

File 20100210.0604: Notes from Reading Group today on the paper by [1]:

I asked about a trusted repository of provenance data, and whether that would best be done at the Privacy CA (would the CA have any advantage in the rôle?

Dr Martin talked about security of nodes in the provenance graph. I (for example) may not be allowed to see the provenance of some of the data; others (cf. cancer research) elsewhere in the chain may have access to the provenance that I can't see. You have to follow the chain.

The idea of storing and restoring virtual machines (Q: will they contain the codes [n.b. from John—binaries] used to process the data in the models as well as the data?) is closely matched with John's earlier work on compilation certificates. Very closely matched.

This is a good paper; it clearly shows how these two groups have been working in parallel but without any knowledge of each other.

References

- [1] John Lyle and Andrew Martin. Trusted computing and provenance: Better together. In *Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX Workshop on the Theory and Practice of Provenance*, San Jose, California, February 22, 2010.