File 20120420.0623: Weekly activity report 0237:

weekly activity report 237 (loughry)
Joe Loughry
Sent: 20 April 2012 06:23
To: Joe Loughry

Weekly activity report no. 20120419.2146 (GMT-7) sequence no. 0237, noughth week TT

Regarding the sequence or set of necessary or desirable events that must
occur for a successful security certification and accreditation, and the
set of tell-tale events that may accumulate to hinder it, I contacted
Robert L. Glass for a reprint of a 1999 article by Craddock because I
think the article will corroborate another hazard I have coded 'science
project'. Craddock was apparently describing architecture astronauts
in the CS90 project but the effect is similar to an NIH effort that
consumed time and resources late in the R-prime CC evaluation activity.
Other problems there included the impedance mismatch in status report
information flow from level zero engineers to the PM, a different sort of
impedance mismatch from the CCTL to level zero at the developer, knowledge
retained by the CCTL and prevented from crossing the CCTL--developer
interface, and other patterns I am currently tracking. I talked with
Prof. Glass by email about it. Still working on coding CS-1 and -2
evidence in ATLAS.ti and my notes and observations.

Also this week I read the certification reports and STs for Fox's data
diode CC evaluations. I was looking for a description of the reliable
one-way proxy server protocol they claim to use, but they put it outside
the evaluation boundary and kept it undocumented. This is relevant
to the setting of the security boundary in CS-1 which in hindsight was
too broad and illustrates the practical lessons that can be learnt from
successful and unsuccessful CC security evaluations. In conclusion, I am
forcing more time to data analysis this week with the end of completing
the coding work in the agreed time.

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End of WAR 0237.

References