issues on a seven-point scale
- additional financial incentives (up to \$18) to complete weekly surveys that asked them to answer questions about the content of the tweets produced by the Twitter bots and identify a picture of an animal that was tweeted twice a day by the bot but deleted immediately before the weekly survey.
- respondents were asked to complete a final survey with the same questions from the initial (pretreatment) survey.

- **Findings:**

- Treated Republicans exhibited substantially more conservative views posttreatment. For Democrats this effect was not statistically significant but in the right direction (become more liberal post treatment).

- **Critique:**

- It is possible that Twitter users may simply ignore such counterattitudinal messages in the absence of financial incentives.

- No group that receives politically consistent messages and thus might just be effect of exposure to information. In addition, do not know if people are reacting to being mad at being exposed to counter attitudinal content, or whether respondents are actually changing their attitudes and public opinion.
- unable to identify the precise mechanism that created the backfire effect among Republican respondents
- exposed respondents to high-profile elites with opposing political ideologies. Might just be antielite effect.

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Literature on polarizing vs. persuasion effect of the media

Pablo Barberá. 2015. “Birds of the Same Feather Tweet Together: Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation Using Twitter Data.” *Political Analysis* 23 (1): 76–91

- **One Sentence Summary:** Bayesian ideal point estimation using Twitter data
- **Argument:** Ideal point estimates of individual Twitter users and political actors (politicians, think tanks, news outlets, and others) can be derived from the “following” structure between these two sets of users. The decision to follow is considered a costly signal that provides information about Twitter users’ perceptions of both their ideological location and that of political accounts.
- **Data/Methods:** Latent space model applied to six countries (the US, the UK, Spain, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands)
 - For each of these countries, a set of political actors with visible profiles are identified on Twitter: (1) all political representatives in national-level institutions; (2) political parties with accounts on Twitter; and (3) media outlets and journalists who tweet about politics. (homophilic networks can be based not only on political traits → important to include identifiable figures with extreme ideological positions since the set of users will determine the interpretation of the latent scale)
 - Next, using the Twitter REST API, obtained the entire list of followers for all identified political actors in each country and discarded inactive users
- **Findings:**
 - Part 1: replicate existing measures of ideology for elites (legislators and political parties)
 - Part 2: validate mass ideology at the aggregate level by examining groups of Twitter users by self-identified ideology and state of residence
 - Part 3: validate mass ideology at the individual level using campaign contribution records and information about voters’ party registration history
- **Critique:** Twitter users as a self-selected minority of the population. Validity of the key assumption that the decision to follow is a costly signal about their ideological location
- **Relevant Literature:** how donations and roll call votes can be scaled onto a latent ideological dimension (Poole and Rosenthal 2007; Bonica 2014)

Andrew M. Guess. 2021. “(Almost) Everything in Moderation: New Evidence on Americans’ Online Media Diets.” *American Journal of Political Science* 65, no. 4 (October): 1007–1022

- **Key Takeaway:** Counterevidence against the prevalence of online "echo chambers", meaning that the internet facilitates selective exposure to politically congenial content.
- **Argument:** Most People have relatively moderate media diets except for a small group of partisans who exert disproportionate influence and visibility.
- **Data/Methods:** Two large N national surveys merged with panelists' internet browsing histories, conducted by YouGov in 2015 and 2016.
 - Media slant measure: For each web domain, used "alignment" score, which is the average of the self-reported ideology of users who have shared pages from that domain on Facebook. Then take the average of the alignment scores for the visited domains at the individual level.
- **Findings:**
 - Relatively moderate media diet of most respondents – found 50~65% overlap in Democrats' and Republicans' media diet distributions. The moderation is mainly a reflection of the centrism of domains, not a balancing of sources with opposing slants.
 - A small group of people with the most homogeneously partisan media consumption habits who drive a disproportionate amount of traffic to ideologically slanted websites. → could influence the majority of individuals with moderate media diets by serving as opinion leaders (possibility of systematic distortions in elite influence) (1018)
- **Contribution/Related Literature** Found a counterevidence against the prevalence of online echo chambers by collecting advanced data for measuring media exposure with survey-based approaches, not relying on self-reported exposure.

Andrew M. Guess et al. 2021. "The consequences of online partisan media." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 118, no. 14 (April): e2013464118

- **Key Takeaway:** Little evidence of online partisan media influencing attitudes
- **Argument:**
 - H1 relates to the effects of partisan media exposure on people's attitudes and opinions – do people take cues from the media when evaluating candidates and policy positions?
 - Test hypotheses related to online and offline political behavior – changes in information diet, lasting effects on media consumption
 - Study effect of partisan media on trust in media generally
- **Data/Methods:** Large, longitudinal online field experiment that naturalistically increased people's exposure to partisan news websites in 2019
 - Assigned participants to set either Fox, HuffPost, control as homepage and then follow the Facebook page, sign up for newsletters
- **Findings:**
 - Exogenous increase in partisan news exposure induced by encouragement led to changes in subjects news diets; Fox News boosted visits to other conservative sites
 - Find little evidence of media impact – do not find measurable impact on many attitudes and behaviors includes effects on agenda setting, elite approval, issue positions
 - Fox News decreased trust in media

Brendan Nyhan et al. 2023. “Like-minded sources on Facebook are prevalent but not polarizing.” *Nature* (July)

- **Key Takeaway:** Exposure to politically like-minded sources on social media is common but its prevalence does not correspond to polarization in beliefs or attitudes.
- **Data/Methods:** Used data from 2020 for the entire population of active adult Facebook users in the USA to estimate the existence of echo chambers. Then conducted a multi-wave field experiment on Facebook where they reduced the exposure to like-minded sources of a group of users by one-third to evaluate the effect of echo chambers.
- **Findings:**
 - Like-minded exposure is common. The median user received a majority of their content from like-minded sources – 50.4% versus 14.7% from cross-cutting sources. However, political news content makes up a relatively small share of what they see on Facebook (about 7%).
 - Despite the prevalence of like-minded sources, extreme echo chamber patterns of exposure are infrequent. Just 20.6% of users get over 75% of their exposures from like-minded sources.
 - In their experiment of reducing like-minded source exposure, found an increase in cross-cutting exposures and a decrease in exposure to uncivil language but no effects on attitudinal measures including affective polarization, ideological extremity, candidate evaluations, and belief in misinfo.
- **Contribution/Related Literature** Descriptive evidence of the prevalence of like-minded sources, although extreme patterns are relatively rare. Causal examination of the online echo chamber effect with null results on a range of political attitudes.

Jin Woo Kim and Eunji Kim. 2021. “Temporal Selective Exposure: How Partisans Choose When to Follow Politics.” *Political Behavior* 43, no. 4 (December): 1663–1683

- **One Sentence Summary:** Partisans vary in terms of when they pay attention to the news, not just in terms of the ideological media sources they follow.
- **Argument:** Partisans vary their political attentiveness and media consumption in response to whether news events are congenial to their party, suggesting that partisans can subject themselves to biased information flows even if their media diets are balanced.
 - Temporal selective exposure: Although selective exposure is typically conceptualized as an outlet-based phenomenon in which citizens choose what to consume, people may temporally increase or decrease their level of political attention in response to flows of good or bad news about their party without following like-minded sources
- **Data/Methods:**
 - Study I: ANES data to investigate how partisans have differed in their media consumption and political engagement over the last seven decades
 - Study II: NAES data to see whether the sudden influx of bad economic news—an event that typically does not bode well for the incumbent party in an election year—affected partisans’ media consumption differently. Utilized the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
- **Findings:**
 - In general, in-partisans become less interested relative to out-partisans under an unpopular president and become more interested under a popular president.

- find that Republicans reported consuming news media less frequently after the financial crisis, while the opposite was the case for Democrats.
- **Critique:** Limitations in studying temporal engagement with observational data and thus in making a fully causal claim on the link between temporal selective exposure and polarization.
- **Contribution/Relevant Literature:** Suggested that the stream of information that in-partisans receive may (in the long run) be different from what out-partisans are exposed to—and this may generate polarization of political beliefs even if most citizens do not rely on partisan sources. Response to previous studies with a sole focus on imbalance in media diets

Yonghwan Kim and Youngju Kim. 2019. “Incivility on Facebook and political polarization: The mediating role of seeking further comments and negative emotion.” *Computers in Human Behavior* 99 (October): 219–227

- **One Sentence Summary:** how (in)civility and the presence of supporting evidence in disagreeing comments on Facebook influence individuals’ attitude polarization? It is the civility or incivility of information that influences whether exposure to dissimilar perspectives either mitigates or reinforces individuals’ attitude polarization.
- **Data/Methods:**
 - Survey experiment, whereby respondents are exposed to a manipulated Facebook news page.
 - They were prompted to read a Facebook news post in which comments were manipulated. Treatment: civil comments with evidence (N=44); civil comments without evidence (N=43); uncivil comments with evidence (N=50); uncivil comments without evidence (N=55)
 - Outcome: series of questions on the topic in question in the post.
 - Example of civil comment: I listen to what they are saying, and respect some points. But I think possessing guns is not a good way to solve mass killings.
 - Example of not civil comment: Dumb ass Republicans! I think possessing a gun is not a good way to solve mass killings. Does a gun protect you? Huh? Bullshit Republicans!!
- **Findings:**
 - the presence or absence of supporting evidence in comments did not have any significant effect on the outcome variables
 - exposure to uncivil opposing comments, compared to exposure to civil disagreeing comments, led to lower levels of willingness to read more comments and greater levels of negative emotions and attitude polarization
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Potential mechanism behind showing that counter-attitudinal information leads to greater polarization.

Matthew Tyler, Justin Grimmer, and Shanto Iyengar. 2022. “Partisan Enclaves and Information Bazaars: Mapping Selective Exposure to Online News.” *The Journal of Politics* 84, no. 2 (April): 1057–1073

- **One Sentence Summary:** When look at strict definition of election related politics news (unlike Guess 2021) see evidence that selective exposure to concordant news sites and increased news consumption in response to events that are favorable to one’s preferred party/candidate.

- **Argument:**

- Critique previous work that looks at echo chambers by arguing that exposure to political news sites fits a very different pattern from exposure to all-purpose sites that provide a variety of browsing activities apart from news.
- When look at political news sites see evidence for echo chambers.

- **Data/Methods:**

- data set of web-browsing behavior over the course of the 2016 US presidential election
- Focus on US-election-related news while Guess et al. 2021 consider news more broadly
- create individual-level measures of partisan segregation, while also examining how consumption of political content changes in response to campaign events

- **Findings:**

- Republicans and Democrats diverge in their political news consumption
- There is political convergence on large-scale portal sites such as Yahoo, MSN, and AOL, which provide a variety of services (most notably, e-mail) and resources other than news coverage.
- Partisans not only exhibit selective exposure when choosing news sources aligned with their point of view, but they also increase their overall level of news consumption in response to “favorable” events
- in the immediate aftermath of breaking events with the potential to benefit a candidate, partisans supporting that candidate tend to increase their news consumption
- no evidence of the opposite effect, that is, avoidance of the news following an event with the potential to harm partisans’ favored candidate
- political and news interest of partisans is highly responsive to the fluctuation of campaigns

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Prior scholarship, has tended to collapse across political and non political news content, conflate visits to sites that infrequently deliver public affairs content with visits to dedicated news sites, and use data aggregated at a high level and evidence derived from self-reported news consumption.

Steve Rathje, Jay J. Van Bavel, and Sander Van Der Linden. 2021. “Out-group animosity drives engagement on social media.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 118, no. 26 (June): e2024292118

- **Key Takeaway:** Examination of the features of social media posts that predict virality, with a focus on group identity motives.

- **Argument:** Out-group animosity drives engagement on social media.

- Social identity theory: When group identities are highly salient, this can lead individuals to align themselves more with their fellow in-group members, facilitating in-group favoritism and out-group derogation in order to maintain a positive sense of group distinctiveness.
- In polarized political contexts, out-group animosity may be a more successful strategy for expressing one’s partisan identity and generating engaging content than in-group favoritism. (“negative partisanship”)

- **Data/Methods:** Facebook and Twitter posts from news media accounts and US congressional members (n=2,730,215).

- **Findings:** Posts about the political out-group were shared or retweeted about twice as often as posts about the in-group. Also, language about the out-group was a very strong predictor of "angry" reactions, creating incentives for content expressing out-group animosity.
 - **Contribution/Related Literature**
-

Misinformation

Why do People Believe and Share Misinformation?

Adam J. Berinsky. 2023. *Political rumors: why we accept misinformation and how to fight it*. Princeton studies in political behavior. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press

- **One Sentence Summary:** Why do people believe rumors and how can we increase the number of disbelievers?
- **Argument:**
 - Political rumor: "unsupported claim with a conspirational edge. ... not simply the misstatement of fact or an incorrect answer to a factual question about politics. Rather a rumor is something more insidious..." (p.3-4)
 - Think of political rumors as pebble in a pond. When creators plant the first seed of a rumor (tossing the pebble), its effects "ripple" outwards in the public, with belief in rumors diminishing from strong believers, uncertain and disbelievers.
 - Repeated encounters with rumors can increase belief in these rumors.
 - Rumors are processed through a partisan lens. Those that are more prone to believe rumors are more partisan and conspiratorially inclined.
 - ★ Among republicans, if rumor is attributed to trump more likely to believe than if rumor was attributed to nobody specifically.
 - Need to focus on the "uncertain" to correct misinformation, because the uncertain comprise a large part of the public and the firm believers are hard to change mind.
 - Corrections from surprising sources are the most efficient in increasing the disbelievers.
 - Only slight asymmetry between republicans and democrats in effectiveness of corrections. Minimal evidence that conservatives less likely to respond to corrections than liberals.
 - elites are not penalized for spreading misinformation.
 - republicans with greater political information are less responsive to corrections of democrat leaning rumors, than republicans with less political information. Among democrats, greater levels of political information are associated with greater rumor rejection regardless of the target. Why? Republican elites more likely to spread misinformation.
- **Data/Methods:** Survey and experimental data starting in 2010.
- **Findings:**
 - Who believes:
 - ★ Those who respond "don't know" to belief in political rumors because for some this response indicates a skepticism of political facts that can sometimes be overcome with the provision of new information.
 - ★ Failure to reject rumors is NOT concentrated in small portion of the electorate. Most people exhibit *some* belief in rumors. One average people endorse 2 of the 7 rumors.

- ★ The most partisan and conspiratorially inclined
- How to correct:
 - ★ Provide correction coming from people who do not benefit from correcting —surprising sources (same argument as Berinsky 2017)
 - ★ Not one method is perfect, must use multiple methods together (analogy of “Swiss cheese model”. Each correction has holes but stacking together many layers covers the holes) In general solution seems to be elite driven.

Ullrich K. H. Ecker et al. 2022. “The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction.” *Nature Reviews Psychology* 1, no. 1 (January): 13–29

- **One Sentence Summary:** Literature review on reasons why people share misinformation and interventions to reduce the spread of misinformation.
- **Theory/Argument:**
 - Misinformation: any information that turns out to be false
 - Disinformation: subset of misinformation that is spread intentionally
 - Drivers of false beliefs:
 - ★ People are often biased to believe in the validity of information, use intuition rather than deliberating about info
 - ★ Repetition increases belief in misinformation
 - ★ Messages are more persuasive and seem more true when coming from credible, human sources that are perceived to be more attractive, powerful, and like-minded
 - ★ People often easily overlook the source of information—don’t realize when it comes from dubious sources
 - Barriers to belief revision → Continued-influence-effect: Idea that belief in misinformation may continue even after correction.
 - ★ Cognitive factors: even if you’re provided with corrective info, misinformation is still accessible in memory
 - ★ Social/affective factors:
 - source credibility, the perceived trustworthiness and expertise of the sources providing the misinformation and correction, has strong impact on acceptance of misinfo
 - (2) worldview - corrections to a person’s worldview can be ineffective or backfire and hinder information revision
 - emotion - misinformation conveying negative emotions such as fear or anger might be particularly likely to evoke a CIE
 - Interventions: Three main types 1) providing facts, 2) address logical fallacies, 3) undermine the plausibility of the misinformation or credibility of its source
 - ★ pre-emptive intervention (prebunking) and reactive intervention (debunking). Prebunking seeks to help people recognize and resist subsequently encountered misinformation, even if it is novel. Debunking emphasizes responding to specific misinformation after exposure to demonstrate why it is false
 - ★ Elements of debunking:
 - provide factual account that includes alternative explanation for why something happened

- misinfo should be repeated to demonstrate how it is incorrect and make correction salient
- corrections delivered by high-credibility sources
- corrections should be paired with relevant social norms
- corrections should have simple language and informative graphic
- world view threatening corrections can be made palatable by concurrently providing identity affirmation
- ★ Social media corrections: include “gentle accuracy nudges” or disclaimers
- **Data/Methods:** Lit review

D.J. Flynn, Brendan Nyhan, and Jason Reifler. 2017. “The Nature and Origins of Misperceptions: Understanding False and Unsupported Beliefs About Politics: Nature and Origins of Misperceptions.” *Political Psychology* 38 (February): 127–150

- **One Sentence Summary:** Misperceptions are rooted in directionally motivated reasoning and corrections are often times not effective when touching on controversial issues and political figures.
- **Argument:**
 - Different goals can be activated when processing information: 1) Directional goals — trying to reach a desired conclusion, and 2) Accuracy goals — trying to process information as dispassionately as possible (Kunda 1990)
 - “motivated reasoning” typically refers to directionally motivated reasoning, which is, arguably, the most common way that people process political stimuli (Redlawsk, 2002; Taber & Lodge, 2006)
 - “Directionally motivated reasoning leads people to seek out information that reinforces their preferences (i.e., confirmation bias), counterargue information that contradicts their preferences (i.e., disconfirmation bias), and view proattitudinal information as more convincing than counterattitudinal information (i.e., prior attitude effect) (Taber & Lodge, 2006, p. 757)”
 - The relative strength of directional and accuracy motivations can vary substantially between individuals and across contexts.
 - Moderators of directionally motivated reasoning:
 - ★ Polarization among party elites: polarization causes people to shift their opinions in the direction of copartisan elites regardless of the types of arguments they read
 - ★ Ingroup members providing correction
 - ★ Directional motivations are likely to be stronger for highly salient political dispute
 - ★ Directionally motivated reasoning occurs most often with people who have relatively high levels of political knowledge (taber and lodge 2006). These people are better able to resist incongruent information and maintain alignment between their factual beliefs and predisposition “what goes with what” (Converse, 1964) and greater ability to counterargue incongruent information (e.g., Nyhan & Reifler, 2010).
 - ★ Controversial finding: political conservatism associated with a tendency toward directionally motivated reasoning
 - ★ Civic-minded motivations are primed, directional motivations become less salient

- **Data/Methods:** Lit Review
- **Relevant Literature:**

- Motivated reasoning (Taber and Lodge 2006; Redlawsk 2002; Kunda 1990)

Andrew Guess, Jonathan Nagler, and Joshua Tucker. 2019. “Less than you think: Prevalence and predictors of fake news dissemination on Facebook.” *Science Advances* 5, no. 1 (January): eaau4586

- **One Sentence Summary:** Sharing false information is rare and conservatives seem to be more likely to share misinformation, but maybe because greater supply of conservative misinformation during the 2016 presidential campaign.
 - **Data/Methods:** link a representative online survey (N = 3500) to behavioral data on respondents’ Facebook sharing history during the campaign, avoiding known biases in self-reports of online activity
 - Posts containing links to external websites are cross-referenced against lists of fake news publishers built by journalists and academics.
 - **Findings:**
 - Over 90% of respondents shared no stories from fake news domains. Thus, sharing misinformation is rare.
 - Strong conservatives more likely to share misinformation during 2016 campaign, but might be because greater supply of Republican leaning misinformation.
 - those who share the most content in general were less likely to share articles from fake news–spreading domains to their friends. Thus, it is not the case that what explains fake news sharing is simply that some respondents “will share anything.”
 - being in the oldest age group was associated with sharing nearly seven times as many articles from fake news domains on Facebook as those in the youngest age group,
 - **Relevant Literature:**
 - Reduces concerns about spread of misinformation and raises further necessary to distinguish between supply and demand of misinformation among Conservatives.
-

How to Reduce the Spread of Misinformation?

Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler. 2010. “When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions.” *Political Behavior* 32, no. 2 (June): 303–330

- **One Sentence Summary:** Backfire effects of corrections of misinformation.
- **Argument:**
 - humans are goal-directed information processors who tend to evaluate information with a directional bias towards reinforcing their pre-existing beliefs
 - Backfire effect: support beliefs even more strongly after correction. Process: people counter incongruent information more strongly and bolster their preexisting views (Lodge and Taber 2000).
- **Data/Methods:** four experiments in which subjects read mock news articles that included either a misleading claim from a politician, or a misleading claim and a correction
- **Findings:**

- Corrections frequently fail to reduce misperceptions among the targeted ideological group.
- “backfire effect” in which corrections actually increase misperceptions among the group in question

- **Critique:**

- More recent literature has generally shown that backfire effects don't exist — See Wood and Porter 2019

- **Relevant Literature:** Lodge and Taber (2006) motivated reasoning and Redlawsk (2002).

- See also Wood and Porter (2019) for a response to these findings.

Adam J. Berinsky. 2017b. “Rumors and Health Care Reform: Experiments in Political Misinformation.” *British Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 2 (April): 241–262

- **One Sentence Summary:** Rumors acquire power through familiarity. More effective to correct for rumors by refuting them with statements from unlikely sources, but quashing rumors through refutation may facilitate their spread through fluency and repetition.

- **Argument:**

- Although refuting a rumor from unlikely source is effective in reducing belief in rumor, repeating a rumor increases its strength through the psychological process of ‘fluency’.
- Rumors: particular form of misinformation – an acceptance of information that is factually unsubstantiated – characterized by two features: 1) lack specific standards of evidence 2) rumors are more than fringe beliefs. They acquire their power through widespread social transmission.
- Fluency is ‘the subjective experience of ease or difficulty associated with completing a mental task. → think Tversky and Kahneman’s availability heuristic. people use their feelings regarding how easy it is to recall or process new information as a signal of the veracity of that information. Thus, more repetition = more likely to think its true.

- **Data/Methods:** Two experiments in which vary the presentation of information concerning the 2010 ACA (health care reform enacted by 2010 Congress).

- Variation: (1) the pairing of rumor and correction, (2) the partisanship of the source of the correction of the rumor and (3) the degree to which the respondent was induced to rehearse the rumor.
- time on the power of the treatments, recording responses not only immediately following the treatment, but also many days later.
- to test fluency: ‘rehearsal’ of the rumor immediately following the presentation of the study should increase the fluency with which people process the information contained in the rumor

- **Findings:**

- corrections acquire credibility when politicians make statements that run counter to their personal and political interests
- the power of corrections fade and rumors regain their strength over time
- asking subjects to repeat the rumor to themselves – without any indication that it is true – increases their willingness to believe the existence of the rumor, even weeks after they read the initial story.

- increased rehearsal of the rumor – in the absence of any information about its veracity – was sufficient to decrease rumor rejection rates, even when the rumor was initially presented in combination with a powerful correction.

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Trying to find explanations for Nyhan and Reifler (2010) counterintuitive results.

Thomas Wood and Ethan Porter. 2019. “The Elusive Backfire Effect: Mass Attitudes’ Steadfast Factual Adherence.” *Political Behavior* 41, no. 1 (March): 135–163

- **One Sentence Summary:** Back-fire effects do not exist.

- **Argument/theory:**

- Previous work showing evidence of backfire effects refer to two mechanisms:
 - ★ A side advances what is perceived to be a “weak” argument in which case the respondent moves further away from the position suggested by this argument, than if the side had simply made no argument at all
 - ★ A counterattitudinal argument inspires the respondent to counteract unwelcome arguments, by bringing to mind countervailing considerations. This calls to mind offsetting considerations and they end up more certain of their prior preference.
- However, there is a competing theory:
 - ★ “subjects detest intellectual effort just as much, or more, than they fear adopting a counterideological consideration. Counterargument is a particularly effortful way to escape unwelcome political facts’ logical consequences.” See Sniderman 1993, and Mondak 1993
- The authors argue that the question wording from Nyhan and Reifler (2010) was confusing for respondents which explains their findings of backfire effects. “the sheer number of facts in the Nyhan and Reifler version might have overwhelmed respondents, causing them to fall back with their ideological cohort, in which they had greater confidence.”

- **Data/Methods:** Five experiments in which enrolled more than 10,100 subjects and tested 52 issues of potential backfire (these are ideologically controversial issues).

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- **Findings:**

- no corrections capable of triggering backfire effects
- “When presented with facts that correct political leaders, subjects along the ideological spectrum are capable of heeding the correction and bringing their beliefs in alignment with the facts. This occurs even when the corrections directly conflict with subjects’ ideological commitments”

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Results oppose “backfire effect,” described by Nyhan and Reifler (2010) who argue that subjects presented with facts correcting misperceptions relevant to their ideology responded by doubling down on their misperceptions.

Leticia Bode and Emily K. Vraga. 2015. “In Related News, That Was Wrong: The Correction of Misinformation Through Related Stories Functionality in Social Media: In Related News.” *Journal of Communication* 65, no. 4 (August): 619–638

- **One Sentence Summary:** Corrections on social media through the related stories function are effective in reducing belief in misinformation.
- **Argument:**
- **Data/Methods:**
 - Facebook began offering “related stories” that display underneath a link when a user clicks on it, generated by an algorithm that attempts to match stories in terms of topic. This study tests the extent to which this functionality may play a role in reinforcing or combating misperceptions, depending on the information provided by these related stories.
 - Essentially respondents see simulated newsfeed with misinformation and then randomize correction or not.
 - After viewing the simulated Facebook NewsFeed, participants were assigned to a separate posttest that matched the issue they saw
- **Findings:**
 - attitude change related to GMOs can be achieved with regard to misperceptions by virtue of exposure to corrective information within social media.
- **Relevant Literature:**
 - Counters Nyhan and Reifer 2010

Gordon Pennycook et al. 2021. “Shifting attention to accuracy can reduce misinformation online.” *Nature* 592, no. 7855 (April): 590–595

- **One Sentence Summary:** Accuracy nudges, whereby respondents are first asked to rate the accuracy of a post, are effective in reducing the likelihood that respondents share subsequent misinformation posts.
- **Argument:**
 - Individuals share misinformation inattentively on social media because they are distracted by other concerns such as signalling their partisanship.
 - Sharing does not mean believing misinformation
 - When you prime individuals to think about the accuracy of posts they are less likely to share false information but not less likely to share accurate information.
- **Data/Methods:** four survey experiments and a field experiment on Twitter

Political Participation and Voter Turnout

Explanations for Participation

William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting.” *American Political Science Review* 62, no. 1 (March): 25–42

- **Key Takeaway:** The formula $R = PB - C + D$ represents the “calculus of voting” and models when it is reasonable for individual voters to turnout – this serves as crucial theoretical framework for subsequent research on voter participation and turnout.
- **Calculus of Voting:** The expected utility of voting can be written as $R = (BP) - C$: it is rational to vote when $R > 0$ and irrational when $R \leq 0$. Because P often very small, B must be extremely large, thus meaning it is mostly *irrational* for voters to cast ballots. A more complex form of this equation can be written as $R = PB - C + D$ to include the fact that reward of voting is a function of *civic duty*.
 - R : the reward that an individual voter receives from his act of voting
 - B : differential benefit that an individual voter receives from the success of his more preferred candidate over his less preferred one
 - P : the probability that the citizen will, by voting, bring about the benefit, B
 - ★ P is a function of n (the number of eligible voters) and v (the number of actual voters) – since both n and v are typically large, P is generally small
 - ★ As the race gets closer to a tie, voters perceive that their vote has a much higher probability of affecting the outcome; voters tend to overestimate P
 - C : the cost to the individual of the act of voting (e.g., time spent deciding, physical cost of going to the polls)
 - D : sense of civic duty (e.g., satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting, affirming allegiance to the political system, affirming a partisan preferences, going to the polls, affirming efficacy in political system)
- **Related Literature:** Blais 2000 stresses the importance of D , Gerber, Green, Larimer 2008 find that manipulating D has large effects

John H. Aldrich. 1993. “Rational Choice and Turnout.” *American Journal of Political Science* 37, no. 1 (February): 246

- **Key Takeaway:** The presence of substantial turnout does not contradict rational choice models of turnout; rather, turnout is a low-cost, low-benefit decision that is atypical among collective action problems
- **Argument:** After reviewing previous rational choice models of voter turnout, identifies some common problems with them. Namely, Riker and Ordeshook 1968 tripped up by the fact that D terms should be strongest predictor (at least according to Barry 1970); P should cause PB to be extremely small, especially when we think of individual-level turnout rather than in aggregate terms. Also Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974 has a model of “maximum regret” that says people turnout to vote because it’s the safer option – don’t want to give up an opportunity to swing an election but this rules out the P term and doesn’t account for possibility of “wasted votes”. Overall, however, turnout is rational because it is a low-cost, low-benefit decision: most elections have multiple contests on single ballot (just need $B > \frac{1}{2}$ in any one of these), there are decision costs to abstention, people come across campaign information by accident so easier than we think to get informed (Downs 1957)

- If low-cost, low-benefit, then small changes in costs and benefits can have large effects. Claim this explains: why many variables predict turnout consistently but only weakly; why we don't know why some subgroups vote but not others; people misestimate rewards of turning out; measurement error should be common; why *D*-term is so important

Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. *Who Votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Although voters have different demographic characteristics than non-voters, they have similar public policy attitudes and partisanship/ideology. Key demographic difference between voters and nonvoters is education, followed by age. Other variables (e.g., marriage, registration laws, race, income) have little influence.
- **Argument:** Thinking in terms of costs and benefits, weigh the *instrumental benefits* (from act of voting on voters' well being, can be a material benefit or not) and *expressive benefits* (from feelings of doing one's duty to "reference group," or affirmed allegiance to/efficacy in the political system) versus costs (e.g., registration, learning about the election, deciding how to vote, getting to the polls). Higher costs → lower probability of voting. Costs of voting don't fall equally on all segments of the population – people with political resources (bureaucratic know-how) can bear the costs of voting more easily. Overall conclusion: demographic biases don't translate into discernable overrepresentation of particular policy constituencies – attitudes on issues are weakly related to social class and race, so poor and minorities have decent change of getting good representation; if future political cleavages more closely parallel education, income, race, and age differences, consequences of resulting variations in turnout will be felt in policy proposals
- **Data/Methods:** Probit regressions on Census data from 1972 and 1974 (80,000 respondents)
- **Findings:**
 - Education has power independent effect on likelihood of voting – especially so for people with less income or lower-status jobs → schooling gives greater ability to learn about politics and master bureaucratic elements of registering and voting, gives cognitive skills like reading, and emphasizes citizenship and obligation to vote
 - Effect of occupation is modest; effects of income relatively small → affects primarily those who have vested interests in outcomes (e.g., government officials reliant on appointed jobs; farmers need government subsidies)
 - Marriage leads to higher turnout, especially among old and uneducated people → interpersonal influence greater among people who live together, relatively uncommon for one spouse to vote while the other does not – may be most important where political interest is low
 - Mobility substantially decreases probability individual will vote – movers may have more difficulty with initial political activities like registration, reestablishing eligibility, and don't know as much about the local political scene as others; effects drop sharply 3-5 years after moving, suggesting excitement of presidential elections gets people back to the polls
 - Substantial disparity between young and older voters. Instead of a steady linear rise in turnout with age, there's a dip after leaving school, followed by a gain until the mid-50s plateau – partly due to geographic mobility of young voters; does not appear to be driven by "free time" hypothesis; but age overall increases information about politics
 - Registration laws: change from most strict to most lenient adds 8-9% to registration since overall, registration substantially raises the costs of voting; those with least education most affected; relaxing reg. laws would increase the number of voters, but bring almost no change in demographic/partisan/ideological characteristics

- Race: in aggregate, Black voters less likely to vote than white voters; once socioeconomic factors held constant though, may have participated at higher rates → possible importance of political culture
- People who express alienated opinions about the system are not less likely to vote than others
- **Critique:** Some of the regressions do not control enough – need better controls for income/education which is what Brady, Verba, Schlozman 1995 do.
- **Relevant Literature:** Both Rosenstone and Hansen 1995 and Brady, Verba, Schlozman 1995 extend this original focus on resources (income and education).

Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*. New York: Macmillan

- **Key Takeaway:** People turnout to vote based on personal costs vs. benefits and whether they are mobilized. However, candidates are strategic in mobilizing, only putting efforts toward those they can turnout with minimal costs → those who turnout are often employed, belong to associations, organization/community leaders, educated, wealthy, partisan.
- **Argument:** People turnout to vote based on (1) personal costs (income, education, age, race, political efficacy, institutional factors) vs. benefits (strength of partisanship, opinion of candidates, sense of civic duty); (2) being mobilized (social networks you belong to, community involvement, party outreach, election competitiveness). Thus, choice to turnout is about individual motivation and strategic motivation. Mobilization is strategic in that leaders rely on existing social networks – don’t cajole or persuade, just leverage networks to get people voting. Explanation for turnout decline centered in limited efforts of party organizations – politics more impersonal, candidate-centered.
 - Centers on ideas of “paradox of voting” (if people are rational, they wouldn’t vote, since it’s costly and result likely the same) and “rational ignorance” (there’s a cost of gathering information, so why bother learning about politics). Social networks can help overcome these paradoxes (provide information and solidary benefits) but don’t explain why people participate – this why direct (by contacting people through mail, televised appeals, door-to-door) and indirect (contact citizens through family, friends, colleagues) mobilization is critical
- **Data/Methods:** NES data of self-reported measures of turnout and contact by political campaigns
- **Findings:** Politicians attempt to mobilize in a way that produces greatest effect with minimal effort (people they know, centrally located in social networks, whose actions can produce political outcomes, those likely to participate) – means those mobilized often employed, belong to associations, organization/community leaders, educated, wealthy, partisan. Mobilization often happens when there are (1) salient issues top of the agenda, (2) other concerns don’t demand attention (e.g., crises), (3) important decisions are pending (elections), (4) close elections, (5) when issues come before legislators (as opposed to bureaucracies and courts). Mobilization has real effects on turnout (does so by helping deal with logistics of voting – e.g., registration, drive to polls, giving info about polling locations)
 - Individual influences of participation: people with money, time, knowledge/education/skill give more to politics because they can more easily afford to do so – lower the cost, more likely to participate
 - Wealth: share social circles with candidates and fundraiser
 - Education/knowledge/skill: imparts citizenship values, ability to understand political questions, able to handle bureaucratic requirements for registration/voting

- Political efficacy: as Americans believe their participation means less, motivation to participate declines
 - Evaluation of political system: civic responsibility (see only a small impact to vote and no discernable effect on the probability to persuade, work on a campaign, or give money) vs. confidence in government (while trust and confidence has declined, trusting citizens are not more likely to vote or engage in campaign activities)
 - Evaluations of parties/candidates: better the options, the more likely people will want to help make the choice (similar argument as Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1979) → when citizens get benefits (policy or simple satisfaction), more inclined to participate
 - Evidence supports a relationship between age and electoral participation – opposes a generational sort of argument that Putnam would make
 - Barely 1/10 of the total impact that party mobilization has on electoral participation stems from its effect on people’s perceptions about candidates, parties, and elections – rest is party mobilization
 - Number of elections people have to participate in matters: if you live in states with competitive primaries, turnout less likely to participate in general elections – people have limited time and attention and have less left over after the primary → key paradox: more chances to vote = lower overall turnout
- **Critiques:** Regress reported voter turnout on reported contact with candidates or political parties – but political contact may not be exogenous predictor of turnout. Parties target their efforts to their core supporters and leaners who are likely to turnout in the first place.
 - **Relevant Literature:** Role of political parties-as-organizations (Aldrich 2011); importance of election timing and turnout (Anzia 2014); moving beyond an apolitical, resource-based model of explaining turnout (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995)

Ryan D. Enos, Anthony Fowler, and Lynn Vavreck. 2014. “Increasing Inequality: The Effect of GOTV Mobilization on the Composition of the Electorate.” *The Journal of Politics* 76, no. 1 (January): 273–288

- **Key Takeaway:** GOTV activities exacerbate participation gap among voters because campaigns specifically target high-propensity individuals rather than those who are under-represented, low-propensity citizens.
- **Argument:** Despite the fact that GOTV experiments can increase average levels of voter participation, may not affect all citizens equally, increasing participation among those already represented in political process than those underrepresented.
- **Data/Methods:** Examine 24 previous experimental interventions from 11 papers and implement new statistical procedure that reduces pretreatment characteristics to a single dimension of vote propensity and simply interact propensity score with treatment indicator
- **Findings:** On average, current mobilization strategies significantly widen disparities in participation by mobilizing high-propensity individuals more than the under-represented, low-propensity citizens.
 - Notable, because their propensity scores shows voters are wealthier, more educated, more likely to attend church, more likely to be employed, more likely to approve of Bush, more conservative, more Republican, and more supportive of key Republican-aligned issue positions
- **Relevant Literature:** inequality in political participation (Bartels 2008, 2009; Gilens 2005); effects of turnout campaigns (Gerber et al. 2011; Green and Gerber 2008; Enos and Fowler 2016)

Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and equality: civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Political participation (activity intended to or has the consequence of affecting, either directly or indirectly, government action) rests on three factors: *motivation*, *capacity*, and *networks of recruitment*.
- **Argument:** Political participation (activity intended to or has the consequence of affecting, either directly or indirectly, government action) rests on three factors: *motivation*, *capacity*, and *networks of recruitment* through which requests for political activity (i.e., both resources and political engagement) are mediated. Those who have both the motivation and capacity to become active are more likely to do so if they are asked. Resources and engagement are not independent. The initial conditions that lead the resources like well-educated parents and high academic achievement will also lead to a psychological attachment with politics and a position where you will be more likely to be asked. Focus on these factors because easier to estimate than psychological engagement (more factual, less fungible), resource accumulation precedes and is independent of political activity.
 - Civic Volunteerism Model:
 - ★ Resources: time, money, and civic skills – most important because causally prior and objective measures can be measured with greater reliability
 - ★ Engagement: psychological dispositions that affect participation (e.g., interest in politics, sense of political efficacy, civic values or sense of civic duty, group consciousness, identification with a political party, commitment to specific policies that individuals would like to see implemented).
 - ★ Recruitment: requests for participation (especially from friends, relatives, or acquaintance) – least important variable, even strong recruitment network, if you have zero resources and zero engagement, recruitment is going to be hard pressed to be effective
- **Data/Methods:** Using mailed surveys requests → 15,000 phone interviews to get basic demo info, 2,500 in-person interviews to identify free time (time left over (in hours) after working, household chores, studying, sleep), money (family income to nearest \$10,000), civic skills (combines years of education, high school student government, verbal ability measured by a vocabulary test, degree of civic/communication skills displayed at work/church/etc.).
- **Findings:** Participation is stratified along socio-economic lines, and the result is “participatory distortion”: the messages sent to policy makers through the process of participation are skewed to reflect the needs and preferences of activists, who differ from the public in politically meaningful ways. While interest, information, efficacy, and partisan intensity provide desire, knowledge, and self-assurance to get people engaged in politics, resources (time, money, and skills) are needed for engagement → need both!!
 - Resources vary in their relationship to SES – for example, income correlated well with SES, but free time does not.
 - Political interest as a control doesn’t take over the effects of civic skills and income
 - For voting, political interest matters more than resources, but civic skills overlaps with interest – overall, voters are relatively representative of the public (as compared to other types of participation)
 - For donating, strongly correlated with income (most important indicator, others don’t matter)
 - For volunteering, political interest matters, civic skills, more than civic interest, income is irrelevant.

- Political activity is firmly grounded in social structure: factors that foster participation are acquired in the basic institutions of society (families, schools, jobs, churches, etc).
- Representation distortion: demographic characteristics of activists differ from the public at large and these are people pressuring public officials to respond → makes those officials hear from unrepresentative. Factors are especially important if related both to activity and to a relevant characteristic (i.e, omitted variable bias)

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Application to Latino politics: Fraga et al. 2006 point out that resource model work differently, with education being more important than income or occupation; religious affiliation matters a lot; other confounding factors like compressed range of income/occupation, higher rates of foreign born, higher rate of bilingualism complicate political incorporation
- More specific focus on resources treatment of this in Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995

Elizabeth Mitchell Elder, Ryan D. Enos, and Tali Mendelberg. 2023. “The Long-Term Effects of Neighborhood Disadvantage on Voting Behavior: The “Moving to Opportunity” Experiment.” *American Political Science Review* (July): 1–17

- **Key Takeaway:** Using the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment, find that intervention did not increase children’s likelihood of voting later in life.
- **Argument:** High-poverty neighborhoods provide less access to employment, education, civic organizations, social ties, efficacy – these are all attributes previous work has suggested is associated with increased political participation. Previous work relies more on correlational approaches, inhibited by selection bias (people who live in a poor neighborhood differ systematically from those who do not, including those that predict participation, making it difficult to identify effects of neighborhood) – leveraging the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment allows us to identify causal effects of neighborhood change.
- **Data/Methods:** Merge data from the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) initiative to voter file records from L2
- **Findings:** Across all participation outcomes, treatments, age groups, and model specifications, MTO either decreased rate of registration or turnout OR results indistinguishable from zero. Potential explanations include (1) increases in education and income induced by treatment insufficient to produce detectable effects on participation, (2) living in lower-poverty neighborhoods does not affect turnout directly, (3) moves for those who used voucher were temporary
- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Causal inference extension to Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995 – shows that in order to change participation rate among voters, need large increases in education attainment or income level.β

Robert D. Putnam. 1995. “Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America.” *PS: Political Science & Politics* 28, no. 4 (December): 664–683

- **Key Takeaway:** Declining levels of social capital in the U.S. explains declining levels of political participation
- **Argument:** Social capital consists of the networks, norms, and trust necessary to enable individuals to act together in pursuit of shared goals. Argues that declining levels of social capital in the U.S. explains declining levels of political participation. Presumes the more we connect with other people, the more we trust them, and vice versa.

- **Findings:** American membership in civic and community organizations (e.g., PTAs, Elks Clubs, etc.) has decline resulting in less opportunities for individuals to socialize and connect with fellow members of their community. Education is a strong predictor of civic engagement (provide skills, resources, inclination), but things like working hours, geography, women moving into the workplace, or decline of traditional family do not appear to be major explanations. Most likely cause is generational change and rise of television (created time displacement and changed outlooks of viewers)
- **Critiques:** Seems possible that while smaller civic organization participation is declining, rise of internet and other technological advances could have created other forms of political participation (e.g., feedback forums for government, online town halls, etc.)
- **Relevant Literature:** Rosenstone and Hansen 1995 examine explanation for turnout decline and find that weakened social involvement only about 9 percent of the decline – most attributed to less mobilization efforts with party organizing replaced by candidate-centered campaigns.

Minority Participation

Lawrence Bobo and Franklin D. Gilliam. 1990. "Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment." *American Political Science Review* 84, no. 2 (June): 377–393

- **Key Takeaway:** While white voters tend to be more politically active than Black voters, those findings go away once the effects of "empowerment" on Black voters are accounted for.
- **Argument:** Understanding black participation requires taking into account the effects of black political empowerment, or the extent to which a group has achieved significant representation and influence in political decision making. Two ways this empowerment should influence mass sociopolitical participation:
 - Sociopolitical behavior is heavily instrumental. People participate because of perceived benefits outweigh the costs. Macro level aspects of a person's sociopolitical environment affect the cost-benefit calculations of voting
 - Expect that the greater the level of empowerment, more likely that Blacks will become politically involved. Empowerment should increase participation because of its effect on political trust, efficacy, and knowledge about politics. As a consequences, empowerment should change the nature of black-white differences in participation.
- **Data/Methods:** Rely on data from 1987 GSS survey N=544 black respondents along with a replication of sociopolitical behavior measures from Verba and Nie's (1972) study. Conceptually, operationalize empowerment as whether a city's mayor is Black as it signals both high level of organization within the Black community and control over local decision making.
- **Findings:** Across sociopolitical participation measures, Whites tend to be more politically active than Black voters. When you consider empowerment, find that Black American living in high-empowerment areas a significantly more likely to be more informed, have more trust and efficacy. They are also more likely to report voting. Empowerment does not have an effect on white participation. Black empowerment can serve as a contextual cue of likely policy responsiveness that encourages Blacks to feel that participation has intrinsic value.
- **Critique:** It's an old article based on exclusively self-reported survey measures. Operationalization of empowerment isn't great either, just a binary measure of whether a city has a Black mayor. Article is also unable to get at mechanisms of empowerment—is it an individual level process or elite led process?

- **Related Literature:** See Barreto (2007) and Fraga (2018). Tied to literature on the link between non-SES resources and voting. Empowerment can be mechanism through which Black voters can increase some of these resources (if political knowledge)

Matt A. Barreto. 2007. “¡Sí Se Puede! Latino Candidates and the Mobilization of Latino Voters.” *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 3 (August): 425–441

- **Key Takeaway:** Latinos are *both* more likely to turn out when a co-ethnic is on the ballot and more likely to vote for that co-ethnic candidate. Among other minority groups, the results are not consistent.
- **Argument:**
 - Shared ethnicity is an important component of Latino political incorporation: shared culture and Spanish, shared immigrant experience, continued discrimination, ethnic candidates focus on co-ethnics, Spanish names can cue low info voters
 - Five reasons why candidate traits matter: diminishing role of parties, rise of candidate centered elections, group-based appeals, media focus on ethnicity, lack of minority representation
 - Minority candidates likely to direct more resources mobilize their co-ethnics. Also role of political empowerment – as minorities gain power, more likely to be involved in politics
 - Argue that ethnicity should play significant role and Latinos are expected to be more supportive of co-ethnics. Due to combination of politicized shared group experience and the presence of a co-ethnic, Latinos expected to be more likely to support co-ethnic
- **Data/Methods:** Precinct-level analysis of election return for Mayor in 5 cities. Looks at both *vote preferences* (support for co-ethnic) along with *voter turnout* along with share of Latino in each precinct.
- **Findings:** Across the cities, finds evidence supporting idea that Latinos are *both* more likely to turn out and vote for a co-ethnic. Among other minority groups, the results are not consistent.
- **Critiques:** The article only looks at 5 cities. In theory section, discusses the role of candidate mobilization and individual empowerment but does not really provide specific evidence for either mechanism. Also fails to disentangle group size vs. presence of co-ethnic
- **Relevant Literature:** Builds on Bobo and Gilliam (1990). Fraga (2018) is a response – attempts to disentangle group size vs. co-ethnic on the ballot.

Bernard L. Fraga. 2016. “Candidates or Districts? Reevaluating the Role of Race in Voter Turnout.” *American Journal of Political Science* 60, no. 1 (January): 97–122

- **Key Takeaway:** Boosts in minority turnout best explained by sense of electoral influence as measured by size of an ethnic group within a jurisdiction increases.
- **Argument:** Fraga argues that existing theories of candidate turnout cannot distinguish between the effect of candidate race/ethnicity and the racial and ethnic makeup of a jurisdiction.
 - Responding to literature that prioritizes **empowerment** as determinant of voter turnout. Individual-level response to political representation and/or influence as the mechanism linking co-ethnic politicians or jurisdiction to participation.

- Alternative view is of **elite mobilization**: elite responses to the demographic composition of the electorate as stimulating shifts in individual voter turnout. Elite mobilization theories may also include co-ethnic candidates as instrumental to stimulate turnout
- Lots of overlap, but two main avenues: **Candidate centered** theories of monitory turnout indicate that the presence of a co-ethnic on the ballot will increase rates of participation for members of the candidate's ethnic group. A **jurisdiction demographics-based** theory of turnout argues that as the size of an ethnic group within a jurisdiction increases, participation rates for members of that group will also increase.
- Strong correlation between candidate race and district composition makes it difficult to distinguish between individual empowerment via either candidates or demographics
- Previous work on minority turnout has issues including: survey over-reporting of turnout, limited case selection due to data availability constraints
- **Data/Methods**: Catalist voters file and turnout from 3 elections (2006,2008,2010) and ACS data. Uses generalized estimating equation (GEE) as an alternative to mixed effects models. Incorporates additional error from Catalist race estimates
- **Findings**:
 - Overall, finds support more consistent with the jurisdiction demographics-based hypothesis and little evidence that a co-ethnic candidate on the ballot alone is sufficient to stimulate turnout among voters. Cannot say turnout is higher when a co-ethnic is on the ballot when accounting for group size.
 - While Black and Latinos citizens are both more likely to vote in majority-Black/Latino districts, the effect is much stronger for Black citizens. Importantly, turnout is much lower overall in majority-minority districts of any sort. In primary elections, results consistent
 - Effect sizes are moderately sized. Ex. In the absence of a Latino candidate, going from 10 to 50 percent Latino results in 6.4 point increase in turnout. For Black voters, around 9 points.
 - Results do not preclude possibility that a mix of individual-level empowerment **and** elite-level mobilization explain how race impacts who votes
- **Critiques**: Does not really provide evidence for the competing mechanisms of individual empowerment vs elite mobilization.
- **Relevant Literature**: See Bobo and Gilliam (1990) for empowerment theory. Response to Barreto (2007)

Bernard L. Fraga. 2018. *The Turnout Gap: Race, Ethnicity, and Political Inequality in a Diversifying America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

- **Key Takeaway**: Racial/ethnic differences in who turns out to vote are best explained by sense of electoral influence which has strong relationships with elite mobilization efforts and sense of empowerment.
- **Argument**:
 - African Americans, Latino and AAPI turnout has almost always lagged behind non-Hispanic White turnout and these gaps are not explained by differences in SES or voter eligibility
 - **Electoral influence**, operationalized as the relative size of a group in a political jurisdiction, shapes the incentives for citizens to vote and politicians to seek that vote. When *any* racial/ethnic group is perceived to have greater electoral influence, they are more likely to get mobilized

by elites and feel politically empowered in a manner leading to greater levels of participation in elections

- ★ Builds on three theories of individual-level voter turnout decisions: Downsian calculus of voting, empowerment theory, and elite mobilization
- Relative size of a group within a jurisdiction contributes to the relevance of the group, elite mobilization efforts, and individual empowerment. Each of these three mechanisms reinforce each other and produces greater rates of turnout for a relevant group. This increased turnout then facilitates the perceived relevance, mobilization and empowerment of the group, shaping future turnout patterns
- **Data/Methods:** Uses Catalist national voter file along with ACS data and state-level election returns. Individual-level race data relies on Catalist models of predicted race. Turnout rates calculated using CVAP. Three sets of analyses:
 - Descriptive analysis looking at relationship between group size and turnout patterns using General Estimation Equations
 - Leverages quasi-random nature of redistricting to explore a causal relation between district-level characteristics and turnout
 - Effect of voter ID Laws
- **Findings:**
 - Across racial groups, including Whites: when a group is perceived to drive election outcomes, members of that group are more likely to turn out to vote. Individuals are more likely to vote when they expect to be able to influence the political process, while candidates and political parties focus their mobilization efforts on minority groups when it is clearly advantageous for them to do so. Supported by evidence in both the descriptive and causal analysis.
 - Provisions associated with vote suppression have inconsistent and often small impact on racial/ethnic disparities in voter turnout. States that implement these laws tend to higher higher than average minority turnout. There may also be counter-mobilization efforts.
- **Critiques:**
- **Relevant Literature:** Fraga's theory of electoral influence synthesises a lot of work on voter turnout. Begins by ruling out classic explanations of turnout tied to SES (ex. Verba, Schlozman, Brady). Then the theory of electoral influence combines Downs, empowerment theory (Bobo and Gilliam (1990)), and mobilization (Rosenstone and Hansen (1993)). Fraga (2016) is an extension of the descriptive analysis.

Melissa R. Michelson. 2014. *Mobilizing Inclusion Transforming the Electorate Through Get-Out-the-Vote Campaigns*. Cumberland: Yale University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Effectiveness of a GOTV campaign is rooted in the effect it has on individual-level cognition within a specific sociocultural context.
- **Argument:** Propose the **Sociocultural Cognition Model**, which argues that the effectiveness of a GOTV campaign is rooted in the effect it has on individual-level cognition which has to be situated within its sociocultural context.
 - Mobilization efforts can provide a set of social cues that lead the targeted individual to adopt a new cognitive schema as a "voter". Schemas allow for scholars to situate political behavior within relevant sociocultural context

- Argue that there is a historical understanding of who a “voter” is and mobilization efforts help disrupt this understanding, facilitating a change in cognition. This happens through mobilization conversations which often take the form of interactive narratives that can help targeted voters adopt a voter cognitive schema
- **SCM** can help explain variation in effectiveness of mobilization efforts. Indirect efforts are missing the sociocultural narrative component, while canvassing introduces additional cues such as presentation of self that can limit schema changes
- **Data/Methods:** Worked with community organization in CA to conduct 268 field experiments using indirect methods (mailers, doorhangers), phone-banking, and canvassing
- **Findings:** Results vary across GOTV mode:
 - **Indirect methods:** Overall, largely not effective. Authors argue it is due to the lack of sociocultural interactions that introduce a narrative component.
 - **Phone banking:** One-call experiments were mildly successful, though results are mixed. Two call experiments had much stronger and consistent effects. More powerful than indirect methods because of the way it was delivered and ability to introduce narrative to help targeted voters adopt new cognitive schemas.
 - **Canvassing:** Largest effect sizes but also significant variation in results. Authors argue that when done correctly, canvassing can introduce the best opportunity for a successful socio cultural interaction, however, that fact that it is also in person introduces more variables that can make it difficult to effectively interact with voters
- **Critique:** The authors do not provide any evidence for the **SCM** model. They created this model post-hoc to try to understand the variation in results across studies. Therefore there is no direct evidence supporting the proposed mechanisms.
- Related to Campaign Effects literature

Allison P. Anoll. 2018. “What Makes a Good Neighbor? Race, Place, and Norms of Political Participation.” *American Political Science Review* 112, no. 3 (August): 494–508

- **Key Takeaway:** Disparate histories in access to the franchise and segregated nature of American communities create race-specific social norms tied to political participation → underscores why Black voters place more social value on voting, role of communities in shaping beliefs about political action
- **Argument:** Anoll argues that disparate histories in access to the franchise and the segregated nature of American communities create race-specific social norms tied to political participation. These norms can lead racial minorities to value participation *more* than Whites, especially grassroots political participation.
 - Rather than a monolithic civic duty norm, Americans exist in a context-specific framework that varies by race and place
 - Two sources of heterogeneity in norms. First, historically minorities have used alternative lanes of political participation to have their voice heard, which can lead to different participatory norms. Second, segregation can facilitate the development of group-based norms in two ways. It can structure micro-level relationships through which norms emerge and are perpetuated and can facilitate the spread of information.
- **Data/Methods:** Online survey of N=2,000 Americans and various regressions

- **Findings:**

- On average, Americans of different racial groups perceive the value of their political action different. Ex. Black voters are more likely than Whites to see voting in presidential elections as valuable. Both Black and Latino Americans are more likely to value grassroots participation than Whites
- On average, minority Americans place more social value on those who are politically active than Whites. When it comes to voting, Black Americans provide more social rewards to voters than Whites
- Social context can moderate participatory rewards through group cohesion, density of group members. Finds that on average, social incentives to participate in both electoral and non-electoral acts are stronger in Black neighborhoods, but does not find same relationship in Latino neighborhoods. Results point to the effect that community level attributes have in shaping normative beliefs about political action

- **Critiques:** Among Latinos, significant differences in group histories than can generate distinct norms across national origin groups. Paper doesn't account for this

- **Relevant Literature:** In a way a response to Gerber, Green, Larimer (2008) and the argument about social norms such as civic duty and voting.

Ariel White. 2016. "When Threat Mobilizes: Immigration Enforcement and Latino Voter Turnout." *Political Behavior* 38, no. 2 (June): 355–382

- **Key Takeaway:** Immigration enforcement increases sense of identification among Latinos with deportees, thus increasing turnout.
- **Argument:** Measures the short-term impact of stricter immigration enforcement measures on Latino voter turnout. Mechanism:
 - At the individual level, the program implementation can be perceived as a threat, even among citizens. Latinos may increase identification with deportees if they feel that they are being "lumped in." Additionally, the perceived threat can de-value Latino identity, spurring voting as act of increasing the social standing of the identity group. Finally, community mobilization by activists can also increase turnout.
- **Data/Methods:** Leverages the implementation of the Secure Communities Program. Uses diff-in-diff comparing changes in turnout between 2006-2010 between implementing and non-implementing counties.
- **Findings:** Implementation of Secure Communities Program, which led to large increases in deportations in counties in which it was implemented, also immediately increased Latino voter turnout by several percentage points. Using survey data, finds initial evidence in support of mobilization mechanism.
- **Critique:** Unable to distinguish between effects of individual perceptions of threat and threat-based activist mobilization.
- **Relevant Literature:** See

Measurement

Michael P. McDonald and Samuel L. Popkin. 2001. “The Myth of the Vanishing Voter.” *American Political Science Review* 95, no. 4 (December): 963–974

- **Key Takeaway:** Typical analyses of turnout use the wrong metric: need to use voting-eligible population (VEP).
- **Argument:** Typical analyses of voter turnout rely on voting-age population (VAP). However, the denominator in this metric is incorrect: includes felons, non-citizens; excludes overseas citizens. Instead, should be using voting-eligible population (VEP).
- **Data/Methods:** Remove non-citizens using CPS and Census data; remove felons using Department of Justice data; add military and civilian persons living overseas using various agencies’ data
- **Findings:** While turnout in the non-South is lower than in the 50s and 60s, there’s no clear downward trend in turnout since the ineligible population trend is growing faster than eligible population – leads to false perception in turnout patterns.
- **Critiques:** Point to 1972 as the start of the analyses but actually tries to make comparisons to the 50s and 60s.

Stephen Ansolabehere and Eitan Hersh. 2012. “Validation: What Big Data Reveal About Survey Misreporting and the Real Electorate.” *Political Analysis* 20 (4): 437–459

- **Key Takeaway:** Nonvoters who are politically engaged and equipped with politically relevant resources consistently misreport that they voted. Misreporters are disproportionately well-educated, wealthy, partisan, and interested in politics → when survey researchers compare voters and non-voters based on reported turnout, they count as voters a particularly engaged set of individuals who actually did not vote.
- **Argument:** Major works on political participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1995, Verba et al. 1995) rely on statistics that are conditional on whether a person voted. Because validated voters and misreporters look similar on key demographics, the statistics themselves conflate the differences between voters and non-voters with the proportion of voters and non-voters in a sample → because surveys tend to be disproportionately populated by reported voters, the ratio measures can lead to faulty inferences.
- **Data/Methods:** Compare commercial data (primarily from Catalist) to CES and NE results
- **Findings:** Nonvoters who are politically engaged and equipped with politically relevant resources consistently misreport that they voted. Cannot be explained by faulty registration records. Respondents are found to misreport only on survey items associated with socially desirable outcomes. Similar to voters, misreporters are disproportionately well-educated, wealthy, partisan, and interested in politics → when survey researchers compare voters and nonvoters based on reported turnout, they count as voters a particularly engaged set of individuals who actually did not vote. Only once nonvoting, but engaged, individuals are removed from analysis, nonvoters and voters begin to look much more similar to one another than they in surveys. Simply put, sociodemographic and political resources do not explain all that much about why certain people vote and others do not.
 - Most overreporting of turnout attributable to misreporting, not sample selection bias, though it depends on whether they are examining CES or NES
 - Respondents regularly misreport voting history and registration status, almost never misreport other items (e.g., race, party, vote mode)

- Data quality is hardly at all predictive of misreporting.
 - **Critiques:** Evidence of this analysis only comes from one survey, but this is the most expansive analysis (all 50 states, national voter file)
 - **Relevant Literature:** argues that Rosenstone and Hansen 1995 and other resources-based models of participation is limited – don’t explain who votes/abstains, just those who identify themselves as voters → result that voters are less different from nonvoters than would be observed from survey responses is important because it questions the issues of equality and representation they discuss
-

Election Reform Effects

Adam J. Berinsky. 2005. “The Perverse Consequences of Electoral Reform in the United States.” *American Politics Research* 33, no. 4 (July): 471–491

- **Key Takeaway:** Reforms designed to make it easier for registered voters to cast their ballots (which are thus said to reduce the direct costs of voting through things like VBM, early voting, internet voting) actually increase, rather than reduce, socioeconomic biases in the composition of the voting public.
- **Argument:** Reforms designed to make it easier for registered voters to cast their ballots (which are thus said to reduce the direct costs of voting through things like VBM, early voting, internet voting) actually increase, rather than reduce, socioeconomic biases in the composition of the voting public. The reason is that most of the cost of voting is associated with cognitive tasks of being engaged and informed about politics. Because levels of political engagement currently follow, rather than cross, demographic divisions in the electorate, reforms designed to make voting “easier” magnify the existing socioeconomic biases – it might be easier for those with cognitive skills to participate, but those with low skills like will not still. Thus, solution to turnout problem and representation gap is to find ways to get people interested in politics and minimize the cognitive tasks of voting.
 - Increasing the electorate can either be done by *stimulating* new voters or *retaining* existing one. Proponents of election reform think stimulation will happen (i.e., the electorate will expand) but probably also serve to retain transient voters from election to election – retention is probably what has greater effects.
- **Data/Methods:** Summary of Adam’s existing work (and others) that relies on CPS data
- **Findings:**
 - Vote-by-mail (Berinsky, Burns, and Traugott 2001): in Oregon, VBM not effective at pulling registered nonvoters into the electorate
 - Early Voting (Neely and Richard 2001): early voters tend to be more political engaged than the rest of the electorate; are partisans who follow elections closely
 - Absentee voting (Karp and Banducci 2001): older, more educated, and political active voters likely to vote absentee than other voters; liberal absentee laws increase participation among students and disabled, minorities or Independents.
 - Registration laws might help expand electorate, but likely won’t shift electorate’s socioeconomic distribution (National Voter Registration Act has minimal effects on that)
- **Critiques:** Focuses only on election reform that is “expansive” but doesn’t discuss the effect of “restrictive” measure on the composition of electorate. That work is pretty thorough in showing who is affected by restrictions, but that work is overlooked and not characterized.

- **Relevant Literature:**

- Somewhat of a critique of Campbell et al.’s split in “core” and “peripheral” voters – turnout patterns, even within individuals, ebb and flow based on their lives and what’s going on in politics (a little bit what of what Rosenstone and Hansen argue).
- Solution to the problem comes from Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: increased mobilization in ways that appeal to the political interests of citizens

Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi, and Lindsay Nielson. 2017. “Voter Identification Laws and the Suppression of Minority Votes.” *The Journal of Politics* 79, no. 2 (April): 363–379

- **Key Takeaway:** Voter ID laws decrease turnout among minority voters.
- **Argument:** Previous research on voter ID laws focused on who has the correct IDs and how they are applied – few look at consequences. Work that looks at consequences previously found mixed results, but this work mostly occurred before round of more strict rule enacted, rely on self-reported rather than validated turnout measures, pay little attention to how laws affect mix of partisan and ideological voters. Two mechanisms by which voter ID impacts voting blocs differently: direct (whether or not individuals have required IDs or know about requirement and are turned away) and indirect (voters feel targeted by laws and choose not to turnout) – neither of them are tested here.
- **Data/Methods:** Examine validated turnout from CES 2006-2014 and compare states with strict identification laws with those that don’t.
- **Findings:** Turnout does decrease among minorities (with estimates as large as 7.1 pp among Hispanics in general elections, compared to 0.2 pp among whites); Republicans and conservatives less likely than Democrats and liberals to experience declines in primary election turnout (but less of an imbalance in general elections)
- **Critiques:** Problems with using survey validated data for turnout; some model specification issues as Grimmer et al. 2018 in response.
- **Relevant Literature:** Produces much larger estimates of effects than previous work (e.g., Citrin et al. 2014; Highton 2017).

Justin Grimmer et al. 2018. “Obstacles to Estimating Voter ID Laws’ Effect on Turnout.” *The Journal of Politics* 80, no. 3 (July): 1045–1051

- **Key Takeaway:** Work finding the voter ID laws decrease minority turnout (e.g., Hajnal et al. 2017) rely on data with inaccuracies – once corrected, those findings go away.
- **Argument:** Work like that of Hajnal et al. 2017 find that voter ID laws decrease turnout among minorities using validated turnout data from national surveys. Those results are the result of data inaccuracies that once are accounted for produce positive, negative, or null estimates of effects on turnout. Specifically, the state-level turnout rates they use on CES data has measurement error from nonresponse bias and variation in vote validation. Moreover, CES has smaller samples sizes in each state, especially for minority respondents (creates noisy estimates), respondents are unlikely to be those who lack acceptable forms of ID, CES record linkage process has changed over time.
- **Data/Methods:** Replicate analyses from Hajnal et al. 2017 based on CES data 2006-2014 and perform placebo tests and other model extensions.

- **Findings:** Placebo tests show that Hajnal et al. failed to account for baseline differences across states. Model misspecification in Hajnal as estimate interpreted as effect of ID laws after first year of implementation – effects go away when model corrected.
- **Critiques:** Would like to see this work done using actual voter file data so that analysis isn't limited to those respondents in CES – this sort of what Komisarchik and White 2022 do specifically for effects of *Shelby County*.

Mayya Komisarchik and Ariel White. 2022. *Throwing Away the Umbrella: Minority Voting after the Supreme Court's Shelby Decision*, September

- **Key Takeaway:** Following *Shelby County v. Holder* (2013) there have minimal effects on minority registration and turnout – could be the result of countermobilization efforts.
- **Argument:** *Shelby County v. Holder* (2013) invalidated Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (i.e., it invalidated the section detailing which jurisdictions would be covered by pre-clearance), ending pre-clearance for election rule changes in jurisdictions with histories of discrimination. People thought this would invite states to enact a wave of new restrictive laws and many states did just that. However, there is little evidence of negative effects and under some specifications, participation may have *increased*. Argue that this may have been the effect of grassroots countermobilization efforts. This is not to say the decision was completely benign: burdens placed by new restrictive laws could still be unreasonable, requiring significant efforts to overcome them.
- **Data/Methods:** Use voter file (Catalist snapshots 2008-2018) and census data in a difference-in-differences design to compare registration and turnout before and after decision. Use NCSL database to look for whether covered states more likely to implement voter ID laws with DiD design. Use Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) to see whether election officials purged registrants or reduce polling place resources with DiD design. Use CES data for reported contact from campaigns or groups.
- **Findings:** In the wake of *Shelby*, minority registration and turnout in formerly preclearance counties have been flat or increasing relative to counties that were not covered. *Shelby* does not appear to have changed legislative activity in states, but did change content of legislation (formerly covered states more likely to enact photo ID laws). Formerly pre-covered states now remove voters at higher rates, have higher provisional-ballot rejection rates, use fewer poll workers. But, it seems groups more active in mobilizing minority voters in previously covered jurisdictions.
- **Critiques:** Coarse measure of before/after *Shelby* but laws came in bundles and at different times. Probably need some more state-by-state analysis to see more about timing and if changes were immediate or delayed or immediate and then there was a rebound. Were there laws imposed that differential effects that may have compensated for some declines? Other work has said that election legislating often through compromise so more work on legislative process needed.
- **Relevant Literature:** While first to really look at *Shelby* exclusively, in conversation with broad batch of work looking at turnout effects of election law (e.g., Grimmer et al. 2018, Hajnal et al. 2017).

Justin Grimmer and Eitan Hersch. 2023. *How Election Rules Affect Who Wins*, June

- **Key Takeaway:** Changes to election law have minimal effects on turnout not because of countermobilization, but because they are targeted on smaller segments of electoral and have realitvely small effects on turnout within those segments,

- **Argument:** Contrary to heated political rhetoric, election policies have small effects on outcomes because they tend to target small shares of the electorate, have a small effect on turnout, and/or affect voters who are relatively balanced in their partisanship. Thus, they create a methodological framework that focuses on *who* is targeted and the effects *within* targeted groups in relation to the group’s prevalence in the community as a whole. Thinking a bit about countermobilization, they argue that the *effectiveness* of campaign/group contact has to be estimated. Rather than these minimal effects being about countermobilization it is really about the fact about those impacted and the ways different laws impact party coalitions – if there are multiple laws bundled together, effect of each law can balance out effects.
- **Data/Methods:** Most of this analysis relies on hypothetical simulations based on existing estimates from previous work along with demographic data in states.
- **Critiques:** A lot of this features in Twitter conversations about this work, but there are other normative consequences of election reform – not just about overall minimum effects, but there may be larger effects within groups that are normatively bad. Overall, paper reads more like a thought experiment than empirical analysis (which is the point) – would like to see an application to an actual bundle of policies a state legislature enacted in a given session and then would like to see if there is “learning” from those effects. Do legislators observe the mixed effects and legislate accordingly?
- **Relevant Literature:** Response to Komisarchik and White 2022’s argument about countermobilization and effects of bundled policies. Large critique on work in this section talking about effects within groups in compared to overall effects in electorate.

Vote Choice, Retrospection, Accountability

Achen and Bartels 2016

- **Key Takeaway:** Retrospective accountability is unlikely because voters are **myopic** when it comes to evaluating economic conditions and often influenced by events outside the control of incumbents. Instead, social identity serves as an important driver of vote choice
- **Argument/Findings:**
 - Folk theory: Voters have preferences about what the government should do, elect leaders who will do those things → what the majority wants becomes government policy
 - ★ Two issues: (1) difficulty with collective action and choice (ex. Arrow); (2) lack of preference stability and ideology, low political knowledge (ex. Converse)
 - Under theory of Retrospective voting voters don't need to have high knowledge, just need to assess performance of incumbents
 - ★ Two mechanisms:
 - **Selection:** voters as prospective selectors of leaders, predicting future performance based on previous performance (e.g., “running tally” model)
 - **Sanctioning:** politicians worried about electoral sanctioning will work to maximize voter well-being → anticipatory effects
 - ★ Effectiveness of retrospective voting in promoting democratic accountability depends on the magnitude of random forces influencing voters' electorally relevant subjective well-being
 - ★ Economic voting is a common application of this theory → if voters systematically biased in perceptions of economic conditions, accountability suffers
 - **Voter retrospections are blind** because of hardships of all kinds → when in pain, tendency to blame government so long they can justify doing so with relevant cultural constructions
 - ★ Voters *consistently* and *systematically* punish incumbents for conditions beyond their control (Shark attacks, weather, droughts)
 - ★ Important role of elites in framing the debate to help voters connect negative experiences to accountability, even if nonsensical
 - Presidential elections provide *some* economic accountability, but skewed by voters short time horizons → **voters are myopic** and reward electeds for some good times and punish for some bad times
 - ★ Voters are poor judges of both *personal* and *national* economic conditions; ultimately economic assessments are somewhat arbitrary
 - **Alternative:** Partisan preferences and voting patterns are shaped by group loyalties and social identities
 - ★ Partisanship is not ideology but a reflection of judgements about where “people like me” belong → then let their party tell them what to think about the issues of the day
 - ★ Partisanship is a special social identity central to elections → constructs a conceptual viewpoint by which voters can make sense of political world, mediated through sympathetic media and social networks
 - Even among well-informed voters, preferences and judgements are *consequences* of PID and group loyalties
 - Not only do voters use own preferences and partisanship to construct ideas of what parties stand for, they use partisanship to construct “objective facts” too
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Direct response to retrospective voting model (Fiorina 1981)

Gerald H. Kramer. 1971. "Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964." *American Political Science Review* 65, no. 1 (March): 131–143

- **Key Takeaways:** macroeconomic fluctuations affect voting behavior
- **Argument:**
 - Rational hypothesis: vote represents a rational choice between alternatives
 - ★ **Classic model**: voters collect information and analyze it in light of their own self-interest, voting based on which party's positions fit own goals
 - ★ **Realistic version**: instead of collecting data, voters use readily available data (such as an incumbent's past performance) → if past performance is satisfactory, vote for incumbent, otherwise don't.
 - Previous studies of the relationship between economic conditions and election results is inconsistent – based on measures (e.g., across indicators, when using polling data vs. election returns)
- **Data/Methods**: model the national vote as a function of the party's "normal" vote (in the absence of incumbency effects), the incumbent's performance (economic conditions), and the institutional advantage of being an incumbent, plus an error term
 - DV: national vote for the US House of Representatives between 1896-1964
 - IV: change in economic measures (personal income, cost-of-living index, real income, civilian unemployment) from preceding year
- **Findings**: incumbent performance, as operationalized by economic conditions, matters a great deal to national election results (esp. congressional ones)
 - All model specifications explain a significant amount of the vote – and the economic coefficients all go in the right direction
 - ★ Coefficient on incumbency small/insignificant – incumbency advantage only helpful when economic conditions are good (not intrinsic boost)
 - In presidential years, coattails account for 1/6 of variance in congressional elections, whereas economic variables account for almost half.
- **Contributions/Related Literature**: one of the earliest pieces demonstrating a correlation between economic conditions and voting for the incumbent party – at least at a macro-level → set the stage for later theorizing about the mechanisms underlying this linkage

Edward R. Tufte. 1975. "Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review* 69, no. 3 (September): 812–826

- **Key Takeaways:**
- **Argument**: Seeks to explain the *magnitude* of national midterm loss by the president's party – why do some presidents lose more seats than others?
 - Puzzle: in every off-year congressional election since the Civil War (except one), the party of the incumbent president has lost seats in the House. Why?
 - Hypothesis: lower approval ratings and less prosperous economy tied to greater loss of support for the president's party in the midterms

- **Data/Methods:** regress standardized vote loss by president's party in midterm on presidential popularity, yearly change in economic conditions (1938-1970, N = 8)
 - DV: magnitude of midterm loss by president's party, relative to past eight on- and off-cycle elections (measured nationally)
 - ★ **Vote loss:** standardized vote loss by president's party in midterm election; measured with respect to how well the president's party *normally* does
 - IV: presidential approval, performance of the economy in year before midterm
 - ★ **Approval:** monthly Gallup poll question about presidential approval
 - ★ **Economy:** yearly pre-election change in real disposable income per capita
 - Vote to seats: based on swing ratio (% change in seats/ % change in votes); percent change in seats associated with 1% change in national vote
- **Findings:** midterm votes in congressional elections act as a referendum on the president's performance and the management of the economy
 - 10pp change in popularity → 1.3pp change in vote, 100 dollar change in RDI → 3.5pp change in vote
 - ★ Model predicts hard cases at least somewhat well (1974 midterms post-Nixon), though seems to be sensitive to extreme values
 - No relationship between presidential approval, pre-election shift in RDI; approval is a function of many things (not just the economy)
 - Votes to seats: nationwide vote poorly reflected in partisan distribution of *seats*, due to structure of the electoral system – ratio *declining* over time
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** response to view of midterm as return to “normal” partisan equilibrium by focusing on the magnitude of votes/seats lost

Pamela Johnston Conover, Stanley Feldman, and Kathleen Knight. 1987. “The Personal and Political Underpinnings of Economic Forecasts.” *American Journal of Political Science* 31, no. 3 (August): 559

- **Key Takeaway:** the public's assessment of the economy are shaped by *personal* economic well-being and *partisan* biases
- **Argument:** Retrospective assessments of economic conditions do not influence economic forecasts
 - Instead, economic forecasts are shaped by *personal* economic circumstances and *partisan* assessments of government performance
 - Information processing theory: people gather new information and use stored information to perform mental tasks (e.g. making economic forecasts)
 - ★ Information may be processed in biased ways. In particular, information that is *emotion-provoking* is more likely to be stored and recalled
 - ★ In addition, there may be error in retrospective judgements, particularly if people interpret the economy in ways that favor their partisan identity
 - Hypotheses
 - ★ **Personal experience:** will disproportionately shape economic forecasts, as they are more emotion provoking, proximate
 - ★ **Political implications:** skepticism about people correctly perceiving economic conditions

- **Data/Methods:** three-part panel study
 - DV: *prospective* evaluations of inflation/unemployment rates
 - IV: (1) *retrospective* evaluations of inflation/unemployment (past year), (2) knowledge variables, (3) *personal economic conditions* (objective and subjective), (4) opinions about the *government's economic performance*, and (5) *partisan predispositions*, including party ID and presidential approval
- **Main findings:** there is considerable variation in prospective judgements of inflation and unemployment – with *many* inaccurate predictions
 - Retrospective and prospective evaluations are only weakly correlated, suggesting that others do not use current economic conditions to predict the future
 - Perceptions of government performance on the economy strongly shape retrospective evaluations – though partisanship does not
 - ★ *Note*: likely multicollinearity here, as perceptions of government performance are likely to be strongly tied to partisanship
 - Process of prospective evaluations is prone to error due to two factors:
 - ★ People overweight *personal conditions* and perceptions of *governmental performance* at the expense of knowledge about the state of the economy
- **Contributions/Related Literature:**
 - Prospective model: Kramer (1971) and Downs envision voting as a forecasting process where voters judge candidates based on expectations of future action
 - ★ Retrospection still matters in prospective models, as past performance is the best predictor of future performance
 - Link to work on partisan bias in evaluations of government: Evans and Anderson (2006), Bartels (2002), tied to Campbell et al. 1960 on the “perceptual screen”

Bartels (2000)

- **Key Takeaway:**
- **Argument:** Conventional wisdom regarding the “decline of parties” is exaggerated and outdated
 - Partisan loyalties in the public have rebounded significantly since the mid-1970s, especially among voters
 - Impact of partisanship on voting behavior has also significantly increased both at the presidential level and Congressional level from 1970s to 1990s
 - ★ Almost 80 percent increase in the impact of PID on voting behavior

Geoffrey Evans and Robert Andersen. 2006. “The Political Conditioning of Economic Perceptions.” *The Journal of Politics* 68, no. 1 (February): 194–207

- **Key Takeaways:** party support causes economic perceptions, rather than the other way around
- **Argument:** When long-term conditions effects of party support on economic perceptions are taken into account, the estimated effects of economic perceptions of party support are reduced. The direction of influence between economic perceptions and political preferences is largely from politics to economics

- Note: Prediction relate to *macro-economy* and not individual-level changes in personal economics
- Partisan “contamination” of voters’ understanding of economic performance (195) means that cross-sectional models regressing voting on economic perceptions will overestimate this relationship
- **Data/Methods**: 1992-97 British Election Panel Study with yearly panel, five waves
 - DV: incumbent vote (Conservative vs not)
 - IV: *Retrospective* economic perceptions and incumbent popularity
 - ★ **Egocentric (pocketbook)**: perceptions of whether own household income had kept up with prices over the past year
 - ★ **Sociotropic**: perceptions of changes in British economy over past year
- **Findings**: “prior political partisanship, measured as both incumbent (Conservative) popularity and vote, systematically influences economic perceptions”
 - Cross-sectional: strong relationship between voting and both sociotropic and egocentric perceptions of the economy
 - SEMs: sociotropic perceptions are strongly conditioned by prior opinions of the incumbent Conservative Party.
 - ★ Once this relationship is accounted for, these perceptions have little effect on incumbent party popularity.
 - ★ Instead, lagged political support is a stronger predictor than sociotropic perceptions of current party support.
 - However, egocentric perceptions are neither affected nor influenced by previous party support.
- **Contributions/Related Literature**: Linked to Campbell et al. 1960– partisanship as a “perceptual screen” through which people appraise economic performance

Gregory A. Huber, Seth J. Hill, and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2012. “Sources of Bias in Retrospective Decision Making: Experimental Evidence on Voters’ Limitations in Controlling Incumbents.” *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 4 (November): 720–741

- **Key Takeaways**: Experimental evidence showing bias in retrospective evaluations and limitations in voters’ ability to effectively implement a retrospective decision rule
- **Argument**: It may be more difficult than anticipated for voters to engage in retrospective voting due to three biases:
 - Recency: Focus on *recent* rather than cumulative performance by incumbents
 - Irrelevance: Influenced by *unrelated events* for incumbents
 - Elite manipulation: Can be *manipulated by rhetoric* (framing, marketing)
- **Data/Methods**: incentives experiment in which participants received payments from an “allocator” over multiple periods and then could choose whether to keep their allocator (incumbent) or get a new one (opposition).
 - Study 1: look at recency effects (“end bias” in retrospective assessments)
 - ★ Manipulated when people learned about ability to choose to change allocators – early vs. late (with latter simulating changed election salience)

- Study 2: examine how people incorporate irrelevant information into their retrospective evaluations, via random lottery
 - ★ Introduced a lottery at different rounds where either gained 5000 tokens, lost 5000 tokens, or stayed even. Simulates a random shock and made clear that lottery was separate from allocator.
- Study 3: comparison between **hedonic** and **informational** primes, with the former focused on current satisfaction. Prior to retention question, three conditions:
 - ★ Control (no question), hedonic (“how satisfied are you”) and information (“what would you estimate is average”)

• **Findings:**

- Study 1: Overweight recent relative to overall incumbent performance when made aware of an election closer Rather than more distant from that event
- Study 2: Allowed an unrelated lottery that affected their welfare influence their choices
- Study 3: were influenced by rhetoric to give more weight to recent rather than overall incumbent performance

• **Contributions/Related Literature:** Demonstrate end bias found in other studies ((Kramer 1971)that focus on election-year outcomes

- Contrary to Fiorina (1981) who suggests that retrospective voting is relatively easy – may be more challenging than assumed
- Patterns of biased retrospection explain why incumbents undertake policy right before elections (Tufte 1975,Achen and Bartels 2016)
- Confirms studies that suggest that elites can manipulate voter retrospection through their rhetoric (Vavreck 2009,Lenz 2020)

Michael W. Sances. 2017. “Attribution Errors in Federalist Systems: When Voters Punish the President for Local Tax Increases.” *The Journal of Politics* 79, no. 4 (October): 1286–1301

- **Key Takeaways:** Voters struggle to correctly attribute blame, even in political contexts in which responsibility should be clear (ex. local property taxes)
- **Argument:** Voters may not be able to attribute blame to the correct political actor – here, they punish the president’s party for local tax increases imposed by direct democracy
 - Retrospective voting: voters observe events, judge how much responsibility to assign to different actors, then use these attribution to inform vote choice
 - ★ Previous work shows that voters distinguish between political actors, but it unclear whether these distinctions are biased (e.g. by partisanship)
 - Mechanism:
 - ★ **Retrospection**: voters only notice their income has decreased (*pocketbook voting*), fail to separate out decrease that is from local taxes
 - there is a strong relationship between the decrease in vote share, size of the tax increase
 - ★ **Priming/salience**: shock of tax increase primes other factors that voters attribute to the president
 - ★ **Turnout**: tax increases change the composition of the electorate by affecting turnout - tax increase passage seems to marginally increase turnout

- ★ **Social construction:** voters may be persuaded that the government is at fault for tax increases
- **Data/Methods:** examine tax increase reforms between 1990-2012 for 351 municipalities (298 of which held at least one referendum, 239 passed at least one increase)
 - Case: property tax referenda in Massachusetts municipalities where citizens voted directly on tax increases
 - Panel analysis: interact tax increase dummy and a Dem/GOP indicator dummy, with added controls for local economic conditions
 - ★ Also add town FEs to rule out time-invariant confounding as well as placebo treatment (*failed* tax increases)
 - Dynamic panel regression: pre-tax increases trends in Dem vote share (adding three leads/lags)
 - no real effect on leads, diminishing effect over time on lags
 - RDD: sharp, based on cutoff at 50 % referendum vote share
 - ★ If multiple referendums, treated if a least one passes
- **Findings:** in years with Democratic incumbent, Democrats lose votes when tax increases happen; in years with Republican incumbents, Democrats gain
 - Results robust to number of alternative specifications and apply only to cases of *successful* tax increases (rather than held referenda) On average, a voter-imposed tax increase leads to a nearly 2-point decline in the incumbent party's vote share
 - ★ Voters appear to react to the change in their personal financial situation, even through they cased this change
 - **Contributions/Related Literature:** suggests that voter retrospection fails because voters cannot correctly attribute blame to the appropriate actor

Anthony Fowler and Andrew B. Hall. 2018. "Do Shark Attacks Influence Presidential Elections? Reassessing a Prominent Finding on Voter Competence." *The Journal of Politics* 80, no. 4 (October): 1423–1437

- **Key Takeaways:** Refuting Achen and Bartels, voters may not be punishing incumbents for shark attacks and the original argument about blind retrospection may be overblown
- **Argument:** Reassess evidence linking shark attacks and their influence on presidential elections and argue there is no compelling evidence that they do—and if there is any effect, it is tiny
- **Data/Methods:** Data on presidential elections (county and town level), fatal shark attacks, and official government classifications of coastal and non-coastal counties. Look at every election from 1872 to 2012
 - Comprehensive test of relationship between shark attacks and voting. Either
 - ★ New Jersey finding is value, exposing systematic flaw in voter reasoning that should appear in similar situations
 - ★ Or it is a one-off case reflecting unusual circumstances and has little to say about general accountability
- **Findings:** Find little support for hypothesis that shark attacks decrease support for incumbent presidents or their parties

- Re-estimate NJ study with more elections and find no evidence of effect

- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Direct response to Achen and Bartels (2016)

Scott Ashworth, Ethan Bueno De Mesquita, and Amanda Friedenberg. 2018. “Learning about Voter Rationality.” *American Journal of Political Science* 62, no. 1 (January): 37–54

- **Key Takeaway:** voter responsiveness to seemingly irrelevant events may be rational if these events reveal information about incumbent “type” (good/bad leader)
- **Argument:** Even if voters are rational, with instrumental preferences, exogenous shocks should affect incumbents’ electoral fortunes
 - Events change voters’ opportunities to learn new information about incumbents, such as their quality (e.g. emergency preparedness)
 - Consequently, evidence of a relationship between electoral outcomes and exogenous shocks does not prove that voters are irrational
 - ★ Effect of shocks should depend on both (1) how governance outcomes are produced and (2) prior beliefs about candidates
- **Data/Methods:** outline Bayesian learning framework, where incumbents and challengers are each one type (good or bad) – voters prefer candidates with better type
 - Voters observe governance outcomes, which are a function of an incumbent’s type and two shocks (observed disaster intensity, unobserved idiosyncratic)
- **Main Findings:** only additive model of the production function for governance outcomes implies voter irrationality if shocks affect electoral outcomes
 - Under certain assumptions, disasters can amplify/mute the effect of type (incumbent competence has larger/smaller effect on governance outcomes when the disaster is large/small)
 - Re-election: probability of re-election depends on a voter’s re-election threshold, distribution of governance outcomes – disasters can influence both
- **Contributions/Related literature:** Response to argument that rational voters should not base electoral decisions on irrelevant events
 - Suggests that voter irrationality can only be inferred from responsiveness to exogenous shocks in cases when the shock does not affect informativeness

Anthony Fowler. 2020. “Partisan Intoxication or Policy Voting?” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 15, no. 2 (April): 141–179

- **Key Takeaways:**
- **Argument:**
 - How do American voters decide who to vote for? Two primary models:
 - ★ Policy voting: Decisions largely influenced by policy preferences and belief about government voting
 - Voters make choices according to beliefs about future outcomes under each candidate and their policy positions

- ★ Partisan intoxication: Voters don't think about policy or government performance, instead are intoxicated partisans
 - **Note**: Claim limited to argument that psychological attachments to a party influence the way a person *votes*; could matter for other types of evaluations
 - Existing evidence points to voters not having strong or stable preferences over policy → instead cast ballot in line with psychological attachments
 - ★ Issues with survey responses
 - ★ Relationship between PID and vote choice may be evidence of *reverse causation*; expect those who align with GOP on policy to vote for GOP candidates
 - **Data/Methods**: Three studies: 2016 election, Southern realignment, candidate choice experiment
 - **Findings**: We do not have enough evidence to claim that a meaningful share of voters are influenced by their psychological attachments rather than their substantive interests; only a small share of American electorate are intoxicated partisans
 - 2016 Election: Trump victory not easily attributable to partisan voting; Trump lost some conventional Republicans and won voters who would normally align with Democrats due to immigration positions
 - Southern Realignment: National platforms of the major parties flipped and diverged over a few decades; if vote choice was largely determined by psychological attachments to parties, white southerners would have continued supporting Democrats
 - ★ Although PID is sticky, vote choices can change quickly when the policy interest of voters no longer align with their pre-existing identification
 - Candidate Choice experiment: Receiving at least one piece of policy information reduces partisan voting by more than 6 points → evidence that respondents care about policy areas and incorporate information into vote choices
 - **Contributions/Related Literature**: Push back against strength of PID as determiner of vote choice
-

Social Influence and Context

Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and MacPhee 1954

- **Key Takeaway:** Sociological context as main influence on voting decisions (“Columbia School”)
- **Argument:** people’s opinions reflect pressures from social networks (including family, friends, coworkers, and other members of your religious group)
 - Voting decisions take place within a social context, such that variations in the context will affect voting patterns
 - ★ **Homogeneity:** if you have a homogeneous circle of friends, coworkers, family, you are more likely to have strongly held partisan views and the more likely you are to vote
 - People who experience cross-pressures across groups are (a) more likely to change their vote over time, (b) less likely to vote overall
 - ★ **Opinion leaders:** people look to more informed, more engaged members of the community for cues about how to vote
 - Minimal effects hypothesis: campaigns and media do not change your views, they just reinforce them
 - ★ Instead, people tend to follow **opinion leaders** within one’s social network, who serve as a more informal cue-givers
- **Data/Methods:** case study of Elmira, NY/ during the 1948 presidential election, based on a four-round panel study
- **Findings:**
 - Social networks: personal environments also tend to be very homogeneous – particularly within friend groups but also amongst colleagues
 - ★ Increased homogeneity of social groups corresponds to greater partisanship, but if the social group is split, people tend to follow the dominant preference of their community
 - ★ **Hereditary vote:** influence of political tradition of one generation on the next
 - Discussion: political talk is centered on the family or among people with similar characteristics, leading to much more agreement than disagreement
 - ★ However, many members of the public look to “opinion leaders” to guide their political beliefs – looking to leaders who they expect to share their point of view but who have greater expertise and interest
 - **Other findings:**
 - ★ Social institutions: unions much more ineffectual and much less engaged in the campaign than expected, though union members largely vote Democratic
 - ★ Social groups: SES (perceived class status) influence voting for Republicans, Protestants vote more GOP than other minority groups
 - However, though people recognize the existence of bloc voting, many members of the electorate don’t know which groups correspond to which party
 - ★ Campaign effects: most voters remain constant in their vote intention over the course of a campaign
 - The people who change their votes are more likely to be exposed to cross pressures, less interested in the election – and they’re more likely to change their vote later in the campaign

- ★ Selective exposure: political discussion tends to take place in situations of mutual agreement
 - even when individuals look to opinion leaders for guidance
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Columbia model based on sociological context, with social group membership influencing partisanship
 - Michigan model: contrary to the Campbell et al. 1960 view of partisanship as a social identity in and of itself
 - ★ Focus on group membership as cause of vote switching
 - Two-step flow of communication from relatively attentive, well informed “opinion leaders” to the public
 - ★ **Similarities:** assume public (1) not knowledgeable about or interested in politics, (2) unaware of where gov’t stands on policy
 - ★ **Differences:** Michigan school argues that social group memberships (religion, class) have little direct impact on voting decisions
 - Social forced conditions voting/attitudes, as discuss politics with friends and families and adopt their views
 - This lies in contrast to PID as “perceptual” screen through which voters interpret issues

Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague. 1987. “Networks in Context: The Social Flow of Political Information.” *American Political Science Review* 81, no. 4 (December): 1197–1216

- **Key Takeaway:** *social environment* plays a crucial role in affecting the social flow of political information
- **Argument:** politics as a *social activity*, driven by *social interactions*, with *environment* playing a key role in the “social flow of political information”
- Theoretical basis for the influence of socially transmitted information
 - To the extent that political preferences are dependent on information, they are inherently dynamic and responsive to social influence → preference is not only inflicted upon socially transmitted information, but socially transmitted info is inflicted upon preference
 - Politics is not at the forefront of most choices that most people make
- Distinction between *context* and *networks*
 - Distinguish between *contexts* (external to the individual) and *networks* (which are the product of choices made by the individuals who compose the network, within a given context)
- **Data/Methods:** 3-wave panel survey of 1,500 respondents was conducted in 1984 – before, during, and after the presidential election
 - Respondents lived in 16 different neighborhoods in South Bend, IN, with neighborhoods selected to maximize within-neighborhood homogeneity and across-neighborhood heterogeneity
 - Networks: collect names of people with whom respondents have political discussions (outside of the family) → combined into a generalized network of “respondents” and “discussants”
- **Findings:** Voters show a high level of accuracy in their perception of discussant behavior. Accuracy is lower within relationships that produce disagreement

- If respondents shared similar voting behavior with discussants, very accurate at predicting discussant behaviors. This accuracy reduces as move to dyads of disagreement but still above 50%
 - ★ Among non-voters, bad at identifying others who are non-voting but can still accurately identify partisanship of voters
 - People’s perceptions of discussants are influenced by *objective* reality (discussant’s self-reported preferences), *subjective* reality (respondent’s own preferences), and *social* reality (composition of preferences within immediate neighborhood)
 - ★ Context affects perceptions of disagreement dyads – much easier to identify disagreement in places where surrounding context supports that disagreement
 - Heterogeneity: asymmetry in choice and perception, with political majorities ignoring dissonant information
- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Emphasize the importance of social environments: (1) a politically supportive social context sustains information receiver’s misperception of dissonance-producing, socially transmitted political information and (2) members of the political minority accurately perceive members of the majority, while members of the majority do *not* accurately perceive members of the minority

James N. Druckman and Kjersten R. Nelson. 2003. “Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens’ Conversations Limit Elite Influence.” *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 4 (October): 729–745

- **Key Takeaway:** Exposure to cross-cutting views in individual discussion networks can limit effectiveness of elite frames
- **Argument:** Past work on framing effects take place in *social vacuum* –respondents receive frame but have no chance to discuss the issues at hand
 - Framing effects can occur via interpersonal discussions → relevant frames or considerations do not need to come from elites, but can come from conversations with others
 - Composition of discussion group affects the group’s impact
 - ★ When conversations include mostly common perspective, expect polarization and strengthening of initial elite frame
 - ★ When group is more cross-cutting, alternative views will be expressed rendering initial frame less effective
 - Knowledge facilitates the use of new frames **and** individuals who possess prior opinions will exhibit less susceptibility to new frames
 - ★ Elite frames will exhibit a greater impact on more knowledgeable individuals and a smaller impact on individuals more likely to have prior opinions
- **Data/Methods:** Lab experiment N=261
 - Topic: Opinion about campaign finance reform
 - Treated participants received either “free speech” frame or “special-interest” frame
 - Participants assigned to three conversational conditions (no discussion, unmixed discussion, mixed discussion)
 - ★ Mixed = opposing frames
 - Outcome: Support passage of campaign finance legislation, belief-importance measure, belief-content measure

- Need to evaluate – tendency to have prior opinion
- **Findings:** Under certain conditions, citizens’ conversations limit the power of elite influence— elite influence via framing may not be so robust in a political world where citizens have access to alternative forms of information
 - Strong evidence for an elite-framing effect in no-discussion group as well as unmixed discussion group, though no polarization
 - No significant framing effects in mixed discussion, no change in beliefs
 - Low NE individuals and those who are highly knowledgeable are more susceptible to elite framing
 - Short time horizon of elite influence
- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Emphasizes a more limited impact of elites in public opinion due to both social context as well as individual-level processes. Tied to framing literature.

David W. Nickerson. 2008. “Is Voting Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments.” *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 1 (February): 49–57

- **Key Takeaway:** Examines spillover effects of GOTV messages on untreated members of a household
- **Argument:** members of the same household evince similar voting behaviors – but it is difficult to determine whether these similarities are because they already share *similar characteristics* (eg, have same finances) or because of the effects of *interpersonal influence*
- **Data/Methods:** two field experimental designs in Denver and Minneapolis during the 2002 congressional primary election
 - Population: two-voter households, targeting neighborhoods with a high density of such households
 - Treatment: exposure of one member of the household to either a GOTV message, a placebo message about recycling, or no campaign contact
 - DV: voter turnout of members of the same household, including people *not* exposed to the message, as a way of measuring behavioral contagion
- **Findings:** Direct effect of GOTV message on propensity to turnout
 - 60 percent of the propensity to vote is passed onto the other member of the household
 - Implication: Interpersonal influence shapes behaviors of people living within the same household
- **Contribution/Related Literature:** immediate social context can have a large bearing on people living within the same household; similarities between members of households are not just a function of selection bias

Daniel J. Hopkins. 2010. “Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition.” *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 1 (February): 40–60

- **Key Takeaway:** Local hostility toward immigrants develops when communities undergo sudden demographic change **and** salient national rhetoric politicizes immigration
- **Argument:** Politicized places hypothesis: when communities are undergoing sudden demographic changes at the same time that salient national rhetoric politicizes immigration, immigrants can quickly become the target of local political hostility

- Builds on existing research on racial threat: Presence of an out-group in sufficient numbers *on its own* is insufficient to generate hostility
- Two key features:
 - ★ Resolves issues of local inattention to demographics by focusing on *changes* in immigration rather than absolute *levels*
 - ★ Media → mechanism through which people connect exposure to immigrants to political attitudes
- Implication: At times when rhetoric related to immigrants is highly salient nationally, those witnessing influxes of immigrants locally will find it easier to draw political conclusions from their experiences
- **Data/Methods**: Eleven surveys from 1992-2009 with county-level geo-codes
 - Choice of relevant contextual unit is important; use both counties and ZIP codes
 - Salience: Index of monthly mentions of immigration by network news programs
 - DV: Change in county's percent immigrant (ACS)
 - IV: support for decreased immigration
- **Findings**: when immigration is a high-profile issue nationally, living in a local context with changing demographics is more strongly related to anti-immigration attitudes.
 - Results do not appear to be tied to (1) national economic conditions, (2) the *absolute* level of the local immigrant population
 - using 9/11 as a case study, find that contextual effects were only activated when immigration was a salient topic
- **Contribution/Related Literature**: Tied to section on inter-group conflict; suggests that inter-group conflict, in the form of anti-immigrant attitudes, requires both local changes in demographics and national rhetoric politicizing immigration.

Cara Wong et al. 2012. “Bringing the Person Back In: Boundaries, Perceptions, and the Measurement of Racial Context.” *The Journal of Politics* 74, no. 4 (October): 1153–1170

- **Key Takeaway**: Subjective perceptions of “context” are psychologically meaningful to individuals
- **Argument**:
 - Choosing appropriate geographic unit for analysis is difficult – both theoretically and empirically
 - ★ Modifiable Areal Unit Problem: relationships between variables at one level can change when studied at a different level of aggregation
 - **Scale**: larger units lead to larger correlations even when the correlation at the individual level is constant
 - **Aggregation**: Many ways to draw specific geography to be meet certain constraints
 - While administrative geographic units are objective designations of someones physical container, context can also refer to environment people *believe* they live in ie the “pictures in their heads”
 - Variation in subjective perceptions of demographics in local environment may produce variation in levels of perceived racial threat
- **Data/Methods**: Develop new measure of local context → ask people to **draw** their own neighborhoods on a map

- **Findings:** Subjective perceptions of local community are meaningful and vary from objective measures
 - People’s perceptions of their community are (1) different from governmental admin units and (2) not commonly shared visions
 - Across races, percentage of blacks are overestimated and Whites underestimated, but perception of racial context are more accurate at more localized levels
 - Comparing results across three types of context – race, PID, economic– (1) little variation in avg. perception of unemployment and partisanship across levels and (2) perceptions of economic and racial context are more distorted than those of partisan context on average
 - Within pairs of white respondents in similar blocks, people perceiving larger Black population tend to have higher racial resentment
- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Pushes back on use of objective measures of context in studies of racial threat (or other contexts); *Subjective* perceptions are important too

Ryan D. Enos. 2017. *The space between us: social geography and politics*. Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press

- **Research Question:** How does geographic space shape political attitudes and behaviors?
- **Argument:** Generally, the theory states that geographic space between two groups leads to psychological space between the groups, which in turn, leads to political space between them. Theory can be summarized by five points:
 1. Human attitudes and behaviors are deeply affected by group identities and the categories by which a person will describe themselves
 2. Certain conditions, including geography, can increase the salience of group categories
 3. Among the geographic conditions the increase salience are a group’s size, proximity, and degree of segregation
 - Salience is a function of *accessibility* and *fit* of group categories
 4. The more salient a category, the more likely it is that one’s attitudes and behavior toward it will have group-based bias
 5. These group-based biases have political consequences
- Character of group interactions are shaped by *social geography*: the size, proximity, and segregation of groups. This in turn influences behavior perceptually by affecting cognition and experientially through interpersonal contact
- Builds on Allport’s (1954) “contact theory” which tells us that under certain circumstances, including economic equality and social integration, residential contact would reduce intergroup prejudice. In the absence of these conditions, may increase it
- **Findings:** Enos (2014) and Enos (2016) are both chapters in this book explaining how social geographic can influence both exclusionary attitudes and turnout.
- **Contribution:** Two primary contributions: (1) Enos presents a comprehensive theory explaining how the social geography of groups can influence attitudes and behavior and (2) Enos presents some of the strongest evidence in support of the effects of context that due to focus on causal identification rather than relying on aggregate or survey data

Joshua L. Kalla and David E. Broockman. 2020. “Reducing Exclusionary Attitudes through Interpersonal Conversation: Evidence from Three Field Experiments.” *American Political Science Review* 114, no. 2 (May): 410–425

- **Key Takeaway:** non-judgmental exchange of narratives can durably reduce exclusionary attitudes
- **Argument:** People often resist persuasion because it poses a threat to their self-image
 - Non-judgmental exchange of narratives: strategy where an individual attempts to persuade another person by providing to or eliciting from them narratives about relevant personal experiences while non-judgmentally listening to the views they express
 - ★ Builds on *narrative persuasion* and *high quality listening*
- **Data/Methods:** Three field experiments across 7 locations N=6,869; door-to-door canvassing
 - Study 1: Randomly varied presence of non-judgmental exchange and held constant content of conversation
 - Study 2: explores potential boundary conditions (transgender issues) and more scaleable version of treatment (video narratives)
 - Study 3: Phone conversations also focused on transgender issues
- **Findings:**
 - Study 1: Door-to-door canvassing that used strategy reduced exclusionary attitudes toward unauthorized immigrants for at least four months compared to regular conversations
 - Study 2: Reduced prejudice toward transgender people up to a month in future; both video only and in-person strategies effective
 - Study 3: Phone conversations also reduce prejudice
- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Large-scale field experiment evaluating the effectiveness of inter-personal conversations in reducing prejudice. Extensions to literature on inter-group contact

Noah L. Nathan and Melissa L. Sands. 2023. “Context and Contact: Unifying the Study of Environmental Effects on Politics.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 26, no. 1 (June): 233–252

- **Research Question:** How should we think about studying contextual effects and inter-group contact?
- **Argument:** Develop a typology of forms of context and contact when thinking about this line of research:
 - *Context* refers to the features of the local environment in which someone lives or works. *Contact* refers to the interactions that a person has with those from other social groups in the course of their lives.
 - “Context” or “Contact” treatments vary across two dimensions: *depth* and *duration*. Expectations of the outcome of this contact will depend on these dimensions.
 - ★ Depth can vary from causal interactions in which two people are exposed to each other but do not engage as peers to cooperative interactions.
 - ★ Duration ranges from one-off brief encounters to sustained exposure.

- The typical story of contact focuses on the psychological effects of out-group exposure as the mechanism leading to a change in behavior or attitudes. Need to expand to more plausible mechanisms:
 - ★ *Prejudice*: Psychological responses that +/– prejudice against out-groups
 - ★ *Distributive politics*: which groups benefit from state policies and patronage?
 - ★ *Elite mobilization*: do political elites strategically emphasize or de-emphasize a group cleavage?
 - ★ *Economic conditions*: do the groups cooperate or compete and what are the economic externalities?
- Importantly, these possible mechanisms are not independent and can influence each-other or happen simultaneously

Groups and Identities

Conceptualizing Identity

Marilynn B. Brewer. 2001. "The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Political Psychology." *Political Psychology* 22, no. 1 (March): 115–125

- **Research Question:** What is social identity?
- **Argument:**
 - Start from the assumption that all conceptualizations of social identity refer in some way to the idea that an individual's self-concept is derived to some extent from the social relationships and social groups they participate in
 - Captured by Tajfel's (1981) early definition of social identity as "that part of the individual's self concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership"
 - **Person-based social identities:** Refers to definitions of social identity that are located within the individual self-concept. Influenced by membership in specific social groups or categories and the shared socialization experiences that such membership implies. Focus on the *content* of the identity. Identification refers to the centrality of a particular social group membership to the individual's sense of self and meaning derived from the identity
 - **Relational social identities:** Defining the self in relation to others. Centered around interpersonal relationships within a larger group context. Also includes group identities when the group involved are defined by a network of interpersonal relationships. Interdependent in the sense that the traits and behaviors expressed by one individual are dependent on and response to other parties in the relationship.
 - **Group-based social identities:** While person-based identities reflect the extent to which a group membership is represented as an integral part of an individual's self-concept, group-based identities refer to the perception of self as an integral part of a larger group unit. Influences self-concept in two ways:
 1. When a group identity is engaged, the construal of self extends beyond the individual person to a more inclusive social unit
 2. The attributes and behaviors of the individual self are assimilated to the representation of the group as a whole
 - **Collective identities:** Involves shared representations of the group based on common interests and experiences but also refers to an active process of shaping and forging an image of what the group stands for. Provides link between social identity and collective action in the political arena
 - Example: Being a mother. At the personal level, being a mother influences perceptions of self. Being a mother also involves a relation with the child (relational identity). Mothers are also a social category (group-based). Motherhood is also a collective identity that invokes specific values and ideals.
 - Important difference between person-based or relational and group-based identities is whether these identities are *selected* and *activated* by the individual or *elicited* by the social context

Rawi Abdelal et al. 2006. "Identity as a Variable." *Perspectives on Politics* 4, no. 04 (December)

- **Research Question:** What is "identity"?

- **Key Takeaway:** Collective identity is a social category that varies along two dimensions: content and contestation.
- **Argument:**
 - Wide variety of conceptualizations and definitions of identity makes some see it as an elusive concepts, difficult to use as a variable
 - **Collective identity** is a social category that varies along two dimensions: content and contestation
 - Content of social identities may take the form of four, non-mutually exclusive types:
 1. *Constitutive norms*: the formal and informal rules that define group membership
 2. *Social purposes*: goals that are shared by members of a group
 3. *Relational comparisons*: defining an identity by what it is not
 4. *Cognitive models*: worldviews of political and material conditions and interests that are shaped by a particular identity
 - Contestation refers to the degree of agreement within a group over the content of the shared identity
- The content of identities is neither fixed nor predetermined, rather, content is the outcome of a process of social contestation within the group. Propose studying contestation as a process that occurs *within* groups
- Argue for the *collective* meaning inherent in social identities. Understanding the interaction among constituent individuals and their groups is a crucial part of the analysis of social identities
- *Salience* and *intensity* are key terms within this framework, but focusing on *meaning* instead and its contestation can be informative

Paula D. McClain et al. 2009. "Group Membership, Group Identity, and Group Consciousness: Measures of Racial Identity in American Politics?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, no. 1 (June): 471–485

- **Research Question:** Are racial identity and group consciousness the same concepts?
- **Argument:** Provide definitions of key concepts in REP literature:
 - **Group membership:** refers to the assignment of an individual into a particular group based on characteristics that are specific to that group, in accordance with widely held intersubjective definitions
 - **Group identification:** refers to an individual's awareness of belonging to a certain group and having a psychological attachment to that group based on perceptions of shared beliefs, feelings, interests with other members. Similar idea to SIT (Tajfel and Turner)
 - **Group consciousness:** This is *not* group identity. Identification is a psychological sense of belonging or attachment. Consciousness is in-group identification politicized by a set of ideological beliefs about one's group's social standing.
- **Key Takeaway:** Group identification **does not** imply group consciousness
- **Related Literature:** Applies generally to much of the REP literature that attempts to build off of Dawson's (1995) argument about linked fate. Work cannot assume that membership in a racial or ethnic group implies shared political goals. Similar idea to Lee (2008)

Maya Sen and Omar Wasow. 2016. "Race as a Bundle of Sticks: Designs that Estimate Effects of Seemingly Immutable Characteristics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19, no. 1 (May): 499–522

- **Research Question:** Is race best understood under an essentials or constructive framework? If essentialist, how can we successfully implement in empirical studies?
- **Argument:**
 - Argue that in experiment or empirical contexts race should be understood as a composite variable or **bundle of sticks**. Conceptualizing race and ethnicity in constructivist terms allows race to be dis-aggregated into constitutive elements, some of which can be experimentally manipulated
 - There are to key theories of race:
 - ★ **Essentialism:** Views race in largely biological terms and categorizes populations by regions of ancestry and phenotype
 - ★ **Constructivism:** Emphasizes weak scientific basis for racial categories and argues that race is best understood as a social construction
 - Studies attempting to estimate the effects of race tend to encounter methodological problems for two reasons.
 1. Treatment should be manipulable by a researcher yet race is often understood as an immutable characteristics.
 2. Race is "assigned" before most variables so considering race along with factors that follow birth can risk post-treatment bias
 3. Race is unstable and can vary significantly across treatments, observations, and time
- Two Proposed Designs
 - *Exposure Studies:* Exposure to a racial cue or signal conveys information about race to a subject.
 - *Within-Group Studies:* Designs that exploit variation *within* a racial or ethnic group rather than across groups. Disaggregates the bundle of sticks and singles out a a specific constitutive element of race that can be manipulated within a group
- **Key Takeaway:** Researchers need to consider exactly what is being captured by racial identification variables. Under a constructivist perspective, race can be conceptualized as a composite of a variety of different social and demographic characteristics

Patrick J. Egan. 2020. "Identity as Dependent Variable: How Americans Shift Their Identities to Align with Their Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 64, no. 3 (July): 699–716

- **Research Questions:** How can politics lead Americans to shift their identities across multiple categories we typically think of as fixed?
- **Argument:**
 - Social identity theory tells us that highly salient identities can provide a definition of the self in terms of the defining characteristics of the identity group. Through self-categorization, these characteristics are woven together into prototypes that become stylized representations of the people in that identity group. When that identity becomes salient, identifiers can engage in a depersonalization process in which beliefs and actions converge toward those of prototypical group members

- In a “social sorting” process described by Mason (2018), the nation’s two political coalitions are now very similar in terms of demographic groups
 - Together, these conditions are leading some Americans to adjust their demographic identities to better align with partisan and ideological prototypes
 - **Data/Methods:** Three waves of GSS panel data ranging from 2006-2014. Looks at identities including race, ethnicity, national origin, class, sexuality, partisanship, and ideology.
 - **Findings:**
 - Demonstrates that a range of identity categories can be overridden by partisanship and ideology
 - Under what conditions might we see politicized identity shifting arise in other contexts?
 1. Political groups must be so highly salient and central to the self-concept that they become identities themselves
 2. Political groups must become distinct enough with regard to ethnicity, religion, sexuality, or other characteristics typically considered fixed that these characteristics are called to mind as components of political group stereotypes
 - **Critique:** Unclear why this framework would explain shifts in identification across multiple different identities that may or may not be related. Also concerns over response stability and/or truthfulness (though the author attempts to address this)
 - **Related Literature:** Similar idea to Margolis’ (2018) book in that they both treat identity as a dependent variable that can be influenced by partisanship.
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Group Identity and Consciousness

Michael C. Dawson. 1995. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press

- **Research Question:** Is race or class more important in shaping African American politics? As African American economic prospects have increased, does their racial identity become less prominent? Why have African Americans remained politically homogeneous even as they become economically polarized?
- **Argument (Chpt 2-3):**
 - Large gaps between black and white economic status remain, however, there is growing economic polarization within the black community
 - Framework requires that we relate AAs political beliefs and actions as *individuals* to their perceptions of racial *group* interests. AAs’ perceptions of interests of the racial group explain to what degree and under what circumstances the economic divisions within the AA community will become politically salient
 - One’s individual preferences are partly shaped by one’s ties to the black community, one’s perception of group interests, which in turn, is partly shaped by one’s place in the AA class structure as well as one’s place in the racial hierarchy
 - Shared experience of historical racial and economic subjugation key in politicizing AA racial interests

- **Black Utility Heuristic:** As long as AAs continue to believe that their lives are to a large degree determined by what happens to the group as a whole, expect AA perceptions of group interests to be an important component of the way individual black voters go about evaluating policies, parties, and candidates
 - ★ Mechanism enabling one to specify conditions under which AA group interests can become stronger or weaker relative to individual interests
 - ★ As long as AA life chances are shaped by race, it is efficient for individual AAs to use their perceptions of interests of AA as a group as a proxy for their own interests
 - **Linked Fate:** construct used to measure the degree to which AAs believe that their own self-interests are linked to the interests of the race. “Do you think that what happens generally to the black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?”
- **Data/Methods:** Survey data from the 80s
 - **Findings:**
 - Theoretical concepts are more important than specific results
 - Socioeconomic status only weakly influences perceptions of linked fate
 - Perceptions of political and economic group interests help structure AA short and long-term evaluations of major political parties, while class divisions were not found to significantly structure AA partisanship or affective evaluations of which party best advances interests of group
 - Political choices and evaluations are also shaped by perceptions of racial group interests, while not significantly influenced by individual economic status or education
 - Class divisions among AAs do exist on certain issue domains such as economic redistribution, however, perceptions of linked fate act as a liberal counterbalance to the greater conservatism of the more affluent
 - **Critique:**
 - Gay, Hoschild, White (2015) conduct a multi-ethnic survey and find perceptions of linked fate are not unique to Black Americans and are expressed across multiple racial groups. Additionally, perceptions of linked fate are not unique to racial identity and extend to class, gender, religion. As a result, linked fate may be measuring a tendency toward group connectedness as opposed to a salient political identity. Additionally, find that linked fate is rarely associated with either political views or political participation.
 - See White, Laird, Allen (2014)
 - **Contribution/Relevant Literature:**
 - Basis of much research on group-based political considerations in addition to Black politics specifically. Explains link between group-based considerations and individual-based political behavior. And when group-based considerations can potentially override self-interest politically.
 - Sanchez and Masouka (2010) introduce the **Brown Utility Heuristic**, extended logic to Latinos. Find that linked fate may be a temporary phenomenon among Latinos, tied to marginalization derived from economic status and immigration experiences

Taeku Lee. 2008. “Race, Immigration, and the Identity-to-Politics Link.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (June): 457–478

- **Research Question:** What is the identity-to-politics link?

- **Argument:**
 - **Identity-to-politics link:** idea that individuals who share a demographic label—Black, Latino, Asian American—will also share common political goals and interests and act in concert to pursue them
 - Expectation of a preordained identity-to-politics link can distort understanding of race and ethnicity by presuming the politicization of these identities
 - Need to split up this idea into five distinct processes:
 - ★ **Definition:** how are the identity categories defined? Are they fixed and stable or malleable and porous?
 - ★ **Identification:** Do the individuals who are defined by a given category identify themselves with it? Existence of a category does not imply identification with that category
 - ★ **Consciousness:** Do individuals who self-identify with a category also share common beliefs and interests? Not all people in a group who ascribe to an identity may agree on what it means to be part of that group
 - ★ **Venue selection:** Do individuals who choose to act in pursuit of group-based interests coordinate and agree upon a common venue for their collective action? Two important dimensions: whether group ends should be pursued politically or non-politically and whether the appropriate political stage is national, local, or transnational
 - ★ **Choice:** Do individuals agree, collectively, on the choice that best represents their group-based interests and ambitions?
- **Key Takeaway:** Literature needs to clearly differentiate between these distinct processes that are often bundled when discussing the politicization of identity. This argument applies broadly to the REP literature and calls on scholars to not presume an identity is immediately politically salient without exploring these difference processes

Katherine Cramer Walsh. 2012. “Putting Inequality in Its Place: Rural Consciousness and the Power of Perspective.” *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 3 (August): 517–532

- **Research Question** Why do people vote against their material interests?
- **Argument:** Some people make sense of politics through a social identity infused with notions of distributive justice
 - Group consciousness is an identification with a social group combined with a politicization of that identity in the form of perceived relative deprivation of that group
 - Cramer introduces the idea of **rural consciousness**.
 - ★ Set of ideas about what type of geographic place one is from, and where that place stands in relation to others in terms of power and allocation
 - ★ It contains ideas about what people are like in rural places—that is, their values and lifestyles—with an emphasis on the importance of hard work in rural areas
 - ★ Operates as a lens through which people think about theme selves, others etc
 - ★ Contains social identification with rural residents as well as a perception of distributive injustice toward the group, a sense of relative deprivation (compared to metro areas) that is perceived to be the fault of political elites in urban areas
 - ★ Encompasses orientations toward government, political trust, and future expectations about rural treatment. Also tied to political alienation and lack of efficacy
 - Place consciousness can serve as a perspective through which people interpret politics

- **Data/Methods:** Cramer takes a *bottom-up* approach centered around participation observation of group conversations in Wisconsin
- **Findings:** Four key themes emerged
 - *Power:* rural vs urban lens structured residents ideas about which geographic areas of the state had power over the agenda
 - *Values and Lifestyle:* Idea that rural residents have distinctive values and lifestyles that contrast those in metro areas
 - *Hard Work:* Belief in hard work was central to this identity
 - *Resources:* Understanding of the distribution of resources such as jobs, wealth, and public expenditures in rural vs urban terms
- **Critique:** Cramer’s interviews are exclusively conducted in Wisconsin among a largely white sample. Some argue “rural consciousness” serves as a cover for racism as urban areas may be associated with minority populations
- **Contribution:** Different perspective on how group-based considerations can override perceived self-interest. In this case, it is a rural place-based identity that people hold attachments to that motivate behavior.

Ismail K. White, Chryl N. Laird, and Troy D. Allen. 2014. “Selling Out?: The Politics of Navigating Conflicts between Racial Group Interest and Self-interest.” *American Political Science Review* 108, no. 4 (November): 783–800

- **Research Question:** How do Black Americans navigate trade-offs between their racial group interests and their simple self interest?
- **Argument:**
 - Push back on Dawson’s (1994) argument in which racial group interest serves as a proxy for self interest when true self interest is difficult to gauge. Instead, explore the navigation of *known conflicts* between maximizing racial group interest and one’s simple self interest. While the black utility heuristic is a useful framework for understanding decision making under conditions of low information, it falls short in explaining decisions where blacks are faced with perceptible trade offs between self interest and group interest
 - Argue that blacks do have incentives to act in their simple self-interest and may accept private gains to defect from the expected racial group norms of political behavior—but only under specific informational conditions. Clear and common understandings of in-group expectations for the political behavior of blacks and of likely social consequences for defection from the group norms place constraints on blacks’ political behavior
 - ★ When political expressions can be publicly observed by in-group members, the costs of defecting from understood norms and practices of the group are about loss of standing within the group which implies both a value to that consequences and an understanding that other members of the group are more likely to be aware of and punish defection
 - ★ *Norm crystallization* and *norm intensity* are important in determining whether social pressure will result in conformity. One example of a crystallized and intense political norm for black Americans is support for Democratic candidates

- **Data/Methods:** Three experiments with college students (HBCU, PWI). Students are provided with money to donate to Obama or Romney. Across three experiments, students are presented with situations in which they have conflicting incentives and social pressures to "defect" from the group and advance their self-interest
- **Findings:**
 - In the absence of social monitoring, defection is not uncommon, but racialized social pressure—demonstrated by monitoring signals from other blacks—has a unique ability to rein in such defection
 - Willingness to defect depended on internalized values, with those who had internalized a strong attachment to money, being most willing to trade personal gain for the group's interest and those who had internalized beliefs in the importance of maintaining racial group solidarity being the least vulnerable to the self-interest incentive
- **Related Literature:** Challenges Dawson (1994) and provides examples of when self-interest may override group based considerations.

Ashley Jardina. 2021. "In-Group Love and Out-Group Hate: White Racial Attitudes in Contemporary U.S. Elections." *Political Behavior* 43, no. 4 (December): 1535–1559

- **Key Takeaway:** White racial identity is a politically meaningful identity driven by in-group feelings, distinct from out-group resentment (racism)
- **Argument:** Distinguish between two types of white racial attitudes: out-group racial resentment and in-group racial solidarity
 - Reason to believe white racial solidarity is more strongly linked to political opinions today
 - ★ Past work treat white in-group attitudes as another expression of racial hostility
 - Treat white identity as a sentiment capturing a desire to protect the in-group and its interest is a force independent of out-group prejudice
 - ★ White identity may be less associated with policies explicitly perceived as benefiting blacks and more closely tied to political preferences, like evaluations of candidates, who whites may recognize as benefit their group
 - Two expectations
 - ★ Evaluations of political candidates may be associated with whites' racial hostilities, either because of candidate race or rhetoric
 - ★ Separate from racial animosities, find that some whites identify with their racial group and motivated by sense of in-group favoritism that manifests as an effort to preserve whites' dominant position atop racial hierarchy
- **Data/Methods:** 2012, 2016, 2018 ANES Pilots and Time series
 - Measure whites' out-group racial using racial resentment scale
 - Measure white identity asking the degree to which racial identity is important
- **Findings:** Both racial resentment and white racial identity were significantly associated with vote choice in the 2012 and 2016 primaries, with both sets of voters less supportive of Obama and more supportive of Trump. By 2016 and 2019, white racial identity's relationship to Trump had been shadowed by the influence of white racial animus

- Correlation between racial resentment and white racial identity is low - concepts related but do not capture the same thing
 - Not all presidential candidates activate white identity, but Trump uniquely did
 - **Contribution/Related Literature:** *Both* whites' in-group and out-group racial attitudes have been important elements in presidential elections. Racial identity is a unique, under-explored concept
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Inter-group Relations

V. O. Key. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: Knopf Chapters 1,15,24

- **Argument:** Race informed political behavior in cases in which it was made salient due to contact. This is why Black belt whites cared much more about maintaining white supremacy than non-Black belt whites
 - The politics of the South (at the time) revolves around the position of Black southerners and the maintenance of control by a White minority. Specifically, the whites of the Black belt who had the biggest interest in maintaining white supremacy
 - Two-party competition would have been fates to the status of Black belt whites: (1) Would have meant an appeal to the Black vote and likely Black rule in some counties and (2) would have also meant the destruction of southern solidarity in national politics. Unity in the national arena was key to resist interference with the south
 - ★ While nationally, there was the “Solid South”, at the state level the Democratic party was a mix of factions struggling for office
 - ★ Persistence of the southern Democratic solidarity depended on the willingness to subordinate to the race question all other social and economic issues
 - **Findings:**
 - A higher percentage of Black population is associated with the Democratic voting tradition of the South. *Note:* “the South” is not homogeneous and the sizes of the Black population varied along with their influence in politics.
 - **Turnout:** Voting rates were particularly high in Black belt counties with large proportion of Black individuals
 - **Policy effects:** because whites in Black-belt communities turn out at high rates, there are more reactionary (read: racist) candidates, who amplify the white supremacist agenda
 - Single-party competition also depressed voting among low-income whites
 - **Contribution/Related Work:** Seminal work and foundation of much of the literature on inter-group relations in the U.S. Idea that proximate contact is important to make group threat salient – Enos (2016) provides contemporary evidence supporting this.
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Ryan D. Enos. 2014. “Causal effect of intergroup contact on exclusionary attitudes.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 111, no. 10 (March): 3699–3704

- **Research Question:** Do causal encounters with members of an out-group influence exclusionary attitudes?

- **Argument:** A common mechanism used to explain the connection between diversity and inter-group conflict is “group threat”. According to this argument, the mere presence of the out-group causes negative reactions, possibly because proximity increases the salience of the out-group, activating negative stereotypes. Past work in labs has struggled with external validity due to lack of repeated contact.
- **Data/Methods:** RCT at commuter rail stations in largely racial homogeneous Boston suburbs.
 - **Treatment:** Randomly assign pairs of Spanish-speaking confederates to go to train stations at the same time each day for two weeks to simulate demographic change
 - **Outcome:** Three questions about exclusionary attitudes tied to immigration, Spanish
- **Findings:** The experiment shifted attitudes relative to the control in the exclusionary direction on all policy questions. Over time, the effect decays with the ATE stronger after 3 days than 10 days. Results show that political and economic competition do not appear to be necessary conditions for the simulation of exclusionary attitudes.
- **Critique:** The decaying treatment effects indicate it there may be some initial negative reaction to members of the out-group that slowly goes away as the people around them become comfortable. Treatment was also kept stable at 2 confederate so it does not simulate large-scale
- **Relevant Literature:** Enos (2017) provides broader theory about the behavioral and attitudinal consequences of geographic space. Also generally related to literature on context effects.

Ryan D. Enos. 2016. “What the Demolition of Public Housing Teaches Us about the Impact of Racial Threat on Political Behavior.” *American Journal of Political Science* 60, no. 1 (January): 123–142

- **Research Question:** How does the context in which a person lives affect their political behavior?
- **Argument:** Building on Key’s (1949 argument about racial threat; whites feel threatened by the presence of African-Americans and are more politically motivated.
 - Past work struggled with causal identification—difficult to disentangle selection bias as people may select into more or less racially diverse contexts
 - Theoretically, the mechanisms can be grouped into *instrumental* mechanisms such as competition over representation and *psychological* mechanisms such as the stimulation of stereotypes. Importantly, they are not mutually exclusive
- **Data/Methods:** Exploits exogenous demolition of 12 Chicago public housing projects that led to displacement of 25,000 African Americans in Chicago living in close proximity to white voters
 - Argues that the effect of racial threat is identified by relaying on the exogenous nature of the removal of the AA population caused by the demolition
 - DiD for white treatment groups. Also used matching to evaluate robustness for both white voters near non-demolished sites as well as for a black control group.
 - **Outcome:** change in white political participation, support for conservative candidates
- **Findings:** After demolition, voter turnout dropped by more than 10pp for white voters living nearest to the projects, but not for African Americans
 - In addition, whites voting near the projects had previously voted more conservatively than whites living farther away, but this difference dissipated post-demolition

- Effects are also visible in other races, particularly focused on Obama’s candidacies. However, differences between white voters only emerge in cases where Obama competed against a white candidate (see Tesler and Sears (2010))
- **Relevant Literature:** Contemporary support for Key’s (1949) argument about racial threat. Enos (2017) provides broader theory about the behavioral and attitudinal consequences of geographic space. Also generally related to literature on context effects.

Eitan D. Hersh and Clayton Nall. 2016. “The Primacy of Race in the Geography of Income-Based Voting: New Evidence from Public Voting Records: RACE AND INCOME-BASED VOTING.” *American Journal of Political Science* 60, no. 2 (April): 289–303

- **Research Question:** Why does the relationship between income and partisanship vary across U.S. regions?
- **Argument:** interregional differences in the income-party relationship are explained by differences among higher-income whites living in close proximity to poor racial minorities.
 - Relationship between income and partisanship not uniform across U.S. regions. Two schools of thought on why this is:
 - ★ *Economic Context:* in poorer states, economics more salient issue to voters
 - ★ *Racial context:* in racially diverse areas, richer voters oppose the party favoring income distribution
- **Findings**
 - In predominantly white districts, the relationship between income and partisanship varies little with the wealth of the locality or the state
 - In the predominantly urban districts in the Northeast with largest proportions of Black voters, voters in the affluent block groups are only slightly more GOP than voters in the least affluent block groups.
 - In specific rural areas with high concentrations of minority poverty such as the Black Belt, CA farming areas, the relationship between income and partisanship is stronger. Not only because minorities are Democrat
- **Data/Methods:** analysis of 73 million geo-coded registration records (via voter file), 185,000 geocoded precinct returns (rather than counties/states)
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** response to Gelman’s Red State, Blue State argument; although they agree that there are state (and sub-state) differences in the relationship between income and voting, they attribute this not to economic context but to the racial composition of local areas.

Avidit Acharya, Matthew Blackwell, and Maya Sen. 2016. “The Political Legacy of American Slavery.” *The Journal of Politics* 78, no. 3 (July): 621–641

- **Key Takeaway:** local prevalence of slavery has detectable effect on present day political attitudes in the South
- **Argument:** Theory of historical persistence of political attitudes – *behavioral path dependence*
 - Southern slavery had lasting effect on attitudes fall of slavery determined the economic and political power of Southern whites, especially in Black belt, making them more hostile toward African Americans and more conservative

- ★ Whites faced both *political* and *economic* threats
 - **Alt Explanations:** racial threat, geographic sorting, contemporary income inequality
 - **Data/Methods:** Rely in mix of historical demographic and contemporary survey data from CES
 - IV: Proportion of each county's 1860 population that was enslaved (Census)
 - DV: partisanship, support for affirmative action, racial resentment, W/B thermometer difference
 - Models:
 - ★ WLS with controls for: demographic and economic indicators both historical and contemporary, geographic variables
 - ★ Instrument slavery with cotton suitability
 - **Findings:** whites who currently live in counties that had high concentration of slaves in 1860 are on average more conservative and express colder feelings toward African Americans than whites who live elsewhere in the South
 - The larger the number of slaves per-capita in their county of residence, the greater prob that a white Southerner today will identify as Republican, oppose affirmative action, and express some racial resentment
 - Areas in the South that were earliest to eliminate incentives for anti-black violence are also where slavery's long term effects have attenuated the most
 - **Contribution/Related Literature:** Suggest *historical persistence* of racial attitudes as alternative explanation to Southern racism
 - **Critique:**
 - ★ Likely *exclusion restriction* violation; cotton suitability may influence some other economic/demographic factors before 1860 that also affected both slavery rates and contemporary racial attitudes
 - ★ Unclear what the treatment is. Also assumes a discrete treatment at a single moment in time, which is likely not the case
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Measuring Racial Prejudice

Donald R. Kinder and David O. Sears. 1981. "Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 40 (3): 414–431

- **Key Takeaway:** Introduce **symbolic racism** as alternative to group conflict theories of racial threat
- **Argument:**
 - Realistic group conflict: origins of prejudice are in the realities of direct competition between Blacks and Whites for scarce resources; competitive interdependence produces the perception of threat; social attitudes reflect private interests
 - ★ Magnitude of racial threat subject to *affect* about some end state and *expectancy* that it may materialize
 - Sociocultural learning: children and adolescents acquire prejudice along with other values in their social environments; conformity pressures and strength of early-learned attitude promote persistence
 - Symbolic Racism: blend of antiblack affect and the kind of traditional American moral values embodied in the Protestant Ethic
 - ★ Replaces support for explicit racism
 - ★ Form of resistance to change in the racial status quo based on moral feelings that Blacks violate traditional American values
- **Data/Methods:** Survey experiments
- **Findings:** Consistently support the Symbolic Racism hypothesis as opposed to racial threat hypotheses
 - Racial attitudes are major determinants of voting behavior in both mayoral elections; specifically symbolic racism
- **Contribution/Relevant Literature:** Foundational piece establishing concept of **symbolic racism**; sets the stage for much of the literature on racial cues like Mendelberg (2000), racial resentment etc

David O. Sears and P. J. Henry. 2003. "The origins of symbolic racism." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 85 (2): 259–275

- **Key Takeaway:** Symbolic racism is a distinct fusion of anti-Black affect and conservative values
- **Argument:** Symbolic Racism is a combination of anti-Black affect and traditional values
 - Symbolic Racism: Move away from explicit, segregationist racism. Whites have become racially egalitarian in principle and new forms of prejudice embodying both negative feelings toward Blacks as a group and some conservative non-racial values are dominant
 - Described as a coherent belief system that embodies for themes: belief that (a) Blacks no longer face much prejudice or discrimination, (b) Blacks' failure to progress results from unwillingness to work hard enough, (c) Blacks are demanding too much too fast, and (d) Blacks have gotten more than they deserve
 - Test theory of black individualism: fusion of anti-Black affect and traditional values; idea that Blacks violate individualistic values
- **Data/Methods:** Multiple experiments, survey data, factor analysis

- **Findings:**
 - Symbolic racism is made up equally of racial prejudice and general conservatism
 - Black individualist has a distinctively racial component and is not just a reflection of more general race-neutral economic individuals → symbolic racism is psychologically grounded in a racialized individualism
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Expansion of the original Kinder and Sears (1981) piece, exploring the psychological underpinnings of symbolic racism/racial resentment.

Edward G. Carmines, Paul M. Sniderman, and Beth C. Easter. 2011. “On the Meaning, Measurement, and Implications of Racial Resentment.” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 634, no. 1 (March): 98–116

- **Key Takeaway:** Critique of racial resentment as a valid measure of racial prejudice
- **Argument:** Kinder and Sanders (1996) support racial resentment scale two ways:
 - Impact of racial resentment on White American racial policy attitudes in unequaled
 - ★ RR might just be an alternative way of asking respondents whether Blacks are entitled to social assistance
 - ★ It is essentially another way of measuring what it tries to explain
 - Measure of racial resentment is characterized by impressive degree of validity– both face and convergent validity
 - ★ Convergent validity b/w racial resentment and racial stereotyping is likely an artifact of scaling items
 - ★ As a result, racial resentment is not interchangeable with stereotypes, may not be valid measure of prejudice
 - **Summary:** Two main points:
 - ★ RR is not exchangeable with racial stereotypes measure → may not be measuring racial prejudice
 - ★ RR may be a measure of racial policy support, not racial resentment generally
- **Relevant Literature:** Direct response to Kinder and Sanders (1996) work on racial resentment.

Alexander Agadjanian et al. 2023. “Disfavor or Favor? Assessing the Valence of White Americans’ Racial Attitudes.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 18 (1): 75–103

- **Key Takeaway:**
- **Argument:** Racial Resentment Scale includes both *favoring* and *disfavoring attitudes*
 - One-sided disfavoring: People low in racial attitude measure have racial indifferent attitudes, while people high in the measure are hostile toward Blacks
 - One-sided favoring: People high in the measure have racially indifferent judgements while people on the low side actively favor Blacks
 - Two sided case also possible
- **Data/Methods:** Two-wave panel study of white Americans

- Racial Resentment Scale initially conceptualized as a measure of one-sided disfavoring toward Black Americans
 - Racial Indifference: a study participant’s judgment of an evaluative target is racially indifferent if the judgment is independent of the target’s race
 - **Findings:** Racial attitude measures do meaningfully predict judgements about race
 - The scale reflects *favoring* (among those who score low on the scale) more than *disfavoring* (among those who score high on the scale)
 - Contrasts with typical way RRS is commonly interpreted
 - When different groups (Latinos or Asians) are the evaluative target, patterns of favoring and disfavoring are different
 - **Contribution/Relevant Literature:** Re-evaluate racial resentment scale and note that it involves both *favoring* and *disfavoring* components
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Policing and the Carceral State

Vesla M. Weaver and Amy E. Lerman. 2010. “Political Consequences of the Carceral State.” *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 4 (November): 817–833

- **Research Question:** What are the political consequences of contact with the criminal justice system?
- **Argument:** Argue that the criminal justice system if a primary site of civic education. Through both interpretive and resource mechanisms, custodial interactions negatively affect the likelihood of participating in politics and carrying out the responsibilities of citizenship. Challenge classic resource model of participation and find that exposure to criminal justice may be more predictive.
 - Criminal justice policies structure individual choices by altering the availability of resources
 - There are also “interpretive effects” beyond pure resources. The ways in which encounters with “street-level” bureaucrats can inform citizens’ understanding of the goals and nature of government
 - ★ Poor evaluations of treatment by the police and other officers translate into broader cynicism about government authorities
 - ★ Lessons learned about own civic identity; interactions influence perceptions of one’s own civic standing, efficacy etc
 - **Data/Methods:** Most surveys do not contain sufficiently large sample of people who interact with CJS. Use multiple longitudinal studies.
 - ★ IV: Construct a measure of criminal justice contact based on survey items
 - ★ Outcome: voter registration, turnout, civic participation, efficacy, trust
- **Findings:** Large, negative effect of criminal justice contact for several aspects of political life including turnout out to vote, involvement in civic groups, and trusting the government. These effects persisted net of SES and criminality.
 - More severe encounters associated with a larger decline in political participation and trust

- **Related Literature:** Tied to the participation literature. One implication is that scholarship on participation and civic engagement should consider not just resources, interest, and mobilization but also the way the state shaped individual civic capacities, efficacy, and perceptions of government.

Ariel White. 2019b. "Misdemeanor Disenfranchisement? The Demobilizing Effects of Brief Jail Spells on Potential Voters." *American Political Science Review* 113, no. 2 (May): 311–324

- **Research Question:** What is the effect of incarceration on voting behavior?
- **Argument:**
 - Expect that jail stays arising from misdemeanor convictions will reduce voter turnout for several reasons:
 1. The political socialization process could plausibly occur during jail stays as well as during prison time. Even brief stays are memorable and might discourage voluntary contact with the state (see Weaver and Lerman (2010))
 2. Jail time can disrupt one's economic life in ways that make it harder to vote (see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995))
 - Expect racial differences in incarcerations effects. This may be to racially-disparate exposure to arrests and misdemeanor charges. There may also be sentencing differences across races.
- **Data/Methods:** Relying on random courtroom assignment in a major county court system, use courtroom variability in sentencing as a source of exogenous variation in jail time.
 - By relying on admin data with an identification strategy, avoids issues related to self-reported survey measures
 - Past work unable to disentangle jail time with more general criminal behavior. Additionally, cannot disentangle state-imposed disenfranchisement
 - Uses courtroom assignment as an instrumental variable for incarceration. Use the part of the variation in jail sentencing that is driven by courtroom assignment (rather than defendant differences) to measure the effect of jail on voting
- **Findings:** First-time misdemeanor defendants in Harris County who are sentenced to jail time due to an "unlucky draw" in courtroom assignment are slightly less likely to vote in the next election than their luckier but comparable peers
 - Jail sentences reduce voting in the subsequent election by about 4 points, but this varies by race
 - White defendants show a small, non-significant treatment effects of jail on voting, while Latino defendants show a decrease in turnout due to jail and Black defendants turnout in the next elections drop by 13 points
 - Results underscore how important even "minor" criminal justice interactions (misdemeanors) can be. Due to use of admin data, unable to disentangle mechanisms

Ariel White. 2019a. "Family Matters? Voting Behavior in Households with Criminal Justice Contact." *American Political Science Review* 113, no. 2 (May): 607–613

- **Research Question:** Do people who see loved ones arrested or incarcerated become mobilized to change the system or do they withdraw from political life?
- **Argument:** Similar to White (2019), the argument is that contact with the carceral state can have resource impacts along with socialization impacts due to negative experiences.

- **Data/Methods:** Measures the effect of "proximal contact" with the CJS using administrative data. Using a dataset from a large county court system, White geolocates defendants and uses the state's voter file to find registered voters who lived at the same address.
 - To get around selection issue, exploits the timing of criminal cases that fall before and after the election
- **Findings:** Finds no evidence that proximal contact (seeing a household member charged, convicted, or jailed) reduces voting in the long run. People who see a household member convicted in the fees immediately preceding the election vote at lower rates than would otherwise, but this effect fades quickly.
- **Related Literature:** Seems to pair with White (2019)

Dean Knox, Will Lowe, and Jonathan Mummolo. 2020. "Administrative Records Mask Racially Biased Policing." *American Political Science Review* 114, no. 3 (August): 619–637

- **Research Question:** How does the use of administrative data influence conclusions over racial bias in policing?
- **Argument:** Police administrative records lack information on civilians police observe but do not investigate. As a result, there is a lack of necessary data to credibly estimate racial discrimination in policing.
 - Difficulty of estimating racial bias in policing is due to a combination of mediation and selection. The effect of civilian race on the outcome of a police encounter is mediated by whether the civilian is stopped by the police, but analysts only have data for the race of stopped individuals. As a result, police records do not contained a representative sample of all individuals police observe, but do not stop. If a civilian's race affects whether officers choose to stop that civilian, then analyzing admin data amounts to conditioning on a variable that is affected by race.
- **Findings:** Existing empirical work is producing a misleading story in terms of the severity of racial bias in police behavior. Ignoring the data generation process leads analysts to dramatically underestimate the differential police violence faced by civilians of color. For example, ignoring the bias would conclude that 10% of uses of force against POC were discriminatory, while a bias-corrected estimate would be closer to 39%

Hakeem Jefferson. 2023. "The Politics of Respectability and Black Americans' Punitive Attitudes." *American Political Science Review* (January): 1–17

- **Research Question:** Why are Black Americans supportive of punitive policies that target group members?
- **Argument:** Argue that a socially instrumental view of respectability—and the focus on behavior and comportment it engenders—helps explain Black Americans support for punitive policies that target group members:
 - *Respectability:* "emphasizes reform of individual behavior and attitudes as a goal in itself and a strategy for reform of the entire structure system of American race relations"
 - Black Americans belong to a stigmatized group in the U.S. Aware of their stratified nature, some Black Americans embrace a view of the social worlds that centers group members' behavior in their thinking about racial inequality. This embrace of respectability, is a social psychological phenomenon.

- Group members view negatively stereotyped behavior as threatening to the image of the social group which is also threatening to their image of self. This threatens the already precarious state of the group.
 - Respectability will correspond with in-group directed shame and anger. There is likely also a relationship between linked fate and belief in respectability.
 - **Data/Methods:** Develops the Respectability Politics Scale using diverse samples of $N = 500$ Black Americans. Two dimensions to respectability, attributions and concern.
 - **Findings:** Higher scores on the RPS scale correspond with being more bothered by negatively stereotyped behaviors. T
 - Also observe that respondents who say being Black is more important to their identity respond more negatively to "bad" behavior
 - Higher RPS scores also correspond for more support for punitive policies such as support for various stricter criminal laws, dress codes, work requirements
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