File 20090408.1255: Notes from talking with Professor Cynthia Irvine, Naval Postgraduate School:

She told me it's all politics. Nobody writes about Common Criteria evaluation. I would like to, I said. I think it's fascinating, and no one is writing about it. I briefly described the failure of RTG 1.0 to achieve CC evaluation. She asked about RM getting evaluated, and I said that my managers had hoped to piggyback on the RTG 1.0 evaluation to get RM a CC cert while somebody else paid for it. She seemed to understand that. She told me that the 4 authors of SKPP did not take the SKPP through evaluation. NSA took it away and did that. I asked if the authors got feedback; she said they did. NSA requested no changes, though. She said that the authors, all former (Quantum?) employees, knew what the SKPP needed, so they went through the CC and specified what they needed. From their perspective, evaluating the PP was not hard because they were setting requirements, not trying to meet any. They knew what was needed to protect classified and high-value information (she mentioned PL-5 several times). They added a whole bunch of explicit requirements to the CC. Some of those will be incorporated in the next version of the CC.

Prof Irvine told me to contact Audrey Dale at NIAP. Will she talk to me about the politics? Who knows? I mentioned that I had been contractually prohibited from talking to anyone at NIAP CCEVS during the evaluation, but now that the project is over, I am free to talk to all of these people. 'This is your dissertation?' she asked. I'm not sure at all if she thinks I am crazy (wouldn't be the first time), but she smiled at my description when I said I'm older than all the other grad students, but one advantage of starting a D.Phil. at age 45 is that by then you've run across a few good thesis topics.

I think I made an OK impression. I gave her my card and she gave me one of hers in return. She specifically recommended an article (a pamphlet, published by the NPS, about the reasons why formal methods ended up in the orange book. The politics. What Bobby Inman said [2].

Note: follow-up with Prof Irvine to clarify that RM did not fail in its CC eval, it was the overall system of which RM was a small part. Thank her for the pointer to the Pottinger article at the same time. [DONE]

Prof Irvine encouraged me to go to the Common Criteria conference, always held in some exotic location, she says. I briefly described my hassles with Export Control.

TODO: Get past proceedings of the CC Conference and read them.

Finally, another paper mentioned by Prof Irvine was [1].

References

[1] Timothy E. Levin, Cynthia E. Irvine, Clark Weissman, and Thuy D. Nguyen. Analysis of three multilevel security architectures. In *Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Computer security architecture*, pages 37–46, Fairfax, Virginia, USA, November 2, 2007.

[2] Garrel Pottinger. Proof requirements in the orange book: Origins, implementation, and implications. Technical report, Mathematical Sciences Institute, 409 College Avenue, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14850 USA, February 11, 1994. Naval Research Laboratory, Code 5540, Washington, D.C. 20375-5337 USA.