Jack Dates Do Y = a mod q = 7 mod 71 = 51 (D 18= xB mad 9 = 712 mod 71 = 4 @ q x A x B mol q = 75.12 mol 71 = 30 @ This breaks the protocol and won't result in a shared secret. It also can reveal the secret number x. In particular, if a mod q-1 exists, (x) = x mod q and the secret is revealed.

The attacker generates 264/2=232 variation of their desired Frandulent message (assuming the language/protocol allows For redundant meaning) along with their hasher. They then start generating valid messages and computing the hashes. It any hash natches the hash of one of the 232 Frandulent messages, they have X sign the valid message, providing the signature for the fraudulent nessage of the same hash. If
the attacker generates mill of the ratio messages, the probability of a collision is about 1/2. 1 They generate 232 valid and 232 Frandhlent messages, and for to be efficient). That's (232+232). M + 232.64 = 233 M + 238 bits @ 233 hosher . 2 20 5 = 213 seconds = 8192 5 @ number of nessages (valid and fraudulent) is 264 now, sa (264+264). M + 264. 128 = 265 M + 271 5its 265 hashes, 5-50 = 245? 3 This is the Merkele-Hellman Knapsack cryptosystem. We calculate the public key B= (ma.s; mod p...) = (1097, 1175, 1408, 1877, 1008, 1194, 779, 45t). To encrypt the bits of P we calculate c= \$B; P; = 1097. 0+1175.1+1409.0+1877.1+1009.0+1194.1+779.1+456.1=5481 To decrypt, we calculate at mod p=1589 and calculate e'= a'c mod p= 1581.5481 mod 1919-1665. We non solve subset sun with the secret S. Since Sis superincreasing, we greedily take the largest value of I that is less than I and set that bit in the plaintext, subtracting from of the element and continuing. 16652946 so the last bit is set, new o'=1665-946=719,7192450 so the 200 last bit is set, and so on giving P=01010111