

File 20101110.2104: The programme office and UCDMO Technical Director exchanged a series of emails this week that indicates they are serious about streamlining the C&A process. The programme office is pushing to include an incremental addition to the baseline technical capability [email and Microsoft Office document files for USFK] and the UCDMO TD wrote back that ‘The CSTG RM Working Group was formed to facilitate the development of a common body of evidence from CT&E and ST&E derived from the first implementation of RM v5.0. This body of evidence would then be available to support reciprocity across the DoD and IC.’ He went on to say, however, that the body of evidence is applicable only to the first implementation configuration and architecture, i.e., the baseline, and any subsequent fielding of a CDS in other than the baseline evaluated configuration would necessitate additional testing, certification if needed, and accreditation support from NSA and/or DIA. The CSTG RM Working Group (CTSGRMWG) would not that additional work; their mission is done [ref: 20101110.2221_RM_email_msg2].

The way I interpret this is that UCDMO-TD is wary of feature creep and being asked to do ‘just one more little thing’ indefinitely. The body of evidence as it exists at the end of the CTSGRMWG covers the baseline operational capability and approximately four follow-ons (SNMP, data link, remote management, RHR, and RHR with remote management). Email would be the fifth follow-on capability. The approval status of the follow-on capabilities is still up in the air; CDTAB has slated TORAs for the first four, but as of mid-November has only completed TORAs on baseline, data-link and possibly SNMP. Other TORAs are planned to be deliberated in December. I have not heard yet of a TORA for email that is slated for deliberation by the board. Presumably, either NSA I173 or UCDMO would update the body of evidence file to contain the final determination of the board with respect to each of the TORAs; that would bring the body of evidence up to date with the new baseline—exclusive of SABI—and would make sense in the context of the UCDMO list of approved solutions. I cannot say that this will actually be done, however, especially in light of I173’s busy schedule and funding, which is not slacktacular. Dennis Bowden is contacting NSA regarding the additional testing that NSA would have to perform for risk assessment in service to the Army CDSO before ACDSO gives the packet to CDTAB or DSAWG (DSAWG in the case of USFK) [ref: 20101110.2223_RM_email_msg4].

However, it was acknowledged from the start that the body of evidence would be derived from the 1st implementation configuration and architecture, and any subsequent RM v5.0 fielding in a configuration other than what was originally tested may require additional testing - of the “delta’s” only.

In Mike Tyson’s email he mentions the need to hold discussions with either NSA or DIA, depending on who will do the additional testing, certification if necessary, and final accreditation. This is in-line with the overall plan summarized in my first paragraph, and would preclude involvement from the CSTG RM Working Group, which has essentially completed its mission.

References