American Political Institutions[1]

Alejandro Frydman, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*
Joseph R. Loffredo, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*
Gabrielle Péloquin-Skulski, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

Contents

1. These notes were developed based on Chloe Wittenberg's reading notes for MIT's American Politics general exam.

Theoretical Foundations

Samuel P. Huntington. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Determines what makes for strong institutions and discusses the process of political modernization in America.
- **Argument:**
  - What are strong political institutions: Effective bureaucracies, well-organized political parties, a high degree of popular participation in public affairs, working systems of civilian control over the military, extensive activity by the government in the economy, and reasonably effective procedures for regulating succession and controlling political conflict.
  - Strength of institutions depends on:
    - Scope of support for the institution: If only small upper class belongs to institution than the scope is minor.
    - Level of institutionalization: Process by which institutions/organizations and procedures acquire value and sustainability.
      - Adaptability: Success in adapting to one environmental challenge paves the way for successful adaptation to subsequent environmental challenges. Can roughly be measured by the following three factors:
        1. Age: longer exist, greater the chance it will last for a long time.
        2. Generational age: if performed by the same people who first performed it.
        3. Organizational adaptability can be measured in functional terms. If institution was able to adapt to the need of new or different functions.
      - Complexity/Simplicity: The more complicated an organization, the more highly institutionalized it is. The greater the number and variety of sub-units the greater the ability of the organization to secure and maintain the loyalties of its members.
      - Autonomy/Subordination: Extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behavior.
      - Coherence/Disunity: The more unified and coherent an organization is, the more highly institutionalized it is.
  - The United States is a good demonstration that a Tudor polity is quite compatible with a modern society.
  - Three Patterns of Modernization: the rationalization of authority, the differentiation of structures, and the expansion of political participation.
    - The early widespread political participation in America as contrasted with Europe often leads people to conclude that political modernization in general occurred earlier and more rapidly in the United States than in Europe. Rationalization of authority and the differentiation of structures occurred much earlier and more completely in Europe than in America.
    - American political institutions did not undergo revolutionary changes. Instead, the principal elements of the English 16th century constitution (i.e., Tudor political ideas and practices) were exported to the new world, took root there, and were given new life
  - The rationalization of authority: Political system did not undergo any revolutionary changes. Tudor institutions.
    - Supremacy of the state over the church, sense of national identity
    - Traditional view of law written in constitution

    - President like the Tudor king, represented the interests of the community as a whole, the individual member of the legislature owed their primary loyalties to their constituencies.
  - The differentiation of structures: In medieval government, and Tudor government, differentiation of functions was not very advanced. Single institution exercised many functions, and many institutions exerced the same function.
    - All major institutions in America (President, Supreme Court, House, Senate) combine both judicial and political functions
    - America perpetuated a fusion of functions and a division of power, while Europe developed differentiation of functions and a centralization of power
  - The expansion of political participation
    - Americans were the first to achieve widespread political participation. Europe dealt with more conflict and wars.
    - In America, continuing threats only came from indigenous people. There was little incentive to develop a European-style military and a European-type state to support and control them. Civil harmony also contributed significantly to the preservation of the Tudor political institution in America.

Charles M. Cameron. 2000. *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Discusses the assumptions and conditions of rational choice in theoretical models.
- **Argument:**
  - "A model is a structure of logical inferences, proceeding from fundamental assumptions, that establishes a causal link between the assumptions and the phenomenon of interest"
    - Theoretical model: establishes a logical claim about causal mechanisms
  - Guiding assumptions of rational choice:
    1. aggregate behavior of social systems reflect the behavior of individual actors
    2. behavior of individuals understood in terms of goals, opportunities, incentives and constraints – these individuals are intentional actors (this is the intentions assumption)
    3. aggregate behavior results from the interaction of intentional actors (aggregation assumption)
  - Rational choice works when:
    1. players act approximately like decision theorists
    2. players collectively play as to create a social equilibrium as conceived in game theory → this works when players have good information about situation, there are rewards for consistent utility-driven play and penalties for shirking
  - What makes a good model: solve puzzles (both the one at focus and others), solve puzzles rival models can't, turn counterexamples into solved problems, should deal with matters we care about

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Terry M. Moe. 2005. "Power and Political Institutions." *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 02 (June)

- **Key Takeaway:** Rational choice theory perceives institutions as structures of voluntary cooperation that resolve collective action problems and benefit all concerned. Institutions may be structures of cooperation but they are also structures of power.

- **Argument:**
  - The new economics focuses on the political insiders: the legislators, interest groups, and bureaucrats who are the winners of the democratic struggle, and who use public authority to create and design the bureaucratic institutions that fill out democratic government. Their relationships are indeed cooperative and mutually beneficial-for them. BUT use their cooperation to impose institutions on the political losers, and indeed on everyone else in society.
  - In democratic politics, cooperation and power are two sides of the same coin: cooperation makes the exercise of power possible, and the exercise of power often motivates the cooperation.
  - To focus on cooperation alone, then, is to miss the essence of what is going on as democratic institutions are being created and designed.
  - The most effective way to proceed and include power in the study of institutions is to focus first on power's most egregious expressions: coercion and force.

Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1989. "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1, no. 2 (April): 131–147

- **Key Takeaway:** Develops the theory of structure-induced equilibrium to show consequences of institutional structure and the development of institutional structure
- **Theory:**
  - From rational choice know that individuals are utility maximizers.
  - Structure-induced equilibrium (SIE): previous work said equilibria were just preference-driven.
    - Basic idea is that institutional process can be in game form, rules determine which moves follow others – it means the identity of the players matter (who are the veto players)
    - "a structure-induced equilibrium may be defined as an alternative (a status quo ante) that is invulnerable in the sense that no other alternative, allowed by the rules of procedures, is preferred by all the individuals, structural units, and coalitions that possess distinctive veto or voting power" (137)

Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies* 44, no. 5 (December): 936–957

- **Key Takeaway:** New Institutionalism does not constitute a unified body of thought but rather three distinct approaches: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological intuitionalism. All these approaches developed in reaction to behavioralist perspectives of the 1960s.
- **Theory:**
  - <u>Historical Institutionalism:</u>
    - Developed in response to group theories of politics and structural functionalism
    - Conflict among rival groups for scarce resources lies at the heart of politics
    - Associate institutions with organizations and rules or conventions
    - Four important features:
      1. Conceptualize the relationship between institutions and individual behavior broadly
      2. Emphasize the assymetries of power associated with the operation and development of institutions
      3. Tend to have a view of institutional development that emphasizes path dependence

4. Concerned to integrate institutional analysis with the contribution that other factors like ideas can make to political outcomes

* Divide the flow of historical events into periods of continuity and flow – "critical junctures" (942)

– Rational Choice Institutionalism:

* Arose from study of American congressional behavior
* Four features of this approach:
  1. Employ a characteristic of behavioral assumptions – actors have a fixed set of preferences, behave instrumentally to maximize attainment, strategic
  2. See politics as a series of collective action dilemmas
  3. Emphasis on the role of strategic interaction in the determination of political outcomes
  4. Developed a distinctive approach to the problem of explaining how institutions originate – use deduction to arrive at a specification of the functions that an institution preforms

– Sociological Institutionalism:

* Arose primarily within the subfield of organization theory
* The institutional forms and procedures used by modern organization were not adopted solely for efficiency – many forms and procedures should be seen as culturally-specific practices assimilated into organization
* Three features:
  1. Tend to define institutions much more broadly than political science and include symbol systems, cognitive scripts, moral templates: Redefines culture itself as institutions
  2. Distinctive understanding of the relationship between institutions and individual action which follows the "cultural approach"
  3. Distinctive approach to the problem of explaining how institutional practices originate and change – argue that organizations often adopt a new institutional practice because it enhances the social legitimacy of the organization or participants.

Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel. 2003. "Institutionalism as a Methodology." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15, no. 2 (April): 123–144

- **Key Takeaway:** Institutionalism and behavioralism are linked because institutionalism presupposes a behavior concept (rational choice for example). Key part to forming theories of institutions is to keep the behavioral concept fixed.

- **Theory:**

  – Definition: "A political institution is a set of contextual features in a collective choice setting that defines constraints on, and opportunities for, individual behavior in the setting" (125). Institutions provide context that shape behavior. They are linked to outcomes via behavior.

  * Rule of thumb for dividing institutions from behavior is the fact that institutions provide context. Institutions provide incentives and constraints to individual behavior.

  – Institutional theory is one that "seeks an understanding of the relationships between institutions, behavior and outcomes"

  – Theory of institutions: explain why some institutional features come into existence and why other don't – key thing here is that we say the contextual features we describe in institutional theories are objects of choice (are endogenous)

Paul Pierson. 2000. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 2 (June): 251–267

- **Key Takeaway:** Path dependence arguments are helpful because they can help political science think about how history and time interplay.
- **Argument:**
  - Path dependence is a "social process grounded in a dynamic of 'increasing returns'" – the idea of increasing returns can provide better framework for examining patterns of timing and sequencing, the range of social outcomes that are possible, consequences of small events, etc. The costs of exit – switching to some previously plausible alternative – rise
  - Features of path dependent processes:
    - Multiple equilibria. Under a set of initial conditions conducive to increasing returns, a number of outcomes-perhaps a wide range-are generally possible.
    - Contingency. Relatively small events, if they occur at the right moment, can have large and enduring consequences.
    - A critical role for timing and sequencing. In increasing returns processes, when an event occurs may be crucial. Because earlier parts of a sequence matter much more than later parts, an event that happens "too late" may have no effect, although it might have been of great consequence if the timing had been different.
    - Inertia. Once an increasing returns process is established, positive feedback may lead to a single equilibrium. This equilibrium will in turn be resistant to change

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Sean Gailmard. 2020. "Game Theory and the Study of American Political Development." *Public Choice* 185, nos. 3-4 (December): 335–357

- **Key Takeaway:** Formal modeling is good for looking at choice and stability but could look at change and development if they take some lessons from APD.
- **Argument:**
  - Benefits of formalization: communication of ideas and generation of ideas
    - Communication benefit only good for those who know the math, but if you do, enhance clarity of ideas
    - Limitation if you make incorrect beliefs of agents
    - Really doesn't handle unforeseen contingencies
  - APD focused on change in institutions that comprise and policies enacted by the American state.
    - "potential for formal theory's contribution to APD exists for two reasons. First, APD as a theoretical approach and formal theory both depend on abstraction. It may seem strange to link the two research traditions on this dimension, for formal theory is (in-) famous for rarefied models detached from any specific cases, whereas APD is known for highly textured descriptions of real events. Yet the two fields share an ideal of theory-building that strips interrelationships between events down to their most essential causal forces"
    - Game theory not as focused on change and development and can't focus on how change happens.

Collective Action and Organized Interests

The Logic and Maintenance of Organizations

Mancur Olson. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.* Harvard economic studies 124. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Introduces theory of groups and explains collective action. Essentially argues that group size matters for collective action, as large groups have more problems providing common goods.
- **Theory:**
  - Definitions:
    - What is the purpose of organizations? To further the interests of their members.
    - Types of "interest": Common interest: a single purpose or objective of a group that aims to benefit all members. While organizations can also serve personal or individual interests, main function of an organization is to advance common interests of groups of individuals
    - Public good: must be available to everyone if they are available to anyone - if there is a group with a common interest, then it is providing a public good through its actions. "The achievement of any common goal or the satisfaction of any common interest means that a public a collective good has been provided for that group... the provision of public or collective goods is the fundamental function of organizations generally"
    - Two types of common goods:
      - Exclusive common goods; limited in supply. Firms prefer to have few competitors because goods are exclusive.
      - Inclusive common goods; supply is not limited. Unions prefer to maximize membership because its goods are inclusive, and having more members spreads the costs around more.
  - How do you get individuals to contribute and not free-ride?: compulsory contribution if not org must give some noncollective good (something that can't just be given out to people) to incentivize individuals to join. Social pressure can be an effective (negative) selective incentive.
  - Traditional theory of groups basically believes everyone joins a group – real distinction between small and large is the scale of functions.
  - Three kinds of groups:
    - Privileged groups (members of this group would gain more from a public good than it would cost them to provide it unilaterally)
    - Latent groups (any member of this group could withhold his contribution to the public good without causing a noticeable reduction in its supply)
    - Intermediate groups (if any member of this group withholds his contribution, it will cause a noticeable decrease in supply of the good, or a noticeable rise in cost to other contributors)
  - Large groups have problems providing common goods for three reasons:
    1. Each group member has a lower share of the benefits
    2. it's less likely that anybody's benefits of helping provide the good exceed the costs. Reason small groups are different than large is because a handful of individual might be willing to share the costs for the entire group because someone will find that his personal gain exceeds total cost.
    3. organizational costs rise with group size
  - Main argument: Y = common goods provision; X = group size

    * As group size increases, provision of the common good becomes less optimal. You can only have optimal provision of the common good if the marginal costs are shared in "exactly the same proportion as the additional benefits"
    * If there is a PRIVILEGED group, the good will always be provided
    * If there is an INTERMEDIATE group, the good might be provided
    * If there is an INTERMEDIATE group, the good might be provided
    * Small stakeholders will tend to exploit big stakeholders (i.e. make them pay a larger share)

Jack L. Walker. 1983. "The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America." *American Political Science Review* 77, no. 2 (June): 390–406

- **Key Takeaway:** Focuses on the ways in which interest groups are created and the means by which they remain in existence. The origins and maintenance of groups depends upon the success of group leaders in securing funds from outside their membership which are needed to keep their groups in operation.
- **Argument:** Large amounts of capital are necessry to form interest groups. The key to success in these efforts usually is the ability of group organizers to secure both start-up funds and reliable sources of continuing financial support from patrons of political action.
- **Data/Methods:** survey by mail was conducted during 1980-1981 of all voluntary associations that are open to membership and concerned with some aspects of public policy at the national level.

James Q. Wilson. 1995. *Political Organizations.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Preoccupied with the problem of organizational maintenance — a prerequisite for influence.
- **Argument:**
    - Agrees with Olson, that most people join organizations for nonpolitical reasons, but rejects Olsons emphasis on economic incentives for joining. Motivations for joining are as varried as individuals themselves.
    - the poor can be permanently organized only when material incentives are present, brokered by middle-class entrepreneurs.
    - Middle and upper-class citizens possess the financial resources, organizational skills and psychological attributes needed to maintain a rich organizational life. A predominantly lower-class society will be characteristically devoid of much organizational life.
    - The less members value their membership in an association, the less likely they will be to participate, and hence, the more oligarchical the organization.
    - organizations based on material incentives will also offer the leadership wide powers-as long as the benefits to members is unimpeded.
    - Only in organizations emphasizing purposive or idealogical incentives do leaders face the necessity of remaining "democratic."

Unequal Representation of Interests

E. E. Schattschneider. 1975. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America.* Hinsdale, Ill: Dryden Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Criticizes group theory for trying to explain too much and for assuming that government merely ratifies the existing balance of power among groups. Author is a strong advocate of party politics meaning that it is important for government to be shaped by political party competition.
- **Argument:** "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent."
  - Conflicts among private groups are taken into the legislative arena by those groups seeking to alter the power balance
  - Pressure groups fail to represent the lower income groups.
  - Competitive party system offers the semi-sovereign people their best chance for a role in the decision-making process, while one party politics tends to vest political power in the hands of those people who already have economic power.
  - More people will vote if they perceive clearer differences between parties.
  - A vigorously competitive party system, as opposed to competing interest groups, offers the semi-sovereign people their best chance for a role in the decision-making process. Conflict is key. The outcome of every conflict is determined by the extent to which the audience becomes involved in it
  - Pressure groups are small-scale organizations while political parties are large-scale organizations.
  - Since pressure groups are not universal by and means, when conflicts are played out in narrow scope, most of the people are not represented.
  - Low turnout is bad for democracy: It is an outrage to attribute the failures of American democracy to the ignorance and stupidity of the masses. Only a pedagogue would suppose that the people must pass some kind of examination to qualify for participation in a democracy

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Dara Z. Strolovitch. 2006. "Do Interest Groups Represent the Disadvantaged? Advocacy at the Intersections of Race, Class, and Gender." *The Journal of Politics* 68, no. 4 (November): 894–910

- **Key Takeaway:** Organizations are substantially less active when it comes to issues affecting disadvantaged subgroups than they are when it comes to issues affecting more advantaged subgroups.
- **Argument:** Organizations downplay the impact of issues affecting disadvantaged groups and frame them as narrow and particularistic in their effect, while framing issues affecting advantaged subgroups as if they affect a majority of their members and have a broad and generalized impact.
- **Data/Methods:** survey of 286 national advocacy organizations (Survey of National Economic and Social Justice Organizations), supplemented with information from face-to-face interviews
  - Biases of interest: (1) middle-class bias in agenda of organizations representing formally excluded groups, (2) organizations with economic focus marginalize race, gender and sexuality, (3) organizations not affective if issue mainly affects subgroup (think of Downsian perspective and not wanting to alienate the median voter)
  - Dependent variable: attention devoted by interest groups to policy issues using measure of level of advocacy activity in each of four domestic policy issues (iniversal issues, majority issues, disadvantaged-subgroup issues, and advantaged-subgroup issues)

- **Findings:**
  - Organizations are most active on the majority issue (true for 83% of organizations), and next most active on the advantaged-subgroup issue (81%), followed by the disadvantaged-subgroup issue (60%). The universal issue comes in last (43% of organizations)
  - Broader the impact, less attention an issue receives
  - For majority and disadvantaged, more active when they perceive more members affected

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Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady. 2012. *The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** The political voices of organized interests are even less representative than those of individuals.
- **Argument:**
  - Organized interest representation is essential both for democratic governance and for the formation and legitimisation of sound public policy. Representatives of organized interests perform a crucial role in providing information in the policy-making process.
  - To understand whether an organized interest gets what it wants, we need to understand its goals, which are often ambiguous.
  - Do organized interests influence policy? On balance, the evidence seems to be stronger for lobbying influence when it comes to relatively narrow issues that do not receive a great deal of attention from the media.
    - Even if the organized interests that take part do not always win, they are better off for having gotten involved
  - Is organized interest representation universal?
    - "the free rider problem" and "the resource problem" suggest that organized interest representation will be anything but universal
    - interest group politics facilitates the conversion of market resources into political advocacy
    - executives and professionals are massively overrepresented in the interest group community, and there is relatively littleinterest group activity on behalf of the poor
- **Data/Methods:** Data that they collected for the Washington Representatives Study to inquire into the kinds of interests that are represented by organizations in national politics and the extent to which that configuration approximates equality of political voice
- **Findings:** Just as in individual political participation, the economically disadvantaged are underrepresented in pressure politics
- **Relevant Literature:** Consistent with Schattschneider's analysis, the economically disadvantaged are underrepresented in pressure politics

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Frank R. Baumgartner et al. 2009. *Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why.* Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Sixty percent of recent lobbying campaigns failed to change policy despite millions of dollars spent trying. Why? The authors find that resources explain less than five percent of the difference between successful and unsuccessful efforts. Moreover, they show, these attempts must overcome an entrenched Washington system with a tremendous bias in favor of the status

quo. When advocates for a given issue finally succeed, policy tends to change significantly. The authors argue, however, that the lobbying community so strongly reflects elite interests that it will not fundamentally alter the balance of power unless its makeup shifts dramatically in favor of average Americans' concerns.

Robert Alan Dahl. 2005. *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City.* 2. ed. New Haven, Conn. London: Yale University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Analyzes the case of New Haven, CT and argues that political power in the United States is pluralistic.
- **Argument:** While power was distributed unequally in New Haven, it was also dispersed among a number of groups in competition with each other, rather than monopolized by a single elite group.
  - While in earlier periods power there was concentrated in a few hands, the breakdown first of patrician domination, and then the decline of the quasi-monopoly exerted by local entrepreneurs, have led to the emergence in New Haven of a pluralistic system of power,
  - Different citizens use different kinds of resources in order to influence officials. No one resource dominates in every big decision.
  - There is no cohesive power elite in New Haven which establish all important public policies. Potential power-holders operate mainly in the limited areas which seem to touch their own vital interests.
  - why do individuals vary in the political resources they command? Wealth, education, even neighborhood—all these unequally distributed resources affect influence in the most clear-cut way. But subjective factors are also significant in this regard. Individuals may be highly self-confident or highly apathetic; they may be poorly informed about the operation of the political system or extremely sophisticated.
- **Data/Methods:** Analyzing a series of recent major political decisions in New Haven, Dahl attempts through detailed interviews to ascertain the individuals who actually played crucial roles in these decisions. It is impermissible to assume actual power only on the basis of potential power.
- **Critique:** Underestimating the importance of broad-based civic participation. Dahl argues that democracy does not require mass participation and in fact rests on the consent of a relatively apathetic population. He later corrects this position in Democracy and Its Critics (1989).
- **Relevant Literature:** Rebutted power-elite theorists such as C. Wright Mills and Floyd Hunter, who had described the United States as a country ruled by a small group of interconnected individuals occupying key positions of power.

Other

Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson. 2016. *The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism.* New York: Oxford University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Tea Partiers are not monolithically hostile toward government; they distinguish between programs perceived as going to hard-working contributors to US society like themselves and "handouts" perceived as going to unworthy or freeloading people.
- **Argument:**

- Tea party has innovative organizational features.
- A small set of nationally operating Republican elites, many of whom have been promoting a low-tax, anti-regulation agenda since the 1970s, have played a key role in local and regional Tea Party efforts.
- previously achieved only limited success in directly connecting themselves to an activist grassroots base.
- Republican elites have been able to rely on powerful conservative media sources, led by Fox News. Previously grassroots conservatives have been embedded in social networks linked to churches and devoted to an agenda somewhat distinct from free-market absolutism.
- Tea Party activists themselves are often socially conservative and may be conservative Christians, the infrastructure of the Tea Party should be distinguished from the church-linked networks prominent in grassroots conservative mobilizations of recent decades

- **Data/Methods:**
  - data from national surveys of the demographic and attitudinal characteristics of Tea Party activists and sympathizers; publicly available data on national funding and advocacy organizations; and information on activism and ideology from various local and regional Tea Party websites. We enrich the nation-wide data with fieldwork observations and personal interviews conducted with the Greater Boston Tea Party by two of the authors during the first half of 2010, plus an e-mail questionnaire distributed to Massachusetts activists.

- **Findings:**
  - Older, middle-class Tea Partiers mostly approve of Social Security, Medicare, and generous benefits for military veterans. Their opposition to "big government" entails reluctance to pay taxes to help people viewed as undeserving "freeloaders" - including immigrants, lower income earners, and the young.
  - influenced by racial and ethnic stereotypes.

Political Parties

Core Theories

Anthony Downs. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper

- **Key Takeaway:** Ideologies are useful for voters and parties; in a two-party system parties will converge toward median voter
- **Argument:**
  - Political parties main interest is gaining office, not improving society → uncertainty allows parties to develop ideology as way to compete for office
    - Obtaining information can be costly to voters → party ideology is a useful cue to distinguish parties
  - Although parties want to maximize votes, some ideological variation due to heterogeneity in society, uncertainty, conflict;
  - Party ideology must be consistent with either (1) its actions in prior election periods; (2) its statements in the preceding campaign or (3) both to be useful
    - *Reliable* if policy statements at the beginning of election period can be used to make accurate predictions about behavior
    - *Responsible* if its policies in one period are consistent with actions in the preceding period
    - Has *integrity* if its policy statements at the beginning of an election period are reasonably born out by actions
  - **Summary:** Uncertainty restricts every voter's ability to relate government acts to their own view of society → party ideology helps make decisions without knowing every policy issue, reduce information costs
    - Parties may find ideologies useful in gaining the support of social groups and short cutting decisions about which policy will gain votes
  - **Assumptions:** parties ordered from left to right on single dimension, they have relative ideological immobility, and voters have singled peaked political preferences
    - In two-party system, parties converge ideologically upon the center; fear of losing extremist voters keeps them from becoming identical; convergence depends on unimodal distribution of voters
    - If distribution of voters remains constant, political system tends to move toward equilibrium in which the number of parties and ideological positions are fixed
      - Number of parties will then depend on (1) shape of the distribution and (2) whether the electoral structure is proportional or plurality
    - Influence parties may appear in two-party systems whenever converges has pulled one of the major parties away from the extremes

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John Herbert Aldrich. 2011. *Why Parties? A Second Look.* 2nd ed. Chicago studies in American politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

- **Key Takeaway:** political parties as "endogenous institutions." That is they are the creature of politicians, partisan activists, and ambitious office seekers and officeholders (i.e., political actors) looking to fulfill their goals and ambitions

- **Argument:** Relying on rational choice theory, argues that political parties are the result of political actors who while seeking to realize their goals, shape institutional arrangements within a given historical context. Specifically, parties are designed to solve collective action problems that current institutional arrangements cannot solve. In turn, parties are a main instrument for allowing political actors (office-seekers and benefit seekers, but NOT voters themselves) to achieve their personal goals (i.e., they help political actors "win more" than other political arrangements). In rational choice terms, political actors create parties to help specify which equilibrium outcomes are chosen, ensure better outcomes (reduce uncertainty in outcomes) by agreeing in advance to cooperate via a binding commitment and institutions (thus, parties are "long coalitions"). The form parties ultimately take reflects (1) electorate, (2) institutional setting, and (3) historical context. In all, democracy is unworkable except in terms of parties, since parties allow means for elected leaders to be held accountable to the public.
  - Assumptions: parties designed to solve problems that current institutional arrangements cannot $\longrightarrow$ specifically, problems of collective action which include:
    1. Ambition: regulating conflict/competition over scarce offices
       - Historical reference: Battle between Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft in 1912 election
    2. Making decisions: parties-in-government are enduring institutions designed to promote achievement of *collective choices* (i.e., overcome majority cycling), eliminating the need to create ad hoc coalitions
       - Arrow's theorem says that cycles are always possible and individual legislators have noncyclical preferences in multidimensional space. Parties as "long coalitions" prevent majority cycling by ensuring individual actors can agree to work out solutions among one another over a series of bills. If a party were a mere coalition formed around a single issue, there would be a cycle among coalitions, mirroring the cycle in preferences.
       - Historical reference: Hamilton wanted to win more often on the role/scope of government ("the great principle") when crafting the Constitution – formed the Federalist Party to ensure there was a coalition that would win across all of their priorities.
    3. Mobilizing supporters: parties help build and mobilize supporters, gather resources around "brand name" (Cox and McCubbins 2005)
       - As Riker and Odershook 1968 explain, calculus of voting can be defined as $R = PB + D - C$ where R is expected utility from voting, P is probability that your vote will affect outcome, B is benefit received from a specific candidate winning, D measures the rewards from voting itself, and C is the cost of voting. Goal of parties-as-organizations is to reduce costs of voting for individual voters (e.g., voter registration drives, transportation to polls, lowering decision-making costs for voters – $\downarrow C$), provide economies of scale for candidates (activities that lower costs of voting for one office do so for candidates up and down the ballot), and increase benefits of voting for party candidates (i.e., making voting a spectacle, a team sport – $\uparrow B$)
       - Historical reference: Following Andrew Jackson's loss in 1824, his guy Martin Van Buren helped create the first massed-base party ("Alliance," "Caucus") that sought to win support, mobilize voters, obtain controls over spoils of office to ensure "common man" voters would be enthusiastic about supporting Jacksonian Democratic candidates $\longrightarrow$ involved gathering resources, concentrating efforts in pick-up states, allowing independent state-level party organizations (making a national platform hard to articulate $\longrightarrow$ meant an amorphous party, one marked by compromise when slavery debates arose)
- **Critique:** Does not explain how "brand names" shift. For example, how do we account for the shift in the Republican Party in the Trump era. Aldrich explains that there are three mechanisms

for party control (self selection of people with policy concerns into political careers, intervention by party activists in nomination process, tendency to select candidates representing party median) – none seem relevant.

- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Cox and McCubbins 2005 jump on the idea of a "party brand"
  - In conversation with Bawn et al. 2012 with a focus on activists, though explains they are less concerned about spoils of office, more focused on outcomes than other political actors ⟶ since activist attachment to a party is contingent upon policy, if a candidate wants to obtain activist time and money, must advocate for activists' policy positions ⟶ encourages policy as a component of the "brand name"
  - Previous theories Aldrich responds to:
    - Diverse coalitions (e.g., VO Key): parties as broad umbrella organizations appealing to the majority of the public based on similar sets of values (e.g., "American creed") ⟶ problem is that parties actually have distinct ideological differences (i.e., haven't converged to the median voter)
      - While Key (1949) might say factions can substitute for parties, factions do not stand for ideas or parties that help voters distinguish between candidates ⟶ labels allow voters to play substantial role in policy
    - Responsible party thesis (Schattschneider 1942): parties offer clear, differentiable policy platforms to voters, which they try to implement if elected ⟶ problem is that this can result in wildly erratic policy, and parties don't actually focus on policy (they focus on candidates)
      - Four criteria for good party: 1) makes policy commitments, 2) carries out commitments when in office, 3) comes up with policy alternatives when out of office, 4) differentiates self from others to offer voters real choice
    - Electoral competition: competition for office as the defining characteristics of parties, with parties as teams used to coordinate to win elections (Downs 1957, Schlesinger)

Kathleen Bawn et al. 2012. "A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 3 (September): 571–597

- **Key Takeaway:** parties as coalitions of *interest groups* and *activists* seeking to capture/use government for their particular goals
- **Argument:** political parties in which *interest groups* and *activists* are the key actors, rather than election-minded politicians. This is a group-centric theory positing that coalitions of groups develop agendas of policies (based on similar interests), demands nomination of candidates committed to these policies, and works to elect these candidates to office. Without activist oversight of nominations, legislators don't seem to form long-term coalitions – instead sell policies in piecemeal fashion
  - In short, parties are coalitions of interest groups that develop common agendas and screen candidates for party nominations based on adherence to these agendas ⟶ *strong emphasis on the importance of nominating process*
  - Normative implications: parties not particularly responsive to citizen preferences, beyond what electoral competition requires ⟶ electoral blind spot is the policy region over which aggregate electorates don't enforce their preferences – thus, voter ignorance gives parties opportunity to win with more extreme candidates than voters would otherwise like
- **Findings:**

- First parties: formation of first parties not driven by ambitious office-holders – instead, citizen groups mobilized and coordinated ⟶ party committees
- Coalition change: civil rights, abortion shifts in party platform driven by policy demanders, rather than office-holders
- Role of politicians: facilitate efforts by policy demanding groups

- **Critique:** Focused primarily on what parties stand for and the constituencies represent, but leaves out their purpose in other context such as in government. Do they serve non-electoral interests? How do the coalitions of interest groups and activists ensure they win preferred outcomes?
  - Schlozman and Rosenfeld 2019: upside of Bawn argument is that it (1) helps account for the sustained absence of Downsian convergence in American politics, (2) collapses distinction between formal party organizations and the networks of nominally independent advocacy organizations and allied interest groups. However, parties appear only as the sum of the groups that comprise them ⟶ parties have no intrinsic features; little discussion of relative strength or weakness of parties as they seek to facilitate agreement among groups, or capacity of parties to mobilize participation and popular sentiment. Furthermore, nomination of Trump a real failure of this theory: party actors so terrified of backlash from voters or media-advocacy institutions within their own coalition that they neglected to offer endorsements or take other decisive action to influence nomination process in their favor ⟶ rather than reflecting victory of one faction over another, Trump beat all the established factions inside the party – and then, thanks to loyal support from Republican identifiers in the electorate, won the presidency. We should think of parties not in terms of what actors get out of them, but how they shape political combat.

- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Responds to previous view of politician-centric parties as teams of politicians whose goal is to win electoral office (Aldrich 2011)
  - Pervasive in Anzia's work on *local* interests and Grumbach's work on influence of national parties in state politics
  - Cohen et al. 2008: explains how today's presidential parties – understood as coalitions of elected officials, interest and advocacy groups, and ideological activists – have learned to work together in the so-called "Invisible Primary" to affect the outcome of the state-by-state presidential primaries and caucuses.

Historical Applications

V. O. Key. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation.* Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. Chapter 14.

- **Argument**: In the absence of an organized political party system in which two parties exist (as in the case of the "one-party South"), politics is characterized by "factional leadership" ⟶ battle for control of government pits ad hoc groups against one another that lack a core of professional politicians and continuity of voter support. Results of factional leadership include: (1) not the best individual leaders in power; (2) leaders who gain power do not use their power; (3) there is no incentive to do well in office to win the next election, promoting an "individualistic or disorganized" style of politics that prioritizes demagogic quality of personality; (4) government is susceptible to individual pressures, disposed toward favoritism.

Eric Schickler. 2016. *Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932-1965.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** The partisan transformation on race often depicted as an elite-led center-driven shift that occurred in the 1960s, breaking apart the New Deal coalition, however, Schickler shows that realignment began with mass and midlevel actors in state and local politics and was complete by the 1940s $\longrightarrow$ this is Bawn et al. 2012 in action.
- **Argument:** When Black voters started to vote consistently for Democrats in 1936 thanks to FDR, it gave rank-and-file Democrats an incentive to show concern for civil rights. CIO (labor union, critically ally to Blacks) associated with Democrats because of New Deal $\longrightarrow$ southern Democrats opposed labor unions and began to side more consistently with GOP, yielding in realignment. Underscores role of federalism and geographical decentralization: locally rooted politicians acted as intermediaries between constituency-based pressures and elite decision-making arenas – activists appealed to rank-and-file local officials, allowing them to raise salience of civil rights as issue
- **Relevant Literature:** Like Bawn et al. 2012, envisions parties as coalitions of policy demanders – nomination processes key to ensuring officeholders follow common program, ideologies represent coalitional bargains by diverse policy demanders. Argues that divisions within Democratic party caused by pairing of Black voters and CIO showed that parties are hardly a "long-term bargain that all sides of the party embraced"

David Karol. 2009. *Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management.* 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Think of parties as coalitions of groups with intense issue preferences that are managed by politicians – how groups are situated impacts how party leaders position the party on issues with the goal of maintaining their coalitions, incorporating existing constituencies, or staking new issue positions with hopes of creating new constituencies.
- **Argument:** Like Bawn et al. 2012, defines parties as coalitions of groups with intense preferences on issues *managed* by politicians – this is a bottom-up definition rather than a top-down one like that of Aldrich 2011, one that depicts politicans as play a managerial or coordination role. Leads us to expect different dynamics of party position change on issues in which parties incorporate groups with intense preferences in contrast to those in which groups are largely absent – thus, autonomy of party politicians varies systematically across issues depending on the composition of coalitions. Idea is that party leaders adopt policies that appeal to groups (even if polling tells them otherwise) to get most electoral benefits as groups control funds and activist networks. Over time groups become entrenched components of party coalitions and influence critical decisions (e.g., nomination of candidates). Typically, politicians take group composition as largely fixed and adapt. Consequently, argues that adaptation by elites is a greater source of change than replacement (this opposes Carmines and Stimson 1989's emphasis on membership replacement) – while flip-flopping has a cost, often one worth paying.
  - Models party position change based on these premises:
    1. Issues vary in the extent to which they are characterized by active interest groups focused on the topic
    2. Groups vary in the extent to which they are included in party coalitions
    3. Groups present in party coalitions constrain their party to be "better" than its rival on their issue, that is, to take a position relatively closer to the group in question.

4. Takes time for a group to change its position in the party system – thus changes in alignment will gradual
5. Politicians have more difficulty making connections with new groups than in adapting in response to old allies

– Models of change:

	Coalition Maintenance	Coalition Group Incorporation	Coalition Expansion
Initiators of change	Party-linked group	Party politicians	Party politicians
Autonomy of party elites	Limited throughout	Initially great, but declining over time	Great throughout
Role of elite turnover	Minor	Significant	Minor
Speed of process	Rapid	Gradual	Rapid
Stability of new position	Stable	Most stable	Unstable
Cases	Trade policy, race (in the North)	Abortion, gun control, race (in the South)	Defense spending, tax/fiscal policy

Figure 1: Models of Party Position Change (Karol 2009)

* Coalition maintenance: respond to demands of groups already within your party's coalition – social/economic changes convince group leadership that traditional policies no longer serve their interest and provide cues to party leaders that things need to change $\longrightarrow$ this should produce rapid change because party politicans don't need to form ties with new groups, voters don't need to alter loyalties
* Coalition group incorporation: party leaders shift positions to attract a particular constituency – a former cross-cutting issue thus becomes increasingly partisan $\longrightarrow$ change is slow (often requiring elite replacement) as incumbents forced to redefine their coalitions and policies (Fenno notes members resistant to changing home style); as new group enters party, gains leverage over party's elected officials, leading them to increasingly reflect the group's preferences rather than overall sentiment in state/district
* Coalition expansion: party leaders adopt a new position to improve their standing with the public generally $\longrightarrow$ rapid change because elites and district-based cues don't cross-pressure elected officials; issue position less stable since no organized group constrains party leaders (means they are able to flip-flop)

– What prevents convergence in positions is public opinion (sense of "latent public opinion") and perceived interconnectedness between policies $\longrightarrow$ creates tradeoffs for party leaders in deciding how to position the party across an array of issues

- **Data/Methods:** Uses data on issues of trade, abortion, gun control, national defense, and fiscal policy
- **Findings:**
  – Trade policy: example of coalition maintenance because parties' constituencies changed little, but preferences of longtime allies in business and labor lobbies altered by developments in world economy $\longrightarrow$ politicians shifted positions to retain the supporters they already had
  – Abortion/gun control: coalition group incorporation because Democrats and Republicans worked to court new constituencies (particularly Republicans trying to pick up Evangelicals/religious right)

- Race: mixture of coalition maintenance and group incorporation as parties tried to respond to old constituencies and court new ones $\longrightarrow$ Northern politicians enacted coalition maintenance as they reacted to divergent signals from business and labor lobbies; in the South, coalition group incorporation was at work as Blacks entered the Democratic Party and racially conservative whites became a source of votes for Republicans
- Taxes and defense spending: coalition expansion as party elites experimented repeatedly with positions to win widespread support not limited to any lobby or discrete subgroup of voters

- **Critique:** Are there groups that parties are more or less responsive to? What are the characteristics of groups themselves that incents party leaders to change party strategy?

- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Party positioning: spatial model (Downs 1957) yet bundles of positions Ds and Rs take is not stable; party images as heuristics (Conover and Feldman 1983; Popkin 1991) but doesn't explain how images emerge in first place; issue ownership (Petrocik 1996) explains which issues candidates stress but doesn't explain *change* in parties' stands
    - Regarding issue ownership: Petrocik (1996), Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1994), and Sellers (1998) argue that, given an imperfectly informed electorate, parties that "own" more popular position on a given issue by raising issue's salience in voters' minds, allowing candidates' choices of issue emphasis to affect voters' decisions $\longrightarrow$ this work shows that parties can gain/lose ownership of issues quickly
  - Position change: realignment theory theory (Key 1959's gradual/secular realignments, Schattschneider 1960, Burnham 1970's critical realignments), but scholars can't seem to agree on periodization schema and party policies and coalitions always evolving (a "multiple orders" argument like Orren and Skowronek 2004); issue evolution (Carmines and Stimson 1989's "punctuated equilibrium") but that work produces few generalizations

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Paul Frymer. 2010. *Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Depending how entrenched a group is in a party's coalition and whether they are a majority/minority group determines whether parties will expend resources to advocate their interests and mobilize their participation – this is the concept of *electoral capture*

- **Argument:** While previous work suggests that competitive two-party systems produce a more democratic and inclusive society, forcing at least one party to reach out to groups not represented by other party, argues that while parties often do this, there is nothing that *necessitate* them to do so. Inn fact, there are politically compelling reason for parties to not reach out to these groups, especially African Americans. Thus posits concept of *electoral capture*: any politically relevant group that votes overwhelmingly for one of the major political parties and subsequently finds the primary opposition party making little or no effort to appeal to its interests or attract its votes.
  - Essentially argues that some voters are stuck in their party (e.g., Black voters in Democratic party) – their interests aren't served by other parties, opposing party doesn't want the group's vote so group has no recourse to threaten their party with defection $\longrightarrow$ party can take the group for granted since they have nowhere else to go
  - Party leaders consider size of group in relation to overall electorate; how much power group's leaders wield in the party organization as well as local and state politics; whether the group can offer financial support to party candidates; whether the group's votes are concentrated within strategic electoral locations; whether groups is ideologically predisposed to vote for them

- Key consideration is whether appeals to group will *disrupt* party's electoral coalition – to create an electoral majority, party must avoid appealing to groups that alienate base or diminish ability to reach out to median/swing voters $\longrightarrow$ if answer is that it would be costly to make appeals, then party leaders will find it strategic essentially ignore group at national level
- Several reasons why Black voters captured in Democratic Party: tend ideologically moderate to conservative on a number of issues; fear that appeals to Black voters will upset blocks of white voters; fear that salience of black overwhelm coalition of white voters united by economic concerns $\longrightarrow$ when parties adapt platforms, seek to mobilize these voters, raise potential electoral costs
  - Basic idea is that party leaders are unsure of where median voter stands, appeal to groups that are highly mobilized, avoid taking risks $\longrightarrow$ focus on appeals to hypothetical median white voter

- **Findings:**
  - While Republicans crucial during Reconstruction to incorporate Blacks into electorate, eventually deserted those efforts when electoral incentives changes as they lost political control of South
  - As Democrats moderated under Clinton, trying to avoid connections made clear by Willie Horton ad, moved toward courting white median voter: welfare reform, crime bill, etc.
  - Black voters aren't mobilized by Democrats because historically low turnout rates, focus attention instead on persuading and mobilizing swing voters loyal to the party, fear of consequences of appeals mean minimize public appearances with candidates to Black voters
  - In the face of resurgent party leadership in the 1960s, growth of party-leadership driven campaigns (thanks to DCCC, DSCC, RNCC, RNSC), some argue that Black interests were better represented with declining role of Southern conservative Democrats (both Rohde and Carmines & Stimson argue this) and Democrats have become home of racial liberalism $\longrightarrow$ Black interests definitely better served in Congress since 1960s (e.g., affirmative action, voting rights, opposition to apartheid), yet rely on antimajoritarian procedures to get this done (e.g., Black interests today rely heavily on seniority, committee autonomy, racial gerrymandering)
    - Congressional Black Caucus: more successful in advocating for civil rights issues rather than economic or urban issues; influence has increased dramatically since 103rd Congress

- **Critique:** Black voters are becoming base of Democratic Party – while they may not switch to vote Republican, low turnout can be damaging, particularly in competitive districts/states $\longrightarrow$ Frymer places too much emphasis on vote choice, not enough on participation itself

- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Swain 1993 argues that descriptive representation does not necessarily promote Black interests, any Democratic member is sufficient to substantively represent Blacks $\longrightarrow$ yet, more Black members has made a difference with more powerful role in agenda setting and veto voice. As Frymer argues, "as long as black issues remain divisive and programs to redress racial inequality remain unpopular, antimajoritarian instruments will remain vital to protecting African American interests"

Congressional Elections

Midterms

Edward R. Tufte. 1975. "Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review* 69, no. 3 (September): 812–826

- **Key Takeaways:**
- **Argument:** Seeks to explain the *magnitude* of national midterm loss by the president's party – why do some presidents lose more seats than others?
  - Puzzle: in every off-year congressional election since the Civil War (except one), the party of the incumbent president has lost seats in the House. Why?
  - Hypothesis: lower approval ratings and less prosperous economy tied to greater loss of support for the president's party in the midterms
- **Data/Methods:** regress standardized vote loss by president's party in midterm on presidential popularity, yearly change in economic conditions (1938-1970, N = 8)
  - DV: magnitude of midterm loss by president's party, relative to past eight on- and off-cycle elections (measured nationally)
    - **Vote loss:** standardized vote loss by president's party in midterm election; measured with respect to how well the president's party *normally* does
  - IV: presidential approval, performance of the economy in year before midterm
    - **Approval:** monthly Gallup poll question about presidential approval
    - **Economy:** yearly pre-election change in real disposable income per capita
  - Vote to seats: based on swing ratio (% change in seats/ % change in votes); percent change in seats associated with 1% change in national vote
- **Findings:** midterm votes in congressional elections act as a referendum on the president's performance and the management of the economy
  - 10pp change in popularity → 1.3pp change in vote, 100 dollar change in RDI → 3.5pp change in vote
    - Model predicts hard cases at least somewhat well (1974 midterms post-Nixon), though seems to be sensitive to extreme values
  - No relationship between presidential approval, pre-election shift in RDI; approval is a function of many things (not just the economy)
  - Votes to seats: nationwide vote poorly reflected in partisan distribution of *seats*, due to structure of the electoral system – ratio *declining* over time
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** response to view of midterm as return to "normal" partisan equilibrium by focusing on the magnitude of votes/seats lost
  - Holt 2022: unified government increases the number of seats a president's party loses during a midterm election; reduces the number of seats saved by presidential approval; increases surge and decline effects ⟶ explains why Democrats have traditionally performed worse during midterm election; indicate that rather than a surge and decline, midterm elections are a counter-surge to the surge in support the president's party receives in the previous presidential election

Campaign Spending

Gary C. Jacobson. 1978. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review* 72, no. 2 (June): 469–491

- **Key Takeaway:** Campaign spending matters, but mostly for *challenger*
- **Argument:** spending by *challengers* has a greater impact on the outcome than spending by *incumbents*, especially for House elections
  - The more incumbents spend, the worse they do, as they raise money in direct proportion to the magnitude of the electoral threat from the challenger
  - Mechanism: campaign expenditures buy challengers necessary voter *recognition*
- **Data/Methods:** Elections returns and campaign spending data from the 1970s for both House and Senate
  - Concerns over *simultaneity* bias: the *expectation* that a candidate will do well may bring campaign contributions, which may influence candidate performance
  - Use 2SLS to avoid this issue
  - **Model:** Challenger vote share Challenger expenditures + Incumbent expenditures + challenger PID + District partisanship
- **Findings:** Spending by *challengers* has a substantial impact on election outcomes, while spending by *incumbents* has relatively little
  - Greater impact of challenger spending remains when controlling for simultaneity bias; the more *both* spend, the better the candidate does
    - the more incumbents spend, the worse they do → they raise and spend money in direct proportion to the magnitude of electoral threat posed by a challenger, but this reactive spending fails to offset progress made by challenger that inspires it
  - Spending buys non-incumbents voter recognition enjoyed by incumbents prior to the campaign
  - Campaign expenditures are a strong predictor of voter name recognition
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Foundational article finding relationship between campaign spending and election outcomes. Future research like Green and Krasno (1988) note methodological critiques.

Donald Philip Green and Jonathan S. Krasno. 1988. "Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 32, no. 4 (November): 884

- **Key Takeaway:** After accounting for challenger quality, both incumbent **and** challenger spending have a direct effect on vote share; response to Jacobson (1978)
- **Argument:** Three forms of model specification lead to underestimation of the effect of incumbent expenditures on vote share
  - Failure to control for *challenger quality*; quality can have an independent effect
    - Challenger Political Quality: The personal characteristics of the challenger that contribute to strength of their candidacy, separate from other aspects of the campaign (Attractiveness + skill)

- Inattentiveness to *interaction effects*
- Inadequate treatment of *reciprocal causality*; 2SLS model insufficient

- **Data/Methods:** Re-analysis of 1978 elections
  - Challenger Quality: In one model, adds a dummy variable for elective office, in another adds Challenger quality index (point values for diff. characteristics)
    - **Results:** Replicates Jacobson's analysis, but finds that challenger quality has a substantial direct effect on the vote
  - Model rigidity: accounts for non-linear, non-additive effects
    - To address non-linearity in the effect of expenditures, runs separate models on subsets of challenger spending
      - **Results:** diminishing returns; effect of challenger spending tapers with spending, whereas effect of quality increases with spending
    - To address non-additive effects (1) take log of challenger spending, (2) interact spending with candidate quality, previous election outcome
      - **Results:** quality increasingly important as spending increases; past party performance is negatively correlated with increased spending
  - Endogeniety: incumbents may spend more money as they become more vulnerable to defeat → omitted variable bias
    - Use *past incumbent expenditures* as an instrument
      - Note: Jacobson uses prior office, challenger/incumbent primary, and incumbent years in the House as instruments
    - **Results:** Incumbent spending exerts a sizeable influence on vote share, across different levels of challenger spending

- **Findings:** After correcting for biases, marginal effect of incumbent spending found to be substantial, on par with challenger spending
  - Challenger quality is also an important determinant of the vote, especially when challengers spend a lot on their campaigns
  - Direct effect of challenger spending is smaller than originally estimated and subject to diminishing returns
  - Challenger spending increases the importance of candidate *quality*, decreases the importance of precious *party performance*

- **Contributions/Related Literature:** direct response to Jacobson – argues that campaign spending is just as impactful for incumbents as challengers
  - Response to Jacobson: model will only deliver unbiased estimates if the spending variables are the only campaign-specific forces, or of this variables are uncorrelated with other factors related to the vote
    - **Challenger quality:** associated with vote share, both spending variables → overestimation of challenger coefficient, underestimation of incumbent coefficient
    - **Model rigidity:** due to assumptions of *linearity* (diminishing returns to spending), *additivity* (lack of interaction effects)
    - **Endogenous regressors:** spending tied to electoral prospects (incumbents insecurity, challenger viability) – simultaneity corrections don't solve

Gary C. Jacobson. 1990. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments." *American Journal of Political Science* 34, no. 2 (May): 334

- **Key Takeaway:**
- **Argument:** Response to Krasno and Green (1988). Believe that incumbent spending likely does have some positive effect, however, skeptical about argument that incumbent and challenger spending is equally effective:
  - The instrument for incumbent spending (past incumbent performance) may be a proxy for party strength and challenger quality
  - Still treat incumbent spending as linear, while we may expect diminishing returns
  - Green and Krasno's findings hold only for 1978; replicated five years later result does not hold
- **Data/Methods:** 1986 panel survey of N=8,000 voters in 60 House districts
  - IV: Total spending as proxy for spending in between waves of the survey (highly correlated)
  - Assume better financed campaigns project a higher volume of more persuasive messages
  - DV: Whether or not the respondent intends to vote for the challenger
- **Findings:** Analyses of changes in voting intentions verifies initial results - campaign spending is crucial to house challengers. The more they spend, the more net votes they pick up
  - Vote intentions in September highly influenced by PID and assessments of incumbents performance, economic trends
  - Challengers who spent little money *lost* support during the campaign → incumbents do have incentive to campaign, though marginal gains do not offset marginal losses by the challenger
  - Challenger's level of spending can make as much as a 12 point difference in vote share
- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Continues debate over the role of campaign spending on vote share; additional evidence that campaign spending is particularly important for *challengers*

Robert S. Erikson and Thomas R. Palfrey. 2000. "Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data." *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 3 (September): 595–609

- **Key Takeaways:** Incumbents outspend challengers and achieve roughly equal effectiveness per dollars in close races, where it matters most, a source of incumbency advantage
- **Argument/Findings:** Continuation of long-held debate about the effects of campaign spending
  - Apply OLS to a subset of congressional districts for which a game-theoretic model predicts that the simultaneity bias should be minimal or non-existence
    - In these districts, new sources of challenger support do not necessarily drive up challenger and incumbent spending
    - These are districts in which, before taking spending into account, the vote is expected to be close or even slightly in favor of the the challenger
    - When a close race is expected, both spending effects can be reliably estimated by OLS
  - **Key Finding:** When the vote is expected to be close, the OLS estimates of spending effects are of roughly equal magnitude for incumbents and challengers
    - Incumbent and challenger spending is an increasing function of race closeness
    - Estimated effects of incumbent spending decline with seniority

Redistricting

Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2009. "Does gerrymandering cause polarization?" *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (3): 666–680

- **Key Takeaway:** Evaluates claim that increasing partisan conflict and polarization is a consequence of partisan gerrymandering
- **Main Findings:** little evidence for link between districting, polarization
  - Large fraction of polarization in House results from *within-district* divergence between voting records of Democrats, Republicans
  - Some of the growth in polarization attributable to increased *congruence* between district characteristics, representative's party
  - Comparing *simulated* to actual districts, find that gerrymandering (sorting into districts) account for very little of the increase in polarization
- **Two Trends:** (1) increase *polarization* and (2) historically low levels of *competition* in congressional elections, especially in the House – but these aren't inherently linked
  - Other districting considerations (compactness, continuity, equal apportionment) reduce ability for even sophisticated gerrymanders to have dramatic effects
  - Politicians have to balance incumbency protection and partisan incentives; partisan gerrymanders *decrease* district homogeneity, *increase* competitiveness
  - Little empirical evidence for linkage, especially given parallel trends in Senate
- **Source of polarization:** (1) *sorting* of legislators into districts, (2) *intra-district* divergence in voting records of Reps/Dems, holding district characteristics constant
  - Gerrymandering should only affect (1) and not (2)
  - Decompose polarization measured as the difference in average NOMINATE scores of Republicans, Democrats into two components:
    - Sorting: based on probability that a district with characteristic z elects a Republican member
    - AIDD: average intra-district divergence between parties, measured as the difference in average NOMINATE scores, conditional on z
      - Estimate using OLS (interacting party, z) matching estimattor based on district characteristics
  - Results: Increase in AIDD from 107th to 108th Congress, accounting for more than 50% of total increase in polarization - much smaller in crease in sorting effect
    - Inconsistent evidence that sorting effect increased post-redistricting cycles – increase in sorting seems unrelated to computerized gerrymandering
    - Gerrymandering accounts for over 80% of decline in competitiveness, but has had little impact on polarization
- **Districting Simulations:** examine whether *districting* (vs redistricting) causes polarization by estimating polarization under various simulated district plans
  - Simulations: randomizing US county-blocks (subdividing counties into 1000-person groups, assuming that county demographics same for each sub-county)
    - First, draw bootstrap sample from actual districts and estimate polarization measures, probability of Republican elected, given z

    - * Second, draw districts from county blocks and compute z for each district
    - * Third, allocate each district to Republican, Democrat based on p(z), and compute NOMINATE score
    - * Fourth, compute polarization across districts
  - Criteria: for allocating county-blocks to distance
    - * **Random:** randomly allocate county-blocks to 435 districts, without attention to any other constraints (polarization = AIDD)
    - * **State:** impose state boundaries, randomly sample within each state → third of sorting effect attributable to variation across states
    - * **Geographic constraints:** use lat and long of county center to approximate contiguity, compactness → again, small sorting effect
    - * **Minority representation:** generated districts based on racial composition, batching together county blocks with larger AA populations → sorting effect accounts for only 10% of polarization
    - * **Political representation:** produce districts that simulatet the partisan, ideological diversity of each state → simulated polarization close to actual
  - When compare simulated 107th to 108th House to see effect of *redistricting*, find minimal evidence of large-scale differences
  - However, redistricting did increase the Republican hold on Congress, but the increase in districts is smaller once other criteria (e.g., contiguity) are imposed

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Jowei Chen and Jonathan Rodden. 2013. "Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8, no. 3 (June): 239–269

- **Key Takeaway:** Geographic concentration of Democrats in large cities produces unintentional gerrymandering, gives Republicans systematic electoral advantage
- **Argument:** Substantial bias in election outcomes (translating votes → seats) results from inefficient concentration of Democrats in large cities, minor industrial agglomerations
  - Method: automated districting simulations based on precinct-level presidential election results (Florida 2000)
  - Main finding: strong relationship between geographic concentration of Democratic voters, electoral bias favoring Republicans
- **Types of gerrymandering:** intentional and unintentional
  - Intentional: district maps drawn to favor partisan/racial groups
  - Unintentional: One party's voters more geographically clustered due to residential patterns, human geography
- There is fairly widespread relationship between population density and Democratic voting, with some cross-state heterogeneity (higher in *industrialized/urbanized* states)
  - Examine the *nearest neighbor* of each precinct and compare partisan predispositions (using both categorical cut-off points, Moran's i for spatial auto-correlation) → Democratic precincts more spatially clustered
  - Smaller clusters of Democrats outside the cities also get subsumed into larger, rural Republican districts → more wasted votes

- **Method:** use automated districting to estimate the electoral bias that would result in hypothetical districting plans that are *not* intentionally gerrymandered by party/race
  - Criteria: (1) equal *apportionment*, (2) *compactness*, (3) *contiguity*
  - General process: randomly select a precinct and find the neighboring district that is geographically closest → merge into new district → iterate until have d districts
  - DV: using precinct-level returns, determine whether a district would have Democratic or Republican majority
- **Findings:** pro-Republican bias (more than 50% of seats) in distribution of seats across any reasonably sized legislature (2-200 seats), regardless of compactness
  - No simulated plan that is neutral/pro-Democratic – and none of the actual Democratic plans produce neutral/pro-Democratic outcome
- **Extension:** to other 20 states, using precinct-level data from county governments, transformed to examine seat share in a "hypothetical" tied election
  - In large, urbanized states, Democrats are at a disadvantage due to urban concentration – by less inefficient clustering in Southern/Western states
  - Strong correlation betweenn simulation estimates and electoral bias of actual districting plans

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Nicholas O Stephanopoulos and Eric M McGhee. 2015. "Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap." *The University of Chicago Law Review*

- **Key Takeaway:** Introduce the efficiency gap as an alternative to partisan bias measure
- **Argument:**
  - Some Vocabulary:
    - **Gerrymandering:** A district plan that results in one party wasting more votes than its adversary
    - **Partisan Symmetry:** A district plan should treat the major parties symmetrically with respect to the conversion of votes to seats
    - **Cracking:** splitting a party's supporters between districts so they fall shy of a majority in each one
    - **Packing:** stuffing remaining supporters in a small number of districts that they win handily
    - **Partisan Bias Measure:** divergence in the share of seats that each party would win given the same share, typically 50 percent, of the statewide vote
  - **Efficiency Gap:** Represents the difference between the parties' respective wasted votes in an election – where a vote is wasted if it is cast (1) for a losing candidate or (2) for a winning candidate but in excess of what is needed to prevail
    - Difference between the parties' respective wasted votes is divided by the total number of votes cast, getting an easily interpretable percentage
    - Some limitations:
      - Unexpected results when one party has very high vote share
      - Metric instability over time; past gap poor predictor of future gap
      - Sensitivity to treatment of uncontested seats
    - Issues with partisan bias measure:
      - Calculated with hypothetical election result rather than actual election

· Relies on **uniform swing** assumption, the premise that vote switchers are present in equal numbers in each district

- **Findings:**
  - Compute efficiency gap for Congressional and state house plans between 1972-2012 → find that the typical plan was fairly balanced and neither party enjoyed systemic advantage
    - In recent years, peaking in 2012, plans have exhibited a steadily larger and more pro-Republican gap
    - Current plans are most extreme gerrymanders
  - Propose setting thresholds above which plans would be presumptively unconstitutional: two seats for congressional plans and 8 percent for state house plans

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Christopher T. Kenny et al. 2023. "Widespread partisan gerrymandering mostly cancels nationally, but reduces electoral competition." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 120, no. 25 (June): e2217322120

- **Key Takeaway:** Partisan bias as a result of gerrymandering largely cancels out nationally, but does reduce electoral competition and responsiveness
- **Argument:**
  - Combination of partisan sorting and winner-take-all, single-member districts makes it difficult tot disentangle whether districting or political geographic systematically advantages on party over the other
- **Data/Methods:** Simulation-based method designed to produce a representative sample from the relevant universe of plans
- **Findings:** While both parties engage in partisan gerrymandering in many states, the resulting bias largely cancels out at the national level, giving the GOP just two additional seats. Remaining GOP advantage may be explained by other factors such as the geographic distribution of voters and redistricting rules
  - Additionally, as a result of gerrymanders by both parties, the overall competitiveness and responsiveness of the House are lower than a non-partisan baseline

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Incumbency, Candidate Quality

Robert S. Erikson. 1971. "The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections." *Polity* 3, no. 3 (March): 395–405

- **Key Takeaway:** Incumbency advantage is spurious, as candidates who are most electorally appealing are more likely to become incumbents, regardless of structural advantage
- **Argument:** measures effect of incumbency on vote division in House elections
  - Common assumption that incumbents have considerable advantages in re-election (eg use of office to do favors, name recognition, fundraising)
  - Main argument: the incumbency advantage may be spurious, due to reciprocal causal relationship between incumbency and electoral success

        * Candidates who are most electorally appealing also most likely to become incumbents, regardless of inherent structural advantages
            · This is especially likely in competitive districts, where incumbents win by being stronger "vote-getters"
    - Finding: electoral advantage of incumbency insufficient to explain fact that incumbent candidates almost always win
        * Instead, most districts seem to be relatively safe for one party, requiring a strong challenger to defeat an incumbent

- **Method:** compares the electoral performance of candidates in their first successful election with their performance in the next subsequent re-election attempt
    - Measure: change in vote share between 1952-1954, 1958-1960 (for Northern reps), accounting for candidate's previous vote, inter-election swings
        * Get residuals from regresssion of vote share in the second election on vote share iin the first election (eg, % Dem 1954 on % Dem 1952) → *actual* vs *predicted* vote share for each candidate
    - Hypothesis: residual vote for new incumbent should be positive, indicating that a change in incumbency status produces an increase in vote margin beyond what would be otherwise expected

- **Results:** dis-aggregated by whether new incumbents defeated previous incumbents vs non-incumbents
    - Majority of new representatives (60%) increase vote share when run first race as an incumbent
    - However, magnitude of effect size is small (1.5 to 1.7 points)
    - Important to recognize two sides of the same coin: new incumbents may be esp. skilled or their opponents unusually poor, difficult to disentangle
    - Small effects may still be consequential in competitive races

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David R Mayhew. 1974a. "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals"

- **Argument:** 5 hypotheses for growing margin of victory for incumbents over time
    - Puzzle: In 1956-1972 period, the number of districts with close house elections sharply decreased, reflecting of a similar, gradual long-range decline
        * **Vanishing marginals:** representatives "whose election percentages could, but now do not, earn them places in the central range of these incumbency distributions"
    - Hypotheses: tied to district line-drawing, incumbency advantages
        * **Line-drawing:** districts could be built to profit incumbents
            · However, weak relationship between redistricting, electoral outcomes – and timing of trends does not match redistricting
        * **Incumbency advantage:** incumbency now carries greater electoral advantage than in the past, boosting members out of marginal zone
            · Advertising: House members better at advertising (using franking)
            · Credit-claiming: more federal programs → more able to claim credit
            · Position-taking: may have become better at catering their issue positions to district opinion
            · Voter behavior: incumbency cue serves as a substitute for party cues → erosion of party loyalty benefits incumbents

- **Data/Methods:** plots the distribution of congressional vote over time, in district with and without incumbents running, relative to the presidential vote in those years
  - Open seats: open seat distributions are highly peaked, centrally clustered → House elections without incumbents tend to be closely contested
  - Incumbents: substantial change in shape over time; distributions begin as close to normal, but become bimodal in shape frmo 1968 onward → decline in number of incumbents in "marginal zone"
- **Findings:** clear evidence for increasing incumbency advantage, pushing incumbents out of the "marginal" zone and decreasing the number of close elections
  - However, mostly speculative paper about origins of increasing incumbency advantage moving into the 1970s
  - Aggregate: with individual drop in narrow election wins, congressional seat swings should also decrease amplitude
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** attempt to hypothesize about change in "swing ratio" from Tufte (1975) over time; popular voting trends will not result in changes in seats when most politicians are on the extreme ends of the distribution

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Thomas E. Mann and Raymond E. Wolfinger. 1980. "Candidates and parties in congressional elections." *American Political Science Review* 74 (3): 617–632

- **Key Takeaway:** Incumbents tend to gain advantages in terms of familiarity (in the form of either recall or recognition), reputation, and preference
- **Argument:** Scholars underestimate the level of public awareness of congressional candidates due to faulty measures
- **Data/Methods:** 1978 CPS national election study, sampling congressional districts
  - Trends: (1) turnout declined (2) more vanishing marginals (3) still unstable membership (turnover) due to retirement
- **Findings:** Voters can recognize and evaluate candidates without remembering their names → incumbents seem to be better known/liked than challengers
  - Quality of challenger matters for incumbency advantage, which is why these advantages are attenuated in the Senate vs. the House
  - Public assessments of the president remain important indicators of the national tide, but are less important than their local candidate options
  - **Party and incumbency cues:** might expect party ID to be a stronger predictor of congressional vs presidential voting, but there has been steadily increasing party defection over time
    - Defection is not one sided – over 75% of defections are in the direction of the incumbent party
  - **Candidate familiarity:** incumbents better known than challengers – but surveys mostly measure name *recall* vs name *recognition*
    - House incumbents almost universally recognized, but smaller proportion of respondents recognize non-incumbent names (esp. challengers)
    - Senate challengers almost as visible as incumbents – less gap in name recognition likely reduces incumbency advantages in this chamber

  - **Candidate reputation:** Incumbents generally well-regarded by constituents
    * Strong relationship between evaluations of incumbent performance and defection
    * Voters focus on perceived character, experience, and local ties when evaluating candidates for office – ideology and party are less salient features
  - **Candidate preference:** based on relative rankings on feeling thermometer – preferences are strongly related to self-reported vote choice
    * If neither candidate is preferred, party identification predicts resulting vote (though incumbents still fare better than might expect)
  - Incumbents have more contact with their constituents and other privileges of office, but their advantages extend beyond constituent engagement to visibility, reputation.

- **Contribution/Relevant Literature:** Early survey evidence of incumbency based benefits in terms of familiarity– ie voters are simply more likely to recognize the incumbent

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Bruce E. Cain, John A. Ferejohn, and Morris P. Fiorina. 1984. "The Constituency Service Basis of the Personal Vote for U.S. Representatives and British Members of Parliament." *American Political Science Review* 78, no. 1 (March): 110–125

- **Key Takeaway:** Constituency service is important to the "personal vote" (incumbency) in both the US and UK

- **Argument:**
  - Personal vote: "portion of candidate's electoral support which originates in his or hers personal qualities, qualifications, and record", separate from party, voter characteristics, national trends
    * Candidates are particularly attentive to the personal vote, given that it is one place where they can exert individual control

- **Data/Methods:** surveys from the Center for Political Studies and British Gallup, interviews with congressional administrative assistants and British MPs/party agents
  - DV: incumbent vote
  - IV: whether personally contacted the incumbent, whether got a response, and whether the response was satisfactory
  - Elite surveys: asked interviewees about the role of constituent services in their re-election prospects
    * DV: magnitude of swings
    * IV: additive index of amount of described casework

- **Main findings:** incumbency advantage in UK that is weaker than in the US but still matters
  - In both the US and UK, party ID and executive approval are more impactful on voting than constituency service – but casework matters at the margins
  - Elite surveys: interviewees believe that constituency work can offset swings against their party of amplify swings toward their party Takeaway: in both countries, constituency service is an important part of the personal vote

- **Contributions/connections:** mostly focused on applications to the British case, but provides a citation about the **importance of casework** in voting behavior

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Gary C. Jacobson. 1989. "Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946–86." *American Political Science Review* 83, no. 3 (September): 773–793

- **Key Takeaway:** Relationship between national economic conditions and incumbent vote shares impacted by *strategic candidate entry*
- **Argument:** Strategic political elites play a pivotal role in the translation of national conditions into election results vis influencing *candidate entry*
  - When prospects favor one party, high-quality candidates from that party will run, get significantly more votes/wins
    - Interaction of exploitable national issues and strong challengers imposes collective accountability on members of Congress
  - Electoral importance of strategic politicians has *increased* in tandem with trend toward candidate-centered elections, at expense of national forces
  - Assumptions: (1) selection (2) outcomes
    - **Selection:** high-quality candidates must be selective about when to run for the House (more likely when higher chance of winning)
    - **Outcomes:** presence of high-quality candidates must increase odds of winning (above/beyond favorable partisan forces that caused them to run)
- **Data/Methods:** probit models predicting challenger runs, wins, vote share, and aggregate model predicting inter-election seat swings
  - DV: change in % House seats won by Democrats, relative to previous election
  - IV: % of challengers who have held elective public office (proxy for quality)
  - Controls: pres. party, number of seats last won by Dems, change in real income per capita, presidential approval
- **Findings:** Challenger quality has a Strong, significant effect on seat swings, after controlling for other relevant variables
  - No direct effect of economic conditions, presidential approval on election outcomes, but has a significant interactive effect with aggregate candidate quality
  - Selection: strong relationship between presence of high-quality candidates, chances of winning $\rightarrow$ esp. for *open seats*, incumbents with *lower past vote shares*
  - Changes over time: strong partisan attachments, nationalized elections $\rightarrow$ less importance of candidate quality on electoral outcomes
- importance of strategic politicians has grown over time, following move toward candidate-centered politics $\rightarrow$ less ability for collective accountability.

Steven D. Levitt and Catherine D. Wolfram. 1997. "Decomposing the Sources of Incumbency Advantage in the U. S. House." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22, no. 1 (February): 45

- **Key Takeaway:** model incumbency advantage, accounting for candidate quality, by only examining elections where two candidates face each other twice (but one has become an incumbent)
- **Argument:** model of the incumbency advantage that accounts for candidate quality, using panel data on the House from 1948 to 1990
  - Main finding: rising incumbency advantage tied tot the ability for incumbents to deter *high-quality challengers*

    - In contrast, not about *office-holder benefits* (e.g., franking, media exposure, fundraising), which have remained stable over time, nor *high incumbent quality*
  - Decomposition: into three advantages: (1) office-holder benefits, (2) ability to deter high-quality challengers, (3) average quality of incumbents

- **Data/Methods:** outcome of House elections assumed to be a function of *normal vote* in a district, *incumbency status*, quality of *competing candidates*, and *national-level political forces*
  - Estimation: using panel data (1948-1990), regress congressional vote on incumbency status, with year and district fixed effect effects
  - Preliminary results: : find strong evidence of a baseline incumbency advantage, differing over time (strongest in the 1980-1990 period)
    - Estimates relatively precise, except for case when elections coincide with redistricting (1972, 1982)

- **Measuring quality:** need to control for *incumbent quality* – not directly observable
  - Assume that quality remains constant across elections → *sophomore surge analysis*, comparing vote share for re-election vs first bid for election
    - Sophomore surge analysis is downwardly biased, as only candidates who had successful first bids are observed as incumbents
    - Create modified version of this analysis with corrections to eliminate correlation between sample selection bias, error terms.
  - Need to distinguish between *office-holder benefits* and *ability to scare off high-quality challengers* – impossible to extricate in standard analysis
    - Method: pairs of congressional contests in which same two candidates face each other in both, but incumbency status differs (N = 122)
    - Results: though significant effects of office-holder benefits, direct benefits have declined since 1980s
    - Conclusion: rise in incumbency advantage due to deterrence of high-quality challengers
      - Decrease in challengers likely due to role of campaign spending – increasing costs of competitive campaigns, fundraising efforts
      - Alternatively, could be related to increase in the stigma associated with losing

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Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart III. 2000. "Old Voters, New Voters, and the Personal Vote: Using Redistricting to Measure the Incumbency Advantage." *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (January): 17

- **Key Takeaway:** Over half of the incumbency advantage can be explained by a *personal vote* (or homestyle)

- **Argument:** A large fraction of incumbency advantage is about the *personal vote* rather than *challenger quality*
  - Use natural experiment of redistricting to estimate the size of the *personal vote* in House elections (1872-1998 across US, 1972-1992 in CT, MA, NJ)
    - Personal vote: vote incumbent receives because represented voters in the past
  - Three potential sources of increasing incumbency advantage
    - Homestyle: personal vote; responsiveness to constituents (casework) in attempt

    - Candidate Quality: incumbents do worse with experienced challengers
    - Voting cue: incumbency as a label that voters rely on when party less salient

- **Data/Methods:** contrast incumbent vote in new part of the district with vote in old part of the district to measure personal vote
  - Data: county-level data across US between 1872-1988 (N ¿ 113,000 county-years), town-level data in three states (CT, MA, and NJ) between 1972-1992
  - Treatment: decennial redistricting → incumbents assigned to new districts containing mix of new and old voters
  - DV: Democratic share of two-party vote
    - By comparing vote in new versus old part of the district, can estimate the magnitude of the personal vote (partialing out other factors)
  - IVs: Dummy indicating whether a county is new to a district (treatment), Democratic party strength (average vote share across realignment periods), incumbency status
  - Controls: *normal* vote as average presidential vote in distrtict, by periods

- **Findings:** in all five time periods, House incumbents receive significantly lower vote shares in new versus old counties
  - Large portion of incumbency advantage (50% to 67%) is attributable to personal vote versus challenger quality, has grown over time
    - Not attributable to strategic redistricting; no significant differences in the presidential vote in old vs. new areas
  - The incumbency advantage differs by district partisanship; the more highly partisan a district, the smaller the incumbency advantage
    - Personal vote significantly interacts with *district partisanship*; incumbents develop larger personal votes when more electorally vulnerable
  - Career effects: incumbents continue to do worse in new districts even after serving a full term; incumbency advantage isn't immediate given post-redistricting

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Jamie L. Carson, Erik J. Engstrom, and Jason M. Roberts. 2007. "Candidate Quality, the Personal Vote, and the Incumbency Advantage in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 2 (May): 289–301

- **Key Takeaway:** Historical evidence of a *candidate quality* effect, though limited evidence of a direct incumbency effect

- **Argument:**
  - Court-led apportionment revolution in the 1960s drove increasing importance of candidate quality
    - Court decisions regularized the redistricting process, leading to more coordination on candidate entry decisions
    - District re-drawing to comport with "one-person, one-vote" scrambled existing geographic foundations of party organizations
  - Suggests that electoral system with cartel-like control of ballot access may produce competition in races that would otherwise not be competitive → looking at era of stronger party control over candidate recruitment can provide insight on modern incumbency advantage

  - Late 19th century elections were characterized by high levels of partisanship and electoral competitiveness, high barriers to entry for winning office, strong party caucuses
    - Prior to Australian ballot
  - Think of parties in this era as teams → higher productivity of team members, better output. As a result, incentives to coordinate entry decisions and compelling high quality candidates. Offered "insurance" to push candidates to run

- **Data/Methods:** Examine elections to the US House between 1870 and 1900
  - At this time, House members did not have personal staff or district offices. Strong parties and high levels of electoral competition. Evidence of incumbent advantage in this era of limited resources is strong evidence that Congressional resources are not driving force behind modern incumbency
  - Break incumbency advantage into two components: (1) a direct effect attributable to resources, staff, mail etc and (2) an indirect effect which is the product of the "quality" advantage held by the incumbent's party and the ability of the incumbent to "scare off" challengers
- **Findings:** Find strong positive evidence of a candidate quality effect and some modest evidence of a direct incumbency effect, even in a highly partisan era
  - Strong parties of the era were able to manufacture electoral competition in parts of the country at the cost of corruption
- **Contributions/Related Literature**

Alexander Fouirnaies and Andrew B. Hall. 2014. "The Financial Incumbency Advantage: Causes and Consequences." *The Journal of Politics* 76, no. 3 (July): 711–724

- **Key Takeaway:** Financial advantage is key part of incumbency advantage, largely driven by access-motivated interest groups
- **Argument:** Incumbency causes a large increase in campaign contributions → a large financial incumbency advantage
  - Access-motivated interest groups coordinate intensively on incumbents
- **Data/Methods:** RDD in US House and State Legislatures
  - Elections from 1990 to 2010
  - FEC contribution data
- **Findings:** Incumbency causes a substantial increase in campaign contributions (approx 20-25 point jump in share of total contribution)
  - Access oriented interest groups create a large fraction (around 2/3) of this financial incumbency advantage and are important driver–and beneficiary– of electoral incumbency advantage
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Gary C. Jacobson. 2015. "It's Nothing Personal: The Decline of the Incumbency Advantage in US House Elections." *The Journal of Politics* 77, no. 3 (July): 861–873

- **Key takeaway:** The incumbency advantage fluctuates over time and has recently declined due to increased nationalization of politics

- **Argument:** Incumbency advantage has fallen over the past decade, in line with rise in *party loyalty, straight-ticket voting,* president-centric *nationalization of politics*
  - Democrats have suffered most from resurgence of party-centered elections, as Republicans benefit from uneven distribution of partisans across districts
- **Data/Methods:** replaces lagged Dem vote in Gelman-King model with district vote share for president, to avoid problems with reapportionment/districting
  - Previous approaches: all deliver relatively similar estimates
    - **Sophomore surge:** Erikson (1971); average gain in vote share won by candidates running as incumbents for first time vs in their first election, adjusted for national partisan swing
    - **Retirement slump:** average drop in party's vote from previous election when incumbent doesn't run, adjusted for national partisan swing
    - **Slurge:** average of sophomore and retirement slump
    - **Gelman-King:** regress Dem vote share in time *t* on Dem vote share at *t-1*, party dummy, party of incumbent
- **Findings:** value of incumbency rose from the 1950s-90s, has since trended erratically downward, paralleling changes in party-line voting
  - House incumbency advantage initially gre as partisanship atrophied but has declined as partisanship has strengthened – evidence by (1) party *loyalty*, (2) levels of *ticket splitting*, (3) growing *nationalization* of House elections
    - Trends evidence in both Southern and non-Southern states, with regional differences in trends shrinking in past two decades
  - Incumbents who won in districts favorable to the rival party have decreased
    - Also affects the importance of challenger quality, as name recognition and experience matter less in a party-centered system
    - With an increase in independent funding streams, incumbents cannot hope to win just by deterring high-quality challengers
  - Republican advantage: at House level, party-line voting favors Republicans, who have structural advantages in distribution of partisans across districts (due to *gerrymandering* and *geographic packing* of Democrats)
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** view of incumbency advantage as tied to two electoral developments: (1) diminishing *partisanship* and *party loyalty* in the electorate, (2) decoupling of congressional and presidential elections due to denationalization.
  - Also, the power of incumbencies *varies* over time and is tied to broader political contexts.
  - Link to Chen and Rodden (2013) on "wasted" Democratic votes in urban centers

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Candidate Ideology

Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart III. 2001a. "Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (January): 136

- **Key Takeaway:** congressional candidates primarily espouse ideology associated with the *national party*, rather than moderate their ideology to match *local conditions* – but this relationship has varied over time

- **Argument:** Congressional candidates primarily espouse the ideology associated with their *national party*, rather than moderate their ideology to match *local conditions* – but this relationship has varied over time
  - However, district competition exerts some pressure on candidates to fit with constituents, and pressure has been more acute at some points in history
  - Past predictions of spatial models have failed
    - **Convergence:** minimal evidence of candidate/party converges at either *national* or *district* level – different positions, different behavior in office
    - **Responsiveness:** of candidate to voter preferences; variable across incumbents/challengers, over time, and based on district marginality
    - **Moderation:** candidates should gain electorally from moderation ((Canes-Wrone et al 2002), but find only small benefits of moderation
- **Data/Methods:** estimated policy positions (NPAT) for congressional candidates running in races where both major party candidates had roll-call records from the House
  - Measures:
    - **Candidate positions:** via National Political Awareness Test for 1996
      - From 1874-1996, estimate ideal points for subset of elections where candidates who *currently* have a roll-call record run against a candidate who *will* have a roll-call record or has past record
    - **Voter preferences:** proxied by two-party presidential vote in district
    - **Electoral outcomes:** outcomes of congressional elections
- **Findings:** candidates clearly do not converge, either nationally or at the district level; in every race, the Republican candidate is more conservative
  - Responsiveness: some evidence of responsiveness, with significant increase in conservatism of nominees for more conservative districts (esp. among Democrats)
  - Moderation: after controlling for district ideology, incumbents are more moderate than open-seat candidates, who are more moderate than challengers
    - Ideological responsiveness increased vote share with similar effect size as campaign spending, challenger quality, personal vote
  - Historical trends: ideological stances of candidates are consistently clustered around their parties' averages with substantial divergence between candidates
    - Until 1930s, neither party's nominees were locally responsive – Republicans begin to become responsive in 1934, Democrats in 1960s
      - However, responsiveness declined again starting in the 1980s
    - Since 1960s, candidates gain modest benefit from distinguishing from the national party – but these effects are small or nonexistent in other periods
- **Contribution/Related Literature:** evidence that Democratic and Republican candidates diverge ideologically within each district

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Bertram Johnson. 2010. "Individual Contributions: A Fundraising Advantage for the Ideologically Extreme?" *American Politics Research* 38, no. 5 (September): 890–908

- **Key Takeaway:** Ideologically extreme candidates may benefit from larger numbers of enthusiastic individual donors

- **Argument:** Ideological extremity may give candidates a fundraising advantage in two ways:
  - (1) Extreme candidates may do better than other candidates in the aggregate, raising more funds than moderate peers
  - (2) Extreme candidates might focus their fundraising efforts on extremist contributors, raising a greater proportion of money from them, even as they raise similar aggregate amounts as other candidates
  - Equivalent aggregate amounts raised by extreme and moderate candidates mask different donor coalitions
- **Data/Methods:** Data on House campaigns from 1984 to 2004
- **Findings:** Candidates with policy positions outside the mainstream seem to thrive by raising money from enthusiastic individual donors
  - More extreme incumbents collect a greater proportion of their funds from individual contributions – funds that are more likely to be given by ideologically motivated (rather than access motivated) contributors
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** (1) Tied to polarization literature as individual donors may associated with elite polarization and (2) tied to the money in politics literature as the rise of individual donors is a contrast to the power of big donors

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Danielle M. Thomsen. 2014. "Ideological Moderates Won't Run: How Party Fit Matters for Partisan Polarization in Congress." *The Journal of Politics* 76, no. 3 (July): 786–797

- **Key Takeway:** ideological conformity with the party – **party fit** – influences decisions to run for office; ideological moderation is discouraged
- **Argument:** Party Fit Hypothesis: Ideological conformity with the party's reputation influences decisions to run for office. Two mechanisms:
  - **Self-selection:** Candidates will self-select into electoral contests if they believe they are a good fit for the party and those who do not will abstain
  - **Party recruitment:** party leaders will recruit candidates they deem electorally viable and gatekeep those they do not
- **Data/Methods:** National survey of state legislators
- **Findings:** Party fit matters for candidate emergence
  - Liberal republicans and conservative Democratic state legislators are less likely to launch a congressional bid than those at the ideological poles
  - Abstention of moderates from candidate pool facilitates polarization through replacement
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Linked to literature on elite polarization; both a cause and a consequences. Existing polarization encourages candidates to consider party fit, which leads to fewer moderates. In turn, this only furthers elite polarization.

Andrew B. Hall. 2015. "What Happens When Extremists Win Primaries?" *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 1 (February): 18–42

- **Key Takeaway:** There is an electoral penalty for nominating ideologically extreme candidates

- **Argument:** Primaries are key part of electoral system → electing especially partisan candidates can contribute to growing polarization
- **Data/Methods:** Combine scaling method for estimating candidate positions based on campaign contributions and a RDD in US House elections from 1980-2010
- **Findings:** When an extremist wins a "coin-flip" election over a more moderate candidate, the party's general-election vote share decreases on average by approx. 9-13 points and the probability that the party wins the seat decreases by 35-54 points
  - Electoral penalty is so large that nominating a more extreme primary candidate causes the district's subsequent roll-call representation to reverse, on average, becoming more liberal when extreme Republican is nominated and more conservative when extreme Dem is nominated
  - **NOTE:** this effect is largely among open-seat races, and there is little effect with incumbents
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** While voters may be polarized, some evidence that there is an electoral penalty for ideological extremity

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Chris Tausanovitch and Christopher Warshaw. 2018. "Does the Ideological Proximity Between Candidates and Voters Affect Voting in U.S. House Elections?" *Political Behavior* 40, no. 1 (March): 223–245

- **Key Takeaway:** Candidate ideology appears to have little influence on vote choice, voters largely vote based on PID
- **Argument:** Past work on spatial voting conflate the effect of *voters' ideology*, *candidates' ideology*, and *ideological distance* between voters and candidates
  - Problematic because the preferences of the voter and the position of the candidate can contribute to vote choice irrespective of the distance between them
  - Party loyalty hypothesis: Ideologically extreme voters are more likely to be loyal to the party on their side of the political party spectrum than moderate voters → more extreme voters likely to support party candidates regardless of positions
  - Valence hypothesis: Irrespective of the spatial proximity between voters and candidates, extreme candidates may be more likely to lose because they are more likely to have undesirable valence characteristics
- **Data/Method:** Dataset includes the policy positions, ideal points, and voting decisions of over 75,000 votes in 1100 electoral contests between 2006 and 2012
  - By failing to take account of voters' and candidates' positions separately, previous studies find artificially high levels of candidate-centered spatial voting
- **Findings:** Ideological positions of congressional candidates only have a small association with citizens' voting behavior
  - Citizens cast their votes "as if" based on proximity to parties rather than individual candidates
  - Ideological moderation has a relatively small effect on the vote share of incumbents – unlikely to increase their vote share more than 1 to 2% by taking more moderate positions
- **Contributions/Related Literature:**
  - Additional evidence that the public does not hold politicians accountable for positions they take in Congressional elections

Andrew B. Hall and Daniel M. Thompson. 2018. "Who Punishes Extremist Nominees? Candidate Ideology and Turning Out the Base in US Elections." *American Political Science Review* 112, no. 3 (August): 509–524

- **Key Takeaway:** Electoral penalty for ideologically extreme candidates is largely due to changes in *party turnout*
- **Argument:** Under the standard kinds of utility functions that formal theories of turnout suppose voters posses, voters in the opposite party should have a stronger incentive to turn out when an extremist is nominated because the extremist is so far away from them ideologically
  - Extremists appear to do little to galvanize turnout in their own party
- **Data/Methods:** Combined election data with survey data from the CCES, voter file data from Catalist
- **Findings:** More extreme candidates do worse, electorally, in part because they decrease their party;s share of turnout in the general election
  - As a result, turnout among the parties' bases is a mechanism for the advantage of moderate candidates rather than a phenomenon at odds with selecting candidates of certain ideologies
  - Extreme candidates do worse because they fail to galvanize their own base and instead encourage the opposing party's base to turn out more, on average
  - Moderates *do* perform better electorally, but their success depends largely on their ability to encourage their partisans to turnout out or discourage opposing partisans from turnout out
- **Related Literature/Contributions:** Possibility that voters are tribal partisans does not imply that more moderate candidates cannot outperform extremist candidates

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Nationalization

Marc Trussler. 2021. "Get Information or Get in Formation: The Effects of High-Information Environments on Legislative Elections." *British Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 4 (October): 1529–1549

- **Key Takeaway:**
- **Argument:** Nationalization of elections is partly a function of a changing media environment; prevalence of ticket splitting was possible due to local media strength
  - The national media provides new "considerations" that alter vote choice
    - Using considerations in a Zaller-esque way: whether political behavior is nationalized depends on the considerations an individual has in mind when voting
    - Access to broadband impacts local media $\rightarrow$ negatively impacts the provision of local information through declining subscriptions but also via weaker product that has fewer resources for political coverage
    - When individuals read news online they are more likely to view news about national politics compared to local politics
- **Data/Methods:** Data on the roll-out of broadband Internet to all CDs, leverages within-district design

  - By focusing on changes to the aggregate media environment, avoids pitfalls of self-report measures

- **Findings:** Estimate that a 100 percent increase in the number of broadband internet providers in a district decreases the incumbent's electoral advantage by 2.7 points
  - Areas with faster than expected rates of broadband internet growth experienced a reduced incumbency advantaged → incumbents' electoral margins in those ares more affected by "down-ballot" effects, which reduce an incumbent's personal vote

- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Closely tied to literature on incumbency advantage. Explicitly links changes in the media environment to changes in voting behavior.

Daniel J. Moskowitz. 2021. "Local News, Information, and the Nationalization of U.S. Elections." *American Political Science Review* 115, no. 1 (February): 114–129

- **Key Takeaway:** Exposure to local news is tied to greater rates of split-ticket voting

- **Argument:** Local news can play important role in helping voters evaluate candidates
  - (1) Local television stations provide news coverage relevant to their geographic constrained audiences (2) viewers experience incidental exposure to local news TV coverage (3) viewers have relatively high trust in local news
  - With greater exposure to local news, voters have more information about local candidates, potentially increasing probability of split ticket voting

- **Data/Methods:** Exploit geography of television media markets as a source of quasi-random variation in exposure to local news coverage
  - Survey data from 2012 and 2016 election, compare residents within the same state and election years

- **Findings:**
  - Residents of in-state media markets, who consequently receive greater exposure to local news, demonstrate greater knowledge of their governor and Senators than residents of out-of-state markets
    - Resident of out-of-state markets do not show greater national political knowledge, indicating local news coverage as a source of state-specific knowledge advantages
  - Higher exposure to local news coverage increase probability of casting split presidential-governor tickets by 4-5 points and split president-senator ticket by 2-3 points

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Representation

Concepts

Hanna Fenichel Pitkin. 1967. *The Concept of Representation.* Berkeley: University of California Press

- **Key Takeaway:** What are the ways political representation can be conceptualized? While representation is defined as "the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact," Pitkin says there a four ways we can think about representation in practice: formalistic, descriptive, symbolic, and substantive.

    1. *Formalistic Representation*: the institutional arrangements that precede and initiate representation – thought of in two dimensions: authorization and accountability. Essential asks: what is the institutional position of a representative?
        - Authorization: means by which a representative obtains his or her standing, status, position or office – what is the process by which a representative gains power (e.g., elections) and what are the ways in which a representative can enforce his or her decisions?
        - Accountability: ability of constituents to punish their representative for failing to act in accordance with their wishes (e.g. voting an elected official out of office) or the responsiveness of the representative to the constituents – what are the sanctioning mechanisms available to constituents? is the representative responsive towards his or her constituents' preferences?
    2. *Symbolic representation*: ways that a representative "stands for" the represented — that is, the meaning that a representative has for those being represented – what kind of response is invoked by the representative in those being represented?
    3. *Descriptive representation*: extent to which a representative resembles those being represented – does the representative look like, have common interests with, or share certain experiences with the represented?
    4. *Substantive representation*: activity of representatives—that is, the actions taken on behalf of, in the interest of, as an agent of, and as a substitute for the represented – does the representative advance the policy preferences that serve the interests of the represented?

Jane Mansbridge. 2003. "Rethinking Representation." *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 4 (November): 515–528

- **Four forms of representation**:
    - *Promissory*: during campaigns representatives make promises to constituents, which they then keep or fail to keep
    - *Anticipatory*: representatives focus on what they think their constituents will approve at the next election, not on what they promised to do at the last election
    - *Gyroscopic*: representative looks within, as a basis for action, to conceptions of interest, "common sense," and principles derived in part from the representative's own background
    - *Surrogate*: legislators represent constituents outside their own districts

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Jane Mansbridge. 1999. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent "Yes"." *The Journal of Politics* 61, no. 3 (August): 628–657

- **Key Takeaway:** descriptive representation can promote substantive representation, but benefits are contingent on context $\longrightarrow$ institutional designs should be fluid in nature

- **Argument:** contingent theory, in which disadvantaged groups gain advantages from descriptive representation in at least four contexts
  - Can enhance substantive representation by improving quality of deliberation: *group mistrust* (improves vertical communication between representatives and constituents, via shared lived experiences and cultural shorthand); *uncrystallized interests* (descriptive traits act as a heuristic for shared interests, giving representatives leeway to have horizontal communication with other legislators $\longrightarrow$ when issues not crystallized, easier for legislators from affected group to influence votes on that issue)
  - Can promote goods unrelated to substantive representation: *historical political subordination* (following past exclusion, can send signal about who is "fit" to rule or govern); *past discrimination* (increase polity's de facto legitimacy by making citizens feel as if they were present in deliberations)
- **Descriptive representation**: representatives as typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent, in terms of shared experiences – either visible (e.g., gender/race) or not (e.g., class)
  - Both normative theorists and empirical researchers (e.g., Swain 1993) find limited evidence of link between descriptive, substantive representation
  - Means of descriptive representation: *microcosmic* (assembly as representative of electorate, selected randomly via lottery vs. election – may reduce ability/expertise of legislators); *selective* (institutional design like districting improves descriptive representation of certain groups)
  - Costs of selection: *essentialism* (assumption that members of groups have essential identity that all members share, no outsiders can access); *districting* (concentrating influence in one district may reduce influence in another, see Swain 1993, Lublin 1999); *accountability* (people may erroneously think substantive interests are represented when they are not)
- **Functions of democracy**: groups interests should be represented deliberatively when their perspectives are relevant to a decision, in aggregation when group interests conflict
  - On matters of pure aggregation, other forms of accountability render descriptive representation unnecessary.
  - However, in deliberation, harder for non-descriptive representatives to empathize with a group's experiences – esp. when there is mistrust or a lack of clear interests
- **Relevant Literature:** Contrary to other works (e.g., Swain 1993 or Lublin 1999), suggests that descriptive representation can inform substantive representation – but only in some contexts
  - Lowande, Ritchie, and Lauterbach 2019: women, racial/ethnic minorities, and veterans are more likely to work on behalf of constituents with whom they share identities $\longrightarrow$ shared experiences operate as a critical mechanism for representation; a lack of political consensus is not necessary for substantive representation

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Heinz Eulau and Paul D. Karps. 1977. "The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 2, no. 3 (August): 233

- **Argument:** Objects to Miller and Stokes 1963's use of "congruence" – real quantity of interest is "responsiveness" but the question is responsiveness with regards to what? Thus, posit four that responsiveness may be assessed along several dimensions including government's success in securing particularized benefits (*service responsiveness*), capacity to deliver funding and administrative benefits (*allocation responsiveness*), ability to create bonds of trust and support (*symbolic responsiveness*), and consistency in achieving desired policy outcomes (*policy responsiveness*). Miller and Stokes 1963 and other conflate "congruence" with policy responsiveness.

Robert Weissberg. 1978. "Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 72, no. 2 (June): 535–547

- **Argument**: Most studies of legislative-constituency representation focus exclusively on pairs of representatives and their constituencies (*dyadic representation*). It is possible, however, to think of representation collectively, i.e., to consider the extent to which the legislature as an institution represents the people in their jurisdiction (*collective representation*). When reanalyzing the work of Miller and Stokes 1963, citizens probably get better representation than is suggested by the Miller-Stokes analysis, that the amount of representation may be more a function of institutional arrangements than of electoral control, and that citizen indifference towards many aspects of legislative politics is quite reasonable, given the existence of collective representation.
  - Soroka and Wlezien 2009 notes that *dyadic* representation $\neq$ policy representation $\longrightarrow$ work related to *public policy mood/thermostatic public opinion* constitute *collective* representation

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Measurement

Christopher H. Achen. 1978. "Measuring Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* 22, no. 3 (August): 475

- **Key Takeaway:** There are three ways to measure representation: (1) proximity/congruence, (2) centrism, (3) responsiveness, with representation only evident for responsiveness.
- **Argument:** There are three ways to measure representation: (1) proximity/congruence, (2) centrism, (3) responsiveness, with representation only evident for responsiveness. These measures go beyond just simple correlations of elite and mass opinion.
  - *Proximity*: ideological distance, tied to norms of equality (constituents should count equally, without favoring special groups) $\longrightarrow$ interpret as the mean distance between legislator and constituents
  - *Centrism*: efficiency; extent to which representatives take the average opinion of their constituents, tied to norms of neutrality (no view is given special treatment) $\longrightarrow$ interpret as legislators' distance from middle of constituency
  - *Responsiveness*: how representatives' views in liberal districts compare with those in conservative districts, linked to popular sovereignty $\longrightarrow$ interpret as whether conservative (liberal) jurisdictions represented by conservative (liberal) representatives
- **Data/Methods:** 1958 survey data on elites/masses from Miller and Stokes 1963
- **Findings:** no difference in levels of representation across issue dimensions, though winners tend to be less representative than losers in terms of proximity/centrism
  - Proximity: in all cases, losers in 1958 were closer to their constituencies/party than winners – with unrepresentativeness driven by GOP incumbents
  - Centrism: in all cases, losers were closer to the middle of their constituencies/party than were winners – again, driven by GOP incumbents
  - Responsiveness: representatives are highly responsive to shifts in the balance of constituencies/-party

- **Relevant Literature:** revision to Miller and Stokes 1963; 2/3 of measures showed that losers were more representative than winners in 1958, and civil rights not more representative than other issue domains.
  - Specifically, correlation Miller and Stokes used problematic because it depends on variance of variables, unstandardized (only helpful for comparing two measures analyzed), correlations are relative orderings (correlation of 1, does not necessarily mean most liberal legislator and most liberal constituency share same preferences)

James A Stimson. 2012. "On the Meaning and Measurement of Mood." *Daedalus* 141 (4): 23–34

- **Argument**: Much of political science has sought to put ideology on primarily a unidimensional, left/right scale (with first *economic* dimension on scope of government, second dimension focused *social* issues) – **public policy mood** provides a direct measure of ideology that is based on actual preferences, not inference from self-id. Previous measures using dyad ratios algorithm (similar to PCA but doesn't assume shared variance) assume orthogonality which isn't the case – in reality, most positions on two dimensions are correlated. Policy mood allows the second dimension to rotate, leaving two dimensions with meaningful economic and cultural interpretations
- **Relevant Literature:** Closely related to Wlezien (1995)'s theromstatic model (for notes on thermostatic model, see Soroka and Wlezien 2009– Stimson argues things are a bit more complicated but mood does show it has some relative bearing

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David E. Broockman. 2016. "Approaches to Studying Policy Representation." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (February): 181–215

- **Key Takeaway:** Measures based on issue scaling just measure ideological *consistency*, not policy *preferences* $\longrightarrow$ representation cannot be reliably assessed in the aggregate; legislators may, on a given issue, vote in line with the majority opinion in their districts, but may be seen as extreme if voters across issues hold mixed views. Thus, ideology is not unidimensional – depends issue-by-issue
- **Argument:** methods that aggregate elite and citizen preferences into "ideology" scores misinterpret these scores as summaries of policy preferences vs. consistency $\longrightarrow$ if studies of representation are interested in representation on specific policies, ideological scaling may be an inappropriate tool
- **Data/Methods**: two surveys on SSI, including a panel survey, covering 12 policy issues, with similar survey administered to state legislators focused on a set of issues (health care, gun control, immigration, taxes, abortion, environment, Medicare, LGBTQ+ rights, affirmative action, unions, birth control, education)
- **Findings:** contrary to past studies, legislators are not significantly more extreme than their constituents
  - Macro opinion: if average mass responses, voters appear moderate (average near a four), despite many holding extreme views on at least some questions $\longrightarrow$ averaging voters' views across issues into single index tells how likely voters are to be liberal/conservative on a random issue – but many voters hold both liberal and conservative views
  - Elites and mass public similarly supportive of moderate policies, but elites tend to be more ideologically "consistent" in their policy support $\longrightarrow$ there is heterogeneity in the collective relationship by issue (as in Miller and Stokes 1963)
  - More informed citizens are actually more moderate on a given issue – but they just better know "what goes with what" (exhibit more ideological constraint)

- **Relevant Literature:** Response to studies of representation based on "ideal point" estimation or other issue scaling techniques (e.g., Bafumi and Herron 2010); critiques measurement error response to Converse 1964 (e.g., Ansolabehere et al. 2008; Achen 1976) – finds strong intra-issue correlations over time (R = 0.56), but not inter-issue (R = 0.13), even without correcting for error

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Substantive Representation & Policy Responsiveness

Responsiveness

Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 57, no. 1 (March): 45–56

- **Key Takeaway:** Members have imperfect info about constituent preferences and citizens have minimal awareness of members' voting records; overall, responsiveness varies across issues
- **Argument:** There are three models of representation: (1) instructed delegate, (2) trustee (Burkean), and (3) responsible national parties – which vary across issues. For there to be influence, need three things: (1) roll-call votes either fit own views or perceived district views, (2) attitudes/perceptions correspond to district's actual opinion, (3) constituency takes policy views into account when choosing a rep
  - Normative models: instructed delegate (representatives should solely serve as mouthpieces for local constituency), trustee (representatives serve interests vs. will of constituency, so shouldn't be mandated to follow constituent opinion), responsible national parties (representatives are responsible to a national vs. local constituency – implement a national program if elected)
- **Data/Methods:** in 1958, interviewed incumbent member, opponent, sample of constituents across a sample of districts (N = 116) $\longrightarrow$ goal is to examine correlation between elite and constituent attitude scores
- **Findings:** very different levels of policy congruence across issue domains – considerable agreement on social welfare, minimal agreement on foreign affairs, strong agreement on civil rights
  - Models: instructed-delegate for civil rights (influence via perceived district opinion), responsible-party for social welfare (strong partisan polarization), Burkean for foreign affairs (public interest beholden to executive branch)
  - Election winners more representative than losers on matters of social welfare.
  - Members have imperfect info about constituent preferences, and citizens have minimal awareness of members' voting records.
- **Critiques:** According to Erikson 1978, this study severely underestimated extent of congressional representation, as correlations attenuated by sampling error (small, non-random samples within districts; attenuation bias) $\longrightarrow$ if using simulated opinion, there is fairly strong correlation in roll-call behavior, showing votes reflect both representatives' personal attitudes and perceptions of constituent views. Achen 1977 also critiques correlation coefficient, saying constituencies are very different from each other on an issue dimension, large correlations will result even when voters are not particularly sensitive to that dimension. Large correlations can occur when representatives are distant from their constituents; small correlations can happen when they are near – why Achen 1978 suggests thinking about representation in a regression framework.
- **Relevant Literature:** connections to Behavior literature on information and ignorance (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964) $\longrightarrow$ most Americans are uninformed about politics but have thoughts about broad evaluative dimensions yet, politicians think their records matter

James A. Stimson, Michael B. Mackuen, and Robert S. Erikson. 1995. "Dynamic Representation." *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 3 (September): 543–565

- **Research Question:** Are *collective* policy outcomes responsiveness to changes in *aggregate* public opinion?
- **Argument:** Policy responds dynamically to public opinion change – though responsiveness varies across institutions, following constitutional design. Public officials are able to sense movement in public opinion and alter behavior in response ⟶ policy changes because of election turnover (*selection*) and rational anticipation (*adaptation*)
  - Mechanisms: elections (change composition of government ⟶ new policy); anticipation (policymakers calculate future electoral ramifications of current views and act accordingly)
  - Assumptions: representatives are rational, well-informed, and in consensus regarding the nature of public opinion movement (link to Kingdon 1989)
    1. Rationality: only future elections influence calculations – but electoral outcomes are highly uncertain
    2. Information: public preferences are rarely crystallized, but actors can ascertain trends in global preferences (link to Zaller 2012)
    3. Consensus: politicians and other elites can decide on the direction of the public mood
  - Level of analysis: macro-scale; about electorates/governments vs. voters/representatives
- **Data/Methods:** dynamic model with multiple indicators, multiple exogenous causal variables (DYMIMIC), as DV is both unobserved, a function of unobserved past values; DV is direction of policy change (using interest group ratings, roll-calls, presidential liberalism, Supreme Court liberalism) and IV is (public opinion using policy mood, election outcomes)
- **Findings:** public opinion seems to influence public policy (fairly quickly), through both elections and rational anticipation, but representation varies across institutions
  - Presidency: representation operates via both rational anticipation, elections
  - House: effect of public opinion operates solely through rational anticipation
  - Senate: stronger relationship than in the House, tied to electoral responsiveness (and particularly turnover and introduction of new members)
  - Supreme Court: decisions modestly vary in response to public opinion, but effects are much smaller than in Congress
- **Critiques:** Similar to other critiques of public mood, it's a blunt tool for measuring response – does it vary by the issue area in question.
- **Relevant Literature:** Builds on policy mood measure (Stimson); Caughey and Warshaw (2018, 2022) suggest that responsiveness is more gradual

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Stuart N. Soroka and Christopher Wlezien. 2009. *Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public Opinion, and Policy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

- **Research Question:** Do policymakers respond to public preference signals? Does the public adjust its signals in response to what policymakers do?
- **Argument:**

- **Thermostatic Model** (Wlezien 1995): when policy increases (decreases), the preference for more policy will decrease (increase), other things being equal; policy will respond positively to public preferences for more spending, shifting policy upward (downward) when the public prefers more (less) policy $\longrightarrow$ can vary across both *time* and *space* (geography); primarily a model of *negative feedback*
  - Most people do not have specific preferred levels of policy in most areas (precise opinions don't exist in most domains, policy often too complex) $\longrightarrow$ more/less question regularly asked and require less thought – helped by the fact that parties structure policy alternatives in simple ways (Jackman and Sniderman 2002), citizens can uses cues (Lupia and McCubbins 1998), and parties/politicans have strong incentive to provide cues (Chong and Druckman 2007)
  - Policy never ends up matching exactly what the public wants – largely a function of which party controls government
  - Adds in this work that the thermostatic model will vary based on both *issue salience* (more people will respond to policy, elites have greater incentive to heed public opinion) and *institutional characteristics* (focus on role of openness of mass media, presences of political competition – determines ease/availability of receiving info about what government does; division of power – when more vertical like with federalism, more difficult for public to gauge and react to policy change, dampens responsiveness)
- Relies on three key possibilities: (1) citizens don't actually need much information to have sufficiently informed preferences and info easy to get; (2) maybe not all individuals informed about policy, but a sufficient number are; (3) responsiveness of individuals can differ across issues (depends on what is paid attention) $\longrightarrow$ all that matters is that the number of people who pay attention is large enough to signal policymakers

- **Findings:** Relying on public opinion data in US, England, and Canada, finds evidence that public responsiveness varies across policy domains (depending on salience and level of federalism) and that public responsiveness directed less toward policy decisions (appropriations) and more toward actual policy outputs (outlays) – public's preferences are informed by *what government actually does*, which depends on both policy decisions and implementation. However, responses often register too quickly, opinion changes before consequences of decisions hit $\longrightarrow$ simply wait for the budget process to complete and then anticipate outcomes, assuming that increases in spending will have predictable effects. On policy side, as salience declines, so too does representation. Evidence for responsiveness holds in the aggregate – not much heterogeneity among groups

- **Relevant Literature:** Provides further evidence of "parallel publics" (Page and Shapiro 1992); extends Wlezien 1995

M. Gilens. 2005. "Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69, no. 5 (January): 778–796

- **Key Takeaway:** There is a moderately strong relationship between what the public wants and what the government does, albeit with a strong bias toward the status quo. However, when Americans with different income levels differ in their policy preferences, actual policy outcomes strongly reflect the preferences of the most affluent but bear virtually no relationship to the preferences of poor or middle-income Americans.

- **Argument:** Previous research, suggests a fairly high level of correspondence between constituency preferences and legislators' behavior, a more modest match between Americans' specific policy preferences and specific government policies (with stronger correspondence on more salient issues), and

a strong aggregate relationship between broadly defined "public mood" and broad measures of government activity. Little work looks at preference/policy relationship across social groups (with the exception of Bartels)

- **Data/Methods:** 1,935 survey questions that have been asked to national samples 1981-2002 (using iPoll/Roper database); match those up to policy decisions across issues and government bodies (e.g., presidency, Congress, Supreme Court)
- **Findings:**
  - Status quo bias: predicted probability of policy change occurring among policies favored by 10 percent of Americans is only .17; proposals that receive overwhelming support among the public have a less than even chance of being enacted; among proposed changes with 90 percent support, predicted probability of adoption is only .46
  - Strength of relationship between preferences and policy outcomes not only increases with each step up the income ladder but does so at an increasing rate $\longrightarrow$ wealth accumulates sway
  - When holding divergent views from the affluent, both poor and middle-class citizens experience low responsiveness
  - Greater attentiveness to politics that characterizes highly educated Americans does not seem to explain the stronger association between preferences and policy outcomes among affluent than less well-off
- **Critique:** Little discussion of mechanism – why is it the case that affluent experience higher levels of responsiveness? Probably left to previous and future research about how affluent can exert their influence
- **Relevant Literature:** At the state-level, both Hertel-Fernandez 2019 and Grumbach 2022 show how affluent/corporate interests can exert influence over policy outcomes. See *Money in Politics* section for some related notes.

Thomas L. Brunell and Justin Buchler. 2009. "Ideological representation and competitive congressional elections." *Electoral Studies* 28, no. 3 (September): 448–457

- **Key Takeaway:** Competitive elections reduce ideological representation and voter trust in government
- **Argument:** Competitive elections are paradoxically bad for democracy by increasing the ideological disagreements between legislators and constituents, reducing approval and trust in government
  - Voters are happiest when the candidates of their choice when, as a result express more positive attitude's toward the incumbent, trust in government, and approval of Congress
    - Non-competitive elections promote representation by creating ideologically homogeneous constituencies with tight ideological clustering around the Representative, minimizing distance between Rep and constituents
  - Competitive elections, on the other hand, maximize voter dissatisfaction because large portions of the electoral are left disappointed in the result
- **Data/Methods:** NES cumulative data file 1948-2004. Calculate mean square ideological distance between representative and constituent
  - Measure of Ideological Distance:

    - ∗ **Distance 1:** Absolute value of difference between respondent self-placement and placement of rep on 7-point scale
    - ∗ **Distance 2:** Anchor "extremely liberal/conservative" self-placement to Nominate scores of -/+ 1 and calculate distance between this score and Reps actual NOMINATE score
    - ∗ **Distance 3:** Anchor extremes to 1st/99th percentile NOMINATE score for 1952-2006
- **Findings:** Mean squared ideological distance between Reps and their constituents is greater when elections are competitive, indicating that constituents are, on average, better represented when elections are not competitive
- **Contributions/Related Literature**: By making elections more competitive, run the risk of reducing ideological representation, eroding trust in government. This article is a **hot take.** Seems like it takes a rather myopic view of representation
    - In a world of non-competitive elections, there will always be a portion of the district that *never* gets represented, while in competitive elections there is always a chance they will
    - Does not acknowledge broader societal implications of created clustered of ideologically homogeneous voters across the country

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Elite Positioning & Constituent Response

Brandice Canes-Wrone, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan. 2002. "Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting." *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 1 (March): 127–140

- **Key Takeaway:** Incumbents receive significantly lower vote share the more they vote with the extreme of their party
- **Argument:** Voters hold representatives accountable for policy decisions; electoral performance is strongly related to roll-call voting, even after controlling for other factors. This is the roll-call ideological extremity hypothesis: increasing partisan extremity results in decreased vote share, probability of re-election (tied to Downsian convergence)
- **Data/Methods:** Regress incumbent vote share on range of factors (both for ind. elections, pooling across elections between 1956-1996/1980-1996) where the dependent variable is two-party vote share, independent variable is ADA scores (proportion of liberal positions on set of votes on key issues; also use DW-NOMINATE). Other controls include presidential vote, challenger quality, spending, freshman, member of president's party.
- **Findings:** In all elections, incumbents receive significantly lower vote share the more they vote with the extreme of their party (about a 1-3pp effect for 25-point shift in ADA score, kind of small, but on par with other vars) $\longrightarrow$ members with more moderate legislative voting records are more likely to be "safe," but even safe legislators face a lower prob. of re-election the more extreme their voting is with their own party
- **Critiques:** Issues with ADA scores (see Snyder 1992). In a different context - in a more polarized Congress, evidence of smaller effects (see Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2018). Instead of responding to the ideological positions of individual legislators, voters evaluate their proximity to the *parties*
- **Relevant Literature:** even if voters are rationally ignorant of members' policy actions (Downs 1957), members are still accountable for their legislative voting; replicates previous work that focuses on a single election or unrepresentative sample of legislators (e.g., Jacobson 1996, Ansolabehere et al. 2001)

- Fowler and Hall 2016: because there's so much *divergence* (regardless of the salience of the issue in question), members of Congress, on average, do not closely represent the preferences of the median voters in their districts $\longrightarrow$ what do we classify as *extreme* then? members rarely have true "moderate" records because of the party pressures they face (Aldrich, Cox and McCubbins), they cater to subconstituencies (Clinton 2006), have systematically different perceptions of constituent opinion (Broockman and Skovron 2018), put differential weight on the opinions of different constituents (Butler and Dynes 2015)
- Carson et al. 2010: rather than focusing on ideological extremeity, focuses on party loyalty/unity (tendency of a member to vote with his or her party on salient issues that divide the two major parties) and finds that party loyalty on divisive votes can indeed be a liability for incumbent House members $\longrightarrow$ voters are not punishing elected representatives for being too ideological; they are punishing them for being too *partisan*
- Brady, Han, and Pope 2007: relative to general-election voters, *primary* voters favor more ideologically *extreme* candidates – in response, congressional candidates position themselves closer to the primary electorate; primary losses mostly occur among ideologically moderate legislators but these losses are strikingly rare; candidates learn, over time, to position themselves close enough to primary constituency to prevent defeat
- Snyder and Ting 2003: Develops theoretical model describing how legislators have two tools to communicate their preferences: party labels and roll call votes. Each legislator must tailor their votes to to their district to forestall reelection challenges from the opposing party $\longrightarrow$ In equilibrium, nonsincere voting records occur mostly in moderate districts, where extreme incumbents are vulnerable to challenges from centrist candidates; in those districts, most extreme legislators may choose to vote sincerely and retire rather than compile a moderate voting record $\longrightarrow$ both roll call scores and candidate types responsive to district type

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Joseph Bafumi and Michael C. Herron. 2010. "Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 3 (August): 519–542

- **Key Takeaway:** Extreme legislators are replaced with other extreme, but opposing, legislators, thereby "leapfrogging over their moderate constituents
- **Argument:** lack of congruence between American voters and legislators because of *leapfrog representation*
  - Leapfrog representation: when a legislator is replaced by a new member of the opposite party, one extremist is replaced by an opposing extremist, leaving a moderate public underrepresented
- **Data/Methods:** CCES combined with legislator voting records from 190-110th Congress
  - Ideal points: array voters/legislators in common space, using bridging methods
    - **Congress:** binary roll-call votes between 2005-08, linking House and Senate via convergence committee votes
    - **President:** Bush's positions published in *Congressional Quarterly*
    - **Voters:** 2006 CCES where respondents asked to take positions on actual roll-call votes
  - Model: uni dimensional Bayesian IRT, with bridging questions to enable comparisons between three sets of actors
- **Findings:** members of the House and Senate are more extreme than state median voters and state median *partisan* voters – less than 10% of voters appear more extreme

  - Donors: proxy political engagement using political donations; donors are always better represented than non-donors
  - Leapfrog representation: when representatives are replaced, go from excessively conservative to excessively liberal (or vice versa) – even compared to partisans
    * These effects aggregate beyond individual races, such that the median member was too conservative pre-2006 election and too liberal after
  - Chamber differences: leapfrogging only happened in the House, not the Senate

- **Contributions/Related Literature:** tied to other work on the extent of congruence between representatives, district residents
  - Broockman 2016: suggests the model isn't actually delivering measures of *extremism* but instead estimating *consistency* – voters and their representatives are far more congruent than these scaling techniques would indicate
  - Downs 1957: candidate competition does **not** → converge to district median, either at the individual or aggregate level
  - Erikson, MacKuen, Stimson 1989: aggregate public opinion corresponds to representation, but balances when adjust too much

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Mia Costa. 2021. "Ideology, Not Affect: What Americans Want from Political Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* 65, no. 2 (April): 342–358

- **Key Takeaway:** Voters care about policy – partisan affect is not everything when it comes to representation
- **Argument:** Argue that people still want representation based on issues, not just partisan affect
  - While social-psychological theories about partisan identities may explain how people view elite members of the opposite party, does not mean they want elites invoking partisan identities if it comes at the expense of their policy positions or quality service responsiveness
- **Data/Methods:** Conjoint experiments
- **Findings:** Affective partisan rhetoric is not rewarded and, in most cases, significantly harms citizens' evaluations of legislators
  - Remains true when people evaluate a legislator of their own party and even among primary voters
  - Positive in-party sentiments are evaluated more favorably than negative, out-party ones
  - Overall, people rate representatives the highest when they share their issue positions and priorities
- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Pushes back against affective polarization narratives – people do still seem to care about policy representation, not all "group attachments"

Stephen Ansolabehere and Philip Edward Jones. 2010. "Constituents' Responses to Congressional Roll-Call Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 3 (June): 583–597

- **Key Takeaway:** voters respond strongly to substantive representation, in terms of their perceptions of members' voting on important bills in Congress ⟶ constituents have the capacity to (and actually do) hold members of Congress accountable for their roll-call votes – they have individual preferences and beliefs about how their representative voted.

- **Argument:** Aggregate election returns suggest that elections ensure policy representation, and representatives whose voting records deviate from district partisanship lose elections (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002) – findings are hard to square with survey data, which suggests that the American public just uses party ID as a cue for voting (e.g., Michigan model)
- **Data/Methods:** two national surveys (CCES) in 2005, 2006
  - Issues: asked about public preferences, perceptions of legislators' votes on a wide range of issues (e.g., partial birth abortion, stem cell research, gay marriage)
  - Model: instrumental variables, using actual vote as an instrument for constituents' perceptions of the vote – DVs: (1) accuracy of voter perceptions, (2) vote choice/job approval; IV: (1) is just descriptive, but on (2) IV is perceived agreement (perceived agreement is constructed by comparing the average number of liberal/conservative positions of respondents, legislators)
- **Findings:** when asked, most people were able to articulate preferences on roll-calls
  - Accuracy: when they offered judgments of how their legislators voted, respondents were fairly accurate (75% correct), and when inaccurate, they tended to perceive representatives as too moderate $\longrightarrow$ actual vote predicts respondent perceptions, even after controlling for party ID – not just about ability to take cues
  - Accountability: perceived agreement with roll-call voting records strongly predicts job approval, voting for incumbent $\longrightarrow$ party ID and ideology have independent effects beyond policy – not just issue voting, but strong evidence that some issue voting exists
  - Summary: nearly all respondents have preferences on important bills in Congress, and they hold relatively accurate beliefs about roll-call votes, which are used to hold legislators accountable.
- **Critiques:** Unclear how citizens learn information about roll-call votes (likely to be media, campaigns – not just random guess)

Stephen Ansolabehere and Shiro Kuriwaki. 2022. "Congressional Representation: Accountability from the Constituent's Perspective." *American Journal of Political Science* 66, no. 1 (January): 123–139

- **Key Takeaway:** Constituents hold representatives accountable: increases in issue agreement improve net approval of legislators but because congressional districts are heterogeneous, effect of issue agreement is smaller at district-level, which accounts for discrepancy between micro and macro studies. Overall, although the public is somewhat biased toward copartisan representatives, on the whole it sees Congress correctly. Second, constituents hold their representatives accountable for their votes on key legislative decisions.
- **Argument:**



Figure 2: Accountability from the Constituent's Perspective (Ansolabhere and Kuriwaki 2022)

  - Important to differentiate between *actual* and *perceived* issue agreement. Focus on the dyadic relationship between a constituent and his representative and assume that, if a constituent can and does hold his representative accountable, he does so regardless of whether the legislator is pivotal – this is very similar to what Miller and Stokes 1963 model.

- **Data/Methods:** CES Data on roll call votes from 2006 to 2018; survey experiments fielded in CES
- **Findings:**
  - Consistent with past work, find that an individual constituent's *actual* agreement between representatives leads to positive evaluations of that representative
    - Also measure agreement on specific votes; this also shapes evaluations even after control for PID an ideology suggesting individual votes matter
  - Most people have a belief about how their representatives vote, and among those who provided an answer, most have the correct belief about *how* their representative voted on specific legislative questions
    - Slippage takes two forms: (1) uncertainty (2) misperceptions
  - Perceived issue agreement has independent effects on approval and vote choice
  - Tension between individual-level and district-level effects of issue accountability are due to the aggregation of individual overs to the district levels
    - Districts are heterogeneous, leading to lower than expected levels of aggregate congruence
- **Contributions/Related Literature:**
  - Reexamines work of Miller and Stokes 1963 and finds that public is in fact capable of having the knowledge necessary to hold representatives accountable – "In the end, were Miller and Stokes wrong? No, they simply did not have a powerful enough microscope."
  - Contrasts with theories suggesting most voters are largely ignorant about legislative decisions and must rely on elites and party labels for representation (Bawn et al. 2012) $\longrightarrow$ thus argue representational failure cannot rely on the premise that individual voters are unable to hold legislators accountable on issues
  - Very closely connected to Ansolabehere and Jones 2010 who argue that voters do respond to substantive representation and can hold members accountable for roll-call votes

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Daniel M. Butler and Adam M. Dynes. 2016. "How Politicians Discount the Opinions of Constituents with Whom They Disagree." *American Journal of Political Science* 60, no. 4 (October): 975–989

- **Key Takeaway:** Politicians systematically discount the opinions of constituents with whom they disagree – this "disagreement discounting" is a contributing factor to ideological incongruence. Public officials rationalize this behavior by assuming that constituents with opposing views are less informed about the issue – cannot be explained by politicians' desire to favor opinions of copartisans/likely voters.
- **Argument:** Most explanations for ideological incongruence focus on electoral/legislative institutions but this assumes politicians learn/use constituent preferences in an unbiased way $\longrightarrow$ literature on motivated reasoning (Lodge and Taber 2013) would suggest that this is not the case (see also Iyengar et al. 2012's relevant discussion of affective polarization). Similar to Miller and Stokes 1963, think that representative views mediate effect of constituent views on roll call votes but that this happens in a more systematic way (*disagreement discounting*)
- **Data/Methods**: Survey experiments on both state legislators and elected municipal officials
- **Findings:** Elites likely to engage is disagreement discounting on both established and new, partisan and nonpartisan issues. Elected officials are expected to defend their position to their constituents on a regular basis as part of being a representative (Fenno 1978). Very act of having to their position

on an issue makes individuals more likely to discount the preferences of those who disagree with their position on that issue – this is striking since elected officials expected to defend position to constituents on a regular basis (Fenno 1978; Grimmer 2013)

- **Critique:** Little discussion of the practical effect – does this mean representatives exhibit less *policy* responsiveness? *Allocative* responsiveness?
- **Relevant Literature:** Evidence from policymaking (e.g., Kingdon 1981) that elites more willing to ignore opinion if public have less intense views; representatives more extreme than their constituents (Bafumi and Herron 2010)

David E. Broockman and Christopher Skovron. 2018. "Bias in Perceptions of Public Opinion among Political Elites." *American Political Science Review* 112, no. 3 (August): 542–563

- **Key Takeaway:** Politicians maintain systematic misperceptions of constituency opinion that may to breakdowns in dyadic representation
- **Argument:** Biases in politicians' information environments lead politicians to systematically misperceive constituency opinion which contribute to breakdowns in dyadic representation. Republicans and Democrats asymmetric in their likelihood to participate in some political acts (e.g., contacting members of Congress). This creates an informational environment that is so unbalanced, that "errors" do not just cancel out as advocates of collective representation claim (Weissberg 1978)
- **Data/Method**: 2014 National Candidate Study to 1,858 state legislators as well as candidates in election – asked to estimate constituency opinion on items being asked in 2014 CES
- **Findings:** In 2012 and 2014, state legislative politicians from both parties dramatically overestimated constituents' support for conservative policies, a pattern consistent across methods, districts, and states. Republicans drive much of this overestimation. Overestimation may arise due to biases in who contacts politicians $\longrightarrow$ Democratic politicians hear from Republican constituents somewhat disproportionately, Republican politicians hear from Republican constituents very disproportionately. Overall, very strong evidence of *responsiveness* in spite of gaps in *congruence*.
- **Critique:** Not only do politicians incorrectly estimate opinion, but do they incorrectly estimate the size and composition of these groups as well? To what extent do legislators consciously respond only to certain parts of their constituencies, or to what extent do they try to represent everyone equally but perceive their district in a biased way?
- **Relevant Literature:** Builds on existing work suggesting that politicians want to be congruent with constituency opinion (e.g., Butler and Nickerson 2011)[2] in line with median voter theorems (Downs 1957) and findings of responsiveness to public opinion (Erikson et al. 2002); reminiscent of Miller and Stokes 1963 and Fenno 1978 who said representatives know constituents mostly through letters, meetings

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Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Matto Mildenberger, and Leah C. Stokes. 2019. "Legislative Staff and Representation in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 113, no. 1 (February): 1–18

- **Key Takeaway:** senior legislative staffers are key mechanism leading to misperception of public opinion

2. Butler and Nickerson 2011: providing legislators with information about public opinion in their districts causes them to cast more votes that are congruent with their district's median voter.

- **Argument:** Senior staff have very skewed perceptions of public attitudes, driving member misperceptions of public opinion
  - Egocentric bias and interest group contact, especially with conservative groups and businesses, may drive some of the mist-match between staffer perceptions and actual opinion
- **Data/Methods:** Survey of senior legislative staffers in Congress merged with mass public opinion data on five policies: ACA, gun control, carbon pollution restrictions, infrastructure, and minimum wage
  - List experiment
- **Findings:** Across all five issues, staffers do not accurately identify their district or state's preferences and often overestimate their constituents' conservatism
  - Stagger personal policy preferences and interest group contact correlate most strongly with the opinion-representation gap
  - Staffers whose personal opinions deviated from their constituents' opinions were less accurate in their estimates of district and state preferences
  - Staffers who reporter greater contact with corporate and ideologically conservative interest groups over liberal ones were less likely to get their constituent preferences right
  - 45% of staffers report having changed their opinion about legislation after a group gave their member a contribution. Also more likely to interpret communication from businesses as being more representative of their constituent preferences than from ordinary voters
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Highlights an important link between legislators and their constituents – **staffers**. These unelected employees also have significant misperceptions of constituent opinion that can bias representation. Linked to Broockman and Skovron (2018) (see behavior notes)
  - Consequences for quality of representation and the public's ability to influence legislator behavior

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Descriptive Representation

Race

Carol M. Swain. 1993. *Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress.* Lanham, Md: University Press of America

- **Key Takeaway:** efforts to advance black interests do not require increasing the number of black representatives in Congress
- **Argument:** majority-minority districts not required for representatives to attend to the interests of minority groups $\longrightarrow$ efforts to maximize descriptive representation actually may negatively impact substantive representation by increasing the likelihood of electing Republican in districts from which black voters were drawn $\longrightarrow$ because Republicans represent black voters worse than Democrats, concentration of black voters into a small number of districts may have unintended consequences.
- **Data/Methods:** voting behavior in the 100th Congress
  - District characteristics:
    - DV: substantive representation, measured by interest group scores (LCCR, AFL-CIO indices)

    - * IV: party of representative, district characteristics (region, % urban, % black) – notably not race of representative
  - Race of representative:
    - * DV: substantive representation, measured by interest group scores (LCCR, AFL-CIO indices)
    - * IV: race of representative
  - Interviews: uses a Fenno 1977/78-style of interviewing, participant observation
    - * Six types of representation: (1) black rep in historically black districts, (2) black rep in newly black districts, (3) black rep in mixed district, (4) black rep in majority white districts, (5) white rep in minority-black districts, (6) white rep in majority-black districts

- **Findings:** party and region are the best predictors of responsiveness to black interests in voting behavior
  - No statistical difference between positions of white, black representatives, after controlling for party
  - Advancing black interests does not depend on the number of black representatives; white representatives (esp. Democrats) may also cultivate biracial policy coalitions
  - Bottom line: challenge to proposition that only African-Americans can represent black interests; both black and white representatives need to effectively form coalitions to serve the interests of their constituents
  - Critiques racial redistricting (creating majority-minority districts) in favor of emphasis on black representation of majority-white districts

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Charles Cameron, David Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?" *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 4 (December): 794–812

- **Key Takeaway:** trade-off between increasing number of minority office-holders, enacting legislation to further interests of minority community
- **Argument:** concentrated minority districts may dilute minority influence in surrounding areas, leading to election of representatives unsympathetic to minority concerns $\longrightarrow$ descriptive representation can actually decrease substantive representation at an aggregate level
- **Data/Methods:** non-linear estimation techniques to simulate districting strategies that maximize substantive representation of minority groups
  - DV: (1) representation; representative's support for minority issues (based on roll-call voting scores), (2) election; probability of electing a black Democrat, white Democrat, or Republican
  - IV: percent of black voters in a district (based on VAP)
- **Findings:** trade-off exists between descriptive and substantive representation, but with different effects depending on region
  - Districting plans designed to maximize descriptive representation concentrate minority voters more than needed to maximize substantive representation $\longrightarrow$ effects are primarily electoral vs. representative (more minority voters influences the type of representative, not their voting behavior) so majority-minority districts not needed – and, in fact, to avoid Republican surges, should seek less concentration of black voters

  - Regional effects: in South, optimize substantive representation by creating concentrated districts of minority voters $\longrightarrow$ outside South, maximize substantive representation by dividing minority voters equally across districts

- **Relevant Literature:** contradicts previous theories assuming close connection between descriptive/substantive representation $\longrightarrow$ Lublin 1999 critiques article but does not disagree with core conclusion, argues against conclusion that substantive representation is maximized in the South via concentrating black voters, given the possibility of more Republicans elected in adjacent districts

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David Lublin. 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?"." *American Political Science Review* 93, no. 1 (March): 183–186

- **Key Takeaway:** response to Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996, arguing that the trade-off between descriptive and substantive representation is likely to be strongest in the South – pessimistic view on the effect of descriptive representation on substantive representation, particularly in areas where minority voters are heavily concentrated

- **Argument:** Test two claims: (1) racial redistricting (creating majority-minority districts) is vital to the election of African-Americans; (2) trade-off between descriptive and substantive representation is larger in South, due to heavier concentration of black voters in South

- **Data/Methods:** re-examination of Cameron et al.'s key findings

- **Findings:** Cameron et al. ignore the role of Latinos on the election of African Americans, meaning majority-minority districts may still be necessary (but black VAP not a complete measure)

  - Indirect impacts of racial redistricting: "racial redistricting not only changes the aggregation of seats into votes but also indirectly boosts the Republican share of votes and seats" (183) because removing black voters from white districts makes election of Republicans more likely in surrounding areas, given likelihood of nominating higher-quality candidates

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David T. Canon. 1999. *Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts.* University of Chicago Press, October

- **Key Takeaway:**

- **Argument:** While some argue that there are monolithic black interests that can be represented by an Black representative, argues that process of candidate emergence and political campaigns show that there factions within Black community that produce representatives with different ideological backgrounds and visions of representing Black interests. Broadly, Black members of Congress differ in their approaches to racial politics can either (1) deemphasize racial aspect of issues (deracialization); (2) balance the interests of black and white constituents (commonality/balancing); (3) see themselves primarily as representatives of black voters (difference).

  - Views of redistricting: *demand-side* focuses on voters and elections (e.g., incumbency safety, partisan bias, racial bloc voting, political geography and demographics, vote dilution, and runoff primaries); supply-side examines the supply of candidates-how individual politicians respond to the changing electoral context imposed by new district lines and how, in turn, their decisions shape the electoral choices and outcomes in a given district.

* Supply-side: type of racial representation depends on racial composition of candidate pool in Democratic party – if only black candidates run, then new-style candidate wins; if mix white and traditional black candidates run, then traditional black candidate wins $\longrightarrow$ who runs dictates the type of substantive representation minority constituents will receive



Figure 3: Model of the Impact of Supply-Side Effects on the Outcome of Elections in Black Congressional Districts (Canon 1999)

- Views of representation: color-blind perspective argues (1) sympathetic white Democrats were hurt by the creation of black majority districts; (2) whites are just as able to represent black interests as blacks
- "Politics of differences" (seeking to represent own group) versus "politics of commonality" (seeking to represent all groups)
  * Descriptive representation important if inherent differences are in terms of identities and shared experiences rather than ideas and opinions – if so, white politicians cannot credibly represent black constituents
  * Opposite view is "color-blind"/commonality perspective that race is no longer central to American politics thus while there be some ideological differences, politicians should seek common ground
  * Canon argues for a middle-ground "balancing approach" since other two perspectives: (1) presents styles of representation too starkly, (2) characterizes positions of different racial constituencies as nonoverlapping, (3) focuses on mean positions of members and constituency rather than variances in both.
- Arguments for descriptive representation: role models (Davidson and Grofman 1994); building bonds of trust and communication (Mansbridge 1996) though trust and responsiveness won't prevail if constituent interests heterogeneous (1997)
- Two ways substantive content of racial representation play out in districts with substantial minority population (and interact with the race of the member): (1) how black and white representatives allocate their time to the racially diverse constituencies, in terms of both issue

emphasis and who they spend time with, and (2) whether the member views racial representation through the lens of the politics of commonality or the politics of difference

  - In Congress, supply-side theory predicts that moderate blacks who cultivate biracial themes and issues positions are expected to serve in leadership, seeking committee assignments that aid both white and black constituents, address issues in language of commonality, engage in strong constituency services for both black and white constituencies

- **Data/Methods:** At the individual level, strong confirmation of the supply side theory by demonstrating significant differences across types of representation style. Commonality more likely to serve in leadership, more moderate, less likely to emphasize race. Larger differences between black and white representatives in style

- **Findings:**

  - Black majority districts produce better representation of black interests while also representing white voters
  - Congressional Black Caucus (CBC): while initially weak and ineffective due to small size and regional bias, moderates have urged the organization to work within Democratic caucus and within party leadership $\longrightarrow$ become a powerful voting block
    * Increased diversity has not undermined CBC strength – still delivers key votes necessary to shape and pass legislation; gaining seats on committees, especially important ones; members are gaining positions of leadership
    * As a whole, roll call votes suggest that deck is *not* stacked against minority interests: vote margins across bill categories similar, substantive racial bills had more hearings and more likely to get out of committee, bills with black sponsor 60% more likely to become law
  - No significant differences in committee assignments between difference and commonality members, blacks overall underrepresented in leadership, more racial content in floor speeches of black representatives than white but difference members more than commonality, commonality members have more success on bills they cosponsor which also tend to be less racial
  - Differences in links to constituency: white members don't focus attention newspapers or newsletters on issues of race but are attentive to racial composition of staff and location of district offices (both more symbolic gestures); in districts represented by black members, more coverage of race which is good for deliberative democracy but notably this does *not* mean whites are not represented – most coverage has nothing to do with race, location of offices and constituent service still sufficient to white constituents; commonality members tried to have staffs that "looked like" the district but difference members tried harder to represent black interests

- **Critique:** Roll call analysis has selection bias issues; doesn't incorporate composition of districts as a factor that dictates style of representatives – pretty big factor considering Fenno 1978's emphasis on how members view their district.

- **Relevant Literature:** Broockman 2013 examines extent to which black legislators motivated to advance black interests; Gay 2002 examines emphasis black and white constituents place on descriptive representation; Swain 1993 notes that to better represent black interests, do not necessarily need to increase number of black representatives

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Claudine Gay. 2002. "Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the Relationship between Citizens and Their Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 4 (October): 717

- **Key Takeaway:** Whites and blacks differ in the value they place on descriptive representation. Black constituents place less significance on descriptive representation, although they are more likely to contact black representatives.

- **Argument:** Most research on descriptive representation focuses on policy responsiveness and constituency service, not constituents' perceptions. Given Mansbridges's argument that descriptive representation forms "bonds of trust." Constituents might use race as a low-cost alternative to understand what a representative stands for; might reflect racial group consciousness/racial prejudice; signal of a representatives "natural constituency" that opens up more two-way communication.

- **Data/Methods:** Respondents from 1980-1998 ANES producing a set of 8,941 respondents (785 of whom have Black representatives).

- **Findings:** On average, constituents more favorably assess shared-race representatives, have greater familiarity with representative's record, more confident in representatives constituency service. White constituents more likely to recall the efforts of white legislators, more likely to approve and rate them favorably, more likely to view the legislators as resources. Both white and Black constituents are more inclined to contact legislators who share their race. valuations. Suggests that extra-policy concerns (e.g., skepticism about accessibility of black legislators) play a role in white constituents' limited receptivity to Black representatives; Black legislators who adopt more racially inclusive representational more likely to be viewed by whites as sources. Affective attachments also influence with white constituents who generally do not feel close to blacks as a group less likely to approve/favorably rate Black legislators. However, what appears to be a preference for descriptive representation among Black constituents really just ideological differences that separate white and Black legislators.

- **Critique:** Largely ignores any discussion of "linked fate" or other sociotropic considerations – do constituents place a premium on those who can represent people *like* them?

- **Relevant Literature:** A turn away from focusing on policy responsiveness and constituency service (Lublin 1997; Canon Race 1999), builds on work related to trust (e.g., Bianco 1994).

David E. Broockman. 2013. "Black Politicians Are More Intrinsically Motivated to Advance Blacks' Interests: A Field Experiment Manipulating Political Incentives." *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 3 (July): 521–536

- **Key Takeaway:** While nonblack legislators were markedly less likely to respond when their political incentives to do so are low, black legislators typically continued to respond even when doing so promised little political reward $\longrightarrow$ black legislators appear substantially more intrinsically motivated to advance blacks' interests.

- **Argument:** Politicians more likely to advance the interests of those who share their personal characteristics. Yet previous work has been conflicting about how descriptive and substantive representation works – intrinsic motivations v. electoral incentives (e.g., Grose 2011). The operational equivalence between two mechanisms means studying motivations with roll-call votes, constituency service, etc. doesn't tease out precisely why there is a link between two forms of representation because all of these actions aid reelection (Mayhew 1974). Watching how politicians change behavior when political incentives are reduced sheds light on degree of intrinsic motivation

- **Data/Method**: Field experiment presented state legislators via email asking for help filing for unemployment benefits – all from a black alias, randomization two levels: sender claimed to live in cities in (out of) the legislators' districts

- **Findings:** Legislators half as likely to respond to sender who claimed to live outside district; black legislators far more likely to continue responding to request from out-of-district individual than nonblack peers.
- **Critique:** Obvious use of deception in experimental design; only manipulates residency of requirement but as Fenno 1978, members see their constituencies in different ways, so residency not only variable dictating incentives
- **Relevant Literature:** Builds on Mansbridge 1999's argument of "shared experiences" and characteristics; Mansbridge 2003's concept of "surrogate" representation.

Other Identities

Michele L. Swers. 1998. "Are Women More Likely to Vote for Women's Issue Bills than Their Male Colleagues?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 23, no. 3 (August): 435

- **Key Takeaway:** gender exerts a significant, independent effect on voting on women's issues, after controlling for other variables $\longrightarrow$ gender is a powerful determinant of voting behavior, with descriptive representation by women translating to substantive representation
- **Argument:** Past theories of roll-call voting behavior highlight the importance of ideology, partisanship, and constituent characteristics – but not personal characteristics of a given representative. However, women tend to be more liberal than men within the same party – particularly for Republicans and Southern Democrats $\longrightarrow$ hypothesis: the more a policy issue directly affects women, the more likely it is that female representatives will vote together across party lines
- **Data/Methods:** examines voting on women's issues in the House in the 103rd Congress (the "Year of the Woman," with historically high levels of female representation) using OLS for composite scores, logit analyses for individual bills – DV is mean voting score on bills related to women's issues (based on interest group ratings, 14 bills, 5 of which were related to women's health), IV is gender of representative, controls for personal characteristics, partisanship/ideology, district characteristics
- **Findings:** gender exerts substantial influence – only secondary to ideology – on voting on women's issues; effects are largely attributable to Republican women, with greatest effect for issues related to abortion and women's health $\longrightarrow$ polarization of Congress should diminish this relationship, as Republican women should become less likely to vote liberally; significance of gender most prominent for health/reproductive issues vs. family/education issues
- **Related Literature**:
  - Griffin, Newman, and Wolbrecht 2012: Shifts focus to *dyadic* relationship between representatives and the *women* they represent and finds little evidence of an overall gender gap, but did find that men are favored in Republican districts; women favored by a significant amount in Democratic districts $\longrightarrow$ Democratic majorities improves women's dyadic representation relative to men, but having a female representative (descriptive representation) does not – this was across a set of key votes covering more than just *women's* issues

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Nicholas Carnes. 2012. "Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class in Congress Matter?: Class and Roll-Call Voting." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 1 (February): 5–34

- **Key Takeaway:** Legislators tend to be more educated, higher income, and higher status (in terms of occupation) than their constituents and this translates to differences in roll call voting.

- **Argument:** Legislators from working class backgrounds have more liberal economic preferences than other legislators. Overall, legislators tend to be more educated, higher income, and higher status (in terms of occupation) than their constituents – but little research on the policy consequences of this disconnect. Conservatism in voting on economic policy increases as you go from working class > professional (not-for-profit) > professional (profit-oriented). This focus is on a different dimension of descriptive representation (class – mutable, not as visible)
- **Data/Methods:** examine relationship between economic voting in the House, social class of legislators, using OLS models, regressing roll-call votes on economic policy (using DW-NOMINATE, AFL-CIO scores) on social class
  - Social class categories: (1) profit (farm owners, business, private sector), (2) working class (workers), (3) NFP (service, politicians), (4) lawyers (corporate and public)
- **Findings:** Substantial variation in voting by occupational category, with profit-oriented politicians voting most conservatively – patterns persist even within subgroups based on legislator characteristics (e.g., party, gender, race, previous vote margin), district characteristics (e.g., district pres. vote share, racial composition, income, and age)
- **Critiques:** Blunt proxy for background; OLS fit very dependent on inclusion of other variables.
- **Relevant Literature:** example of descriptive representation (see Pitkin 1967)

Legislators as Individuals

Goals

David R. Mayhew. 1974b. *Congress: The Electoral Connection.* Yale University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** members of Congress as single-minded seekers of re-election, who engage in advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking to gain support $\longrightarrow$ policymaking is not a core feature of what gets members re-elected as position-taking is but one of several strategies members use to cultivate electoral advantage
- **Argument:** members of Congress are motivated solely by a desire for re-election
  - Simplification of other likely goals (e.g., reputation, making good policy – Fenno) but is a proximate goal to pursue if any other goals are to be achieved
  - Three activities: electorally useful, may engage in a mix of all three activities
    - **Advertising**: disseminate one's name in a favorable light, but with little to no issue content – perhaps via mailings (franking) or TV appearances
    - **Credit claiming**: acting in ways that cause relevant political actors to believe that the member is individually responsible for a desirable outcome
      - *Particularized benefits*: ad hoc allocation of resources to a particular group or geographic constituency
      - *Bills*: harder to credibly claim credit for passage of a bill (outside of committee participation – see Fenno on Post Office/Interior)
    - **Position-taking**: publicly staking out a position on an issue of interest to relevant political actors (related to both policy ends and means) (e.g., speeches, roll call votes, TV ads/appearances)
  - Congress is organized to suit the electoral needs of its representatives, resulting in little zero-sum conflict among members
    - Structural units: institutions tailored to electoral needs (e.g., office resources, committees/subcommittees, parties though Mayhew doesn't see party as necessary to re-election)
    - Functions: roles Congress fulfills within structural units, including (1) opinion expression, (2) constituent casework, (3) legislating and oversight (mobilizing support, dictating legislation content, guiding implementation)
    - Maintenance: individual interests kept from undermining Congress via control committees and party leaders, who glean internal benefits
  - Overall, the goal is to increase the "expected Incumbent Differential": any difference perceived by a *relevant political actor* between what an incumbent congressman is likely to do if returned to office and what any possible challenger would be likely to do
    - "Relevant Political Actor": anyone who has a resource that might be used in the election in question; doesn't need to be constituent (e.g. money, organizational skills, ability to make persuasive endorsements, etc.)
    - Members only have limited resources, only want to use what's necessary to win $\longrightarrow$ act conservatively to ensure victory
- **Data/Methods:** application of (soft version of) rational choice theory to the actions of members of Congress
- **Findings:** members of Congress engage in a number of activities designed to promote their goals as single-minded seekers of re-election, and they structure Congress in order to facilitate these goals

- Mix of activities differs across *chambers* (e.g., Senate engages in position-taking, whereas House mostly focuses on particularism), *constituencies*, levels of ambition (e.g., aspirants focus on advertising, position-taking vs. credit-claiming)

- **Critiques:** Assumes that parties will never be cohesive, never be an organizing structure – which may reflect the time in which he was writing

- **Relevant Literature:**

  - R. L. Hall 1987, 1998: can explain activity of representative by their interests (both electoral and personal) and institutional role: when interests are high + informational/transaction/opportunity costs low + have resources $\longrightarrow$ members are likely to participate in policy making, a decision that impacts outcomes more so than preferences

    * Thus, active policy participation (i.e., working in committee markups) is limited to a handful of members (those in positions of leadership; those who have personal interest in an issue) $\longrightarrow$ "rational abdication" because interests better served doing activities like what Mayhew describes

  - Jacobson 2016: electoral connection, although refashioned, remains potent as ever, providing a firm basis for the polarized partisanship and intransigence observed in the contemporary Congress – members of Congress still have a desire for a career in Congress, but are increasingly focused on being in the majority and have less control over results (due to increased partisanship, nationalization of politics); greater tools for reelection now (more staff, travel allowances, easier position-taking); members are no longer as insulated from national trends; growth of strong parties compared to Mayhew's time means stronger incentives for party loyalty, meaning threat now *within* parties; much more money available to both incumbents and challengers – members increasingly tied to fates of their parties

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Tactics

Richard F. Fenno. 1977. "U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration." *American Political Science Review* 71 (3): 883–917

- **Key Takeaway:** "home style"; members of Congress develop a personalized representational style to get re-elected, and they attend to multiple, concentric constituencies $\longrightarrow$ roll-call voting behavior is not only way to understand why individuals get re-elected – studies that just focus on district preferences may miss that representatives are more responsive to some constituencies over others and may represent constituents in ways that are completely orthogonal to policy

- **Argument:** develops typology of different constituencies within the geographic constituency, and identifies different "styles" or strategies for cultivating support within these constituencies

- **Data/Methods:** "soaking and poking" – travels with 17 members to their home districts (not representative sample), some over multiple trips, some with additional interviews in Washington

- **Perceptions of constituencies**: concentric circles of different constituencies

  - *Geographic*: typically corresponds to a district with fixed, legal boundaries and a location in a particular place

    * Strongly tied to district-level demographic and political variables (e.g., SES, ideology, race/ethnicity, etc.) $\longrightarrow$ level of homogeneity of district

  - *Supporters*: re-election constituency (explicitly political), based on the groups that tend to support (cross-sectional), as well as past voting blocs (longitudinal)
    * Characterized by uncertainty: who voted in the past, who will vote in the future, and who the challenger might be (which redefines constituency)
  - *Strongest supporters*: primary constituency ("political base"), differentiated from routine or temporary supporters $\longrightarrow$ tend to be fundraisers, volunteers
    * Routine supporters only vote, using party ID as a cue, and temporary supporters support as "best available alternative"
    * Difficult to delineate, but visible in face-to-face interactions ("at homeness" index – where seem to have greatest rapport/support)
  - *Intimates*: those with personal relationships (e.g., advisers and confidants), contains both political and emotional dimensions

- **Home style**: activities within district to cultivate constituencies to achieve electoral goals
  - *Allocation of resources*: resources allocated directly to the district via time (trips home) and staff (proportion allocated to home district vs. Washington)
    * Method: survey of members' offices about trips home, allocation of staff
    * Findings: some regional/state clustering for both dimensions, but home style is a function of both place and individual choice
      · Time: not linked to electoral margins, but linked to tenure (decreases with seniority), distance from D.C., family location
      · Staff: % total expenditures on district staff not linked to electoral margins, seniority, or trips home
  - *Presentation of self*: mix of verbal/non-verbal cues $\longrightarrow$ trust $\longrightarrow$ political support
    * Antecedents of trust: (1) qualifications for seat, (2) identification with constituents, (3) empathy
    * Politicians adopt different home styles (e.g., person-to-person, issue-oriented), constrained by three factors:
      · Contextual: homogeneity of district, predecessors' approaches
      · Personal: individual inclinations and talents
      · Strategic: decisions about allocating time across constituencies (linked to district homogeneity, electoral insecurity)
  - *Explanation/justification of D.C. activity*: tied to voting (need to explain votes) and to presentation of self (issue-oriented styles provide more explanations)
    * Also tied to perceptions of "me-in-the-constituency" (level of homogeneity across district, sense of fit)
    * Few people seem to cater explanations to different audiences, but many seem to distinguish themselves from other politicians/Congress

- **Critique:** In what ways can party organizations (both national and local) shape/help the ability of members to present themselves as individuals

- **Relevant Literature:** Grimmer 2013 provides an update using press releases

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Justin Grimmer. 2013. "Appropriators not Position Takers: The Distorting Effects of Electoral Incentives on Congressional Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 3 (July): 624–642

- **Key Takeaway:** Implementing text analysis methods of Senate press release finds that marginal representatives engage in credit claiming, more comfortable representatives engage in position taking.
- **Argument:** Responsiveness to constituents can negatively affect position parties take during policy debates – electoral connection says marginal members adopt moderate positions and avoid taking specific positions $\longrightarrow$ more likely to credit claim than *aligned* representatives (those in districts with lots of copartisans). However, the more a member is a better ideological fit for their jurisdiction, the greater the incentive to adopt policy-focused home styles and abandon non-partisan, appropriations-focused style. A key explanation for this is dealing with *primary* vs. *general* elections: need to win copartisans in primary, opposing partisans in general – competing for votes among different constituencies makes position-taking less attractive as same position will not build support in both primary and general constituencies. The result: when marginal representatives avoid articulating positions, they allow ideologically extreme representatives to dominate policy debates.
- **Data/Methods:** Analyze the content of Senate press releases from 2005-2007 – shows how senators emphasize topics and express priorities. Rely on press releases because more likely to claim credit in them than floor speeches
- **Findings:** Senators with views aligned (dis-aligned) with their constituents allocate larger (smaller) share of press releases to taking positions
- **Critique:** Do those who credit claim seek to take positions in other means (e.g., who they take meetings with, what they say in committees, or floor speeches)? To what extent are these credit claims and position statements actually made visible to voters themselves? Fenno's version of home style more personal, discussing event attendance, town halls.
- **Relevant Literature:** Extends Fenno 1977's concept of home style and members desire to cultivate a personal vote or *valence* characteristics through things such as earmarks or federal grants (Wichowsky 2012); take positions in aligned districts to signal part of the partisan "team" (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 2005; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004)

Jaclyn Kaslovsky. 2022. "Senators at Home: Local Attentiveness and Policy Representation in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 116, no. 2 (May): 645–661

- **Key Takeaway:** Areas with important campaign donors are significantly more likely to receive resources; local visits may decrease approval among ideologically opposed constituents; inconsistent evidence regarding effectiveness of local staff $\longrightarrow$ results suggest local attention does not always cultivate goodwill in the district; under polarized politics, home style *does not* effectively substitute for policy representation.
- **Argument:** Time in district often thought to generate trust and open lines of communication between representative and constituent, therefore increasing perception of responsiveness and approval; also thought to provide opportunities to position take, advertise, and credit claim. In midst of polarization, time and staff allocation may work to alienate constituents who don't feel priorities are being represented – thus build support among followers, reduce support among opposed.
- **Data/Methods:** Newly collected data on *senator* travel and staffing behavior along with survey data from the 2011–2018 CES
- **Findings:** Metro areas with large populations and important campaign donors significantly more likely to be allocated visits and staff, indicating that constituents in these areas are receiving outsize access to their legislators. Notably, no relationship between trips and whether a *county* is a *core* or *swing* area – most senators try to visit every county each year. Local visits may actually decrease

approval among ideologically opposed constituents – meaning district activities not reliable substitute for roll-call voting. In context of today's polarization, inequalities in legislator time and staff may translate into inequalities in policy representation; suggest traditional theories of legislators in their district need to be reevaluated; local activities might actually serve as way to reinforce issue accountability.

  - Results indicating local visits do not lead constituents to improve their evaluations of ideologically distant incumbents driven among those *who follow the news*

- **Critique:** Senators are more salient figures – only 2 of them per state – meaning voters could have strong priors about them leaving little opportunity for home style to change opinion. This should be done at congressional or state legislature-level to see how these results change when voters are less likely to be informed about the target of analysis.

- **Relevant Literature:** In *Home Style*, Fenno 1977, 1978 described how legislators strategically allocate resources to develop personal ties with constituents through periodic visits to districts and carefully crafted communications. Ever since, scholars argued legislators use resources in district to gain voting leeway in Washington (Grimmer 2013) – this piece undercuts that argument. Findings about location of staff and offices reflect work showing how place-based identities shape how people relate to their representatives (Cramer 2016) and differential exposure biases how representatives perceive their district's policy preferences (Broockman and Skovron 2018).

John W. Kingdon. 1973. *Congressmen's voting decisions.* University of Michigan Press

- **Key Takeaway**: There are a variety of actors that influence member roll call voting (e.g., constituencies, colleagues, leadership, interest groups, executive branch, staff, media) – none are more important than the others. Legislators ultimately make decisions based on a "consensus mode of decision" that incorporates feedback across actors.

- **Argument:** Because members do not often have well-formed or intense opinions on many subject, rely on these actors to make decisions. Floor voting is important and visible and each actor serves a different function: information, decision constraints, agenda setting, alternative specifying.

- **Data/Methods:** Interviews conducted during 91st Congress (1969) with congressmen and with others close to the legislative process with unit of analysis legislator x issues; identify whether actors are important by whether a legislator mention them without prompt, compare legislator and actor comments, compare roll call vote and actor perceived position on an issue

- **Findings:**

  - Members must decide whether a vote has potential for controversy – if not, just vote with your colleagues. If there is controversy, then pay attention to the "field of forces" (all of the various actors. In the end, roll call voting characterized by the *consensus* model (i.e., a function of all the different forces). Legislators do not seek out costly information. If an issue presents no conflict, if a legislator has intense preferences, or if s/he has a voting record on the issue, information will not be sought out. Source and content of information matter. Key decision features: attention-getting (when a problem is defined as a problem that needs governmental intervention; media key), legislative agenda (set by Speaker and Committees), alternative specification (set by committees), decision boundaries (set by perception of mass public, elites, and committee action).

    * **Constituency**: substantial effect; not homogeneous (consist es of elites and mass public); has various ways of influencing (e.g., recruitment for office, requiring explanations of votes



Figure 4: Member Decision-making Process (Kingdon 1973)

which members can give way to skirt around given other decision-making bodies; direct communication; electoral consequences)

- **Colleagues**: position of who a member consults with often dictates voting behavior; often in agreement with member and are credible experts, perhaps with seniority and part of member's delegation; degree to which members rely on colleague's advice depends on salience of issue
- **Party leadership**: *unimportant* as interest groups, new legislators, and decentralization have weakened parties; yet, leadership does have control over the agenda and parliamentary rules
- **Interest groups**: middling influence, but influence greatest at committee-level (floor-level is resource-intensive); most influence if within members' constituencies
- **Executive branch**: Little to no influence; president has more sway within party than with opposite party
- **Staff**: no influence
- **Media**: important for agenda setting, not for vote-making; can constrain a member's acceptable actions

- **Critique:** Idea that party leadership exerts little influence a clear reflection of the times. Lacking a clear discussion of *primary* vs. *general* electorates and how they uniquely affect voting decisions.

R. Douglas Arnold. 1990. *The Logic of Congressional Action.* New Haven: Yale University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** To understand when and why Congress decides to act on various policies, need

to understand nature of the issue (is it salient, something people are paying attention to) and are individuals in Congress willing to do the hard work necessary to address the issue.

- **Argument:** legislators estimate the political consequences of voting decisions, considering both (1) the degree to which an issue is potentially *salient* to many voters and (2) the availability of *coalition leaders* who can help legislators receive credit for diffuse policy benefits
  - Legislators attend to the potential preferences of the public on policy issues: linked to incidence of costs and benefits and the causal link between the policy instrument and its effects
  - Assumptions:
    - The public has preferences over policy outcomes but not means
    - Legislators' predominant goal is re-election, such that, if two alternatives are available, they will select the one that will improve re-election chances
    - Two types of policy evaluations: *prospective evaluation* (estimate consequences that would follow from adoption of a new program – harder when multi-stage); retrospective evaluation (seek to identify causes of known problems and attribute them to government policy)
  - Models of voting behavior: legislators fear voters will focus on individual candidates/incumbents and not on general parties
    - Prospective: based on positions of either parties or candidates
    - Retrospective: monitor performance of government and reward/punish the party in power or the incumbent accordingly
  - Voters can be categorized into different types of publics:
    - Attentive: aware of specific issues on congressional agenda, know of alternatives, have firm policy preferences
    - Inattentive: lack this knowledge, don't have stable views – but can become attentive if instigated by an interest group
  - Voters ability to vote/punish for a policy depends on the traceability of that policy back to an individual representative, based on three conditions:
    - Perceptible effects: conditions that a citizen notices on their own to stimulate a search for explanations, activating a search process
    - Identifiable government actions: deeds that caused perceptible effects and define whether government/Congress at fault
    - Visible individual contributions: deeds that connect an individual representative to identifiable government action
  - The probability that citizen preferences matter depends on (when inattentive publics become attentive publics):
    - Magnitude: citizens notice relative effects of policy
    - Timing: citizens notice early-order but not later effects
    - Proximity: citizens notice geographic concentration of effects
    - Instigator: availability of an articulate elite to raise consciousness
  - Legislator decision rules: aided by various resources in form of committees, staff members, colleagues, constituent outreach, or interest groups (see: Kingdon)
    - Identify groups that might care about a vote
    - Assess the direction/intensity of their views (asymmetry across groups)
    - Estimate probability that potential preferences $\longrightarrow$ real preferences
    - Weight preferences according to size of various publics

    - Overweight preferences of consistent supporters
  - Coalition leader strategies: either MCs or outside activists try to convince other MCs to vote for a particular policy
    - Persuasion: create, change, or make salient different policy preferences for both legislators and the public
    - Procedural: influence traceability chain of policy using rules and procedures (e.g., delegating responsibility, closed door meetings)
    - Modification: alter components of policy to fit preferences (or potential preferences) by dispersing costs, integrating other coalition leaders

- **Critique:** This talks about the circumstances in which do the hard work of pushing an issue on their own, but does not outline what it takes to be successful – that's where Wawro 2001 is important.

- **Relevant Literature:**

  - Link to retrospection literature: citizens ability to judge the costs/benefits of a policy are affected by heuristics/biases (e.g., negativity bias, hyperbolic time discounting)
  - Link to interest group literature: politicians will favor organized interests who are attentive and communicate their interests both to coalition leaders and leaders Fang-Yi Chiou and Rothenberg 2003

Gregory John Wawro. 2001. *Legislative Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House of Representatives.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Members engage in legislative entreprenurship to help their goals of achieving influence in the chamber and good public policy

- **Argument:** Why do *individual* members bear the costs of engaging in legislative entrepreneurship (LE) efforts (i.e., invest time, staff, other resources to acquire information in particular policy areas, draft bills, build coalitions, and pushing legislation)?

  - Components of LE:
    - Information: policy knowledge (like Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987) and political intelligence (Hall 1996)
    - Coalition building and legislative push: aim to take advantage of "policy windows" (Kingdon 1984) and practice heart of heresthetics (i.e, structuring circumstances to win; Riker 1986), advertising (e.g., press releases, speeches, testifying before committees)
  - LE impacts Fenno's triumverate of goals: by engaging in LE, aiming to make good public policy, but end up devoting resources to Washington rather than district (thus paying attention to preferences of wrong actors) $\longrightarrow$ bear these costs because electorally relevant actors might (especially political organizations who consider efforts when making campaign contributions; including those who wouldn't vote for them based on party ID alone) pay attention to them; might be good for securing district benefits; being good at LE helps members secure positions with specials parliamentary rights and procedures (e.g., party leadership, committee chairs) which helps satisfy goal of influence within chamber and thus better position to enact vision of "good public policy"
  - LE also benefits the party: if one member engages in LE, helps those who don't, helps enhance party label by having legislation to pass

- **Findings:** Little evidence that constituents respond *positively* to legislative entrepreneurship, only some negative effects $\longrightarrow$ doesn't really electoral pay to be "workhorses"; no positive correlation between LE activity and PAC contributions $\longrightarrow$ campaign finance needs not a motivation to engage in LE; ultimately, payoff from LE is advancement to committee and party leadership positions (especially within majority party); one major effect of 1970 reforms: create an atmosphere conducive to legislative entrepreneurship (largely a result of efforts to claw back power from executive which created more prestigious positions)
- **Relevant Literature:** Extends Arnold 1990's concept of "coalition leader," places new emphasis on goals of "good public policy" and "influence within the chamber" (Fenno 1977); some support for Fiorina 1989's argument that pork barrel politics has more electoral payoff than legislative efforts (i.e., want tangible benefits)

Tracy Sulkin. 2005. *Issue Politics in Congress.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Posits a theory of "issue uptake" in which winning legislators take up their challenger's priority issues in the hopes of achieving their electoral goals
- **Issue uptake**: Challengers try to exploit weaknesses in the incumbents they run against – the issues they focus on provide signals to legislators about the issues they have neglected. By addressing these issues after an election to shore up their prospects for the next election, legislators provide an indicator of *responsiveness*. When governing coalitions as a whole engage in issue uptake, they demonstrate *institutional responsiveness*. Consequently, by looking out for their own electoral interests, legislators contribute (albeit unintentionally) to the process of agenda change in Congress.
  - Who engages in issue uptake? Safest legislators engage in the most uptake b/c from Zaller (1998) incumbents who win time and time again are stronger candidates
  - How to engage in issue uptake? Bill introductions are hardest activity, cosponsorships the easiest, with floor statements in between – introducing bills provides the biggest benefit but requires the most work; floor statements get least direct attention besides nice quotes in media
- **Critique:** No discussion of how party platforms and expectations of party loyalty restrict the ability of members to engage in issue uptake – if they are focused on maintaining a party brand, then issue updtake has to be *selective*.
- **Relevant Literature:** Expands on Fenno's classic triumvirate of goals by adding "being a good representative of their constituency's interests"; concordant with Mayhew's argument that members should be engaged in activities related reelection

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Christian R. Grose, Neil Malhotra, and Robert Parks Van Houweling. 2015. "Explaining Explanations: How Legislators Explain their Policy Positions and How Citizens React." *American Journal of Political Science* 59, no. 3 (July): 724–743

- **Key Takeaway:** Most senators tailor explanations to their audiences which are effective at currying support—especially among people who disagree with the legislators' roll-call positions
- **Argument:** Extends Fenno 1977 research on how legislators present themselves to constituents, theorizing that they seek to explain policy positions to achieve their electoral goals and enhance their overall support, using *tailored* explanation to compensate for policy choices that are incongruent with preferences of some constituents, congruent with others.

- **Data/Methods:** Pair of experiments: (1) within-subjects field experiment where US senators receive letters from in support and opposition of immigration reform and compare letter responses – first field experiment fielded to all 100 senators; (2) survey experiment to see how individuals react to targeted/untargeted messages, using real communications written by senators.
- **Findings:** Senators vary key elements of descriptions of Washington activities though they are not explicitly deceptive – instead, tailor explanations to selectively provide information about secondary Washington actions that accord with views of the constituents they are communicating with. Thus, senators can nearly erase the consequences of disagreements with constituents on roll calls: tailored explanations change respondent perceptions of senator positions and likelihood they would vote for them in future.
- **Critique:** Is there a limit based on the issue at hand? This piece uses immigration as the issue to study – would this vary for more contentious issues or when communications done in a more public forum (rather than letter)?
- **Relevant Literature:** Mayhew 1974 said members would tailor their explanations, but Fenno 1977 found consistency in explanations

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Pablo Barberá et al. 2019. "Who Leads? Who Follows? Measuring Issue Attention and Agenda Setting by Legislators and the Mass Public Using Social Media Data." *American Political Science Review* 113, no. 4 (November): 883–901

- **Key Takeaway:** based on temporal analysis of Twitter data, legislators are more likely to *follow*, rather than *lead*, discussion of public issues
- **Argument:** members of Congress respond to the issues being discussed by the mass public with three considerations:
  - Publics: (1) partisans, (2) attentive citizens, (3) public at large
  - Issue relevance: members of Congress should be particularly responsive to changes in attention involving issues that are salient to a group
  - Role of the media: primary mechanism by which the public and legislators learn the other's issue priorities
- **Data/Methods:** analyze all tweets sent by members of 113th Congress from January 2013-December 2014, media outlets, and 10K partisans (each for Republicans, Democrats, based on followership patterns), 10K attentive citizens (who follow at least one major news outlet), 25K randomly sampled users – outcome is change in legislators expressed agendas on Twitter (using LDA) and independent is issue attention by publics
- **Findings:**
  - Congruence: when comparing issue distributions of different groups, find strong correspondence between supporters and their co-partisans in Congress, as well as between members and the media
  - Responsiveness: stronger evidence of a responsiveness vs. leadership dynamic, with changes in issue attention positively predicting which issues members of Congress discuss – legislators are more likely to be responsive to their *supporters* and, to a lesser extent, attentive citizens, than *general public*
  - Salience: only find support for issue relevance hypothesis as it relates to supporters, not to other publics

- Role of the media: shifts in issue attention by media outlets most strongly affect the issue agendas of members of Congress and party supporters $\longrightarrow$ news media contribute to supporter responsiveness model: media > supporters > Congress

- **Related Literature:** although some studies predict that politicians will be responsive to the general public (Downs 1957), others argue that politicians respond to attentive citizens (Arnold 1990, Aldrich 1995) and supporters (Clinton 2006, Bawn et al. 2012)

Ideology

Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. "Patterns of Congressional Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 1 (February): 228

- **Key Takeaway:** Congressional roll call voting is highly structured and stable over time - from a spatial perspective, voting occurs predominately along one major dimension, though at some points in time there is a second dimension

- **Argument:** In a spatial model, each legislator is represented by a point in s-dimensional Euclidean space. Each roll call is represented by two points that correspond to the policy consequences of the "yea" and "nay" outcomes and spatial model assumes legislators prefer closer of the two alternatives. The way legislators fall on these roll calls can be summarized in D-NOMINATE scores (Dynamic Nominal Three-Step Estimation).

- **Findings:** Relying on roll call votes from 1789-1985 (for legislators who cast at least 25 votes; excludes unanimous votes), voting very stable along dimension with exception of 1815-1825 (collapse of Federalist Party) and early 1850s (collapse of Whig Party, division over slavery)

- **Critique**: Where does stability and low-dimensionality come from? What are actors are important to incorporating new issues into liberal/conservative ideology? Parties presumably play a major role especially in light of Binder's work on politics of confrontation, even on issues that are not themselves inherently liberal/conservative.

- **Related Literature**:

  - Poole, Rosenthal, and Poole 2007: extends analysis through 2004 with modified procedure of DW-NOMINATE which includes a linear time trend to track legislator movement over time and extra parameter to account for party switching. Finds that today that second-dimension is essentially non-existent – they define first-dimension captures economic/size of government issues; second-dimension are cross-cutting issues (e.g., race and civil rights); first-dimension almost always divides parties, second-dimension captures within-party dimensions
    - When changes happen in Congress, primarily through *replacement*; in terms of polarization, there is (1) less overlap, and (2) more distance between two parties since the mid-20th century
    - Realignments: should see members move around in space; replacements should be distinct from those they replace; realigning issue should change its orientation in space $\longrightarrow$ only 1850s shows signs of this, other changes (e.g., 1890s and 1930s) more result of partisan surges without changes to the issue space; new issues predominately absorbed into *existing* issue structure or fade away (e.g., abortion, ideology)
  - Wilcox and Clausen 1991: argue against the unidimensional interpretation of roll-call voting – using data from the 80s and 90s find that a single dimension hasn't emerged though evidence of some convergence; in reality, decision making is more complex with different forces structuring

issues ⟶ multiple dimension approach allows for some to correlate, but maintain separation that characterizes some lawmakers.

- Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004: introduce a Bayesian procedure for modeling roll call votes which is more flexible and can be applied to different legislative setups; account for additional dimensions, party leadership, changes in legislative agenda
- Roberts, Smith, and Haptonstahl 2016: applying optimal classification, finds that the degree of aggregation (i.e., individuals bills, small subset of bills, all roll call votes) used to analyze votes determines the degree of observed dimensionality; liberal-conservative dimension appears more dominant in more highly aggregated analyses – this a disconnect of DW-NOMINATE which produces scores to cover roll call votes across two-year legislative sessions but most of work theorizes on individual bills or group of bills, plus multiple "dimensions" could be invoked *within* individual bills (think omnibus bills)
- Caughey and Schickler 2016: using case studies of 1920s Senate Progressives and Southern Senators in the age of FDR, show that dimensions uncovered by NOMINATE correspond imperfectly to each other and other plausible conceptualizations of ideological divisions ⟶ NOMINATE is useful in many scenarios, but there are some challenges:
  1. underlying dimensions being estimated cannot be assumed to have a common meaning across time, at least insofar as that meaning is given an ideological interpretation ⟶ NOMINATE not really substantively *comparable* across time
  2. appropriate identifying assumptions for estimating ideal points will depend, in part, on both the historical context and the analysts' purposes ⟶ DW-NOMINATE constrains ideal points to move as a polynomial function across time, which allows for cardinal comparisons, but not ideal for analyzing rapid/non-monotonic change

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John E. Jackson and John W. Kingdon. 1992. "Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes." *American Journal of Political Science* 36, no. 3 (August): 805

- **Key Takeaway**: Economists think legislator's ideology is more important in explaining legislative decisions than other variables but the problem is that most methods for measuring ideological preferences (e.g., ADA scores) lead to statistical biases that overestimates influence of personal ideology
- **Argument:** When researchers seek to explain roll call votes they often use blunt economic indicators (which do not necessarily capture constituency preferences or interests; also only *economic* focused) and ideological scores (e.g., ADA scores) which only explain votes with other votes. This is a problem especially for one-dimensional issues. Combination of the noise in the nonideology variables with the tautological character of the estimation of ideology attenuates the importance of the other potential variables explaining roll call voting patterns. Moreover, should not rely on roll call-based scores since there may be several factors that structure how members think – analyses that are just a function of votes can't tell us *why* legislators take the positions they do
- **Findings:** From a set of models, demonstrates the larger the influence of ideology, more the estimate of other variables (e.g., constituency interests, party membership) tend to zero.
- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Snyder 1992: focusing on ADA scores, explains that interest group ratings based on roll-call voting records tend to exaggerate the degree of extremism and bipolarity in Congress. Scores assigned to relatively moderate members of Congress are typically more extreme than their true positions

Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches.* MIT Press, June

- **Key Takeaway:** behavior of members of Congress has become *highly polarized* along a liberal-conservative dimension, reversing decline in polarization from early 20th century to late-1960s
  - Main argument: constituency characteristics are more related to congressional ideology – median *income* increasingly linked to *conservatism*
- **Measuring ideology:** (1) *interest group* rating, (2) *scaling* methods of roll call votes
  - Interest group ratings: e.g., ADA, LCV, Chamber of Commerce; select votes that are important to their agendas and rank legislators based on their support
    - **Limitations:** can only summarize results for single Congress, based on selective sample of votes that place many legislators at extreme ends
  - Scaling: using all roll-call votes, based on spatial model – allow linear change in position throughout legislators' careers
    - Often performs well in classifying votes (both overall and when compared to null model where all senators assumed to vote with majority position)
    - *Note*: unidimensional model works well for most votes, except for on civil rights, where second dimension also necessary
- **Trends in polarization:** surge in polarization began in 1970s
  - Dimensionality: almost all conflict falls on liberal-conservative continuum, with civil rights dimension largely vanishing as converges with ideology
    - Second dimension no longer improves classification after late 1960s
  - Extremity: range of positions of members has increased → more extremity
    - During 20th century, within both chambers, Republicans became more moderate until the 1970s, but then began to move apart
  - Cohesiveness: ideological composition of two parties has become more homogeneous, with fewer regional differences – intra-party homogeneity
    - Standard deviation of scores within parties have also decreased
  - Differentiation: positions of average Democrats, Republicans have become more widely separated – inter-party heterogeneity
    - Dispersion of members has systematically increased since mid-1970s, in both chambers – members increasingly clustered at ends of spectrum
  - Sorting: less overlap in party positions – no longer liberal Republicans, conservative Democrats
    - Fewer moderates, evidenced by percent of members that have ideal points closer to mean of opposing party vs. mean of own party
- **Representation:** representatives' behavior often deviates from measures of constituency preferences/interests (contra "instructed delegate" model)
  - Model: regress NOMINATE scores on party dummy, constituency characteristics, and personal characteristics of representative
  - Hypotheses: differ in terms of perceived trends in predictiveness of constituency
    - **Sorting:** polarization reflects better match between members, districts –conservative districts more likely to elect Republicans, and vice versa

    - **Divergence:** for a given district, Republican members are more conservative, Democratic representatives more liberal
  - Data: model run on four different terms of the House (93rd – 1973-4, 98th – 1983-4, 103rd – 1993-4, 108th – 2003-4)
  - Results: contributions of party, constituency, and ideology in explaining roll-call behavior have changed over past 30 years
    - Both party and constituency characteristics better explain NOMINATE scores now versus in 1970s
    - Relationship seems to operate through increasing importance of **income**
    - Results not just explained by increasing partisan *sorting* within districts – some differences based on *within-district* polarization
  - Implication: polarization associated with a strengthening of relationship between district demographics, voting behavior of members

- **Alternative explanations:** responses to alternatives to *income*-based argument
  - Southern realignment: many of the economic and demographic trends in the US were magnified in the South – realignment not just attributable to views on race
    - Republican gains seem to be concentrated in high-income districts
    - Voting cleavages around race seem to be converging to pre-existing economic cleavages → trend toward unidimensionality
  - Partisan reforms: centralization of party power in the 1970s has increased polarization either via *agenda control or party discipline*
    - Agenda control ("artificial extremism") hypothesis unlikely; holding a simulated agenda constant, general patterns of polarization would remain
    - Little evidence of selective party pressures; only marginal gains with two-cutpoint model (allowing party discipline) vs. one-cutpoint model
  - Districting and apportionment: strongest evidence against apportionment involves fact that Senate has shown nearly identical trends to House
    - Little evidence that majority-minority districts have increased polarization; when exclude these districts, no effect on polarization trends
    - In addition, if anything, incumbent-protecting gerrymanders may have decreased polarization trend, given that polarization driven by replacement
    - Largest change in polarization via districting relates to reallocation of seats to Sunbelt during decennial census
  - Primaries: moderates have harder time winning primaries ⟶ polarization, but adoption of primary occurred at end of 19th century (when polarization lowest)
    - Some argue that decline in participation in legislative primaries leads to polarization, as voters likely to be more ideological, but minimal direct evidence

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Effects of Polarization

Andrew O. Ballard et al. 2023. "Dynamics of Polarizing Rhetoric in Congressional Tweets." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (February): 105–144

- **Key Takeaway:** More ideologically extreme members, those from safer districts, and those who are not in the president's party are more likely to send polarizing tweets, and that polarizing tweets garner more engagement, increasing campaign funding for more polarizing members.
- **Argument:** While affective polarization documented among public, political elites also play an important role (Lee 2016). Primary benefit of employing polarizing rhetoric is increased attention and engagement with members' messages, particularly among core supporters. There are risks to polarizing appeals, such as lower candidate evaluations—which can lead to worse electoral outcomes—and lower trust in government. But certain members, for example, those not in the president's party, those running in safer elections, and more ideologically extreme members, have more incentive to make polarizing statements because the potential benefits outweigh the costs, particularly as increased enthusiasm and engagement can lead to increased campaign donations that bolster members' reelection efforts
- **Data/Methods:** Analyze tweets sent by members of Congress, coding for whether they contain polarizing rhetoric using RoBERTa
- **Findings:**
  - Polarizing tweets accumulate more likes and retweets than non-polarizing tweets, and lead more accounts to follow members of Congress on Twitter
  - More ideologically extreme members, those in safer electoral con- texts, and those in the party opposite the president are more likely to use polarizing rhetoric
- **Critique:** Does this expand to other congressional communications (e.g., floor speeches, newsletters)?
- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Russell 2018: Republicans are more likely to name-call their Democratic opponents and to make expressions of intraparty loyalty, particularly when they are the minority party

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Bryce J. Dietrich. 2021. "Using Motion Detection to Measure Social Polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives." *Political Analysis* 29, no. 2 (April): 250–259

- **Key Takeaway:** Democrats and Republicans less willing to literally cross the aisle, and this behavior is also predictive of future party voting, even when previous party voting is included as a control
- **Argument:** Builds on Kirkland (2011)'s distinction between strong and weak legislative ties which explains why informal conversations are important to legislative outcomes: when ties are strong, new information is rarely exchanged, preventing legislative coalition from expanding; weak legislative ties originate from less frequent interactions, when those interactions do take place, information is more likely to be novel and ultimately shared which helps lay the foundation for future cooperation
- **Data/Methods:** Using largest collection of Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN) videos ever complied, introduces motion detection to measure extent to which members of Congress (MCs) cross the aisle,
- **Findings:** Party votes are more likely after videos of floor votes in which motion declines – thus extent to which members of Congress willing to engage with each other on the legislative floor is associated with rate of party-line voting.

Alex Alduncin, David C. W. Parker, and Sean M. Theriault. 2017. "Leaving on a Jet Plane: Polarization, Foreign Travel, and Comity in Congress." *Congress & the Presidency* 44, no. 2 (May): 179–200

- **Key Takeaway:** Republican House members, have altered their foreign travel patterns: ideologically extreme members have always less likely to take foreign trips, but extremely conservative Republican have become much more likely to travel only with copartisans as polarization has increased in Congress; to a lesser extent, moderate Republicans also increasingly likely to travel only with copartisans
- **Argument:** Textbook Congress era characterized degree to which members of both parties able to socialize and work together; in today's polarized environment, members quickly divided into their partisan teams. Practice of taking fact-finding trips abroad—called CODELs (COngressional DELegations) provide members with opportunity to socialize – waiting in airports, flying on planes, attending meetings, eating meals together fosters opportunity to talk and discover commonalities, which can build friendships that transcend policy issues, legislation, or even partisan battles.
- **Data/Methods:** Examine travel records 1977-2012
- **Findings:** Those who want run for higher office, represent electorally competitive district less likely to travel abroad. Those who travel in bipartisan groups from high demand committees like Foreign Affairs and Armed Services. Clear differences between Democrats and Republicans: Republicans seem far more sensitive to electoral and personal considerations in decision to leave home. Ideological effects: extreme members find it hard to justify travel with members of opposite party but differently by party – extremely conservative Republican have become much more likely to travel only with copartisans as polarization has increased in Congress; to a lesser extent, moderate Republicans also increasingly likely to travel only with copartisans.
- **Relevant Literature:**
  - McGee and Theriault 2022: liberal Democrat are more likely than moderate Democrat to travel with their copartisans, and moderate Democrat are more likely than liberals to travel abroad in cross-party delegations. For Republicans, the former relationship holds, uncover no relationship for the latter.

Organization of Congress

Party Leadership

Core Theories

Joseph Cooper and David W. Brady. 1981. "Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn." *American Political Science Review* 75, no. 2 (June): 411–425

- **Key Takeaway:** Strength of party leadership depends on the political context in which leaders serve.
- **Argument:** no one effective style of leadership; instead, leadership style is contingent on context (e.g., level of party strength) $\longrightarrow$ transition in House leadership from Cannon to Rayburn involved moving from a *hierarchical* to *bargaining* pattern of leadership
  - Contextual: the *institutional context* of the House determines leadership power and style, with leadership style and effectiveness contingent on situational factors
    - Impact of institutional context on leadership power/style is conditioned on *party strength*, with centralization more likely when party more cohesive
  - Predictions: when party strength is high, power will be concentrated in task/goal-oriented leaders; when party strength is low, power will be dispersed, with leaders oriented toward bargaining and relationship-building
  - Takeaway: no direct relationship between leadership *style* and *effectiveness* in the House; different styles work better depending on the context
- **Data/Methods:** case study of the House under three eras: (1) Czar Rule (1890-1910), (2) transition from Cannon to Rayburn (1910-40), and (3) Rayburn (1940 onward)
- **Findings:**
  - Czar Rule (1890-1910): centralized power in Speakers as agent of majority, starting with "Czar Reed" and Cannon
    - Leadership style: centralized power (hierarchy) in the Speaker $\longrightarrow$ Speaker appointed committees/headed Rules, but also controlled access to the floor $\longrightarrow$ control over agenda-setting process
    - Party chief: Speaker had power as head of the party and could also enforce party discipline through this role
  - Cannon to Rayburn (1910-40): transition for House as an institution, tied to weakening power/position of leadership, greater independence of members
    - Revolt: Republicans craving reform formed coalition with Democrats to undermine Cannon $\longrightarrow$ (1) greater use of caucus and/or steering committees (ill-suited to times of partisan heterogeneity); (2) committees emerged as rival to party power; (3) decentralized committee appointment system $\Rightarrow$ seniority as core criterion for committee leadership
    - From Bloch Rubin 2013:
      - Cannon Revolt aimed to strip the Speaker of his power to sit on and appoint legislators to Rules
      - Reform made possible by intraparty coalition
    - Leadership style: bargaining system; leaders served as *brokers* trying to bargain and build coalitions of support for particular bills
  - Rayburn (1940-60s): new type of House, enduring until reforms in the 1960s/70s

    - Power more decentralized, but wider *dispersion* of power vs. fractionalization – *party leaders*, *committee system* as rivals
    - Leadership style: focused on negotiation between parties and committees/chairs ⟶ emphasis on personal skills vs. resources endowed by institutional power

- **Critiques:** How much of this is about leadership selection versus adaptation to institutional context? Would these leaders have behaved differently in other contexts, or could they only rise to leadership under these conditions?

- **Relevant Literature:** precursor to Rohde 1991 and CPG, suggests that decision to centralize formal powers in leadership is contingent on levels of party strength

  – However, Cooper and Brady suggest that leadership strength is not just formal but also can be found in bargaining and relationship-building

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David W. Rohde. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Posits the theory of *conditional party government* (CPG) which says that strength of party leadership depends on both the homogeneity of preferences within parties and division between parties.

- **Argument:** party responsibility exists only if there is widespread policy agreement among the majority party (homogeneity of preferences) ⇒ *conditional party government.* Thus, CPG connects exogenous electoral change to the growth of more homogeneous party caucuses ⟶ greater ability to reach consensus on previously divisive policy issues

  – See also Rohde 2013: "Two features—intraparty homogeneity of preferences and interparty divergence—will govern the willingness of members to delegate strong powers to party leaderships"
    - Delegate because members want to accomplish their policy goals and are not fearful that leaders will pursue ends incompatible with what they want
  – Conditions: (1) greater homogeneity of both parties, based on changing electoral conditions (including realignments); (2) institutional reforms designed to favor the party majority; (3) leader who is willing to exercise the powers granted to them
  – Consequences: reforms in the 1970s had a delayed effect, leading to a resurgence of party voting in the 1980s
  – Heterogeneity: may see different role of leadership across issue areas, depending on homogeneity of interests in a given area (see: Lee 2009)
    - In most areas, there should be little difference in interests (e.g., low-cost distributive policy, programs that affect many constituents in all districts) ⟶ leadership should only be active on issues where the interests of the majority of the party are at stake

- **History**:

  – Reforms in 1970s aimed to give power back to party leaders, at the expense of committee chairs – encouraged by liberal Democrats who were frustrated that conservative Southern Democrats (who held committee chairs) blocked legislation that the majority of the party supported ⟶ policy as a key goal beyond re-election
  – Reforms driven by Democratic Study Group and were targeted at rules of Democratic Caucus (e.g., empowerment of Speaker in 1974 to appoint party membership and chair of the Rules committee)

- Growth of liberal bloc resulted in increased Democratic cohesion ⟶ increased pressure on party leaders to reflect personally widely-shared positions and the Caucus was frequently the device used to apply the pressure ⟶ party loyalty now a "litmus-test" for receiving good assignments/chair positions
- Tracks of reforms:
  1. Committee chairs: reforms to remove/reduce chairs' powers (e.g., recorded teller votes, empowered subcommittees with Subcommittee Bill of Rights which reduced chair authority over assignments and bill handling, changed appointment power, secret votes for selection of chairs)
  2. Democratic Party: strengthened party/leadership (e.g., created Steering and Policy Committee; gave leadership spot on Committee on Committees; expanded Rules Committee; gave Speaker additional powers to refer bills and take away committee monopoly power over bills by allowing multiple referrals; solidifying party whip positions; creation of task forces)
     * Whips allowed leaders to assess satisfaction with leadership – had power over committee assignments and bill scheduling; helped raise funds, speak for them, influence the media
     * More leaders + task forces ⟶ task of contacting and persuading others in the party could be accomplished with great efficiency
     * Rules Committee could be used as arm of leadership – restrictive rules give ability to control whether there are limits on amendments or debate time
  3. Collective control: reforms designed to make leaders responsible to the interests of party majority ⟶ changes enabling Caucus to assert its influence
- John Herbert Aldrich and Rohde 2017 provide some updated history showing CPG still holds:
  * Newt Gingrich: Republicans all ran in 1994 on the "Contract for America" ⟶ were willing to delegate more power to leadership and limit traditional powerful committee chairs to achieve policy goals – included allowing Newt to name chairs (bypassing seniority), naming freshmen loyal to Newt to Appropriations, use Appropriations to enact policy changes (against House rules)
  * Dennis Haster: thin Republican majorities, tried to return to regular order ⟶ Haster rule (not allow legislation to reach floor without approval of majority of majority party)
  * Nancy Pelosi: supported challenges to senior committee chairs she didn't like, allowed the Rules Committee to become arm of leadership
  * John Boehner: Freedom Caucus did not trust party leaders ⟶ sought restrict powers of party leaders

- **Critiques:**
  - Similar to Krehbiel (1993), how can we actually see the effects of party – what might seem like party could just be preferences. Rohde 2013 responds saying that if this were the case, votes would regularly have both minority and majority members voting in favor, yet majority is almost always majority-party dominated, and the minority party almost never wins
  - Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug 2008: selection of roll call votes is endogenous to characteristics of voting behavior we care about (party cohesion) – roll call votes are only a subset of all votes taken, parties might use roll call votes to discipline members (so we don't know outcome if vote not done by roll call)

- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Response to Mayhew (1974) which argued that institutions in Congress (e.g., the committee system) were designed to serve re-election goals, with members averse to party influence over

their position-taking (they cared about position-taking, not necessarily outcomes, so want weak parties so they are not told how to vote)

    * Rohde 2013 expands on this: seniority system for committees ensured members could keep their positions and continue to lay claim to its work

- Moving away from the Textbook Congress: reforms in the 1970s established rules that undermined the independence of committee leaders/members, in favor of stronger party leadership (see Fenno 1962)
- Member goals: Rohde assumes that members have multiple goals, following Fenno 1973, and in later works have added a fourth: majority status (Rohde 2013)
    * Essentially, moving above Mayhew's view that members just want reelection $\longrightarrow$ members clearly cared about policy, status quo wasn't satisfactory, so they changed institution
- Procedural cartel theory: Rohde doesn't view these theories as incompatible – just argues that CPG focuses on positive agenda power, whereas PCT negative agenda power
- While Rohde points to frustrated liberals, Schickler, Mcghee, and Sides 2003 point out that junior members and liberals were more pro-reform than senior members and conservatives; Republicans were often more likely than Democrats to back reform

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Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives.* Cambridge University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Positing the *procedural cartel theory* argue that *majority* parties gain their strength via their ability to control the legislative agenda, maintaining their "party brands" by preventing votes that could possible roll them on the legislative floor.
- **Argument:** develop and extend *procedural cartel theory*, which argues that parties exert strength by controlling the agenda (i.e., negative agenda power keeping bills that might roll the majority party off the legislative power), not by controlling votes (i.e., using positive agenda power) since voting discipline is costly. Thus *party strength* not generated by a party's ability to form a cohesive voting bloc ("marshal its troops on a given issue"), but because they are able to set the agenda and prevent party-splitting issues from reaching the legislative floor. Key points of this argument are:
    1. Parties arise to manage campaign costs ("electoral externalities")
    2. Legislative parties analogous to legal partnerships (e.g., junior/senior partners)
        - Agenda power is almost always cartelized (only some actors, particularly the more "senior partners" have proposal/veto power), whereas voting power is equally distributed
    3. Legislative parties specialize in agenda vs. vote control
    4. Majority party trades off negative vs. positive rights, depending on the degree of *intraparty homogeneity* $\longrightarrow$ greater (less) homogeneity = expand (restrict) proposal rights + restricting (expanding) veto rights
        - Positive agenda control: ability to push bills through the legislative process to a final passage vote on the floor (via allocation of proposal rights)
        - Negative agenda control: ability to block bills from reaching a final passage vote on the floor (via allocation of veto or delaying rights)
        - If a veto agent refuses to block bill that will roll majority, bill merely advances one stage in the legislative process and another agent can block; if a single agent has the right to place bills directly on the floor for a vote, then once that single agent has chosen to violate the minimum fiduciary standard, the damage is already done

- *Key point is that positive agenda control is costly and leaves opportunities for individual members to be left in tough situations: vote their own interests/preferences or support the party line*

- **Procedural Cartel Theory**: set of six assumptions

  1. Members of Congress seek re-election, internal advancement within the House, good public policy, and majority status – Fenno-esque + Aldrich & Rohde
  2. reputation/brand name of a party affects re-election probability for individual members, probability of majority status – think of Aldrich 2011
     - Reputation is a public good to all party candidates: all members benefit or suffer from changes to this reputation (regardless of their contributions)
  3. party reputation depends on record of legislative accomplishment, thus parties' legislative actions have electoral consequences: better majority controls power $\longrightarrow$ better legislative record $\longrightarrow$ better brand name $\longrightarrow$ better reelection prospects
  4. legislating is similar to team production and is thus plagued by cooperation/coordination problems – particularly managing the "party brand"
  5. parties regulate members' legislative actions by delegating power to a central authority (group of "senior partners" – e.g., committee chairs, Rules Committee, speaker)
  6. majority parties delegate agenda-setting power to senior partners, creating a procedural cartel to collectively monopolize agenda-setting power
     - Cartelization happens when majority party's members secure most of the agenda-setting offices
     - Agenda-setting officers expected to try to block party-splitting bills (their "minimum fiduciary standard"), avoid "crimes of commission" $\longrightarrow$ "rolls" (when push bills most of party dislikes)
     - If majority extremely heterogeneous, then only minimum standard can be enforced; more homogeneous, then must also push legislation that party supports
     - Spatial point to think about: minority should lose more as its median member is farther from floor median; majority should never lose since there should be no relationship between majority median and floor median $\longrightarrow$ party discipline often centers who the floor median is

- **Critiques:** there is must-pass legislation that cannot be kept off the agenda, thus some essence of party discipline might be needed, especially when minority party has capacity to work their will. This critique particularly relevant if we are thinking of the Senate. See Ballard and Curry 2021.

- **Relevant Literature:**

  - Contrasting Krehbiel's definition of party strength, which focuses on getting members to vote against their wishes, Cox and McCubbins argue that parties can have large influence even if they don't persuade members to vote differently.
  - Member goals: contra Mayhew, legislators are not just motivated by re-election – but also by internal advancement, good public policy, and majority party status
  - Unlike theories of *conditional party government*, does not require *both* preference agreement within the majority party + disagreement between parties; no expectation of party discipline (except on procedural votes); parties only exert influence on members' votes enough to win (i.e., seek minimum winning coalitions to keep costs low)

– Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins 2010: applies quasi-experiments at the state legislature-level and finds the majority party uses its control over the agenda to screen out bills that would split its own membership, devotes more floor time to bills that divide majority from minority party legislators, and ultimately uses agenda control to protect the policy interests of its members – Anzia and Jackman 2013 build on this and find that there is variation across agenda control institutions on majority roll rate (where majority-appointed committees can decline to hear/report bills, majority leadership can block bills from appearing on the calendar); Jackman 2014 finds that majoritarian rules can still reduce ability of majority to secure favored policy outcomes

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Steven S. Smith. 2007. *Party Influence in Congress.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** We do not have to think of parties as either enacting negative OR positive agenda control – parties have multiple goals and puruse different means of influence over their members to achieve their collective goals.
- **Argument:** Congressional parties are motivated by both electoral and policy goals and while they are compatible, often require leaders to make tradeoffs $\longrightarrow$ because parties have *multiple collective goals*, they pursue *multiple forms and varying degrees of influence* on legislator voting behavior and policy outcomes



Figure 5: Summary of Sources and Types of Party Influence

– An attempt to (1) move us away of thinking party influence is either pressure and arm-twisting (positive power) or agenda setting (negative power) and (2) stress the role of *party size* as shaping what strategies are viable to pursue $\longrightarrow$ minority party leaders have more influence when majority is not large or cohesive

– Expectations of party leaders: win the majority, hold policy views representative of the caucus, hold policy views that would be a winning agenda, appeal to key constituent groups (e.g., for Democrats, women and minorities) $\longrightarrow$ members look for the candidate that has optimal mix of policy and electoral strategies

- If explanations of party are centered around a single goal, need two things: (1) must explain why legislators willing to sacrifice for good of party; (2) must explain what it takes to motivate leaders to provide leadership as a collective good
  - Creation of leadership authority can't be explained solely by policy: if policy was all members cared about, they would have to worry that leadership would use power to make them vote against their wishes. Yet, by allowing parties to coordinate policy, some semblance of gains from trade, economies in producing legislation $\longrightarrow$ from this view, individual legislators still free to pursue their own interests
- Stresses idea of parties as "long [policy] coalitions" (like Aldrich): policies need to be enacted AND defended in long run $\longrightarrow$ coordinated party strategies are necessary
- Direct and indirect forms of policy influence don't happen separately:
  - *Direct influence*: manipulate incentives (committee assignments, appointments to party posts, campaign contributions), election resources (campaign committees, access to media outlets, donor bases, policy research), public relations activities and staff.
    - Sources: group identity (legislators come up with strong psychological attachments to parties, look to fellow members for guidance, leaders are proactive in getting personal support from fellow party members), tangible incentives (degree of control over standing committee assignments; appointments to conference committees, task forces, travel delegations; fundraising assistance and campaign on behalf of members); implementation of leadership structure (professionalization and growing influence of whips)
  - *Indirect influence*: helps leader minimize tradeoff between policy and election goals: reduces frequency with which members have to decide between preferred policy position and position good for reelection (i.e., it's not just about creating a winning record)
    - Examples: arranging meetings that wouldn't otherwise occur, offering incentives to facilitate bargaining, offering compromises/logrolls that wouldn't have been proposed, offering incentives for members to keep agreements, setting the agenda
    - Sources: vote scheduling, setting priorities, assignments, overseeing staff administration
  - Relates closely to negative power (ability to defend the status quo in the face of a majority that favors change) vs. positive power (ability to change the status quo in the face of a majority that opposes change)
- Overall, how much party influence there is depends on three factors: (1) incentives leaders can use to acquire support of legislators; (2) incentives leaders can use to acquire support for party interests; (3) agenda-setting power.
- External forces play a role in shaping degree of party influence: party regimes (margin of victory, policy commitments, role of local/state parties in nominations) influence what legislators need from and willingness to sacrifice for legislative party; electoral coalitions (homogeneous/heterogeneous, like Cooper and Brady, Rohde argue) dictate whether leaders are empowered with more direct and indirect influence; presidents (if member of POTUS party, both POTUS and leadership have to create strategy with POTUS often leading; for elections, presidential coattails)
- Why the Senate is distinct: majority party never empowered presiding officer to use discretion in recognition, filibustering of rule changes that disadvantage minority, lack of germaneness requirement for amendments $\longrightarrow$ party leaders have hard time preventing bills from being offered as amendments

- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Similar to Fenno, slight disagreement with Mayhew: members care about both reelection and policy: reelection prospects helped if party's record of policy achievement viewed favorably by public

- Bridges "electoral" perspective (Mayhew, Cox and McCubbins, Arnold 1990) with "policy" perspective (Clausen, Krehbiel)
- CPG (Aldrich) does not emphasize electoral interests enough: under conditions of polarization, party leaders are better able to force policy sacrifices out of legislators for party's electoral success – CPG doesn't make this a central point to the story. Party size ignored in CPG but incentive to exert party influence is greater as size declines (especially if not perfectly cohesive)
- Procedural Cartel (Cox and McCubbins) also does not include electoral interests in model or application: they only talk about preferences for policy, but ignore idea that negative power can prevent members from weighing policy vs. electoral interests. Party size made irrelevant in the PC model focused on preferences of party and chamber median $\longrightarrow$ overlooks fact that with smaller majority, distance between party and chamber median smaller; risk of lossing majority status greater in smaller majorities, making electoral considerations a priority over short-term policy considerations
  - More broadly, argues that theories emphasizing negative agenda power removes some realism and gives inadequate emphasis on positive power: suggests that leaders care about passing legislation and therefore devote considerable effort to set the agenda and directly influence colleagues

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Andrew O. Ballard and James M. Curry. 2021. "Minority Party Capacity in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 115, no. 4 (November): 1388–1405

- **Key Takeaway:** Congressional minority parties—despite what theories of negative agenda control might suggest—are capable of influencing legislative outcomes.
- **Argument:** Capacity of the minority party to exert legislative influence is a function of three factors: *constraints* on the majority party, which create *opportunities* for the minority party; minority party *cohesion* on the issue at hand; and sufficient *motivation* for the minority to engage in legislating rather than electioneering.
  - Typically, ability of minority to influence outcomes chalked by shortcoming of the majority – Ballard and Curry argue that minority members have their own agency. Previous research didn't really grapple with variation in minority party influence on a bill-to-bill, issue-by-issue basis or why minority influence varies across stages of legislative process
  - Constraints on majority: divided government, smaller majorities, some issues divide the majority more than others (even on issues that cannot simply be kept off the agenda like Procedural Cartel Theory suggests; e.g., appropriations bills, debt ceiling, tax extenders, reauthorizations); dealing with public pressures (e.g., GOP majority allowing reauthorization of Violence Against Women Act after 2012 elections)
  - Cohesion: can the minority pick off enough votes
  - Motivation: pressure to legislate rather than obstruct (e.g., emergency situations, issues with statutory deadlines that serious consequences), issues popular with the public, presidential leadership in divided government (minority parties feel more pressure to "govern" when they control at least one branch to create a brand of policy success and effective governance; simply wanting their president to enact agenda)
- **Data/Methods:** Roll call data on every bill considered 1985-2006; case examples from notable bills
  - Outcome variables included whether a bill received a final passage vote, became law; use version of W-NOMINATE scores to examine cohesion within issue areas (use instead of DW because it provides single score for members across periods), motivation measured as whether issue is mentioned in State of the Union during a Congress

- **Findings:**
  - Bills dealing with issues where minority party capacity is greater are more likely to be considered on the House floor
  - Bills addressing issues that unified the minority and divided the majority were just as likely to be considered on the House floor as those that unified the majority and divided the minority
  - Bills where majority is constrained and minority cohesive have higher probability of becoming law, even more so if issue a minority priority
- **Critiques:** Measure of motivation is fairly weak (though a systematic alternative is pretty hard to come up with); probably not enough focus on rules themselves that other work really pays attention to and the ability to change them
- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Describes what Cox and McCubbins essentially ignore: majorities sometimes advance legislation that divides the majority and unifies the minority in ways that cartel theory cannot explain
  - Expands on CPG which focuses on *majority party unity*, what they show here is minority party unity also important
  - In slight conversation with Binder's work that examines precisely when minority rights granted and taken away

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Contemporary Interpretations

Frances E. Lee. 2016b. "Legislative Parties in an Era of Alternating Majorities." In *Governing in a Polarized Age: Elections, Parties, and Political Representation in America,* edited by Alan S. Gerber and Eric Schickler, 115–142. Cambridge University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** The combination of partisan polarization and insecure majorities incentivizes political parties to be more combative in how they go about their business, including crafting legislative alternatives and communication strategies that aim to create maximum differences between the parties
- **Argument:** In recent decades, the fights for majority control of Congress have become more regular and intense. In turn, legislative leaders have devised and put more resources into communication strategies that benefit their party at the expense of the other. Very closely follows Mayhew's idea of the "expected incumbent differential:" amplify the differences that voters and other relevant political actors perceive between what an incumbent party is likely to do if returned to power and what the opposition party will do.
  - Larger point is that *actually* legislating doesn't matter as much as *proposing* alternatives to make clear what the differences between the parties are – any public perception that advantages Republicans necessarily disadvantages Democrats and vice versa
  - Leaders engage in *advertising* (create a favorable image but messages [have] little or no issue content), *credit claiming* (foster the belief that one party responsible for good policies, opposing party is responsible for undesirable policies), and *position taking* (specifically on issues of political importance – use message votes, press conferences, position posts/papers) to widen the expected party differential and make for their party to be in the majority
- **Data/Methods:** analyze random sample of all communications published by each leadership office during the first quarter of 2013.

- **Findings:** partisan blaming was single most common type of communication, though advertising and position taking take more positive tones; number of communications staff for congressional leadership offices has increased drastically between 1961 and 2012
- **Critiques:** does not talk about voters themselves and their demand for such divisive partisan content as a reason for why this communication shift has become advantageous
- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Lee (2009, 2016a)'s larger work on how legislative leaders have concerted efforts to craft party images in extra-legislative ways.
  - Aldrich 2011; Cox and McCubbins 2005 emphasis on party reputations, think "parties as public-relations operations"
  - Behavioral work related to demand for partisan content and its benefits

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Frances E. Lee. 2016a. *Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Adds historical context to what Lee 2016b argues, pointing to 1980 as a turning point where both majority and minority parties saw it advantageous to enact strategies that would usher in a new era of confrontational politics.
- **Argument:** After 1980, both majority and minority parties placed heavy and growing emphasis on communications. Under these more competitive circumstances, majority parties had reason to worry about the possibility of losing control, and minority parties began to see themselves as potential majority parties. Watching one another closely, members pressed their leaders to improve their party's capacity for communications by citing concern about competitive disadvantage relative to the opposition. Both ambitious minorities and insecure majorities perceive a pressing to invest in communications to promote their party's image and undercut that of the opposition. This has created a new era of confrontational politics.
  - Incentives for minorities to simply vote no: increases pressure on majority to find votes; lack of help forces majority to whip moderates – increases costs of party discipline, making positive agenda control more costly
  - Messaging: on issues that elicit differences (can be policy, competencies, or ethics)
  - Bipartisanship undercuts party messaging efforts: supporting legislation across the aisle shows the minority can still get some of what they want, grants legitimacy to the majority
  - Ideal strategies:
    * minority party under unified government: strongest incentives to focus on messaging – unlikely to win on policy
    * minority party under divided government: want to define contrasts, set up issues to retake majority; but controls presidency, so need to offer legislative incentives to ensure POTUS somewhat successful
    * majority party under unified government: priority is legislating, but have to give up some messaging power to POTUS; has to let supporters down once in a while to advance goals and push legislation
    * majority party under divided government: more messaging – build record of opposition to retake presidency, play "blame game"

- Important points about Senate: supermajoritarianism has complex effects on how parties weigh messaging and legislating – reduces the majority's burden because they can blame opposition for blocking, giving more freedom to focus on messaging compared to House majorities; yet Senate minority's have greater responsibility for outcomes, means it has a greater party in governance than House minorities

- **Relevant history:** 1980s were a turning point where both parties saw themselves as having a shot to succeed and win majorities
  - GOP beefed up fundraising, candidate recruiting (even against Democratic leaders); New Right advanced trumpeted issues and forced party message votes, built communications and fundraising network; Senate Democrats in minority began to hold more caucus meetings and party retreats, staged media events, more fundraising, emphasizing scandals
  - In response to Republicans' growing grievances against Democrats (IN-8 contested election, Democrats increasing use of special and restrictive rules)

- **Relevant Literature:** in conversation with work related to CPG – with parties homogeneous and distinct, greater incentives to make those differences apparent to voters in hopes of capturing majorities

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Frances E. Lee. 2009. *Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the US Senate.* University of Chicago Press

- **Key Takeaway:** The disagreement between parties in Congress is not just ideological disagreement, but acts of "partisan brinkmanship" $\longrightarrow$ parties attempt to create conflict on issue even when there is no ideologically reason to.

- **Argument:** ideological disagreement doesn't account for all party conflict in Congress; disagreement between parties is also attributable to a *competitive struggle* for office and influence $\longrightarrow$ "partisan brinkmanship".
  - Many issues in Congress cannot be arrayed on spectrum from liberal to conservative (e.g., distributive policy, ethics reforms, other valence issues)
    - Ideology alone cannot structure congressional voting on issues that do not fall along ideological spectrum
    - Instead, members' *political* interests can create party conflict even in the absence of ideological *preferences*.
  - Therefore, only some party voting is traceable to ideological preferences $\longrightarrow$ parties are institutions with members who share interests in winning *elections* and wielding *power* – these collective interests are zero-sum across parties $\longrightarrow$ conflict even without ideological differences

- **Data/Methods:** original classification of roll-call votes in the Senate by whether they pertain to issues that divide liberals and conservatives in American politics
  - Based on bill/amendment language, Congressional Record of discussions
  - Ideological issues: able to specify which position is liberal/conservative
    - Economic issues: regulatory and redistributive government programs,
    - Social issues: issues of individual equality/freedom in opposition to moral/social order (e.g., abortion, school prayer, affirmative action, crime)
    - Hawks/doves: use of force, distribution of resources to military defense
    - Multi/unilateralism: international treaties, international institutions

  - Non-ideological issues: tend to be valence issues
    * Good-government causes: liberals and conservatives both believed to support efficiency, competence, integrity of government (anti-corruption!)
    * Institutional powers: no consistent liberal/conservative position on roles/procedures for different institutions of government
    * Non-regulatory/non-redistributive domestic programs: e.g., science/medical research, space exploration

- **Findings:** much larger proportion of party vs. non-party votes had ideological content, but almost half (44%) of party votes concerned non-ideological issues
  - Relatively little change in the proportion of party conflict over ideological issues across Congresses (over time)
  - Heterogeneity: differences in party voting across ideological issues: economy most partisan, multilateralism least.
  - Polarization vs. teamsmanship: some evidence of ideological polarization: increased partisanship more pronounced on ideological vs. non-ideological issues
    * However, increasing conflict not confined to ideological issues – suggest rise in partisan conflict not just about polarization of party platforms but also about "more effective partisan coordination across the board"
    * Greater part of the agenda taken up by polarizing issues like the economy

- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Member goals: electoral interests are tied to collective records of parties, so need to maintain a party brand as a public good (Cox and McCubbins 2005)
  - Root of Lee 2016 in that competition necessitates conflict
  - More evidence against Krehbiel 1993 that congressional parties are weak – they are able to influence votes on things that don't fall neatly on a liberal/conservative or Democratic/Republican spectrum

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Andrew J. Clarke. 2020. "Party Sub-Brands and American Party Factions." *American Journal of Political Science* 64, no. 3 (July): 452–470

- **Key Takeaway:** In addition to being members of legislative parties, inter-party factions (e.g., the Tea Party or the Green New Deal coalition) exist to allow legislators to define themselves more as individuals and acquire resources that reflect their interests $\longrightarrow$ adds a wrinkle to the level of homogeneity parties sometimes need to accomplish their goals

- **Argument:** Ideological factions provide party sub-brands, which allow legislators to more precisely define their partisan type and capture faction-specific resources
  - Builds on idea from Aldrich that parties provide brands and parties-in-the-legislature create institutions to ensure members don't want to defect and are electorally protected (do this by selecting officers/committee chairs, setting the agenda). *Ideological factions* lack procedural capacity for agenda control, but consolidate political resources as a means of unifying their voting bloc
  - Faction membership provides members with a branding that can (1) communicate ideological identity and (2) after repeated exposure, branding provides voters/donors with more certainty about how representatives will operate in Congress

  - Factions do not compete with party brands: they offer a complementary identity, anchored to the political party, that allows legislators to appeal to niche markets of political supporters.

- **Data/Methods:** examines 9 ideological factions in House from 1995-2018; examines ideology with DW-NOMINATE scores (fixed effect models), FEC data for campaign donations (difference-in-differences)

- **Findings:**

  - Political product: Factions vote in ideologically distinct ways, suggesting a product ripe for party sub-branding; faction leaders spend a significant amount of time communicating their sub-brand information to the general public, but faction members don't necessarily state it as explicitly
  - Faction donor base: joining a faction changes the ideological composition of a candidate's donor base, conditional on the strength of the faction's institutions (Blue Dog with the biggest effect, New Democrat Coalition small, and Tea Party Caucus no effect)

- **Critiques:** Does not explore other roles these ideological factions play: each faction often has their own website, media team, leadership – helps build notoriety for other members and these leadership position offer additional opportunities for members to have influence within the chamber

- **Relevant Literature:**

  - Role of party brands: Aldrich 2011, Cox and McCubbins 2005
  - Member goals (think Mayhew, Fenno): ideological factions provide new ways to take positions, advertise

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Evidence of Party Influence

Keith Krehbiel. 1993. "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (2): 235–266

- **Key Takeaway:** What we think are the effects of party influence really are a manifestation of member preferences.

- **Argument:** Presence of party voting $\neq$ party strength, as party voting can occur even if parties don't induce a shift from sincere to operative preferences $\longrightarrow$ individual legislators vote with their party because of *policy agreement* rather than *in spite of policy disagreement*

  - Significant party behavior: "behavior that is consistent with known party policy objectives but that is contrary to personal preferences" $\longrightarrow$ operationalized as "behavior that is consistent with known party policy objectives but that is independent of personal preferences"

- **Data/Methods:** examines two procedural decisions, which he assumes would be more partisan than voting (see also: Ansolabehere et al. 2001b), in the 99th Congress

  - Cases: two stages of legislative process: (1) assignment of members to standing committees, (2) assignment of members to conference committees
  - Standing committees: examines committee-interest group rating pairs and examines whether assignment to that committee is influenced by party, preferences, or an interaction of party and preferences
  - Conference committees: same model, with additional controls for information/specialization effects of different committees

- **Findings:** after control for preferences, party effects are relatively rare in terms of assignment to both standing and conference committees
  - Committee assignments: seats allocated based on ideology vs. partisanship
  - Conferees: appointed based on committee, House seniority, not partisanship
- **Critiques:** measures of preferences are based on roll-call votes, which may be constrained by party influence (see: Cox and McCubbins 2005), making it impossible to detangle preference and party
- **Relevant Literature:** response to Rohde 1991 and others who suggest that parties and leadership exert strong influence over legislative process – it's all about preferences (though Ansolabehere et al. 2001b say party does have an independent effect on roll-call voting, even after controlling for preferences)
  - Krehbiel 1999 builds on this, further making the point that there is observational equivalence between voting on basis of party and voting based on preferences, especially when parties are polarized
    - Party strength: parties said to be strong exactly when, based on a simple spatial model, they appear to be superfluous (due to role of preferences) $\longrightarrow$ when conditions for CPG are met, voting on the basis of party vs. preferences is observationally equivalent; instead, it is precisely when parties are divided that leadership can be more persuasive, influential over voting behavior
    - Lawmaking: theories of party influence over lawmaking are observationally equivalent with committee power, pivotal politics
    - Party voting: party voting occurs even when all legislators ignore partisan identities; measures of this concept cannot distinguish partisan vs. non-partisan roll-call voting behavior
    - Majority-party deck stacking: evidence for procedural deck-stacking again goes in opposite direction of predictions based on partisanship $\longrightarrow$ partisan behavior in procedural voting have the same appearance as behavior driven by individual policy preferences
  - Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman 1999: contra Krehbiel, finds evidence of independent party effects on legislative behavior so long as interest groups scores are not used to measure policy preferences (these scores conflated with party influence because they reflect party agendas themselves) – instead, use *non-partisan* interest group socres along with measures of institutional interests, electoral security, and party affiliation

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Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart III. 2001b. "The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26, no. 4 (November): 533

- **Key Takeaway:** Party has an independent effect on roll-call voting, even after controlling for policy preferences
- **Argument:** party has an independent effect on roll-call voting, even after controlling for policy preferences. The strength of party influence depends on four factors: close votes (leaders should only "buy" votes when these votes are likely to change outcomes), procedural votes (party influence stronger for procedural vs. final passage votes, as the latter are more visible as Arnold 1990 found); party issues (parties are interested in maintaining their "brands" as Cox and McCubbins suggest, especially within certain domains); asymmetry (vote buying for moderates vs. majority status)
- **Data/Methods:** examine how well party and preferences (as measured in 1996-1998 NPAT) predict overall roll-call voting, as well as voting on specific bills

- **Findings:** both party *and* preferences matter in predicting roll-call behavior during these three Congresses. However, independent effects of party present only for 40% of roll-call votes
  - Moderates within the parties, as evidenced by NPAT scores, still have roll-call voting scores that are consistent with their party
  - Even when Democrats and Republicans have identical NPAT scores, their voting records are highly different
  - Heterogeneity: party effects largest on *close* votes, *procedural* votes, and defining "party" issues, smallest on matters of conscience (e.g., abortion, gun control)
- **Critiques:** Study is hard to replicate given the fact that candidate surveys are likely to have very low response rates now
- **Relevant Literature:** response to Krehbiel 1993 on the weakness of parties by actually attempting to measure party and preferences separately – finds that party does matter

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Committees

Richard F. Fenno. 1962. "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration." *American Political Science Review* 56, no. 2 (June): 310–324

- **Key Takeaway:** Congressional committees of the "Textbook Congress" era were characteristic of "committee integration"—as exemplified by the House Appropriations Committee—and marked by restrained partisanship, division of labor, and unity through a clear consensus of goals.
- **Main points:** Examining the House Appropriation Committees (1947-1961) as a case study, posits concept of *committee integration*: degree to which there is a working together or meshing together or mutual support among its roles and subgroups – requires ways to minimize and deal with internal conflicts, primarily through widely-agreed norms and control mechanisms (e.g., socialization and sanctioning). Appropriations is characteristic of the "Textbook Congress" era in which high committee integration translated into parties not meaning much.
  - Defining characteristics of Appropriations:
    1. Clear consensus on goals or tasks: main task to guard Federal Treasury, serve critical role in process of funding government – notably, this might come at the expense of a member helping their own district but "no member is expected to commit electoral suicide"
    2. Subject matter: deal regular with same sets of money issues, less directly with difficult policy decisions; because appropriations is a yearly process, it promotes familiarity $\longrightarrow$ dollars/cents provides more freedom in negotiations than policy questions
    3. Members' legislative orientation: "responsible legislators" who follow the norms of the House, willing to give-and-take, those from safe districts who are capable of compromise, more senior members who have learned norms
    4. Attractiveness of membership: committee is powerful because it controls government spending; becoming a member allows congressmen to be known as a hard worker
    5. Membership stability: it's a coveted position, so people wait their turn to get a position and stay $\longrightarrow$ creates stable leadership groups, ability to internalize committee norms, time to learn the ropes
  - Work of the committee: primarily in subcommittees; marked by internal unity, minimal dissent, minimal partisanship, specialization, reciprocity, and deference – values that help minimize conflict, ensure committee is not rolled on the House floor (not being rolled helps the committee maintain its reputation of power and prestige)

  - Importance of apprenticeships: junior member sit back and learn from senior leaders (e.g., chair and ranking member who work together knowing full well their roles could reverse)

- **Relevant Literature:** concrete example of the Rayburn era Cooper and Brady (1981) describe, result of what happens when conditional party government conditions are not met; Fenno (1973) provides a more thorough explanation of committees broadly in a more rational choice view (this piece is more sociologocial); work related to norms like Matthews (1959)

  - Berry and Fowler 2016: updated look at rewards of Appropriations Committee, finds that chair of Appropriations subcommittees (called the "cardinals") generate more funding for their constituents only from programs within their jurisdiction (this opposes a larger literature suggesting broadly that important committee positions allow members to procure more funds for their constituents)
  - Hanson 2017: even today, continuance of nonpartisan norms because all members have a variety of interests – benefit both from their party's reputation and their ability to claim credit for accomplishments $\longrightarrow$ while today's members place greater weight on strong party reputation it is still in their interest to work across party lines to pass spending legislation (include minority support for bills, open debate).

Richard F. Fenno. 1973. *Congressmen in Committees.* Boston: Little Brown

- **Key Takeaway:** The Textbook Congress era was marked by a strong committee system and the way each committee operated was function of how members sought to use them to achieve their goals of (1) re-election, (2) influence in the House, and (3) good public policy (secondary goals include careers outside House or private gain)

- **Argument:** congressional committees matter, but they differ from one another in terms of their ability to fulfill members' goals, along five dimensions

  - Member goals: members of each congressional committee have goals they want to achieve via committees, and different committees serve different goals
    - Goals: (1) re-election, (2) influence in the House, and (3) good public policy (secondary goals include careers outside House or private gain)
  - Environmental constraints: committees experience environmental constraints (e.g., influential external groups) – structure to satisfy these groups' expectations.
    - External constraints: (1) members of the "parent House," (2) members of the executive, (3) interest groups, and (4) leaders of political parties
    - The types of external groups that constrain committees influence behavior within committees – even if goals are uniform.
  - Strategic premises: committees have agreed-upon prescriptions for decision-making (decision rules) that enable accommodation of member, external interests
  - Decision-making process: internal processes, based on strategies (decision rules)
    - Considerations: (1) how manage internal partisanship, (2) participation-specialization (scope of subcommittees), (3) leadership (style, personality)
  - Decisions: committee decisions reflect decision-making rules and processes.

- **Data/Methods:** case studies + semi-structured interviews of six committees of the House between 1955-1966 (Democratic control): (1) Appropriations, (2) Education and Labor, (3) Foreign Affairs, (4) Interior, (5) Post Office, and (6) Ways and Means



- **Findings:**
  - Member goals: Appropriations and Ways & Means tied to influence in the House (prestigious, can exercise control over "money power")
    - Interior and Post Office are tied to re-election goals, as they involve constituent service
    - Education & Labor and Foreign Affairs are tied to public policy, driven by strong personal interest in the issues
  - Environmental constraints: Appropriations and Ways & Means are driven by other members of the House, though Appropriations also executive-led, W&M tied to interest groups
    - Interior and Post Office driven by constituents, local organizations, though Interior has more fragmented interests than Post Office
    - Education & Labor and Foreign Affairs have different policy coalitions, with Foreign Affairs executive-led and E&L shaped by *all* groups jockeying for power
  - Strategic premises: Appropriations, Ways & Means, and Interior have consensus on decision rules/norms, oriented around securing success on the floor
    - In contrast, Post Office, Foreign Affairs, and Education & Labor lack consensus, orientation toward success on the floor
  - Decision-making processes: W&M, Appropriations, Interior more autonomous than Foreign Affairs, E&L, Post Office
- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Part of Fenno's typology of multiple member goals – beyond just re-election (Mayhew 1974) – arguing that standing committees were the primary means for members to pursue these goals
  - Independence and committee autonomy may have reflected the relatively low levels of partisan polarization, enabling more internal consensus and avoiding internecine conflicts $\longrightarrow$ CPG (Aldrich and Rohde) would suggest that increasing intra-party homogeneity, inter-party heterogeneity of the 70s should have decreased committee autonomy, shifted power to leadership

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Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power." *American Political Science Review* 81 (1): 85–104

- **Key Takeaway:** Committees ensure preferred outcomes are outcomes thanks to both their control over the agenda in their jurisidiction and the ability to monopolize the conference committee stage.
- **Argument:** committees so powerful because they have multiple opportunities to enforce policy wishes: (1) *agenda-setting* stage, (2) *conference* stage
  - Explanation of committee power rests in rules governing the sequence of *proposing*, *amending*, and *vetoing* in the legislative process $\longrightarrow$ the last stage of legislative process, where bicameral differences are resolved (conference stage), plays surprisingly important role
  - Committees may hold power due to: (1) *veto* power (gatekeeping), (2) advantages in *information* and *expertise*, (3) *proposal* power
    - Committees can enforce deference via: (1) *punishment*, (2) *ex ante* defensive behavior, (3) *ex post* defensive behavior
    - *Ex post* veto sufficient to make gatekeeping and proposal power effective, even if these powers seem to arise from informal reciprocity arrangements
- **Data/Methods:** formal modeling of decision-making process, assuming Committee C in jurisdiction X has agenda powers: (1) *ex ante* veto power, (2) monopoly proposal power (though, once proposed, competing amendments allowed), and (3) *ex post* veto power
- **Findings:** Reciprocity and deference wouldn't be equilibrium outcome if C just had ex ante veto power (gatekeeping) and proposal power. In contrast, *ex post* veto can confer offensive advantages by conditioning prior behaviors of other actors $\longrightarrow$ prevents rolling.
- **Critiques:** Getting to the conference stage is becoming more rare and this model doesn't consider bicameral legislatures where different parties control each chamber
  - Park, Smith, and Vander Wielen 2017 examine three key factors that have shaped post-passage politics: (1) competitiveness of parties, (2) distribution of preferences, (3) inherited institutions
    - Competition: while it can generate a party-oriented legislative process, also creates tensions within parties about strategy and concern about outcomes $\longrightarrow$ electoral interests motivate parties to have a stronger hand at post-passage stage, replacing traditional conference committees for negotiations within caucus and leadership meetings
    - Polarization: leaders less willing to trust conference committees in uncertain and hostile environments $\longrightarrow$ reduce role of minority delegation in conference, informal discussions/negotiations among leaders to avoid procedural obstacles
    - Institutions: reforms to budgetary process enables policymaking in reconciliation bills, produces omnibus-style bills means what was once decentralized, committee-by-committee, bill-by-bill legislative process now replaced by a few bills, constructed by budget committees in some cases, and always supervised by top party leaders $\longrightarrow$ naturally decreased number of conferences needed; sunshine laws reduce ability of committee to act without constraint; multiple referrals give leaders more control over policy considerations; recorded, electronic voting for amendment give non-committee incentives to introduce amendments
    - Overall, this change to "regular order" has consequences: reduces incentives for individual rank-and-file members to become policy experts (rely on leaders instead), decreased transparency, reduced ability of minority members to shape outcomes, possibly more extreme outcomes
- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Stewart (2012): Decline in conference committees in favor of using majority party leadership, executive officials, or lobbyists, means that committee power at the ex post stage has been greatly diminished

- Tied to literature on committees as stability inducers, due to (1) gatekeeping power of committees, (2) distribution of policy to committees through jurisdictional system, (3) germaneness rules restricting policy alternatives to single dimension

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General Institutional Structure

Donald R. Matthews. 1959. "The Folkways of the United States Senate: Conformity to Group Norms and Legislative Effectiveness." *American Political Science Review* 53, no. 4 (December): 1064–1089

- **Key Takeaway:** The US Senate was marked by a set of norms that governed the decorum through which members went about their business – these seem very outdated in today's sense.
- **Research Method:** Several months of close personal observation and interviewing of senators, congressional staff members, lobbyists and Capitol Hill journalists.
- **Argument**: Think of the US Senate as a "club" with a set of accepted and informally enforced norms – these very much mirror what Fenno 1962 discusses
  1. Apprenticeship: junior members first take the assignments, offices, seat that senior members do not want; expected to listen and learn, stay silent, seek advice $\longrightarrow$ a process more difficult for some Senators who feel the need to create a record right away
  2. Legislative work: devote majority of time to *boring* and detailed legislative work, instead of aiming to gain publicity and personal advancement, in order to gain respect from his colleagues in the Senate $\longrightarrow$ the difference between "show horses" and "work horses"
  3. Specialization: needed because it's impossible for Senators to devote attention to all bills, should focus on things most relevant to their state $\longrightarrow$ helps keep the Senate (a place of unlimited debate) moving – division of labor system created with committees helps keep workload manageable and ensures issues get necessary expert attention
  4. Courtesy: political disagreements should not influence personal feelings – seniority helps, deqorum requirements (e.g., addressing "Mr. President," the "gentlemen from X")
  5. Reciprocity: a senator ought to provide their assistance, and then be repaid in kind – logrolling policy but also vetoes (not filibustering)
  6. Institutional patriotism: expected to believe they are in the world's greatest deliberative body, be suspicious of other branches and bureaucracy
- **Relevant Literature**:
  - Sinclair 2017a: describes shift away from these folkways – by the 1970s, Senate more outward looking, senators took advantage of extended debate and amendment process for own purposes, cohesive parties exploit rules for partisan advantages creating a procedural arms race $\longrightarrow$ filibusters more frequent, targeted and used for wider range of legislation; oppose nominees as a bargaining chip; offering nongermane amendments at higher rates; placing holds before unanimous consent agreements; majority leaders now lead policy, bypassing committees at higher rates; higher opposition on "motion[s] to proceed" (which makes 60 votes necessary for basically everything)

Nelson W. Polsby. 1968. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives." *American Political Science Review* 62 (1): 144–168

- **Key Takeaway:** There is set of criteria that helps identify the extent to which Congress has "institutionalized" from the way membership has stabilized, members have created a division-of-labor system, and more universalistic in the procedures they undertake.
- **Argument:** an organization is institutionalized if it is (1) relatively *well-bounded* (members are easily identifiable, relatively difficult to become a member, leaders are recruited principally from within, less turnover, longer apprenticeships); (2) relatively *complex* (functions are internally separated, there is a division of labor); and (3) use *universalistic* rather than particularistic criteria, and *automatic* rather than discretionary methods for conducting internal business (precedents and rules are followed, merit systems replace favoritism and nepotism, impersonal codes for behavior). In Congress, reflected Durkheim's division of labor theory: as responsibilities of government grew, larger proportion of national economy affected by federal government, organizations of federal government institutionalized. Result is a Congress that gives incentives to stay; opportunities to exert influence within areas; decentralization of power (more jobs to be had), great emphasis on courtesy, reciprocity, and predictability.
- **Data/Methods:** summary statistics from historical records related to a range of measures related to these criteria
- **Findings:**
  - Establishment of boundaries: terms of service have lengthened through the 1950s (greater seniority), speakers served more terms before getting that position, speakership became a position coveted at end of career rather than one you hop back and forth from (as Henry Clay did), development of a House leadership group
  - Growth of internal complexity: growth in the autonomy and importance of committees; specialized agencies of party leadership (e.g., creation of floor leaders, party whips); funding for office space, salaries, allowances, staff aid, and committee staffs
    - Committee phases: (1) early on few standing committees; (2) Jefferson used them and they became connected to presidential parties; (3) Henry Clay made them a creature of the House/speaker; (4) committees are an institutional fixture – fixed jurisdictions, leadership determined by seniority, work is specialized, have discretion in their domain
  - Universalistic decision-making: seniority in committee chair selection, sit on fewer committees and ones relevant to your district, more incumbent-bias in debates over contested elections
- **Critiques:** focused on an era of Congress that doesn't really exist anymore
- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Jenkins and Stewart 2018: Reevaluate these metrics with new data, finding: careerism has plateaued (turnover increasing slightly, especially among Republicans given their skepticism of government); House remains complex but lateral movement between committee and party leadership reestablished itself (parties more quickly going to the bench to replace leadership); seniority system now almost non existent (now just one of many goals; prospective committee leaders need to demonstrate they are aligned with party goals and ability to position-take in interest of party brand)
  - Related to work focused on norms of the "Textbook Congress" era like Matthews (1959) and Fenno (1962)

Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets." *Journal of Political Economy* 96 (1): 132–163

- **Key Takeaway:** Extending theories of organization, argues that legislative institutions exist to structure and enforce bargains among legislator, ensuring the preferred policies and the coalitions that support them are durable.
- **Argument:**
  - Extends theories of organization to argue that legislative institutions are structured to enforce bargains from legislators and ensure these bargains are durable $\longrightarrow$ durability of policies + and coalitions supporting these policies
  - Crux of the problem: legislators try to provide benefits for their constituents but need others to get that done $\longrightarrow$ require "trading partners" in a market exchange but this requires individuals to know bills and their potential outcomes
  - Because current legislators cannot bind future legislative session and are concerned with problems of enforcement $\longrightarrow$ devise institutions for long-term durability of agreements that extend benefits beyond the current session – key to these institutions is repeated interaction
  - In Congress, durability is supported by committee system (have control over specific areas, seniority for seats, vacant seats are filled, agenda control prevents ex post reneging and worries about simultaneity); coalitions need to include relevant committee members; committee property rights ensure that there aren't large swings in policy within domains with small changes in Congress' composition
  - Key takeaway: when the members of committees are those who want it, policy choice parallels a more explicit exchange system $\longrightarrow$ because exchange is institutionalized, it is subject to fewer enforcement problems
- **Critiques:** congressmen represent interests within their districts; parties place no constraints on individual behavior; majority rule is a constant
- **Relevant Literature:** Echoes Fiorina 1987's idea that committees facilitate a "comprehensive logrolling arrangement" among members $\longrightarrow$ this is a demand-side explanation of congressional organization

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Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. 1994. "Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions." *Legislative Studies Quarterly,* 149–179

- **Key Takeaway:** A review of theoretical research on legislative institutions with a focus on the purposes they serve and why they are created.
- **Key points**:
  - Demand side: there are "gains from exchange" $\longrightarrow$ individual legislators benefit from swapping areas of influence through institutions like the committee system (cite Fiorina 1987 for idea of "comprehensive logrolling arrangement")
  - Supply side:
    - Legislative institutions provide information (cite Krehibel): legislators do not know exactly how policies will translate into outcomes (*uncertainty postulate*) and thus majorities creates institutions (*majoritiarian postulate)* that can gather necessary information and expertise
      - Krehbiel and Gilligan 1987; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990: by definition a committee with expertise knows the precise consequences of legislation in its jurisdiction $\longrightarrow$ (1) committee are useful to the legislature when it specializes in a policy that it would be costly for rest of legislature to be ignorant about; (2) it's best when preferences of

legislature and committee are similar; (3) if committee too extreme, no one benefits from specialization; (4) more uncertain we are about a policy area, more moderate committee preferences should be (e.g., Appropriations, Ways and Means)

- Curry 2019: from interviews with staffers and members (2005-2008), shows that while many traditional legislative practices have eroded, rank-and-file members (often pressed for time, have other competing priorities) rely on knowledgeable lawmakers—especially the senior committee members and staff—for information and cues on how to vote on proposals related to committee's domain $\longrightarrow$ when committee leaders communicate cues about floor amendments, influence likelihood fellow lawmakers vote to support/oppose and influence likelihood amendments adopted/rejected
- Critique from Shepsle: relies on the assumption of a single policy dimension – eliminates the possibility of legislative and political exchange across *different* issues

* Parties help legislator's achieve their election goals (cite Cox and McCubbins): when majorities are sufficiently homogeneous, redesign legislative institutions and practices to suit their needs $\longrightarrow$ parties provide reputations, have access to most of important positions in legislatures and control what gets through
  - Critique from Shepsle: problem with how party members' preferences are aggregated – there is a more of a middle ground where party as strong organizers can coexist with strong committees; Cox and McCubbins tests of their theory based on NOMINATE scores, which are endogenous to what actually gets to the floor, doesn't say anything about member preferences

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Sarah A. Binder. 1997. *Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress.* 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, June

- **Key Takeaway:** Minority rights are conditional on shape of partisan forces within the institution
- **Argument:**
  - Far from enjoying iron-clad protection, minority rights are conditional on shape of partisan forces within the institution – members are policy focused and know the success of achieving those goals depend on set of rules $\longrightarrow$ minority parties historically lose parliamentary rights when majority party member believe rules changes necessary to secure favored outcomes; minority parties recoup rights when cross-party coalitions emerge to demand new rights from a weakened majority party
    * Definition of minority rights: procedural advantages protected from arbitrary change that enable members of the minority party to amend, debate, or obstruct the majority agenda
  - Partisan need alone not the only explanation – also need a sufficiently large majority willing to enact rule changes (i.e., majority can't be factionaized) $\longrightarrow$ inherited rules will dictate the ease with which a winning majority will form (determines how large coalition needs to be, costs of creating coalition)
- **Findings:**
  - Minority rights more often surpressed in House – in mid-1800s, minority members relied on individual rights (disappering quorum, offering motions) and there was little majority could do $\longrightarrow$ after Reed Rules, majority collected more floor and agenda control
  - Minority rights flourished in Senate when they dropped previous question rule: no means short of unanimous consent to constrain members seeking to amend legislation or debate it indefinitely

- Restrictive rule changes in House primarily reflect *short-term* policy goals of majority (e.g., Reed Rules passed to limit dilatory tactics by ending disappearing quorum and eliminating dilatory motions during 1880 election cases, consideration of tariff; in 1970s reforms, once liberals gained control, willing to limit quorum calls and increasingly suspend rules) – this is opposed to other alternative hypotheses arguing that overall distribution of rights a function of expanding size of Congress and increased workload
    - Key takeaway: the House as a partisan, majoritarian institution wasn't inevitable: instead, it was intentional choice of majorities seeking to achieve short-term goals but existing institutional always provides a wrinkle as they give minority ways to obstruct the majority $\longrightarrow$ minority exploitation of inherited rules has a substantial impact on change in minority rights as majority parties realize a partisan need for changing rules of the game

- **Critiques:** Broadly historical, focuses exclusively on rights to debate and delay without a focus on the ability of minority members to influence actual policy outcomes (as Ballard and Curry 2021 do)

- **Relevant Literature:**
    - More of a historical application to existing theories on the organization of legislative parties: like CPG, focuses on the necessity of cohesive and policy-focused majorities to enact change; like Procedural Cartel Theory, focuses on the capacity of majorities to prevent minorities from taking actions that could roll majority and broadly killing the agenda
    - Similar to Ballard and Curry (2021) who emphasize the degree of majority constraint as a factor associated with the extent of minorities to influence the legislative process
    - Parallels Bloch Rubin 2013's story about the Cannon Revolt and ability of cohesive minority, as part of a cross-party coalition, to enact change

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Eric Schickler. 2001. *Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress.* Princeton: Princeton University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** The politics of institutional change in Congress can be explained by conflicting logics tied up with interests of individual members at different points in time.

- **Argument:** Changes reflects "multiple interests" that are a function of the numerous goals members have $\longrightarrow$ together, these interests makes "disjointed pluralism" central feature of institutional development
    - *Disjointed pluralism*: idea that dynamics of institutional development derive from the interactions and tensions among competing coalitions promoting different interests
        - Interests include: (1) reelection; (2) institutional capacity, power, and prestige; (3) member access to institutional power bases; (4) success of party; (4) policy outcomes
            - Reelection: Explicitly makes the point that reelection as an interest on its own not enough – values of reelection depends in part on how powerful and prestigious Congress is as an institution
            - Institutional capacity, power, prestige: some (e.g., Dodd 1977, Sundquist 1981) would argue strong party leaders for Congress to make coherent, effective policies and compete with Executive Branch; others (e.g., Krehbiel 1981), argue that strong committee system facilitate information gathering and thus policymaking
            - Institutional power bases: influx of junior members (who want their own power) can lead to institutional changes (Diermier 1995), but this goal might come at the cost of fragmenting authority and thus Congress' capacity and power by impeding ability to enact responses to policy problems (Dodd 1977)

Collective Interest	*Group for Whom It Is a Good*	*Predicted Authority Structure*
Reelection	Incumbents (vs. challengers)	
perks for incumbents (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977)		Decentralized incumbent cartel
particularistic goods and pork (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977; Fenno 1973)		Decentralized incumbent cartel
opportunities for individual entrepreneurial action (Mayhew 1974; Loomis 1988)		Individualistic entrepreneurship; decentralized committee system
position-taking devices (Mayhew 1974; Arnold 1990)		Decentralized incumbent cartel
Congress-centered		
congressional capacity and power (Dodd 1977; Sundquist 1981; Cooper 1988; Davidson and Oleszek 1976)	Congress as a whole (vs. executive)	Integrative mechanisms and central leadership instruments
policy expertise (Krehbiel 1991; Maass 1983)		Informationally efficient committee system controlled by floor
congressional prestige and popularity (Matthews 1960; Born 1990; Jacobson 1993)	Congress as a whole	Predictions unclear
chamber capacity and power (Diermeier and Myerson 2000)	Chamber (vs. other chamber)	Integrative mechanisms; multiple veto points
Individual power bases (Dodd 1977; Loomis 1988)	Juniors (vs. seniors)	Individualistic entrepreneurship; decentralized committee system
Party-centered		
majority party reputation and effectiveness (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rohde 1991)	In-party (vs. out-party)	Party cartel or conditional party government
Policy-based		
ideological success (Krehbiel 1998; Schickler 2000)	Ideological bloc (vs. opposing bloc)	Rules promote policy positions of median voter on floor
sectional benefits (Bensel 1984; Holcombe 1925)	Regional bloc (vs. other regions)	Predictions unclear
sectoral benefits (Shepsle and Weingast 1984; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Hansen 1990; Burns 1949)	Bloc based on producer interests (vs. consumers or other producers)	Decentralized committee system

Figure 6: Summary of Collective Interests and Implications

· Policy-based interests: as median voter moves closer to majority party, will work with party to strengthen leaders' agenda control (Schickler 2000); policy-goals may also divide members based on sectional/sectoral blocs

- Key claims:
  1. Multiple collective interests typically shape each important change in congressional institutions – can lead to "common carrier" changers where multiple groups are in support (e.g., 1970 reforms)
  2. Entrepreneurial members build support for reform by framing proposals that appeal to groups motivated by different interests – do so to help party gain power, but even nonpartisan changes can also create personal power or electoral rewards for proposer
  3. Congressional institutions typically develop through an accumulation of innovations that are inspired by competing motives, which engenders a tense layering of new arrangements on top of preexisting structures – reminiscent of Orren and Skowronek discussions of institutional layering, often reflection of path-dependence (Pierson 1988) $\longrightarrow$ often not a master plan to institutional structure, often contradictory, reflecting conflicting interests
  4. Adoption of a series of changes intended to promote one type of interest typically will provoke contradictory changes that promote competing interests (e.g., tension of boosting party power at expense of taking power away from individual members)

- **Data/Methods:** examines institutional changes in four periods (1890-1910, 1919-32, 1937-1952, and 1970-89) using roll-call, sponsorship, transcripts, newspaper accounts, etc. to test the following hypotheses with a focus on changes to rules, committee system, and leadership instruments:

  1. Electoral interests matter more as member careerism increases (Mayhew 1974)
  2. Congressional capacity and power more salient when president has gained influence at Congress' expense (Dodd 1977; Sundquist 1981)
  3. Members' interest in institutional power bases generate pressure for decentralization following an influx of junior members that substantially alters the seniority distribution (Dodd 1986; Diermeier 1995)
  4. Majority party interests will be particularly important when majority is homogeneous and ideologically distinct from minority (Rohde 1991)
  5. Policy-based interests generate pressure for institutional change when electoral shocks and exogenous factors substantially shift location of the median floor voter (Krehbiel 1998; Schickler 2000).

- **Findings:** more than one interest determines institutional change within each period, that different interests are important in different periods, and, more broadly, that changes in the salient collective interests across time do not follow a simple logical or developmental sequence

  - Historical findings:
    * 1890-1910: minority interests were key to shaping House rules under Reed and Cannon; though Cannon Revolt removed some changes, not all were eliminated, thus layering new tools for cross-party coalitions
    * 1919-1932: ideological concerns interacted with members' personal power interests to promote reforms that loosened majority leaders' agenda control
    * 1937-1952: main interests were defending Congress from expanding presidential power (which came mostly under FDR) – included Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and increase in congressional investigations
    * 1970-1989: resurgence of party interests with influx of new junior members seeking power bases, helping Congress stand its grown against other branches, goal of policy outcomes

- Accommodating multiple interests more important for formal rule changes (getting a majority floor coalition requires broader appeals and changes) which explains why most 1970s reforms within the caucus; downside is that formal rule changes bind all members and are harder to reverse $\longrightarrow$ median voter model better in explaining formal rules changes than informal changes
- Entrepreneurs focused on a range of reforms (both floor-approved and caucus), consisted of both party leaders (typically focused on party interests) and backbenchers (often part of cross-party coalitions as in Cannon Revolt)
- Effectiveness of institutional change often compromised by need to accommodate preexisting authority structures that privilege other interests (e.g., stripping Speaker's control over Rules in 1910, but maintaining most of the Committee's power over scheduling)
- Innovation often focused on helping a single interest often provokes response (e.g., strong leadership of Jim Wright reflected push for strong party leaders, but resentment surfaced from GOP and rank-and-file Democrats)
- Little evidence that reelection interests drives development (with exception of boom LRA, boom in Senate obstructionism) – more broadly, given that changes are often zero-sum (helping some members at expense of others), there is not a *common* interest in reelection
- Even though several reforms involved junior members' dispersing power, timing does not often coincide with changes in *number* of junior members

- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Extends the idea from Fenno 1973 that members have multiple goals and thus explicitly opposes idea from Mayhew 1974 that reelection is all that matters
  - Rejects idea from Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007 and Weingast and Marshall that suggest legislative institutions reflect a single collective interest across congressional history

Lawmaking

Interbranch Relationships

Keith Krehbiel. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press

- **Key Takeaway**: the ability to pass policy is contingent on the size of the gridlock interval, measured as the distance between the *filibuster* and *veto* pivots
- **Argument**: a parsimonious theory of lawmaking is consistent with two facts
  1. Gridlock: "persistent inability to enact major legislation when majorities on Capitol Hill and/or president seem to prefer these enactments to status quo" $\longrightarrow$ gridlock occurs often, but not always (*common, not constant*)
  2. Large bipartisan coalitions: sufficient condition to break gridlock is simple majority in Congress to vote, president to sign – but coalitions are usually larger than minimum-majority-sized
- **Assumptions**:
  - Policy space: unidimensional policy space, with exogenous status quo q
  - Players and preferences: lawmakers (president, n legislators in unicameral legislature), each having an ideal point, single-peaked, symmetric utility function
    - Assume perfect information about the locations of other players $\longrightarrow$ rational anticipation
    - Utility is totally determined by policy preferences, not other goals
  - Procedures: ability to enact policies affected by two super-majoritarian procedures – (1) presidential *veto*, (2) Senate *filibuster*
  - Pivot: 3 pivotal legislators – (1) median voter, (2) veto pivot, (3) filibuster pivot
    - Veto point: if president on the left (right) of median voter, legislator for whom ideal point and all points to the right (left) make up exactly or just more than 2/3 of legislature
    - Filibuster point: if president on left (right) side of median voter, then legislator for whom ideal point and all to the left (right) make up exactly or just over 3/5 of legislature



Figure 7: Pivotal legislators if the president is liberal

  - Sequence of play:
    1. Median voter m chooses bill b or chooses to accept SQ q
    2. If bill b proposed, filibuster pivot f decides to mount filibuster $\longrightarrow q$
    3. If f does not filibuster, president p decides whether to sign/veto bill
    4. If p vetoes bill, veto pivot $v$decides whether to sustain or override veto
  - Equilibrium and gridlock: "absence of policy change in equilibrium in spite of the existence of a legislative majority that favors change" $\longrightarrow$ gridlock occurs when a pivotal player chooses q over b (or chooses q directly), unless $q = m$

- **Conditions for gridlock and change**:
  - Full convergence: when status quo is extreme relative to ideal points of president, pivotal legislators $\longrightarrow$ m adopted (intervals I, V) – relatively uncommon
  - Partial convergence: when status quo lies in interval II, IV, tempered version of $b \neq m$, in order to make f or v indifferent between b, q $\longrightarrow$ no filibuster or veto
  - Gridlock: centrally located status quo (interval III), where moderate coalitions can always resist moves in either direction $\longrightarrow$ when q already moderate, cloture/veto procedures prevent further convergence to a centrally located policy



Figure 8: Equilibrium policies in the pivotal politics theory

- **Empirics**: using multiple regression analysis to look at legislative activity in Congress 1947-1994, find that change in gridlock interval significantly predicts productivity, whereas mood (changes in activist mood as Mayhew posits) and regime (unified vs. divided government) effects lose significance once control for gridlock; effects are especially strong for important enactments
- **Contributions/connections**: gives a nice overview of existing party and social choice theories (that he deems insufficient for explaining gridlock and coalition sizes)
  - Responsible party govt: parties adopt well-defined and differentiated policy platforms that they enact once they are elected
    - Gridlock rare/non-existent because cohesive parties always enact platform
    - Coalitions will be size of majority party, never bipartisan
  - Conditional party govt (Aldrich, Rohde): party strength when have homogeneity of within-party preferences, division across parties $\longrightarrow$ non-centrist outcomes
    - Similar predictions as RPG, as parties again cohesive coalitions
  - Divided vs. unified govt: gridlock attributable to split party control of Congress, executive branch $\longrightarrow$ unified govt necessary to break gridlock
    - However, gridlock may occur even under unified government, if q falls in the gridlock interval (similar to Mayhew in *Divided We Govern*)

- Median voter theorem: members arrayed along issue space, with single-peaked preferences $\longrightarrow$ equilibrium of policy proposal at median member's ideal point
$\longrightarrow Gridlock never occurs (unless legislative median is constant) \longrightarrow Coalition size is small, but non-partisan (depending on ideal points)$
- Majoritarian chaos: sincere voting will not lead to stable policy outcomes in multidimensional issue space
  - Gridlock never occurs, as all policies can be overturned by majority vote
  - Coalition size is small, but bipartisan (partisanship doesn't matter)
- Stability-induced theories (Shepsle/Weingast): institutions account for stable outcomes in seemingly chaotic environment
  - Gridlock should be common, but coalition size is unclear, due to difficulty gaining traction over multidimensional space
- Divide-the-dollar games: non-cooperative game theory approach
  - Gridlock never occurs, and winning coalitions are almost always small or minimum-majority-sized
- Economic theories: regulation of interest group pressures
  - Focused on government *responsiveness* to interest groups, not gridlock
- Electoral party competition (Downs): parties adopt platforms and compete for votes with sole goal of gaining office
  - Limited gridlock, never divided government
- Balancing theory: voters derive utility from balance of government
  - Gridlock never occurs, and no role of partisanship (beyond preferences)

- **Related Literature**:
  - To avoid the veto points brought on by the filibuster, presidential veto, and veto override, Congress has looked to make policy in other ways to circumvent the gridlock associated with polarization. For example, under the leadership of Newt Gingrich, Republican majorities sought to use appropriation bills to enact major policy change (John H. Aldrich and Rohde 2000). As Ryan and Minkoff 2023 show, when Congress faces larger gridlock intervals and a greater ideological divide between the Senate and House, appropriations bills are in fact an effective way to make major policy changes. Yet members may fear that legislating through appropriations puts the funding of vital government programs at risk. Members instead might use nonstatutory options, such as committee reports, to direct government agencies and thus change policy outcomes (Bolton 2022)

Terry M. Moe. 1987. "An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional Dominance'." *Legislative Studies Quarterly,* 475–520

- **Key Takeaway:** Usually think Congress has tight control over bureaucratic agencies, but in reality, tools at Congress' disposal for control really are not as strong as we think.
- **Argument:** General theory of "congressional dominance" is that legislators are motivated by reelection, structure the legislator to suit their interests, sit on committees most beneficial for their district, committees specialize in their area of policies, and they members will use their positions to direct bureaucratic behavior to suit their goals. Do so by control budget, engaging in oversight (new legislation, harassment, threats to careerists), appointment control.

- There are questions of what it means to "control": responsibility for oversight is with relevant committees and committee members might have different preferences that chambers as a whole. More broadly, what "legislative goals" related to bureaucracy actually are is unclear. Usual logic is "fire-alarm oversight" (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984), meaning members simply set limits of bureaucratic behavior or agencies proactively reign in their behavior. Plus, members get credit for "putting out fires" so no real incentive to enact reform. Given that bureaucrats have their own interests, can do more than simply anticipate and react – thus, fire-alarm oversight only describes small portion of agency behavior.
- Budgetary control: problem is that funding has cross-pressuring effects – on one hand, if members want higher regulatory enforcement, they could provide more money, but there is no guarantee that money is actually used for enforcement; if members take away money, they deny agency financial resources they would need to comply with committee wishes.
- Threat of new legislation: can affect budget, personnel, jurisdictions, and programs; however legislation is hard to pass and when passed, there is simply a new statutory context in which same control problems can reassert themselves (i.e., compliance could still be a problem)
- Appointments: fragmentation and competition among legislator usually allows president to take advantage and use appointments to suit their purposes

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Nolan M. McCarty and Keith T. Poole. 1995. "Veto power and legislation: An empirical analysis of executive and legislative bargaining from 1961 to 1986." *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 11 (2): 282–312

- **Key Takeaway:** Consistent with what's called the Presidential Agenda Control (PAC) Model, Congress does accomodate on policy to account for presidential veto threats.
- **Argument:** Classic theories of executive veto are typically shaped by legislative agenda control (LAC) model – which states that legislature sets the agenda by proposing policies. Increasingly, however, it appears presidents have taken that power – result of president's public standing (Kernell 1986) or inability of Congress to develop policies (Sundquist 1981). When Congress refuses to act on presidential wishes, have option of "going public" with a veto threat to rally opinion against Congress (given presidents' power to persuade, Neustadt 1990).
  - Legislative Agenda Control (LAC) Model: Whenever proposer closer to president than status quo, proposer need not accommodate since any veto threat would not be credible; when the proposer more distant from president relative to status quo, proposer must accommodate somewhat to the president $\longrightarrow$ veto has little influence over legislation
  - Presidential Agenda Control (PAC) Model: collective-action problems, slow pace of legislative deliberations, and desire to force executive to make tough decisions forced Congress to abdicate role in producing legislation
  - Presidential Public Commitments (PPC) Model: If voters punish presidents who renege on commitments, president can get more preferable policies; if commitments credible enough, then resulting policies equivalent to those if president had formal proposal power, because president would credibly veto all but his own proposals; where commitments not clear-cut, predicts legislative proposer will submit preferred bill that president has not threatened to veto
- **Findings:** LAC overpredicts accommodation to president – it misclassifies many observations in the accommodation regime, and underestimates legislative influence on proposals that are accommodating; consistent with PAC, partisan strength in chamber does increase accommodation

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Jeffrey A. Segal. 1997. "Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts." *American Political Science Review* 91, no. 1 (March): 28–44

- **Key Takeaway:** While some work in positive theory suggests that Supreme Court justices defer to preferences of Congress when making decisions, there is clear evidences that justices follow the "attiudinal model" and engage in rationally sincer behavior (i.e., vote how they want to vote).
- **Argument:**
  - Attiudinal Model: justices decide cases based on the facts and their sincere ideological attitudes and values (Segal and Spaeth 1997) for a variety of reasons including the institutional protections granted the Court (e.g., life tenure,- no diminution of pay), and because docket control weeds out legally unambiguous cases
  - Separation-of-Powers Model: Justices are policy-motivated actors who use legal rules to achieve policy results, but only vote sincerely when their preferences lie within pareto set that cannot be overturned by Congress
    - Problems of this model include level of information justices have, not recognizing fact that justices can justify decisions based on *both* Constitution and statute, fact that Court can bundles issues in anyway they choose, the difficulty in passing legislation to respond to Court decisions
- **Findings:** There is a spectrum to the Separation-of-Powers Model that depends on party control of legislature and a judiciary with/without constitutional powers. However, fact is that justices do not appear to change as the political environment changes, suggesting that combinations of factors are at work.
- **Relevant Literature:** Attitudinal model from Segal and Spaeth 1997

Hans J. G. Hassell and Samuel Kernell. 2016. "Veto Rhetoric and Legislative Riders: Veto Rhetoric and Legislative Riders." *American Journal of Political Science* 60, no. 4 (October): 845–859

- **Key Takeaway:** When considering riders to appropriations bills, veto threats are effective in bringing the final legislation closer the president's preferences. Threats achieve their success, in large part, by interrupting the textbook legislative process in the Senate—spawning filibusters, prompting leaders to punt bills to conference, and encouraging the use of other "unorthodox procedures"
- **Argument:** Previous work on veto threats have overly restrictive assumptions about how institutional actors do business with each other, understating influence of veto threats. In context of party competition, veto rhetoric helps define policy stances for members of POTUS party and opposition party.
  - "Cheap talk" theory of vetoes rests on assumptions that really don't match well with Washington context. Given all of the hurdles that "partisan teams" need to overcome to pass legislation – thus, vetoes may work to alter legislators' rankings of provision bundles, make POTUS party consider what's necessary for successful legislative program for legislature and POTUS themselves, may set up bargaining game between legislative parties (especially important in Senate where minority given a lot of power to block)
  - Unorthodox procedures in Senate: POTUS positions may lead Senate leaders to use alternative ways to pass must-have appropriations or simply "punt" decision to conference
- **Data/Methods:** Sample of 989 riders to appropriations bills 1985-2008

- **Findings:** Presences of a veto threat more than halves a rider's chance of surviving legislative process. When POTUS gets involved early, enjoy better outcomes than if they waited for "take it or leave it" choice. At each step of legislative process, threatned riders removed more often than nonthreatened riders, showing sway president has.
  - Veto threats on riders more likely when opposition party control House or when riders originate in Appropriations Committee
  - Threats increase likelihood of filibuster by 14pp – as veto threats separate and hard partisan positions, make filibusters more likely and compromises more difficult
  - Punting does not work: punted riders only marginally less likely to be excluded from bills, but punting does not pose a problem for conference passage of overall bills
- **Critique:** Appropriations is a different kind of legislation: there's a strict deadline of October 1 to get things passed, House is always first in the sequence (majorities well-positioned to stake extreme measures to push president to take a stand at start of negotiations; specialization and majoritarianism gives opposition parties good leverage to bargain with)

Filibuster

Gregory J. Wawro and Eric Schickler. 2007. *Filibuster: Obstruction and Law Making in the Us Senate.* Princeton: Princeton University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** The filibuster is an endogenous institution and prior to modern enactment of cloture in 1917, Senate had difficulty getting its business done near the end of legislative sessions but obstruction was lessened due to the costs of conducting a filibuster.
- **Argument:** In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Senate managed to accomplish policymaking due to norms of restraint precluding the use of costly filibusters $\longrightarrow$ filibuster pivot as an endogenous institution
  - Senate relied on an informal system of regulating filibuster battles prior to adoption of cloture rule in 1917 $\longrightarrow$ this was the adoption of Rule 22, which allowed senators to end debate by vote of 2/3 of members (in 1975, it became 3/5 or 60 members)
    - Prior to this time, filibusters like "wars of attrition," with resolve a key variable, driven by preferences for bill versus the status quo
    - As a result, norms of restraint, combined with ambiguous rules and threat of rules revolution, prevented the use of costly filibusters and enabled policymaking to occur
    - As the Senate grew in size/workload, informally governed system broke down, so cloture rule added some formality
  - However, filibustering is now virtually costless, regardless of resolve $\longrightarrow$ unwillingness of majorities of fewer than 60 senators to engage in wars of attrition (with their attendant costs) has made filibustering costless.
  - Heterogeneity: there may be greater threats of obstruction at end-of-Congress, when there is pressure to pass bills, or when there is unequal salience of the issue (with an intense minority and less committed majority)
  - Predictions: majorities are sufficient to legislate when the end-of-Congress deadline isn't looming and when issues are of equal salience $\longrightarrow$ more likely to see rules changes proposed when there is a committed majority and an obstructionist minority

- **Pivotal politics model (Krehbiel):** senators can be arrayed along left-right, unidimensional ideological continuum according to their "ideal points"
  - For a bill to pass, coalition supporting legislation must be large enough to overcome minority obstruction and override potential presidential vetoes $\longrightarrow$ because 3/5 majority now required, 40th and 60th percentile senators are "filibuster pivots"
  - Assumptions:
    1. *Filibustering is costless* – this is true now but wasn't historically, which may have deterred filibusters from occurring; however, filibustering can serve as an alternative way for position-taking, credit-claiming if bill is killed; cost is contingent still on value of passage of legislation, timing of bill (in pre-1917 Senate, date of adjournment mattered and made filibusters less costly)
    2. *Institutional rules/procedures that identify pivotal players are unambiguous, fixed, and exogenous* – despite that, some obstructionists dealt with possibility of rule changes (e.g., precedents from chair rulings) when pursuing informal methods of delay; given that supermajoritarian procedures are "objects of majoritarian choice," they can be changed $\longrightarrow$ rules really aren't self-enforceable
    3. *Players cannot alter rules in ways that advantage them* – however, pre-cloture, rules were ambiguous about threshold for overcoming obstruction

- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Matthews 1959: role of norms in the Senate, favoring institutional patriotism and maintenance of the institution
  - Binder 2018: In Trump era, Republicans had unified control: dodged, bent, or reinterpreted several institutional constraints (e.g., changing cloture rules for nominations) in pursuit of their party's legislative priorities but stopped short of formally changing rules $\longrightarrow$ fear of setting precedent for the future (a path dependence argument), though ideological outliers were supportive of nuclear option
  - Wawro and Schickler 2018: examines 2013 and 2017 changes to cloture for nominations: similar to Binder 2018, argues that early moves in the Senate shaped preferences and beliefs about role of minority obstruction – small changes were made, ones that would not have been chosen if institutional context didn't privilege minority rights. The Binder view is from the "lock-in perspective": as Binder 1997 said, eliminating previous question built in bias for minority (i.e., it was critical juncture). Wawro and Schickler argue form "remote majoritarianism" view: agrees that inherited institutions are important, but more that senators became comfortable in the system and were not willing to give up their individual rights $\longrightarrow$ change only happens when *individual* members become sufficiently frustrated.

Effects of Polarization, Gridlock

Note: Other sections of notes can explain so-called *external* forces of polarization. These explanations focus on *replacement* and *sorting*. As Rohde 1991 outlines, replacement of conservative southern Democrats with conservative Republicans yielded two ideologically homogenous legislative parties with members seeking to achieve more of their policy goals. Yet, as McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, southern realignment alone does not explain congressional polarization, failing to explain, for example, the disappearance of liberal Republicans outside the South. Redistricting, another popular explanation for polarization, also does not provide a satisfactory answer, failing to explain why polarization in the Senate has largely tracked with polarization in the House of Representatives (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Theriault 2008) or why actual levels of polarization differ little from those produced by simulated redistricting plans (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2009). Others have pointed to the fact that the partisan preferences of Americans have become more consistent with ideological preferences (Hetherington 2001), resulting in less ticket-splitting (Jacobson 2000; see Trussler 2021 for a discussion of how the media landscape has shape ticket-splitting behavior). This, in combination with the fact that Americans are geographically sorted along partisan lines (Rodden 2019), means that members of Congress tend to represent more politically homogeneous constituencies.

Mass partisan sorting mirrors the efforts of party elites and activists to take clear and differentiated positions on issues (Carmine and Stimson 1989, Schickler 2016), bringing consistency to the ideological underpinning of both the Democratic and Republican parties. Given that primary electorates tend to be comprised of more engaged and activist voters, members have become more ideologically extreme, more so than even some of their own constituents (Bafumi and Herron 2010). In turn, members have less incentive to cooperate with members across the aisle as they are rewarded for being in ideological agreement with their constituents (Brunell and Buchler 2009) and have the goal of serving in the majority (Lee 2016).

Internal forces of polarization include recorded teller vote for the Committee of the Whole have provided more opportunities for members to force votes on amendments that require members to take positions on controversial issues (Roberts and Smith 2003) as procedural votes represent a growing proportion of roll call votes, members face less instances where they must weigh the interests of their constituency against the interests of their party's legislative record (as would be the case on substantive votes), thus increasing the regularity with which parties split on roll call votes (Theriault 2008). On those substantive votes that do come up, members are often tasked with making decisions on more polarizing issues like the economy (Lee 2009).

The readings below are focused primarily on the effects of polarization on the ability of Congress to go about its business or regularity with which legislating is done via regular order.

David R. Mayhew. 2005. *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-2002.* 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Because members always have incentives to legislate and sometimes political conditions are more fortunate, frequency of high-publicity congressional investigations and the enactment of important legislation is unrelated to unified and divided government
- **Argument:** frequency of high-publicity congressional investigations and the enactment of important legislation is unrelated to unified and divided government
  - There is constancy to legislating: members always seeking reelection, higher office and have need to promote legislation regardless of which party is in charge
  - Congressional parties not cohesive, undermining relationship between party control and legislative activity
  - Shifting economic and social conditions, public moods, cycles within presidential terms, differences among presidents all shape activity and productivity of government

- **Data/Methods:** Examines 267 "important laws" to analyze Congress' ability to pass landmark legislation
- **Critique:** Problem with analysis is lack of baseline – focused on absolute number of major laws adopted rather than what did not get passed ⟶ why Binder 1999's work is important. Also, policy direction, scope, or speed of enactment not examined systematically ⟶ this is a problem because one question for divided control of government is extent to which it neutralizes the direction of policy change and limits the policy aggressiveness embodied in legislation, and how quickly new directions are adopted
- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Howell et al. 2000: find that Mayhew's claim that divided government does not affect legislative productivity is a consequence of aggregating time series that exhibit different behavior ⟶ reexamining all 17,663 enacted between 1945-1994 with appropriate time-series techniques find that periods of divided government depress production of landmark legislation by about 30%, at least when productivity is measured on the basis of contemporaneous perceptions of legislative significance. Divided government, however, has no substantive effect on the production of important, albeit not landmark, legislation and actually has a positive effect on the passage of trivial laws
  - Binder 2017: measure deadlock by isolating set of salient issues on nation's agenda, determine legislative fate of those issues, and create ratio of failed measures to all issues on the agenda in each Congress ⟶ over last decade, overall size of the agenda increased incrementally, but the number of salient issues rises significantly; unified party control considerably reduces frequency of deadlock – other factors include amount of moderates (impacting coalition building, overcoming veto points), bicameral party differences, overall polarization

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Sarah A. Binder. 1999. "The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96." *American Political Science Review* 93 (3): 519–533

- **Key Takeaway:** intra-branch conflict (esp. bicameralism), in addition to inter-branch rivalry (e.g., divided party control), helps to explain gridlock
- **Argument:** alternative theory of gridlock, based around distribution of *policy preferences* within the parties, between chambers, and across Congress more generally
  - Partisan theories: focus on partisan variables, including divided party control, policy preferences, and timing of electoral change
    - Hypothesis 1: divided party control increases policy gridlock, while unified party control increases legislative success
    - Hypothesis 2: more polarization of partisan elites (e.g., more extreme vs. moderate legislators), more gridlock
    - Hypothesis 3: more cohesive legislative preferences, less gridlock
    - Hypothesis 4: longer a new congressional majority has been out of power, greater dissatisfaction with status quo, less gridlock
  - Institutional theories: focus on supermajority rules, effects of bicameralism
    - Hypothesis 5: greater policy distance between chambers, more gridlock
    - Hypothesis 6: greater threat of filibuster, more gridlock
  - Policy theories: focus on demand for policy, based on provision of new benefits, national mood
    - Hypothesis 7: larger budget surplus, relative to outlays, less gridlock

    - Hypothesis 8: more public support for gov't action, less gridlock

- **Data/Methods:** Congress-by-Congress "gridlock scores" using unsigned newspaper editorials identifying every salient legislative issue between 1947-1996 $\longrightarrow$ use editorials because of Binder's critique of Mayhew 2005 that measures of legislative productivity require estimation of denominator of *all possible policies* that could have been enacted, not just the numerator of policies that were enacted

- **Findings:** strong support for partisan hypotheses, mixed support for institutional, policy hypotheses
  - Divided government linked to gridlock, relative to unified or quasi-divided government
  - Gridlock also associated with partisan dynamics – more likely as parties polarized, fewer moderates (esp. when majority was out of power for long time)
  - Bicameralism also matters – increasing distance between chambers also increases the probability of gridlock

- **Critique:** Fang-Yi Chiou and Rothenberg 2008a, 2008b argue that W-NOMINATE—which Binder uses—never designed for comparing Senate to House members or for analyzing multiple Congresses jointly $\longrightarrow$ one this measurement issues resolved, all of Binder's results go away

- **Relevant Literature:** revision to Mayhew 2005's account of unified vs. divided government, suggesting that inter-branch (and intra-branch) dynamics both shape legislative productivity in important ways

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Barbara Sinclair. 2016. "Partisan Polarization and Congressional Policy Making." In *Congress and Policy Making in the 21st Century,* edited by Jeffery A. Jenkins and Eric M. Patashnik, 48–72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** When considering effects of polarization, still need to consider homogeneity of power and majority size.

- **Argument:** Impact of polarization on Congress' capacity to make public policy has both a direct and indirect component. Direct effect is ability to create winning coalitions as spatial models of preferences and grid lock (e.g., Krehbiel 1998) suggest. Indirect effects include changes to internal chamber organization and distribution of power – strengthening of party leadership (Rohde 1991) plus greater rewards for being "team players" amplify impact of partisan polarization on policy. Overall, argument is that high partisan polarization can facilitate the enactment of landmark legislation when control of the branches and chambers is unified but, when control is divided, it may well result in near stalemate and public policy that is "bad" from the perspective of all the major actors. landmark legislation makes big changes in policy and thus difficult to pass; that passage is discretionary only adds to the difficulty; the reversion point is the status quo, not some calamity, as is the case for the "must pass" legislation to be considered later
  - In arguing for indirect effects, suggests the policy outcomes cannot be explained solely by stable, exogenously determined member preferences as Krehbiel contends – instead, Cox and McCubbins, Rohde, Smith all right that party has influence
  - Crises makes legislating a bit easier – great ideological distance between parties makes it an agreement will require one or both parties to make major concessions, giving both strong incentives to hold out; crises, however, change the calculus (the "rally around the flag" effect)

- **Findings:** Compare success of 111th Congress in which Democrats able to pass Affordable Care Act versus 112th Congress.

- Affordable Care Act: Democrats able to pass because of ideological homogeneity and skillful congressional party leadership – 2008 election gave them mandate for health care reform; health care community was behind one cohesive plan (i.e., coalition of activist groups not competing; interest groups were involved early in process and were part of bargaining); all three congressional committees with jurisdiction worked together on one bill led by party leadership and worked out compromises when necessary; in the Sentate, procedural tools were more limited, but leadership did all they could to overcome minority obstruction; when Democrats lost their 60th vote, resorted to reconciliation process
- TARP: Economic crisis of 2008-11 made stimulus "must pass" but some Republicans and Democrats didn't want to bail out big banks; once Republicans took control wanted to let debt default $\longrightarrow$ long term economic consequences encouraged action

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Barbara Sinclair. 2017b. *Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress.* Fifth edition. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage CQ Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Legislative processes have changed in response to the problems and opportunities institutional structures and political environment creates $\longrightarrow$ in House, means cutting out the minority from legislative process; in Senate, means more obstruction, increased need for broad coalitions
- **Argument:** Describes the changing legislative process: bills sent to more than one committee, controversial bills skip committees all together, major substantive changes worked out via informal processes $\longrightarrow$ process has changed in response to problems and opportunities the institutional structure and political environment present to them as they pursue their goals
  - Overall, unorthodox lawmaking makes legislating more difficult in Senate. Members more willing to exploit rules so legislating requires accommodating individual
  - Political environment of 60s and 70s made role of policy entrepreneur available to more Senators – successfully playing that role brought reputation as a player, media attention, and shot at the presidency
  - Potential argument for filibuster: improves deliberations, allows members to highlight neglected issues and policy proposals
- **Findings:** Primary changes to the legislative process:
  - House:
    * Use of multiple referrals has drastically increases since the last 1980s – while most committees have worked out processes to coordinate actions together, MRs has increased likelihood decisions are made through informal processes (often led by majority); plus side of this is that each bill now receives info from multiple perspectives, gives voice to more interests at the all important committee stage (think Gilligan and Krehbiel information perspective)
    * More partisanship across the board, but committees that deal with constituency-benefit legislation (e.g., agriculture, transportation) still try for unity and bipartisanship; overall though, minority most often cut of decision-making
    * Bypassing committee: could be done by discharge petition but rarely enough votes (though threat of discharge petition can force leadership to put bills on the floor)
    * Post-committee adjustments: changes of negotiated outside committee, incorporated as substitute bill or amendment $\longrightarrow$ often important for issues that are controversial and salient
    * Suspension of the rules: usually for noncontroversial legislation – pleases interest groups, those pursuing policy interests and valuable benefits for constituencies

    - Increased use of restrictive rules: important for major legislation where majority may want to limit number of amendments that can be added; saves time and prevent obstruction, focuses attention on critical choices, structures choices members confront on floor in ways that promote particular outcomes
        - legislative majorities have increasingly looked to limit debates on bills through the use of restrictive rules (Sinclair 2006) with the goal of holding their members to the majority's preferred policy outcomes (Marshall 2002) and to prevent being rolled on the legislative floor (Cox and McCubbins 2007)
    - Previous question motion: floor debate for legislation begins with debate on the rules – once rules debate finished, majority moves the previous question $\longrightarrow$ losing this vote is really bad for majority (this why procedural cartel put its focus on these procedural votes)
- Senate:
    - Multiple referral not the norm, but usually multiple committees are involved on individual bills
    - Less polarization in committee decision-making because most committees are small and given thin majorities in the chamber, most committees have about an even number of majority/minority members $\longrightarrow$ incentives to build broad coalitions; time pressures, combined with the openness of floor proceedings, contributes to Senate committees' tendency to put off conflict until floor stage
    - "Gangs": members form ad hoc (usually bipartisan) groups to create legislative compromises
    - Majority leadership has less control over calendar: senators can filibuster motion to proceed, block unanimous consent request (which specify time for general debate, debate on amendments; just one senator can block it) $\longrightarrow$ means majority leader checks with all interested legislators before going to the floor (involves majority and minority leadership to work together); often times, members will place a "hold" on legislation so that they are consulted – this is an informal custom, but it's powerful given implicit/explicit threat to filibuster motion to proceed $\longrightarrow$ leads to "hostage taking" (extracting concessions for bills to nominations)
    - More amendments on important substantive, appropriations legislation $\longrightarrow$ mostly credit claiming since many amendments dropped at conference stage
    - Cloture: Senate Rule 22, places cap of 30 hours on consideration after cloture vote (includes time spent on quorum calls, voting, debate), requires amendments considered after cloture to be germane; no limit on the number of cloture petitions that may be filed on one measure
    - Filibusters less dramatic now (more in the form of "holds"), occur even on minor legislation
    - Majority can keep the Senate moving by: offering motion to proceed, immediately move for cloture on the motion, then immediately withdrawing motion $\longrightarrow$ Senate can continue with business during time before cloture vote, if cloture votes fails then just move to reconsider when majority has the votes (no need to do the whole cloture process again)
    - Once 60 votes are in hand, majority fills the amendment tree and cuts off additional ones – because filibuster threats routine, 60 vote requirements often written into UCAs (majority agrees because it saves time, minority can get substantive concessions without going through time-consuming cloture process)
    - Budget Act in 1975 marked big shift: prevented filibusters on budget resolutions and reconciliation bills
    - Use of legislative summits: relatively formal negotiations between congressional leaders and high-ranking administration officials – occur when stakes are high, members not willing to let committee leaders make decisions on behalf of party membership; more informal processes if majority and POTUS same party

James M. Curry and Frances E. Lee. 2019. "Congress at Work: Legislative Capacity and Entrepreneurship in the Contemporary Congress." In *Can America Govern Itself?,* edited by Frances E. Lee and Nolan McCarty, 181–219. SSRC Anxieties of Democracy. Cambridge University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Even though Congress is polarized, it is still successful in passing transformative legislation and is better able to engage in "conflict-clarifying representation" now
- **Argument:** Regardless of whether Congress is centralized/leadership-led or decentralized/committee-led, Congress can still take "transformative action;" while Congress unable to avoid stalemates, unorthodox, leadership-led process help Congress resolve conflicts and pass legislation it otherwise wouldn't have through more traditional process since these centralized processes provide more flexibility to create "grand bargains" and solve logjams. Congress also better able to engage in "conflict-clarifying representation" to express and educate the public on the positions of the parties and to give voice to the opinions of various groups in society (messaging – not concerned with enactment, conflict *is* the goal); more opportunities for expressive and position-taking entrepreneurship than in previous era
  - Leadership-led process allows for less transparent, more behind-the-scenes deal cutting which shields most of the conflict created by intense partisanship
  - Differentiate *lawmaking* (Congress acting in a transformative manner by developing, considering, and passing policy proposals) from *representation* (expresses, reflects, and gives voice to the diver- gent views of different political groups and constituencies)
- **Data/Methods:** Data on Congress' activities, interviews with long-serving lawmakers and high-level staffers
- **Findings:**
  - Contemporary Congress still legislates on basis of large, bipartisan majorities – even as parties have polarized on roll call votes and congressional processes have centralized in party leaders, today's Congress rarely passes laws on the basis of narrow majorities or the support of a single party
  - From interviews, two key reasons for centralization: (1) efficiency, (2) secrecy and flexibility
    - On most issues, Congress still follows the model of the "Textbook Congress," but there is a greater trend in "crisis legislating" (i.e., legislating to the deadline as debt ceiling bills demonstrate) and party leaders play critical role in resolving debates in crises
    - Centralized processes allows for more secret dealmaking: mutes lobbyist pressures, mutes pressures from party activist bases
  - When party leaders control the process, rank-and-files kept cut out of the loop $\longrightarrow$ members best bet for influence is to make themselves a force on a specific policy issue, ensuring that party leaders consult with them (given their policy knowledge or ability to provide political cover by speaking on behalf of specific groups, caucuses, etc.)
- **Critique:** Probably not enough emphasis on what gridlock covers – while legislation still passed on bipartisan basis, what's the substantive content of those bills (are they on major or minor issues? what groups are being cut out from these bipartisan bills?)
- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Frances Lee's work on partisan brinkmanship, conflict: particularly concept of "reflective partisanship" from Lee 2009 which argues legislative parties see it as advantageous to take opposing

positions, hold to the them in an effort to differentiate themselves from the opposing party, and see which side is willing to make concessions first. In pursuing such strategies, certain policy outcomes resulting from compromise are essentially off the table, often resulting in legislative gridlock on policies in need of long-term solutions. However, given the stakes of failing to resolve issues requiring immediate action like the debt limit, Congress has been willing to implement stopgap solutions (e.g., raising the limit just enough to hold off discussions over a long-term solution for a short period of time). Thus, as Barber and McCarty 2016 note, congressional polarization appears to have the effect of enabling Congress to "kick the can down the road" (pg. 75) on tough decisions.

- Polsby (1975): transformative (generates and develops legislative proposals through internal processes; well-institutionalized; deliberative processes) vs. arena legislatures (play a small role in developing policy; laws drafted elsewhere by party organs or executive and then legislature just ratifies; primary goal is debate, expression, representation)
- Sinclair 2016: uses Affordable Care Act passage in 2010 as example of big things getting done despite polarization
- Harbridge-Yong, Volden, and Wiseman 2023: Why is bipartisanship still alive and well? Bipartisanship unambiguously helps individual legislators who seek to advance their policy goals – members of the House and Senate (1973–2016) who attract larger portion of bill cosponsors from the opposing party much more successful at lawmaking; patterns robust to both majority-party and minority-party lawmakers, under changing legislative and electoral conditions and over time $\longrightarrow$ clear path to attracting bipartisan cosponsors involves reciprocity, making cosponsoring others' bills across party lines attractive.

Executive Branch

Formal Powers of the Presidency

Presidential System

Juan J Linz. 1990. "The Perils of Presidentialism." *Journal of democracy* 1 (1): 51–69

- **Key Takeaway:** Parliamentarism leads to a more stable democracy than presidentialism as it is less rigid and less of a zero-sum-game.
- **Argument:**
  - Parliamentarism: Government authority is dependent on parliamentary confidence.
    - Power is not always given to a single person/party, through majority/minority government. Consequently a coalition can be formed. However, coalitions can give undue power to extremist parties.
    - PM can afford little in terms of detachment from parliamentary opinion
    - PM is more on equal footing with its ministers
    - No term limit
  - Presidentialism: An executive with considerable constitutional powers is elected by the people for a fixed term and is independent of parliamentary votes of confidence (can be removed between elx only through impeachment). Political process is thus more rigid.
    - Unlike, parliamentary democracies "winner-takes-all". This raises the stakes of elections and make increase polarization.
    - Required cooperation with the legislative branch weakens the presidency
    - Office of president is two-dimensional: 1) Head of state and the representative of the entire nation. 2) Stands for a clearly partisan option. Difficult to combine the role of representative for all and leader of their party
    - President and cabinet are not on equal footing.
    - Presidential system is often seen as more stable than parliamentary system. However, stability at the cost of rigidity. Impeachment is uncertain and time consuming compared to votes of no confidence.
    - Time frame of presidency will affect their political style, compared to PM who does not have term limit.
    - Time constraints combined with zero-sum character of presidential elections are likely to render such contests more dramatic and divisive than parliamentary elections.

John A. Dearborn. 2021. *Power Shifts: Congress and Presidential Representation.* Chicago studies in American politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Congress created the institutional presidency (more powers, more staff, more favorable institutional arrangements, etc.), the impetus was not from the president. In doing so, Congress followed the idea that the president works for everyone.
- **Argument:**
  - A driving factor for the design of presidential reforms (and subsequent withdrawals of institutional powers) has been the idea of presidential representation (the idea that the president is uniquely positioned to represent the entire nation and its people) versus Congressional (or other) forms of representation.

- The idea of presidential representation envisions a shift in the constitutional division of labor, anticipating a relocation of the hub of policymaking from the legislative to the executive branch.
- Congress created the institutional presidency (more powers, more staff, more favorable institutional arrangements, etc.), the impetus was not from the president. Previously given reasons for why Congress gave this power to the president (collective action problem, giving informational power to branches more appropriate for using it) are not convincing since they don't explicitly explain why the president got all the power.
- In the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate, presidential representation was viewed as suspect, and Congress expressed doubts about the ongoing value of depending on what had become an "imperial presidency,".
- Other factors that in the 1980s changed the prior calculus include more polarized politics fueled by issues increasingly addressed on a national stage,two major political parties with a realistic chance of taking over a majority in Congress, and a splintered mass media ecosystem. Congress began to question whether to continue to support presidential authority over the issues that earlier legislatures had empowered the president to handle.

- **Relevant Literature:** See Dahl (1990)

Vetoes

Charles Cameron and Nolan McCarty. 2004. "Models of Vetoes and Veto Bargaining." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7, no. 1 (May): 409–435

- **Key Takeaway:** summary and expansion on Cameron 2001 (Veto Bargaining), noting that presidents have power over policy via the exercise (or threat) of vetoes
- **Argument:** under veto bargaining, a proposer makes a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer to a receiver, with the possibility that rejections of offers may be overridden
  - Key assumption: under complete information, no vetoes should occur, but the president should still be able to influence policy through the threat of a veto
  - Cameron's models: both of which incorporate assumptions of imperfect info
    - Override model: uncertainty about location of veto pivot, learned through repeated attempts to override a presidential veto
      - Assumes no concessions made to the president, as the goal is to override the president, not to pass the bill without a veto
    - Sequential veto bargaining (SVB): uncertainty about the location of the president's ideal point, with multiple rounds of bargaining
      - Assumes at least some concessions to the president post-veto, in order to avoid future vetoes
- **Data/Methods:** in book version, examines vetoes by presidents between 1945-1992, based on (1) divided vs. unified government, (2) relative importance of legislation
- **Findings:** vetoes often arise out of sequential bargaining between Congress and the president, and tend to be successful in enabling the president to get policy concessions
  - Vetoes are rare under unified government but are more frequent for major (salient) legislation under divided government

- If president and Congress disagree, more important bills are likely be vetoed (at least once), with smaller concessions between rounds.

- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Neustadt 1990: presidents have three sources of power: (1) formal powers, such as vetoes, (2) reputation (skill/will), and (3) public popularity
    - Presidents can demonstrate skill/will by vetoing – demonstrating a commitment to their legislative agenda – in order to get policy concessions that lead to more preferred outcomes.
  - Mayhew 1991 (Divided We Govern): agrees with Mayhew that divided government doesn't necessarily decrease legislative productivity, but suggests it can lead to different outcomes, due to concessions from veto bargaining

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Tim Groseclose and Nolan McCarty. 2001. "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining before an Audience." *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (January): 100

- **Key Takeaway:** theory of blame-game vetoes, which can lead to inefficient outcomes (vetoes, gridlock), even under perfect information

- **Argument:** when bargaining, Congress and the president are both trying to signal to a third party – voters – about their preferences
  - Key assumption: when a president vetoes a bill, this signals that their preferences are more extreme than voters thought → drop in approval ratings
  - Blame-game veto: when Congress proposes a bill that it knows the president will veto, in order to make the president seem extreme
    - Contrary to other theories of bargaining that assume vetoes occur due to incomplete information about preferences
  - Under divided government, Congress will pass bills that it knows the president will veto, in order to make the president look extreme.
    - The president might thus sign things that are worse than the status quo (in terms of his ideal point) in order to appear moderate to the public

- **Data/Methods:** theoretical model, combined with (very simple) empirical results

- **Findings:** "despite Congress and the president being completely informed, an uninformed third party causes the outcome to be Pareto inefficient"

- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Gridlock: contra Krehbiel 1998, who argues that gridlock is a function of divergent policy preferences, suggests that gridlock may occur even when Congress and the president agree (because they don't want to appear similar)
  - Question: does this assume that Congress always proposes a moderate bill, with a veto signaling extremity? Couldn't a veto also indicate moderation?

Political Appointments

David E. Lewis. 2008. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance.* Princeton: Princeton University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** probes link between the president and the bureaucracy by examining the effects of political appointments on agency management
- **Argument:** presidents trade off achieving policy change (via control) and preserving bureaucratic competence
  - "Congress has numerous means at its disposal for controlling the bureaucracy: it writes specific statutes, mandates deadlines and consequences for poor performance, forces agencies to use the rulemaking process for policy changes, cuts or increases budgets, conducts investigations, and hold oversight hearings"
  - President's power on bureaucracy comes from personnel decisions. "Appointees interpret the vague and sometimes conflicting laws enacted by Congress and translate them into policy. " Thus, has important consequences on policy.
  - Politicization increases when presidents believe agency views differ from their own (e.g., conservative president, liberal agencies) - Looks at this by comparing politicization levels after a party change in president
  - Some agencies more or less prone to politicization based on ability to incorporate appointees without effects on competence. Depends on task complexity, worry about slippage, threat of career professionals leaving en masse because they have good private sector opportunities – switching up NASA will be hard
  - Number of appointees increases when presidents and majority in Congress share same partisan/ideological lens.
  - Consequences: politicization harms agency competence: lack of expertise, high rates of turnover, challenges with recruitment/retention, and reduced incentives for high performance.
  - Senate-confirmed appointees (PAS) are the most visible to Congress and the hardest for presidents to change; they also have the largest influence on policy. Senate- confirmed positions must be created in statute, and such appointees must be confirmed by the Senate; this means that Congress regularly considers these positions and who will occupy them.
- **Data/Methods:** analysis of Plum Book (publication of appointed positions in US government for every election year since 1960)
  - DV: amount of politicization
  - IV: party change vs. no party change in White House
  - Case study: FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina (highly politicized agency)
- **Findings:** "politicization, when it does occur, is, at the top levels, defined both by pay and by appointment authorities" (25)
  - All presidents try to increase their appointees, but the effects on the number/percentage of appointees is larger after a party change
    - Politicization is larger under unified government, when Congress will be more willing to create new appointed positions
  - Trends: politicization has increased somewhat since 1960s, though not as much as previously thought

    - * Not solely a Republican trend – both parties have (de)-politicized at times
  - Performance: politicization affects performance by determining who leads gov't agencies, with downstream effects on morale, recruitment, incentives of career managers
    - * FEMA: increasing politicization of FEMA prior to (and exacerbated by) its transition to DHS caused problems that influenced response to Katrina

- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Presidential power: presidents have the formal ability to exercise power over bureaucracy through appointments– but has major consequences if presidents prioritize policy and patronage concerns over agency competence

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Christina M. Kinane. 2021. "Control without Confirmation: The Politics of Vacancies in Presidential Appointments." *American Political Science Review* 115, no. 2 (May): 599–614

- **Key Takeaway:** PAS positions require Senate approval, but one nomination strategy that presidents use to sidestep this process include leaving positions empty and making interim appointments.
- **Argument:** Presidents may strategically use vacancies in PAS positions to achieve their policy priorities, whether by deliberately leaving a position empty or installing an interim appointee rather than seeking Senate confirmation for a formal nominee
  - Between 1996 and 2016, nearly 40% of vacant PAS positions reported to the Government Accountability Office went without subsequent nominations, and 60% of those vacant positions were temporarily filled by interim appointees.
  -
- **Data/Methods:** develop a new dataset that identifies when a president leaves a position empty by design or unilaterally fills it with an interim appointee.
  - Data: capture the status of PAS positions (e.g., empty, interim appointee, permanent appointee), the positions' capacity to control policy outcomes, and the Senate's and president's policy priorities, across all fifteen Executive departments from 1977 to 2016. Covers a total of 11,043 position-year observations.
- **Findings:**
  - When presidents prioritize expansion,4 vacant positions with high levels of capacity to control their agency's policy outputs are more likely to be filled with interim appointees.
- **Relevant Literature:** Challenges the dominant perspective that presidential appointment power operates only through formal channels like nominations or recess appointments, which does not leave room to consider the informal power of unilateral presidential inaction.

Informal Powers of the Presidency

Persuasion and Bargaining

Richard E. Neustadt. 1990. *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: the Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan.* New York: Free Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Presidents influence policy via persuasion and bargaining, not by commanding others to do their bidding. Thus, they have the potential of having more than formal powers.

- **Argument:** "presidential power is the power to persuade" (11)
  - Power to persuade: because of separation of powers, distributed authority (Congress, executive branch itself, cabinet secretaries, agency heads, and individual bureaucrats all have leverage), presidents must bargain/persuade others that what he wants is in their best interest.
    - Presidents need to both bargain with other branches (esp. Congress) and within the executive branch
    - "The essence of a president's persuasive task, with congressmen and everybody else, is to induce them to believe that what he wants of them is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their interest, not his" (40)
    - The president's status and authority confer advantages in bargaining, as other actors may rely on the president to achieve their own interests.
  - Professional reputation: president must convince "Washington community" (other elites) that he has the skills/will to use his bargaining advantages
    - Reputation is based on past experiences and observations of past actions
    - Best reputation: (1) cultivate uncertainty about the consequences of ignoring what the president wants, (2) ensure people don't think the president will renege on his support
  - Public prestige: how the public views the president, and how elites think the public will view them if they do what the president wants
  - President sit on top of cabinet, agency admins, military leaders; lower heads below each of these → president has 'take-care' and appointive power, control over budget, control over personnel but these are also responsible to Congress → there's a divided loyalty
- **Data/Methods:** case studies of Eisenhower (1953-61), Truman (1945-53) presidencies
  - Power to persuade: Truman pushing Marshall Plan (European aid) forward because Truman convinced actors to collaborate who would not have otherwise
  - Professional reputation: first year of Eisenhower's term as opposite of presidential power
    - Eisenhower backed down from his budget proposal after criticism from both parties, conveying a lack of commitment to his objectives and indicating a willingness to relent to opponents (lacked resolve).
  - Public prestige: examines Gallup approval ratings over time to suggest that prestige is not a personality trait, but is instead highly variable based on connection between president and personal well-being.
- **Relevant Literature:** following Fed. 10 (Madison 1787), takes pluralist view of politics, wherein competing factions mobilize/countermobilize, bargain over policy
  - Response to work on the formal powers of the president (as endowed in the Constitution and other statute) – presidents have other sources of power
  - Polarization: homogeneity of preferences doesn't reduce need for bargaining, as many actors have self-interests that are not altogether policy-oriented

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Going Public

Samuel Kernell. 2007. *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership.* 4th ed. Washington, D.C: CQ Press

- **Key Takeaway:** presidents no longer need to rely on bargaining to get their way; instead, they can selectively "go public" – making direct appeals to voters – to scare Congress into passing their desired legislation

- **Argument:** divided government makes bargaining a less appealing and successful strategy, thereby forcing presidents into making public appeals

  - "Going public": "strategy whereby a president promotes himself and his policies in Washington by appealing directly to the American public for support" (1-2).
  - Going public is different from bargaining, in that it is:
    - (a) Not based on substantive exchange
    - (b) Predicated on threats for non-compliance vs. benefits for compliance
    - (c) Reduces incentives for compromise, as it requires posturing
    - (d) Undermines legitimacy of other politicians (esp. Congress)
  - Changes in Washington: transition in 1970s/80s from institutionalized to individualized pluralism, tied to a decline in party loyalty (both mass/elite), increase in interest groups/independent political entrepreneurs
    - Institutionalized pluralism: "separated institutions sharing powers," where need to build coalitions across institutions
    - Individualized pluralism: "extreme individualism" makes it difficult to bargain with a diffuse set of actors, with divergent interests
  - Effects compounded by changes in technology (e.g., television), increased frequency of divided government (due to ticket-splitting)

- **Data/Methods:** examine 60 years of trends in "going public," including a particular focus on the use of television in enabling this behavior

  - Note: argues that the act of "going public" may be in decline, given the rise in cable television (link to Prior 2007) and polarization.

- **Findings:** going public has become the norm, but this was not always the case (see: the 1950s/60s when Neustadt 1960 was writing)

  - Going public is particularly likely for outsider presidents, especially with an oppositional Congress, as they are less embedded in institutional networks
  - Public appeals can be combined with vetoes, which act as credible signals of the president's seriousness about his legislative agenda

- **Relevant Literature:** response to pluralist models of presidential bargaining (e.g., Neustadt 1960)

  - Link to Canes-Wrone 2006; argues that presidents only go public when message is (at least latently) popular with the public
  - Link to Skowronek 1993: plebiscitary era where rise in mass communication has led to a greater connection between presidents, public and ability to appeal for support directly from the public
  - Link to Schattschneider 1960: presidents are in a unique position to attract a national audience to a specific policy, giving them power to make appeals

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Jeffrey Tulis. 1987. *The Rhetorical Presidency.* Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Neither the strategy of going public nor the public expectation of a personal president are recent innovations. They are devices used throughout the twentieth century that depart from presidential practice at the founding of the republic and in the nineteenth century.
- **Argument:** Our political culture has been transformed since the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Two changes highlight this transformation: the public has been drawn into the policy process by presidents trying to increase congressional support for their policies; the public and elite opinion leaders have come to expect presidents to be popular leaders, who lead popular opinion, publicly defend their presidencies and policies, and inspirit the population.

Brandice Canes-Wrone. 2001. "The President's Legislative Influence from Public Appeals." *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 2 (April): 313

- **Key Takeaway:** Do public appeals facilitate influence and increase presidential bargaining power? Modern presidents systematically achieve policy goals by promoting issues to the public.
- **Argument:** Appeals should generate influence, but this influence depends on presidents strategically choosing issues to promote to the public. President will promote issues on which their position is popular, but for which Congress would not otherwise enact the president's preferred policy.
- **Data/Methods:**
  - Data: data from the nationally televised addresses of Presidents Eisenhower through Clinton
  - Analyze a simultaneous-equations model of the causes and policy consequences of presidential appeals over budgetary policy

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Unilateral Action

Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell. 1999. "Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory: Unilateral Action and Presidential Power." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (December): 850–873

- **Key Takeaway:** presidential power derives from the informal capacity to act unilaterally to make law.
- **Argument:** presidential power via unilateral actions is strong precisely because it is not specified in the Constitution and is therefore ambiguous
  - Unilateral action: presidents can make laws without consent of Congress, via executive orders, proclamations, and national security directives
  - President = executive. Government operations in their control so presidents feel it is in political interests to make government suit their political needs
  - President also has access to pool of expertise, experience, and information from bureaucracy and institution of presidency – gives them a leg up over branches
  - Presidents have first-mover advantage – "If they want to shift the status quo by taking unilateral action on their own authority, whether or not that authority is clearly established in law, they can simply do it—quickly, forcefully, and (if they like) with no advance notice. The other branches are then presented with a fait accompli, and it is up to them to respond. If they are unable to respond effectively, or decide not to, presidents win by default. And even if they do respond, which could take years, presidents may still get much of what they want anyway" (856)

  - Puzzle: if the Constitution grants lawmaking power to Congress, why is the president allowed to make law, without being stopped by Congress/the courts?
  - Theory: unlike enumerated powers, powers of unilateral action gain force because they are not specified formally → strength and resilience deriving from ambiguity
    * Presidents have strong incentives to exploit this ambiguity in strategic ways (but only in moderation)
  - Because of inherent features of their institutions, neither Congress nor courts will frequently stop presidents from acting unilaterally:
    * Congress: hampered by collective action problems, transaction costs – limiting ability or desire to reverse presidential action
      · President, however, will still have to moderate unilateral action, in order to avoid roll-back with support of veto pivot
    * Courts: first, presidents nominate justices who are likely to preserve presidential power while on the bench
      · Supreme Court interested in prestige of institution, and may increase this prestige by upholding popular unilateral actions
  - Consequence: presidents will act strategically and in moderation to promote their interests, gradually shifting the balance of power in their favor. Presidents can only push Congress or the Court so far before these institutions react.

- **Data/Methods:** mostly theoretical paper, based on a simple spatial model arraying president, Congress (including veto pivot, see: Krehbiel 1998)
- **Relevant Literature:** response to Neustadt 1990, suggesting that presidents have power that derives from their office, if not formally specified in the Constitution
  - Question: where does the public fit in all of this? How does the public respond to unilateral actions, and are actors sensitive to public opinion?

William G. Howell. 2003. *Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action.* Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Argues against Neudstadt 1990 and focusing on presidents' ability to act unilaterally he shows that presidents regularly set public policies over vocal objections by Congress, interest groups, and the bureaucracy. He examines the political conditions under which presidents can change policy without congressional or judicial consent.
- **Argument:**
  - posits an inverse relationship between a president's likelihood to issue significant executive orders and Congress's ability to produce legislation. when Congress is fragmented and less capable of legislating, presidents issue more significant executive orders.
- **Data/Methods:** Game theory
- **Critique:** Chiou and Rothenberg (2013) show that, because of congressional constraints, presidents have less discretion to issue EOs than much of the unilateral politics literature suggests

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Alexander Bolton and Sharece Thrower. 2016. "Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism." *American Journal of Political Science* 60, no. 3 (July): 649–663

- **Key Takeaway:** Develops a theory of presidential unilateralism in which both ideological divergence with Congress and legislative capacity influence the president's use of executive orders.
- **Argument:** legislative capacity conditions the role of ideological disagreement in shaping presidential action.
  - The political science literature finds that the president is constrained by Congress, issuing fewer executive orders under divided government (Fine and Warber 2012; Howell 2003; Young 2013). → BUT this work is on the *modern* presidency. Presidential policy making are time-dependent and conditioned by congressional capacity.
  - When Congress is less capable of constraining the executive, the president will issue more executive orders during periods of divided government. In periods of high legislative capacity, the president is less likely to issue executive orders when faced with an opposed Congress.
- **Data/Methods:**
  - Test theory on years between 1905 and 2013
  - Identify years prior to the mid-1940s as characterized by low congressional capacity and the subsequent period as characterized by high capacity
- **Findings:**
  - Find that presidents issue more executive orders under divided government prior to 1945. However, this relationship reverses after 1945, consistent with theory.
  - Over time, the effect of divided government is conditional on legislative resources, particularly expenditures and committee staff sizes.
- **Relevant Literature:** Howell 2003, Moe and Howell 1999.

Moderators of Power

Issue Domains

Aaron Wildavsky. 1998. "The Two Presidencies." *Society* 35, no. 2 (January): 23–31

- **Key Takeaway:** "two presidencies" thesis (or "dual president theory"), focuses on the fundamental differences between presidential power on foreign vs. domestic policy, and concludes that president has more power on foreign policy.
- **Argument:** presidents more successful in Congress on foreign policy vs. domestic issues
  - Main thesis: "The United States has one president, but it has two presidencies; one presidency is for domestic affairs, and the other is concerned with defense and foreign policy" (23).
  - Presidents prevail in foreign policy because they have both (1) superior resources, and (2) weak or uninterested opponents (e.g., Congress, interest groups, public, and even the military)
  - For foreign policy decisions are perceived to be both important and irreversible, there is every reason for Presidents to devote a great deal of resources to them.
  - Foreign policy not really shaped by public opinion.
  - Interest groups: a range of them for domestic policy – on foreign policy, the interest group structure is weak, unstable, and thin

- **Data/Methods:** examine rates of congressional action (pass/fail) on presidential proposals from 1948-1964
- **Findings:** compare rates of successful legislative reforms across types of policy
  - For domestic policy, presidents rarely accomplish substantial legislative reforms (except during crises) For foreign policy, presidents rarely fail to enact major policies: 70% vs. 40% success rate
- **Relevant Literature:** sparked big debate over whether presidents have greater influence over foreign vs. domestic affairs

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Brandice Canes-Wrone, William G. Howell, and David E. Lewis. 2008. "Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis." *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 1 (January): 1–16

- **Key Takeaway:** Develops Wildavsky (1998)'s argument by highlighting the fact that it is not only formal powers that explain why the president has more power over foreign policy than domestic policy, but also his first-mover advantage, information advantage, and different electoral incentives than Congress
- **Argument:**
  - First-mover advantage
    - Executive orders, national security directives, proclamations, executive agreements can be done all without Congress
    - "Given their unilateral powers, presidents can respond quickly to foreign conflagrations, negotiate peace settlements between other nations, monitor the development of nuclear programs, and retaliate against terrorist attacks—usually without first securing the formal consent of Congress or the courts" (4)
  - Information:
    - President has more information about relevant plays, strategic consequences of policies, covert ops, etc. than Congress. Whereas fo *domestic* policy, Congress can see first-hand effects of domestic policy and can pick up info from interest groups.
  - Electoral incentives
    - President more apt to be blamed for foreign policy; interest groups more active in domestic policy across each issue but not so much for foreign policy
    - "Since foreign policy is not as large a factor in congressional elections as is domestic policy, members have less reason to maintain strong control of this domain. Indeed, given the excruciating demands on their time, members have reason to delegate those decisions that are unlikely to influence their reelection prospects and to focus instead on activities that enhance these prospects." (6)
    - "...because voters—by comparison—do hold presidents accountable for foreign policy, presidents have cause to seize as much control as they can over the area." (6)
- **Relevant Literature:** Expansion of Wildavsky 1998.

Previous Administrations

Stephen Skowronek. 1997. *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton.* Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** APD take on the presidency, focusing on presidential power as reflecting a president's political identity, vis-à-vis the previous regime. In other words, the status quo an incoming president faces shapes the politics of their administration.
- **Argument:** four structures of politics – *reconstruction, disjunction, pre-emption, and articulation* – that cycle over time
  - Highlights that transformative presidents often followed by weak presidents – Adams/Jefferson, Buchanan/Lincoln, Hoover/FDR, Carter/Reagan
  - Three competing impulses: together create a presidency hostile to previous arrangements, as presidents always want to secure their legacy
    - Order-shattering: presidents incentivized to use their power as see fit
    - Order-affirming: presidents need to justify their exercise of power in terms of constitution, existing ideological commitments
    - Order-creating: presidents tempted to use powers to construct new political arrangements
  - Structures of political authority reflect the president's identity as it relates to the previous regime → 2 x 2 grid
    - Political identity: whether a president's ideological commitments fit with existing arrangements (opposition vs. affiliation) Leaders come into power from opposition to pre-established regime, or they are affiliated with pre-established regime's basic commitments.
      - an opposition president has independence that allows them to justify disruptions and exercise power.
    - Previous commitments: whether previous commitments have support/credibility, or are open to attack (resilient vs. vulnerable)
  - Four types of presidencies:
    - Politics of reconstruction: vulnerable commitments of previous administration, opposition to previous regime → revolutionaries, with opportunities for major reforms. Initial election puts president into situation ripe for transformative politics, remake government wholesale, galvanize support for release of government power on new terms, move past old problems and see new possibilities.
    - Politics of articulation: resilient commitments, affiliated with previous regime → continue previous vision, but carve out own niche ("orthodox innovators"). Carry the torch of previous regime, inherit a favorable agenda but are often constrained by partisan division within government (think Truman after FDR) when things get sour they do so quickly (LBJ, TR didn't run for reelection).
    - Politics of preemption: resilient commitments, but opposition leader → "wild card" presidents, tends to end in disaster (impeachment/resignation)
      - Disaster because want to make change, but have little legitimate authority with which to do so
    - Politics of disjunction: vulnerable commitments of previous administration, affiliation with previous regime → impossible position, as cannot criticize unpopular regime associated with own party. Presidents have less authority over national political discourse, can't really do anything of significance.
- **Data/Methods:** in-depth case studies of six presidents

- Roosevelt: reconstruction, able to bring about New Deal reforms not due to political acumen, but due to role as opposition leader in vulnerable regime
- Johnson: articulation, able to enact significant legislative accomplishments, but in doing so exposed flaws in the current political order
- Carter: disjunction, could not resist the existing regime (would be criticized by own party) or extend the existing regime (would receive opposition from other sources) → need to balance affiliation with Democrats, image as an outsider
- Reagan: reconstruction, came to power amidst backlash against previous regime, affording him "Teflon" status (not impeached for Iran-Contra)
- H.W. Bush: articulation, sought to uphold Reagan orthodoxies but hampered in this identity by attempts to differentiate himself in the primaries

- **Findings:** even with changes in political climate, presidents continue to follow same patterns of political time
- **Relevant Literature:** response to theories that group presidential history into eras based on contiguity; instead, suggests a cyclical or periodized nature to presidential power ("political" vs. "secular" time)
  - Suggests that presidents are a product of their time, with personality mattering much less to leadership success/failure than previously expected

		President's political identity	
		Opposed	Affiliated
Previously established commitments	Vulnerable	Politics of reconstruction (Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, FDR)	Politics of disjunction (both Adams, Pierce, Hoover, Carter)
	Resilient	Politics of preemption (Tyler, Wilson, Nixon)	Politics of articulation (Monroe, Polk, LBJ, Teddy Roosevelt)

The Media

Matthew A. Baum and Samuel Kernell. 1999. "Has Cable Ended the Golden Age of Presidential Television?" *American Political Science Review* 93, no. 1 (March): 99–114

- **Key Takeaway:** Presidents used to be able to command the attention of the nation and garner large audiences via television, but that seems to have waned considerably. The authors find that it is likely due to cable television as opposed to political disaffection, and that presidents and broadcast networks have begun to strategically adapt to these changes.
- **Argument:**
  - Without the ability to speak for themselves, presidents are moderated via the news media and under the jurisdiction of journalistic practices.
  - Why are presidents losing their audience? There are two common explanations
    * Pervasive public cynicism
    * Growth of cable and satellite television

  - Hypotheses: cable subscribers will be less likely to watch a presidential appearance than those who remain captive to the broadcast, and that captive viewers will experience negligible opportunity costs in watching the president so they will tend to do so even when they anticipate minimal benefit.

- **Data/Methods:**
  - Data: NES survey
  - Look at the effects of the Cable variable (whether one is subscribed to the cable) and political disaffection on debate watching for the 1996 presidential debates
  - Control variables allow them to control for the possibility that some individuals subscribe to cable as a means of avoiding politically relevant programming – thus, their tastes reflect apolitical tastes rather than the effects of alternative programming.
  - To confirm the findings from the survey, the authors examine the average audience ratings using Nielsen data
  - IV: Main hypothesis: whether one is subscribed to cable tv. Competing hypothesis: trust in government, external efficacy

- **Findings:**
  - Political disaffection appears irrelevant to the decision to watch presidential candidate
  - Those without cable are more likely to watch the debate. Effect becomes even stronger with many controls.
  - Cable competition also prompted the networks to reassess their willingness to surrender prime time to the president

- **Critique:** We know that self-declared media consumption is horrible.

- **Implications:** "How will presidents promote themselves and their policies to a citizenry that depends almost entirely on television for its news and information yet is increasingly unwilling to allow them into their home?" (111)
  - Link with Kernell (2007) going public

Strength of Party Organizations

Sidney M. Milkis. 2014. "The Presidency and Political Parties." In *The Presidency and the Political System,* edited by Michael Nelson, 304–348. Washington, DC: CQ Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Goes through a bunch of administrations from FDR and Obama, and shows that presidents are increasingly legislating through executive order and budget reconciliation and highlights the fact that it helps for presidents to invest in and strengthen party organizations.

- **Historical Summary:**
  - Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR):
    * Party system too much based on state and local orgs, better for congress than a national, executive-ordered system focused on public issues (306)
    * Appointed New Dealers to DNC, used press conferences, shunned Democratic Congressional caucuses, changed DNC requiring 2/3 support for presidential nominees (hurting southern Dems), efforts to unseat conservative Dems ("a purge") (307)

    - FDR make parties national and programmatic – personal link with public instead (helped by radio broadcast, weakening of parties because of direct primary) (308)
    - Reorganization Act helped institutionalize presidency, trying to govern independently of political process (309)
    - "preempted party leaders in many of their limited, but significant, duties: providing a link from government to interest groups, staffing the executive department, contributing to policy development, organizing election campaigns, and communicating with the public" (310)
- Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ):
    - Also tried to de-emphasize traditional party orgs – slashed DNC ops and budget (maybe worried DNC would support Kennedys) → thought they intruded on business of governing (311)
    - Friction b/c of Civil Rights meant issues with southern local Dem orgs – thus, do party work through WH
    - Use task forces to create policy proposals (312)
    - Split b/w party and president made mobilizing support for Great Society difficult – got swamped in 1966 and 1968 (313)
    - Noncareer executive assignments – non confirmable roles that could be placed in agencies for control that were loyal to Great Society program (313)
- Ronald Reagan: revitalizing party politics
    - After 1976, RNC expanded fundraising and candidate service efforts; after 1980, DNC caught up – "As a result, the traditional apparatus of both parties, which was based on patronage and state and local organizations, gave way to a more programmatic party politics, based on the national organization" (316)
    - Reagan was different – identified closely with party org, which helped RNC fundraising, set up RNC to catch up by the 90s and control the presidency for 3 terms (317)
- Bill Clinton:
    - Was a moderate, head of DLC in the 80s – New Dealer, but some welfare polices too far (319)
    - Found it difficult to legislate social issues through executive order
    - While moderate, seemed to appease liberal quite a bit
    - Health care made conservatives and liberal mad, Reps capitalized in 1994 with Contract for America (321)
    - Era of Big government is over (323)
    - Clinton didn't invest down ballot which means they didn't pick up seats in 96 (323)
- George W. Bush (GWB):
    - Compassionate conservativism – being conservative without being antigovernment (325)
    - But still emphasized traditional issues, which means they lost control of senate when Jeffords switched parties
    - Tried to consolidate party and policy control in WH under Karl Rove (326)
    - War changed things (326)
    - Picked up in 2004, but this was really helped by long-term investment in RNC, WH also played key role in candidate recruitment and mobilization (328)
    - Bush's administrative strategy not only impeded the emergence of a more collaborative, party-centered policy process, it also contributed directly to the party's declining fortunes after 2004 (329)

  - Barack Obama:
    * 50 state strategy, grassroots campaign with data and social media, registration strategy (331)
    * OFA becomes party of DNC (really co-opted) (332)
    * Republican obstructionism – raise support for ACA through campaign style rallies and town halls (333)
    * "In sum, Obama appears to have bestowed bipartisan legitimacy on an executive-centered party system. Improving on the innovative techniques developed by the Bush-Cheney campaign in 2004, Obama forged a "reciprocal top-down and bottom-up campaign strategy" that mobilized followers to "realize their collective strength." For all the controversy attending it, the health care battle, fueled by lively, sometime vitriolic town meetings throughout the country, confirmed that the recrudescence of partisanship has renewed interest in politics. By pitting Obama's OFA against the new grassroots conservative Tea Party movement, the health care battle showed, as one Democratic congressional staffer observed, that "the age of apathy is over, and that's a good thing"" (335)
    * We Can't Wait – use of executive order to legislate (336)

- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Aldrich: political parties provide a vital resource in reducing the costs of voter mobilization.

Public Opinion

Andrew Reeves and Jon C. Rogowski. 2016. "Unilateral Powers, Public Opinion, and the Presidency." *The Journal of Politics* 78, no. 1 (January): 137–151

- **Key Takeaway:** Public has opinion on the use of the president's unilateral powers. Attitudes toward presidential power are shaped both by short-term factors, including presidential popularity, and more enduring core democratic values including the belief in the rule of law. This has implications for public opinion's role in constraining the use of presidential power.
- **Argument:**
  - Public opinion on unilateral powers:
    * Low levels of support for unilateral powers
    * These attitudes are stable over time
    * Opinions on unilateral powers are structured both by presidential approval and beliefs in the rule of law. Political context conditions support for unilateral power.
    * These attitudes are consequential for policy evaluation.
- **Data/Methods:**
  - Data from five nationally representative surveys conducted between 2013 and 2015 to study Americans' attitudes toward presidential power
- **Findings:**
  - Support for unilateral powers reflects respondents' evaluations of the president in office and their beliefs in the rule of law. These results are consistent across three types of unilateral powers and in five surveys despite varying levels of politicization of presidential power during this time.

- Support for unilateral power is strongly conditioned by the context in which it is exercised, as the public is substantially more supportive in matters of national security and when Congress is unwilling to act.
- Attitudes toward unilateral power influence Americans' evaluations of the policies that are achieved through their use.

Presidential Responsiveness

Brandice Canes-Wrone and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2004. "The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 4 (October): 690–706

- **Key Takeaway:** empirical test of leadership and pandering model enumerated in Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts 2001, using budgetary proposals
- **Argument:** political conditions affect levels of presidential responsiveness
  - Presidents are more responsive to public opinion when elections are imminent and when their public standing makes these elections likely to be close
  - Responsiveness is higher for issues that citizens are likely to consider on a routine basis (namely, more frequently salient issues).
- **Data/Methods:** presidential budgetary proposals from 1972-99 on a set of eleven major policy issues for which there are recurring surveys on citizens' preferences over spending
  - DV: policy congruence – the relationship between citizens' preferences, president's proposed budgetary authority, for a given issue and year
    - Coded as 1 if president proposes increase and majority of public prefers an increase (or vice versa), 0 when president/public diverge
  - IVs: presidential popularity (Gallup approval), president and congressional ideological congruence (based on match with Poole common scores), public concern (Gallup MIP), president/issue fixed effects
- **Findings:** presidents are more responsive to mass opinion on issues that are familiar to citizens in their everyday lives
  - Heterogeneity: substantial variation across issue areas
  - Conditions for responsiveness: for reelection-seeking presidents, responsiveness depends on two key factors
    - Timing: more responsive when next election is imminent
    - Popularity: presidents with average approval ratings more likely to adopt congruent policy positions, relative to those with high/low approval (non-monotonic relationship)
- **Relevant Literature:** empirically tests the proposed conditions under which presidents will be more or less responsive to public opinion

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Brandice Canes-Wrone, Michael C. Herron, and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2001. "Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking." *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 3 (July): 532

- **Key Takeaway:** formal articulation of the leadership versus pandering model expanded in Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Canes-Wrone 2006

- **Argument:** presidents who have information suggesting that a popular policy is contrary to voters' interests may or may not pander to voters by choosing it
  - Instead, under certain conditions, the president can increase his probability of re-election by choosing an unpopular policy that is in the public's long-term interest
  - Main argument: presidents will be most likely to endorse popular policy when public standing is such that the decision may be pivotal to re-election
    - If standing is either sufficiently high/low, policy position won't be pivotal and therefore won't pursue popular policies
  - Three types of behavior:
    - True leadership: fail to enact a popular policy because know it won't be in the public's best interest (or enact an unpopular policy)
    - Pandering: follow popular opinion despite what believe to be in the public's best interest
    - Fake leadership: enact an unpopular policy that he believes is contrary to voters' well-being, when deleterious effects unlikely to manifest quickly
- **Data/Methods:** basic formal model examining presidential policy choice when the public will or will not learn whether the choice was in their interest before an election
  - DV: choice to pursue a particular policy
  - IV: competitiveness of election, challenger quality, probability of uncertainty resolution regarding whether a policy is in public interest prior to the election
- **Findings:** the incumbent president is more likely to pander in close elections, versus when he is either far ahead of or behind a challenger
  - Pandering is more likely just before an election, as the public is unlikely to learn that the policy was not in their interests prior to the elections
  - While elections will not always encourage pandering, they may also encourage other bad kinds of behavior, such as fake leadership, designed to signal that the "incumbent knows best"
- **Relevant Literature:** following other models that don't focus on presidential personality or reputation (contra Neustadt) and more on structural conditions
  - Response to Kernell 1997: presidents' incentives to go public are conditional
  - Link to Achen and Bartels 2016: the possibility of "bad" policy is much higher in the lead-up to an election, as bad effects unlikely to be felt until after

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Other

Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Tonja Jacobi, and Barry R. Weingast. 2006. "The New Separation-of-Powers Approach to American Politics." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy,* edited by Donald A. Wittman and Barry R. Weingast, 1:199–222. New York: Oxford University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Introduce new way to study the presidency by looking at interactions between institutions, named "seperation-of-powers approach". We cannot fully understand the behavior of one institution without understanding it in the context of the others, and in doing-so we increase the number of observations which is often an issue when studying the presidency.
- **Argument:**

- Reconceptualizing the independent variable; many presidents face variations in their environment, such as the partisan composition of the Congress. Thus, the unit of analysis becomes not just a presidency, but a president-Congress combination
- Embedding the study of the president in a spatial model that allows to study systematically the interaction with other institutions, typically in the context of something the president does again and again (e.g. appointments, budgets, and vetoes).
- With this method notice that actors anticipate behavior of others and highlights the importance of the decision-making sequence, because of first-mover advantage.

- **Findings:**
  - Example of Ferejohn and Shipman findings using this model: "This model also showed how judicial review can draw the policy outcome back towards congressional preferences by mitigating the influence of the presidential veto. The president can veto congressional amendments of agency action, so in effect the president can choose between supporting congressional action and allowing the decision to revert to the agency's decision. This constrains Congress's choice of actions, which in turn broadens the agency's discretionary range. The threat of the judiciary overriding an agency's action has the effect of reducing the agency's range of discretion, and so drawing the equilibrium policy outcome back toward the congressional median. Thus Ferejohn and Shipan showed how judicial action shapes congressional-bureaucratic relations and congressional-presidential relations" (218)

Robert A. Dahl. 1990. "Myth of the Presidential Mandate." *Political Science Quarterly* 105, no. 3 (September): 355–372

- **Key Takeaway:** Critique the primitive theory of the president's mandate.
- **Argument:**
  - Primitive Theory: presidential elections can accomplish four things
    1. Confers constitutional and legal authority on the victor
    2. Conveys information; reveals the first preferences for president of a plurality of votes
    3. Conveys further information; namely that a clear majority of voters prefer the winner because they prefer his policies and wish him to pursue his policies.
    4. Because the president's policies reflect the wishes of a majority of voters, when conflicts over policy arise between president and Congress, the president's policies ought to prevail.
  - Dahl argues against the third point and thus also does not believe in the fourth point. Constituents' wishes usually cannot be known, at least when the constituency is large and diverse, as in presidential elections.
  - Thus, the presidential mandate is a dangerous myth because it is employed to support misleading and manipulative interpretations. The president does not deliberate or communicate with members of congress, and instead appeals to and manipulates public opinion. The president's private interests are hidden behind appeals to the public interest.

Bureaucracy

William A. Niskanen. 1971. *Bureaucracy & Representative Government.* New Brunswick, NJ: Aldine-Atherton

- **Key Takeaway:** Bureaucracy constrained by relationship with appropriators
- **Argument:** Introduces a *supply side* theory of bureaucracy – shaped by the behavior environment that constraints individual choices
  - Conceptualize bureaus as "non-profit organizations" financed by appropriations
    - Good at providing goods preferred to supplied in large amounts (high fixed costs, difficulties collecting fees)
  - When the objective of government and a bureaucrat are consistent → the level of difficulty in instructing the bureaucrat can lead to variance in actual output and desired output
    - When goals are not aligned → actual output can be systematically different than desired output
  - Bureaus are defined by its relations with: (1) collective organization that provides appropriation (Congress), (2) suppliers of labor and factors of production, (3) consumers of their services
    - Bureau and sponsor relation is that of a **bilateral monopoly**
      - Bureau promises activities and outputs; has informational advantage on area speciality; multi-stage budget review
  - Bureaus strive for increased budgets → but need to balance budget requests with reasonable ability to follow through on activities
  - **Propose Alternative:** Increase competition among bureaus in supply of same or similar services

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Stephen Skowronek. 1982. *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** path dependent development of bureaucracy; industrialization generated political demands that led to creation of a strong administrative state
- **Argument:** Modern American state as reconstruction of precious statelessness via incremental reforms
  - Initially, American did not have a "state" – instead, the government operated through a "state of courts and parties," focused on patronage, pork-barel politics, and decentralized power
  - Pressured of industrialization (and its associated social trends) created demand for a national administrative apparatus, with reforms hastened by the 1890s electoral realignment (which established Republican hegemony)
    - After Republicans lost dominance, there was a struggle for power within – and outside – the bureaucracy, leading to struggles between Congress and the president over control of the bureaucracy
  - These struggles led to the emergence of an American state with a powerful bureaucracy – more powerful than it would've been absett these struggles
- **Data/Methods:**
  - DV: strength of the American state (essentially centralization of power within a national admin apparatus)

  - IV: time (in terms of secular trends), demand for an administrative state, different actors' interests

- **Findings:** the state-building between 1877-1920 involved layering reforms atop existing institutions, with debates over how best to reform the government influenced by this context
  - **State-building as patchwork:** 1877-1900; new institutions designed to meet immediate needs, particularly influential groups
  - **State-building as reconstitution:** 1900-1920l environmental changes signaled need for a new state, with the national bureaucratic state that formed a function of pre-existing institutions

- **Contributions/Related Literature:**
  - Presidential power: though a strong bureaucratic state offered an opportunity to expand the role of the presidency, Skowronek suggests a very weak view of the president as a "glorified clerk"

Michael Lipsky. 1983. *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation

- **Key Takeaway:** Street-level bureaucrats are important

- **Argument:** Street-level bureaucrats dominate conversations about public service: (1) debate about propose scope and focus of government services is debate about these employees; (2) they have considerable impact on people's lives
  - Exercise of discretion is a critical dimension of much of the work of street-level bureaucrats who regularly interact with citizens in the course of their jobs
  - These jobs are often not performed according to the highest standards of decision making in the various fields because street-level workers lack the time, information, and other resources necessary to respond properly to the individual case
    - Instead, develop routines of practice and psychologically simplifying efforts
  - Work as diverse and apparently unrelated as social workers, cops, teachers are structurally similar so that one could compare work settings with each other
    - Paradox: The work is often highly scripted to achieve policy objectives, but it also requires improvisation and responsiveness to individual cases
  - **Key Claim:** Decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively *become* the public policies they carry out

- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Foundational piece on street-level bureaucrats

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Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms." *American Journal of Political Science* 28, no. 1 (February): 165

- **Key Takeaway:** "fire alarm" vs " police patrol" oversight of agencies

- **Argument:** what appears to be a lack of congressional oversight is a rational preference for one type of oversight ("fire alarm" as opposed to ("police patrol" oversight)
  - Previous theories assume that congress neglects its oversight responsibility
  - Main argument: Congress uses fire-alarm oversight instead of police-patrol oversight to monitor agencies

    - Fire-alarm oversight is more likely to ensure compliance with legislative goals, though may be more particularistic than public-focused
  - Police patrol oversight: centralized, active, direct surveillance of agency activities
    - Involves Congress sampling agency activities, with goal of detecting, remedying, and discouraging violations of legislative goals
  - Fire alarm oversight: system of rules, procedures, informal practices that enables citizens/interest groups to monitor agency behavior, seek remedies when needed
    - Congress waits for alarm to be sounded by others

- **Data/Methods:** lays out assumptions and consequences of a model of fire-alarm oversight. Assumptions:
  - Technological: choice between two forms of oversight, or some combo
  - Motivational: members want to take as much credit as possible for net benefits, avoid blame for costs borne by potential re-election supporters
  - Institutional: executive agencies as agents of Congress

- **Findings:** Congress will adopt an extensive and somewhat effective policy of fire-alarm oversight, while largely neglecting police-patrol oversight
  - If members favor any oversight, they prefer fire-alarm vs. police-patrol form, because former enables more efficient credit-claiming
    - Under fire-alarm system, only intervene when potential supporters complain about violations → get credit for intervening
    - Costs of oversight incurred by citizens/interest groups, administrative agencies/courts - not members
  - Congress will not neglect oversight responsibility – should adopt extensive, though imperfect, policy, especially because fire-alarm oversight is low-cost
  - Consequences: fire-alarm oversight more effective, on balance, than police-patrol oversight (in ensuring compliance with legislative goals)
    - Many violations might be missed under police-patrol framework because only take a sample of executive branch actions

- **Contributions/Related Literature:** response to theories that Congress neglects its oversight responsibility due to the complexity of the bureaucracy (e.g., Lowi 1969), a desire to keep the bureaucracy non-political, or too much decentralization of Congress

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Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control." *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,* 243–277

- **Key Takeaways:** Administrative procedures as devices to enhance political control; most *administrative law* is written to help elected officials retain control over policy making

- **Argument:** elected representatives want to ensure that policy decisions are responsive to citizen interests/preferences, but policy making requires *delegation* of authority to unelected bureaucrats
  - Central premise: political control of agencies as a *principal-agent problem*
  - Solution: administrative procedures constitute an additional mechanism (beyond monitoring, sanctioning) for achieving greater bureaucratic compliance

  - Active oversight: high cost of monitoring and sanctions prevents them from being a good strategy for control over the bureaucracy
  - Procedural solutions: administrative procedure acts (APAs) can sole information asymmetry, keep administrative decisions in line with politicians' interests
    * Alterations in procedures can shape the relative influence of people who are affected by a policy, without requiring additional time/effort from politicians
    * Administrative procedures also transfer responsibility for decisions fro, elected officials to agencies and courts

- **Data/Methods:** mostly theoretical
  - DV: administrative decision-making
  - IV: use of administrative procedures to control the bureaucracy

- **Findings:** : by requiring agencies to collect and disseminate politically relevant information, Congress and the president make the threat of sanctions a more efficacious control device
  - The administrative system is designed so that some of the costs of enforcement are borne not by politicians, but by constituents and the courts
  - Administrative procedures affect the costs to agencies of implementing policies that are opposed by groups enfranchised by these procedures. This alters the incentive structure of the agencies and thereby shapes their decisions." (246)

- **Contributions/Related Literature:** emblematic of McNollgast perspective on the purposive design of major institutions of bureaucratic agencies to affect use of discretion in policymaking
  - Congressional dominance: Congress is effective at directing bureaucratic agencies to pursue policies in its own interests, even absent significant oversight

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Terry M. Moe. 1989. "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure." In *Can the government govern?,* edited by John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, 267–329. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution

- **Key Takeaway:** The bureaucracy is not designed to be effective; the structure of the bureaucracy is designed to serve the interests/strategies of those exercising power

- **Argument:** bureaucracy as inherently inefficient, due to competing structural designs of different groups, meant to serve different purposes
  - Motivating question: What sorts of structures do different political actors (interest groups, presidents, Congress, bureaucrats) find conducive to their own interests?
    * What form of bureaucracy will emerge from efforts to exercise political power?
  - Interest groups generally know what they want (in broad strokes) but lack the expertise to solve complex social problems, predict the future
    * As a result, they delegate authority to agencies, but cannot ensure that bureaucrats act in their interests
    * They design a structure to select bureaucrats with good reputations and design a structure to give these bureaucrats autonomy.
  - Because most interest groups are not dominant, they design structures to insulate the bureaucracy from changing political tides
    * However, opponents also have a say in the process and will impose structures that reduce effective performance, politicize agency decisions

- Legislators: legislators follow interest groups – they strive for *particularized* control to advance interests of relevant constituents
- Presidents: presidents want to control the bureaucracy, but find tension with interest groups, who want to insulate agencies from politics
- Result: bureaucracy with a mix of political appointees, careerists to reflect the competing interests of presidents, interest groups

- **Data/Methods:** case studies of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), EPA
  - DV: bureaucratic (in)efficiency
  - IV: structure of the bureaucracy
- **Findings:** "A bureaucracy that is structurally unsuited for effective action is precisely the kind of bureaucracy that interest groups and politicians routinely and deliberately create" (328
  - Because of political *uncertainty*, interest groups will not demand an effectively designed organization
  - Because no interest group is dominant, need to *compromise*, even though losing group is dedicated to undermining agency effectiveness
  - Presidents and interest groups act in *conflict* – with one trying to politicize and the other trying to insulate
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** suggests the inherent difficulties of designing effective bureaucracy, given the competing interests of different groups jockeying for control

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Kathleen Bawn. 1995. "Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures." *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 1 (March): 62–73

- **Key Takeaway:** Trade-off between technical competence and political control is captured in model about agency procedures
- **Argument:** Agency independence as a choice made by Congress
  - An agency is more*independent*,the less its decisions are determined in advance by Congress. *Independence* refers to an agency's potential to drift from legislative intent ex ante, not its realized influence on policy ex post
  - **Central Thesis:** The degree of agency independence on any particular policy reflects the legislature's willingness to trade uncertainty about policy consequences for uncertainty about agency behavior
  - Model choice of agency procedures by a coalition in Congress:
    - Procedures determine which groups in society the agency is most responsive to; procedures establish preferences over policy outcomes, degree of uncertainty about preferences, and uncertainty about policy consequences
    - Choice between control and expertise will vary depending on technical features of the policy and political environment
  - Bridge two approaches to studying congressional influence on agency decisions:
    - Stack the deck: Procedural decisions by Congress critically affect subsequent policy decisions; procedures chosen on the basis of strategic political considerations (see McCubbins, Noll, Weingast (1987)

    - * Game Theoretic models: models administrative procedures in games of incomplete information; preferences are exogenous

- **Data/Methods:** Formal model
- **Findings:** Model shows how a trade-off between control and expertise affects the degree of independence delegated to an agency. A legislative coalition's choice of agency independence, made through the choice of procedures, depends on technically uncertainty about policy consequences, as well as uncertainty about the political environment
    - If legislators care about the consequences of agency decisions, administrative procedures and agency independence will vary according tto the technical and political features of the policy area
    - **Limitation:** treats the legislative coalition as a single decision maker with coherent preferences

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Daniel P. Carpenter. 2001. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928.* Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** bureaucratic agencies are able to gain autonomy over policy, despite executive and legislative objection
- **Argument:** bureaucrats can build reputations for agencies, erect coalitions behind favored policies, and secure favored policies despite opposition from politicians
    - Motivating question: why and how does autonomy happen, and why are some agencies autonomous while others were not?
        - * **Bureaucratic autonomy:** autonomy occurs when political authorities (Congress, pres., courts) see it as in their interest to defer to agency action
    - Main argument: autonomy tied to reputational uniqueness and political multiplicity
        - * **Uniqueness:** have to show that agency can create solutions or provide services that no others can
        - * **Multiplicity:** maintenance of legitimacy amongst groups with diverse sets of interests → coalitions to support the agency's work
    - Conditions: for bureaucratic autonomy:
        - * **Politically differentiated:** from the actors who seek to control them (e.g., unique preferences, interests, and ideology)
        - * **Unique capacities:** to analyze, create new programs, administer programs efficiently and without corruption
        - * **Political legitimacy:** strong organizational reputation embedded in an independent power base
    - Timing: bureaucratic autonomy emerged during the Progressive era (1890s-1920s) *not* the New Deal era
        - * During the New Deal, many regulatory agencies were expanded or created – but most of these agencies lacked permanence.
        - * Before 1900, there was little belief in the capacity of government agencies, but were able to incrementally build coalitions.
- **Data/Methods:** case studies of three departments – Post Office, Agriculture, and Interior

  - Methods: focus on historical narratives, statistical analysis, counterfactuals, and policy comparisons
  - Timing: focus on bureaucratic autonomy during the period between the Civil War and the Great Depression
  - Puzzle: why Post Office and Agriculture became politically independent policymakers, whereas Interior did not
- **Findings:** integrating organizational theory, rational choice, network concepts
  - Bureaucratic autonomy as form of *deference*: when politically differentiated agency takes action that neither politicians nor organized interests prefer but either cannot or will not overturn/-constrain
  - Bureaucracies with *unique goals* achieve autonomy when middle-level (mezzo) officials establish reputations among diverse coalitions for effectively providing *unique services*
  - These coalitions enable agencies to resist political control and make it costly for politicians to ignore the agencies preferences
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Challengers view by Skowronek (1982) that the 19th century American state was entirely composed of "courts and parties"

Rachel Augustine Potter. 2017. "Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in Rulemaking." *The Journal of Politics* 79, no. 3 (July): 841–855

- **Key Takeaway:** Bureaucrats can strategically time rule-making process to align with more favorable government
- **Argument:** Bureaucrats can speed up, or "fast-track" decision making to have the transaction occur in a favorable political climate where political principals are sympathetic to the agency of decision. Conversely, in more hostile political environments, bureaucrats may delay a decision – "slow roll," until the political climate improves
  - Centers on the ability of bureaucrats to manage two types of drift: if agencies move quickly, they can cash in on known "bureaucratic drift"; if they delay, they can benefit from "coalition drift"
  - Rule-making process is critical way that bureaucrats make policy
  - Key contribution is dual focus on *both* rule-making and discretion over timing
- **Data/Methods:** Event history models; dataset of more than 11,000 proposed rules issues by 150 bureaus between 1995 and 2014
- **Findings:** In the face of opposition from Congress, the White House, or the courts, agencies slow the pace of rule-making and are much less likely to issue a final rule
  - Rules out two alternative explanations: (1) agency capacity explains slower pace and (2) agencies are "sincerely delayed" by the complexity of the policies
  - Agencies have mastered the administrative process and are able to opportunistically time rule finalization to capitalize on supportive coalitions or wait for drift from a future coalition

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Hye Young You. 2017. "Ex Post Lobbying." *The Journal of Politics* 79, no. 4 (October): 1162–1176

- **Key Takeaway:** Interest groups can lobby legislators directly following the passage of legislaiton to influence distribution of *particularized* good in the regulatory rule-making process
- **Argument:** Understanding special interest group decision making regarding when to lobby is important because it sheds light on how interest groups allocate their resources across different stages of policy making process
  - Existing theories of lobbying fail to explain a significant amount of lobbying activity that happens after bills are passed
  - Each piece of legislator can be characterized by degree of collective vs particularistic goods → this determines whether an industry as a whole enjoys benefits from legislation it supports
  - Significant amount of ex post lobbying implies that there is a classic collective action problem among interest groups → while there are incentives to lobby ex ante, also incentives for groups that support the bill to sit back and lobby ex post
- **Data/Methods:** 600,000 lobbying disclosure reports from 1998 to 2012
- **Findings:** 40% of lobbying activity that targets bills signed into law occurs after the bills' passage and over 50% of ex post lobbying targeted members of congress
  - Significant amount of ex post lobbying implies that interest groups allocate substantial resources to lobbying Congress to influence the implementation stages of the policy-making process
  - Pushes back on description of interest groups' lobbying activities focusing on committee stage
  - Rather than focus on lobbying federal agencies directly, substantial amount of resources target legislators themselves
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Emphasizes the important of *timing* lobbying, pushing back on existing literature that emphasizes ex ante lobbying. Tied to the money in politics literature.

Law and Courts

Robert A. Dahl. 1957. "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker." *Journal of Public Law* 6 (2): 279–295

- **Key Takeaway:** Supreme Court is a political institution because it takes on controversial questions of national policy
- **Argument:** People think the court is not political; legitimacy rests on this idea → but the court is a national policy-maker
  - Majority View: see the court as protecting minorities against tyranny of the majority
  - Right or Justice: most important function of the Court is to protect rights
  - The Court is part of the "dominant political alliance"; SC is part of the political leadership and possess bases of power on its own including the legitimacy attributed to it through its interpretations of the Constitution
    - Jeopardizes legitimacy is constantly opposes dominant alliance, but given the limits set by the policy goals of this alliance the Court can make policy
    - Main task of the court is to confer legitimacy on the fundamental policies of a successful coalition

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Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth. 2002. *The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited.* New York: Cambridge University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** argument for the *attitudinal model*; judges are policymakers who decide cases primarily on the basis of their *personal policy preferences*
- **Argument:** Supreme Court justices as policymakers, who are virtually unconstrained in their decision-making
  - Legal Model: justices as constrained by pre-existing law, particularly the meaning of states and the Constitution, the Framers' intent, or past precedent
    - "The belief that, in one form or another, the decisions of the Court are substantially influenced by the facts of the case in light of the plain meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the Framers, and/or precedent"
    - **Critique**: inherent ambiguity of precedent, vague/imprecise language, etc. makes it so that judges cannot just be mechanical decision-makers.
  - Attitudinal Model: justices make decisions based on their *ideological attitudes* and *political values* – and act sincerely on these personal preferences over policy
    - "The Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-a-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices"
    - Assumes that justices are unconstrained by rules when issuing decisions, so policy attitudes should be the determining factor in shaping their decisions.
  - Rational Choice Model: justices are constrained by their institutional environment, particularly separation of power
    - Assumes that judges have preferences, though not necessarily ideological preferences (as in the attitudinal model
    - **Separation-of-powers model**: justices strategically deviate from their ideal points to avoid being overridden in their decisions

        - "The Court will construe legislation as close to its ideal point as possible without getting overturned by Congress"
    - **Critique:** argue that separation-of-powers models employ bad assumptions (e.g., unidimensionality, restricted to statutory decisions, choice of last mover)

- **Data/Methods:** analysis for post-WWII Supreme Court *case law data* on search-and-seizure cases
  - DV: whether a liberal decision is issued by a civil liberties case
  - IV: test three models using (1) justices' attitudes, (2) Congressional preferences, and (3) facts of the case
    - **Attitudinal model:** "exogenous" measure of justices' attitudes based on judgments from newspaper editorials characterizing nominees as liberal/conservative on civil liberties
    - **Other models:** (1) facts of the case, (2) congressional preferences
- **Findings:** find strong evidence for the attitudinal model; attitudes alone predict 70% of outcomes in search and seizure cases
  - Congressional preferences do not significantly predict the outcome of statutory cases, after controlling for justices' policy preferences
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** response to legalist myth about justices as objective, impartial, and dispassionate – suggests that, like other actors, justices are policy-oriented

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Howard Gillman. 2001. "What's Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the "Legal Model" of Judicial Decision Making." *Law and Social Inquiry* 26:465–504

- **Key Takeaway:** critique of behavioral school (*attitudinal model)*l although there may be a personal component to decision-making, this is constrained by professional norms
- **Argument:** proponents of attitudinal model typically discount legal variables, by defining law based on a set of *clear, determinate rules* ratther than allowing for *discretion*
  - However, if you broaden legal variables to include a general set of rules or principles, justices tend to act in ways that are consistentt with these rules
  - Critique: Segal and Spaeth paint legal model as deterministic; justices acting on the facts of the case would all have to decide in the same way – overly dogmatic
- **Data/Methods:** examine whether original dissenters from a precedent-setting case change their behavior to support the precedent in later "progeny" (related) cases
- **Findings:** Segal and Spaeth find that justices who dissent from precedent-setting cases generally maintain opposition in future related cases
  - The effect more pronounced in ordinary vs. landmark cases, statutory vs constitional cases
  - Segal/Spaeth interpretation: if justices follow stare decisis, they should move toward precedents that they initially voted against – but they tend to maintain initial opposition, so precedent can't influence Supreme Court decision-making
  - Gillman response: Supreme Court justices are not obligated to gravitate toward the position of their colleagues – deference to stare decisis not expected
    - However, positive tests of legal models are near-impossible, without changing the concepts of legal influence beyond recognition

    - As a result, ethnographic or interpretivist (post-positivist) methods might be better-suited to adjudicating these models

- **Contributions/Related Literature:** critique of Segal and Spaeth 2002's rejection of the legal model based on empirical tests that are not actually in line with legalist assumptions about how justices act

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Keith E. Whittington. 2005. ""Interpose Your Friendly Hand": Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court." *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 4 (November): 583–596

- **Key Takeaway:** Support for judicial review is linked to the governments need to use the judiciary as a mechanism to advance favorable policy and overcome barriers

- **Argument:** Consider the conditions under which judicial activism by a relatively friendly court may emerge and be sustained

  - Existing literature on judicial independence emphasizes how judicial activism emerges when the judiciary is relatively unfriendly to the current legislative majority
  - Emerging literature concerned with showing how the SC doctrine fits within the goals and tensions within the broader political regime
    - Observed that the exercise of judicial review does not fit the "counter-majoritarian" framework, but efforts to develop explanations for the emergence of judicial review are still in their initial stages
  - Structural characteristics of the political systems such as the US encourage cooperation between judges and political leaders to obtain common objectives
    - The Court assists powerful officials within the current government in overcoming various structural barriers to realizing their ideological objectives through direct political action
    - Three sets of barriers: (1) federalism, (2) entrenched interests, (3) fragmented political coalitions
  - Expect that there will be additional supports for the active exercise of judicial review by an ideologically friendly judiciary to the extent that there are political barriers that hamper the realization of a governing coalition's agenda
    - Allied elected officials would stand to benefit from an active judiciary if the ability of those officials to reach their preferred policy positions on their own is limited
  - Expect political support for judicial review to be apparent in four activities: (1) selection of "activist" judges; (2) encouragement of specific judicial action consistent with political needs of coalition leaders; (3) congenial reception of judicial action after it has been taken; (4) public expression of generalized support for judicial supremacy in the articulation of constitutional commitments

- A politically sustainable judicial activism can be understood as a vehicle of regime enforcement

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Gerald N. Rosenberg. 2008. *The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?* 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Dynamic vs Constrained view of court; significant social reform possible when certain conditions met

- **Argument:** Explore the extent and under what conditions courts can produce political and social changes
  - Litigation support significant social reform has increasingly turned to the courts and been most successful when other branches of government have failed to act
  - Dynamic Court: courts can produce significant social reform even when other branches of government are inactive or opposed; functional view of the courts as a powerful, proponent of change
    * Courts are free from electoral constraints and institutional arrangements; have the capacity to act where others may be politically unwilling to
    * Institutional inertia and group pressures make it difficult for non-judicial institutions to reform themselves
  - Constrained Court: weak, ineffective, powerless court; lack both budgetary and physical powers so their ability to produce political and social change is limited
    * **Constraint 1:** Bounded nature of constitutional rights prevents courts from hearing or effectively acting on many significant social reform claims, and lessens the changes of popular mobilization
    * **Constraint 2:** Judiciary lacks the necessary independence from the other branches of the government to produce significant social reform
    * **Constraint 3:** Courts lack the tools to readily develop appropriate policies and implement decisions ordering significant social reform
  - Conditions for producing social change
    * **Condition 1:** courts may effectively produce significant social reform when other actors offer positive incentives to induce compliance
    * **Condition 2:** courts may effectively produce significant social reform when other actors impose costs to induce compliance
    * **Condition 3:** courts may effectively produce significant social reform when judicial decisions can be implemented by the market
    * **Condition 4:** courts may effectively produce significant social reform by providing leverage or a shield, cover, excuse, for persons crucial to implementation who are *willing to act*
- **Data/Methods:** Focus on civil rights and women's rights
  - How to deal with causation? Two types of influence from the court:
    * Court decisions can produce social reform through a *judicial* path that relies on the authority of thee court
    * Court influene could follow an *extra-judivial path* that invokes court powers of persuasion, legitimacy to give salience to issues

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Steven Michael Teles. 2008. *The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law.* 2. Dr. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press

- **Argument:** Long-term alliance of rich conservative donors focused on creating a parallel set of institutions to rival liberal legal establishment
  - Conservative opponents of activist liberalism developed six strategies for long-term political investment
    * Develop institutions, providing infrastructure through which strategic action could occur

    - Used institutions to both produce critiques of existing government commitments and to spell out conservative alts to the status quo
    - Shifted from essentially reactionary approach to one that focused on seizing control of the intellectual and programmatic agenda from the left
    - Attempted demonstrate efficacy of these alternatives, by identifying short-term changes that would alter the ground on which subsequent battles would be fought
    - Created networks to facilitate collective action and to create a cadre of conservative activists
    - Sought to shift the foundation of the conservative movement, putting ideologically motivated activists and intellectuals in the driver's seat, displacing the previously dominant role played by business interests
  - Takes ideas seriously and play the long game → building an intellectual infrastruture for challenging the liberal constitutional order

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Jonathan P. Kastellec, Jeffrey R. Lax, and Justin H. Phillips. 2010. "Public Opinion and Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees." *The Journal of Politics* 72, no. 3 (July): 767–784

- **Key Takeaway:** Senators are responsive to public opinion when voting on Supreme Court nominees
- **Argument:** Given the visibility of roll-call votes on Supreme Court nominees, and the stakes for controversial policies at the heart of recent elections, expect reelection-minded senators to pay close attention to the views of their constituents
  - Three links necessary for a meaningful connection between public and who sits on the court: knowledge, salience, and senatorial attention
- **Data/Methods:** MRP estimates of state-level opinion on support for SC nominees
- **Findings:** Greater home-state public support significantly increases the probability that a senator will vote for confirmation, even when controlling for other predictors of roll call voting (ideological, congruence between nominee and senator, PID)
  - Impact of opinion varies with context, with a greater effect on opposition party senators, ideologically opposed senators, and weak nominees
- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Important methodological contribution providing evidence that Senators are responsive to public opinion when it comes to the court

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Mila Versteeg and Emily Zackin. 2016. "Constitutions Unentrenched: Toward an Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design." *American Political Science Review* 110, no. 4 (November): 657–674

- **Key Takeaway:** Constitutions can either be constrain those in power by being spare and entrenched or specific; the latter is increasingly common
- **Argument:**
  - Dominant theme of constitutional theory literature is that successful constitutions must not only constrain those in power, but do so over long time horizons (eg "entrenchment function"); mechanism for permanently removing some questions form the political agenda
    - Entrenched constitutions typically constructed as spare frameworks since highly specific documents are unlikely to remain relevant over long time horizons
  - The model of an entrenched and spare document successfully described the US constitution, but not many other countries or even state constitutions

    - Specific and unentrenched constitutions developed over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries and are dominant across the globe and within US states
    - these polities' flexible and detailed constitutional texts embody alternative model of constitutionalism → rather than entrenching constraints through spare and stable texts, provide officeholders with specific and frequently modified instructions; still attempts to constrain political power
  - Both types of constitutional design are attempting to solve the same principal-agent problem; specific constitutions do so not by limiting actions through fixed boundaries, but by limiting the latitude within which agents operate and relaxing the rigidity of the constitutional boundaries to accommodate constitutions' increased scope and detail

- **Data/Methods:** Longitudinal data from every democratic country and the US states from late 18th century to today + regional case studies

- **Findings:** Constitutional drafters increasingly chose specificity over entrenchment as a means to constrain the exercise of political power → in doing so, embark on developmental path that was different from the course of federal constitutional development in the US

- **Contributions/Related Literature:** Argue that scholars should no longer define constitutional success in terms of the stability of a single constitutional text.

Policymaking & Policy Feedback

Theodore J. Lowi. 1964. "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory." *World Politics* 16, no. 4 (July): 677–715

- **Key Takeaway:** When thinking about arenas of power and conflict in the policy-making sphere, need to consider the *type* of policy and how that shapes conflicts over power
- **Argument:**
  - Three existing models of policy competition and power in policy making:
    - **Pluralist Model:** Lots of different groups form coalitions around "shared attitudes" in support of policy. Power is highly decentralized, fluid, and situational. No single elite but a "multi-centered" system in which the centers exist in conflict and bargaining relations
    - **Elitist Model:** Pluralistic model fails to take into account the general economic and political structure within which the group processes take places. Accounts for social stratification and power elite
    - **Schattschneider Model:** Multiplicity of groups in a decentralized and bargaining arena, but relations are not pluralistic. Based on a "mutual non-interference" among uncommon interests. Power structures stabilized toward the "command posts"
  - Proposed framework to understand political outcomes:
    - Types of relationships to be found among people are determined by their expectation – by what they hope to achieve or get from relating to others
    - In politics, expectations are determined by governmental outputs or policies
    - Therefore, a political relationship is determined by the *type* of policy at stake, so that for every type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship
  - Three major categories of public policies and real arenas for power
    - **Distributive Policy:** Characterized by ease with which they units can be disaggregated and dispensed unit by small unit
      - Schattschneider theory effective explanation of the arena of power here
    - **Regulatory Policy:** Also specific and individual in impact, but not capable of the almost infinite amount of disaggregation In the short run, involves a direct choice as to who will be indulged and who deprived
      - Reflected most by pluralist model
    - **Redistributive Policy:** like regulatory in the sense that relations among broad categories of private individuals are involved – broader impact approaching social classes
      - Reflected most by elitist model

John W. Kingdon. 1984. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.* Boston: Little Brown

- **Key Takeaway:** Policy making involves many different actors, inside and outside government, and involves working in the constraints of government and the general period in time (mood, relevant problems)
- **Argument:** Provides an overview of the policy-making process and all the factors the influence it
  - Making policy involves: (1) setting the agenda, (2) specification of alternatives from which a choice is to be made, (3) an authoritative choice among specified alternatives, (4) implementation of the decision

- **Agenda:** list of subjects or programs to which government officials and people outside of government associated with those officials pay serious attention to at any given time
  - Government Agenda: subjects getting attention
  - Decision Agenda: Subjects up for active decisions
  - Issues can come onto the agenda: relevant problems, changes in respected indicators, gradual accumulation of knowledge, political processes, electoral swings, public mood
  - Garbage Can Model: people's preferences are inconsistent and conflicts, don't understand existing processes in other sectors or boundaries of organization
    - A choice opportunity is a "garbage can" into which various problems and solutions are dumped by relevant parties
  - Revised Model: Government as organized anarchy; people recognize problems and engage in political activities
- **Policy communities:** specialists in think tanks, committees. Some communities are fragmented which can lead to policy fragmentation
- Evolution of policy comes more from recombination than mutation; policy makers combine ideas new and old, adapt ideas
- **Softening up:** many communities are inertia bound and resistant to changes – by educating the public, presidential speeches, trial balloon legislation, you gain traction for ideas, get people talking about it being a possibility
  - National mood: people in and around government sense it and are aware of climate in country, changes in public opinion, social movements
- Within government, admin changes bring changes in policy agendas; turnover in Congress, battles between agencies and congressional committees
- **Policy Window:** the short periods of time where participants can take advantage of opportunity to enact change – open infrequently and do not stay open for long
  - Windows close because participants feel they have addressed the problem; participants fail to actually get action b/c they don't want to spend time or political capital; events that provided window pass; if a change in personnel opens a window, turnover may close it relatively quickly before things get done; there are no available alternatives
- Combination of national mood and elections is a more potent agenda setter than organized interests – interest groups can blog legislation they don't like but tougher to get things of their own

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Paul Pierson. 1993. "When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change." *World Politics* 45, no. 4 (July): 595–628

- **Key Takeaway:** Overview of policy feedback theory
- **Argument:** Framework for understanding policy feedback
  - Three primary actors of policy feedback: government officials, interest groups, mass public
  - Two primary mechanisms for policy feedback:
    - **Resources and Incentives:** Policies can impact the resources and incentives different political actors have. Public policies can confer resources on individuals and create incentives for them
      - Among interest groups, public policies create "spoils" that provide motivation for beneficiaries to mobilize in favor or against

        - Policies may also provide resources that make mobilization activity easier; direct access to funds, access to decision makers
        - Among officials, policies can transform state capacities; influencing resources and incentives within government. Creatiot of new bureaucratic organizations etc
        - Among the public, Policy can influence important life choices and resource based decisions. Policies that provide incentives to encourage individuals to act in ways that *lock in* a particular path of policy development
    * **Interpretive:** Beyond material path, emphases the way that public policies impact the cognitive processes of social actors
        - *Learning effects:* cumulative process of policy learning. Policy makers may react negatively/positively to past policies and adapt. Depends on:
        - Insulation of decision makers, policy complexity, and stages of the policy making process
        - *Informational effect:* Among the mass public, policy can raise the salience of issues, heightening political connections, generating "focusing events"
        - Depends on the *visibility* and *traceability.* Visibility is when policy leads people to experience an outcome that leads them to inquire about it. Traceability is the ability to link the outcome to government action

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Suzanne Mettler. 2002. "Bringing the State Back In to Civic Engagement: Policy Feedback Effects of the G.I. Bill for World War II Veterans." *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 02 (June): 351–365

- **Key Takeaway:** Public policy can function in promoting norms, in this case participatory norms and developing social capital
- **Argument:** Examines effects of the GI bill, one of the most generous and inclusive social entitlements
    - Program extended numerous social benefits including higher education and vocational training to returning veterans of WWII
    - Through features of their design, policies may shape beneficiaries subjective experience of what it means to be a citizen; affect formation of political identity; unify or stratify society and the political community in new ways
    - Propose framework that bridges Pierson (1993) and VBS civic voluntarism model
        * The resources bestowed on citizens through policy, whether in the form of payments, goods, or services have distinct resource effects on individuals' material well being and opportunities, directly affecting their capacity for participation
            - Can also have interpretive effects if people connect their improved life circumstances to the government
            - Can also influence civic predisposition
        * Features of policy design, including admin rules and procedures, form and scope of eligibility, have interpretive effects. Through these, citizens acquire perceptions of their role in the community, their status, how the policy has affected their lives
    - GI Bill effects
        * Reciprocity explanation: resource effects would foster among recipients a sense of obligation, owing something back to society

    * critical effects explanation: Through both interpretive and resource effects, impact on individuals from less advantaged groups that affected their participation

- **Findings:** The GI Bill produced increased levels of participation– by more fully incorporating citizens, especially those from less privileged backgrounds through enhancement of their civic capacity and predisposition for involvement

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Andrea Louise Campbell. 2003. *How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and the American Welfare State.* Princeton: Princeton University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Expansion of Social Security created an intense, entrenched voting bloc of seniors supportive of the policy and willing to react if threatened → leads to further expansion, entrenchment and cycles

- **Argument:** Social Security helped create a powerful voting constituency with direct interest in maintaining the policy

  – Social Security (and Medicare) has provided two stimuli:

    * Growth of the programs, which have enhanced seniors participatory capacity over time

    * Threats to the programs, which have inspired participatory surges that lawmakers heed and that protect the programs from cuts

    * A combination of these stimuli produces a loop in which senior welfare programs expand: the programs enhance seniors' capacity so that when the programs are threatened, they can defend them

  – In contrast to seniors, standard welfare participates also have interest in public affairs arising from dependence on government action, but their level of interest is lower than seniors and cannot enhance participation levels

    * Design of welfare, which requires recipients to meet with caseworkers who ask probing questions, appear to have great discretion over outcomes, undermines feelings of efficacy toward government

  – Expansion of social security and Medicare correlated with four participatory trends: voting, contributing to campaigns, campaign work, contacting representatives

  – Initially, SS expanded through policy advocacy from within the SS administration, but eventually created feedback look

    * As the program became universal in coverage and as benefits increased, the capacity of seniors to participate in politics grew – fact that these benefits were conferred by the federal government fostered seniors an interest in public affairs

    * SS also gave seniors a political identity as program beneficiaries and became targets of political party and interest group mobilization

    * Congress increasingly paid attention to senior issue both because of lobbying and interest groups and electoral relevance → leading to more expansion

- Cycle that began with development of SS policy which over several decades spawned interest groups and created a political identity for seniors, yields in the 1980s an empowered, vigilant constituency able to defend its programs → government policy transformed its target population

- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Key work in the policy feedback literature. Social Security is a central example of how policy can create politics. The policy created an entrenched, intense electoral coalition in support of it. Another recent example is Obamacare.

Jacob S. Hacker. 2004. "Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 2 (May): 243–260

- **Key Takeaway:** While the American Social Policies may appear resilient to retrenchment, changes have been more subtle leading to incomplete coverage and risk privatization

- **Argument/Findings:**

  - While most U.S. public social programs have resisted radical retrenchment, the social welfare framework is also increasingly incomplete and fails to provide protection against social risks

  - Two sources of change

    * In policy areas that rely substantially on public-private or intergovernmental cooperation, the shifting aims of benefit sponsors and administrators has transformed the ground-level operation of formally stable policies

    * Recent decades have seen an accelerating process of "risk privatization" in which stable social policies have come to cover a declining portion of the salient risks faced by citizens → many of the most potent threats to income are faced by families on their own rather than collective intermediaries

  - Crucial policy changes *have* taken place over the past three decades despite general stability in formal policy

    * Key source is not large-scale legislative reform, but a set of decentralization and semi-autonomous processes of alteration *within* existing policy bounds

  - **Implication:** There is not one single pattern of institutional change → institutional change takes multiple forms and strategies for institutional change systematically differ according to the character of institutions and political setting in which they are situated in

    * Actors who wish to change popular or embedded institutions in political environment that militate against authoritative reform may find it prudent to *not* attack the institutions directly

    * Shift those institutions' ground-level operations, prevent their adaptation to shifting external circumstances, or build new institutions on top of them

  - Retrenchment may also refer to changes in the political environment which are propitious for these explicit changes later

    * Retrenchment is generally hard: it involves imposing concentrated costs on a group, with very diffuse benefits

- Strategies to reform policies
    - **Drift:** Shift in the social context of policies, such as the rise of new or newly intensified social risks with which existing programs are poorly equipped to grapple. Drifts occur most likely when a policy poses high hurdles to internal conversion + when the status-quo bias of the external political context is high
    - **Conversion:** existing institutions are redirected to new purposes, driving changes in the role they perform and/or the functions they serve.
    - **Layering:** When existing policies resist conversion but the political–institutional context permits the creation of new policies. Adding new institutions rather than dismantling the old.
    - **Revision:** when a policy is both easily convertible and situated in a change-conducive political institutional setting. It is highly vulnerable to formal revision, whether through reform, replacement, or elimination
- Although public social policies have indeed largely resisted the political and economic onslaught of recent decades, efforts to update them to changing social risks have failed (drift), their ground-level operation has shifted in directions at odds with their initial goals (conversion), and new policies that subvert or threaten them have been put in place (layering). The result is the erosion of social protection.
- **Risk Privatization:** Fragment and undermine collective insurance pools that offer reduced cost protection to higher-risk and lower-income citizens in favor of arrangements that leave individuals and families responsible for coping with social risks largely on their own.

Eric M. Patashnik and Julian E. Zelizer. 2013. "The Struggle to Remake Politics: Liberal Reform and the Limits of Policy Feedback in the Contemporary American State." *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 4 (December): 1071–1087

- **Key Takeaway:** Absence of strong feedback is often the product of initial policy design features, divisive enactment, and the failure of reformers to uproot the institutional bases of opponents when a law is enacted
- **Argument:** Explore ACA and Dodd-Frank – develop an argument about the limits of policy feedback
    - Insufficient attention paid to the fragility of inherited policy commitments and that the capacity of reforms to remake politics is contingent, conditional, contested
        - Feedbacks are shaped not only by the internal attributes of policies, but also the interaction between policy-specific characteristics, goals of officeholders, and political forces arising from contentious environment
    - Literature on reform entrenchment
        - "Deck-Stacking": reformers who won the enactment battle can strategically create procedures to establish a structural context that endures long after the enacting coalition has frayed, ensuring the coalition that generated the program's adoption will hold say in the post-enactment phase

    - We need to also consider the partisan structure of governing coalitions, both at enactment and over time as reforms are carried out

- Two key stages of policy development: enactment (when policies are designed, feedback potential emerges, and pre-existing governance structures are rearranged or left untouched) and the postenactment phase (when implementation begins, public authority is engaged, and processes of self-reinforcement take off or not).

- Enactment Phase. Three outcomes can undermine feedback generation:

    - (1) Failure of the initial policy design to create incentives for constituency mobilization; (2) failure of reformers to undercut institutional bases of support of the policy's opponents; (3) adoption of the policy by narrow margins

        - Ex. Clean Air Act has diffuse benefits, will struggle to get constituency who will mobilize

        - Undercutting involves the termination of existing institutional structure; another strategy is layering

        - Divisive policy can increase partisanship, make people think something is wrong

- Post enactment phase. Four ways to impact feedback

    - (1) advocates may fail to repair defects in the original policy design; (2) changing perceptions may cause actors to become skeptical of the success or value of a policy (3) a policy may fail to cause groups to alter their social identities in ways that strengthen constituency support; (4) policy may be unable to call upon needed intuitional supports

- Example: ACA

    - Interpretive effects: Reliance on tax credits and regulations makes it difficult for people to perceived clear benefits ("submerged state"). ACA was also divisie and passed by small margins

    - Resource effects: Delay in individual-level resource effects will benefits initially diffuse. Deficit hawks calling for cuts that would limit impact.

    - Institutional effects: Deck stacking strategy to protect certain provisions; but failed to displace pre-existing health care arrangements

- Dodd-Frank: benefits too diffuse and long term, vulnerable to interest-group capture

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Chloe N. Thurston. 2015. "Policy Feedback in the Public–Private Welfare State: Advocacy Groups and Access to Government Homeownership Programs, 1934–1954." *Studies in American Political Development* 29, no. 2 (October): 250–267

- **Key Takeaway:** In studies of the public –private welfare state, scholars have emphasized citizens' inability to recognize the government's role in shaping distributional outcomes and pointed to their political demobilization as a result. The same mechanisms that often depoliticize public–private policies for citizens who already benefit from them may actually politicize them for citizens who are unable to access those benefits.

- **Argument:**
  - In previous studies of the public-private welfare state, scholars have emphasized citizens' inability to recognize the government's role in shaping distributional outcomes and pointed to their political demobilization as a result.
  - The state's role in setting and backing boundaries to access can politicize (for some groups) the inequalities of access that ensue, even as it obscures the role of the government to citizens who already use and enjoy the benefits of the public–private welfare state.
- **Data/Methods:** Two case studies
  - Case 1: Civil Rights
    * African American civil rights advocates and allies detected and contested features of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) that systematically discriminated against blacks, monitoring the activities of the FHA as well as private providers over decades.
    * FHA has been an important public-private tool to encourage homeownership in the U.S. Through the FHA, the U.S. govt would promote homeownership indirectly, by insuring loans originated by private lenders.
    * While opening up homeownership to millions, the FHA effectively closed it off to others
    * Civil rights groups detected broad patterns of exclusion of their constituents, linked it to government policies and activities, and mobilized to change the boundaries to full participation.
  - Case 2: The GI Bill
    * A loan provision for veterans: Title III of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (GI Bill) offered honorably discharged veterans loan guarantees backed by the VA
    * The American legion and the Veteran of Foreign Wars received a multitude of complaints related to the title III provision loans; veterans were still unable to find housing with the loans. The nation's housing stock was struggling to reabsorb the retiring GIs and their families
    * American Legion led the charge in pushing for legislative and administrative reforms to the GI Bill's loan programs
    * Beyond reforming VA procedures, the Legion also developed a list of proposed amendments to the GI Bill, which it brought to Congress
- **Findings:**
  - These two types of groups followed precisely the same processes of political mobilization and contestation in each case: First, they aggregated individual grievances into broader collective problems. Then, they traced those problems not to impersonal market mechanisms but to government policies and state authority. Finally, they pushed for reform across multiple venues to expand access for their members.

Sarah F. Anzia and Terry M. Moe. 2016. "Do Politicians Use Policy to Make Politics? The Case of Public-Sector Labor Laws." *American Political Science Review* 110, no. 4 (November): 763–777

- **Key Takeaway:** Politicians can use policy to "make politics," but strategic behavior is constrained by collective action problems
- **Argument:**
  - *Policies can make their own politics*– when a new program is created, so are new constituencies and politics
  - Focus on adoption of public-sector collective bargaining laws by states from the 1960s-1980s. Instructive for two reasons
    - Laws had important consequences for American politics, fueling emergence of unions that have shaped the party and interest groups systems to the advantage of Democrats
    - Little work on public sector unions – laws that gave rise to these unions are worth studying
  - Politicians have incentives to "make politics" when the political consequences of laws are *policy specific*
    - Additionally, when the consequences of policies involve the *larger balance of power between the parties*, the incentives of politicians are diluted by collective action problems → as a result, politicians may not act on what seem like obvious opportunities and may act in ways that are disadvantageous to their own parties; especially bad when parties are more internally diverse
- **Data/Methods:** Case: Expansion of public-section union laws
- **Findings:**
  - Using state-level data, show that Democrats supported public-sector labor laws, but Republicans also played pivotal roles in *supporting* these laws and igniting growth of unions
    - Why? Collective action problems limit the conditions under which parties will engage in strategic, future-oriented behavior, leading to outcomes that in the aggregate look irrational
    - *Individual* Republicans acted rationally, responding to district and constituency concerns– anot not to the collective goods that were being generated for their party

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Joshua D. Clinton and Michael W. Sances. 2018. "The Politics of Policy: The Initial Mass Political Effects of Medicaid Expansion in the States." *American Political Science Review* 112, no. 1 (February): 167–185

- **Key Takeaway:** Short-term evidence of the political effects of policy; Medicaid expansion increased voter registration and tunrout for 1 election
- **Argument:**Conditions required to produce mass political effects by a social policy appear well satisfied given the score, salience, and publicity surrounding the ACA and Medicaid expansion
  - Unlike ephemeral benefits of some social policies, policy consequences of the ACA and expansion of eligibility for health insurance were prominent and publicized
    - Politics surrounding the ACA were different – voted on party lines

    - State variation provides identification strategy
  - Increase in political participation may be due to both interpretive and resource effects
- **Data/Methods:** As a result of 2012 court case, expansion of Medicaid was left to discretion of each state
- **Findings:** Expansion of Medicaid caused substantial decreases in the share of people without insurance in counties located in expansion states relative to otherwise similar counties located in non-expansion states
  - The impact is concentrated in counties with an above average share of the population making less than 138% of the poverty level, as the expansion intended
  - Increase in coverage covaries with an increase in political participation with some caveats
    - In both 2014 and 2016, voter reg increases by 3 tto 4 points in high-eligibility counties, not effect in low eligibility counties
    - Only temporary effect on turnout: in 2014 turnout in high-eligibility counties is as much as 3 points greater in expansion states than non-expansion states but effect goes away in 2016

Jamila Michener. 2018. *Fragmented Democracy: Medicaid, Federalism, and Unequal Politics.* 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, March

- **Key Takeaway:** Important to consider the role of different layers of government in the design and implementation of local policy, contingent on local context, and how this can all shape individual levle political behavior
- **Argument:**
  - Medicaid is the largest source of public health insurance in the US and the primary mechanism for providing health coverage to low income Americans
    - Intergovernmental configuration of the program allows for a wide discretion across state and local levels
  - Contextualized Feedback Model of Political Participation: Scholars of participation and policy feedback ignore:
    1. design, implementation, constraints of policy are contingent on local contexts
    2. macro-institutions structure those contexts
    3. institutionally embedded contexts affect individual experiences with policies, shaping political capacity and influencing their participatory actions
  - Particularistic Resistance: when policy beneficiaries take oppositional action in response to administrative decisions that threaten their access to valuable resources
    - Avenue through which beneficiaries can check the power of local welfare institutions and delivers a proximate opportunity for exercising political voice

- **Data/Methods:** In-depth qualitative interviews, state administrative records, and surveys. Consider where federalism emerges in the lives of those whoa re economically and racially marginal, how it affects their understandings of politics, when it prompts political participation, and how it transforms their citizenship.
- **Findings:** Through a study of the variation in Medicaid implementation across the country, finds that Medicaid has a varied political effect across geographies. Federalism produces geographically differentiated political capacity across population of beneficiaries and federalist social policy is a key purveyor of political inequality
  - State variation in policy design and local variation in policy implementation can often pose a substantial danger to democracy
  - Medicaid provides uneven and inconsistent access to policy benefits across geographic space
  - State policy implementation can boost or dampen political participation among recipients; those who live in states that expand coverage may be more likely to participate, in states that reduce benefits less likely to participate
  - Experience with Medicaid dampens the proclivity for local political activism among beneficiaries who perceive disorder in their neighborhoods more than it does for beneficiaries who are not as cognizant of disorder
  - Federalism can make it difficult to successfully use policy advocacy to make reforms
- **Contribution/Related Literature:** Builds on both the political participation and policy feedback literature, emphasizing the key role of **federalism** in structuring how people participate and react to policy implementation

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Jamila Michener. 2019. "Policy Feedback in a Racialized Polity." *Policy Studies Journal* 47, no. 2 (May): 423–450

- **Argument:** Introduce the racialized feedback framework (RFF), a two tiered framework
  - The first facet addresses *when* race should be a dominant feature of feedback studies; conditions of disproportionality and decentralization are crucial indicators that race is an imperative part of policy feedback
    - **Disproportionality:** Policies vary widely with regard to how evenly they distribute benefits and burdens across racial groups.
      - Affect mechanisms through which feedback operates: funnels policy *resources* unevenly, serves some *interests* better than others and influences *interpretations* of policy
    - **Decentralization:** policies vary in the degree to which the mechanisms for distributing benefits and burdens are centralized
  - The second facet tackles *how* race can be incorporated into research on feedback; one useful approach is to map feedback types and levels to prevailing research on REP
    - Emphasize both the *types* of feedback (behavioral, attitudinal, non-materializing) and the *levels* (elite, mass) of feedback

- Re-analysis of Campbell (2002)
    - Clear disproportionate distribution of benefits, yet SS key to black retirement Bush appeals to Black seniors, trying to get them to believe SS hurt them

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Michael Hankinson, Asya Magazinnik, and Melissa L Sands. 2023. *The Policy Adjacent: How Affordable Housing Generates Policy Feedback Among Neighboring Residents*

- **Key Takeaway:** Policy feedback effects usually shown among a policy's direct winners and losers, less is known about whether such effects occur among the indirectly affected (" policy adjacent"). Using statewide ballot propositions funding affordable housing in California, show that policy generates feedback effects among neighboring residents in systematic ways: new, nearby affordable housing causes majority-homeowner blocks to increase their support for the housing bond, while majority-renter blocks decrease their support. This is due to positive effect among homeowners who approve housing's replacement of blight and improvement of property values.
- **Argument:** Positive feedback effects among homeowners are likely driven by increases in nearby property values due to the replacement of "blight" (e.g., dilapidated structures, vacant housing, and empty lots). Thus, when bonds for further housing development are on the ballot, expect increase in support among neighboring homeowners – these are labeled the "policy adjacent." Builds on the idea that affordable housing creates economic/social externalities, self-interest a driver of local politics (Einstein, Palmer, and Glick 2019) and relies on the facts that residents are aware of developmemt (through public hearings, public info sessions, local media coverage); residents are attuned to issues in local communities; residents can connect bond issue to housing development.
- **Data/Methods:** Election data and geolocated data on 458 LIHTC housing developments within a difference-in-differences framework over the period 2002-2006

Federalism, State & Local Politics

Nationalization

Daniel J. Hopkins. 2018. *The increasingly United States: how and why American political behavior nationalized.* Chicago studies in American politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

- **Key Takeaway:** State and local politics has become increasingly nationalized as parties have come to represent the same things and Americans pay less attention to what goes in their areas at the expense of what's happening nationwide.
- **Argument:** American political behavior has become substantially more nationalized, because political parties are increasingly offering same options across the country, American identities are less based on local factors, and Americans are moving away from traditional media markets that promote local politics. Since 1970s, gubernatorial voting and presidential voting is increasingly indistinguishable; divisive issues have become similar across places, low engagement and knowledge with state and local politics
  - Nationalization because *political parties* funded nationally by interest groups and offer same choices across country (because of centralization of government authority, decline of democratic governance in, increasing homogeneity in American economy), changing media markets (less extensive coverage of state/local politics), changing identities (region less a common source of social/political identity compared to religion, occupation, family roles)
  - Impacts: accountability (changing incentives for state/local officials if all that matters in elections is PID); greater polarization (little incentives to bargain for constituent-targeted benefits making coalition building more difficult); on a positive note, voters do have a helpful heuristic when voting locally (though only when partisanship is on the ballot/it's not a nonpartisan election)
- **Findings:**
  - From tests of local contextual effects 1993-2012 on salient (terrorism, crime, economy) and nonsalient issues (climate, federal power, wolves), on most issues, local context does not affect political attitudes but local context does influence attitudes on issues that are salient *nationally* (e.g. terrorism, crime, economy)
  - Using county-level data from 1928-2014 and exit poll data, presidential and gubernatorial vote choices increasingly correlated (even in spit of differences in platforms and candidates); presidential candidates no longer have sizeable advantages in their home state (no "favorite son/-daughter" advantage) $\longrightarrow$ not just a story of fall of one-party South or political competition, or timing of new communication methods (does TV reduce nationalization while radio and cable TV increases)
  - Using survey data, decline in ability to name governor, favorite/least favorite politicians often *national* figures, care more about the party who controls federal government – politics in the US become a contest of evocative symbols, state and local politics devoid of those symbols $\longrightarrow$ expressive explanations are better in explanations of political participation (people like constructive narratives a la Berinsky and Kinder 2006)
  - Analyzing state party platforms with text analysis, state parties increasingly take similar positions; voters perceive state parties as being similar to their national affiliates, largely based on the social groups each party serves; when voting for governors, voters place relatively little weight on state parties' ideological positions

  - Effects of changing media environment not results of changes in focus within media types, but more from voter shifts in the type of media they consume

- **Critique:** How does this explain vote choice patterns in *nonpartisan* elections? How should voters grapple with questions over what are *local* issues that don't map on to the liberal/conservative dimensions? Which leaders should they follow?

- **Related Literature**:

  - State/local politics now another arena where voters can rely on party cues to make ballot decisions (Campbell et al. 1960, Fiorina 1981, Popkin 1994)

Jacob M. Grumbach. 2022. *Laboratories Against Democracy: How National Parties Transformed State Politics.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Nationalization of politics and state parties has led to a resurgence of state governments in American policymaking, reduced policy learning between states controlled by opposing parties, and democratic backsliding in states controlled by Republicans.

- **Argument:** State governments exacerbate national challenges including unequal political influence and declining accountability, opening U.S. to democratic backsliding. Overall, the nationalization of parties (along with increased coordination among activists, groups, and candidates in each party coalition) produce three effects: resurgence of state governments in American policymaking (increasing policy variation across states, policy polarization between red and blue state, advantaging well-resourced groups), reduced policy learning between states controlled by opposing parties (distinct groups of legislative subsidizers, little relationship between policy success and diffusion), and democratic backsliding in states controlled by Republicans (increased use of state power to shape democratic performance). Overall, central point is that nationalized parties have potentially nullified most potential benefits of American federalism and the *partisan learning model* holds strong.

  - Mechanism: polarization and divided government at *national*-level has encouraged policy-demanders to move attention to state-level where one party often in control.

  - Why do state pull policies from copartisan states? Because they do care about party brands and are cognizant of issue ownership effects (Petrocik 1996), know that parties can improve valence brand through good governance. Incentive to not help outpartisan policies find success stories and help decrease uncertainty about policy effects. States don't pay attention to *economic* success, but like to pull policies from copartisan states that were clear *electoral* winners.

- **Data/Methods:** Mixture of evidence: some APD-based; some quantitative using DiD designs and new measures of backsliding (*State Democracy Index*), use MRP to study opinion at state-level

  - Measuring policy outcomes: looks at 35 policies (e.g., abortion, campaign finance, education, guns, voting) – created indices by area that are essentially number of liberal policies − number of conservative and scale

  - *State Democracy Index*: incorporates 61 indicators of performance (registration policies, wait times, partisan gerrymandering) to model democracy as a latent variable using Bayesian factor analysis for mixed data

- **Findings:** Overall, state policy variation within issue areas has diverged over time ⟶ kind of policies we experience greatly determined by state. Level of polarization between red and blue states varies by issue. While to a greater extent state with more conservative (liberal) opinions are adopting more conservative (liberal) policies, this has not been the result of increased public liberalism/conservatism *within* states. Particularly important individuals include *interest group activists* (who are more ideologically extreme than other donors, more likely to contact legislators; often concentrate donation in primary elections) and *party insiders* (donors affiliated with state party committees, but who end up having no consistent effect on legislative behavior). State governments primarily learn policies from copartisan governments and learning has little to do actual economic benefits (though *electoral* benefits if copartisan) of policies.

    - Overall 2010 appears to be turning point for backsliding in the U.S. – corresponds to when Republicans took control over a large number of state legislatures ⟶ Republican control of state government reduces democratic performance (as opposed to other theories including racial threat, polarization, competition)

- **Critiques:** Some of the indices are too blunt, treating some reforms as equivalent to others leading to some states that probably appear way more anti-democratic than they really are (this was Charles' point). Has little focus on the legislative process, structure of legislatures and their ability to pass policies (aside from just whether there is unified/split control of government). Little story of how voters have responded – includes only one chapter using MRP to look at estimates of policy support and action.

- **Relevant Literature:** Reference to Louis Brandeis' idea that states are "laboratories of democracy." In conversation with work on the nationalization of politics (Hopkins 2018), responsiveness (Caughey and Warshaw 2022), influence of groups in state politics (Hertel-Fernandez 2019). Very much aligned with a Bawn et al. 2012 view of parties as coalitions of policy-demanders.

Distinctiveness of Subnational Politics

Paul E. Peterson. 1981. *City Limits.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Local politics is its own thing given the constraints placed on what local governments can do, the policies local governments pursue, and the nature of what citizens pay attention to.

- **Argument:** Local politics is distinct from national politics: it is more limited, constrained by several outside force. Classically, federalism is described with Grodzin's "marble cake" metaphor (i.e., that power widely diffused and widely shared among levels of government) but this suggests flux, change, and complexity that does not exist. In Peterson's view, for a solid federalist system to exist, local governments must have two powers: (1) control over recruitment of political and administrative leadership; (2) power tax citizen to provide necessary government services. Local governments provide services that are centered on developmental, allocational and redistributional policies, of which local governments particularly well-suited for allocational policies. Primary interest of cities is to maintain and enhance economic productivity, predominately by attracting productive labor and capital.

    - Previous arguments: Banfield argued that urban processes allowed for expression of all particular interests within city (but few would argue that policies are in public's interests just because they followed procedure); Tiebout argued that communities seeks to attain optimum size for efficient delivery of the bundle of services local governments produce

    * Peterson argues that cities seek policies that maintain or enhance economic prestige, social prestige, or city's political power – this is the goal because cities consist of social interactions structured by their location in a particular territorial space. Economic standing is the foremost concern of cities – explains why most city policies are focused on land, labor, capital to attract commerce and industry. Economic policies help protect fiscal base of local governments so that they made fund of other programs: good government is good politics. Tiebout argued that when citizens are frustrated with tax and expenditure policy, they can simply "move with their feet" – by pursuing optimal fiscal policies, cities maintain their base.

- Developmental policies enhance the economic position of the city – strengthen local economy, enhance local tax base, generate revenue that can be used for community's welfare $\longrightarrow$ praised by most, opposed only by partial interests that conflict with interests of overall community, often left to be carried out by autonomous agencies and developed by respected community leaders

- Redistributive policies benefit low-income residents but at the same time negatively affect the local economy – because they help the needy, often incorporated into local government practice even it creates bad economic consequences; local political system is "biased" against redistributive policy not because elites make it so but because it's a role better served by national government given fiscal base of cities

- Allocational policies are more or less neutral in their economic effects – includes spending on police and fire departments (i.e., housekeeping services of local government), they are widely allocated but come at expense of every taxpayer; when conflict does arise, usually over terms and conditions of employment thanks to influence of public unions (and other small groups) because little attention is paid to local politics

- Fiscal capacity, cost of supplying service, and demand for service dictates how cities allocate developmental, redistributive, and allocational policies – if a weak economy, less on redistributive policies; developmental policies are a priority regardless since that serve to enhance standing of city

- Compared to national governments, local governments sensitive to external changes, focused on developmental (though developmental policies a shared responsibility) rather than redistributive objectives (nations provide welfare, health care benefits, etc.), more effective perform allocation (delivered and financed locally), rely on the *benefits-received* principle (i.e., taxes should be proportional to what individuals receive) rather than *ability-to-pay* principle

- Local politics doesn't follow the "pressure group" model and are more narrow-focused than national politics: local parties are not characterized by salient issue debates (e.g., military losses, economic disasters, racial grievances) since they have little control over them – partisan political life more one-dimensional, vauge reflection of national politics at local level. Thus, national parties dominate local political systems (meaning in more homogeneous jurisdictions, local politics dominated by one-party rule), outcomes of local elections determined by public opinion toward national parties. In most places, however, local politics is the "politics of nonpartisanship" – turnout often lower (especially in working-class neighborhoods), voters less interested and easily mobilized, without party labels Republicans/conservatives are advantaged (press, interest groups, social networks better able to mobilized higher income, better educated part of electorate), more issueless-politics (incumbents less likely to be defeated, so vote choice more about who you know), organized groups have marginal impacts *in policy formation* (because local governments usually conduct business behind closed doors, limited role of news media in local politics, lesser ambitions of local politicians, lesser use of polling in local politics)

- **Relevant Literature:** Influences Anzia's work on local elections (2014) and interests (2022). Discussion of how national politics dominates local politics echoed in Hopkins 2018.

Representation in Subnational Politics

Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver. 1989. "Political Parties, Public Opinion, and State Policy in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 83, no. 3 (September): 729–750

- **Research Question:** What explains the relationship between state-level public opinion, control of state government, and state policy outcomes?
- **Argument:** State policy liberalism is responsive to state opinion liberalism, though partisan politics provides key context. Specifically, state opinion liberalism is directly and positively correlated with Democratic party control, but parties become more centrist/moderate when making policy. Parties respond to state opinion liberalism by becoming more liberal, but centrist parties are *electorally rewarded* $\longrightarrow$ negative relationship between party liberalism and Democratic party control $\longrightarrow$ low overall correlation. Thus, party ideology suppresses positive relationship between party control and policy, as liberal parties decrease Dem. control but increase liberal policy.
- **Data/Methods:** Pool polls from several years from CBS-NYT into single sample to run models where *state policy liberalism* is DV and *state opinion liberalism* is the IV.
  - Party elite liberalism: four indicators: (1) candidates (based on surveys), (2) state legislators (factor scores from surveys), (3) local party chairs (based on coding of previous studies), (4) national convention delegates (self-placement)
  - State opinion and PID: mean mass ideology and PID via pooled surveys
  - Democratic legislative strength: mean Dem. strength of leg. chambers (1977-84)
  - Legislative liberalism: weighted average of elite liberalism scores, based on parties' relative legislative strength
  - State policy liberalism: standardized sum of state policy scores across different policy issues (scaling along common dimension)
- **Findings:** parties are responsive to opinion, non-convergent to median voter
  - Opinion liberalism increases Democratic party control, but party liberalism advantages Republicans, such that effects wash out in the aggregate
  - Policy directly affected by (1) leg. liberalism, (2) Dem. party strength, (3) opinion
- **Critiques:** How do they deal with simultaneity? How can they discern responsiveness from selection/congruence? More broadly, this really measures *collective responsiveness* using disaggregation methods – these require sufficient samples size at the level of analysis which usually means researchers have to pool surveys over a number of years $\longrightarrow$ this sort of analysis is difficult within areas or when new policy debates have sprung up.
- **Relevant Literature:** Given issues with the method, want to look at work that uses new methods (e.g., MRP - see Lax and Philips 2009). This is an article-length treatment of *Statehouse Democracy*, which argues that state opinion correlates strongly with policy outcomes. Similar findings in Lax and Phillips (2012) in terms of responsive relationship between state policy liberalism and opinion liberalism

Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin H. Phillips. 2009. "Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness." *American Political Science Review* 103, no. 3 (August): 367–386

- **Key Takeaway:** On LGBTQ+ policy, find high levels of responsiveness to public opinion, but a lack of congruence on many policies (in a conservative direction)
- **Argument:**
  - Hypotheses: LGBT policy should respond to policy-specific opinions, with opinion majorities prevailing in debates over policies – with some variation by:
    * Salience: legislators will yield to constituent preferences more readily on high-salience issues, with more attentive publics (Arnold 1990)
    * Interest groups: presence of religious right (both organized groups and interest groups) should increase opposition to LGBT policy
    * Institutions: capacity (professionalization) and majoritarian institutions (direct democracy, elected judges) should both increase responsiveness
- **Data/Methods:** estimate state-level policy-specific opinion using multi-level regression and post-stratification (MRP)
- **Findings:** for all policies, more liberal policy-specific opinion associated with higher probability of policy adoption
  - However, there is a lack of congruence, wherein majority support (or even supermajority support) is insufficient for policy adoption
  - Moderators: policy salience strongly increases the influence of policy-specific opinion – both directly and relative to general voter ideology
    * When policies are non-congruent, they tend to be more conservative than desired by voters – perhaps reflecting minor impact of interest groups
    * Little to no evidence that institutions affect either responsiveness or congruence of policy
- **Critique:** Given that LGBTQ+ rights could be considered an easy issue (being that it is moral in nature), how do these issue-specific results replicate on other issues (e.g., election policy)?
- **Relevant Literature:** a more specific version of Lax and Phillips 2012 focused just on policies affecting the LGBTQ+ community – very similar findings

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Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin H. Phillips. 2012. "The Democratic Deficit in the States." *American Journal of Political Science* 56, no. 1 (January): 148–166

- **Key Takeaway:** State policy displays responsiveness without congruence; though state policy responds to opinion, policy is only congruence with majority opinion half of the time. General conclusion: state governments are generally responsive to voter preferences across a wide range of issues, particularly when salience is high, yet there is a clear democratic deficit
- **Argument:**

  - Key definitions: can have responsiveness without congruence
    - Responsiveness: positive correlation between opinion, policy
    - Congruence: policy actually matches majority opinion
  - Democracy deficit: policy is congruent with majority will only half of the time, and large supermajorities only prevail less than 60% of the time
  - Consequence: state policy is far more polarized than public preferences

- **Data/Methods:** estimate state-level support for 39 policies across eight issue areas (e.g., immigration, abortion, criminal justice, health care, LGBTQ+ rights, electoral reform, gaming, and education), using multi-level regression with post-stratification (MRP)
- **Findings:** Policy is highly responsive to policy-specific opinion, even after controlling for other influences, however, policy is only congruent with the majority will half of the time
  - Responsiveness: strong evidence of responsiveness, with the probability of a liberal policy positively correlated with liberal policy-specific opinion – strength of relationship varies across issues and policymaking has a liberal/conservative bias; responsiveness stronger on moral issues (perhaps because they are easier issues as Carmines and Stimson 1980 would suggest)
  - Congruence: find a great deal of incongruence in state policymaking; though policy is generally responsive to opinion, it only matches opinion 48% of the time $\longrightarrow$ incongruence seems systematic, with blue (red) states more likely to implement largely liberal (conservative) policies, rather than respond on a policy-by-policy basis
  - States tend to "overshoot" the median voters' policy preferences with over-responsiveness to voter ideology $\longrightarrow$ polarized state policies, relative to opinion majorities
  - Moderators:
    - Responsiveness: salience, government liberalism, term limits, professionalization, and interest groups are associated with responsiveness
    - Congruence: overall congruence affected by salience, term limits, and professionalization but not ideology, partisanship, or interest groups
- **Relevant Literature:** Linked to Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993 about the correlation between voter ideology and state policy

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Devin Caughey and Christopher Warshaw. 2022. *Dynamic Democracy: Public Opinion, Elections, and Policymaking in the American States.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

- **Key Takeaway:** State policymaking *is* responsive to public opinion, but responsiveness doesn't occur immediately
- **Argument:** State policymaking *is* responsive to public opinion, but responsiveness doesn't occur immediately – prevalence of veto players, scarcity of time and resources means barriers to change are often high $\longrightarrow$ change tends to be incremental

- Election critical, but not necessary: simply facilitate adaptation by (1) allowing electorate to filter out candidates who are out of step and (2) enabling voters to hold incumbents accountable (thus incenting officials to react preemptively to public opinion) $\longrightarrow$ two mechanisms by which elections induce representation: *selection* and *incentives*

- Partisan selection involves (1) voters' conservatism impacting probability of electing candidates of one party over the other and (2) newly elected officials must implement different policies than opponents would have

- **Data/Methods:** use of historical survey data combined with Bayesian models (using IRT, MRP) to get state-level estimates of mass- and policy-ideology

- **Findings:**

  - Great alignment of partisanship and policy preferences: partisanship became increasingly correlated with racial, cultural, economic conservatism (it was the first two that were originally negatively correlated); state publics have largely adapted their partisanship to match operational ideology rather than other way around $\longrightarrow$ Americans have responded to changes in party system by updating party ID to match preferences; result was "ideological nationalization of partisanship" in which state partisan leaning have aligned with ideological ones, cross-state differences within parties have disappeared, within-state differences across parties has increased

    * Why this happened isn't straightforward? New Deal realignment, South's drift toward Republican Party and congressional polarization sharpened party brands; polarization exacerbated by decline of traditional party organizations and patronage; change in media environment

  - Most states' policy ideology, like mass ideology, has tended to be stable over time (unlike partisanship) – most policies, even in different issue domains, do not vary independently from one another; direction of policy change tends to be consistent; when states do go through policy change, it's done incrementally; mid 1900s, some Republican state had more *liberal* policies than Democratic states, but that has decline as mass partisanship and party control of government has aligned with policy ideology by early 21st century

  - Divergence in state policy outcomes between Democrat- and Republican-controlled state due at least in part to increasing ideological distance between party's core supporters

  - Turnover in state offices has weak, ambiguous relationship with mass conservatism (though become stronger in more recent decades) $\longrightarrow$ mass partisanship is dominant driver of election outcomes; states punish candidates who take extreme positions (tend to select moderates, incent candidates to project moderate images); some voters engage in partisan balancing (i.e., switching their votes to the opposition as a check against ideologically extreme policymkaing) $\longrightarrow$ reinforces incremental nature of policy as parties both anticipate this sanctioning and see their changes repealed after turnover

  - Responsiveness is in fact due to both partisan selection and adaptation but public opinion more of an influence on policymaking on economic issues and historically stronger outside the South

  - Evidence suggests that partisan selection is increasingly becoming the mechanism for state policy responsiveness

  - State policies are usually out of step with public opinion primarily because there is a bias toward status quo: due to difficulty of overturning existing policies and incremental nature of

responsiveness, policies are proximate to public opinion when issue is new to political (polling) agenda; longer the issue is on the agenda, more likely it is to match public opinion in the long run

    * Status quo bias has big impact: liberals seek policy change more often than conservatives and face material disadvantages in achieving their policy goals as most policies start with a conservative status quo (though as Matt Grossman shows, right-wing efforts are pushing more radical conservative change in states)

  – Effects of undemocratic features (Jim Crow, malapportionment, partisan gerrymandering):

    * Jim Crow: southern states far less congruent with preferences of Black residents, gap was smaller for white residents in South; gap also small in non-southern states

    * Representation improved dramatically once malapportionment fixed

    * States with legislative districts gerrymandered to favor one party overrepresent views of the favored party

  – Very few democratic reforms have effects on voter turnout, partisan control of government, policy ideology, policy responsiveness, policy proximity

    * Only two have effects: direct democracy and right-to-work laws (everything else including expanded voter access laws, term limits, campaign finance reform have null effects)

- **Critiques**: While methodologically sophisticated in showing that policy change is incremental, it makes claim that incrementalism is a result of the various veto players that exist in state politics but doesn't dissect fully what they are – are there legislative rules within states that inhibit change, role of state courts, limited professionalism and convening of legislatures. Bottom line, there's more of an analysis within institutions themselves that could be explored.

- **Related Literature**:

  – Build on work of Erikson et al. 1989 (and their work in *Statehouse Democracy*) which argues that state policymaking is highly responsive to public opinion – primary mechanism: each state party adopts ideological leanings of its electorate; by influencing state party positions, citizens influence the direction of state policy

    * Notable objections: Lax and Philips find that policies align with majority opinion just about 1/2 the time; *Statehouse Democracy* focused on the 1980s but in the years before states had undemocratic institutions (e.g., malapportionment, suffrage restrictions) – in reality, they just wrote about their own era

  – Disagree with Achens and Bartels' "folk theory of democracy:" while politics might be messy, over time public can exert a powerful influence

  – Evidence of MacKuen et al.'s "macro polity": the aggregate balance between two parties and relative partisanship of subpopulations have gone through major changes

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Policy & Special Interests

Sarah F. Anzia. 2014. *Timing and Turnout: How Off-Cycle Elections Favor Organized Groups.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

- **Research Question:** How does the timing of elections (are particularly at the municipal-level) affect who turnout out to vote and which individuals/groups are advantaged as a result?
- **Argument:** The timing of elections affects who votes, which candidates win, and to whom elected officials are responsive to in making policy. Shifting to off-cycle elections (e.g., not in November, not on federal primary days) increases the electoral presence of the *organized*. Advantages organized groups gain come through two channels: *individual effects* (even without mobilization, individuals who stand to benefit most will turnout anyway and will make up greater share of electorate) and *group effects* (because turnout is lower, mobilizing each individual voter has larger marginal returns). From a policy-perspective, benefits are gained because opponents of the good organized group seek are less likely to participate, thus shifting policy outcomes in the groups favor.
  - Framework for analysis: (1) differentiate between *consistent voters* and *presidential voters* – the balance of each will dictate which policies or candidates are advantage; (2) differentiate between two groups based on relative *organizational capacity* (resources at their disposal to mobilize and persuade)
  - Regardless of political parties' goals, change in election timing will help them if it helps the interest groups they depend on
- **Data/Methods:** Historical analysis of election timing changes in 19th century, progressive era; legislative analysis on support for related bills; policy-outcome analysis focused on resources allocated to certain groups in government (e.g., teachers, public safety officers).
- **Findings:**
  - In 1800s, moving to off-cycle elections decreased turnout in city elections and those who pushed for changes, did not with the expectation there would be electoral benefits $\longrightarrow$ changes to election timing a feature of party strategy. Similar story in progressive era, but politics of election timing in different context (e.g., not a lot of fusion voting today, political parties not most important group in local elections).
  - While voters (according to a CES module) are concerned about low turnout in local elections and prefer consolidation of election dates, legislator more responsive to group preferences (decision affects their reelection prospects, parties that mobilize for them rely on group resources, state-level interests groups active player in legislative races). While most legislative bills about election timing aren't passed, if they do pass, make election timing discretionary rather than mandating consolidation. Overall, it appears Democrats most opposed to consolidation (they benefit from important groups like teacher's unions)
  - Policy outcomes: teachers paid higher salaries in districts with off-cycle elections $\longrightarrow$ teacher unions active; more generally, cities with off-cycle elections spend more per capita on employee salaries, retirement costs, health care
- **Critiques:** What extent does election timing affect the cognitive task for voters? Do these off-cycle elections have fewer races on a single ballot or are voters tasked with making many relatively uninformed decisions in these off-cycle elections?
- **Relevant Literature:**

- Argument is in line with that of Rosenstone and Hansen 1993 who argue that turnout can be explained by characteristics of individuals (e.g., resources, sense of political efficacy) and influence of group mobilization

- Anzia 2022 provides a more thorough treatment of interest groups in local politics.

Sarah F. Anzia. 2022. *Local Interests: Politics, Policy, and Interest Groups in Us City Governments.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press

- **Research Question:** How active are interest groups at the local level, what do they do in local politics, and how do they shape local policies?

- **Argument:**

  - Largely, literature on interest groups have ignored the role they play in *local* government and has failed to focus on the key thing interests groups zero in on and care most about: *public policy* – thus, this book focuses on public policy as the dependent variable. Additionally, interest group literature too focused on resources rather than policy aims of groups – follows Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson's "policy-focused approach".

  - More broadly, argues that broader local politics literature starts with a focus on partisanship and ideology rather than considering the core functions of local government and the interests they generate – this leads to a view that local politics is distinctive. That is, rather than being defined by national partisan and ideological alignments, local interest groups' activities and alignments (and therefore, political conflict) shape what local governments do. In representation literature, argues that there is too much focus on public opinion polling that simply doesn't exist for local politics. Instead focus on groups and their role in what Dahl called the "second face of power:" preventing debate and blocking issues from the local agenda. Only with a focus on public policy + interest groups = correct understanding of local representation

  - Use policy as dependent variable, rather than something like roll-call votes because: votes not necessarily connected policy outcomes, interest groups care about policy outcomes in long run, roll-call votes prone to selection bias (ignoring the things kept off the agenda; focusing on most salient, contentious issues where group influence probably most limited according to Pierson)

- **Data/Methods:** Policy examples from Albuquerque, Seattle, Redwood City; survey of elected officials and candidates in municipal government fielded in 2015, 2016, 2017; campaign contribution data; focuses on policy areas of economic development and growth, public safety

- **Findings:**

  - Policies shape interest group activity – group alignments vary according to the issues, not necessarily according to the partisan and ideological alignments in national politics

    * Examples: Cities with more active chambers of commerce rely more on business tax incentives (has little to do with city partisanship); greater activity by police and fire unions $\longrightarrow$ more spending on police/fire compensation (regardless of partisanship, thus cities not necessarily responsive to its liberal citizens but to its active interest groups); greater police and fire union activity $\longrightarrow$ winning candidates more favorable views on spending (thus interest group activity shapes electoral activity)

- Political parties are active in many local elections, but not as much as interest groups – when local parties are engaged, they are simply another groups operating alongside interest groups, not coordinating or structuring local interest group activity

    * National parties do involve themselves in local politics to some degree: support/recruit candidates that could be national candidates some day, give money to candidates who are supported by groups that are part of/look like national party donor base

    * Parties are involves more in partisan elections than nonpartisan, in places with greater interest group activity (but there's a whole range of other factors like election timing, partisan balance, legacy of strong state party organizations)

- Role of issues in local elections: opposition to growth makes a difference; when environmental groups are more active, winning candidates have more anti-growth views; in cities with more homeowners, winning candidates less favorable to expanding housing

- **Critiques:**

    - Narrowness of data: survey data means predominate measure of interest group activity is based on responses (perceptions) of local officials/candidates; campaign contribution data only from two states (Washington and South Carolina) – does show that findings from two data sources yield similar and intuitive findings

- **Relevant Literature:**

    - Olson argued that small groups should be more successful than large groups in overcoming collective action problems and that large groups should really only be able to organize they offer selective benefits – Anzia says the patterns really don't apply in local politics nor help understand what kind of groups will be active in local politics

    - Other broader interest group/lobbying lit focus on when to buy votes, buy access, support candidate, and *strategy* more broadly – does not focus on how active groups will be across contexts, the fact that their goals are policy focused (rather than merely surviving/resource-maintainment as Gray and Lowery say)

    - Role of political parties: most of what we read focuses national parties (e.g., creating brand names, mobilization); Bawn et al. (UCLA School) say interest groups and policy demanders create party coalitions to achieve policy goals – this would suggest local parties are predominate players in local politics and it doesn't seem to be case with these data; local parties are engaged, but presence not universal, and work as just another group, not umbrella organizations steered by coalition of local interest groups. Bawn et al. overall focuses on nominations, however, interest groups can shape local elections in many other ways (endorsements, money, mobilization, campaign) and may see which candidates emerge and support best candidate for them later

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Alex Hertel-Fernandez. 2019. *State Capture: How Conservative Activists, Big Businesses, and Wealthy Donors Reshaped the American States and the Nation.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press

- **Key Takeaway:** Right-wing policy at the state-level has largely been coordinated by a network interest groups and activists (led largely by the American Legislative Exchange Council) that provide model bills and legislative assistance to predominately Republican legislators.

- **Argument:** Across states, Republican legislators have pursued similar policy aims thanks in party to a trio of conservative groups dubbed the right-wing troika (American Legislative Exchange Council/ALEC, State Policy Network/SPN, Americans for Prosperity/AFP) – these groups provide model bills to legislators, provide opportunities for legislators and businesses to network. Cohesiveness of a conservative agenda result of these groups working to reshape the priorities of politicians (and their parties). Echoing the view that parties are coalitions of policy demanders, shows that interest groups coalitions don't have sway just via nominations but also by providing relatively inexperienced, low-resourced legislators with the policy tools necessary to build records of legislative accomplishment, thus helping define what it means to be conservative and pro-business.

    - Why would legislators rely on these groups? Those who have little legislative resources (e.g., fewer staffers, shorter sessions in office, low salaries) and less experience rely on these groups to substitute policy skills and expertise. ALEC provides models bills which legislators can just use, provide research expertise, offer expert witnesses. Additionally, networking opportunities provide access to business leaders, other legislators, activists, and donors across states that might be helpful for higher office. In short, ALEC's model bills and legislative resources allow ambitious politicians to position themselves as productive lawmakers with a track record of writing and passing pro-business legislation.

- **Findings:**

    - Influence of ALEC can be found along range of policies. For example, ALEC members were inspired by Indiana's strict photo ID law in 2005 $\longrightarrow$ Public Safety and Elections Task Force created a model bill soon introduced in 37 states following 2008 election

    - Right-wing troika dependent on strong connection to corporate business but these businesses worry about how they are perceived to the public – when connection to ALEC came under scrutiny by media and left-wing groups following Trayvon Martin killing in 2012 (ALEC supported the stand-your-ground law), troika lost some of its power.

    - Using text-analysis to compare model bills to those introduced in state legislatures mid-1990s to 2013, finds strong influences on education reform, insurance, climate – there's less influence on gun control and voting rights even though that's what ALEC get most of the hate for

        * Rate at which these model bills are actually enacted depends on control of state government – more success under unified Republican government though some Democratic governments did enact some of these (particularly on school choice/charter schools, some health insurance reform)

    - Why is there no troika on the left? (1) Liberals focused too much early on in trying to create bipartisan, national networks of government officials (e.g., National Conference of State Legislators; just as conservatives saw an opening to be more effective in their efforts); (2) poor funding strategies (there's plenty to go around among left-leaning foundations and donors, but they were interested more at the national- rather than state-level)

        * Left also has problem of focusing their subnational policy ideas in urban areas, which can often be preempted by state legislatures

- **Critique:** Suggests that left-leaning politicans don't have the same support network, yet Democrats at the state-level often do pursue similar policies. How do liberal policy ideas spread as it pertains to specific, more complex issues like education, business, elections?

- **Relevant Literature:**
  - Role of corporate interests aligning with activists provides evidence in support of the Bawn et al. 2012 view of political parties which AH-F argues provides a realistic assessment of party politics by acknowledging limited attention individuals pay to politics and large role interest groups and activists play in elections
  - Like Karol 2009, shows how politicians manage relationship between parties and interest groups – takes coordination of activists, donors, and businesses to create an enduring coalition that can pursue shared goals and buttress a party
  - Work like that of Ansolabehere et al. 2003 often find it difficult to see how business shapes policy – lack of findings because most influence happens earlier in the legislative process when alternatives considered and language is written (this is where model bills are important)

Jessica Trounstine. 2016. "Segregation and Inequality in Public Goods." *American Journal of Political Science* 60, no. 3 (July): 709–725

- **Key Takeaway:** Segregation along racial lines contributes to public goods inequalities: racially segregated cities are also politically polarized cities, making collective investment more challenging and public goods expenditures lower $\longrightarrow$ segregated municipalities are more politically polarized and spend less on a wide range of public goods
- **Argument:** Segregated cities are also politically polarized cities: gulf between whites and racial and ethnic minorities in segregated places (because they have divergent preferences, priorities, and opinions) makes it less likely that they will find common ground in support of a bundle of taxation and expenditures, driving down collective investment
- **Data/Methods:** Using mayoral elections results, implement measures of segregation (dissimilarity index); merge that with data on public expenditures; to identify causal relationship between spending and segregation, use waterways as instrument for segregation
- **Findings:**
  - Strong evidence that segregation and public goods spending are negatively related $\longrightarrow$ spending on public goods is lower in cities with greater segregation
  - Substantial declines in direct general expenditure as segregation increases, regardless of the size of the minority population $\longrightarrow$ largest impact in cities with moderate size minority population
- **Relevant Literature:** see Trounstine 2020

Katherine Levine Einstein, Maxwell Palmer, and David M. Glick. 2019. "Who Participates in Local Government? Evidence from Meeting Minutes." *Perspectives on Politics* 17, no. 1 (March): 28–46

- **Key Takeaway:** Individuals who are older, male, longtime residents, voters in local elections, and homeowners are significantly more likely to participate in local government meetings (particularly planning and zoning board meetings).
- **Argument:** Concentrated costs of housing development may create strong incentives for certain people affected by proposal to mobilize; on the flip side, benefits are diffused. Thus, relative to supporters, housing development opponents are more likely to (1) be informed about developments

happening in their community and (2) be able to target their own appointed/elected officials in voicing their views about housing. Both information and efficacy are positively associated with political participation $\longrightarrow$ even those individuals who are predisposed to support construction of affordable housing in the abstract will be inclined to oppose specific housing project proposals in their communities. Those who participate will do so with more intensity and frequency; participants will exhibit high levels of expertise – those who think development as a threat will get into the weeds of regulations, may ask experts (lawyers, architects, etc.) to help make sound arguments against development

  - Part of broader argument that opposers (which they call "neighborhood defenders") have desire to protect their community and property and aim to take advantage of delay power through participatory institutions

- **Data/Methods:** Records from planning and zoning board meetings in Massachusetts that contain names and addresses of attendees $\longrightarrow$ matched to voter file record
- **Findings:** On average, meeting participants are older, have lived at their residence for longer (proxied by the length of their voter registration at that location), and are more likely to be men. Notable differences in the reasons provided by supporters and opponents. Supporters of new housing were significantly more likely to mention affordability concerns. Opponents, in contrast, were more likely to raise traffic, environmental, flooding, and safety concerns
- **Critique:** Focused on just one, relatively niches area of local policy – are these patterns reflected in debates over allocational policies (e.g., funding of police, fire departments, other tangible services local governments can provide)
- **Relevant Literature:** Other work about who participates, who has power in local government (e.g, Dahl 1961) and how local political debates are skewed towards those with vested interestes (e.g., Anzia's 2014) and (2022 pieces)

Jessica Trounstine. 2020. "The Geography of Inequality: How Land Use Regulation Produces Segregation." *American Political Science Review* 114, no. 2 (May): 443–455

- **Key Takeaway:** More stringent land use regulations are supported by whiter communities and work to preserve racial homogeneity as they explain metropolitan area segregation patterns over time
- **Argument:** Land use regulations affecting residential developments is largely driven by the demands of homeowner and residents of white communities will be those most likely to view people of color as a threat to their public goods and property values. Through land use regulations, governments control value and geographic distribution of housing. Therefore, segregation patterns seen in America's cities direct result of intentional policy choices backed by white residents.
- **Data/Methods:** Merge Wharton Land Use Regulatory Index with city-level demographic data
- **Findings:** Cities that were whiter than their metropolitan area in 1970 are more likely to have restrictive land use patterns in 2006. Cities with more restrictive policies diversified more slowly than their neighbors. Using precinct level initiative elections from California cities show that whiter neighborhoods are more supportive of restricting development

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Gerald Gamm and Thad Kousser. 2021. "Life, Literacy, and the Pursuit of Prosperity: Party Competition and Policy Outcomes in 50 States." *American Political Science Review* 115, no. 4 (November): 1442–1463

- **Key Takeaway:** States with competitive party systems spend more than other states—and specifically spend more on education, health, and transportation, areas identified as investments in human capital and infrastructure $\longrightarrow$ leads to longer life expectancy, lower infant mortality, better educational outcomes, and higher incomes. Thus, party competition is not just healthy for a political system but for the life prospects of a state's residents.

- **Argument:** Political institutions in general—and party competition in particular—are central to explaining variations in development across the states. Parties give members individual electoral incentives to pursue the collective goal of improving the public welfare, at the same time that they create the political ties necessary to move a major policy program through government (Aldrich and Griffin 2018; Key 1949). When parties compete most fiercely, these incentives and advantages are magnified. Close competition between two parties in a statehouse leads to investments in human capital and infrastructure, with these investments later paying off for the wealth, health, and educational attainment of state residents.

    - Relies on theory of Key 1949 that in states with one party, politics just based on factions; brought together by machines or regional alliances; with leaders interested in delivering distributive benefits for their specific constituencies; members introduce bills simply to claim credit. However, when there is competition, members care about a "party brand" and enacting a legislative program. Thus, party competition creates bonds between copartisans from across the state and between the executive and legislative branches, leading both parties to work for programs that benefit a broad set of constituents. This often involves investments in human capital and infrastructure

- **Data/Methods:** Quantitative historical analysis that collects on party competition and state public investment 1880-2010

- **Findings:** Party competition has strong and positive effect on education, health, transportation investment. Increased investment has strong and positive effects on key development outcomes, including: infant mortality, life expectancy, high school completion, literacy rate.

- **Critique:** I'd like to see some multilevel modeling with level being year to be able to see how these estimates vary across time. They do break down analysis into the pre-New Deal era, but I'd like to change in state legislature spending patterns and relationship to competition in more recent decades as state politics has nationalized; effect of conservative groups on state policy has increased.

- **Relevant Literature:** Reiterates the issues related to one-party rule (Key 1949). Application of fact that legislative parties care about a record of legislative accomplishment, particularly as a means to win elections (Cox and McCubbins 2005).

Money and Politics

Lobbying and Policy Influence

Richard L. Hall and Alan V. Deardorff. 2006. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy." *American Political Science Review* 100, no. 1 (February): 69–84

- **Key Takeaway:** lobbying as *legislative subsidy*, in that interest groups tend to subsidize the behavior of existing allies, in order to achieve shared objectives
- **Argument:** Previous work on lobbying falls into two camps: lobbying as *exchange* vs. *persuasion*. They posit lobbying as form of legislative *subsidy* with the goal of assisting natural allies in achieving shared objectives (rather than changing minds)
  - Exchange Theories: Interest group agents and legislators engage in mutually beneficial trades (campaign contributions for votes). Evidence of vote-buying is relatively mixed, especially since most lobbyists give to legislators who already agree with their views Legislators often give access to public interest groups with few electoral resources (e.g., affiliated PACs, mass membership base)
  - Persuasion theories: Information transmission about what positions legislators should take to gain re-election (information-signaling). Lobbyists gather costly information about district opinion, policy consequences, which they use to influence legislators' choice of policies
  - Subsidy Theory: Direct lobbying as an attempt to subsidize the legislative resources of supportive member. Lobbyists can reduce the costs of pursuing progress on one issue by providing information in the form of policy expertise (e.g., research, speech-writing) and political intelligence (e.g., predict others' positions)

Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page. 2014. "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens." *Perspectives on Politics* 12, no. 3 (September): 564–581

- **Key Takeaway:** find evidence of *elite domination* (by high-income citizens) and *biased pluralism* (with domination by business-centric interest groups
- **Argument:** economic elites and business groups tend to have independent influence on US policy, relative to average citizens and mass-based interest groups
- **Data/Methods:** dataset of 1,779 policy cases between 1981-2002 wherein national survey of the public asked a favor/oppose question about a proposed policy change, with divisions across income levels available
- **Findings:** Overall, the preferences of average citizens are highly, positively correlated with those of economic elites, across a range of issues. However, interest group stances, including mass-based groups, are not correlated with average citizens or economic elites. In contrast, economic elites have a substantial, significant impact on policy, shared with organized interest groups – partial support for *economic-elite domination* and *biased pluralism*. When both interest groups and affluent Americans oppose a policy, it has a low likelihood of being adopted. However, there is a status quo bias in policy-making

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Joshua L. Kalla and David E. Broockman. 2016. "Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment: FIELD EXPERIMENT ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND ACCESS." *American Journal of Political Science* 60, no. 3 (July): 545–558

- **Key Takeaway**: Concern that donations to political campaigns secure preferential treatment from policy makers has long occupied judges, scholars, and the public. Present the first randomized field experiment on the topic. The experiment focuses on whether contributions facilitate access to influential policy makers. In the experiment, a political organization attempted to schedule meetings between 191 congressional offices and the organization's members in their districts who were campaign donors. However, the organization randomly assigned whether it revealed to congressional offices that prospective attendees had contributed to campaigns. When informed prospective attendees were political donors, senior policy makers made themselves available between three and four times more often.

Michael J. Barber, Brandice Canes-Wrone, and Sharece Thrower. 2017. "Ideologically Sophisticated Donors: Which Candidates Do Individual Contributors Finance?" *American Journal of Political Science* 61, no. 2 (April): 271–288

- **Key Takeaway**: Analyze whether individual contributors sophisticatedly differentiate among candidates according to policy positions by combining data from a new survey of over 2,800 in- and out-of-state donors associated with the 2012 Senate elections, FEC data on contributors' professions, and legislative records. Three major findings: (1) policy agreement between a donor's positions and a senator's roll calls significantly influences the likelihood of giving, even for same-party contributors; (2) there is a significant impact of a senator's membership on a committee with jurisdiction over policy issues related to the donor's occupation. This result holds even for donors who claim to be motivated primarily by ideology or other nonmaterial goal, but it does not appear to be motivated by an expectation of access; (3) conditional upon a donation occurring, its size is determined by factors outside a legislator's control.

Alexander Fouirnaies and Andrew B. Hall. 2018. "How Do Interest Groups Seek Access to Committees?" *American Journal of Political Science* 62, no. 1 (January): 132–147

- **Key Takeaway**: Do interest groups seek political access through their modest contributions, or are these contributions only a minor and forgettable part of the political process? Present comprehensive evidence that interest groups are extremely sophisticated in the way they make campaign contributions. Using data set on state legislative committee assignments and legislator procedural powers from 1988 to 2014, merged with campaign finance data, and a series of difference-in-differences designs based on changes in individual legislators' positions in the legislature, find that not only interest groups seek out committee members, but that they value *indirect* access (defined as those who have control over assigning members to committees, but also party leaders, rules committee chair, etc.). When a legislator gains procedural powers, interest groups reallocate considerable amounts of money to her. Thus, interest groups seek to influence policy process not only by seeking direct access to policy makers but by seeking indirect access to legislative procedure as well.

Alexander Fouirnaies. 2018. "When Are Agenda Setters Valuable?" *American Journal of Political Science* 62, no. 1 (January): 176–191

- **Key Takeaway**: Why do industries donate money to legislative campaigns when roll-call votes suggest that donors gain nothing in return? Argues that corporate donors shape policy outcomes by influencing agenda setters in early stages of lawmaking. Using data on individual state legislator sessions, shows how agenda control is deemed valuable to legislators and groups seeking influence on policy. Employing a difference-in-differences design, results indicate that industries funnel money to legislative agenda setters by whom they are regulated, and to those endowed with important procedural powers. Relaxing contribution limits significantly benefits committee chairs and party

leaders more so than it does other legislators, suggesting that agenda setters have strong incentives to obstruct restrictive campaign finance reforms.

Donors

Stephen Ansolabehere, John M De Figueiredo, and James M Snyder. 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 1 (February): 105–130

- **Key Takeaway:**
- **Argument:** Individuals give to campaigns because of the consumption value associated with politics, rather than because they receive direct private benefits
  - Investment model: campaign fundraising as a market for public policy, wherein interest groups (firms, assocs., individuals) seek private benefits from public laws
    - This system represents a "market failure," since legislators in gatekeeping positions (e.g., committee chairs, party leaders) can gain donations without changing policy by threatening oversight or regulation
    - Tullock's puzzle: considering the value of public policies and purported influence of campaign contributions, why so little money in politics?
      - Specifically, what explains the discrepancy between the value of policy and the amounts contributed?
      - Explanation: money has little leverage over voting behavior, especially after controlling for legislator ideology
  - Consumption model: individuals give because of the consumption value associated with politics (namely, the value associated with participation)
    - Individuals give because they are (1) ideologically motivated, (2) excited about a particular election, (3) were asked by a friend or colleague, and (4) have necessary resources
  - **Investment model:**
    - DV: roll call voting score from Chamber of Commerce between 1978-1994 (panel data to avoid omitted variable issues)
    - IVs: corporate/labor campaign contributions
    - Controls: three variants: (1) party affiliation + measure of district preferences, (2) party affiliation + district fixed effects, (3) legislator fixed effects
    - Instruments: degree of electoral competition, members' relative power in House
      - Close race → demand for PAC contributions (measured by total spending by opponent, vote share – 0.5, whether member ran opposed)
      - Power → increased value of support (measured using dummies if party leader, committee chair, member of Ways & Means/Energy & Commerce)

  - **Consumption model:** test consumption predictions using five datasets: (1) political contributions of corporate executives, (2) time-series of campaign spending under FECA from 1978-2000, (3) time-series of candidate/party expenditures in pres. elections from 1884-2000, (4) panel data on campaign spending by gubernatorial candidates from 1976-2000, and (5) cross-section data on spending in House in recent decades

- **Findings:**

  - Investment model: limited evidence, across model specifications, that campaign contributions have substantial effect on legislators' voting records

    * Once add fixed effects (district or legislator), effect of contributions almost completely mitigated

    * Instead, legislators seem more responsive to their re-election constituency

  - Consumption model: personal income, electoral competition most strongly predict spending on gubernatorial and congressional races

    * Top executives spend similar proportion of their income on political campaigns as national average

    * No trend in campaign spending relative to national income – campaigns account for similar fraction of GDP

    * Candidates raise disproportionately more from small individual donations vs. interest groups (PACs or large individual donors) – thereby muting the leverage of interest groups

- **Relevant Literature:** corrects common misconception about the relationship between campaign giving and legislative voting records

  - Interest groups: suggests countervailing force minimizing the impact of interest group investments – campaigns court individual donors

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Seth J. Hill and Gregory A. Huber. 2017. "Representativeness and Motivations of the Contemporary Donorate: Results from Merged Survey and Administrative Records." *Political Behavior* 39, no. 1 (March): 3–29

- **Key Takeaway:** donors differ from non-donors in substantial ways, but their giving is oriented around perceived electoral stakes, not perceived ideological proximity

- **Argument:** in both parties, donors tend to be consistently, notably divergent from non-donors, in terms of greater ideological extremity

  - Donors appear responsive to the *stakes* in a given electiton to participate in ways beyond just tuning out

- **Data/Methods:** combined administrative records on donating and voting

- **Findings:**

  - Donors are starkly different than non-donors, with a bigger gulf than voters and non-voters

* Differences: in terms of wealth, education, religiosity (more secular), older, less racially diverse, more likely to vote (esp. in primaries), and more ideologically extreme compared to their parties

* Motivation: those who perceive more at stake in elections are more likely to contribute, as measured by perceived *ideological stakes*

    · In particular, those who have a greater expected loss are more likely to give to a campaign

    · Not just about extremism, nor about perceiving party positions as closer to one's own or that parties have stark choices – about perception of what one would lose if less-preferred party wins

* Did not find a strong relationship between donor ideology and the ideology of the candidates to which they give, suggesting that giving isn't solely a policy-oriented activity

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Jacob M. Grumbach and Alexander Sahn. 2020. "Race and Representation in Campaign Finance." *American Political Science Review* 114, no. 1 (February): 206–221

- **Key Takeaway:** Using new data on the racial identities of over 27 million donors, find that campaign contributors are racially unrepresentative: Black and Latino shares of contributions are smaller than their shares of the population, electorate, and elected offices. However, presence of ethnoracial minority candidates mobilizes coethnic donors: results suggest presence of ethnoracial minority candidates increases the share of minority contributions in US House elections. Also find a reduction in white contributions to black Democrats, and to black and Latino Republicans, but little difference in overall fundraising competitiveness. Thus, results suggest nomination of minority candidates can increase the ethnoracial representativeness of campaign finance without costs to fundraising.

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