E PLURIBUS UNUM: OUT OF MANY, ONE

AMERICAN JEWISH POPULATION GROWTH SINCE 1840

A Thesis

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of Cornell University

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by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis presents novel estimates of the Jewish population of the United States from 1840 to 2023. It does so by adapting a simple demographic model ("the model") to the specific circumstances of American Jewry, as informed by the work of Ira Rosenwaike and Sergio DellaPergola — even as it does not accept DellaPergola's definition of "core" Jewry as the standard. The goal is twofold: [i] to create an accurate enough model of U.S. Jewish population growth so that historic estimates can be improved and made available; and [ii] to explore the past, present, and future trajectories of U.S. Jewish demography and identity. On net, the results suggest that some historic population estimates should be revisited or entirely replaced, and the author argues that a more pluralistic, fundamentally American stream of collective Jewish identity has emerged in the United States.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Jacob Rosewater is graduating from the Cornell University College of Architecture, Art, and Planning (AAP) in May 2025 with a Bachelor of Science in Urban and Regional Studies and a minor in Animal Science. He is matriculating to Harvard Law School in the fall. Jacob has presented work at "Making Space: Peopling and Placing the Matter of Jewish Studies" and he has completed two research projects in the field: "Lebn Zol Datn: A Retrospective Census of Jewish Pottstownians in 1910 & 1930" and "Jewish Immigration and Textile Firm Clustering in New York City." Apart from this, Jacob has sat on the AAP Dean's Advisory Council and the Cornell Campus Planning Committee, and he received the 2024 Westchester County Municipal Planning Federation scholarship award for his regional housing policy work.

Dedicated to all my grandparents:

Alta Enright Morabito

Louis Morabito

Sandy Rosewater, and

Lewis Rosewater, and to my brother

Tobias Edward Rosewater

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I express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Ira Sheskin for looking over the demographic model with me to ensure its reasonableness and to my faculty advisor, Dr. John Carruthers, for encouraging me to pursue this idea as an honors thesis. I want to specifically thank Dr. Elisa Sampson and Dr. Jonathan Boyarin for getting me involved in Jewish Studies to begin with, and for supporting me on this journey. They are two of the warmest people I have met at Cornell, and I am a better person for having met them. Lastly, I would like to thank my brother, Toby Rosewater, and my close friend and two-time co-author, Adrian Elimian, for helping me to improve the model and for putting up with me talking about it.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AJYB: American Jewish Year Book

CBR: Crude Birth Rate

CDR: Crude Death Rate

DJN: Distinctly Jewish Surname

EJCBR: Effective Jewish Crude Birth Rate

EJRNI: Effective Jewish Rate of Natural Increase

FSU: Former Soviet Union

ICBS: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics

INEGI: National Institute of Statistics and Geography [Mexico]

INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service [U.S.]

JCBR: Jewish Crude Birth Rate

JCDR: Jewish Crude Death Rate

JRNI: Jewish Rate of Natural Increase

NJPS: National Jewish Population Survey

ONS: Office of National Statistics [U.K.]

RNI: Rate of Natural Increase

USCBR: United States Crude Birth Rate

USCDR: United States Crude Death Rate

PREFACE

This project, which started in the fall, is essentially the culmination of two to three years of research into Jewish-American demographics. It began, oddly enough, as a tangent from other research into the local histories of New York State, and specifically from this author's attempt to turn the 1865 New York State Census into workable datasets (link here). These data, while not relevant to this project, became useful when taking two of Dr. Elissa Sampson's courses on Jewish urban geography: "Jews and the Immigrant City" and "Jewish Cities." Through the State census data, it was possible to answer larger questions regarding Jewish urbanization, leading to a research project about if Jewish population growth *caused* textile firm agglomeration in New York City. This, inevitably, raised questions about what the Jewish populations of New York City and the United States actually were, which led to further exploration.

The original idea for this paper was to standardize geographies of local American Jewish population estimates in 1878, 1907, 1917, 1927, and 1937 so that they could be compared to one another appropriately (appendix five). It was about halfway through this process, at some point last summer, that it became apparent that some of these estimates were not just unlikely, but more or less impossible. Trying to correct for this led the author to Rosenwaike (1977) and his population estimates, which rely on a simple demographic model but only go back to the year 1940. The author, frustrated and unable to contact the late Dr. Rosenwaike, learned how to replicate his approach — building a prototype model. The results were imperfect, but over the next few months the author made constant updates to it including novel immigration estimates in 1840-80, an adjustment for intermarriage effects, and countless other things. While the final results are far from exact, they are *reasonable* and this should inspire confidence in the author's depiction of American Jewry's population trajectory.

INTRODUCTION

This paper is divided into four parts: [i] background, [ii] methodology, [iii] results, and [iv] discussion. The first of these examines the reasons for choosing a demographic approach and potential flaws in the model, and it takes a hard look at past population estimates to check their validity as “benchmarks” to anchor the results. The second part contains an intuitive breakdown of the components of the model: fertility, mortality, immigration, and emigration (discussions about accession and secession are found in §1.2.B). Next, the third part walks through the model in chronological order, looking at how the results compare to previous estimates in 1840-80, 1880-1924, 1925-70, and 1971-2023. Finally, in the fourth part, the model is used to explore changing narratives of U.S. Jewish population growth, and to gain insight into the demographic transition more broadly. The discussion culminates in a meditation on U.S. Jewish identity in both §4.2-3 and makes somewhat provocative conclusions about the future paths of American Jewish identities and institutions.

PART I: BACKGROUND

The U.S. Decennial Census does not ask about either religion or Jewish ethnicity, so estimating the nation's Jewish population requires workarounds. Some of these methods are better than others, and no method is perfect. This paper utilizes a simple demographic model inspired by Rosenwaike (1977) and the corpus of Dr. Sergio DellaPergola and others at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The advantage of this approach is that it creates a methodologically consistent time series, enabling "apples to apples" comparisons over time. This is different from methods that produce a "snapshot" of the population at one point in time, such as a national survey or a summation of local enumerations. Moreover, a demographic model can correct past estimates that are less reliable than current ones — providing insight into the past, present, and future trajectory of the Jewish-American population.

That being said, the goal in this section is to create a road map for the reader. The first step is to explain the basic approach and model (§1.1) and to discuss some potential flaws in the demographic approach (§1.2). The next step is to review various "snapshot" estimates during the period of study (1840 - 2023) to select "benchmarks" that the results can be compared to for accuracy (§1.3). This last subsection is neither comprehensive nor a formal literature review, but it digs into the most well known and high quality estimates. If the reader is looking for a full list of non-redundant scholarly U.S. Jewish population estimates, see appendix one; for a more in-depth review of historic snapshot estimates, see Phillips (2007).

1.1. The Simple Demographic Model

The demographic balancing equation sets the population in some year as equal to that of the previous year plus natural increase (births - deaths) and net migration (Canudas-Romo et al. 2022). This "simple" model has long been used by U.S. Jewish demographers, best seen in Ira

Rosenwaike's 1977 paper "A Synthetic Estimate of American Jewish Population Movement over the Last Three Decades." Unlike Rosenwaike, who only included the basic parameters of the simple model (birth and death rates, net migration), subsequent work by faculty at Hebrew University, and DellaPergola in particular, improved this method with age-cohort analysis and additional parameters related to intermarriage, accession, and secession (Rebhun et al. 1999; DellaPergola 2021b, 2024). However, recent surveys from the Pew Research Center have problematized these results through different population definitions — creating a divide between DellaPergola and his American counterparts (Tighe et al. 2023).

This paper's approach tries to split the difference between the simplistic Rosenwaike model and the complex Hebrew University model. On the one hand, Rosenwaike's "closed system" works when endogamy rates are low and the distinction between Jews and non-Jews is clear — meaning it works best before intermarriage rates rose in the 1960s (Phillips & Fishman 2006; Epstein 1986). On the other hand, the Hebrew University model relies on swathes of data that are historically difficult to find and interpret. This is a problem not only because this paper's time series is long, but also because its author is an undergraduate student who has neither the time nor the ability to create a more comprehensive model.

The compromise is to start with the standard parameters of the simple model and then to adjust for the effects of intermarriage on the crude birth rate in a way that also accounts for most secessions and some accessions. This "middle" approach lets this paper's model account for more variables without needing to calculate entirely parameters based on unsound data.[1] Experts, notably. Ira Sheskin of the University of Miami, were consulted during the model's creation, and

[1] Specifically, it would be difficult to find the total fertility rate and accession/secession in much of the nineteenth century. DellaPergola builds his models using data from high-quality surveys that did not exist for much of the model's time series.

the balancing approach described here makes it less likely that the model overestimates or underestimates the U.S. Jewish population to a large degree.

1.2. Potential Flaws in the Model

The model, like all models, is built on a set of assumptions. Some of these assumptions are necessarily wrong, problematizing the results. It is thus necessary to address overarching concerns, which in this case are related to [i] the base year population estimate; [ii] the lack of explicit accession and secession; [iii] some issues with the intermarriage model; and [iv] the way that the model "defines" Jewishness. Such issues are far from comprehensive, but they are some of the most pressing. However, if the reader is more interested in how assumptions are built into the specific machinery of the model, then skip to section two. Otherwise, the goal here is to be transparent about the model's general problems, and to explain why these are not bad enough to jeopardize the population estimates.

1.2.A: U.S. Jewry in 1840 (The Base Year Estimate)

The American Almanac in 1840 estimated the U.S. Jewish population at 15,000, and this statistic has been oft-repeated since then (Jacobs 1914; Goldstein 1971; Sarna 2019). If the rate of natural increase in 1840 is supposed for 1830-39, and if the 1830 Jewish population estimate from Rosenwaike (1989) is assumed, then net migration only needs to be around 1,000 persons per year to get to the American Almanac total (table 1). This is reasonable, being well below the average annual net migration of 1,712 persons per year that the model predicts for years between 1840 and 1849 (see: §2.3.B). However, because the 1840 estimate has no methodology attached to it, a large degree of error is still possible.[2]

[2] The 1840 estimate from the American Almanac could not be located in its original form and thus its exact methodology is unclear. It is likely accurate enough considering how often it is

In the worst case scenario, where the 1840 estimate is either ten thousand persons too large or ten thousand persons too small, the effects are noticeable but not serious. This can be seen in table two, which shows how each of these scenarios affect the model if everything else stays the same. In either the low (5k in 1840) or high (25k in 1840) cases, the error is equal to ±19,593 in 1880, ±38,832 in 1920, and ±66,579 in 2020 (table 2). In practice, these numbers mean that a defective 1840 estimate would be concerning but not alarming; nothing to sneer at but not enough to invalidate the results.

1.2.B: Lack of Explicit Accession and Secession

Accession refers to non-Jews who become Jews and secession refers to Jews who leave Judaism or stop identifying as Jews. Accessions and secessions can be thought of as either "hard" (formal conversions) or "soft" (informal changes in identity).[3] When a person who has a Jewish parent is raised in another faith but later identifies as a Jew not by religion, this can be seen as a "soft accession." In the same vein, a "soft secession" occurs when a person who has a reasonable claim to Jewish identity (i.e. they have a Jewish parent) chooses not to identify as Jewish in adulthood or practices another religion.

Technically, any person can undergo a soft accession or secession, but in reality this applies only to children with one Jewish parent. The proof is as follows: all people have either zero, one, or two Jewish parents. People with zero Jewish parents who do not undergo a formal conversion are not considered Jewish even if they identify as such, since demographers consider these people to be non-Jews of "Jewish affinity" (Alper et al. 2021). People with two Jewish parents who do not convert-out can only stop being Jewish if they no longer identify as

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referenced, but that does not mean it was perfect, or even good. If a later source explained how the estimate was derived, then the author is unaware of it.

[3] The distinction between "hard" and "soft" accession and secession is (to the best of the author's knowledge) a novel one.

ethnically or culturally Jewish, which is rare. Therefore, since people with either two or zero Jewish parents rarely undergo "soft" accession or secession, it makes sense to think about these processes as only applying to people with one Jewish parent. This is to say that a lot of these soft accessions and secessions are actually captured in the retention rate of children in intermarried households ("the retention rate") (see: §2.1.C). So, if the model also separately modeled all accession and secession, then there would be double counting.

To be more specific, data from Alper et al. (2021) ("Pew 2020") shows that 90% of non-Jews with a Jewish background were raised in intermarried households and that 77% of secessions arose from the same.[4] All these people are captured in the retention rate (based on identification in adulthood) and are thus included in the model. In addition, while no accessions are explicitly modeled, imperfections in the intermarriage adjustment (see: §2.1.C) may account for at least some spousal conversions (41% of hard accessions).[5, 6] What is being referred to here is that the model assumes that intermarried and endogamous couples have the same fertility rate, when in reality the former have fewer children than the latter (Alper et al. 2021). The purpose of this simplification is to account for the 7.65% chance that each intermarriage has of leading to a

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[4] To calculate the percentage of secessions that are soft secessions, start with Alper et al. (2021, 211), which found that 90% of non-Jews of Jewish background had only one Jewish parent and that 57% of non-Jews of Jewish background were raised in another religion. The latter category is excluded from the model at birth, and presumably the 57% is almost all people raised in intermarried households. This gives a universe of secessions equal to 43% of non-Jews with a Jewish background, wherein 77% ("soft accessions") have one Jewish parent and the remainder have two Jewish parents ("hard accessions").

[5] The model assumes that intermarried and inmarried households have the same fertility rate, which is wrong. This upregulates the effective births in intermarried households, which is intended to account for conversions of non-Jewish spouses (equivalent to births).

[6] The number of spousal accessions is assumed to be equal to the percent of Jewish adults with a Jewish spouse who have zero Jewish parents (119,086) and the number of hard accessions is assumed to be equal to the total number of Jews who have zero Jewish parents (290,000) (Alper et al. 2021, 107). Thus, by dividing the first number by the second number, one finds that 41% of hard accessions are due to spousal conversions.

conversion — equivalent to a birth in the model.[7] It is not known whether this overestimates or underestimates accessions, but it is better than nothing.

All this being said, the lack of explicit accession and secession parameters is a serious hindrance to the model. It might, in fact, be one of the reasons why the population estimate in 2023 (7.2 million) is below the Pew 2020 benchmark (7.5 million) (see: §1.3.B). After all, if the model accounts for 77% of secessions but 45% of accessions (more or less), then the net effect should be negative — although, to repeat, it is impossible to know whether the number of spousal conversions is over or underestimated. In any case, the lack of comprehensive accession and seccession models is problematic.

1.2.C: Other Issues with the Intermarriage Model

There are two problems with how intermarriage is modeled, in addition to the tangential issues mentioned in §1.2.B. These are related to how spousal accession and differential divorce rates affect the *measured* endogamy rate and thus the model. On the first point, if a Jew by birth marries a convert, then they are excluded from the intermarriage rate. This makes sense in terms of identity, but it can disrupt the estimate. An interethnic inmarriage where a Jew marries a non-Jew who then converts to Judaism has the same "efficiency bonus" as an intermarriage plus a much higher retention rate, but it is included in the set of inmarriages and is thus unaccounted for in the model. Therefore, the effective U.S. Jewish crude birth rate might be higher than the model predicts — even as the model has an upward adjustment to deal with "hard accessions" by non-Jewish spouses, as discussed in the last subsection.

[7] Alper et al. (2021, 94) shows that 59% of Jewish adults are married and 42% of these adults have a non-Jewish spouse, implying the existence of 1.43 million non-Jews married to Jews. Thus, since data from Alper et al. (2021, 107) implies 119,086 spousal accessions (see previous footnote), the chance of conversion by a non-Jewish spouse can be calculated at (119086/(119086+1437240)) = 7.65%.

On the second point, which Sheskin drew the author's attention to, studies have shown that intermarriages are more likely to end in divorce than endogamous ones (Goldstein 1992; Sheskin 2025). So, if the efficiency gains of intermarriage apply to divorced couples who are necessarily excluded from the intermarriage rate, then the percentage of U.S. Jews who have only one Jewish parent might be greater than the model predicts. One could thus speculate that the model is too conservative in its intermarriage adjustment. If, for example, the exogamy rate is raised by 20% in all years since 1970, then the model produces a total estimate for 2023 that is almost identical to the 7.7 million proposed in the most recent addition of the American Jewish Year Book currently in development (Sheskin 2025). This is not to imply that 7.7 million is the correct estimate, but rather that the (purposefully conservative) model might underestimate the Jewish American population to some degree.

1.2.D: Definitions of Jewishness

"Who is a Jew?" is a contentious question around which two camps have emerged in the social sciences. The first is composed of experts from the Pew Research Center and Brandeis University ("Pew/Brandeis") and the second is headed by Sergio DellaPergola at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The Pew/Brandeis team defines Jews as including all adults who are either Jewish by religion or not by religion (the latter meaning persons who have at least one Jewish parent, consider themselves Jewish, and do not practice another faith) and all children who are raised Jewish in some way and have at least one Jewish parent (Lugo et al. 2014; Alper et al. 2021; Tighe et al. 2023). Where DellaPergola differs from Pew/Brandeis is that he adds an additional hurdle wherein people who are Jews of No Religion with one Jewish parent are assumed to be "partly Jewish" and are not included in the topline number for the "core Jewish population" (DellaPergola 2023a; Saxe et al. 2023). Before explaining why this paper does not adopt DellaPergola's definition, it is worth acknowledging that he has a point when he says that the inclusion of people with multiple ethnicities and no religion into the set of people who are considered Jewish shows "the end of a clear dichotomy between Jews and non-Jews" in the United States (DellaPergola 2019).

But DellaPergola's framework does a poor job of reflecting minority identification in the United States, and it does not align with how other marginalized transnational groups define themselves. For example, it is well known that someone who is considered Black in the U.S. might be thought of as non-Black in countries like Haiti, Colombia, or South Africa (Wade 2009; Carney 2021; Tewolde 2024). No reasonable person would argue that African-Americans do not qualify as Black on that fact alone. It can thus be inferred that context and continuity determine one's identity, not a set of universal diktats. DellaPergola himself says that the advantage of a demographic approach is that it is "designed to determine **nationwide** Jewish population estimates" [emphasis added] (DellaPergola 2019). It does not follow from this statement that "it would not be acceptable to employ different population definitions" in different countries based on the totality of the circumstances (DellaPergola 2021b).

To be fair, DellaPergola's definition of "core" Jewry strikes a balance within the context of Israeli law. He does not use the *halachic* definition found in Section 4b of the Return Law (Jews are born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism) and he also does not embrace the Court's holding in the *Shalit* case (1969) (children of no religion with a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother can be considered Jews) which Section 4b overturned (Gavison 2011). The problem with DellaPergola's "core" definition is ***not*** that it asserts an Israeli understanding of Jewishness for the sake of crafting a specific narrative, as is sometimes implied, but rather that it views Jewishness as *necessarily* competing with other ethnocultural identities rather than as something layered atop them. DellaPergola's analogy of choice is alcohol, saying that if an "alcoholic beverage is 12-13% it is wine; at 4-6% it is beer" (DellaPergola 2021a). But this is not the right metaphor: American identity is not like alcohol. It is instead like a wedding cake with many layers where each tier is baked separately and in full-form. Having one tier be strawberry does not in any way dilute the flavor of a tier that is vanilla or chocolate.

Thus, the model tries its best to use the Pew/Brandeis definition of Jewishness rather than that of DellaPergola, even if the former cannot be replicated one-to-one within the confines of a simple demographic model. There is also the more practical concern that if the Pew/Brandeis definition were not favored, then the model would lack the ability to use the Pew 2013 & 2020 studies as benchmarks (see: §1.3.B). None of the above is meant to denigrate DellaPergola's work, but there is just no good reason for a study of U.S. Jewish demography to privilege a universal definition of Jewishness over an American one.

1.3. Selecting the "Benchmarks"

Finally, before moving on to the full methodology, it is important to choose a set of "benchmark estimates" that the results can be compared to. These benchmarks are intended to represent the most reliable data points, and they cannot come from other demographic models (to avoid "turtles all the way down"). Given this, it is necessary to review past estimates to assess their trustworthiness — conducting a literature review of sorts, divided into pre-war and post-war subsections. In addition, a second set of benchmarks is added for the sake of redundancy, with these data derived from U.S. Census returns and a list of Distinctly Jewish Surnames (DJNs) from Sheskin (2012). By the end of this subsection, the reader should [i] know why each benchmark was selected or created, and [ii] understand the flaws with other methods of enumeration, especially in the pre-war period.

1.3.A: Pre-War Estimates (1880 - 1945)

The first serious population data comes from Hackenberg (1880) and his tally of local estimates collected by congregations and lodges. Despite its novelty, the results proved to be problematic due to factual errors and the lack of an articulable methodology for finding the Jewish population in large cities (Weissbach 1988). Thus, even if Hackenberg is a useful reference for some purposes, it is not accurate enough to be a "benchmark."

Similar issues arise from American Jewish Year Book (AJYB) surveys in 1907, 1917, 1927, and 1937 — which used similar methods to Hackenberg except in major cities, where primary school absences on Yom Kippur served as a proxy.[8] The general consensus is that all surveys save 1907 were overestimates, as recognized by Linfield (1928), Seligman & Swados (1949) and Rosenwaike (1977). U.S. Census returns support these findings, showing that the number of DJNs increased by 26.7% between 1920 and 1940 — below the 36.9% increase implied by the AJYB's 1917 and 1937 surveys.[9] It is true that 1907 might be more accurate, but it is too methodologically similar to the faulty surveys to be used as a benchmark.

Rather, the only "benchmark worthy" pre-war estimate is from Jacobs (1914) and his analysis of "foreign White stock" and "mother tongue" data in the 1910 U.S. Census.[10] This is because the census is an official dataset (non-reliant on congregations for data collection) whose derived estimates are in line not only with each other, but also with data from immigration

[8] S. Oppenheim (1918) only utilizes the Yom Kippur method for New York City whereas Linfield (1928) did this for eleven cities with Jewish populations of greater than 50,000 people. No cities had their populations estimated in 1907 with the Yom Kippur method as far as the author is aware.

[9] See §1.3.C for more information on the DJN calculation.

[10] Jacobs (1914) estimated the Jewish population at 2.346 million based on foreign white stock and at 2.369 million based on mother tongue data. The benchmark in this paper is equal to an average of these two numbers (2.357 million) (table 4).

returns and the Industrial Removal Office (Jacobs 1914). It is no surprise that Ritterband et al. (1988) finds these to be "well-grounded" and there is no reason to reject them here.

1.3.B: Post-War Estimates (1945 - 2020)

The AJYB has kept a rolling sum of local population surveys since 1955, with the total mostly reflecting legitimate studies rather than self-reported guesstimates like those underlying the 1907-37 data. The problems with this method are that [i] it double counts people during periods of high geographic mobility, and [ii] it relies on studies that use different methodologies and population definitions (DellaPergola 2013a). Therefore, the post-war benchmarks were all selected from national "snapshot" population surveys.

The first of these is the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey of 1957 as analyzed by Chenkin (1959) — widely recognized as "the gold standard of American surveys" due to its large and representative sample (Phillips 2007; Ritterband et al. 1988). The 1970-71 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) is also included as a benchmark because of its use of in-person interviews and its participants' high response rate, although it is not as well respected as the Current Population Survey (Phillips 2007). Finally, NJPS 1990 is known to have had some issues relating to sample weights and response rates, but it is "accepted by social scientists as methodologically sound" and thus used as a benchmark in this paper (Phillips 2007).

Of the three major twenty-first century national surveys (NJPS 2000-01, Pew 2013, and Pew 2020) only Pew 2013 and Pew 2020 are accepted as benchmarks. NJPS 2000-01 is rejected because of its low response rate, undercount of immigrants, abnormal population estimate, and problematic methodology (Kadushin et al. 2005; Phillips 2007; Sheskin 2025). There was a comedic "two rabbis, three opinions" level of infighting, and the author (a lowly undergraduate) cannot make heads or tails of it (Phillips 2007). By contrast, most of the questions raised about

Pew 2013 & 2020 relate to the issue of "who is a Jew?" discussed in §1.2.D (DellaPergola 2023a; Saxe et al. 2023; Tighe et al. 2023). Therefore, because this paper accepts Pew's definition of Jewishness, there is no issue with using these studies as benchmarks.

In sum, the "benchmark" estimates used to test the model are the Jacobs (1914) estimate for 1910, the Chenkin (1959) adaptation of the Current Population Survey for 1958, the NJPS 1970 and 1990 surveys, and the Pew 2013 and 2020 surveys. These are some of the highest quality enumerations to exist, although the lack of pre-1900 benchmarks is problematic for testing the model's accuracy. Other methods, including the use of non-benchmark estimates and alternative benchmarks (see: below), are needed.

1.3.C: DJN-Based Benchmarks

DJNs have a long history of being used to create population estimates, but computational limitations have limited their use. Here, as an alternative set of benchmarks, the number of DJNs in the U.S. Census (available online at ancestry.com) is used to create retrospective estimates in 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, and 1950 (table 3).[11] The process itself involves counting the number of DJNs in each census and then indexing the results to the model in 1850 (table 3). In other words, it is assumed that if the DJN count is e.g. 100% greater in 1920 than 1850, then the U.S. Jewish population in 1920 must also be 100% greater than what the model predicts in 1850. While this produces an imperfect result with some endogeneity issues, it helps to fill in some of the gaps left by the benchmark estimates selected in the proceeding subsections.

[11] Unlike later censuses, the 1840 Census only includes data on heads of household, so it does not make sense to index the number of DJNs to this date. The 1890 Census is excluded because most of it was lost in fire and thus never digitized. As for censuses after 1950, these have not yet been made public in accordance with Pub. Law 95-416 (U.S. Census Bureau 2024a; Dorman 2008).

PART II: METHODOLOGY

The demographic balancing equation sets the population in some year equal to the population from the previous year plus population growth, measured as births minus deaths plus immigration minus emigration (Canudas-Romo et al. 2022).[12] However, since the United States Census Bureau has rarely provided such figures for Jews, the task of creating historic estimates is difficult. The goal is thus to provide *reasonable* and *conservative* estimates for all parts of the model (crude birth rate, crude death rate, immigration, and emigration) and to show that there is a *rational basis* for arriving at the results.

2.1. Modeling Jewish Fertility (Crude Birth Rate)

Simple demographic models measure fertility as a crude birth rate equal to the number of live births per thousand people (Canudas-Romo et al. 2022). However, no official data exist for the U.S. Jewish crude birth rate, so the model instead calculates it as a percentage of the United States' crude birth rate like in Rosenwaike (1977). Where the model differs from Rosenwaike is in its adjustment for intermarriage effects and its allowance for fluctuations in the U.S. Jewish crude birth rate as a percentage of the total U.S. crude birth rate. The hope is that these changes improve the necessarily imperfect fertility model.

2.1.A: Finding the U.S. Crude Birth Rate

The first step to calculate the U.S. Jewish crude birth rate (JCBR) is to find the United States' total crude birth rate (USCBR) for all years covered by the model. This is easy for years from 1909 to 2022 since the Human Fertility Database (2024a), Rosenwaike (1977), and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (1995) provide annualized USCBR data. To go further back then

[12] Although the model does not explicitly model secessions/accessions, the intermarriage model likely accounts for *most* secessions and *some* accessions (see: §1.2.B).

1909 (before CDC data is available) the model needs to find the USCBR as a weighted average of the U.S. White and Black crude birth rates — known from Coale & Zelnik (1963), Haines & Hackner (2006), Coale & Rives (1973), and Elben (1974). The final results, which are only marginally adjusted, seem to be reasonable (fig. 1).

2.1.B: Estimating the U.S. Jewish Crude Birth Rate (JCBR)

Recall that the model calculates the Jewish crude birth rate as equal to the United States' crude birth rate times some percentage. Instead of having this percentage be a fixed number, the model lets it fluctuate based on a ratio between the Jewish total fertility rate (JTFR) and the U.S. total fertility rate (USTFR). The model's major assumption is that if the JTFR is e.g. half of the USTFR, then the same must be true for crude birth rates. This means that if the average Jewish woman has half as many children as the average American woman, then the model assumes that the Jewish population has half as many births per person as the U.S. population.

To calculate these ratios, the model uses data from Billings (1891), DellaPergola (1980, 2005a, 2024), Rebhun et al. (1999), Lugo et al. (2014), and Alper et al. (2021) on the JTFR and it takes USTFR data from Dattani et al. (2025), Hacker & Roberts (2022), and O'Neill (2019). These only provide JTFR/USTFR data for years between 1890 and 2020 (fig. 2).[13,14] With respect

[13] To estimate the Jewish total fertility rate from 1910 Census data, start with the "children ever born" statistic for women born in Russia (7.2 children per woman). Two methodologies are then pursued: [1] because DellaPergola (1980) estimates the Jewish total fertility rate at 40.5% of the same statistic in 1940 for Russian mothers, apply that percentage to the 1910 Census data to arrive at JTFR = 2.92; and [2] choose a random building in the Lower East Side in 1910 (74-76 Delancey Street) and count the number of [i] children living (60), and [ii] native-born children living (31). 51.7% of all children are thus U.S. born, so apply this proportion to the same 1910 Census data as before to get JTFR = 3.72. Since both of these methods are imperfect and not scientific, split the difference to get JTFR = 3.32 (roughly equal to what would be expected given linear decline from 1890 to 1930). Clearly, the 1910 JTFR number is problematic, but someone with a better methodology can improve on it later.

[14] DellaPergola (2024a) found that the average number of children born to women aged 30-34 was 1.1 in 2020, lower than the 1.5 children per woman listed in Alper et al (2021). This paper uses the latter as a stand-in for the TFR rather than DellaPergola's figure and it does so for two reasons: [i] Driscoll et al. (2024) shows that births among women 35+ years old are 20.9%

to years before 1880, the model assumes that the JTFR is equal to 80% of the USTFR based on data from Rosenwaike (1977). Then, to fit everything together, the model supposes a linear increase in this percentage from 1880 to 1890. The net result is that a "fertility spike" is simulated at the start of the Great Wave of Immigration — as argued for by DellaPergola (2024a) and supported by work in Kosmin (1982) (fig.3).[15] While not perfect, the fertility model produces believable figures that are similar enough to the actual Jewish crude birth rate.

2.1.C: Adjusting for Intermarriage Effects

The term "effective Jewish fertility" was first coined by Schmeltz & DellaPergola "to take into account the probability that an intermarried Jewish parent will raise his/her child as a Jew" (Ritterband 1992). When the intermarriage rate goes up, effective Jewish fertility (which, in this case, is the effective crude birth rate) can either over or undershoot "raw" Jewish fertility as measured in §2.1.B. The advantage of intermarriage is that a single intermarried parent can raise as many Jewish children as two endogamous parents, but the disadvantage is that children are less likely to identify as Jewish in adulthood (Alper et al., 2021; Ritterband 1992). The model balances these "efficiency gains" and "assimilatory losses" through a multiplier whose value is equal to $((I\%_t * R\%_t * 2) + (1 - I\%_t))$ where I% is the intermarriage rate, R% is the percentage of children with one Jewish parent who remain Jewish as adults, and t is some year. The idea is to separate births into two groups: those in inmarried and intermarried households. All the children in the first group are assumed to maintain their Jewish identity, but only a portion (R%) of the

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of all U.S. births, meaning that DellaPergola's figure underestimates true fertility by a significant margin; and [ii] Kosmin et al. (1991) found that older "Gentile adults" in Jewish households have a higher fertility rate than Jewish adults in those same households, so excluding Jews born to non-Jewish women (i.e. patrilineal Jews) also leads to underestimation. To counteract this, it is safer to go with the larger number.

[15] DellaPergola (2024a) argues for a "fertility spike" among Jews in the United States, citing data from Kosmin (1982) on British Jews' crude birth rates.

second group is assumed to do the same. The model also doubles the effective fertility rate of the exogamous group to account for the "efficiency bonus" of intermarriage. The result is that the multiplier accounts for the "push and pull" of efficiency and assimilation, letting the effective Jewish crude birth rate diverge from the raw crude birth rate over time.

In terms of data, the model uses Massarik & Chenkin (1973), Lugo et al. (2014) and Alper et al. (2021) to find the intermarriage rate and Saxe et al. (2014) and Alper et al. (2021) to determine the retention rate. The model assumes in both cases that the rate in the last year where data is available (1900 for the intermarriage rate and 1928 for the retention rate) is the rate for all years prior. As a result, the multiplier has basically no effect on the Jewish crude birth rate before 1960, degrading effects from 1961-80, and positive effects from 1981 to 2022 (fig. 4).

2.2. Modeling Jewish Mortality (Crude Death Rate)

Jewish Americans have had lower death rates than non-Jewish Americans throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, mostly due to low infant mortality (Billings, 1891; Fauman & Mayer, 1969; Condran & Kramarow, 1991). Thus, as the infant mortality rate declined among all Americans, the Jewish and United States crude death rates underwent convergence (fig. 7). This idea, supported by burial data collected from Jewish cemeteries in New York, is the driver of the mortality model. While the model's annualized crude death rate data is not intended to be exactly accurate in any given year, the figures should be roughly correct.

2.2.A: Finding the U.S. Crude Death Rate (USCDR)

As with the Jewish crude birth rate, the model calculates the Jewish crude death rate as a percentage of the United States' crude death rate. The first step is to find the U.S. crude death rate between 1840 and 2022. This is simple from 1900 to 2022, since the Human Mortality Database (2024a) and Nowlin (1956) provide the data. However, in order to estimate the U.S.

crude death rate before 1900, a fourth polynomial regression needs to be run on the known data (R^2 = 0.924) and projected backwards. The results (while imperfect) appear to roughly approximate the falling mortality rates of the late nineteenth century (fig. 5).

2.2.B: Finding the Jewish Crude Death Rate (JCDR)

Although the model technically calculates the Jewish crude death rate as a percentage of the United States' crude death rate, it is possible to bypass this entirely for years between 1900 and 1990. This is because the Jewish crude death rate for New York City can be estimated during this period, when it was broadly representative of U.S. Jewry (Rosenwaike 1977). This is itself a three step process. The first step is to tally burials by year for all Jewish cemeteries in New York City using data from the find-a-grave index. These burial data are then compared to the outputs from a fifth polynomial regression model of the Jewish population of New York City over the same period (N = 40, R^2 = 0.922).[16] The result is a "raw" crude death rate for New York City's Jewish population that is much lower than the actual crude death rate, but which approximates the trend over time. So, in order to account for Jews buried in non-Jewish cemeteries and Jewish burials not uploaded to the find-a-grave index, raw estimates are indexed on known data for the New York City Jewish death rate from Rosenwaike (1977) — adjusting all figures upwards and arriving at a "true" estimate.

The overall trend from 1900 to 1990 is that the Jewish crude death rate as a percentage of the United States' crude death rate increased from around 75% in 1900 to essentially 100% from 1960 onwards. (fig. 6). With this in mind, the model supposes that the Jewish crude death rate prior to 1900 was 75% of the United States' crude death rate, with that percentage being 100%

[16] Data is found in Chalmers (1914), Ritterband (1997), Oppenheim (1918), Brzowsky & Sigalow (2023), Saxe et al. (2021), Chenkin (1956, 1964), and Cohen et al. (2011).

after 1960. While this is an oversimplification, the results match the conceptual "convergence" framework and are reasonable enough to pass a *rational basis* test (fig. 7).

2.3. Modeling Jewish Immigration

Creating annualized estimates of Jewish immigration is a challenging task. Data prior to 1881 and after 1968 are unavailable, and there is a mismatch between data collected by calendar year (ending December 31st) and fiscal year (ending on June 30th before 1976 and September 30th thereafter). The main concern is preventing immigrants from being double counted, rather than worrying about whether it is proper to assign 1890 fiscal year immigration data to the 1890 calendar year. There will necessarily be issues for the tallies in any given year, but the model is more or less accurate in its broad strokes (fig. 10).

2.3.A: Previous Estimates Utilized (1881-1968)

The U.S. Immigration and and Naturalization Service (INS) collected data on "Hebrew" immigration to the U.S. from 1881 to 1943 (Rosenquist & Friedman 1951).[17] These figures are mostly accurate to Jewish immigration (within which "Hebrew" is a subset), but there is some evidence that these data may be marginal underestimates (Zeisal, 1949).[18] In addition, for years

[17] The number of "Hebrew" and thus Jewish immigrants is halved in 1881 because the 1880 estimate runs from Jan-Dec 1880 while the INS's 1881 estimate runs from July 1st 1880 to June 30th, 1881 (i.e. the 1880 data already covers half of the 1881 INS estimate).

[18] Zeisal (1949) showed that INS data in 1898 had immigrants of Jewish religion outnumbering immigrants of Hebrew race by 0.34%. However, not only does Begerano (1989) note that the U.S. Vice Consul in Cuba estimated Jewish illegal immigration from 1924-29 at as high as 14,000, but Jenelik (1972) mentions that because most Jews from Hungary spoke Magyar and considered themselves Hungarian "officials at… port[s] of entry" were "neither able nor willing to differentiate between the various newcomers from [Hungary]." The latter point is supported by arrival records at the Port of New York for the DJN Vajda (which was the 6th most common Jewish-Hungarian surname, but the 182nd most popular surname among Non-Jewish Hungarians), which shows that only 1.7% of Vajdas were classified as Hebrews (Farkas 2012; Ancestry 2010). This is suspect in and of itself, but it is particularly questionable given that "Hebrews" only represented 3.8% of immigrants from Hungary despite being 5.0% of the total

between 1944 and 1968, data is acquired from Dijour (1961, 1962, 1963) and Diamond (1966, 1969), who both estimated immigration by combining records from the U.S. Joint Distribution Committee, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the United Service for New Americans. Together, these sources contribute almost 100 years of Jewish immigration estimates and help to fill in the model.

2.3.B: DJN-Derived Immigration Estimates (1840 - 1880)

Total U.S. Jewish immigration from 1840 to 1880 was estimated by Lestchinsky (1944) at 200,000 based on a flawed study from Hackenberg (1880) (see: §1.3.A). Other estimates for Jewish immigration to the United States exist for some parts of the German Confederation during this period, but they are insufficient to create comprehensive migration statistics (Kober, 1952; Barkai 1994; Lowenstein, 2023). It is therefore necessary to create new estimates using a different and more systematic approach.

The first step of this subsection's methodology is to search the ancestry.com database of arrival records at the Port of New York for distinctly Jewish surnames (DJNs) by calendar year from 1840 to 1880 — borrowing a DJN list from Sheskin (2012). The next step is to multiply the number of DJNs by a DJN to Jewish immigrant ratio (DJN:JI ratio) of 10.99 to find the "true" number of Jewish arrivals at the Port of New York, which is assumed to equal 75% of total U.S.-bound Jewish immigration. The DJN:JI ratio was found by comparing the DJN counts to known values of Hebrew immigrants between 1902 and 1911, and the assumption that 75% of Jewish immigrants went through the New York is based on AJYB data that gives this percentage at 75.17% for migrants arriving between 1900 to 1913.[19]

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population (Puskas 1975; Don & Magos 1983). Thus, it is probable that immigration, especially of Hungarian Jews, was higher than the model estimates.

[19] Data from AJYB (1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907b, 1908, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912, and 1913) by fiscal year for all years 1900-13.

When this method is repeated for years from 1881 to 1911 and the DJN-derived estimates compared to the number of Hebrew immigrants, there is a strong correlation between the actual and expected values (R^2 = 0.868). This is despite the fact that Hebrew immigrant data is given by fiscal year while the DJN-based estimates are calculated by calendar year. In addition, the final estimate of 248,169 Jewish immigrants between 1840 and 1880 is not far off from Lestchinsky's figure of 200,000 — suggesting that this paper's estimate more or less aligns with prior expectations (fig. 8). It is, at the very least, reasonable.

2.3.C: Post-1968 Jewish Immigration

To calculate Jewish immigration after 1968, the model takes a piecemeal approach where estimates from several different regions of origin are added together in order to produce a final dataset (fig. 9). The first step is to use Tolts (2019) to estimate Jewish immigration from the former Soviet Union between 1970 and 2018. Next, the number of U.S.-bound Israeli Jewish immigrants is found by multiplying the total number of Israeli immigrants by the percentage of Israelis who are Jews — with these data acquired from Herman & LaFontaine (1982), the INS (1982, 1988, 1991, 1997, 2002), Hoefer (2006, 2010), Rytina (2013), Rosenblum (2016a, 2016b, 2019), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2023), and the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) (2024a).[20, 21]

Estimating Jewish immigration from Latin American countries is more difficult, with Liwerant (2015) citing totals between 100,000 and 150,000 immigrants between 1970 and 2010.

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[20] Data for Israeli Jewish immigrants is calculated separately for each year and then summed together. For example, if 1000 Israelis immigrated to the U.S. in 1975 and if 80% of Israelis in Israel were Jewish in 1975, then the estimated number of U.S. bound Jewish Israeli immigrants would be 1000 * 0.8 = 800.

[21] The final result for Israeli Jewish immigration since 1970 (185,053) splits the difference between American Community Survey data on U.S. Hebrew speakers (222,110) and people with Israeli ancestry (149,709) in 2023 (U.S. Census Bureau 2024a, 2024b).

The model assumes that the lower bound is the true number in order to maintain a conservative estimate, at an average rate of 2,381 immigrants per year. Then, to account for newer immigrants while keeping the estimate low, a rate of 2,000 arrivals per year is input into the model after 2010. The result is a "best guess" estimate of Latin American immigration at 124,000 — which is both reasonable and conservative.[22]

Additional locations of Jewish immigration to the United States after 1970 that can be roughly estimated in some way are Syria, Canada, Iran, South Africa, and France. In the case of Syria specifically it is possible to give a near-exact estimate of 3,700 Jewish immigrant arrivals between 1992 and 1994 (Gold, Steven 2015). Data on Canadian-born Jews are also available, with local community surveys in New York and Los Angeles showing that at least 17,730 Canadian Jews living in the United States, inserted into the model after 1969 at a rate of 328 per year (Brzowsky & Sigalow 2023; Aronson et al. 2022a).

Next, for Iran, statistics from Shapiro (1980), and Schmelz & DellaPergola (1984, 1988) show that the Iranian Jewish population fell from 70,000 in 1978 to 22,000 in 1986, with the difference (48,000) presumably emigrating. Thus, to calculate the number of U.S. bound Iranian Jewish immigrants, the model subtracts *aliyah* to Israel (11,372) from the total emigrant pool (ICBS 2024b, 2024c). The final estimate of 36,628 appears to be reasonable, aligning with local survey data from New York and Los Angeles that suggest a population of 41,868 Persian American Jews (Brzowsky & Sigalow 2023; Aronson et al. 2022).

The model's South African immigration statistics come from Horowitz & Kaplan (2001) and their estimate of 9,817 U.S.-bound South African Jewish immigrants between 1970 and

[22] Local community surveys from New York (8 County Area), Miami-Dade County, FL, Broward County, FL, San Diego, CA, and Los Angeles, CA show an adult immigrant population of no less than 76,110 Latin American born Jews (Brzowsky & Sigalow 2023; Aronson et al. 2022a, 2022b; Sheskin 2014, 2016). While this paper's figure of 124,000 is somewhat higher than this number, it appears to be reasonable enough.

1991.[23] Since their data also mention that 20% of South African Jewish emigrants came to the United States from 1991 to 2002, and because the pair also note the percentage of emigrants who moved to Israel (15%), it is possible to work backwards from Israeli immigration statistics to arrive at an estimate of 4,179 U.S. bound South African Jews between 1991 and 2002 (ICBS 2024c). When combined with the 1970-91 data, this suggests that a total of 13,996 Jews moved from South Africa to the United States from 1970 to 2002 — input into the model at a rate of 437 immigrants per year.

Lastly, data from the American Jewish Committee (2019) is used to roughly estimate the number of U.S.-bound French Jews. To be specific, this survey found that the United States was the preferred destination for emigrants at 29%, followed by Canada (23%), Israel (21%), and Great Britain (14%). However, because it is much easier to immigrate to Israel than the United States, the model assumes that half of all emigrants moved to Israel — assigning the remaining emigrants to other destinations proportional to respondents' preferences. However, because the model would predict a high number of 16,097 arrivals since 2010 if it worked backwards from Israeli *aliyah* statistics using this method, only 10,000 immigrants are assumed to have actually moved from France to the United States between 2010 and 2022 — input into the model at a rate of 769 per year, a reasonable figure.

All together, the model estimates that 817,804 Jewish immigrants arrived in the United States between 1969 and 2022. Of these, around half (426,700) came from the Soviet Union and its successor states, with eighty percent of the remainder (309,053) coming from either Israel and the Occupied Territories, or Latin America.

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[23] Horowitz & Kaplan (2001) give estimates for the number of Jewish emigrants from South Africa and the percentage of those immigrants coming to the United States for the years 1970 through 1991.The two numbers are multiplied together to get the final estimate.

2.4. Modeling Jewish Emigration

Jewish emigration is easier to estimate than Jewish immigration, and potential error is less problematic given the former's small scale. The main sources of data are the INS's tally of Hebrew emigration from 1908 to 1943 and Israeli *aliyah* statistics from 1949 to 2022 (AJYB 1946; Jacobs 1914; ICBS 2024b, 2024c). The model also uses data from the 2021 Canadian census to account for the ~12,000 American Jews who have moved north of the border since 1970 (Brym, 2022b).[24]

The more difficult task is estimating pre-1908 emigration. On the one hand, the 1908-43 INS data that do exist give an emigration rate of 4.57% — much lower than for other immigrant groups. On the other hand, Sarna (1981) suggests that the pre-1908 Jewish emigration rate might have been as high as 15%, as was the case for English Jewry. Since it is difficult to confirm Sarna's findings, and for the sake of simplicity, the model splits the difference between the two rates prior to 1880 while assuming that the annual number of emigrants for years between 1881 and 1908 was equal to five percent of the annual number of immigrants.

Upon summation, the model includes 309,270 Jewish emigrants between 1840 and 2022 (fig. 11). This includes 91,013 emigrants in 1840-1908, 51,209 emigrants in 1909-45, and 160,849 emigrants in 1946-2022. Net migration is thus reduced from 3,897,914 to 3,588,644 from 1840 to 2022. There is no good way to check these estimates, but the figures seem to be reasonable enough and population totals can be compared to benchmarks.

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[24] Graham (2024) shows that 3,189 American-born Jews live in Australia, but this is not included in the emigration model because, frankly, the author found this source only two weeks before the thesis was due and it was not practical to reboot the entire model to account for such a small population, although appendix three was updated.

PART III: RESULTS

The model predicts three periods of population growth: from 1840 to 1925, 1940 to 1965, and 1980 to 2020 (fig. 12, 13). The first of these, fueled by high immigration, is often split into two periods: 1840-80 and 1880-1925. Therefore, in order to determine how accurate "the narrative" of historic U.S. Jewish population growth is, the results are analyzed in four sections: the first covers 1840-80 (§3.1), the second 1881-1925 (§3.2), the third 1926-1970 (§3.3), and the fourth 1971-2023 (§3.4). To keep the analysis focused, each section hones in on a few key takeaways and either argues for the model's result or provides nuance. For granular, year-by-year estimates of the American Jewish population, see appendix two. To see how the results compare to the DJN-Census estimates and the benchmarks, see tables three and four.

3.1. Before the Great Wave (1840-1880)

The U.S. Jewish population increased by 1883.94% between 1840 (pop: 15,000) and 1880 (pop: 297,591) according to the model. Most of this growth (74.04%) was due to net migration, with the remainder (25.96%) resulting from natural increase in the population. None of this is surprising. What differentiates the model in this early period is the trajectory of population growth, not the tallies in 1840 and 1880.

Scholars have long believed that the U.S. Jewish population at the time of the Civil War was around 150,000 — citing an estimate that originated in *The Occident and American Jewish Advocate*, a monthly periodical (Sarna & Shapell 2015; Sarna 2019; Burton 1997; Lerski 1973; Dubow 1970; Fein 1961; AJHS 1961; Korn & Nevins 1951). There is reason to believe that this might be wrong. The model predicts a U.S. Jewish population of 102,257 in 1860, and this aligns with the DJN/Census baseline for 1860 of 88,955 and a tally of vital records from Jewish congregations in Philadelphia that imply an 1859 U.S. Jewish population of 86,020.[25] In addition, it is difficult to see how the 150,000 estimate lines up with what is known about Jewish immigration during this period. Barkai (1994) estimates U.S.-bound emigration from Posen and West Prussia to have numbered 20,000 between 1840 and 1860, and even if one assumes that 50,000 Jews left other parts of Germany and 20,000 came from the Lowlands, Britain, and Bohemia, then there would only be 90,000 immigrants. This is similar to what the model predicts (84,711), but it is far from the 110-125k needed to get to 150,000 by 1860.

The model instead suggests that more Jewish immigration took place after the Civil War than before it, with 130,578 immigrants predicted to have arrived from 1865 to 1879 (almost all between 1865 and 1875) (fig. 8). This seems counterintuitive since most German Jews arrived before the Civil War, but it makes sense because Eastern European Jews started to immigrate to the United States slightly before 1880 (Pearlman 2006). This is best seen in Census data from 1860, 1870 & 1880 for people with the DJN "Cohen" that show the percentage of foreign born Cohens from Germany fell from 44% to 23% between 1860 and 1880 while the percentage of those from Poland or Russia rose from 17% to 41% over the same time period (fig. 14). As the "migration network" model from Spitzer (2021) predicts, the place of origin for Jewish migrants to the United States shifted slowly from Germany to Poland and to Russia; it did not immediately change after the assassination of Czar Alexander II and the May Laws of 1882. The model thus suggests that "Great Wave" Jewish immigration from Russia cannot be separated from pre-1880 Jewish emigration from Central Europe.

In sum, the model's prediction of a Jewish population of 297,591 in 1880 is not far from

[25] Ancestry.com maintains a database called "Pennsylvania and New Jersey, U.S., Church and Town Records, 1669-2013." By selecting for the denomination "Jewish," vital records can be tallied by year for congregations in Philadelphia. The count of vital records is 281 in 1859 and 49 in 1840. Thus, if the U.S. Jewish population was 15,000 in 1840, then the population in 1859 would be ((281/49)*15000) = 86,020.

the 280,000 suggested by Barkai (1994) based on the population estimate from Hackenberg (1880). Where the model diverges from "the narrative" is in its emphasis on Jewish migration in the postbellum decade. Although it is impossible to prove these findings right or wrong, the hope is that these results will spark a conversation about revisiting population estimates that have been accepted as correct by historians of U.S. Jewish demography.

3.2. During the Great Wave (1881-1924)

The Great Wave of immigration lasted from 1881 to 1924 and included 2,322,722 Jewish immigrants (see: §2.3.A). Two-thirds of these migrants had industrial skills upon arrival in the United States, where they settled in large, urban centers like Lower Manhattan or Chicago's West Side (Rischin 1977; Sampson & J. Boyarin 2015). Here, they had lots of children and "spiked" the U.S. Jewish fertility rate for a time (see: §2.1.B) (fig. 3). With more children and immigrants, the urban "ghettos" Jews lived in became overcrowded, causing poor sanitation and a rise in the U.S. Jewish crude death rate from 1902-09 (Ager et al. 2023) (fig. 15). This subsided, however, and the demographic transition continued as both fertility and (to a lesser degree) mortality rates trended downward in the 1910s and 20s.

The net result was a population explosion, as the U.S. Jewish population rose from 317,756 in 1881 to 3,361,386 in 1925. The majority of growth (63.28%) occurred between 1900 and 1920, as an average of 72,769 Jews poured into the country each year. With respect to specific causes, the model shows that net migration was *directly* responsible for 70.7% of growth during the Great Wave, with an additional 18.2% attributed to natural increase in the immigrant population. Upwards of 88.9% of population growth was thus the result of immigrants and their children between 1881 and 1924, with the remaining 11.1% of growth accounted for by natural increase in the preexisting U.S. Jewish population.

None of this is a surprise. The model performs well against scholarly estimates before World War One, including the Jacobs (1914) benchmark for 1910 (2.18 million [model] v.s. 2.36 million [benchmark]). Further, the DJN/Census benchmarks and the AJYB's 1907 estimate align with the model almost perfectly — providing additional evidence that the model is more or less correct (fig. 16). It is true that the model predicts a lower population than other estimates after World War One, but these findings are defensible and they suggest that interwar U.S. Jewish population estimates need to be revisited (fig. 16).

Specifically, the model disagrees with S. Oppenheim (1918) and his estimate for 1917, as well as with subsequent estimates for 1927 and 1937 provided by H.S. Linfield, who used a similar methodology (Phillips 2007). Time and again, it has been found that these estimates are unreliable, with "demographic experts" finding them to be "adequate only for purposes of rough calculation" (Seligman & Swados 1949, cited by Phillips 2007). Yet, because of a lack of an alternative, these incorrect data continue to be the basis for historic demographic estimates from Sarna (2019) and Sheskin & Dashefsky (2021).

Given that DellaPergola (2024a) shows that fertility rates declined significantly between 1910 and 1940 — as it does in the model — and knowing that immigration essentially zeroed out during World War One, it does not make sense for the U.S. Jewish population to have increased so rapidly between 1907-17 and/or 1917-27. Even Linfield (1928) thought Oppenheim's 1917 estimate was "too high," preferring the AJYB's alternate estimate of 3.01 million U.S. Jews. This aligns with both the 1920 DJN/Census estimate of 3.03 million and the model's 1920 estimate of 3.01 million. It thus appears that the true size of American Jewry was probably around three million people in 1920, rather than the 3.3-3.6 million estimated by Sarna (2019) and Sheskin & Dashefsky (2021) (fig. 17).

3.3 Great Depression & Baby Boom (1925-1970)

The model shows that the U.S. Jewish population rose from 3,436,398 to 5,170,706 between 1925 and 1970, with most (71.6%) of this growth being due to natural increase rather than net migration. This section tackles the history in three distinct subsections. In the first of these (§3.3.A), the author discusses the closure of the United States to most immigration as well as U.S. Jewry's low rate of natural increase in 1925-40. Then, in the second (§3.3.B), the model is contrasted with Linfield (1928, 1940) so that his estimates can be disproven and replaced once and for all. Finally, in the last subsection (§3.3.C), the author argues that while the model does predict a post-war baby boom as expected, it imperfectly models the retention rate for children in intermarried households, undershooting the 1958 and 1970 benchmark estimates.

3.3.A: Closing the Gates

The United States closed its doors to most Jewish immigration in 1924, with new arrivals falling from 272,268 in 1921-24 to 56,160 in 1925-29. This redirected migratory flows elsewhere as Jewish immigration to e.g. Mandatory Palestine increased from 12,856 in 1924 to 33,801 in 1925 (Linfield 1932). Meanwhile, at home, the lack of new migrants meant that demand for "first generation" immigration neighborhoods fell off, leading to decline and relocation to outer borough "second-generation" communities (map A5.8, map A5.12).[26]

Birth rates, already falling, reached their lowest point in 1933-36 in the midst of the Great Depression. While both Jews and non-Jews experienced this dip, birth rates among Jews fell faster and further than in the population as a whole — reflecting a more widespread acceptance of family planning among young Jews than other White ethnics, most of whom were Catholic and thus skeptical of contraception (Mehta 2024) (fig. 1). This led to a period of essentially no

[26] Or various non-New York equivalents.

population growth with the effective Jewish rate of natural increase (EJRNI) falling from 6.19 to 0.67 per thousand in 1927-33. Population growth remained stagnant thereafter, increasing again once immigration ticked up before World War Two (fig. 10).

To be specific, since the 1924 Immigration Act worked via a quota system that favored immigration from countries in northern and western Europe, a large number of German-Jewish refugees were able to enter the United States before 1941 (table 5). The Truman Directive of 1945 and the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 then enabled non-quota Jewish immigration after World War Two, even as the latter excluded most Shoah survivors (Batlan 2024). Together, these waves added 327,038 Jewish Americans to the population in 1936-51, accounting for 45.18% of Jewish population growth during this period.

3.3.B: Correcting Linfield Specifically

Linfield (1928, 1940) estimates the U.S. Jewish population at 4.23 million in 1927 and 4.64 million in 1937. These are impossibly high numbers and egregious outliers when compared to other scholarly sources, the model itself, and the DJN-Census data (Seligman & Swados 1949; Rosenwaike 1977; Phillips 2007) (fig. 18). Yet these incorrect estimates, like with *The Occident*, keep getting cited in a never-ending loop of scholars adapting previous estimates from other scholars who cite back to Linfield (see: Diamond 1977; Marcus 1990; Sarna 2019; Sheskin & Dashefsky 2021). Please stop doing this; these estimates are wrong.

Take Linfield's estimates of New York City, for example. He predicts that the City's Jewish population was 1.77 million in 1927 and 2.04 million in 1937, which is an increase of 270 thousand in ten years. He also finds that the Jewish population in surrounding counties increased by just under 50 thousand, implying a total increase of 320 thousand. This makes no sense. First, the birth rate had crashed and immigration was low, so this kind of growth seems unlikely to begin with. Second, the U.S. Census shows that the number of people with the DJN Cohen living in New York State increased by just 4.34% between 1930 and 1940, well below the 15.3% growth Linfield predicted (Ancestry 2024a) Finally, data from find-a-grave shows that the average annual number of burials in New York City's Jewish cemeteries in 1930-35 was only 5.09% higher than in 1925-30 despite the former being coterminous with the Depression (Ancestry 2024b). Given that no other estimate supports Linfield, and since the model shows an increase of 4.39% in 1927-37 that is more or less identical to the increase suggested by the DJN Cohen data (4.34%) and the NYC Jewish burial data (5.09%), it is fair to assume that the model should be preferred to Linfield's national estimates — which were plainly wrong.

While no estimate is perfect, these are especially bad, and they sketch out a demographic trajectory that is misleading. Compare the model to Sheskin & Dashefsky (2021) citing Sarna (2019) [who cites Marcus (1990) and Diamond (1977) citing Linfield]. Even though both the model and Sarna show similar numbers in any given year, albeit with some gaps, the model predicts three distinct phases of population growth while Sarna shows a single logistic increase (fig. 17). It is thus no surprise that some demographers were skeptical of improved estimates in the 2000s which showed a growing Jewish population. In Sarna's dataset, which represents the consensus, this rise seems unnatural, almost surreal. In this paper's model, it looks like just another growth period, no different from the others (fig. 17).

3.3.C: The Baby Boom; Undershooting the Benchmarks

Although this model agrees with all other estimates that the Baby Boom played a large role in U.S. Jewish population growth (accounting for 78.6% of U.S. Jewish population growth in 1940-65 according to the model), it marginally undershoots the 1958 and 1970 benchmark estimates (table 4) (fig. 18). The problem seems to be localized in the retention rate model specifically, which excludes people who were raised as Jews but left Judaism as adults — as if they never existed in the first place. This is an issue in the 1960s and 70s since data from Massarik & Chenkin (1973) and Saxe et al (2014) show that while most children with one Jewish parent were raised as Jews, many did not stay Jewish in adulthood.

If the model is rerun with a retention rate of 80% rather than the 37-38% based on the Saxe et al. (2014) data, then the results almost perfectly match both benchmarks, as well as data from Rosenwaike (1977) and the AJYB summations of local population surveys with corrected estimates for New York City (fig. 18). Thus, although the benchmarks should be preferred to the model in both 1958 and 1970, the problem appears to be a self-correcting one-off which does not suggest any deeper mechanical issues with the model.

3.4. Modern Population Growth (1971-2023)

The "rock bottom" for U.S. Jewish population growth was 1970-71, when emigration outpaced immigration, actual and effective rates of natural increase were at historic lows, and exogamy had risen so much that some community leaders were warning of "a second, silent Holocaust" (fig. 19, 20) (Gold, Samuel 2022). This section is about explaining why (despite a drop in 1971-74) a "silent Holocaust" never happened. The answer is twofold, related to both immigration and a higher effective crude birth rate. In fact, by rerunning the model without migration, and without increasing the crude birth rate above 1970 levels, one can estimate that immigrants and their children accounted for 38.4% of Jewish population growth since 1970 while higher birth and retention rates (which are the factors that determine the effective crude birth rate) contributed 17.4% and 44.2%, respectively (fig. 22).

With this in mind, this section is split into three brief subsections, covering immigration to the United States since 1970 (§3.4.A) (see also: §2.3.C), rising effective crude birth rates when compared to 1970 levels (§3.4.B), and a comparison versus the benchmarks (§3.4.C). The model undershoots Pew 2020 but overshoots Pew 2013 and NJPS 1990 to show a smooth increase from 5.2 million in 1970 to 5.7 million in 1990 to 7.2 million in 2023 (fig. 21). While NJPS 1970 is preferred to the model, the author thinks that some or all of the benchmarks could have had some normal error that threw their results off by a few hundred thousand.

Section 3.4.A: Immigration Since 1970

The Soviet Union was an impoverished, authoritarian state that merged anti-Zionism with antisemitism to suppress its Jewish population (Tabarovsky 2022). The Soviets let 77,100 Jews emigrate to the U.S. amidst détente in the 1970s, but the War in Afghanistan damaged relations and zeroed out emigration until 1985 (Tolts 2019; Rosenberg 2015). The Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society was pressured by Israel into restricting its aid to only those Jews who had close relatives in America after 1982, and the Bush Administration started to deny refugee status to some Soviet Jews with Israeli visas around 1989 (Rosenberg 2015).[27] While 426,700 Jews eventually came to America, the equilibrium level of U.S.-bound immigration would probably have been closer to 738,841 absent chicanery from various actors.[28]

Nevertheless, immigration led to population growth in the 1980s and 90s, with the United States welcoming 811,893 Jews between 1970 and 2022. The aforementioned 426,700 Soviet Jews represented a slim majority (52.56%) of this total, with Israelis, Latin Americans, and Iranians accounting for 22.40%, 14.98%, and 4.51%, respectively. The remaining 5.55% was some mix of Canadian, South African, Syrian, and French Jews (see: §2.2.C). Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and their children are 10% of all U.S. Jewry today, and a large

[27] HIAS provided unconditional help to Israel-bound Soviet Jews.

[28] The 738k number takes the percentage of Soviet Jews who immigrated to the U.S. in 1970-79 and applies it to the total pool of Soviet Jewish emigrants until 2018 (Tolts 2019).

chunk, if not an overwhelming majority, of these immigrants have raised Jewish children (Alper et al. 2021; Sheskin 2023). They are an important, and diverse, part of the community.

Section 3.4.B: Effective Crude Birth Rate Since 1970

The effective crude birth rate is a function of the "raw" crude birth rate and the retention rate of children in intermarried households. Both increased over time relative to 1970. First, the raw crude birth rate rose from 10.84 to 12.27 per thousand between 1970 and 2000 due to high fertility rates among Haredi (TFR = 6.6-7.1) and Israeli-American Jews (TFR = 2-3) as well as among potentially other non-FSU immigrants (Lyman Stone 2023, 2024; Garenne 2024; Rebhun 2021). As for the retention rate, this rose significantly in the 1980s and 90s, with Sasson et al. (2017) finding that Millennials with one Jewish parent were more likely to be raised as Jews than in previous generations. The retention rate for Gen X Jews was around 37-38% while the same number for millennials was 61%, which reflects the openness of Reform Jews in particular after the 1983 Patrilineal Descent Decision (Saxe et al. 2014; Sasson et al. 2017).

These two trends (higher birth and retention rates) had synergistic effects that upregulated the effective crude birth rate from 9.95 in 1970 to 14.20 in 2000 (fig. 4). Age-cohort effects may also have played a large role, but this could only have impacted the model through the U.S. to Jewish crude birth rate conversion. It is unknown if the model's current retention rate reflects how Jewish identity of children in intermarried households will play out in adulthood. Rising antisemitism in the U.S. could either push Jews on the margins away from their Jewish identity or towards it. Either way is possible. Who knows?

Section 3.4.C: Compare to the Benchmarks

The model shows that the U.S. Jewish population increased from 5.2 million in 1970 to 5.7 million in 1990 and then to 7.2 million in 2023. The NJPS 1970 estimate of 5.4 million is preferred to the model, but the model might be more accurate than NJPS 1990 and its estimate of 5.5 million. Phillips (2007) finds that NJPS 1990 was not as sound as NJPS 1970 even though both were high-quality surveys, and there is some evidence that NJPS 1990 underestimated new immigrants.[29] Given this, if one assumes some normal survey error, the model presents a viable alternative estimate to NJPS 1990.

As for Pew 2013 and 2020, it is difficult to interpret the model's performance. Either Pew 2013 or Pew 2020 is correct; they cannot both be right. Populations are not "like carrots or maize where [in] a given year the yield was scant; and [in] a different year, one reports a good crop" (DellaPergola 2021a). The model, for whatever reason, splits the difference between Pew 2013 and Pew 2020 by overshooting the former and undershooting the latter (table 4) (fig. 21). The U.S. scholarly consensus rests with Pew 2020 because it aligns with other studies and has a more up to date methodology, but it could still be an overestimate (DellaPergola 2021b). Only a small error could have thrown the results off like what may have happened to NJPS 1990. Just as one could argue that DellaPergola (2013a) too eagerly accepted NJPS 2000-01 because it fit his preexisting worldview, the same thing might be said about U.S. scholars and Pew 2020 today.

Here is the warning: if the model is actually correct (and it might not be) then the Jewish population will probably be around 7.3-7.4 million in 2030. Therefore, if a Pew-like survey takes place around that time and has a normal error in the opposite direction, then it might show a total closer to 6.9-7.0 million. Imagine how insufferable the discourse could get, if the estimate fell by 500k in only ten years? The truth is that all surveys, even high-quality ones, are prone to some error. That is fine; this is what happens when studying rare populations.

[29] Tolts (2019) shows 182,750 Jews immigrated from the USSR to the USA between 1970 and 1989, but NJPS 1990 only lists 160,000 such Jews. This is not a huge difference, but recall that many "Great Wave" immigrants born in Russia were still alive at the time and thus included in this category, suggesting a more serious undercount (Kosmin et al. 1991).

PART IV: DISCUSSION

The model is about the past, but this discussion is about the future demographic and cultural trajectories of U.S. Jewry. It ultimately concludes that American and Israeli streams of Jewish identity are diverging to such an extent that an ethnocultural schism is possible. Given this, as well Israeli law's lack of recognition of all U.S. Jews as Jews, American Jews and their institutions need to aggressively pursue their own interests within the Jewish World. This means both [i] embracing the "big tent" of American Judaism as described by Mnookin (2018) to some extent, and [ii] increasing the retention rate and immigration via outreach to marginal or rapidly growing communities both at home and abroad. "[I]n seeking to understand identity, our options are not that identity groups are fictions or that they are biologically defined categories. Social identity groups exist. They are non-fictional entities rooted in complex networks of social relations" (Ritchie 2019 cited by D. Boyarin 2022). U.S. Jews are Jews whether other people like it or not, and our long-run survival requires the community to embrace the always metaphorical, often literal, ties that bind it together and to the American nation.

4.1 Historiographic Insight

Demographic estimates have traditionally shaped narratives of Jewish population growth or decline, with e.g. NJPS 1990 leading to worries about intermarriage and the creation of the Birthright Israel Foundation (Abramson 2017). This section asks the question: to what extent are these narratives accurate? The trends captured in "snapshot" estimates, if they are correct, reflect what *has* happened and not what *will* happen. Large, often rapid, corrections to older and less accurate estimates can make change seem more jarring than it really is, and sometimes this locks in a narrative that better fits the recent past than the present. This is, essentially, the argument in subsection 4.1.A, which suggests, among other things, that while the "assimilation anxieties" of the 1990s and early 2000s were overblown, there is reason to believe that the current U.S. Jewish population is not growing as rapidly as it did over the last few decades.

This is followed by subsection 4.1.B wherein historic global Jewish population estimates in appendix four are used to frame a discussion about evolving American Jewish identity. Here, the author proposes that because of a myopic focus on assimilation, old narratives missed the real fissures forming between the two poles of Jewry: the U.S. and Israel. American Judaism, instead of being snuffed out of existence, is rapidly becoming a new "type" of Jewish peoplehood that presents both challenges and opportunities for Jewish institutions which risk being engulfed in a transnational "cultural schism" in the medium term.

4.1.A: Narrative Lags Reality

When the trajectory of U.S. Jewry changes, it takes time for the community to notice, and when it finally does notice, the change is often exaggerated. There is no more perfect example of this phenomenon than the Linfield (1928, 1940) estimates in AJYB, which show that the U.S. Jewish population increased from 4.2 to 4.7 million between 1927 and 1937. Given that only 73,169 Jews immigrated during this timeframe, and knowing that the Jewish birth rate crashed due to the Great Depression, this seems unlikely. The DJN-Census data, which show an increase not more than half that of Linfield, support this hypothesis, and Rosewater (2024) found similar overestimation at the local level. So what happened?

The way to arrive at H.S. Linfield's 1937 estimate is to assume that his 1927 estimate is correct and then to suppose that the United States' crude birth and death rates are equal to the Jewish crude birth and death rates (fig. 23). These assumptions are wrong, but they suggest that each community reported numbers to Linfield based on *what they assumed* was true and not what was actually true. There are two possible explanations. Either the "key persons" who

Phillips (2007) explains were in charge of submitting local estimates to Linfield used "vital statistics" from the U.S. Census Bureau to construct their data or they had an intuitive sense of the natural increase in the whole population and applied this to their local community. Whatever the case, these "key persons" assumed that the Jewish population would continue to rise after immigration ceased. In other words, because there was no way for community leaders to know what the demographic trends within U.S. Jewry were, they supposed that (without immigration) Jewish population growth would mirror the nation as a whole.

Similarly, from 1955 to 1968, AJYB estimates increased at an average rate of 1.24% per year, almost double the "actual" average annual rate of 0.77% (fig. 24). The cumulative error started to be corrected after NJPS 1970, with the AJYB's 1973 estimate being 6.27% lower than its 1972 estimate. Subsequent corrections in 1977, 1982, and 1991 remedied the issue, with NJPS 1990 aligning the AJYB with reality (fig. 21, 24). Of course, long-time readers of the AJYB experienced these corrections as a continuous decline (or, at best, a stagnation) in the U.S. Jewish population despite this not being true. Thus, when combined with falling endogamy rates and broader assimilation anxieties, these corrections fostered a pessimistic narrative of U.S. Jewish life that did not reflect the population growth of the 1980s and 90s.

To be specific, it was "the prevailing position among social scientists" in the 1990s that "American Jewry [was] rapidly assimilating" with Klausner (1997) predicting that within "the next two generations the majority of American Jews would convert to Christianity" (Reisman 1997). The disastrous NJPS 2000-01 seemingly confirmed these anxieties since it was "supposed to reflect the inflow of… new immigrants" but showed a population decrease that suggested American Jewry was beginning its final act (DellaPergola 2003b). While methodological errors made that specific estimate essentially worthless, the survey reinforced a narrative of communal decline that was, ultimately, proven wrong.

Yet the pendulum has swung again. Just as downward corrections in the 1970s and 80s set the stage for a too pessimistic narrative, upward corrections in the Pew 2013 & 2020 surveys may have birthed a narrative that is too optimistic. The 2019 Jewish Population Study of Greater Philadelphia is one example of how, in a time of upward correction, implausibly high estimates (in this case: a sixty percent increase in ten years) sometimes get published (Sheskin & Dashefsky 2020). As for larger worries, it is unknown whether FSU Jews and their children will stay Jewish in the long run. The number of FSU Jewish adults in the New York Eight-County Area declined from 190,960 to 103,149 in 2011-23, and only 43% of this drop is attributable to upticks in the Russian speaking populations of Florida & New Jersey (Brzowsky & Sigalow 2024; Cohen et al. 2012; U.S. Census Bureau 2024b). While it is possible that the 50,410 Jews who "disappeared" were a fictional population created by survey error, it is not out of the question that *some* of these Jews *may* have stopped identifying as such. At the very least, it is important to recognize that there are uncertainties, and things could change.

In sum, the model suggests that population estimates (at least in their trajectory) lag true rates of population increase. It takes time for demographers to notice a change in the U.S. Jewish population, and when they do, the sharpness of their correction can fix a narrative in place for years or decades. This is not shocking. People tend to "systematically rescale estimates of proportions toward more central prior expectations" as a rule, and this presumably includes proportions that change over time (Guay et al. 2024). This results in "punctuated equilibria" of narratives where triumphalism and pessimism tend to dominate.

4.1.B: U.S. Jewry in a Global Perspective

Using data from appendices two and four, it is possible to reconstruct the U.S. Jewish population as a percent of all Jewry from 1897 to 2021 (fig. 25). Prior to World War II, the U.S. Jewish population was about one fourth of all Jewry, peaking at 25.15% in 1926 before declining to 24.41% in 1938. The Shoah caused this percentage to rise to 40.13% by 1947, and it remained stable thereafter at around 40-45%. Similarly, U.S. Jewry increased as a percent of the diaspora population from 42.84% to 75.61% between 1947 and 2021, showing that the global population consolidated in two central hubs (Sarna 2014; fig. 25). Thus, the size and staying power of U.S. Jewry raises questions about diasporic existence. Perhaps American Jewry is in *diaspora* but not in *exile*; or, to go further, maybe the United States has birthed a new branch of Jewishness no less valid than those that once emerged in Eretz Ashkenaz or Sefarad.

This is, in other words, a more palatable version of the argument expounded by Aviv & Shneer (2005) in their book *New Jews: the End of the Jewish Diaspora*. On the one hand, there is still a transnational identity that unites Jews, including through connections with the "textual and liturgical homeland" of Eretz Yisrael (J. Boyarin 1997). But, on the other hand, Jewish identities in the two poles of the Jewish world, the United States and Israel, are "on divergent paths, if not a collision course" (DellaPergola 2023a). While some people in Israel may want to analogize innovations in U.S. Jewish life to the assimilation of Irish and Italian Americans, the comparison is erroneous and perhaps dangerous — risking, essentially, a schism.

Most U.S. Jews came from the diaspora, not from Israel, so it is not *only* Israelis who can "stres[s] boundary maintenance" and draw lines in the sand (DellaPergola 2023a). As absurd as it might sound to some in Israel, it is not unimaginable that *some* Jewish Americans *could* start to think of themselves as the "more authentic" strain of Jewry. After all, this is the logical endpoint of D. Boyarin (2023) and his call for "the reclamation of the Diaspora Nation… as a defining characteristic of Jewish existence," and it is possible that early American Reform theology could be rhetorically weaponized to this end.[30, 31] To be clear, the author does not necessarily want this to happen, and there is not much short-term risk of it. The point is just that social scientists have focused so much on the question of assimilation that they have ignored the possibility that U.S. Jews who are told they are not "real" Jews might seek to redraw the boundaries of Jewish identity to place themselves above those in Israel in the hierarchy of Jewish existence, degrading transnational ties (Schraub 2024).

Polling suggests this possibility. Zionist self-identification is lower in the U.S. than other countries — with only 26% of Jews in Portland, Oregon identifying as such, for example (table 6) (Boxer et al. 2023b). It is hard to believe that this is just because the term "Zionism" is ambiguous in political discourse, otherwise British and Australian Jews would also have low Zionist self-identification (table 6). Rather, one way to interpret data from e.g. the Los Angeles and Chicago surveys — which show "explicit Zionism" at around 40% but with supermajorities supporting Israel as a Jewish state — is that American Jews support Israel not because they are aligned with state ideology, but because of a shared connection to other Jewish peoples and an understanding that threats to Israel could have serious, material consequences at home (Aronson et al. 2021, 2022a; Waxman 2017). If this is true, and it might not be, then a U.S.-Israeli "cultural schism" is not incompatible, at least in part, with current U.S. Jewish opinion.

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[30] *See* Principle 5 of the Pittsburgh Platform, from Wise (1885a): "We consider ourselves no longer a nation but a religious community, and therefore expect neither a return to Palestine, nor a sacrificial worship under the administration of the sons of Aaron, nor the restoration of any laws concerning the Jewish state."

[31] *See also* Rabbi Issac Meyer Wise (1885b): "**We are** the orthodox Jews in America, and **they were** the orthodoxy of former days and other countries… You do not represent the sentiments of American Jews… you are an anachronism, strangers in this country, and to your own brethren. You represent yourselves, together with a past age and a foreign land. We must proceed without you to perform our duties to our God, and our country, and our religion, for **we are** the orthodox Jews of America."

To repeat, the argument here is just that cultural divergence from Israel is not like that of Irish Americans from Ireland or Italian Americans from Italy. In those cases, the “chauvinism of authenticity” could only flow in one direction whereas for Jews the flow can be bidirectional due to the peculiarities of Jewish diaspora. With this in mind, the next section will focus on the future of U.S. Jewry’s demographic trajectory — asking whether, and to what extent, U.S. Jews diverge from the historic demography of the Jewish people, and to suggest some paradigmatic responses that appreciate newer elements of American Jewish identity. The next step for Jewish institutions may be a realignment of their priorities and a reassessment of their interests.

Section 4.2. Past, Present, and Future Trajectories

This section opens with the sweep of demographic history since the early modern period, asking whether and to what extent U.S. Jews are still a demographic outlier (§4.2.A). It then goes on to discuss the importance of the retention rate of children in intermarried households, which has been and will be the primary determinant of population growth or decline (§4.2.B). Finally, building off the previous section, the author gives their own view regarding what *should* be the future of Jewish identity writ-large (§4.2.C). Here, the author argues that U.S. Jewish identity as a whole has taken on some of the properties of U.S. national identity, such as its connection to the land and its aspersion to literal, but not metaphorical, blood logic. In response, it *should* be the position of American Jewish organizations that U.S. Jewish interests lie in domestic, and not global, population growth — adjusting their priorities with this in mind.

4.2.A: Do Jews Remain a Demographic Avant-Garde?

Demographic transition “refers to the secular shift in fertility and mortality from high and sharply fluctuating levels to low and relatively stable ones” (Lee & Reher 2011). The forerunners of this transition were aristocrats in Western Europe, followed by Jews in those same countries

(Livi-Bacci 1986; DellaPergola 1989). Blanc (2024) provides strong quantitative evidence that natality decline among the general population in late-eighteenth century France can be directly attributed to secularization, and it is likely that similar trends preceded and then accompanied Jewish emancipation in Europe. Jewish mortality and fertility rates consistently declined before and at a faster rate than the general population across Europe and North America, albeit with certain exceptions due to migration (DellaPergola 2023b).

All this holds true in the model, which shows that the Jewish crude birth rate was lower and fell faster than the United States' crude birth rate during the early twentieth century and after the "baby boom" years of the 1950s and 60s (fig. 3). However, the model predicts that the U.S. and Jewish crude birth rates converged between the late 1970s and the early 2000s, with the two being essentially the same between 2005 and 2015. While it appears that the Jewish crude birth rate fell at a greater and more rapid pace than the U.S. crude birth rate in the late 2010s, the gap between the two rates is less than it used to be.

There are two main causes of convergence between the Jewish and U.S. crude birth rates in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. The first is the large U.S. Haredi Jewish population, whose total fertility rate of 6.6-7.1 is well above all other groups in the U.S., on par with populations in rural Niger (Lyman Stone 2023; Garenne 2024). This upregulates the Jewish crude birth rate in combination with Israeli-American Jews whose total fertility rate was 3-4 in the 2000s (Lyman Stone 2024). The second, more obvious reason for convergence is that fertility declined in the general population after Jews had already completed their demographic transition. This is born out in the data. Alper et al. (2021) estimates that Jews aged 40-59 had an average of 1.9 births per woman in 2020, up from 1.47 births per woman in 1970 (DellaPergola 1980). The opposite trend is seen among other populations, with total fertility rates in the United States and New

York State declining by 35.8% and 33.5% from 1970 to 2020, respectively (O'Neill 2024; Galofré-Vilà & Gómez-León 2025). All populations are sliding towards similar equilibria, but the demographic transition does not lock-in low birth rates forever — things can change.

Just as U.S. and Jewish crude birth rates converged, so too have death rates. The historic difference between Jewish and non-Jewish death rates was due to lower infant mortality among Jews, so it makes sense that the rates converged as infant mortality fell in the general population (Billings, 1891; Fauman & Mayer, 1969; Condran & Kramarow, 1991). Modern U.S. Jewish mortality is characterized by a longer lifespan, a decreased likelihood of chronic illness, and an increased likelihood of dying from communicable disease like COVID-19 (Chase 2016; Staetsky 2024). What this means is that although the model probably undershoots Jewish mortality in 2020-21, the Jewish death rate itself is likely equal to the U.S. death rate in most years — albeit with older deaths as the norm. Such uniqueness will likely continue into the future given the Haredi population, since religiosity in Jews is correlated with a lower risk of e.g. heart disease but higher death rates from preventable, communicable diseases due to vaccine and public health skepticism (Eilat-Adar et al. 2022; Carmody et al. 2021).

It is unclear whether U.S. Jews are still a demographic outlier. On the one hand, Jewish birth and death rates have converged with the general population. On the other hand, the specific patterns of Jewish fertility and mortality hint at broader, post-transition population growth that is not yet applicable to non-Jews. The future of U.S. Jewish population growth will likely reflect the Haredi-heavy growth of U.K. and Canadian Jewry, but the extent to which other factors contribute is contingent (Wagner 2016; Mashiah 2018; Brym 2024).

4.2.B: Retention in All Possible Tomorrows

Whether the U.S. Jewish population grows or shrinks will be determined by the retention rate of children in intermarried households to a large degree. Figure 25 shows the future population of American Jewry in all years from 2024 to 2040, given retention rates of 30%, 50%, 70%, and 90%. The large gap between the high (90%) and low (30%) population projections speaks to the importance of upregulating this percentage — or, at a minimum, keeping it above half (fig. 26). There is not much use in altering the intermarriage rate because the divide between endogamy and exogamy will be blurred over time, so what matters is shaping Jewish identity in a way that is meaningful but also dynamic and inclusive.

To understand where the retention rate is going, it is important to know how it got to the level it is today. Massarik & Chenkin (1973) found that around 80% of children in intermarried households were raised as Jews, but Saxe et al. (2014) determined that only 38% were Jews in adulthood. This contrasts with millennials, of whom 59% were raised as Jews and 61% identified as Jewish adults (Kosmin et al. 1991; Saxe et al. 2014). The retention rate has stayed essentially the same since the 1990s, with 69% of children in current intermarried households being raised as Jews by religion, not by religion, or mixed religion (Alper et al. 2021).

Polling found that the percentage of Americans who "heard any criticism or talk against the Jews" fell from 64% in 1946 to 12% in 1959, around the time that the intermarriage rate increased (Mnookin 2018, 162). However, this was well before the retention rate increased, so it is unlikely that declining antisemitism caused the change. Rather, it is probable that the retention rate rose because of [i] increasing acceptance *among Jews*, and [ii] broader secularization among U.S. Whites. On the "acceptance hypothesis," one can point to U.S. Reform's 1983 Patrilineal Descent Decision as an inflection point, as well as to the passing of "Great Wave" immigrants who opposed intermarriage (Fishman 2013; Bronner 1998, 34). As for the "White secularization hypothesis," it is known that U.S. Whites became more irreligious over time — with 65% of Whites being Christian in 2016, down from 93% in 1957 (Muller & Lane 1972; Cox & Jones 2017). Nearly all of this change was among White Protestants who were already more likely to convert to Judaism than Catholics, so it is probable that higher retention rates reflect religious apathy among Protestants specifically (Rebhun 1999).

The future retention rate hinges on a few questions. The first is about how to deal with non-supersessionist religions, one of the only areas where the "core" definition of Jewishness is more inclusive than the Pew/Brandeis definition. The Institute for Jewish Policy Research (2024) already includes people "who self-identify as Jewish in social surveys, and do not have another ***monotheistic*** religion" [emphasis added] in its definition of core Jewry, and Mnookin (2018, 129) in *The Jewish American Paradox* acknowledges a similar distinction. It is true that Judaism and faiths like e.g. Hinduism are theologically incompatible, but they can be complementary in practice since the latter [i] is not premised on the appropriation of Jewish scripture; [ii] lacks a painful history with Jews; and [iii] is, in the U.S., also a minority ethnoreligion. The high degree of overlap between Jewish and Asian American enclaves makes it incumbent on U.S. Jewish institutions to reach out to mixed families in order to maintain and expand the "big tent" of American Judaism (Yanklowitz 2015; Mnookin 2018) (see: §4.2.C).

The second, more controversial question is about how to handle cultural drift from Israeli definitions of Jewishness. The fact is that "[c]ontemporary Jewish discourse… in the USA and in Israel… unfolds under the wings of parallel founding utopias" that reflect different, conflicting visions for the future of Jewry (DellaPergola 2023a). Yet the problem is fundamentally emotional. Most American Jews are not Orthodox, and some Israeli religious and public figures have been known to denigrate liberal sects (Times of Israel 2021; Maltz 2014; Lis 2018). As discussed in §4.1.B, this could contribute to a cultural schism, or — as Schraub (2018, 2024) of the Lewis & Clark Law School argues — cause a conflagration whereby "in 50 years' time…[we] will have completely split… [into] fundamentally two different peoples."

Whether this comes to pass or not is besides the point. Most non-Orthodox Jews in two or three generations will trace their matrilineal line "back to a woman who had the temerity to convert" to a liberal sect or to an interfaith couple (Schraub 2018). This is likely to cause real divides within the Jewish World, but it is inevitable, and the evidence that it is causing Jews to assimilate out of existence is weak. Given all this, it might be time to revisit the U.S. Jewish identity paradigm and its institutional priorities.

Section 4.3. True Americanism - The Spirit of the Nation

The United States is an imperial nation bounded by two great oceans; its ideals rest in its founding documents independent of its sins and bellicosity. But this begs the question: "What are American Ideals?... [And] what is there in these ideals which [are] peculiarly American?" (Brandeis 1915). It is this: unlike how "other countries… have assumed their common good would be attained only if the privileges of citizenship in them should be limited practically… to persons of a particular nationality… America… has always declared herself" for an "inclusive brotherhood" of all people (Brandeis 1915).

The hypothesis is as follows: rather than Jews acculturating as individuals, it is American Jewish collective identity that is being transformed. Look at what lies ahead; a paradigmatic change lingers on the horizon. American Jewry is becoming like America itself, enmeshed in "a blood-and-soil homeland whose values… are neither militaristic nor based on sect or ethnicity. **It has the power of blood without being of blood**" [emphasis added] (Kaplan 2017, 51). Just as the nation is bound by metaphorical, but not literal, blood ties, so too are U.S. Jews moving in this direction. To appropriate Federalist No. 2, “[t]his country and this people seem to have been made for each other… as if it was the design of Providence” (Jay 1787).

Take, for example, Hasidic cemetery tourism. Only a few decades ago, Hasidic religious life, which, in the minds of American Jewry, represents “a timeless manifestation of authentic Jewish spirituality,” was necessarily foreign, consisting of pilgrimages only to sites in Israel and Eastern Europe (Kugglemass 1997). Today, the situation is very different. The *ohel* of Rebbe Menachem Mendel Schneerson in Queens draws larger crowds than the grave of Rabbi Nachman in Uman, Ukraine, and “wholly American religious attraction[s]” like Viznitz Cemetery in Monsey bring in pilgrims from across the Jewish world — “redefin[ing] how the diasporic Jewish community is plotting its course” and thinking about itself (C.S. Oppenheim 2022, 2024).[32] Through these domestic pilgrimage sites, Hasidic-Jewish-Americans are creating a permission structure for other U.S. Jews to seek homegrown authenticity, entrenching American Jewish religious identity in the soil.

Yet this permission structure is not enough to prove the point. One could instead look to new Jewish museums, or to the shift towards kosher caskets in Reform and Conservative Jewish funerals, or to the proliferation of liberal *chevra kadisha* (burial societies) in American cities, or to the creation of new Jewish organizations like J-Street, and so on to arrive at the same or a very similar conclusion (Aviv & Schneer 2005; Krupnick 2020; Duhovny 2011). U.S. Jewish identity is entering a phase of multiplication where homegrown understandings of Jewish authenticity are becoming the norm. This is changing how Jewish Americans relate their Jewish identity to the land, and it is creating a new stream of Jewish peoplehood in the process.

Change is ok, and it might even be good. In the face of rising antisemitism and Christian

[32] The grave of Rabbi Nachman attracted 30-40k pilgrims/year prior to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine while the *ohel* of Rebbe Schneerson drew around 50k pilgrims/year over that same period (Kuzio 2019; Pfeffer 2018; Dreyfus 2015; Liphshitz 2019).

Nationalism, American Jewry and its institutions should reassess their own interests to align with the acculturating collective, pluralistic identities of American Jews. The voices of U.S. Jewry need to meet the moment, and the seriousness with which others listen to these voices is, to a large degree, a function of the community's demographic trajectory. This means, at a minimum, two things: [i] defining U.S. Jewish identity with as broad a brush as practicable, only excluding supersessionists who want to erase Jewish peoplehood, and [ii] making an active effort to redirect Jewish migration to America and to retain Jewish migrants, including Israelis, who enter the country. This might entail e.g. people-to-people exchanges between the U.S. and peripheral, rapidly growing, or unrecognized Jewish communities (e.g. Nigeria) (Miles 2023). It might also mean being in "soft competition" for immigration with the Jewish Agency for Israel or, for more liberal groups, pushing to amend U.S. immigration law so that conscientious objectors or yeshiva students who choose not to be conscripted into armed forces overseas can be guaranteed political asylum. Of course, these are all mere suggestions which may or may not have merit, but the gist is that American Jewish institutions should operationalize the paradigmatic shifts in American Jewish collective identity that are, to some extent, inevitable.

CONCLUSION

The Jewish population of the United States grew from 15,000 to 7,189,615 between 1840 and 2023 due to the arrival of 3,897,914 Jewish immigrants, including 1,076,201 immigrants who arrived after World War Two. The United States has enjoyed a positive net Jewish migration balance with all other countries, including Israel, and it has been the preferred destination for Latin American and Canadian Jewish emigrants.[33, 34] All this happened without much effort by American Jewish institutions compared to their Israeli counterparts, suggesting that if the former actively courted Jewish immigrants to choose the United States over other, foreign destinations, then this could be highly successful. Pursuing these interests is of the utmost concern. The Israeli right-wing seeks to clamp down on liberal interpretations of the Return Law, and they will probably, eventually succeed (Stub 2025; Demogge 2023; Starr 2023). American Jews, some of whom the Israeli state does not even consider Jewish today, should not delude themselves into thinking that their children and grandchildren will be protected, let alone be recognized as equal Jewish persons, under Israeli law. U.S. Jewry must learn to stand alone.

By looking back on American Jewish demographic history, this paper tells a story about Jewish collective identities and the American nation. The promise of the United States is not the so-called mosaic, where different groups segregate themselves into fragments or shards of glass held together by the mere grout of civil society. Nor is it the forced assimilation that "the melting pot" is caricatured as. It is somewhere in the middle. The nation is more like a beef stew or a

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[33] The model predicts that 82,809 of the 113,600 Israelis who became permanent legal residents since 2000 are Jewish. This implies a net Jewish migration balance of +31,191 with Israel since the beginning of the millennium (ICBS 2024c) (see: §2.3.C). This ignores all net migration post-October 7th, which likely favors the United States.

[34] ICBS (2024c) shows that 44,736 Latin American Jews and 4,603 Canadian Jews have immigrated to Israel since the year 2000 while the model suggests that 50,190 Latin American Jews and 7,552 Canadian Jews came to the United States over the same period. The United States thus outcompetes Israel on both counts.

spaghetti Bolognese. Beef is not any less beef because it has soaked up the flavor of other ingredients, and pasta is not any less pasta because it is enmeshed with meat and basil. Yet if one were to make beef stew without carrots or broth or onions or a glass of red wine, then the experience would be unpalatable. Every American contributes to the larger whole while maintaining their unique experiences and identities in full form. Overlapping identities, rather than mutually exclusive frameworks, define the American ethos and improve it over time. This is the spirit of America, and thus of American Jewry too.



Figure 1: U.S. Total, White, and Black Crude Birth Rates (1840-2022)

Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets. Data collected and/or calculated from Human Fertility Database (2024a), Rosenwaike (1977), U.S. Centers for Disease Control (1995), Coale & Zelnik (1963), Haines & Hackner (2006), Coale & Rives (1973), and Elben (1974).



Figure 2: U.S. Total and Jewish Total Fertility Rates (1890-2020)

Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets. Data collected and/or calculated from Billings (1891), DellaPergola (1980, 2005a, 2024), Rebhun et al. (1999), Lugo et al. (2014), and Alper et al. (2021), Dattani et al. (2025), Hacker & Roberts (2022), and O'Neill (2019).



Figure 3: U.S. Total, White, Black, and Jewish Crude Birth Rates (1840-2022)

Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets. Data collected and/or calculated from Billings (1891), DellaPergola (1980, 2005a, 2024), Rebhun et al. (1999), Lugo et al. (2014), and Alper et al. (2021), Dattani et al. (2025), Hacker & Roberts (2022), O'Neill (2019), Human Fertility Database (2024a), Rosenwaike (1977), U.S. Centers for Disease Control (1995), Coale & Zelnik (1963), Haines & Hackner (2006), Coale & Rives (1973), and Elben (1974).



Figure 4: U.S. Jewish "Raw" and Effective Crude Birth Rates (1930-2022)

Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets. Data collected and/or calculated from Billings (1891), DellaPergola (1980, 2005a, 2024), Rebhun et al. (1999), Lugo et al. (2014), and Alper et al. (2021), Dattani et al. (2025), Hacker & Roberts (2022), O'Neill (2019), Human Fertility Database (2024a), Rosenwaike (1977), U.S. Centers for Disease Control (1995), Coale & Zelnik (1963), Haines & Hackner (2006), Coale & Rives (1973), Elben (1974), Massarik & Chenkin (1973), Saxe et al. (2014).



Figure 5: U.S. Crude Death Rate (1840-2022)

Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets. Data collected and/or calculated from Human Mortality Database (2024a) and Nowlin (1956).



Figure 6: U.S. Jewish Crude Death Rate (Percent of U.S. CDR) (1900-1990)

Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets. Data collected and/or calculated from Human Mortality Database (2024a), Nowlin (1956), Ancestry (2024b), Rosenwaike (1977), Chalmers (1914), Ritterband (1997), Oppenheim (1918), Brzowsky & Sigalow (2023), Saxe et al. (2021), Chenkin (1956, 1964), Cohen et al. (2011).



Figure 7: U.S. Total and Jewish Crude Death Rates (1840-2022)

Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets. Data collected and/or calculated from Human Mortality Database (2024a), Nowlin (1956), Ancestry (2024b), Rosenwaike (1977), Chalmers (1914), Ritterband (1997), Oppenheim (1918), Brzowsky & Sigalow (2023), Saxe et al. (2021), Chenkin (1956, 1964), Cohen et al. (2011).



Figure 8: U.S. Jewish Immigration, with Upper/Lower/Mean Estimates (1840-1880)
Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets. Data collected and/or calculated from Sheskin (2012), Ancestry (2010), and AJYB (1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907b, 1908, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912, and 1913).



Figure 9: U.S. Jewish Immigration by Place of Immigrant Origin (1969-2022)

Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets. Data collected and/or calculated from Tolts (2019), Herman & LaFontaine (1982), the INS (1982, 1988, 1991, 1997, 2002), Hoefer (2006, 2010), Rytina (2013), Rosenblum (2016a, 2016b, 2019), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2023), ICBS (2024a, 2024b, 2024c), Liwerant (2015), Steven Gold (2015), Brzowsky & Sigalow (2023), Aronson et al. (2022a), Shapiro (1980), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1984, 1988), Horowitz & Kaplan (2001), and the American Jewish Committee (2019).



Figure 10: U.S. Jewish Immigration Model (1840-2022)

Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets. Data collected and/or calculated from Sheskin (2012), Ancestry (2010), AJYB (1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907b, 1908, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912, and 1913), Rosenquist & Friedman (1951), Dijour (1961, 1962, 1963), Diamond (1966, 1969), Tolts (2019), Herman & LaFontaine (1982), INS (1982, 1988, 1991, 1997, 2002), Hoefer (2006, 2010), Rytina (2013), Rosenblum (2016a, 2016b, 2019), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2023), ICBS (2024a, 2024b, 2024c), Liwerant (2015), Steven Gold (2015), Brzowsky & Sigalow (2023), Aronson et al. (2022a), Shapiro (1980), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1984, 1988), Horowitz & Kaplan (2001), and the American Jewish Committee (2019)



Figure 11: U.S. Jewish Emigration Model (1840-2022)

Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets. Data collected and/or calculated from Sarna (1981), AJYB (1937, 1946), Jacobs (1914), Brym (2022b), and ICBS (2024b, 2024c).



Figure 12: U.S. Jewish Population Estimates (1840-2022)
Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets.



Figure 13: U.S. Jewish Population Growth by Year, as both an Absolute Increase and an Annual Percent Change in the Population (1840-2023)

Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets.



Figure 14: Foreign Born Cohens by Birthplace in the 1860, 1870 & 1880 U.S. Censuses
Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets. Data collected from Ancestry (2024a).



Figure 15: U.S. Jewish "Raw" and Effective Crude Birth Rate, Crude Death Rate, and "Raw" and Effective Rate of Natural Increase (1880-1925)

Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets.



Figure 16: U.S. Jewish Population Model Compared to All Scholarly Estimates, the 1910 Benchmark Estimate, and DJN-Census Estimates (1840-1940)

Source: Created by the Author using Google Sheets. See Appendix One for scholarly estimates; Jacobs (1914) for 1910 Benchmark Estimate. DJN-Census Estimates created using Sheskin (2012) and Ancestry (2024a).



Figure 17: U.S. Jewish Population Model Compared to Sarna (2019) as cited by Sheskin & Dashefsky (2021)

Source: Created by the Author using Google Sheets. Data collected from Sheskin & Dashefsky (2021). Note that Sheskin & Dashefsky (2021) use the higher end of the estimates from Sarna (2019).



Figure 18: U.S. Jewish Population Model Compared to "80% Retention" Model and Sets of Scholarly Estimates, including Benchmarks, and DJN-Census Estimates (1925-1970)

Source: Created by the Author using Google Sheets. Non-Model Data collected from Linfield (1928, 1940), Seligman & Swados (1949), Rosenwaike (1948), Chenkin & Seligman (1954), Chenkin (1955, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968), Massarik (1974), and calculated from Sheskin (2012) and Ancestry (2024a).



Figure 19: Jewish Net Migration to the United States (1950-1980)
Source: Created by the Author using Google Sheets.



Figure 20: U.S. Jewish "Raw" and Effective Rate of Natural Increase (1950-2020)
Source: Created by the Author using Google Sheets.



Figure 21: U.S. Jewish Population Model Compared to Sets of Scholarly Estimates Including the Benchmarks Pew 2013 & 2020, NJPS 1990 & 1970 (1970-2024)

Source: Created by the Author using Google Sheets. Data for "AJYB, World" from Schmelz & DellaPergola (1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996), DellaPergola (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003a, 2004, 2005b, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2013b, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2024b), and Shapiro (1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1978, 1979, 1980). Data for "AJYB, USA" from Sheskin (2025), Sheskin & Dashefsky (2024, 2023, 2022, 2021, 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2008, 2007, 2006), Schwartz & Scheckner (2002, 2001, 2000, 1999, 1998), Scheckner (1997), Kosmin & Scheckner (1996, 1995, 1993, 1992, 1991, 1990), Kosmin (1994), Kosmin, Ritterband, and Scheckner (1989, 1988, 1987), Chenkin (1986, 1985, 1984, 1983, 1978, 1977, 1976, 1974, 1973, 1972, 1970), and Chenkin & Miran (1982, 1981, 1980, 1979). Other data sourced from Rosenwaike (1977), Massarik (1974), Kosmin et al. (1991), Berman & Kaplan (2003), Saxe et al. (2021), Alper et al. (2021), Tighe et al. (2019, 2015, 2012), and Lugo et al. (2014).



Figure 22: U.S. Jewish Population Model in Scenarios Without Migration and/or a Rise in the Jewish Crude Birth Rate Compared to 1970 Levels (1970-2023)
Source: Created by the Author using Google Sheets.



Figure 23: Getting to Linfield (1940) by Supposing both Linfield (1928) and U.S. CBR & CDR for the U.S. Jewish Population; Results Compared to the Model (1927-1937)

Source: Created by the Author using Google Sheets. Data collected and/or calculated from Linfield (1928, 1940), U.S. Centers for Disease Control (1995), and Nowlin (1956).



Figure 24: Annual Percent Change in the U.S. Jewish Population Shown in "AJYB USA" as Compared to the Model (1955-2023)

Source: Created by the Author using Google Sheets. Data for "AJYB, USA" collected from Chenkin & Seligman (1954), Chenkin (1955, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1986, 1985, 1984, 1983, 1978, 1977, 1976, 1974, 1973, 1972, 1970), Chenkin & Miran (1982, 1981, 1980, 1979), Sheskin & Dashefsky (2024, 2023, 2022, 2021, 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2008, 2007, 2006), Schwartz & Scheckner (2002, 2001, 2000, 1999, 1998), Scheckner (1997), Kosmin & Scheckner (1996, 1995, 1993, 1992, 1991, 1990), Kosmin (1994), and Kosmin, Ritterband, and Scheckner (1989, 1988, 1987).



Figure 25: U.S. Jewish Population as a Percent of World Jewry and the Jewish Diaspora Outside of Eretz Yisrael [Historic Palestine] (1897-2021)

Source: Created by the Author using Google Sheets. See Appendix Four for details.



Figure 26: U.S. Jewish Population Projections Given Retention Rates for Children in Intermarried Households of 30%, 50%, 70%, and 90%

Source: Created by the Author using Google Sheets

TABLES

Table 1: Potential U.S. Jewish Population Growth 1830-40

Year	JCBR	JCDR	Births	Deaths	Net Migration	Jewish Pop.
1830	41.02	22.05	164	88	1,000	**4,000**
1831	41.02	22.05	208	112	1,000	5,076
1832	41.02	22.05	253	136	1,000	6,172
1833	41.02	22.05	299	161	1,000	7,289
1834	41.02	22.05	346	186	1,000	8,428
1835	41.02	22.05	393	211	1,000	9,587
1836	41.02	22.05	442	237	1,000	10,769
1837	41.02	22.05	491	264	1,000	11,974
1838	41.02	22.05	542	291	1,000	13,201
1839	41.02	22.05	593	319	1,000	14,451
1840						15,725

Source: Created by the author using data from Rosenwaike (1989) and the model.

Table 2: The Model, Given Different Starting Populations in 1840

Year	5,000 in 1840	15,000 in 1840	25,000 in 1840
1860	87,961	102,257	116,553
1880	278,052	297,591	317,130
1900	1,027,810	1,057,345	1,086,880
1920	2,991,887	3,030,719	3,069,552
1940	3,721,191	3,763,417	3,805,643
1960	4,894,678	4,946,836	4,998,994
1980	5,247,066	5,301,067	5,355,068
2000	6,232,917	6,292,306	6,351,695

2020	7,099,304	7,165,883	7,232,462

Source: Created by the author.

Table 3: Calculation of DJN-based U.S. Census Estimates 1850-1950

Year	#DJNs ("Raw")	Index to 1850	DJN-Census Est.	The Model
1850	6,094	**100.0%**	**36,036**	**36,036**
1860	15,046	246.9%	88,972	102,257
1870	33,231	545.3%	196,507	184,594
1880	49,658	814.9%	293,646	297,591
1900	202,653	3325.5%	1,198,360	1,057,345
1910	388,850	6380.9%	2,299,409	2,178,631
1920	509,156	8355.0%	3,010,821	3,030,719
1930	604,181	9914.4%	3,572,738	3,581,641
1940	645,203	10,587.5%	3,815,316	3,763,417
1950	662,565	10,872.4%	3,917,984	4,366,615

Source: Created by the author using data from Ancestry (2024a).

Table 4: Comparing the Model to the Benchmarks 1910-2020

Year	Source	Benchmark	The Model
1910	Jacobs (1914)	2,357,720	2,178,631
1958	Chenkin (1959)	5,030,000	4,845,581
1970	NJPS 1970	5,400,000	5,170,706
1990	NJPS 1990	5,500,000	5,699,486
2013	Pew 2013	6,700,000	6,912,928
2020	Pew 2020	7,500,000	7,165,883

Source: Created by the author using data from Jacobs (1914), Chenkin (1959), Massarik (1974), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1983a), Lugo et al. (2014), and Alper et al. (2021). Note that Jacobs (1914) is an average of the estimates derived from "mother tongue" and "foreign white stock" data in the 1910 Census). NJPS 1970 is rounded to the nearest hundred thousand.

Table 5: Jewish Immigration to Select Destinations by Year 1936-50

Year	U.S.	Israel	Argentina	Brazil	Canada	U.K.	China
1936	6,252	29,727	4,261	3,450	880	3,065	225
1937	11,352	10,536	5,178	2,004	619	2,937	225
1938	19,736	12,868	1,050	530	584	12,642	1,347
1939	43,450	16,405	4,300	4,600	890	18,900	15,272
1940	36,945	4,547	1,464	2,416	1,623	7,407	4,481
1941	23,737	3,456	932	1,500	626	4,853	1,210
1942	10,608	3,630	1,164	108	388		
1943	4,705	4,270	192	11	270		
1944	2,400	20,848	384	66	238		
1945	4,160	13,156	728	50	93		
1946	12,774	17,761	295	450	1,517		
1947	29,724	21,542	128	573	1,866		
1948	17,581	101,819					
1949	41,222	239,576					
1950	13,057	170,467					

Source: Created by the author. Data collected and/or calculated from Linfield (1944), Dijour (1961), ICBS (1951, 2024b), Pan (2019), Liskofsky (1948), Tartakower (1942) and Davis (2017). U.K. and China estimates are novel; U.K. estimate is not fully reliable.

Table 6: Explicit Zionism by Jewish Community 2016-24

Universe	**Country**	**Year**	**%Zionist**	**Jewish Pop.**
Hebrew Speakers in Israel	ISR	2016	77%	5,610,000
Jews in Australia	AUS	2016	77%	116,967
Jews in South Africa	SAR	2019	69%	52,300
Jews in Great Britain	UK	2023	63%	292,000

Russian Speakers in Israel	ISR	2016	53%	990,000
Jews in Greater St. Louis, Missouri	USA	2024	45%	45,800
Jews in Los Angeles County, California	USA	2021	42%	564,700
Jews in Greater Chicago, Illinois	USA	2020	40%	319,600
Jews in Northeastern Pennsylvania	USA	2024	39%	5,500
Jews in Greater Portland, Oregon	USA	2022	26%	56,600

Source: Adapted from Rosewater & Elimian (2025). Data from Sheskin et al. (2023), Graham & Narunsky (2017), Graham & Boyd (2024), Graham (2020), Brookner et al. (2025), Boxer et al. (2023a, 2023b), and Aronson et al. (2021, 2022a).

APPENDIX ONE:

NON-REDUNDANT SCHOLARLY U.S. JEWISH POPULATION ESTIMATES (1654-2024)

Table A1.1: Non-Redundant Scholarly Estimates of U.S. Jewry 1654-2024

Year	Estimate	Sourced from
1654	23	Tempkin (1974)
1660	50	Sarna (2019)
1700	250	Sarna (2019)
1776	1,000	Rosenwaike (1989)
1790	1,200	Goldstein (1971)
1790	1,400	Rosenwaike (1960)
1800	2,500	Sarna (2019)
1818	3,000	Diamond (1977)
1820	2,700	Rosenwaike (1963)
1826	6,000	Diamond (1977)
1830	4,000	Rosenwaike (1989)
1840	15,000	Diamond (1977)
1848	50,000	Diamond (1977)
1859	150,000	Sarna & Shappel (2015)
1878	250,000	Hackenberg (1880)
1880	280,000	Barkai (1994)
1888	400,000	Diamond (1977)
1890	475,000	Rosenquist & Friedman (1951)
1897	937,800	Diamond (1977)
1899	1,043,800	Diamond (1977)
1900	1,058,135	Diamond (1977)
1901	1,045,555	AJYB (1901)
1902	1,136,240	AJYB (1902)
1903	1,127,268	AJYB (1903)
1904	1,253,213	AJYB (1904)
1905	1,418,813	AJYB (1905)

1905	1,508,435	AJYB (1907b)
1906	1,418,013	AJYB (1906)
1907	1,777,185	AJYB (1907b)
1910	2,044,762	AJYB (1913)
1910	2,349,754	Jacobs (1914), based on “immigration returns”
1910	2,346,023	Jacobs (1914), based on “foreign white stock” [Census]
1910	2,369,416	Jacobs (1914), based on “Yiddish speakers” [Census]
1910	2,366,045	Jacobs (1914), based on data from the Industrial Removal Office
1914	2,933,374	Jacobs (1914)
1917	3,012,141	AJYB (1917)
1917	3,390,572	Oppenheim (1918)
1920	3,602,150	Linfield (1923)
1927	4,228,029	Linfield (1928)
1937	4,770,647	Linfield (1940)
1940	4,162,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1941	4,211,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1942	4,250,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1943	4,292,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1944	4,325,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1945	4,359,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1946	5,000,000	AJYB (1946)
1946	4,399,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1947	4,480,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1948	4,542,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1948	4,500,000	Seligman & Swados (1949)
1949	4,626,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1950	4,680,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1951	4,741,000	Rosenwaike (1977)

1952	4,794,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1953	4,844,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1953	5,000,000	Chenkin & Seligman (1954)
1954	4,893,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1955	4,941,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1955	5,200,000	Shapiro (1955)
1956	4,993,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1956	5,200,000	Chenkin (1957)
1957	5,050,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1957	5,255,000	Chenkin (1958)
1958	5,260,000	Chenkin (1959), based on local estimates
1958	5,030,000	Chenkin (1959), based on 1957 Current Population Survey
1958	5,101,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1959	5,367,000	Chenkin (1960)
1959	5,250,000	Shapiro (1959)
1959	5,150,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1960	5,531,500	Chenkin (1961)
1960	5,197,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1961	5,510,000	Chenkin (1962)
1961	5,243,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1962	5,585,000	Chenkin (1963)
1962	5,286,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1963	5,600,000	Chenkin (1964)
1963	5,329,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1964	5,660,000	Chenkin (1965)
1964	5,367,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1965	5,720,000	Chenkin (1966)
1965	5,612,000	Shapiro (1965)

1965	5,399,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1966	5,720,000	Chenkin (1967)
1966	5,425,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1967	5,800,000	Chenkin (1968)
1967	5,447,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1968	5,869,000	Chenkin (1969)
1968	5,468,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1968	5,870,000	Shapiro (1969)
1969	5,490,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1970	5,512,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1970	5,370,000	Massarik (1974) citing NJPS 1970
1970	5,420,000	Schmelz & DellaPergola (1983a) citing NJPS 1970
1971	6,060,000	Chenkin (1972)
1971	5,533,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1972	6,115,000	Chenkin (1973)
1972	5,547,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1973	5,732,000	Chenkin (1974)
1973	5,557,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1974	5,567,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1975	5,581,000	Rosenwaike (1977)
1976	5,845,000	Chenkin (1977)
1978	5,781,000	Chenkin & Miran (1979)
1979	5,860,900	Chenkin & Miran (1980)
1980	5,920,000	Chenkin & Miran (1981)
1980	5,690,000	Schmelz & DellaPergola (1982)
1981	5,500,000	Chenkin & Miran (1982)
1982	5,705,000	Schmelz & DellaPergola (1984)
1983	5,327,000	Chenkin (1984)

1984	5,439,000	Chenkin (1985)
1984	5,705,000	Schmelz & DellaPergola (1986)
1985	5,425,000	Chenkin (1986)
1986	5,814,000	Kosmin, Ritterband, and Scheckner (1987)
1986	5,700,000	Schmelz & DellaPergola (1988)
1987	5,944,000	Kosmin, Ritterband, and Scheckner (1988)
1988	5,935,000	Kosmin, Ritterband, and Scheckner (1989)
1988	5,700,000	Schmelz & DellaPergola (1990)
1989	5,944,000	Scheckner & Kosmin (1990)
1989	5,515,000	Schmelz & DellaPergola (1991)
1990	5,500,000	Kosmin et al. (1991)
1990	5,981,000	Kosmin & Scheckner (1991)
1990	5,535,000	Schmelz & DellaPergola (1992)
1991	5,798,000	Kosmin & Scheckner (1992)
1991	5,575,000	Schmelz & DellaPergola (1993)
1992	5,828,000	Kosmin & Scheckner (1993)
1992	5,620,000	Schmelz & DellaPergola (1994)
1993	5,840,000	Kosmin (1994)
1993	5,650,000	Schmelz & DellaPergola (1995)
1994	5,880,000	Kosmin & Scheckner (1995)
1994	5,675,000	Schmelz & Della Pergola (1996)
1995	5,900,000	Kosmin & Scheckner (1996)
1995	5,690,000	DellaPergola (1997)
1996	5,900,000	Scheckner (1997)
1996	5,700,000	DellaPergola (1998)
1997	6,005,000	Schwartz & Scheckner (1998)
1997	5,700,000	DellaPergola (1999)
1998	6,041,000	Schwartz & Scheckner (1999)

1999	6,061,000	Schwartz & Scheckner (2000)
2000	5,700,000	DellaPergola (2000)
2000	5,200,000	Berman & Kaplan (2003) [NJPS 2001]
2000	6,136,000	Schwartz & Scheckner (2001)
2001	5,700,000	DellaPergola (2001)
2001	5,340,000	Kosmin (2009)
2001	6,155,000	Schwartz & Scheckner (2002)
2002	5,700,000	DellaPergola (2002)
2002	6,155,000	AJYB (2003)
2003	5,300,000	DellaPergola (2003a)
2004	5,290,000	DellaPergola (2004)
2005	5,280,000	DellaPergola (2005b)
2006	6,452,000	Sheskin & Dashefsky (2006)
2006	5,275,000	DellaPergola (2006)
2007	6,443,805	Sheskin & Dashefsky (2007)
2007	5,275,000	DellaPergola (2007)
2008	6,489,110	Sheskin & Dashefsky (2008)
2008	5,300,000	Kosmin (2009)
2008	5,275,000	DellaPergola (2008)
2010	6,500,000	Lugo et al. (2014) [citing Tighe et al. (2010)]
2012	6,800,000	Tighe et al. (2013)
2012	6,721,000	Sheskin & Dashefsky (2012)
2012	5,425,000	DellaPergola (2012)
2013	6,700,000	Lugo et al. (2014) [Pew 2013]
2013	6,721,965	Sheskin & Dashefsky (2013)
2013	5,425,000	DellaPergola (2013b)
2014	6,786,980	Sheskin & Dashefsky (2014)
2014	5,700,000	DellaPergola (2014)

2015	7,160,000	Tighe et al. (2015)
2015	6,829,930	Sheskin & Dashefsky (2015)
2015	5,700,000	DellaPergola (2015)
2016	6,856,000	Sheskin & Dashefsky (2016)
2016	5,700,000	DellaPergola (2016)
2017	6,850,865	Sheskin & Dashefsky (2017)
2017	5,700,000	DellaPergola (2017)
2018	6,925,475	Sheskin & Dashefsky (2018)
2018	5,700,000	DellaPergola (2018)
2019	7,479,000	Tighe et al. (2019)
2019	6,968,600	Sheskin & Dashefsky (2019)
2019	5,700,000	DellaPergola (2019)
2020	7,600,000	Saxe et al. (2021)
2020	7,500,000	Alper et al. (2021)
2020	7,153,000	Sheskin & Dashefsky (2020)
2020	5,700,000	DellaPergola (2020)
2021	5,995,000	DellaPergola (2021)
2021	7,400,000	Sheskin & Dashefsky (2021)
2022	6,000,000	DellaPergola (2022)
2022	7,500,000	Sheskin & Dashefsky (2022)
2023	6,300,000	DellaPergola (2024b)
2024	7,700,000	Sheskin (2025)

Source: Created by the Author

APPENDIX TWO:

RESULTS FROM THE SIMPLE DEMOGRAPHIC MODEL OF AMERICAN JEWRY (1840-2023)

Table A2.1: U.S. Jewish Population 1840-2023

Year	USA#Jewish	USA%Jewish	Year	USA#Jewish	USA%Jewish
1840	15,000	0.09%	1933	3,622,553	2.88%
1841	16,485	0.09%	1934	3,626,958	2.86%
1842	17,191	0.09%	1935	3,634,693	2.85%
1843	18,331	0.10%	1936	3,642,808	2.83%
1844	19,555	0.10%	1937	3,653,542	2.82%
1845	20,864	0.10%	1938	3,673,607	2.82%
1846	22,800	0.11%	1939	3,705,895	2.82%
1847	25,481	0.12%	1940	3,763,417	2.85%
1848	27,770	0.13%	1941	3,819,497	2.85%
1849	31,864	0.14%	1942	3,869,332	2.85%
1850	36,036	0.16%	1943	3,917,271	2.84%
1851	39,944	0.17%	1944	3,955,048	2.83%
1852	46,075	0.19%	1945	3,994,579	2.82%
1853	53,106	0.21%	1946	4,037,747	2.81%
1854	61,548	0.23%	1947	4,119,041	2.83%
1855	70,882	0.26%	1948	4,204,104	2.85%
1856	76,725	0.27%	1949	4,275,008	2.86%
1857	83,445	0.29%	1950	4,366,615	2.89%
1858	92,206	0.31%	1951	4,427,695	2.87%
1859	96,518	0.32%	1952	4,496,571	2.87%
1860	102,257	0.33%	1953	4,556,455	2.85%
1861	108,691	0.34%	1954	4,612,817	2.84%
1862	112,824	0.34%	1955	4,671,416	2.83%
1863	117,662	0.35%	1956	4,727,982	2.81%
1864	123,105	0.36%	1957	4,787,025	2.80%
1865	130,414	0.37%	1958	4,845,581	2.79%

1866	139,031	0.39%	1959	4,897,532	2.77%
1867	149,993	0.41%	1960	4,946,836	2.76%
1868	162,033	0.44%	1961	4,991,256	2.75%
1869	173,274	0.46%	1962	5,030,404	2.73%
1870	184,594	0.48%	1963	5,065,869	2.72%
1871	195,588	0.49%	1964	5,096,941	2.70%
1872	207,593	0.51%	1965	5,123,594	2.68%
1873	223,943	0.53%	1966	5,142,193	2.65%
1874	237,462	0.55%	1967	5,153,940	2.63%
1875	247,931	0.56%	1968	5,163,076	2.60%
1876	257,418	0.57%	1969	5,169,253	2.57%
1877	266,582	0.57%	1970	5,170,706	2.54%
1878	275,423	0.58%	1971	5,173,645	2.52%
1879	285,531	0.58%	1972	5,172,482	2.49%
1880	297,591	0.59%	1973	5,171,236	2.46%
1881	317,756	0.62%	1974	5,170,986	2.43%
1882	325,731	0.62%	1975	5,175,342	2.41%
1883	343,951	0.64%	1976	5,184,416	2.39%
1884	358,711	0.65%	1977	5,196,294	2.37%
1885	376,695	0.67%	1978	5,212,657	2.35%
1886	400,339	0.69%	1979	5,246,198	2.34%
1887	428,713	0.72%	1980	5,301,067	2.34%
1888	469,285	0.78%	1981	5,331,015	2.33%
1889	506,794	0.82%	1982	5,370,615	2.33%
1890	542,690	0.86%	1983	5,398,934	2.32%
1891	582,552	0.91%	1984	5,424,830	2.30%
1892	645,105	0.98%	1985	5,451,895	2.29%
1893	733,109	1.10%	1986	5,481,935	2.29%

1894	784,097	1.15%	1987	5,511,812	2.28%
1895	829,755	1.19%	1988	5,550,887	2.27%
1896	872,969	1.23%	1989	5,601,891	2.27%
1897	992,891	1.28%	1990	5,699,486	2.29%
1898	960,999	1.31%	1991	5,748,868	2.28%
1899	1,002,458	1.34%	1992	5,824,565	2.28%
1900	1,057,345	1.39%	1993	5,911,835	2.29%
1901	1,134,901	1.46%	1994	5,985,324	2.29%
1902	1,208,654	1.52%	1995	6,053,873	2.28%
1903	1,282,713	1.58%	1996	6,107,854	2.28%
1904	1,375,348	1.66%	1997	6,160,667	2.27%
1905	1,496,715	1.78%	1998	6,209,060	2.26%
1906	1,641,836	1.91%	1999	6,251,318	2.25%
1907	1,809,575	2.07%	2000	6,292,306	2.24%
1908	1,974,231	2.22%	2001	6,338,062	2.23%
1909	2,097,230	2.31%	2002	6,384,412	2.23%
1910	2,178,631	2.36%	2003	6,428,187	2.22%
1911	2,287,926	2.44%	2004	6,471,784	2.21%
1912	2,406,101	2.53%	2005	6,518,118	2.21%
1913	2,515,870	2.61%	2006	6,565,810	2.20%
1914	2,646,655	2.71%	2007	6,616,767	2.20%
1915	2,814,263	2.84%	2008	6,668,081	2.20%
1916	2,876,555	2.86%	2009	6,718,951	2.20%
1917	2,928,682	2.87%	2010	6,767,976	2.19%
1918	9,982,704	2.89%	2011	6,817,730	2.19%
1919	3,004,998	2.87%	2012	6,865,087	2.19%
1920	3,030,719	2.86%	2013	6,912,928	2.19%
1921	3,070,067	2.85%	2014	6,960,170	2.19%

1922	3,216,119	2.94%	2015	7,005,444	2.19%
1923	3,289,857	2.96%	2016	7,046,369	2.19%
1924	3,361,386	2.98%	2017	7,083,573	2.18%
1925	3,436,398	3.00%	2018	7,114,895	2.18%
1926	3,469,024	2.98%	2019	7,142,037	2.17%
1927	3,499,838	2.96%	2020	7,165,883	2.16%
1928	3,532,746	2.95%	2021	7,173,044	2.16%
1929	3,559,380	2.93%	2022	7,176,988	2.15%
1930	3,581,641	2.91%	2023	7,189,615	2.15%
1931	3,603,392	2.90%			
1932	3,615,138	2.89%			

Source: Created by the Author.

Table A2.2: U.S. Jewish Effective Births and Deaths 1840-2022

Year	Effective Births	Deaths	Year	Effective Births	Deaths
1840	615	331	1933	39,041	36,624
1841	670	360	1934	39,755	35,834
1842	693	371	1935	38,610	35,002
1843	732	392	1936	40,344	35,554
1844	774	415	1937	43,435	34,489
1845	819	438	1938	47,228	34,422
1846	887	474	1939	49,009	34,761
1847	982	526	1940	54,662	35,376
1848	1,060	567	1941	60,964	34,681
1849	1,205	645	1942	73,395	35,946
1850	1,346	722	1943	73,116	39,956
1851	1,488	791	1944	75,634	38,404
1852	1,713	905	1945	77,616	38,508

1853	1,970	1,032	1946	104,758	36,138
1854	2,278	1,187	1947	94,240	38,801
1855	2,618	1,350	1948	91,723	38,299
1856	2,816	1,450	1949	88,460	37,492
1857	3,080	1,559	1950	86,949	38,164
1858	3,382	1,709	1951	89,637	38,432
1859	3,491	1,774	1952	91,856	39,480
1860	3,687	1,856	1953	93,040	41,828
1861	3,847	1,956	1954	95,507	40,547
1862	3,772	2,006	1955	95,863	42,230
1863	3,693	2,074	1956	94,749	42,030
1864	3,790	2,152	1957	92,763	44,807
1865	4,088	2,250	1958	90,185	45,015
1866	4,477	2,377	1959	86,201	44,665
1867	4,915	2,542	1960	82,238	44,027
1868	5,272	2,722	1961	77,081	44,722
1869	5,661	2,873	1962	72,183	45,425
1870	5,981	3,033	1963	67,949	46,758
1871	6,353	3,184	1964	64,231	45,872
1872	6,774	3,384	1965	57,886	46,164
1873	7,260	3,579	1966	52,716	47,720
1874	7,647	3,759	1967	50,514	47,313
1875	7,986	3,868	1968	49,546	50,237
1876	8,142	3,977	1969	50,388	49,108
1877	8,278	4,079	1970	51,454	47,726
1878	8,333	4,173	1971	49,630	48,374
1879	8,536	4,283	1972	46,076	47,535
1880	8,980	4,419	1973	44,580	47,317

1881	9,942	4,671	1974	45,355	46,435
1882	10,430	4,739	1975	45,584	44,508
1883	11,427	4,953	1976	46,518	47,282
1884	12,234	5,112	1977	49,278	45,520
1885	12,954	5,311	1978	50,290	45,194
1886	13,865	5,585	1979	53,091	43,701
1887	15,129	5,916	1980	54,488	49,989
1888	17,036	6,406	1981	68,001	47,393
1889	18,718	6,841	1982	69,887	47,960
1890	19,973	7,288	1983	70,072	48,590
1891	21,512	7,736	1984	71,160	49,800
1892	24,086	8,470	1985	73,217	49,885
1893	26,894	9,517	1986	73,988	49,995
1894	28,027	10,060	1987	76,002	48,339
1895	28,958	10,579	1988	78,949	49,465
1896	29,747	10,999	1989	82,499	46,944
1897	30,265	11,490	1990	85,016	48,503
1898	30,831	11,820	1991	84,243	49,325
1899	31,640	12,260	1992	83,655	49,451
1900	33,044	13,153	1993	82,902	51,669
1901	33,565	14,947	1994	82,324	51,953
1902	35,811	16,947	1995	81,754	52,729
1903	37,955	17,637	1996	81,851	52,711
1904	41,001	20,451	1997	83,142	52,674
1905	44,093	22,256	1998	84,542	53,025
1906	47,855	26,023	1999	85,442	54,136
1907	52,180	29,098	2000	89,321	54,177
1908	55,810	30,008	2001	91,031	54,254

1909	57,324	27,285	2002	91,324	54,778
1910	59,262	28,039	2003	93,076	54,704
1911	60,835	27,272	2004	94,182	53,522
1912	62,728	25,986	2005	95,541	54,491
1913	63,858	27,423	2006	98,873	53,905
1914	66,948	30,278	2007	100,565	53,728
1915	69,036	31,717	2008	99,834	54,678
1916	68,400	31,182	2009	98,009	53,886
1917	66,999	29,990	2010	99,341	54,415
1918	66,302	46,948	2011	98,868	55,428
1919	60,692	37,653	2012	99,275	55,607
1920	63,752	38,339	2013	99,397	56,607
1921	61,214	36,411	2014	98,107	56,409
1922	61,214	40,169	2015	95,407	58,145
1923	60,912	38,689	2016	92,017	58,485
1924	61,216	35,933	2017	87,505	59,644
1925	58,947	36,323	2018	83,619	59,836
1926	56,168	35,280	2019	80,100	60,136
1927	53,848	32,199	2020	75,072	71,444
1928	50,222	34,974	2021	75,791	73,667
1929	47,238	37,267	2022	76,947	66,961
1930	46,663	36,139			
1931	43,920	37,547			
1932	41,914	36,802			

Source: Created by the Author

Table A2.3: U.S. Jewish Immigration and Emigration 1840-2022

Year	Immigration	Emigration	Year	Immigration	Emigration

1840	1,333	133	1933	2,372	384
1841	440	44	1934	4,134	319
1842	909	91	1935	4,837	330
1843	982	98	1936	6,252	308
1844	1,055	106	1937	11,352	232
1845	1,729	173	1938	19,736	255
1846	2,520	252	1939	43,450	176
1847	2,037	204	1940	36,945	150
1848	4,000	400	1941	23,737	186
1849	4,015	402	1942	10,608	117
1850	3,649	365	1943	4,705	88
1851	6,037	604	1944	2,400	100***
1852	6,916	692	1945	4,160	100***
1853	8,338	834	1946	12,774	100***
1854	9,158	916	1947	29,724	100***
1855	5,058	509	1948	17,581	100***
1856	5,949	595	1949	41,222	584
1857	8,045	805	1950	13,057	761
1858	2,931	293	1951	18,239	568
1859	4,469	447	1952	7,800	292
1860	5,114	511	1953	5,353	202
1861	2,491	249	1954	3,933	294
1862	3,414	341	1955	3,253	321
1863	4,249	425	1956	6,513	187
1864	6,301	630	1957	10,876	277
1865	7,532	753	1958	7,160	378
1866	9,847	985	1959	8,098	330
1867	10,741	1,074	1960	6,622	413

1868	9,657	966	1961	7,102	313
1869	9,481	948	1962	9,325	619
1870	8,939	894	1963	10,750	868
1871	9,818	982	1964	9,300	1006
1872	14,360	1,436	1965	7,800	924
1873	10,931	1,093	1966	7,500	749
1874	7,312	731	1967	6,600	665
1875	5,964	596	1968	7,800	932
1876	5,554	555	1969	5,911	5,739
1877	5,158	516	1970	5,857	6,646
1878	6,609	661	1971	5,167	7,586
1879	8,675	868	1972	5,950	5,737
1880	16,426	821	1973	7,102	4,615
1881	2,846*	142	1974	8,747	3,311
1882	13,202	673	1975	11,024	3,025
1883	8,731	445	1976	15,564	2,922
1884	11,445	584	1977	15,394	2,793
1885	16,862	860	1978	31,589	3,143
1886	21,173	1,080	1979	48,650	3,172
1887	33,044	1,685	1980	27,983	2,534
1888	28,281	1,442	1981	21,597	2,606
1889	25,352	1,293	1982	9,307	2,915
1890	28,639	1,461	1983	8,105	3,691
1891	51,398	2,621	1984	8,491	2,787
1892	76,373	3,895	1985	8,850	2,142
1893	35,322	1,801	1986	8,066	2,192
1894	29,179	1,488	1987	13,150	2,038
1895	26,171	1,355	1988	23,585	1,775

1896	32,848	1,675	1989	63,632	1,592
1897	20,372	1,039	1990	14,466	1,597
1898	23,654	1,206	1991	42,538	1,758
1899	37,415	1,908	1992	55,136	2,071
1900	60,764	3,099	1993	44,532	2,276
1901	58,098	2,963	1994	40,516	2,339
1902	57,688	2,942	1995	27,431	2,474
1903	76,203	3,886	1996	25,885	2,212
1904	106,236	5,418	1997	20,006	2,081
1905	129,910	6,625	1998	12,570	1,829
1906	153,748	7,841	1999	11,448	1,766
1907	149,182	7,608	2000	12,072	1,460
1908	103,387	6,189**	2001	11,038	1,465
1909	57,551	6,189**	2002	8,988	1,758
1910	84,260	6,189**	2003	7,136	1,912
1911	91,223	6,610	2004	7,786	2,113
1912	80,595	7,569	2005	8,910	2,268
1913	101,330	6,950	2006	8,369	2,380
1914	138,051	7,143	2007	6,794	2,316
1915	26,497	1,524	2008	7,959	2,245
1916	15,108	199	2009	7,599	2,697
1917	17,342	329	2010	7,580	2,753
1918	3,627	687	2011	6,503	2,585
1919	3,055	373	2012	6,686	2,513
1920	14,292	358	2013	6,667	2,412
1921	119,036	483	2014	6,485	2,662
1922	53,524	830	2015	6,336	2,673
1923	49,719	413	2016	6,576	2,905

1924	49,989	260	2017	6,250	2,789
1925	10,292	291	2018	6,080	2,720
1926	10,267	341	2019	6,585	2,703
1927	11,483	224	2020	6,051	2,518
1928	11,689	253	2021	5,522	3,702
1929	12,479	189	2022	5,595	2,953
1930	11,526	299			
1931	5,692	319			
1932	2,755	452			

Source: Created by the Author

* Immigration halved in 1881 (see: footnote 16)
** Data available for the collective 1908-10 period; total divided equally among years.
*** Emigration assumed to be 100.per year from 1944 to 1947 (when there is no data available)

APPENDIX THREE:

CURRENT GLOBAL JEWISH POPULATION ESTIMATES BY NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL GEOGRAPHIES (2023)

Table A3.1: Ten Largest Jewish Populations by Country in 2023

Source	Definition	Year	Geography	State	Jewish Population	%Tot
		2023	**Total J-Pop**		**16,587,286**	**100%**
Appendix Two	JBR + JNR	2023	United States	USA	7,189,615	43.34%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Israel	ISR	6,662,100	40.16%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Palestinian Terr.	PAL	468,300	2.82%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	France	RoW	446,000	2.69%
Brym (2022a)	JBR + JBE	2021	Canada	CAN	393,502	2.37%
Mix	JBR + JBE	Mix	United Kingdom	UK	294,719	1.78%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Argentina	RoW	175,000	1.06%
Tolts (2023)	“Core”	2023	Russia	RoW	132,000	0.80%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Germany	RoW	118,000	0.71%
Graham (2024)	“Core”	2021	Australia	AUS	116,957	0.71%

Source: Created by the Author

Table A3.2: Jewish Populations by Subnational Region in 2023

Source	Definition	Year	Geography	State	Jewish Population	%Tot
		2023	**Total J-Pop**		**16,587,286**	**100%**
Adj. Saxe et al (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	New York State	USA	1,503,654	9.07%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Tel Aviv Dist.	ISR	1,377,600	8.31%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	California	USA	1,104,242	6.66%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Jerusalem Dist.	ISR	820,900	4.95%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Petah Tiqwa S.D.	ISR	732,200	4.41%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Florida	USA	732,115	4.41%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Rehovot S.D.	ISR	602,900	3.63%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Ashqelon S.D.	ISR	534,300	3.22%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	New Jersey	USA	538,478	3.25%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Haifa S.D.	ISR	471,300	2.84%

ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Palestinian Terr.	PAL	468,300	2.82%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Be’er Sheva S.D.	ISR	466,400	2.81%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	France	RoW	446,000	2.69%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Sharon S.D.	ISR	374,400	2.26%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Pennsylvania	USA	327,424	1.97%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Ramla S.D.	ISR	320,300	1.93%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Massachusetts	USA	315,014	1.90%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Illinois	USA	314,731	1.90%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Hadera S.D.	ISR	279,300	1.68%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Yizre’el S.D.	ISR	234,500	1.41%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Texas	USA	230,709	1.39%
Brym (2022a)	JBR + JBE	2021	Ontario	CAN	230,142	1.39%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Maryland	USA	217,160	1.31%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Akko S.D.	ISR	205,500	1.24%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Argentina	RoW	175,000	1.06%
ONS (2022)	JBR + JBE	2021	Greater London	UK	153,885	0.93%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Connecticut	USA	145,463	0.88%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Ohio	USA	138,971	0.84%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Arizona	USA	137,372	0.83%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Virginia	USA	136,054	0.82%
Tolts (2023)	“Core”	2023	Russia	RoW	132,000	0.80%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Georgia	USA	123,540	0.74%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Michigan	USA	121,941	0.74%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Germany	RoW	118,000	0.71%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Zefat S.D.	ISR	108,000	0.65%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Colorado	USA	103,876	0.63%
Brym (2022a)	JBR + JBE	2021	Quebec	CAN	99,204	0.60%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Washington State	USA	98,512	0.59%

Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	North Carolina	USA	97,948	0.59%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Brazil	RoW	91,500	0.55%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2022	Kinneret S.D.	ISR	79,700	0.48%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Nevada	USA	71,414	0.43%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Oregon	USA	65,110	0.39%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Minnesota	USA	61,064	0.37%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Missouri	USA	56,078	0.34%
Graham (2024)	“Core”	2021	Victoria	AUS	54,483	0.31%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Wisconsin	USA	47,516	0.29%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Washington D.C.	USA	47,516	0.29%
Graham (2024)	“Core”	2021	New South Wales	AUS	47,009	0.28%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Hungary	RoW	46,800	0.28%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Tennessee	USA	44,693	0.27%
ONS (2022)	JBR + JBE	2021	East of England	UK	43,385	0.26%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	South Carolina	USA	41,306	0.25%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Indiana	USA	39,047	0.24%
ONS (2022)	JBR + JBE	2021	North West England	UK	34,345	0.21%
Tolts (2023)	“Core”	2023	Ukraine	RoW	33,000	0.20%
Graham (2020)	“Core”	2019	Gauteng	SAR	32,700	0.20%
ONS (2022)	JBR + JBE	2021	British Columbia	CAN	31,511	0.19%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Kentucky	USA	30,203	0.18%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Netherlands	RoW	29,700	0.18%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Belgium	RoW	28,900	0.17%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Italy	RoW	27,200	0.16%
ICBS (2024a)	“Pop. Group”	2023	Golan S.D.	ISR	27,000	0.16%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Kansas	USA	25,498	0.15%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Louisiana	USA	23,334	0.14%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	México (State)	MEX	21,685	0.13%

Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Alabama	USA	21,547	0.13%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Delaware	USA	21,170	0.13%
ONS (2022)	JBR + JBE	2021	S.E. England	UK	20,780	0.13%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Rhode Island	USA	20,700	0.12%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	New Hampshire	USA	19,947	0.12%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Maine	USA	19,100	0.12%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	New Mexico	USA	18,818	0.11%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Switzerland	RoW	18,400	0.11%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	México (City)	MEX	17,981	0.11%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Uruguay	RoW	16,400	0.10%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Oklahoma	USA	16,278	0.10%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Vermont	USA	15,901	0.10%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Chile	RoW	15,900	0.10%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Iowa	USA	15,807	0.10%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Sweden	RoW	14,900	0.09%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Turkey	RoW	14,500	0.09%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Utah	USA	13,737	0.08%
Graham (2020)	"Core"	2019	Western Cape	SAR	13,600	0.08%
Brym (2022a)	JBR + JBE	2021	Manitoba	CAN	13,573	0.08%
Brym (2022a)	JBR + JBE	2021	Alberta	CAN	13,367	0.08%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Spain	RoW	12,900	0.08%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Arkansas	USA	11,197	0.07%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Austria	RoW	10,300	0.06%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Panama	RoW	10,000	0.06%
Miles (2023)	"Normative"	2023	Nigeria	RoW	10,000	0.06%
ONS (2022)	JBR + JBE	2021	Yorkshire & Humber	UK	9,995	0.06%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Nebraska	USA	9,785	0.06%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Hawaii	USA	9,691	0.06%

DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Iran	RoW	9,400	0.06%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Romania	RoW	8,800	0.05%
ONS (2022)	JBR + JBE	2021	S.W. England	UK	8,490	0.05%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Idaho	USA	7,809	0.05%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	New Zealand	RoW	7,500	0.05%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Belarus	RoW	7,200	0.04%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Azerbaijan	RoW	7,000	0.04%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Mississippi	USA	6,680	0.04%
Graham (2024)	“Core”	2021	Western Australia	AUS	6,634	0.04%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Denmark	RoW	6,400	0.04%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	West Virginia	USA	6,210	0.04%
Rocker (2024)	JBR + JBE	2022	Scotland	UK	5,863	0.04%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Montana	USA	5,834	0.04%
Graham (2024)	“Core”	2021	Queensland	AUS	5,634	0.03%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Venezuela	RoW	5,000	0.03%
ONS (2022)	JBR + JBE	2021	West Midlands	UK	4,860	0.03%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	India	RoW	4,800	0.03%
ONS (2022)	JBR + JBE	2021	East Midlands	UK	4,710	0.03%
ONS (2022)	JBR + JBE	2021	N.E. England	UK	4,585	0.03%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Poland	RoW	4,500	0.03%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Latvia	RoW	4,300	0.03%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Greece	RoW	4,100	0.02%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Czechia	RoW	3,900	0.02%
Graham (2020)	“Core”	2019	Kwazulu-Natal	SAR	3,800	0.02%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Alaska	USA	3,670	0.02%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Portugal	RoW	3,300	0.02%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	Wyoming	USA	3,011	0.02%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	China	RoW	3,000	0.02%

DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Uzbekistan	RoW	2,800	0.02%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Ireland	RoW	2,700	0.02%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Slovakia	RoW	2,600	0.02%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Costa Rica	RoW	2,600	0.02%
Brym (2022a)	JBR + JBE	2021	Nova Scotia	CAN	2,576	0.02%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Kazakhstan	RoW	2,400	0.01%
ONS (2022)	JBR + JBE	2021	Wales	UK	2,320	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Lithuania	RoW	2,300	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Colombia	RoW	2,100	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Morocco	RoW	2,100	0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Puebla	MEX	2,079	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Bulgaria	RoW	2,000	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Peru	RoW	1,900	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Estonia	RoW	1,800	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Moldova	RoW	1,700	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Croatia	RoW	1,700	0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Veracruz	MEX	1,666	0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Jalisco	MEX	1,654	0.01%
Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	South Dakota	USA	1,505	0.01%
World J. Cong.	“Core”	2023	Puerto Rico	USA	1,411	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Georgia	RoW	1,400	0.01%
Graham (2020)	“Core”	2019	Eastern Cape	SAR	1,400	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Serbia	RoW	1,400	0.01%
Graham (2024)	“Core”	2021	South Australia	AUS	1,340	0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Baja California	MEX	1,319	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Finland	RoW	1,300	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Norway	RoW	1,300	0.01%
Brym (2022a)	JBR + JBE	2021	Saskatchewan	CAN	1,297	0.01%

Adj. Saxe et al. (2021)	JBR + JNR	2023	North Dakota	USA	1,230	0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Nuevo León	MEX	1,189	0.01%
Brym (2022a)	JBR + JBE	2021	New Brunswick	CAN	1,174	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Paraguay	RoW	1,100	0.01%
Graham (2024)	"Core"	2021	Capital Territory	AUS	1,037	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Japan	RoW	1,000	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Tunisia	RoW	1,000	0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Hidalgo	MEX	981	0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Morelos	MEX	951	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Guatemala	RoW	900	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Singapore	RoW	900	0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Quintana Roo	MEX	896	0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Oaxaca	MEX	846	0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Gibraltar	UK	800	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Guanajuato	MEX	788	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Michoacán de Oca.	MEX	713	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Luxembourg	RoW	700	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Monaco	RoW	700	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Chihuahua	MEX	692	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Tamaulipas	MEX	611	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Ecuador	RoW	600	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Querétaro	MEX	566	<0.01%
ONS (2022)	JBR + JBE	2021	Northern Ireland	UK	501	<0.01%
Graham (2020)	"Core"	2019	Free State	RSA	500	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Cuba	RoW	500	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Jamaica	RoW	500	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Bolivia	RoW	500	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	"Core"	2021	Bosnia-Herzegovina	RoW	500	<0.01%

INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Chiapas	MEX	477	<0.01%
Graham (2024)	“Core”	2021	Tasmania	AUS	440	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Coahuila de Zara.	MEX	453	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Tlaxcala	MEX	399	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Yucatán	MEX	353	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Guerrero	MEX	324	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Kyrgyzstan	RoW	300	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Cyprus	RoW	300	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	U.A.E.	RoW	300	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Kenya	RoW	300	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Nayarit	MEX	298	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Baja California Sur.	MEX	296	<0.01%
Brym (2022a)	JBR + JBE	2021	Newfoundland	CAN	282	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	San Luis Potosí	MEX	264	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Aguascalientes	MEX	259	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Sonora	MEX	250	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Sinaloa	MEX	201	<0.01%
ONS (2022)	JBR + JBE	2021	Channel Islands	UK	200	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Bahamas	RoW	200	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Suriname	RoW	200	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Turkmenistan	RoW	200	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Thailand	RoW	200	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Zimbabwe	RoW	200	<0.01%
Brym (2022a)	JBR + JBE	2021	Prince Edward Is.	CAN	194	<0.01%
Graham (2024)	“Core”	2021	Northern Terr.	AUS	191	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Tabasco	MEX	174	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Durango	MEX	169	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Colima	MEX	134	<0.01%

INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Campeche	MEX	117	<0.01%
Graham (2020)	“Core”	2019	Rest of S.A.R.	SAR	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Bermuda	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Barbados	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Dominican Rep.	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	El Salvador	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Malta	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Slovenia	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	North Macedonia	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Armenia	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Indonesia	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Philippines	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	South Korea	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Syria and Lebanon	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Taiwan	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Egypt	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Ethiopia	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Botswana	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Congo D.R.	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Madagascar	RoW	100	<0.01%
DellaPergola (2021)	“Core”	2021	Namibia	RoW	100	<0.01%
INEGI (2023)	JBR-Only	2020	Zacatecas	MEX	91	<0.01%
Brym (2022a)	JBR + JBE	2021	Yukon Territory	CAN	82	<0.01%
Brym (2022a)	JBR + JBE	2021	Northwest Territory	CAN	59	<0.01%
Brym (2022a)	JBR + JBE	2021	Nunavut	CAN	41	<0.01%

Source: Created by the Author

APPENDIX FOUR:

HISTORIC GLOBAL JEWISH POPULATION ESTIMATES BY NATIONAL AND REGIONAL GEOGRAPHIES (1897-2021)

Description

This appendix contains two tables and four figures. Table A4.1 lists roughly decennial population estimates by country and table A4.2 lists the sources and/or methodologies used to create these estimates. The U.S. estimates come from the model, and the U.K., France, and Ethiopia estimates are also reliant, to some extent, on simple demographic modeling. Aside from this, all estimates not otherwise specified were created by finding select data points and then assuming linear growth/decline between them. Each country's estimate is not intended to be fully accurate, but together they should approximate the growth of World Jewry.

As for geographies, the Former Soviet Union and Poland are presented as one because the annexation of part of Interwar Poland by the USSR in 1939 proved too difficult to reconcile with the population flows before and after the Shoah. Israel and Palestine are also combined into one unit, called "Eretz Yisrael" in table A4.1, which is also known as "Historic Palestine." This is not meant to be political; it was done because it was too difficult to track where immigrants to Mandate Palestine moved within the territory prior to 1948.

Finally, please note the following three things. First, although the decennial data does not show it, the model accurately incorporates the Shoah, predicting a total population decline of 5,911,852 between 1939 and 1945 in Continental Europe that is essentially equal to the accepted figure of six million murders once new, simultaneous births are accounted for. Second, although U.S. Jewish population estimates are consistent across appendices, this is not necessarily the case for the Jewish populations of other countries. Lastly, note that the timeframe of the model starts in 1897 because of the 1897 All Russia Census and concludes in 2021 because DellaPergola (2021b) had the most recent data for all countries at the time of writing, providing a "backstop" for countries with no other accurate and recent population estimates.

Table A4.1: Jewish Population of the World by Country 1897-2021

Year	World	United States	E. Yisrael	FSU/Poland	Afghanistan	Algeria
1897	10,012,771	922,891	37,929	5,991,986	3,692	54,175
1910	12,043,733	2,178,631	51,455	6,122,227	4,192	71,716
1920	13,021,081	3,030,719	65,467	5,813,924	4,577	89,394
1930	14,489,631	3,581,641	175,791	6,351,883	4,962	104,051
1940	15,463,914	3,763,417	454,778	7,007,538	3,978	120,085
1950	10,791,007	4,366,615	1,103,000	2,455,742	2,843	139,091
1960	11,601,143	4,946,836	1,882,600	2,295,360	1,708	93,333
1970	12,196,143	5,170,706	2,543,100	2,175,130	622	1,500
1980	12,578,008	5,301,067	3,249,400	1,814,719	0	409
1990	13,008,602	5,699,486	3,802,700	1,379,680	0	211
2000	13,804,179	6,292,306	4,914,100	497,050	0	100
2010	14,951,304	6,767,976	5,752,200	326,350	0	100
2021	16,415,426	7,173,044	6,928,300	225,500	0	100

Year	Argentina	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Brazil	Bulgaria
1897	9,651	14,666	175,000	9,000	2,000	32,000
1910	68,000	17,082	190,000	24,756	3,417	40,070
1920	127,000	21,182	190,714	38,171	11,286	45,968
1930	191,000	23,055	191,429	51,585	33,667	47,832
1940	254,000	27,777	75,000	65,000	56,000	48,181
1950	294,000	39,055	25,171	41,738	70,000	12,911
1960	309,000	57,773	10,577	39,123	86,000	6,014
1970	286,000	72,000	10,532	36,508	88,000	5,043
1980	242,000	77,000	10,486	33,892	90,000	4,071
1990	218,000	86,000	10,441	31,709	90,366	3,100
2000	200,038	99,250	10,395	30,803	90,732	2,745
2010	188,115	110,537	10,350	29,897	91,098	2,390
2021	175,000	120,000	10,300	28,900	91,500	2,000

Year	Canada	Chile	China	Cuba	Czechoslovakia	Denmark
1897	12,510	1,000	2,500	2,500	255,230	4,700
1910	70,309	2,300	5,000	4,263	283,997	5,131
1920	121,204	3,300	7,000	6,888	347,947	5,962
1930	153,673	5,860	9,500	8,546	356,830	6,848
1940	168,890	8,420	32,100	9,238	330,863	7,734
1950	201,436	10,980	4,000	9,931	16,000	7,188
1960	249,272	13,760	2,384	9,500	17,429	6,563
1970	283,315	16,590	1,279	1,700	14,571	6,200
1980	311,147	19,420	645	1,200	9,664	6,923
1990	353,638	19,160	500	700	7,800	6,796
2000	369,341	18,110	795	633	7,381	6,668
2010	389,558	17,060	1,578	567	6,961	6,540
2021	393,000	15,900	3,000	500	6,500	6,400
Year	**Egypt**	**Ethiopia**	**France**	**Germany**	**Great Britain**	**Greece**
1897	30,000	25,000	82,378	487,400	183,357	100,000
1910	44,919	31,898	98,741	539,000	318,814	103,250
1920	61,526	37,204	150,400	568,000	322,639	92,000
1930	68,011	42,510	206,400	518,000	319,524	82,492
1940	73,469	47,816	250,000	182,737	358,244	79,950
1950	60,417	53,009	212,980	40,000	386,865	8,193
1960	15,250	59,787	240,272	24,722	389,232	5,431
1970	1,500	72,763	392,468	30,000	372,701	5,062
1980	449	79,925	406,496	32,632	343,127	4,869
1990	364	63,971	426,371	40,182	320,602	4,681
2000	279	32,869	443,004	92,000	301,106	4,494
2010	194	11,551	459,132	104,381	292,791	4,306
2021	100	4,416	457,476	118,000	297,155	4,100

Year	Hungary	India	Iran	Iraq	Ireland	Italy
1897	400,000	14,674	38,000	45,448	2,406	37,065
1910	433,575	16,981	42,368	68,220	3,725	39,619
1920	473,355	18,755	46,316	85,736	3,734	39,791
1930	444,567	20,529	50,263	103,934	3,475	39,662
1940	404,943	22,303	54,211	122,208	3,200	44,767
1950	114,365	21,718	58,158	100,000	5,200	34,570
1960	70,148	19,417	62,105	4,559	5,053	30,723
1970	65,988	14,000	66,053	2,500	4,667	30,958
1980	61,828	6,764	70,000	1,350	4,281	31,192
1990	57,791	5,646	20,560	200	3,896	30,920
2000	54,245	5,373	16,960	136	3,510	29,720
2010	50,700	5,100	13,360	73	3,124	28,520
2021	46,800	4,800	9,400	3	2,700	27,200

Year	Libya	Mexico	Morocco	Netherlands	New Zealand	Nigeria
1897	15,000	500	100,000	104,000	1,561	0
1910	27,251	6,979	118,321	107,210	2,076	0
1920	41,568	12,720	132,191	115,223	2,373	0
1930	34,700	17,286	156,835	138,055	2,616	0
1940	27,759	21,571	203,285	160,886	2,935	0
1950	20,762	27,207	258,196	30,998	3,542	0
1960	10,286	38,242	161,000	29,675	3,750	0
1970	2,020	49,277	17,000	28,304	3,958	0
1980	32	61,790	13,625	26,934	4,250	0
1990	19	63,685	9,875	25,825	4,682	0
2000	5	65,581	5,125	27,075	5,591	2,333
2010	0	67,476	3,161	28,325	6,500	5,667
2021	0	58,000	1,000	29,700	7,500	9,333

Year	Panama	Romania	South Africa	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland
1897	500	456,647	20,500	1,332	3,000	9,000
1910	612	478,555	45,659	1,935	3,539	18,462
1920	698	496,798	62,103	2,398	4,061	20,979
1930	946	552,072	79,348	2,861	5,553	23,344
1940	1,438	546,613	96,049	1,250	7,931	36,250
1950	1,929	219,695	108,497	2,500	10,690	28,866
1960	2,420	121,429	114,762	5,750	13,448	18,613
1970	2,911	64,510	118,200	9,000	14,286	16,300
1980	3,402	21,534	117,963	10,489	14,643	16,712
1990	4,833	11,089	100,724	11,979	15,000	17,124
2000	6,500	7,400	66,718	13,468	14,968	17,535
2010	8,167	7,421	59,129	14,957	14,935	17,947
2021	10,000	8,000	52,000	17,000	14,900	18,400
Year	**Syria/Lebanon**	**Tunisia**	**Turkey**	**Uruguay**	**Yemen**	**Yugoslavia**
1897	30,000	105,000	93,703	100	10,000	90,000
1910	32,600	96,273	100,000	146	20,455	100,000
1920	34,600	76,727	89,336	2,700	28,496	67,951
1930	31,520	62,794	78,033	7,000	36,538	62,610
1940	27,170	63,314	65,237	20,562	44,580	60,237
1950	12,000	65,641	53,545	23,332	20,681	7,750
1960	9,910	38,990	46,273	23,853	2,603	6,208
1970	7,820	19,941	39,000	24,375	2,162	5,623
1980	5,730	12,293	22,000	24,896	1,721	5,038
1990	3,789	4,644	20,171	23,947	1,292	4,453
2000	568	1,453	18,341	22,632	875	3,868
2010	308	1,232	16,512	21,316	459	3,283
2021	33	1,000	14,500	20,000	1	2,640

Source: See Table A4.2

Table A4.2: Sources Utilized by Country for Historic Estimates 1897-2021

Country	**Data Sourced From**	**Notes**
United States		See Appendix Two
Eretz Yisrael (Historic Palestine)	ICBS (1951, 2023a), Linfield (1945). Ben-Arieh (1975)	Includes both the Occupied Palestinian Territories & the Disputed Golan Heights
FSU/Poland	Konstantinov (1991), Altshuler (1998), Magocsi (1996), Ruthenberg (1967), DellaPergola (2000, 2012, 2021b), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1991), Tolts (2019, 2023) Levin (2010a, 2010b, 2010c), AJYB (1947), Vilenski (2022), Gitelman (2012), Engel (2010), Leavitt (1945), Rudnicki (2011), Moskovich (2010), Zeltser (2010), Cienciala (2001), Lewi Stone (2019), Letizia (2023), Yad Vashem (n.d)	
Afghanistan	Frogel (2015)	
Algeria	Laskier (1994), Jacobs (1914), Linfield (1928), AJYB (1939), Chouraqui (1952), Farber (2021), DellaPergola (2000)	
Argentina	Schmelz & DellaPergola (1987), DellaPergola (1997, 2021b)	
Australia	Burgess (2019), Knibbs (1911), Wilson (1951), Bartrop (2022), Carver (1961), Archer (1965), Shapiro (1970), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1989), DellaPergola (1998), Graham (2014), Graham & Narunsky (2017)	
Austria	Bureau of Jewish Social Research (1920), Office of the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues (2020), Shapiro & Sapir (1948), Shapiro (1955), DellaPergola (2021b)	
Belgium	Schmelz & DellaPergola (1991), Office of the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues (2020), Staetsky & DellaPergola (2022)	
Brazil	AJYB (1905, 1917, 1934), Linfield (1927), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1987), DellaPergola (2021b)	
Bulgaria	Gelber (1946), Christidi (2023), ICBS (1951), Bureau of Jewish Social Research (1920), Linfield (1945), Shapiro (1955), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1992), DellaPergola (2021b)	

Canada	Brym (2021), Shahar (2004, 2014), Yam (1974)	
Chile	Linfield (1923), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1984), DellaPergola (2021b)	
China	Pan (2019), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1992), DellaPergola (2021b)	
Cuba	AJYB (1909), Linfield (1930), Shapiro (1951, 1959, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1971), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1992), DellaPergola (2021b)	
Czechoslovakia	Bureau of Jewish Social Research (1920), Capková et al. (2010), Shapiro (1964, 1971), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1985, 1992), DellaPergola (2021b)	
Denmark	AJYB (1900, 1919), Chitwood (2023), Shapiro (1970, 1976), DellaPergola (2021b)	
Egypt	Jacobs (1914), Linfield (1929), AJYB (1939, 1947), Shapiro (1957, 1962, 1967, 1974), DellaPergola (2021)	
Ethiopia	ICBS (2023b), AJYB (1946), DellaPergola (2021b), Human Mortality Database (2024b), Human Fertility Database (2024b)	Assume 25k in 1900. Uses a simple demographic model from 1946 to 2021.
France	Szajkowski (1946), AJYB (1917, 1946), Weinberg (n.d.), ICBS (2023b), Human Mortality Database (2024c), Human Fertility Database (2024c)	Simple demographic model from 1946 to 2021. Rough approximation at best.
Germany	Rosenthal (1944), Blau (1950), Shapiro (1951, 1954, 1971), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1991), DellaPergola (2000, 2021b)	
Great Britain	Kosmin (1982), DellaPergola (2024), Graham (2015, 2016), O'Neill (2024), Mashiah (2018), Rocker (2016), Davis (2016), Tartakower (1942), Gartner (1960), Weber (2013), Bureau of Jewish Social Research (1921), AJYB (1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940), Linfield (1922, 1923, 1924, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1942, 1943, 1944), Linfield & Moskowitz (1941)	All years based on a simple demographic model. Includes an intermarriage adjustment and a fairly comprehensive net migration model.
Greece	Bowman (1986), DellaPergola (2021b)	
Hungary	Bureau of Jewish Social Research (1920), Don & Magos (1983), Kovács (2010), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1990), DellaPergola (2021b), Haraszti (2010)	

India	Reissner (1950), Shapiro (1958, 1967, 1974), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1989), DellaPergola (2021b)	
Iran	Tsadik (2005), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1983b), 1988), DellaPergola (2021b)	
Iraq	Karpat (1978), Linfield (1927), Kosover (1951), Hurewitz (1952), Yin'am (1953), Shapiro (1970), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1992), Rashty (2021)	
Ireland	Linfield (1930), AJYB (1946), Shapiro (1951), DellaPergola (2021b)	
Italy	Bachi (1962), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1991), DellaPergola (2021b), Office of the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues (2020)	
Libya	Jacobs (1914), Linfield (1929), AJYB (1939, 1947), Shapiro (1967, 1974), World Jewish Congress (n.d.)	
Mexico	INEGI (2011, 2023), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1988), Shapiro & Sapir (1948), Linfield (1923, 1928), AJYB (1904)	
Morocco	Jacobs (1914), Linfield (1929), AJYB (1939), Chouraqui (1952), Malka (1965), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1985b), Gruen (1994), Kasraoui (2021)	
Netherlands	Knippenberg (2002), Imhoff et al. (2001), Fishman (1978), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1991), DellaPergola (2021b)	
New Zealand	Linfield (1931), AJYB (1939), Shapiro & Sapir (1948), Shapiro (1973), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1990), DellaPergola (2021)	
Nigeria	Miles (2023)	Assume linear increase from 0 in 1980 to 10k in 2023.
Panama	Linfield (1930), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1985b), DellaPergola (2021)	
Romania	Gyémánt (2010), Volovici (2010), Bureau of Jewish Social Research (1920), Manuila & Filderman (1957), DellaPergola (2021)	
South Africa	Dubb (1969), Linfield (1929), DellaPergola & Dubb (1988), Shain (1999), Graham (2020)	

Spain	Feit (2017), Flesler et al. (2011), Shoah Resource Center (n.d.)	
Sweden	Bureau of Jewish Social Research (1920), Margolinsky (1962), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1992), DellaPergola (2021)	
Switzerland	Joseph & Kayserling (1906), Erlanger (2006, 2014), DellaPergola (2021)	
Syria/Lebanon	Linfield (1929), AJYB (1946), Shapiro & Sapir (1950), Gottesman (1985), Gruen (1994), Klein (2022), World Jewish Congress (n.d.)	
Tunisia	Jacobs (1914), Linfield (1929), AJYB (1939), Chouraqui (1952), Shapiro (1967), Gruen (1994), Cheslow (2016)	
Turkey	Karpat (1978), Bureau of Jewish Social Research (1920), Shapiro & Sapir (1950), Shapiro (1971), Schmelz & DellaPergola (1982), DellaPergola (2021)	
Uruguay	Schmelz & DellaPergola (1985a), Linfield (1923), Litofsky (1948), DellaPergola (2021)	16.4k in 2021 seemed low, so rounded up to 20k.
Yemen	Jacobs (1914), Schechtman (1952), Gottesman (1985), Deutch (2022)	"Aden" had 4k according to Jacobs (1914), but this felt too low so it was changed to 10k in 1897.
Yugoslavia	Bureau of Jewish Social Research (1920), Vidakovic-Petrov (2021), Ristović (2001), Shapiro (1955)	

Source: Created by the Author



Figure A4.1: Model of World Jewry as an Absolute Population and as a Percent of All Human Beings Alive (1897-2021)

Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets, plus Kremer (1993) and Ritchie et al. (2024). See Table A4.2.



Figure A4.2: Jewish Population of the United States, E. Yisrael (Hist. Palestine), CANZUK (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom), the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Poland, and the Rest of the World (1897-2021)

Source: Created by the Author using Google Sheets. See Table A4.2.



Figure A4.3: Jewish Population of the United States, E. Yisrael (Hist. Palestine), and the Former Soviet Union and Poland (1897-2021)

Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets. See table A4.2. Each Soviet Republic and Poland was modeled separately in 1897-1938 and in 1947-2021, but they were merged together because it was not possible to model them as distinct entities in 1939-46.



Figure A4.4: Jewish Population of Countries with Some Simple Demographic Modeling Aside from the United States (1897-2021)

Source: Created by the author using Google Sheets. See table A4.2. Note that France and Ethiopia are only modeled after 1946 whereas Great Britain is modeled in all years. Otherwise, assume linear growth/decline between known data points. The author thinks France might be slightly lower than modeled in recent years, but this is nothing more than a rounding error in the global population model.

APPENDIX FIVE:

HISTORIC COUNTY AND TOWN MAPS OF JEWRY

IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES (1878-1937)

Description

The following maps show data from Hackenberg (1880), AJYB (1907a), Oppenheim (1918), and Linfield (1928, 1940). The author considers AJYB (1907a) to be the most plausible of these datasets, although even it is questionable. These maps use unique standardized county and municipal level geographies that maintain fixed boundaries over time and are thus valid across the 1878-1937 period (link to full dataset here). Maps A5.1, A5.4, A5.7, A5.10, and A5.13 show the Jewish population in each county-level geography in the eastern United States as a percent of the total population. A5.2, A5.5, A5.8, A5.11, and A5.14 do the same for town/city level standard geographies in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island while also displaying the absolute size of each town/city's Jewish population. This is replicated in A.5.3, A.5.6, A5.7, A5.12, and A5.15, which zoom in on the New York City Metropolitan Area so that more local dynamics can be observed. To repeat, all these data are flawed, but they likely paint an accurate picture of the relative size and concentration of Jewish-Americans even as many of the estimates (particularly 1927 and 1937) are probably wrong.



Map A5.1: Standard County-level Geographies in the Eastern United States in 1878 and their Jewish Populations as a Percent of the Total Population

Source: Created by the author using Hackenberg (1880) and Seaton (1883) and QGIS software.



Map A5.2: Standard Town/City-level Geographies in New York State, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Connecticut in 1878 and their Jewish Populations in terms of Absolute Size and as a Percent of the Total Population

Source: Created by the author using Hackenberg (1880) and Seaton (1883) and QGIS software.



Map A5.3: Standard Town/City-level Geographies in Greater New York City, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island in 1878 and their Jewish Populations in terms of Absolute Size and as a Percent of the Total Population

Source: Created by the author using Hackenberg (1880) and Seaton (1883) and QGIS software.



Map A5.4: Standard County-level Geographies in the Eastern United States in 1907 and their Jewish Populations as a Percent of the Total Population

Source: Created by the author using AJYB (1907a) and Harris (1913) and QGIS software.



Map A5.5: Standard Town/City-level Geographies in New York State, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Connecticut in 1907 and their Jewish Populations in terms of Absolute Size and as a Percent of the Total Population

Source: Created by the author using AJYB (1907a) and Harris (1913) and QGIS software.



Map A5.6: Standard Town/City-level Geographies in Greater New York City, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island in 1907 and their Jewish Populations in terms of Absolute Size and as a Percent of the Total Population

Source: Created by the author using AJYB (1907a) and Harris (1913) and QGIS software.



Map A5.7: Standard County-level Geographies in the Eastern United States in 1917 and their Jewish Populations as a Percent of the Total Population

Source: Created by the author using Oppenheim (1918) and Steuart (1921) and QGIS software.



Map A5.8: Standard Town/City-level Geographies in New York State, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Connecticut in 1917 and their Jewish Populations in terms of Absolute Size and as a Percent of the Total Population

Source: Created by the author using Oppenheim (1918) and Steuart (1921) and QGIS software.



Map A5.9: Standard Town/City-level Geographies in Greater New York City, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island in 1917 and their Jewish Populations in terms of Absolute Size and as a Percent of the Total Population

Source: Created by the author using Oppenheim (1918) and Steuart (1921) and QGIS software.



Map A5.10: Standard County-level Geographies in the Eastern United States in 1927 and their Jewish Populations as a Percent of the Total Population

Source: Created by the author using Linfield (1928) and Steuart (1931) and QGIS software.



Map A5.11: Standard Town/City-level Geographies in New York State, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Connecticut in 1927 and their Jewish Populations in terms of Absolute Size and as a Percent of the Total Population

Source: Created by the author using Linfield (1928) and Steuart (1931) and QGIS software.



Map A5.12: Standard Town/City-level Geographies in Greater New York City, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island in 1927 and their Jewish Populations in terms of Absolute Size and as a Percent of the Total Population

Source: Created by the author using Linfield (1928) and Steuart (1931) and QGIS software.



Map A5.13: Standard County-level Geographies in the Eastern United States in 1937 and their Jewish Populations as a Percent of the Total Population

Source: Created by the author using Linfield (1940) and Jones (1942) and QGIS software.



Map A5.14: Standard Town/City-level Geographies in New York State, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Connecticut in 1937 and their Jewish Populations in terms of Absolute Size and as a Percent of the Total Population

Source: Created by the author using Linfield (1940) and Jones (1942) and QGIS software.



Map A5.15: Standard Town/City-level Geographies in Greater New York City, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island in 1937 and their Jewish Populations in terms of Absolute Size and as a Percent of the Total Population

Source: Created by the author using Linfield (1940) and Jones (1942) and QGIS software.

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