File 20120219.1725: Kletz [1, ch. 5] is about reasons why incidents are not published; lawyers get a good portion of the responsibility. Companies, he says, often welcome new standards because they force competitors to pay for the same safety improvements that we would like to do except for the thought that our competitors wouldn't bother. Publication of accident reports can have a beneficial effect because it induces competitors to spend as much on safety as we do. Company IP review can be a powerful blocker; in this case, anonymisation is a powerful weapon. He suggests, if a company lawyer gets in the way, offer anonymisation as an inducement and suggest that the lawyer will be blamed personally if the accident recurs after[1] publication is denied.

Pages 94–95 of Kletz [1] contains notes on the position of a safety advisor in the company hierarchy, advice mirroring today's exhortations that information security officers must report to the CEO, not the CFO, and to the Board directly if possible.

I keep having the feeling that HAZOP might be applicable to the kind of project management problems experienced repeatedly by LMT on the RTG 1.0 project. Consider progress reporting: what happens if there is too little progress reported? Too much? Reverse progress? Consider it like flow through a line: reverse flow or no flow; too high, too low flow; too high temperature, too low temperature; pressure similarly? What is the analogy of contaminants in the line? Leftover material from a previous turnover? Valves set incorrectly or actuators not hooked up after maintenance? Turnover is similar to the periods between projects; maintenance is similar to changes in procedures, although not quite—what is the correct parallel here?

References

[1] T. A. Kletz. *Lessons from Disaster—How Organisations Have No Memory and Accidents Recur.* Institution of Chemical Engineers, Rugby, UK, 1993.

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[1]a subtle point here: after, not because of