File 20100331.2113: Notes for *Crosstalk* journal article:

- In the expanded journal article, amplify the rôle of CESG in the first case study (crazy Venn diagram). Right now it says that CESG was the 'most trusted government information security advisor' but it makes it sound like their decision to paint S^* as 'not fit for purpose' was capricious, which it was not. It was based on careful analysis using subtle tools. If possible, correct this impression in the final copy for VALID 2010 as well.

- Reference [1, Chapter 14] in the context of measuring the parameter we want to know directly, rather than inferring it from something else that is easier to measure, with regard to counting the number of post-CT&E software defects found in successive versions of the software.

- Also, are we primarily interested in software defects found in ST&E findings, or reported in some other manner?

Also, if the VALID 2010 paper gets accepted, send a copy of it along with the (much better!) *Crosstalk* article to Dr Levy and see if it convinces him to grant me an interview.

References

[1] Trevor A. Kletz. *What Went Wrong?: Case Histories of Process Plant Disasters.* Elsevier, Burlington, Massachusetts, fourth edition, 1999.