File 20100122.0230: Weekly activity report 0120:

weekly activity report 120 (loughry)

Joe Loughry

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Attachments:

Weekly activity report no. 20100121.1816 (GMT-7) sequence no. 0120, week 1 HT

Dr Martin pointed out this morning a new report from the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) on Cloud Computing Risk Assessment. The report was most interesting to me for its description of the risk assessment process they used. Risk assessment is crucial to the tool I have to develop later this year. I am reading the report more for insight into its methodology and techniques than anything else. I think there are at least two techniques I can use from it (see below).

Reading group started up again this week with a presentation by Shamal of his and Ivan's new paper on a meta-model for usable security. Shamal has three publications now so I'm feeling the pressure to keep up. The methodology chapter outline is developing well and is on-track for completion of the writing in another 2 or 3 weeks. That, combined with a re-purposed version of the poster I made for ACSAC 25 that was not accepted last December, will make a good paper for the journal Crosstalk. I plan to submit that paper by the beginning of March.

We met formally twice this week to talk about my methodology chapter outline. I included it with the agenda each time to show how the chapter is evolving. Besides commenting on the organisation of the chapter (in particular suggesting how I could make clearer the relationship between pieces of the methodology) and on my writing style, Dr Martin gave me more advice on research, writing, and presentation. I have added a survey of subject matter experts (SME) on the relationship between testing effort and the principle of defence in depth to the methodology. I think this will provide a useful perspective that is orthogonal to the recollections of participants in the first case study and the second case study. Finally, I am still looking in the security-critical systems literature in case anyone has found a set of axioms or theorems that would seem to be adaptable to answering the question I have, which is: how much testing is enough? How do you know when you're done?

On Monday, Dr Martin questioned the connection I want to draw between the well-established principle of defence in depth and the level of testing that exists in people's minds---whether that connection really exists. We talked about it back and forth for a while, and about the way it relates to formal methods, and about process depth as compared to test depth. Dr Martin pulled a few books off the shelf behind him and suggested Leveson (1995) as a possible source. If the axioms I am looking for don't appear in that textbook, he said, they probably do not exist. I got a copy from Amazon yesterday. The safety critical literature has its own fundamental principle: ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Possible) which is found throughout the field, especially in chemical engineering and process plant operation. Dr Martin reminded me to look in the SCS course notes, which I had forgotten about. I found a long paper by Bowen and Stavridou (1993) that might have a pointer in it.

In Thursday's meeting, we talked more about the safety literature and my expanded outline. Dr Martin advised me not to lose momentum writing by reading too much in the security literature this week. Focus instead on writing and expand the outline into prose. To reiterate, the plan

is to have this chapter completely written by 19th February when I give a talk on it before the department. I am on a roll and want to keep that momentum. Lockheed is still a problem; I am trying to push back and keep them from demanding more of my time than is fair.

## Tasks:

- 1. methodology chapter
- 2. Software Engineering talk (19th Feb)
- 3. Crosstalk article (to be submitted by 1st March)

## Reading:

- 1. ENISA report (for their risk assessment process and SME survey methodology)
- 2. Leveson (1995) looking for security-critical axioms or theorems  ${\tt I}$  can adapt
- 3. Probably not Anderson (2007)

Next meeting: Thursday, 28th January at 1400 Oxford time.

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End of WAR 0120.

## References