



War and Domestic Political Violence: The Case of the United States 1890-1970

Author(s): Michael Stohl

Source: *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Sep., 1975), pp. 379-416

Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/173436>

Accessed: 12-08-2018 17:55 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at

<https://about.jstor.org/terms>



Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
The Journal of Conflict Resolution

War and Domestic Political Violence

THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES 1890-1970

MICHAEL STOHL

*Department of Political Science
Purdue University*

This paper is concerned with the indirect systemic linkages whereby conflict at one level (in this case war involvement) generates systemic changes at the domestic level, which in turn alter the character of conflict at that level. To evaluate these linkages, I examine the changes in the magnitude and intensity of economic, social, and political violence in the domestic system that occur before, during, and after war involvement. Data have been collected on 2,861 violent events during this period. The impact of war on the pattern of these events is evaluated through the use of an interrupted time series, quasi-experimental design. The analysis indicates that war did have a significant, although different, impact on the pattern of domestic violence for each of the five wars.

This paper seeks to rectify two major problems in the study of violence within and between nations. The study of violence within nations often proceeds with total disregard for the impact of the external system (see Gurr, 1968, 1970; Muller, 1972; and Grofman and Muller, 1973). The study of the relationship between internal and external violence, on the contrary, generally assumes that such a relationship does indeed exist, but normally tests the relationship within a theoretical vacuum (see Wilkenfeld, 1973; and Wilkenfeld and Zinnes, 1973) or with research designs that make such testing almost impossible (see Stohl, 1973, for an extended

AUTHOR'S NOTE: This is a revision of a paper presented to the International Studies Association annual meeting, St. Louis, March 20-23, 1974. The author acknowledges the helpful criticisms of Arthur Stein.

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 19 No. 3, September 1975
©1975 Sage Publications, Inc.

/379/

discussion of this problem). Thus, if the quasi-experimental design proposed herein is useful and my arguments persuasive, those who study violence within societies will begin to look at external impacts on society and those who study linkages will do so with proper theoretical care.

The concern here is with the indirect, systemic linkages whereby conflict at one level (in this case war involvement) generates systemic changes at the domestic level, which in turn alter the character of conflict at that level. To evaluate these linkages, I will examine the changes in economic, social, and political violence in the domestic system that occur before, during, and after involvement.

The theoretical framework of this paper assumes that the political system is the distributor of values within a social system. The approach taken is consistent with a group conflict theory orientation in that its basic premise is that “violent conflict and revolution arise out of group conflicts over valued conditions and positions” (Gurr, 1971a: 12). Further, I argue that dominant segments, through their disproportionate share in the nation’s wealth, prestige, and power, in large part determine the ranking of lower segments and hence the resultant distribution of goods and services (see Stohl, 1973: 63-89). This existing distribution of values is primarily responsible for the potential future distribution of values and thus provides the major basis for political conflict and violence.

The interactions involved in attempts to maintain or adapt the rank system to changes in the environment involve the systems concepts of morphostasis and morphogenesis.

The former refers to those processes in complex systems environment exchanges that tend to preserve or maintain a system’s given form, organization or state. Morphogenesis will refer to those processes which tend to elaborate or change a system’s given form, structure or state. Homeostatic processes in organisms, and ritual in socio-cultural systems are examples of morphostasis; biological evolution, learning, and societal development are examples of morphogenesis. [Buckley, 1967: 58-59].

Changing economic conditions may cause the potential contributions of a segment and the distribution of goods among segments to rise or fall. This would create (or perhaps rectify) a rank disequilibrium, in Galtung’s (1964) terms, which would increase the tension in the system to the point at which the dominant groups would have to adapt the system, to increase the available goods, or to put lower strata in a position to attempt to alter the current distribution of goods and services as well as the ranking system.¹

1. While Galtung suggests that disequilibrium intensifies aggression, Dahrendorf (1959: 218) asserts that, on the contrary, the greater the disparity between socioeconomic status and authority positions, the less intense class conflict will be.

WAR AND THE PATTERN OF CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

The American economic system, as a capitalist system, has within it the seeds of such problems. Marxists have not been the only observers who have recognized this dilemma. The major thrust of liberal economics has been to create the conditions under which the internal economic system would be maintained within the current international system. Members of the American dominant segments have thus often seen international, as well as domestic, economic expansion as the key to domestic prosperity and social peace. Frankel (1964: 54) suggests that

One of the most significant relationships within the environment is the interaction between domestic and foreign affairs. On the basis of the relative security and isolation from foreign affairs it has been customary for British and American thinkers and statesmen to believe that the two domains are separate and that domestic affairs prevail. Very different is the tradition of the continental countries where such separation has never taken place.

While we would not dispute the importance of the connection that Frankel suggests, we would disagree with the assertion that American statesmen believed that the two realms were separate. Many national leaders operate in both arenas, domestic and international. To stay in power, they must solve problems in both realms. Domestic affairs prevail in the sense that international decisions are judged as to their domestic affects. Williams (1970: 4), commenting on the period concerned in this study, has suggested that American leaders:

were primarily concerned with obtaining markets for surplus manufactured goods and venture capital, and with acquiring access to cheap raw materials needed by the American industrial system. That industrial orientation became increasingly clear during the twentieth century as American leaders struggled to build and maintain an international system that would satisfy the interrelated economic, ideological, and security needs and desires of the United States as they defined those objectives.

During periods in which American leaders attempted expansion of the free market place, the United States became involved in a number of wars. Williams (1970: 46) asserts that there were "Wars to apply the principles; and wars to defend the freedom and the prosperity that the expansion of the principles had ostensibly produced for Americans." While this is not a necessary or sufficient explanation for all war involvement by the United States, for whatever causes the United States became involved in war the

consequences of war for the stratification and political systems were significant.²

In the following pages we will investigate periods since 1890 in which the United States was involved in war, to determine if these periods are characterized by increasing violence as lower segments clash with higher segments over the distribution of scarce values. In the periods following successful war the dominant segments would be strengthened as a result of the increases in markets and their ability to provide more goods within the same ranking system. However, another result of the participation in war should be an increase in social dislocations (internal migration, upward mobility for semi-assimilated segments) which both intensify demands and threaten the positions of the dominant segments. Attainment of war objectives means the dominant segments will have increased goods to distribute in addition to their increased status and will attempt to protect the gains of war from those who seek to have the system adapted to provide a different distribution. Periods after successful war would then be

2. In causal modeling terms the difference between Williams's assertion that the wars were caused by dominant leaders attempting to defend their positions at home and the position taken in this chapter that there is an interactive effect between war and the stratification and political systems may be distinguished in the following figures, where A represents the logical consequences of Williams's argument and B the position taken in this paper.




Figure A:




Figure B:

expected to show a continuation of domestic violence with increases in the amount of violence between top and bottom and with more violence being directed downward from above.

Every successful imperialist policy of coercing the outside normally—or at least at first—also strengthens the domestic “prestige” and therewith the power and influence of those classes, status groups and parties under whose leadership the success has been attained [Gerth and Mills, 1958: 170].

In less successful wars, either empty victories or stalemates, the same pattern of social dislocation should be repeated, but dominant segments will not have increased prestige or increased goods to distribute. They will wish, once again, however, to protect the political system that ensures their dominance and will thus perceive internal challenges more in zero-sum terms than if they had gained expanded markets. Hence, violence directed against lower segments will again prevail. The lower segments will not receive benefits from the war despite their intensified demands and thus will direct more violence toward dominant segments than after successful wars.

PLAUSIBLE RIVAL HYPOTHESES

At least three quite contradictory hypotheses can be found in the literature dealing with linkages between internal and external conflict behavior.

- (1) Increases in foreign conflict behavior are related to a decrease in domestic conflict behavior (Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1956; Wright, 1941).
- (2) Increases in foreign conflict behavior are related to an increase in domestic conflict behavior (Wilkenfeld, 1968, 1969; Stohl, 1971; Collins, 1969).
- (3) Foreign conflict behavior is generally unrelated to domestic conflict behavior (Rummel, 1963; Tanter, 1964).

Although Simmel (1955) has suggested a somewhat contradictory set of hypotheses within his work, few researchers have attempted to deal with the problem. He suggests that conflict with out-groups leads to increased cohesion in the in-group. Thus researchers looked for decreases in internal conflict behavior (Tanter, 1964; Stohl, 1971). However, he also suggests that conflict with out-groups makes the group more intolerant of internal dissent, and perhaps the group also looks for internal enemies that may be forcefully removed from within the group. This would suggest that while certain types of conflict may decrease, other forms of conflict in fact may

increase. Previous research has not concentrated on violence that is done by and for the state, but rather has focused on violence against the "legitimate" authorities.

To summarize the above discussions, I postulated for testing in this study the following hypotheses concerning the ways in which war stimulates changes in the internal political system and resultant conflict and violence.

Hypothesis 1: Wartime economic mobilization brings new groups into the productive process and enhances the economic positions of subordinate groups relative to the dominant segments, thus intensifying conflict and violence.

Hypothesis 2: Wartime social mobility increases the status positions of underdog social groups relative to the dominant segments, which increases the hostilities between them.

Hypothesis 3: The economic and social changes of the war generate demands for the reallocation of political power and rewards, which intensifies conflict and violence.

Corollary 3A: Success in war provides increased goods to be distributed by dominant segments while increasing their power and prestige. This intensifies their efforts to maintain the control of the political system while increasing their ability to do so. The result is an increase in violence directed downward by dominant segments which is greater than the increase of violence directed upward by lower segments.

Corollary 3B: Lack of success in war decreases the power and prestige of dominant segments and provides no additional goods to distribute. This intensifies their efforts to maintain control of the political system without increasing their ability to do so. The result is an increase in violence directed downward which is matched by an increase in violence directed upward by lower segments attempting to maintain the relative gains accruing to them during war.

In the following section, I will discuss the procedures employed to test the hypotheses generated herein, and the problems of translating information on violence during war periods into testable form.

THE INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

In order to observe the impact of war on the type and extent of domestic political violence, we require, in addition, a design that will allow for the introduction of the independent variable only at specified times in

the sequence of events. The subject of study does not allow us to introduce the independent variable (U.S. participation in war) whenever we would want to provoke a change in the domestic violence measures, as we would be able to do within the confines of the laboratory experiment with individuals or small groups or within the context of the program of a simulation. Rather, we must recreate the logic of a laboratory experiment utilizing naturally occurring phenomena.


The purpose of experimentation is generally to create the conditions under which the experimenter can separate the influence of confounding variables from those independent variables that he is interested in pursuing, and then to assess the relationships between these variables and his dependent observations. The researcher thus is interested in observing interpretable variation in an independent variable and detecting if the change in the independent variable has had an effect.

Campbell and Stanley (1963) have developed a number of designs that allow the researcher artificially to recreate experimental conditions. These quasi-experimental designs are appropriate when the events are socially given. As Caporaso (1973: 9) has noted,

Quasi-experimental designs are rooted in conditions where there is no ability to manipulate the stimulus and no control through matching and randomization over competing stimuli. Experimental stimuli occur naturally, in a richly textured environment, with no active intervention of the researcher.

The researcher thus intervenes only insofar as he identifies, after the fact, an experimental input and indicates what that input is stimulating, through the careful development of theoretical hypotheses and observation. The particular quasi-experimental design which we will utilize in this work is the interrupted time series design. This design involves periodic measurements on the dependent variable(s) obtained at equally spaced time points (month in this case) and the introduction of the independent variable(s) or experimental input somewhere in the series. The design may be diagrammed as follows:

Interrupted Time Series Design



Where "x" is any indicator, and where time is specified by 1, 2, ..., n+k, and where experiments "a" and "b" are two different experiments. The first pretest series has "m" data points, the second "n," and so on.

The object of this design (as in all experimental designs) is to determine whether a change in the dependent variable(s) has occurred after the introduction of the experimental input. Explanations of change can follow only after it has been established that a change in the dependent variable has indeed taken place. We are thus interested in two major questions (see Caporaso, 1973: 11):

- (1) Did a nonrandom change occur in the vicinity of the experiment?
- (2) Is the change attributable to the occurrence of the experimental input?

The determination of whether a nonrandom change has occurred in the dependent variables is the function of significance tests, which are used in conjunction with appropriate theoretical models which dictate where one looks for discernible shifts in value. The changes we assess with significance tests are the difference between the expected and observed (or pre- and posttest expected in the case of the double-mood test) value points or distributions of points in the months before and after the experimental input (war).

Conceptually, then, in the interrupted time series analysis a "true change" is one that changes the junction of the series, or one at least that is not interpretable in terms of the series' past function. Change will therefore occur under the following conditions: (1) when there is a discontinuous shift away from the trend line due to the impact of a substantive variable, (2) if there is a change in the rate of change (slope) or mean level of the variable (intercept) or (3) if there is an error exceeding the limits of the probability model [Caporaso, 1973: 25].

The tests used and their descriptions may be found in Appendix A. The identification of nonrandom changes, while crucial to experimentation, is only the first step in the process of establishing the credibility of hypotheses. It is also necessary to increase confidence by examining likely confounding sources of error in data sources and the procedures of collection and transformation, as well as to distinguish plausibly rival substantive hypotheses. Next I indicate some likely trouble spots in the data and in the procedures employed to transform the data into indicators.

DATA COLLECTION AND CONSTRUCTION OF INDICATORS

There will be five quasi-experiments in this study, each at the time of U.S. participation in war. In the period of the study, the United States was involved in the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, and the

Korean and the Vietnam wars. The dependent variables to be studied are the type and extent of domestic political violence. Domestic political violence will here be defined as all collective nongovernmental or governmental attacks on persons or property resulting in damage to them that occur within the boundaries of an autonomous political system. For operational purposes, "collective" refers to twenty or more people. This will exclude most purely criminal acts and juvenile delinquency and yet it will encompass most acts of political violence. The phrase within the boundaries is meant to exclude such events as raiding across international boundaries and attacks mounted abroad by dissident exiles.

SOURCES

The primary source of the domestic violence data for his study was the *New York Times Index*. This primary source has been supplemented where possible by information in the stories themselves; and secondly, coverage was checked by a comparison of the events found in the index with a number of historical accounts and documentary studies for the period. The study is therefore essentially an analysis of violence reported in the *New York Times*. An important question is thus the adequacy of this particular source of information.

There have been many objections and criticisms of work that has relied on *The Times* for information on conflict and violence in events analysis. Indeed, the most cursory examination of the newspaper will demonstrate that there are obvious biases in its coverage. This coverage bias centers around two main concerns. First, differential concern for different regions and nations, and second, concern for the dramatic and unusual. As Gurr (1972: 56) points out:

Wars, major natural disasters, coups d'état, cabinet shakeups, and competitive national elections are among the kinds of events, mostly dramatic and violent, that seem reported with some consistency in mid twentieth century newspapers. Lesser conflict events like demonstrations, clashes, and diplomatic protests are somewhat less likely to be reported, especially if they occur in countries that are not of great current interest. Minor outbreaks of conflict that might ordinarily be reported are sometimes overshadowed either by a very dramatic event or by the sheer number of similar events.

Thus the first concern of most critics of the use of the *Times* should pose less of a threat to the reliability of coverage for the United States. The *Times*, while weak on coverage on certain areas of the globe, should always be concerned with the dramatic violent event within the United States. The problem that minor outbreaks of conflict might be overshadowed or missed because of the sheer number of events indicates that the totals of

violent events of limited magnitude and intensity are probably under-reported and hence not included in the analysis. However, a great number of these less violent events do, in fact, comprise the bulk of the data set.

DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES

The first step was to identify events by searching the *Times Index* for all years included in the study and to record all information for all entries that appeared to indicate that a violent event had occurred. The coder then recorded all relevant information on the code sheets (see Appendix B). Second, the coder had to determine whether the event was part of a larger event which was described in a number of articles. If so, the totals for the event were recorded as they would be for any single day event, with the exception of the duration which listed the appropriate number of days. If the type of event changed over a number of days (for example, if an event that began as a clash was followed by a clear attack by one of the conflicting groups against another the following day), the coder was instructed to code the series of daily violence as separate events.

The simplest test for reliability of any type of context coding is the "percentage of agreement" between two coders or judges. Thus a random sample of one hundred events was chosen, and two assistants were given the coding instructions and asked to code the data. The percentage of agreement reached was .91 for the two assistants with the author and .89 between the two assistants.³

Why, then, have we chosen to rely on the New York *Times*? Tilly (1969; 42) suggests that, in his study of violent events in France, the newspapers provided the fullest enumeration of such events and that their chief bias was toward overreporting of events in large cities. This same tendency may be true of the *Times* coverage as well (it is obviously so in the case of overreporting events in New York City), but if we are aware of this we can interpret the results with this bias in mind. In addition, in a recent study that investigated the accuracy of the New York *Times* for this type of research, McCormick (1970) was unable to recommend anything of greater value. Thus we are reasonably confident in the comprehensiveness of its coverage for the purposes of this particular study.⁴ Multiple

3. It has been suggested that a reliability test ought also to have been performed at the first stage of the two-part coding process. While checks were made as to the thoroughness of the data set by comparisons with additional historical documents, no actual test of reliability was performed on the initial compilation of events.

4. I am, however, not as confident as the editors of the index who suggest that if you cannot find it in the index perhaps it did not happen (introduction, New York *Times Index*).

sources would obviously have been preferred, but given resource limitations compromises had to be made. A second corrective, suggested by Gurr (1972: 56), involves reliance not merely on the sheer number of events, but also on their magnitude and intensity. This procedure was incorporated in the construction of indicators of violence (see below).

The independent variable in the quasi-experimental analysis is used merely as the interruption point around which pre- and posttest fluctuations in the dependent variable are measured. The interruptions were the months in which both the onset and termination of war occurred, as indicated in the Singer and Small (1972) data set.

VARIABLES AND INDICATOR CONSTRUCTION

As indicated previously, we are interested in both the type and extent of domestic political violence. We chose to divide types of violence between two main dimensions.⁵ The first differentiated political violence by issue area. The issue area dimension attempts to determine the issue or

5. There are always problems with any attempt to categorize complex phenomena in a limited number of categories. In addition to the problems typical to any coding scheme, there are a number of conceptual problems concerning what is and what is not "political violence" that need be mentioned. The following suggested examples of political violence were not included in this study:

A. Are certain arrests for murder political? A political figure is convicted of murder (or, for that matter, any major "nonpolitical" crime). Is it a criminal or political act? Is the conviction concerned with political or criminal violence? Two examples of this problem that are familiar are the conviction and execution of Joe Hill for murder during the labor struggle at the beginning of this century, and the trials of Bobby Seale for murder in Connecticut of a Black Panther.

B. Thomas Szasz suggests that the act of committing individuals to mental institutions is a political crime. In the United States this criticism has been scoffed at by many. However, we do know that the Soviet Union has employed this means to rid itself of some of its most eloquent critics (Medvedev for one) and Szasz argues that this political crime occurs in the United States, though not perhaps at the specific order of the government.

C. How does one classify the arrests of "political" individuals for drug possession? Is this "normal" law enforcement or a political arrest? Conversely, is it political protest to smoke marijuana if more than twenty people are together, and if caught at one time is it a political arrest?

D. Studies of criminal law enforcement in the United States suggest that many arrests of blacks and other low-ranked individuals occur in large part because of their blackness or low status. Moreover, in certain crimes such as rape, the pattern has been that individuals are more likely to be arrested if a white woman rather than a black women is raped, especially if the rapist is a black man. Should this be considered an area of political law enforcement, and if so, does rape sometimes become a political crime, as Eldridge Cleaver suggests?

subject of conflict which is responsible for violent action. The determination of issue area was based on considering (Stohl, 1973: 63-89):

- (1) the ranking system within which the violence occurred, and where possible
- (2) the systemic target of the initiating group.

The ranking systems considered were the (1) racial, (2) ethnic, (3) religious, (4) educational, (5) economic, (6) political organizational, and (7) governmental. Events whose participants and targets were identifiable members of one of the first four ranking groups were combined into a type of violence classified as social. Events whose participants and targets were identifiable members of the economic ranking system were classified as such. Events whose participants and targets were identifiable members of the political organizational and government ranking systems were combined in a type of violence classified as political organizational. The events within each of the three types, social, economic, and political organizational, were then aggregated by summing the monthly scores of the indicators of extent (see below) for each type of violence. The ranking systems follow the presentation in Stohl (1973: 63-89), and the systems and their contents may be found in the sample code sheet presented as Appendix B.⁶

The second dimension differentiates type of violence by the perceived systemic intent of the initiating groups. The initiator-of-attack categories are concerned with identifying pro-system events (initiating group seeks to maintain the status quo), anti-system events (initiating group seeks to reform or challenge the status quo), and clashes where there are no clearly discernible initiators of violence in the event. In addition, the pro-system violence is subdivided into government-initiated and dominant group-initiated violent events during the period 1935-1970. The former is hereafter often referred to as repression and the latter as reaction. Both are considered manifestations of violent attempts at morphostasis, while anti-system violence is considered as an indication of morphogenesis.

The extent of violence refers to two dimensions, duration (number of total days of the event) and intensity (the cost of the event in terms of deaths or arrests). Property damage and injuries were to be included in intensity; however, the reporting was very irregular on these two variables

6. An example of economic violence would be the violence arising from strikes or lockouts where workers and management conflict. The clearest example of social violence is the race riot, but ethnic riots and religious clashes also are comprised by this category. Violent anti-war demonstrations or attacks by governmental authorities on political protestors would be Stohl's clear example of political organizational violence.

and they were dropped from the analysis. As indicated above, the information for extent was collected for each event and then aggregated later by months for each of the types of violence. The quasi-experimental analyses thus will test the impact of U.S. participation in war by comparing pre- and posttest observations of magnitude and intensity for (1) economic, social, and political organizational violence and (2) anti-system, pro-system (both reaction and repression), and clashes. In addition, all violent events that occur within the period will be analyzed to obtain a composite view of the violence occurring within any period.

These tests of the hypotheses ignore much of the complexity of the environment within which the events take place. There are obviously a great number of other events and/or processes which occur coterminously with the independent variable, or intervene between the occurrence of the independent variable and its presumed effects. These occurrences may therefore rival war as an explanation of the observed changes in the type and level of domestic political violence. The only correctives for this problem are good theory and comparison across cases. In this study the use of each of the different wars as cases will allow for comparison across cases. If, given the great variance in internal and external conditions and change over time, the same patterns of relationships are discovered, idiosyncratic explanations of "cause" for the changes after each particular case will be less persuasive.

RESULTS

The working hypothesis was that each of the "events" would provide a socially given behavior that could be interpreted in the quasi-experimental terms of the design. The introduction of war is the event to be assessed. There is nothing else "in" the event other than the interruption point. The problem is that of determining the degree of discontinuity around the interruption point (the war). If the level of domestic violence was influenced by the event, it is hypothesized that the impact may be assessed by evaluating the differences (if any) between the pre- and posttest slopes and intercepts. The influence on the type of violence may be assessed by comparing changes in the levels of the different types. The war (event) was introduced and assessed for impact on the domestic violence series at the start and end of the war. In addition, the war months were deleted and the pre- and postwar months were directly compared.⁷

7. For each of the time series analyzed concerning the start and end of war, each month preceding the experimental input comprised the pretest series, and each

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

On April 4, 1898, the United States declared war against Spain. The impact of U.S. participation and its aftermath was evaluated for 29 indicators (results in Table 1).⁸ There are only 4 indicators which are significant at the .05 level and an additional 3 are significant at the .10 level. At the start of the war interruption only the duration of economic violence shows a significant (.10) change. The intercept of these variables increases from 1 to 4 days per month.⁹ The duration of violent clashes and all events intercepts, while not statistically significant, increase from 2 to 5.3 days per month with no appreciable slope changes. The number of deaths for violent clashes and all events also increases in the postwar months, but deaths related to economic violence do not. The third measure of intensity, arrests, shows no measurable slope or intercept changes.

At the end of the war the duration of economic violence, clashes, and all events all show increases in intercept level significant at the .05 level, with slopes remaining constant. Deaths, while again not statistically significant, increase for both violent clashes and all events; in addition, socially related deaths increase in the postwar period.

By deleting the war months, one expects to find that the results follow the pattern of the start and end of war interruptions. While slopes remain constant in the pre- and postwar periods, the intercepts rise for duration of all events (.10) and violent clashes (.10) by almost 5 days per month, and for economic events (.05) by almost 4 days per month. In conclusion,

month after the event, the posttest series. When the war months are deleted the pretest series remains the same as at the start of the war, but the posttest series does not commence until after the cessation of hostilities. We thus actually eliminate all months during which the war was fought and directly compare the pre- and postwar months.

8. The difference in the number of variables analyzed for each of the wars results from: (1) the absence of certain types of behavior in the five periods, for example, during the Spanish-American War period, there were only 16 recorded pro-system events and none between 1894-1900 (after the Homestead and Pullman strikes); there were 21 recorded anti-system-initiated events with most occurring after 1901; for both of these categories there were many more observation points than events, which prevented statistical analysis; (2) the addition after World War II of the categories of reaction and pro-system and reaction, with the former referring to private forms of pro-system behavior and the latter representing the combined pro-system category in previous war periods. The pro-system violence for the latter two wars thus simply refers to government-initiated violence.

9. The intercepts indicate the initial value in the series, i.e., the measurement of the variable at time point x_m , for the pretest series and x_n in the posttest series.

TABLE 1
Impact of Spanish American War on Domestic Violence

Variable	Type of Violence	Pre ^a N	Post N	Slope		Intercept		Significance Tests	
				Pre ^a	Post	Pre	Post	Single Mood	Walker Test 1
Start of War (1/12 = 8.33%) ^b									
Duration	Economic	99	105	.01	-.01	.91	3.85	No	No
Duration	All Events	104	100	.01	-.02	2.19	7.18	No	No
	Clashes	104	100	.01	-.03	1.98	7.15	No	.10
	Economic	104	100	.00	-.02	1.00	5.11	No	.05
End of War (3/12 = 25%)									
War Deleted (3/5 = 60%)									
Duration	All Events	99	100	.01	-.02	1.95	6.72	No	No
		99	100	.01	-.02	1.83	6.71	No	.10
		99	100	.01	-.02	.91	5.02	No	No
Total (7/29 = 24.14)									

a. Pre and Post N refers to the number of observations in the series.

b. Significant results (no. significant cases/no. of tests = percent significant).

TABLE 2
Impact of World War One on Domestic Violence

Variable	Type of Violence	Pre ^a		Post		Slope		Intercept		Significance Tests	
		N	N	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Single Mood	Walker Test I	Lev Test 3	Double Mood
Start of War (13/21 = 61.90) ^b											
Duration	All Events	51	81	-.14	.04	6.63	5.26	No	.05	.05	.05
	Pro System	51	81	-.02	-.02	1.05	3.36	No	No	.05	.05
	Clashes	51	81	-.11	.05	5.34	1.74	No	.05	No	.05
	Political	51	81	.00	-.04	-.21	5.14	No	No	.05	.05
	Economic	51	81	-.14	.06	6.03	-1.54	No	.05	No	No
	Social	51	81	-.01	.02	.40	1.23	.05	No	.05	.05
	Political	51	81	.00	-.01	.00	.98	No	No	.05	.05
	Economic	51	81	-.06	.04	2.26	-2.55	No	.10	No	No
	All Events	51	81	-.43	-.53	15.77	78.49	No	No	.05	.05
	Pro System	51	81	-.23	-.46	8.77	66.25	No	No	.05	.05
	Clashes	51	81	-.19	-.04	7.00	8.58	No	No	No	.05
	Political	51	81	.00	-.36	.07	55.41	.05	No	.05	.05
	Economic	51	81	-.43	-.16	15.70	19.79	No	No	.05	.05
End of War (16/21 = 76.19)											
Duration	All Events	71	61	-.04	-.09	4.74	19.69	No	No	.05	.05
	Pro System	71	61	.01	-.06	.53	7.56	No	.05	.05	.05
	Clashes	71	61	-.04	-.02	3.98	9.65	No	No	.05	.05
	Anti System	71	61	.00	-.02	.24	2.76	No	No	.05	.05
	Political	71	61	.03	-.06	-.34	7.47	No	.05	No	.05
	Economic	71	61	-.09	-.01	5.05	6.00	No	No	.05	.05
	Social	71	61	.02	-.02	.01	4.62	No	No	No	.05

TABLE 2 (Continued)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Violence</i>	<i>Pre</i>	<i>Post</i>	<i>Pre</i>	<i>Post</i>	<i>Pre</i>	<i>Post</i>	<i>Mood</i>	<i>Test 1</i>	<i>Test 3</i>	<i>Mood</i>
Deaths	All Events	.71	.61	-.03	.01	1.87	4.90	No	No	.10	.05
	Clashes	.71	.61	-.03	.03	1.73	2.05	No	No	.10	.10
	Anti System	.71	.61	.00	-.02	.19	3.00	No	No	.10	.10
	Political	.71	.61	.01	-.01	.11	1.18	No	.05	No	No
	Social	.71	.61	.00	-.02	.26	4.65	No	No	.10	.10
Arrests	All Events	.71	.61	.40	-.77	-.09	104.93	No	.05	No	No
	Pro System	.71	.61	.43	-.60	-4.01	81.59	No	.05	No	No
	Anti System	.71	.61	.06	-.11	.00	13.13	No	No	.05	.05
	Political	.71	.61	.45	-.52	-8.18	72.90	No	.05	No	No
	War Deleted (7/7 = 100%)										
Duration	All Events	.51	.61	-.14	-.08	6.63	16.63	No	No	.05	.05
	Pro System	.51	.61	-.02	-.05	1.05	6.12	No	No	.05	.05
	Clashes	.51	.61	.11	-.02	5.34	8.50	No	No	.05	.05
	Anti System	.51	.61	.00	-.01	.23	2.23	No	No	.05	.05
	Political	.51	.61	.00	-.05	.21	6.19	.05	.05	.05	.05
	Economic	.51	.61	-.14	.00	6.03	5.06	No	.05	.05	.05
	Social	.51	.61	-.01	.01	.41	4.12	.05	No	.05	.05
	Total (36/39 = 73.47%)										

a. Pre and Post N refers to the number of observations in the series.
 b. Significant results (No. significant cases/No. of tests = percent significant)

there is a step level increase following the initiation of war and in the postwar months. Duration of events is the most affected indicator although the same pattern is exhibited by deaths. Violence related to economics appears to account for the increases in duration, but apparently not for the increase in deaths.

WORLD WAR I

The impact of World War I was evaluated for 49 indicators (results Table 2). Thirty-two of these variables showed significant changes at the .05 level, and an additional 4 at the .10 level. The United States entered World War I as an official combatant in April 1917. The number of days per month during which violence took place shows significant drops in level at that time for all categories of violence with the exceptions of political and pro-system violence which had sharp increases, and anti-system violence, which evidenced no slope or intercept differences. There were a number of statistically significant slope changes, but the magnitude of those changes was very small for the variables which showed significant intercept differences. Recorded deaths, with the exception of an increase (.05) from 0 to 1 for political deaths, remained constant. The number of arrests in this period rose appreciably, with only the social and anti-system categories showing no change. Pro-system and political arrests, as well as arrests in the total events category, showed an intercept increase of over 55 per month. In addition, there were 4 significant slope differences (all events, pro-system, economic, and political). It is notable that while the total number of violent events decreased in these months, political and pro-system-initiated duration and arrests rose markedly after the involvement in war.

The end of the war in November 1918, after 19 months of official American participation, evidenced significant (.05) rises of duration in all categories of violent events. Significant slope changes also occurred in every category. Recorded deaths rose for all but pro-system and economic events, with only political organizational deaths evidencing any slope change, and that was negative. The most marked change occurred in the recorded arrests category with significant (.05) intercept increases from less than 1 to 105 in the all events category. Anti-system, pro-system, and political events sharply increased accounting for most of the change, but violent clashes and economic and social arrests, while not statistically significant, also increased. The end of the war thus brought clear step level increases in all categories of recorded violence with pro-system and political events demonstrating the greater changes.

Once again the war months were deleted to compare pre- and postwar months for changes in the duration of violence. The 7 categories tested (duration for all events, pro-system, violent clashes, anti-system, political organizational, economic, and social) displayed significant (.05) increases in intercept and, unlike the Spanish-American War events, significant negative slope changes as well, with the exception of economic and social events, although none of the slope changes was of any appreciable magnitude.

WORLD WAR II

The impact of World War II was evaluated for 59 indicators (results in Table 3). Twenty of these indicators showed significant changes at the .05 level and an additional 8 at the .10 level. The number of days per month during which violence took place shows significant drops in level after December 1941 for all events (.05), pro-system (.05), social (.05), and economic violence (.10). Violence associated with clashes, on the contrary, evidences a significant (.05) increase. There were 2 significant slope changes; these occurred for pro-system (.05) and economic (.10) violence, but the actual magnitude of these changes were very small. Recorded deaths showed significant (.05) but slight increases for all events, clashes, and social violence and a significant but small decrease in economic-related deaths (.10). Once again the magnitude of slope changes was very small, and only pro-system (.05) and economic (.10) deaths demonstrate significant changes. The number of arrests in this period rose significantly (.05) and appreciably for the all events, and the pro-system and political violence categories in particular. The remaining variables, while all evidencing decreases rather than increases, were not significant. Only arrests stemming from political violence demonstrated a significant (.10) slope change.

The end of the war in August 1945, after 45 months of American participation, evidenced significant (.10) intercept changes of duration in only 2 categories of violent events, pro-system and economic. There were no significant slope changes at this time. Pro-system (.05) and economic (.10) deaths showed the only significant changes in loss of life attributable to domestic violence. Once again, there were no significant slope changes. The number of arrests show significant intercept decreases accompanied by slope increases for all events (.10) and pro-system (.05) and a decrease in political (.05) arrests accompanied by a slight decrease in slope. It is significant that there were no recorded anti-system arrests after the end of the war.

TABLE 3
Impact of World War Two on Domestic Violence

Variable	Type of Violence	Pre ^a		Slope		Intercept		Single Mood		Significance Tests	
		N	Post N	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Walker Test 1	Lev Test 1	Double Mood	
Start of War (13/20 = 65.00%) ^b											
Duration	All Events	83	73	-.04	-.02	4.09	3.78	No	No	.05	.05
	Pro System	83	73	-.01	.00	1.26	.52	No	.05	.10	.05
	Clashes	83	73	-.03	-.02	2.70	3.16	No	No	.10	.05
	Economic	83	73	-.02	.00	.00	.30	No	.10	No	No
	Social	83	73	-.02	-.02	-.02	3.22	No	No	.05	.05
Deaths	All Events	83	73	-.03	-.02	2.30	2.95	No	No	.05	.05
	Pro System	83	73	-.01	.00	.94	.15	No	.05	.10	.10
	Clashes	83	73	-.02	.02	1.37	2.79	No	No	.05	.05
	Economic	83	73	-.02	.00	1.36	.26	No	.10	No	No
	Social	83	73	-.01	-.02	.89	2.52	No	.10	No	.05
Arrests	All Events	83	73	-.05	-.08	4.95	14.14	No	No	.05	.05
	Pro System	83	73	.00	-.08	.86	13.82	No	No	.05	.05
	Political	83	73	.00	-.01	.33	14.09	No	.10	.05	.05

TABLE 3 (Continued)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Violence</i>	<i>Pre</i>	<i>Post</i>	<i>Pre</i>	<i>Post</i>	<i>Pre</i>	<i>Post</i>	<i>Mood</i>	<i>Test 1</i>	<i>Test 3</i>	<i>Mood</i>
End of War (7/20 = 35.00%)											
Duration	Pro System	128	28	.00	.04	.95	-.450	No	.10	No	No
	Economic	128	28	-.02	.01	2.10	1.39	No	.10	No	No
Deaths	Pro System	128	28	-.01	-.01	.69	1.69	No	.05	.10	
	Economic	128	28	-.01	-.02	1.02	2.80	No	No	.10	
Arrests	All Events	128	28	.02	.24	2.46	-32.41	No	No	.10	
	Pro System	128	28	.06	.24	-.91	-32.41	No	No	.05	
	Political	128	28	.05	.04	-.109	-.491	No	No	.05	
War Deleted (8/19 = 42.11%)											
Duration	All Events	83	28	-.04	.02	4.09	-.25	No	No	.05	No
	Pro System	83	28	-.01	.04	1.26	-.284	No	.05	.05	No
	Social	83	28	-.02	.01	1.20	-.13	No	No	.05	.05
Deaths	All Events	83	28	-.03	-.03	2.30	3.70	No	No	.05	.05
	Pro System	83	28	-.01	-.01	.94	1.24	No	No	.05	.05
	Social	83	28	-.01	-.01	.89	1.75	No	No	.05	.05
Arrests	Pro System	83	28	.00	.24	.86	-21.49	No	.10	No	No
	Social	83	28	-.02	.20	1.20	-18.30	No	.10	No	No
Total (28/59 = 47.46%)											

a. Pre Post N refers to the number of observations in the series.

b. Significant results (No. significant cases/No. of tests = percent significant).

TABLE 4
Impact of Korean War on Domestic Violence

Variable	Type of Violence	Pre ^a N	Slope		Intercept		Significant Tests		
			Post N	Pre	Post	Pre	Single Mood	Walker Test I	Lev Test 3
Start of War (13/25 = 52.00%) ^b									
Duration	All Events	29	.79	.13	-.01	.04	2.37	No	.05
	Clashes	29	.79	.09	.00	-.37	1.01	No	.05
	Anti System	29	.79	.05	.00	-.39	.11	.10	.05
	Political	29	.79	.00	-.01	.41	1.35	No	.05
	Economic	29	.79	.13	.00	-.98	-.16	No	.10
	All Events	29	.79	.01	.00	.02	.11	No	.05
	Pro System	29	.79	.00	.00	.00	.08	No	.10
	Anti System	29	.79	.01	.00	-.06	.00	No	.05
	Political	29	.79	.01	.00	-.06	-.03	No	.10
	Economic	29	.79	.01	.00	-.02	-.02	No	.10
	Pro System	29	.79	-.08	-.05	2.19	5.78	No	.05
	Anti System	29	.79	.05	.00	.24	.09	No	.05
	Political	29	.79	.11	-.06	2.50	5.66	No	.05
End of War (9/25 = 36.00%)									
Duration	Pro System	67	41	.00	-.62	.28	2.55	No	.05
	Political	67	41	.00	-.03	.54	2.72	No	.10
	Economic	67	41	-.01	-.03	.69	2.62	No	.10
	Social	67	41	.00	.05	.80	-.35	No	.05

TABLE 4 (Continued)

a. Pre and Post N refers to the number of observations in the series.
 b. Significant results (No. of significant cases/No. of tests = percent significant).

The war months were deleted to compare the pre- and postwar periods. The duration of all events, pro-system, and social violence showed the only significant (.05) changes in intercept and only pro-system violence had a significant (.05) slope change. All these were negative changes. Thus there was a significant decrease in violent days per month in the postwar period. Recorded deaths associated with all events, pro-system, and social violence also demonstrated significant (.05) intercept changes. However, these were increases rather than decreases with no measurable slope differences. The number of arrests in the postwar period evidenced significant (.10) increases in slope for pro-system and social violence, but no significant slope changes occurred.

In conclusion, there is a decrease in the duration of violence associated with World War II, but an increase in deaths and arrests accompany the decrease in days per month (duration), indicating that the costs of violence rose. Pro-system and social violence are the most affected types of violence in this period.

KOREAN WAR

The impact of the Korean War, which the United States entered in June 1950, was evaluated for 75 indicators (results in Table 4). Twenty-six of these indicators showed significant changes at the .05 level, and an additional 11 at the .10 level. With the beginning of U.S. participation, the duration of domestic violence shows significant (.05) intercept increases for all events, clashes, anti-system, political violence, and economic violence accompanied by significant slope changes for each of these indicators with the exception of political violence. Recorded deaths evidence significant (.10) intercept increases for all events, pro-system, political violence, and economic violence, and anti-system violence was significant at this .05 level. All slope changes were minute, with only political (.10) and anti-system violence (.05) demonstrating a statistically significant decrease in direction. The number of arrests associated with pro-system and political violence demonstrates significant (.05) intercept increases, and anti-system arrests evidence a significant (.05) decrease. The slope of the arrest lines indicates no significant deviations.

The end of active fighting in Korea 37 months later in July 1953 shows still further significant (.10) increases in the duration of political and economic violence. At this time pro-system violence also evidences a significant (.05) intercept increase and social violence a significant (.10) intercept decrease with pro-system (.05), political (.10), and social (.05) violence demonstrating significant slope changes. Recorded deaths rose significantly (.05), again for all events and economic violence, with

reaction events now also showing a significant increase in loss of life. Slopes remain unchanged once again. The only variable which has a significant (.05) change in the number of arrests at this time is pro-system violence, although there are relatively large rises in political and economic arrests and a decrease in arrests arising from social violence.

The 37 months of war were deleted and the quasi-experimental analysis indicates significantly different pre- and postwar periods in the magnitude and intensity of violence. The duration of violence is the most affected indicator with significant intercept increase evident in all events (.05), pro-system (.10), clashes (.05), anti-system (.05), political (.10) and economic (.05) violence, and a significant decrease in social violence. Only reaction events demonstrate no deviation from the trend. In addition, all events (.05), clashes (.05), anti-system (.05), and economic (.05) and social (.10) violence demonstrate significant slope changes. The number of recorded deaths is appreciably higher in the postwar period with all events (.10), anti-system (.10), reaction (.05), and economic (.05) deaths all showing significant intercept increases with only anti-system violence evidencing any significant (.10) slope changes. It is interesting that there were no recorded pro-system deaths in the postwar period. The intercepts of the number of arrests significantly rose in the postwar period only for pro-system (.10), anti-system (.10), and political (.05) violence. It is noteworthy that while deaths increased for reaction events there were no recorded arrests arising from reaction events in the postwar period. In conclusion, there are significant differences in the pre- and post-Korean War periods with most of these differences, unfortunately, in the direction of increasing duration and deaths associated with domestic violence.

VIETNAM WAR

The extensive build-up of American forces in March 1965 has been selected as the starting point for the analysis of the impact of the Vietnam War on the pattern of domestic violence. The data base extends only to the end of 1970 and thus it will be possible to analyze the war's impact only for the start of the war. The analysis of this war consists of 25 indicators (results in Table 5). Of these 25, 9 were significant at the .05 level and an additional 2 at the .10 level. The duration of violent events rose significantly (.05) for the following types of events: clashes, reaction, and political violence. Clashes and reaction demonstrate significant intercept increases, while that of political violence decreases. Slopes decreased significantly for clashes and reaction and increased for political violence. This would indicate that for the former 2 types of violence,

TABLE 5
Impact of the Start of Vietnam War on Domestic Violence

Variable	Type of Violence	Pre ^a N	Slope		Intercept		Significance Tests	
			Post N	Pre	Post	Pre	Single Mood	Walker Test I
Duration	Clashes	62	.70	.09	-.04	.26	9.48	No
	Reaction	62	.70	.02	-.03	1.10	4.23	No
	Pro System & Reaction	62	.70	.04	-.03	1.31	5.73	No
	Political	62	.70	.01	.05	-.09	-1.97	No
	All Events	62	.70	.02	-.15	.15	2.15	No
Deaths	Clashes	62	.70	.01	-.02	-.09	2.99	No
	Reaction	62	.70	.01	.00	-.02	.62	No
	Pro System & Reaction	62	.70	.01	.00	-.02	.62	No
	Social	62	.70	.01	.00	-.02	.19	No
Arrests	Reaction	62	.70	-.05	.04	-.14	2.94	No
	Political	62	.70	1.16	.91	-.23	-.44	No
						-50.86	No	No
								.10
							Total (11/25 = 44.00%) ^b	

a. Pre and Post N refers to the number of observations in the series.

b. Significant results (No. of significant cases/No. of tests = percent significant).

duration rose immediately and then slackened, while for the latter, violence increases during the war period. The number of deaths attributable to domestic violence increases significantly for a number of types of violence in the war period. All events (.05), clashes (.10), reaction (.05), and social (.05) deaths all show appreciable increases. These are primarily, however, immediate increases with the levels then returning to the trend that began before the war intensified, with slopes and intercepts for the entire period rising at the same rate as the prewar period. The number of arrests is significantly altered only for reaction (.05) and political (.10) events with both showing decreases in intercept, and the former an increase in slope and the latter a decrease. Note the virtual nonexistence of economic violence as measured by duration, and that no deaths or arrests associated with economic violence were recorded for the entire war period.

THE IMPACT OF THE FIVE WARS COMPARED

The five wars, while not evidencing comparability over all indicators and types of violence for each of the war periods, do show a number of important similarities and step changes. At the start of all five wars there were significant intercept changes. The nature of these intercept changes, however, varies from period to period. At the start of three of the wars, (World War I, Korea, Vietnam), the duration of political organizational violence rose significantly and in no case did political organizational violence significantly decrease. This occurred despite the fact that only in one war (Korean) did the total duration of *all events* increase at the start of war. In the two largest wars (World Wars I and II), the extent of economic violence decreased with their outbreak, while at the start of the two smallest wars, (Korea, Spanish-American), economic violence as measured by duration rose. As was noted previously, there was almost no economic violence for the entire Vietnam War period. Social violence was only significantly affected in World Wars I and II, rising in the former and decreasing at first in the latter. In only the Korean War did duration of anti-system violence increase significantly, while clashes rose in the last three wars, decreased during World War I, and did not change during the Spanish-American War. Pro-system violence was only significantly altered at the start of World Wars I and II, rising in the former and decreasing in the latter. However, reaction, which we have classified as a private form of pro-system violence, also rose during the Vietnam War. When we compare changes in recorded deaths resulting from violent events at the start of war there are a number of significant changes that occur, but only in the latter three wars. No changes occur in the Spanish-American War or World War I. In the thirteen cases where the number of deaths were altered, with the

exception of pro-system and economic deaths during World War II when deaths declined, the number of deaths rose. The only consistent pattern emerges in the total number of deaths resulting from all events, which rose in all three of the later wars. The variable "arrests," when significantly altered, rises on all occasions except for anti-system arrests during the Korean War. Excluding the Spanish-American War, we find that arrests resulting from political organizational violence increase at the start of all the wars. Pro-system arrests rose at the start of World Wars I and II and during the Korean War.

When we compare the four completed wars for the impact that the end of the active participation has on domestic violence, we find a much greater consistency in the direction of impact within each war period than at the start of the war, across all three variables of magnitude and intensity. With the exceptions of World War II, where pro-system and economic duration evidence the only significant deviations from trend and economic duration following the Korean War, all remaining significant deviations are in an upward direction. The most affected postwar period is that of World War I when every type of violence increases in extent. Political organizational violence, which rose significantly at the start of World War I and Korea, is significantly increased in their postwar periods as well.

The costs of domestic violence as indicated by number of deaths evidence no decrease with the end of war. In the Spanish-American War there was no measurable deviation, but for the other three wars deaths, when deviating from the war period trend, only increase, with World War I once again demonstrating the most marked impact. Arrests provide a pattern that is closer to duration than deaths at the end of the wars. While there are no significant changes after the Spanish-American War, arrests after World War I are appreciably higher and fall along with duration after World War II. The only affected type of arrest after the Korean War was pro-system arrests which, like duration, significantly increased. Note that this follows on the heels of an increase in this category at the start of the war.

When the four war periods were deleted there were significant step level increases in the number of days per month that violence took place in the postwar periods of the Spanish-American War, World War I, and Korean War, and decreases associated with World War II. The post-World-War-I and Korean War periods evidenced increased duration of all types of violence with the exception of social violence following the Korean War. While all types do not evidence significant increases following the Spanish-American War, it should be emphasized that there was not enough recorded

pro-system or anti-system violence to permit statistical analysis of the postwar period for those types of violence. The number of deaths attributable to domestic violence shows significant increases when deviation from prewar periods occurs in the postwar months for both World War II and the Korean War. Despite the fact that for World War II the duration of all violence, pro-system and social violence, significantly decreased, deaths for these types of violence increased in the postwar periods.

The hypothesis that the postevent distribution of domestic violence after each of the wars was part of either a seasonal or a longer-term trend does not appear tenable given the fact that the prewar observations do not exhibit the same trend. It is clearly not the case that preevent values can be extrapolated to obtain the results evidenced. Much of the postwar behavior thus appears to be part of a different trend—that is, sensitive to different forces than the prewar behavior. In the next section we will explore these aberrations.

EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES

Three substantive hypotheses were presented earlier, predicting changes in postwar interactions and behavior. While the quasi-experimental approach does not allow inferences to be drawn in terms of strengths of relationship, changes in the pattern of violence in terms of these hypotheses may be indicated.

Hypothesis 1: Wartime economic mobilization brings new groups into the productive process and enhances the economic positions of subordinate groups relative to the dominant segments, thus intensifying economic conflict and violence.

After both the start and end of the Spanish-American War the number of days of economic violence increased. However, after the start of World War I economic violence fell, although it rose again after the armistice. There was a large increase in the number of strikes during the war (Link, 1967: 309). However, despite the growth of strikes, the level of violence during World War I was low, and the violence was mainly directed against strikers. The increase in violence after 1919 may be explained by the twin factors of the government's policy after the war of sending troops to trouble spots as a precautionary measure and by the fact that employers who had accepted the tremendous union growth (from 2,772,000 to 4,881,000 during 1916-1921) as a wartime necessity (or as a government fiat) were now anxious to rid themselves of labor organizations (Taft and

Ross, 1969: 332-333). At the start of World War II economic violence decreased, demonstrating the same impact as the start of the previous war. The 45 months of American war participation, however, witnessed the greatest number of strikes of any period until that time, 14,471 strikes involving 6,774,000 workers. But the bulk of these strikes were over working conditions and not wages, and both the union leadership and management worked to suppress the strikes. There was thus a decrease in violence (see Brecher, 1972). The end of the war saw an even greater acceleration of strikes. The number of work days lost to strikes doubled in September, and then doubled again in October. Yet the increase in strikes notwithstanding, the duration of violence decreased, although the costs of violence rose with deaths significantly increasing in the postwar period.

At the start of the Korean War economic violence increased and continued significantly upward with the war's conclusion. During the war itself, there was one major strike, the steel strike, at which time President Truman briefly seized the mills until his action was reversed by the Supreme Court. The strike continued for 54 days, but no major violence or deaths were recorded. After the immediate postwar period labor-management relations improved to the extent that there has been little economic violence since the immediate postwar period. The Vietnam War period is the only case where no significant change in economic violence occurred, and since 1960 there have been no deaths recorded in the data set attributable to economic violence. Thus, it appears that the 4 earliest wars operated to accelerate either the duration or the consequences of economic violence by enhancing labor's bargaining position and management's negative reaction to these new demands. But with the eventual acceptance of organized labor as a respectable partner, the Vietnam War found unions and management working conspicuously together to protect their ever more similar interests.

Hypothesis 2: Wartime social mobility increases the status positions of underdog social groups relative to the dominant segments, which increases hostilities between them.

Both the initiation of the Spanish-American War and the end of fighting saw no change in social violence. The initiation of World War I and its conclusion were accompanied by significant increases in social violence. During the war the cities of the north increased their black populations in large numbers as blacks moved north, primarily due to increased labor demands. With the end of the war, the decrease in available jobs, and the frequent use of blacks as strikebreakers, social hostilities increased markedly. These hostilities culminated in major race riots in Chicago,

Charleston, Washington, Knoxville, Omaha, and Long View, Texas. In each of these riots, whites attacked blacks. In addition, during the war German Americans in Montana, Minnesota, and Wisconsin were whipped, tarred, and feathered, as part of the war hysteria. The conclusion of the war saw ethnic hatred transferred to alien radicals (see discussion below, Hypothesis 3).

The start of the Second World War was again accompanied by massive migration of blacks from the south to the urban industrial centers. The hostilities did not wait for the war's conclusion in this case, with major riots occurring in Detroit, Los Angeles, and Harlem. The Detroit and Los Angeles riots followed the pattern of 1919 and other preceding race riots, but the Harlem violence was mainly directed at white property, and was initiated by blacks. The end of the war witnessed a decrease in duration of racial violence, but an increase in deaths. In contrast to the First World War when blacks threatened white jobs, the end of the war saw blacks lose jobs far more quickly than whites, and the postwar period despite the increase in strikes was one of relative prosperity. Unlike the First World War, German Americans were not the victims of nativist hysteria; instead the government moved to its own version of hysteria by detaining 110,000 Japanese Americans in stockades for most of the war's duration.

The Korean War period witnessed no increase in racial or ethnic violence. The Supreme Court's Brown decision came almost a year after the conclusion of the war and was not followed by an upsurge in violence for another year. The Vietnam War period results should provide an interesting surprise to most current commentators on the effects of American involvement, in that there appears to be no increase in social violence attributable to the war. Only deaths due to social violence deviate from the prewar trend, providing increased human costs without increased duration. The rise in black-white violence which was mainly characterized by black "commodity riots" (see Janowitz, 1969) was part of a long-term trend that began before the acceleration of the war effort. Thus, only the two world wars significantly altered the pattern of social violence. It is difficult to ascribe, as many analysts have done, the racial difficulties of the past ten years to the Vietnam War.

Hypothesis 3: The economic and social changes of the war generate demands for the reallocation of political power and rewards, which intensifies conflict and violence between top and bottom.

Corollary A: Success in war provides increased goods to be distributed by dominant segments while increasing their power and prestige. This intensifies their efforts to maintain the control of the political system while increasing their ability to do so. The result is an increase in violence directed downward

by dominant segments which is greater than the increase of violence directed upward by lower segments.

Corollary B: Lack of success in war decreases the power and prestige of dominant segments and provides no additional goods to distribute. This intensifies their efforts to maintain control of the political system without increasing their ability to do so. The result is an increase in violence directed downward which is matched by an increase in violence directed upward by lower segments attempting to maintain the relative gains accrued to them during war.

As indicated earlier, there were no changes in political violence after the Spanish-American War and not enough recorded government-initiated violent events for analysis. During and after World War I the picture is quite different, with a sharp increase in both pro-system and political violence, as well as a small increase in anti-system-initiated violence at the end of the war. The great increase in violence can be traced to the legislative and ideological foundations laid during the war for a nationalistic, anti-radical crusade (the Espionage Act of 1917, then the Sedition Act of 1918, and congressional authorization of the Justice and Labor departments to deport any alien simply on grounds of belonging to an organization that advocated revolt or sabotage). No such bills were passed in the Spanish-American War, perhaps because of the swift success of the war effort. The Red Scare of 1919-1920 and the resultant Palmer raids led to the arrest of over 4,000 persons, including bona fide citizens, most of whom were eventually released after spending time in government stockades.

The Second World War witnessed an initial decrease in the level of pro-system violence as measured by duration and deaths, but an increase in arrests. Arrests associated with political violence also increased. There was little opposition to the war once the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, and with the exception of the internment of Japanese Americans and trouble arising in the stockades in which they were located, there was no recorded violence. With the end of the war the level of political violence duration decreases, but the slope or direction of the violence is upward after the initial decrease in the postwar period. Deaths attributable to pro-system violence increase after the war, while arrests associated with political and pro-system violence decrease markedly after the armistice, but increase once again with the passage of time. The government's efforts to protect the nation from internal radicals and alien subversives were not as spectacular as in the previous war. However, while the magnitude of deportation activities and the public governmental reaction in no way approached the hysteria of 1919-1920, the same processes of fear and curtailment of civil liberties were set in motion (see Freeland, 1972:

208-217). It should also be noted that the raw files collected under the loyalty program provided the material for McCarthy's later unsubstantiated charges of Communist infiltration in the federal government.

The period preceding the Korean War has been characterized as "a period of greater peacetime repression than the country had ever known" (Brooks, 1969: 514). The Republican Congress and President Truman competed to see who could root out the most subversives from the government. Against this background, the start of the Korean War produced still higher levels of political violence. Although anti-system violence did increase, anti-war violence did not account for this increase, having been successfully eliminated through fear and pro-war violence at the very start of the war. The end of the war brought with it even greater duration levels of pro-system and political violence. Joseph McCarthy, who symbolizes rather than is responsible for the hysteria of the period, began his rise to notoriety four months prior to the outbreak of the war. The end of the war coincided with the acceleration of his activities. McCarthy's attacks and "investigations" do not fall directly into the categories of political violence collected for analysis, but the whole range of governmental activity is important because, against this background of congressional and executive activity, pro-system violent events increased as well.

The start of the Vietnam War brought increased political and reaction violence as measured by duration, deaths, and arrests. While much of the violence during the war can be characterized as anti-war and anti-system, this anti-system bias did not begin to equal pro-war violence until October 1967. With the increases in anti-war-group-initiated violence, however, came corresponding pro-system increases as the events of Chicago in August 1968 and Kent State in May 1970 bear witness. Remember too that the anti-war violence was directed primarily toward property, while pro-system violence was aimed at individuals. Employing the provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Nixon administration was also responsible for the internment of 10,000 demonstrators in Robert F. Kennedy stadium during and after the May Day demonstrations of 1971. The Watergate hearings have also revealed the existence of extensive governmental preparations for handling "subversives" and the administration appears to have had plans for linking the Democrats to the "Communist menace," a plan McCarthy, Nixon, and the Republicans were able to sell the public twenty years ago.

Thus with each of the latter four wars violence between top and bottom increased and dominant segments perceived a direct challenge to their authoritative positions and to the political system itself. In the two wars where war aims were clearly achieved (World Wars I and II), it was

predicted that pro-system violence would increase. While we cannot evaluate the strength of this relationship, it is clear that in the First World War the increase in pro-system violence was far greater than the increase in anti-system violence. However, in World War II both forms of violence decreased with war's end, although pro-system violence began an immediate rise—a trend that does not characterize anti-system violence. The two latter wars certainly exhibit lack of successful outcomes, yet with the conclusion of the Korean War there is a rise in pro-system violence much greater than in anti-system violence, thus appearing to refute Corollary B of Hypothesis 3. Vietnam's postwar period has not been analyzed, but if recent trends continue there would not seem to be much support for Corollary B in this case either.

CONCLUSION

The analysis indicated that war did have a significant, although different, impact on the pattern of domestic violence for each of the five wars. In spite of the mixed results in support of the three hypotheses, the importance of comparing pre- and postwar years for changes in violence due to involvement in war is highlighted by comparison with the results of a study by Levy (1969: 83) which found that

The absolute number of politically violent events has been rising throughout American history with the exception of three periods. One was in the decade prior to the turn of the century. The second was prior to and following World War One. This was followed by a sharp rise during the depression period but there was another drop shortly before, through and shortly after the Second World War.

Thus increases in postwar violence also appear to occur during periods which are not characterized by long-term increases in violence. An approach which did not have the ability to distinguish short-term slope and intercept changes would likely miss a substantial change within these long-term trends.

REFERENCES

- BRECHER, J. (1972) Strike. San Francisco: Straight Arrow Books.
BROOKS, R. (1969) "Domestic violence and America's wars: a historical interpretation," pp. 503-521 in H. Graham and T. Gurr (eds.) Violence in America. New York: Signet Books.

- BUCKLEY, W. (1967) *Sociology and Modern Systems Theory*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- CAMPBELL, D. and J. STANLEY (1963) *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research*. New York: Rand McNally.
- CAPORASO, J. (1973) "Quasi-experimental approaches to social science: perspectives and problems," in J. Caporaso and L. Roos (eds.) *Quasi-Experimental Approaches*. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press.
- and A. PELOWSKI (1971) "Economic and political integration in Europe: a time-series quasi-experimental analysis." *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 65 (June).
- CHADWICK, R. (1963) "An analysis of the relationship of domestic to foreign conflict behavior over the period 1955-1957." Northwestern University. (mimeo)
- CHAFFEE, Z. (1941) *Freedom of Speech in the United States*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.
- COLLINS, J. (1969) "Foreign conflict behavior and domestic disorder in Africa." Presented at the 1969 Annual Meeting of the APSA, New York.
- COOK, F. (1971) *The Nightmare Decade*. New York: Random House.
- COSER, L. A. (1956) *The Functions of Social Conflict*. New York: Free Press.
- DAHRENDORF, R. (1959) *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- DALFIUME, R. (1971) "Beginning the Negro revolution," pp. 144-150 in K. Nelson (ed.) *The Impact of War on American Life*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- FRANKEL, J. (1964) *International Relations*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
- FREELAND, R. (1972) *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- GALTUNG, J. (1964) "A structural theory of aggression." *J. of Peace Research* 2: 95-119.
- GERTH, H. and C. W. MILLS (1958) *From Max Weber*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
- GRAHAM, H. and T. GURR (1969) *Violence in America*. New York: Signet Books.
- GROFMAN, B. and E. MULLER (1973) "The strange case of relative gratification and potential for political violence: the v curve hypothesis." *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 67 (June): 514-539.
- GURR, T. R. (1972) *Polimetries*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- (1971a) "Violence, political revolution and social change." Prepared for a seminar on revolution and social change, Pennsylvania State University.
- (1971b) "Democratic response to political violence in historical response." Presented to the National Programmatic Institute on the Response to Political Violence Through Democratic Means.
- (1970) *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.
- (1969) "A comparative study of civil strife," pp. 544-596 in H. Graham and T. Gurr (eds.) *Violence in America*. New York: Signet Books.
- HAZELWOOD, L. (1973) "Externalizing systematic stresses, international conflict as adaptive behavior," pp. 148-190 in J. Wilkenfeld, *Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics*. New York: David McKay.
- HOFSTADTER, R. (1970) "Reflections on violence in America," pp. 3-43 in R. Hofstadter and M. Wallace (eds.) *American Violence*. New York: Random House.
- JANOWITZ, M. (1969) "Patterns of collective racial violence," pp. 393-422 in H. Graham and T. Gurr (eds.) *Violence in America*. New York: Signet Books.

- LEVY, S. (1969) "A 150 year study of political violence in the United States," pp. 81-92 in H. Graham and T. Gurr (eds.) *Violence in America*. New York: Signet Books.
- LINK, A. (1967) *American Epoch: A History of the United States Since the 1890's*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- MCCORMICK, D. (1970) "A field of dynamic international processes." Research Report 40. Dimensionality of Nations Project.
- MULLER, E. N. (1972) "A partial theory of potential for political violence." *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 66 (September): 928-959.
- NARDIN, T. (1971) Theories of Conflict Management. *Peace Research Reviews*, Vol. 3.
- NELSON, K. [ed.] (1971) *The Impact of War on American Life*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- PETERSON, H. C. and R. FITE (1967) *Opponents of War 1917-1918*. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press.
- QUARLES, B. (1964) *The Negro in the Making of America*. New York: Collier Books.
- RUMMEL, R. (1963) "Dimensions of conflict behavior within and between nations." *General Systems Yearbook* 13: 1-50.
- SCHATTSCHEIDER, E. E. (1960) *The Semi-Sovereign People*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- SIMMEL, G. (1955) *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations* (translated by K. Wolff and R. Bendix). New York: Free Press.
- SINGER, J. D. and M. SMALL (1972) *The Wages of War*. New York: John Wiley.
- STOHL, M. (1973) "War and domestic political violence in the United States 1890-1970." Ph.D. dissertation. Northwestern University.
- (1971) "The study of conflict behavior within and between nations: some new evidence." Presented to the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, May.
- SWEEN, J. and D. T. CAMPBELL (1965) "A study of the effect of proximally autocorrelated error on tests of significance for the interrupted time-series quasi-experimental design. Northwestern University Department of Psychology. (mimeo)
- TAFT, P. and P. ROSS (1969) "American labor violence: its causes, character and outcome," pp. 281-395 in H. Graham and T. Gurr (eds.) *Violence in America*. New York: Signet Books.
- TANTER, R. (1964) "Dimensions of conflict behavior within and between nations." Ph.D. dissertation. Indiana University.
- TILLY, C. (1969) "Collective violence in European perspective," pp. 4-42 in H. Graham and T. Gurr (eds.) *Violence in America*. New York: Signet Books.
- WEBER, M. (1947) *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations*. (trans. by T. Parsons). New York: Free Press.
- WILKENFELD, J. [ed.] (1973a) *Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics*. New York: David McKay.
- (1973b) "Domestic conflict in the Middle East: an analysis of international inputs." Presented to Commission II.3, Ninth International Political Science Association, the World Congress, Montreal.

- (1969) "Research communication: some further findings researching the domestic and foreign conflict behaviors of nations." *J. of Peace Research* 3: 147-155.
- (1968) "Domestic and foreign conflict behavior of nations." *J. of Peace Research* 1: 56-69.
- and D. ZINNES (1973) "A linkage model of domestic conflict behavior," pp. 325-356 in J. Wilkenfeld (ed.) *Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics*. New York: David McKay.
- WILLIAMS, W. A. (1970) *The Roots of the Modern American Empire*. New York: Vintage Books.
- WRIGHT, Q. (1941) *A Study of War*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

APPENDIX A

Tests of Significance

Single-mood tests. The single-mood test is a t-test appropriate for assessment of the deviation of the first value after the occurrence of an event from a theoretical value predicted by an extrapolation from a linear fit of pre-X values. As pointed out elsewhere (Caporaso and Pelowski, 1971) it is a simple line-fitting technique based on the least-squares criterion where the regression estimate of the pre-X data is used to predict the first observation value. The t-statistic yields a value indicating the probability that the observed value could have occurred simply by extrapolating the line.

Double-mood test. This test simply extends the logic of the single-mood test. It involves both a pre-X and a post-X linear fit and a comparison of the predictions by these two estimates of a hypothetical value lying midway between the last pre-X point and the first post-X point (Sween and Campbell, 1965: 6). This test is appropriate for the assessment of intercept differences as well as slope changes.

Walker-Lev test one. This statistic evaluates the hypothesis that a common slope fits both pre- and post-X data. This condition (i.e., a common slope) may hold even if the occurrence of an event causes a change in the mean level at which the series operates, e.g., a five-year plan may result in a shift in productivity to higher levels without affecting the rate of economic growth.

Walker-Lev test three. This test yields an F-statistic which tests the null hypothesis that a common regression line fits both pre- and post-X distributions. Separate regression estimates are calculated for both sets of data. These are subsequently compared to see if they could have been drawn from the same population.

APPENDIX B
Sample Code Sheet

Date of Event	Month _____	Day _____	Year _____	Page / column
Location				
Formations Involved				
Magnitude:				
Duration _____ (in days)				
Intensity:				
Injuries _____	Property Damage _____	Deaths _____	Arrests _____	

Initiator of Attack

Pro-System ____ (Reaction ____ Repression ____) Clashes ____ Anti-System ____

Ranking System				
Governmental	11 Federal	Ethnic	41 Northern European	
	12 State		42 Southern European	
	13 Local		43 Eastern European	
	14 (Other)		44 Latin	
			45 Asian	
Racial	21 White	Political Org.	51 Republican	
	22 Black		52 Democrat	
	23 Indian		53 Right Wing	
	24 Oriental		54 Left Wing	
Economic	31 Employer		55 Anti-War	
	32 Landlords		56 Women	
	33 Credit		57 (Other)	
	34 Commodity	Religious	61 Protestant	
	35 Small Business		62 Catholic	
	36 Farmer		63 Jewish	
	37 Employees		64 (Other)	
	38 Agricultural Laborers			
	39 Unemployed			
		Educational	71 University Ad.	
			72 Faculty	
Issue Area			73 Students	
1. Foreign Policy				
2. Racial			99 No Information	
3. Economic				
4. Religious	Economic (3)			
5. Ethnic	Social (2, 4, 5, 7)			
6. Ideological	Political (1, 6)			
7. Educational				
9. No Information				
