
Labor Market Flows of Young Workers in Colombia

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Motivation

 Do changes in payroll taxes affect labor market flows of young adults in Colombia?



Literature

Description of labor flows

Kaitz (1970); Blanchard et al. (1990); Mortensen and Pissarides (1994); Pissarides (1990); Burdett and Mortensen (1998);

Labor Search Models

Burdett and Mortensen (1998); Van den Berg and Ridder (1998); Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (2000); Meghir et al. (2015); Narita (2020)

Latin-America and Colombia

Prada (2012); Lasso (2013); López y Lasso (2016); Flórez et al (2018); Lasso (2020)

Payroll Taxes in Colombia

Kugler and Kugler (2009); Antón (2014); Galiani et al. (2015); Becerra (2017)

First Job Act

Law 1429 of 2010 known as "Ley del Primer Empleo".

- Reduction of the value of payroll taxes of SENA, ICBF,
 Family Compensation Funds, Health Funds and Pension funds
- Workers younger than 28 years old. Groups
- First Job Act applied for firms that hire workers between January 2011 and December 2014.
- Firms must satisfy some conditions to receive payroll tax reductions

I use the condition for new workers younger than 28 years old to estimate the effect of the First Job act on worker flows.




Structure of The Paper

- 1 Theoretical Framework (Labor Search Model)
- 2 Data (Colombian National Labor Survey)
- 3 Empirical Strategy (Regression Discontinuity Design)
- 4 Results

Theoretical Framework

Narita (2020)

- Self-employment ability θ
- Labor experience ϵ
- Transition probabilities: δ^i , $\lambda_{\epsilon}^k(\theta)$
- Distribution of wages:
 F^j (w)
- Non-labor income and home production value: $b_{\epsilon}(\theta), h_{\epsilon}(\theta)$
- Reservation wages: $R_{c\perp 1}^{kj}(\theta)$




▶ Bellman Equation

► Measure of Worker

→ Firms

Theoretical Framework

Mancera (2021): Out of labor state



Bellman equation for workers out of labor force

$$\begin{split} \left(1+r\right)H_{\epsilon}\left(\theta\right) &= h_{\epsilon}\left(\theta\right) + \lambda_{\epsilon}^{41}\left(\theta\right) \int_{R_{\epsilon+1}^{41}}^{\bar{w}^{1}} W_{\epsilon+1}^{1}\left(\chi,\theta\right) dF^{1}\left(\chi\right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{42}\left(\theta\right) \int_{R_{\epsilon+1}^{42}}^{\bar{w}^{2}} W_{\epsilon+1}^{2}\left(\chi,\theta\right) dF^{2}\left(\chi\right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{43}\left(\theta\right) 1\{W_{\epsilon+1}^{3}\left(\theta\right) > H_{\epsilon+1}\left(\theta\right)\}W_{\epsilon+1}^{3}\left(\theta\right) \\ &+ \delta_{\epsilon}^{4}\left(\theta\right) 1\{U_{\epsilon+1}\left(\theta\right) > H_{\epsilon+1}\left(\theta\right)\}U_{\epsilon+1}\left(\theta\right) \\ &+ \left[1 - d_{\epsilon}^{4}\left(\theta\right)\right] H_{\epsilon+1}\left(\theta\right) \end{split}$$

▶ Measure of Workers

Colombian National Labor Survey (GEIH)

Individual data from January 2008 to December 2019

	Formal	Informal	Self-	Unemployment	Inactivity
	Employment	Employment	Employment	Offernployment	illactivity
Age (mean)	28,07	27,52	28,52	26,44	25,75
Schooling					
None	0,86	0,67	1,93	0,39	1,24
Primary	3,76	1,53	5,69	1,56	3,37
Secondary	1,54	0,42	1,90	0,68	1,35
High School	16,82	2,13	10,64	5,82	11,75
Vocational education	7,38	0,35	2,73	2,03	1,63
College degree	5,24	0,12	2,42	1,49	0,58
Graduate degree	1,25	0,01	0,53	0,15	0,05
% Females	16,27	3,70	10,76	7,38	15,42
Labor Income					
Mean	\$ 1.695.660	\$ 581.253	\$ 671.182	-	-
Std.dev	\$ 2.602.678	\$ 3.587.242	\$ 915.771	-	-
% Social Security	34,41	4,39	21,48	9,00	17,63

Transitions From Out of Labor Force










Transitions From Informality



Empirical Strategy


Let y_a transition rates from one state to another for age groups individuals a

$$y_a = \tau D + f(a) + e_a \tag{1}$$

Where D is a dummy variable that indicates 1 if the age group if treated and 0 otherwise. a is normalized age (in months), f(a) is a polynomial function of age and e_a is the error term.

Main Specification

RD estimate of First Job Act effect on transition rates from informality to formality



Main Specification

RD Estimates of First Job Act

Dependent	All	Men	Women
Variable			
Informality	-0.0287***	-0.0621***	-0.0110
to Formality			
	(0.00760)	(0.0130)	(0.00868)
Unemployment to Formality	0.00506	-0.00557	0.00685
to Formality	(0.0107)	(0.0273)	(0.0124)
Inactivity	-0.000568	-0.00301	0.00313
to Formality	(0.00519)	(0.0125)	(0.00589)
Informality	0.00300	0.0117	-0.00166
to Self-employment	*******	***	
	(0.00572)	(0.0128)	(0.00770)
Unemployment to Self-employment	-0.00670	0.00826	-0.0117
to Sen-employment	(0.0119)	(0.0188)	(0.0127)
Inactivity	-0.00593	0.00757	-0.00786
to Self-employment			
	(0.00479)	(0.0132)	(0.00516)
N	204	204	204


Robustness Checks

RD Estimates of First Job Act including time effects

Dependent Variable	All	Men	Women
Informality		0.05=0444	
to Formality	-0.0270**	-0.0679***	-0.00658
	(0.00994)	(0.0154)	(0.00969)
Unemployment to Formality	-0.00416	-0.00816	0.00279
to Formanty	(0.0131)	(0.0292)	(0.0148)
Inactivity	0.00141	-0.00576	0.00331
to Formality	(0.00507)	(0.0139)	(0.00585)
Informality	0.00118	0.0106	-0.00329
to Self-employment	(0.00695)	(0.0143)	(0.00871)
Unemployment	0.00607	0.00336	-0.00333
to Self-employment	(0.0166)	(0.0200)	(0.0164)
Inactivity	0.00440	0.00620	0.00054
to Self-employment	-0.00442	0.00629	-0.00854
	(0.00469)	(0.0161)	(0.00532)
N	9454	6448	8797

Robustness Checks

RD estimates of First Job Act effect with varying bandwidth



Conclusion

- In this paper, I propose an extension of the on-the-job labor model of Narita (2020) to understand how labor decisions made by firms and workers can affect the flows between states and then I estimate the effect of First Job Act on changes in labor market flows of young adults.
- I found that the reduction in payroll taxes of around 11 percentage points of formal firms in Colombia can raise flows from informality to formality of workers by around 2,8 percentage points. The effect is larger for men whose transition rate increase in 6,2 percentage points.
- This raises the question of which policies encourage flows from other states into formality, even in the context of developing countries such as Colombia.

To do list

- Run robustness from Cattaneo et al (2014).
- Run McCrary test (2008).
- Estimate the structural model including out of labor force state.

Labor Market Flows of Young Workers in Colombia

Thanks for your attention and comments

First Job Act Target Groups

- Workers younger than 28 years old
- Workers in forced displacement condition
- Women above 40 years old and without formal employment in the past twelve months
- Heads of household eligible for social assistance programs
- Workers with a 1.5 Colombian minimum wage and without previous experience in the formal sector

▶ First Job Act

First Job Act Conditions

- The employer must increase the number of employees in relation to the number of employees that contribute to social security in December to the previous year.
- The employer must increase the total payroll value of the firm in relation to the total payroll value in December to the previous year.
- Payroll taxes that are going to be discounted were fully paid.
- The new worker must not to be hired to replace an old worker. (This means that hiring requires new jobs).
- New jobs do not result from firm's merge.



Unemployment

$$\begin{split} (1+r) \ U_{\epsilon} \left(\theta\right) &= b_{\epsilon} \left(\theta\right) + \lambda_{\epsilon}^{01} \left(\theta\right) \int_{R_{\epsilon+1}^{01}}^{\bar{w}^{1}} W_{\epsilon+1}^{1} \left(\chi,\theta\right) dF^{1} \left(\chi\right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{02} \left(\theta\right) \int_{R_{\epsilon+1}^{02}}^{\bar{w}^{2}} W_{\epsilon+1}^{2} \left(\chi,\theta\right) dF^{2} \left(\chi\right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{03} \left(\theta\right) 1 \{W_{\epsilon+1}^{3} \left(\theta\right) > U_{\epsilon+1} \left(\theta\right)\} W_{\epsilon+1}^{3} \left(\theta\right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{04} \left(\theta\right) 1 \{H_{\epsilon+1} \left(\theta\right) > U_{\epsilon+1} \left(\theta\right)\} H_{\epsilon+1} \left(\theta\right) \\ &+ \left[1 - d_{\epsilon}^{0} \left(\theta\right)\right] U_{\epsilon+1} \left(\theta\right) \end{split}$$

Out of Labor Force

$$(1+r) H_{\epsilon}(\theta) = h_{\epsilon}(\theta) + \lambda_{\epsilon}^{41}(\theta) \int_{R_{\epsilon+1}}^{\bar{w}^{1}} W_{\epsilon+1}^{1}(\chi, \theta) dF^{1}(\chi)$$

$$+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{42}(\theta) \int_{R_{\epsilon+1}}^{\bar{w}^{2}} W_{\epsilon+1}^{2}(\chi, \theta) dF^{2}(\chi)$$

$$+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{43}(\theta) 1\{W_{\epsilon+1}^{3}(\theta) > H_{\epsilon+1}(\theta)\} W_{\epsilon+1}^{3}(\theta)$$

$$+ \delta_{\epsilon}^{4}(\theta) 1\{U_{\epsilon+1}(\theta) > H_{\epsilon+1}(\theta)\} U_{\epsilon+1}(\theta)$$

$$+ \left[1 - d_{\epsilon}^{4}(\theta)\right] H_{\epsilon+1}(\theta)$$

Formal Employment

$$(1+r) W_{\epsilon}^{1}(w,\theta) = w + \delta_{\epsilon}^{1}(U_{\epsilon+1}(\theta) + UI + sw)$$

$$+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{11}(\theta) \int_{w}^{\bar{w}^{1}} W_{\epsilon+1}^{1}(\chi,\theta) dF^{1}(\chi)$$

$$+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{12}(\theta) \int_{R_{\epsilon+1}^{12}(\theta)}^{\bar{w}^{2}} W_{\epsilon+1}^{2}(\chi,\theta) dF^{2}(\chi)$$

$$+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{13}(\theta) 1\{w < R_{\epsilon+1}^{13}(\theta)\} W_{\epsilon+1}^{3}(\theta)$$

$$+ \lambda_{\epsilon+1}^{14}(\theta) 1\{w < H_{\epsilon+1}(\theta)\} H_{\epsilon+1}(\theta)$$

$$+ [1 - d^{1}] W_{\epsilon+1}^{1}(w,\theta)$$

Informal Employment

$$\begin{split} (1+r) \, W_{\epsilon}^2 \left(w, \theta \right) &= w + \delta_{\epsilon}^2 \, U_{\epsilon+1} \left(\theta \right) + \lambda_{\epsilon}^{21} \left(\theta \right) \int_{R_{\epsilon+1}^{21} \left(w, \theta \right)}^{\bar{w}^1} \, W_{\epsilon+1}^1 \left(\chi, \theta \right) dF^1 \left(\chi \right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{22} \left(\theta \right) \int_{w}^{\bar{w}^2} \, W_{\epsilon+1}^2 \left(\chi, \theta \right) dF^2 \left(\chi \right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{23} \left(\theta \right) 1 \{ w < R_{\epsilon+1}^{32} \left(\theta \right) \} W_{\epsilon+1}^3 \left(\theta \right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{24} \left(\theta \right) 1 \{ w < H_{\epsilon+1} \left(\theta \right) \} H_{\epsilon+1} \left(\theta \right) \\ &+ \left[1 - d_{\epsilon}^2 \left(w, \theta \right) \right] \, W_{\epsilon+1}^2 \left(\theta \right) \end{split}$$

The measure of workers in formal employment state

$$\begin{split} \textit{M}_{\epsilon+1}^{1}\left(w,\theta\right) &= \left[1-\textit{d}_{\epsilon}^{1}\left(w,\theta\right)\right] \textit{M}_{\epsilon}^{1}\left(w,\theta\right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{01}\left(\theta\right) \textit{u}_{\epsilon}\left(\theta\right) \textit{max}\{\textit{F}^{1}\left(w\right)-\textit{F}^{1}\left(\textit{R}_{\epsilon+1}^{01}\left(\theta\right)\right),0\} \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{21}\left(\theta\right) \int_{\underline{w}^{2}}^{\bar{w}^{2}} \textit{max}\{\textit{F}^{1}\left(w\right)-\textit{F}^{1}\left(\textit{R}_{\epsilon+1}^{21}\left(\chi,\theta\right)\right),0\} \textit{d}\textit{M}_{\epsilon}^{2}\left(\chi,\theta\right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{31}\left(\theta\right) \textit{m}_{\epsilon}^{3}\left(\theta\right) \textit{max}\{\textit{F}^{1}\left(w\right)-\textit{F}^{1}\left(\textit{R}_{\epsilon+1}^{31}\left(\theta\right)\right),0\} \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{41}\left(\theta\right) \textit{m}_{\epsilon}^{4}\left(\theta\right) \textit{max}\{\textit{F}^{1}\left(w\right)-\textit{F}^{1}\left(\textit{R}_{\epsilon+1}^{41}\left(\theta\right)\right),0\} \end{split}$$

The measure of workers in informal employment state

$$\begin{split} M_{\epsilon+1}^2\left(w,\theta\right) &= \left[1-d_{\epsilon}^2\left(w,\theta\right)\right] M_{\epsilon}^2\left(w,\theta\right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{02}\left(\theta\right) u_{\epsilon}\left(\theta\right) \max\{F^2\left(w\right)-F^2\left(R_{\epsilon+1}^{02}\left(\theta\right)\right),0\} \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{12}\left(\theta\right) \int_{\underline{w}^1}^{\bar{w}^1} \max\{F^2\left(w\right)-F^2\left(R_{\epsilon+1}^{12}\left(\chi,\theta\right)\right),0\} dM_{\epsilon}^1\left(\chi,\theta\right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{32}\left(\theta\right) m_{\epsilon}^3\left(\theta\right) \max\{F^2\left(w\right)-F^2\left(R_{\epsilon+1}^{32}\left(\theta\right)\right),0\} \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{42}\left(\theta\right) m_{\epsilon}^4\left(\theta\right) \max\{F^2\left(w\right)-F^2\left(R_{\epsilon+1}^{42}\left(\theta\right)\right),0\} \end{split}$$

The measure of workers in self-employment state

$$\begin{split} m_{\epsilon+1}^{3}\left(\theta\right) &= \left[1-d_{\epsilon}^{3}\left(\theta\right)\right] m_{\epsilon}^{3}\left(\theta\right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{03}\left(\theta\right) u_{\epsilon}\left(\theta\right) 1\{W_{\epsilon+1}^{3}\left(\theta\right) > U_{\epsilon+1}\left(\theta\right)\} \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{13}\left(\theta\right) \int_{\underline{w}^{1}}^{R_{\epsilon+1}^{31}\left(\theta\right)} dM_{\epsilon}^{1}\left(\chi,\theta\right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{23}\left(\theta\right) \int_{\underline{w}^{2}}^{R_{\epsilon+1}^{32}\left(\theta\right)} dM_{\epsilon}^{2}\left(\chi,\theta\right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{43}\left(\theta\right) m_{\epsilon}^{4}\left(\theta\right) 1\{W_{\epsilon+1}^{3}\left(\theta\right) > H_{\epsilon+1}\left(\theta\right)\} \end{split}$$

The measure of workers in out of labor force state

$$\begin{split} m_{\epsilon+1}^4\left(\theta\right) &= \left[1 - d_{\epsilon}^4\left(\theta\right)\right] m_{\epsilon}^4\left(\theta\right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{04}\left(\theta\right) u_{\epsilon}\left(\theta\right) 1\{H_{\epsilon+1}\left(\theta\right) > U_{\epsilon+1}\left(\theta\right)\} \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{14}\left(\theta\right) \int_{\underline{w}^1}^{R_{\epsilon+1}^{41}\left(\theta\right)} dM_{\epsilon}^1\left(\chi,\theta\right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{24}\left(\theta\right) \int_{\underline{w}^2}^{R_{\epsilon+1}^{32}\left(\theta\right)} dM_{\epsilon}^2\left(\chi,\theta\right) \\ &+ \lambda_{\epsilon}^{34}\left(\theta\right) m_{\epsilon}^3\left(\theta\right) 1\{H_{\epsilon+1}\left(\theta\right) > W_{\epsilon+1}^3\left(\theta\right)\} \end{split}$$

Firms

Formal firms steady state profit

$$\pi_{1}\left(p,w
ight)=\left(1-\sigma
ight)\sum_{\epsilon}\sum_{ heta}\left[p-\left(1+ au+\delta_{\epsilon}^{1}s
ight)w
ight]\ell_{\epsilon}^{1}\left(w, heta
ight)\gamma_{\epsilon}q_{ heta}$$

Informal firms steady state profit

$$\pi_{2}(p, w) = [p - C - w] \sum_{\epsilon} \sum_{\theta} \ell^{2}_{\epsilon}(w, \theta) \gamma_{\epsilon} q_{\theta}$$

 With normalized labor size of formal and informal firms equal to:

$$\ell_{\epsilon}^{1}(w,\theta) = \frac{1}{n_{1}} \frac{dM_{\epsilon}^{1}(w,\theta)}{dF^{1}(w)} \quad \text{and} \quad \ell_{\epsilon}^{2}(w,\theta) = \frac{1}{n_{2}} \frac{dM_{\epsilon}^{2}(w,\theta)}{dF^{2}(w)}$$

Retrospective Questions

Formal Employment

State	Question	Question Code
	¿Have you ever worked for at least two consecutive weeks?	P7430
	¿How long have you been working for the last time? At least for two weeks	P7440
	How long have you last looked for a job?	P7456
Formal	¿Have you looked for work for the first time or have you worked before for at least two consecutive weeks?	P7310
Employment	¿How many weeks ago have you stopped working for the last time?	P7320
	¿How many weeks have you been or were you looking for work?	P7250
	¿How long have you been working in this company, business, industry, office, firm or farm continuously?	P6426
	Before the current job, ¿did you have another job?	P7020
	¿How many months were you without a job between your current job and your previous one?	P760

→ Transition

Retrospective Questions Unemployment

State	Question	Question Code
	¿Have you ever worked for at least two consecutive weeks?	P7430
	¿How long has it been since you last worked?	P7440
	How many weeks ago have you stopped working for the last time?	P7320
	In this last job you were:	P7350
Unemployment	¿How long have you been working in this company, business, industry, office, firm or farm continuously?	P6426
	In your previous job you were:	P7028
	¿How many months were you without a job or job between your current job and your previous one?	P760
	¿How long have you been working in this company, business, industry, office, firm or farm continuously?	P6426
	In this job you are:	P6430

Retrospective Questions

Informal Employment

State	Question	Question Code
	¿How many weeks ago have you stopped working for the last time?	P7320
	In this last work it was:	P7350
Informal Employment	¿How long have you been working in this company, business, industry, office, firm or farm?	P6426
,	In your previous job you were:	P7028
	¿How many months were you without a job or job between your current job and your previous one?	P760
	In this job you are:	P6430

Retrospective Questions Self-Employment

State	Question	Question Code
	¿How many weeks ago have you stopped working for the last time?	P7320
	In this last work it was:	P7350
Self- Employment	¿How long have you been working in this company, business, industry, office, firm or farm?	P6426
1 3	In your previous job you were:	P7028
	¿How many months were you without a job or job between your current job and your previous one?	P760
	In this job you are:	P6430

Retrospective Questions

Out of Labor Force

State	Question	Question Code
	¿Have you looked for work for the first time or had you worked before for at least two consecutive weeks?	P7310
	¿How many weeks ago have you stopped working for the last time?	P7320
Out of	¿How many weeks have you been or were you looking for work?	P7250
Labor Force	¿How long have you been working in this company, business, industry, office, firm or farm continuously?	P6426
	Before the current job, ¿did you have another job?	P7020
	¿How many months were you without a job or job between your current job and your previous one?	P760
	¿How long did have your last work?	P7440

Bi-proportional Matrix Scaling

- 'Initial' matrix Z of dimension n by m where $a_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}^+$ and an unknown 'target' matrix Z* with the same dimensions and other mathematical properties
- Third matrix $\tilde{\bar{Z}}$ not only with the same dimension and mathematical properties as Z^* but also with the same known margin
- $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \bar{z}_{ij}^{*} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \widetilde{z}_{ij}^{*}$ and $\sum_{j=1}^{m} \bar{z}_{ij}^{*} = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \widetilde{z}_{ij}^{*}$
- The problem is to obtain a \overline{Z} that is as close as possible to Z^*

▶ Transition

Transition Rates

- Stock of states: Unemployment (U_t) , Formal Employment (E_t) , Informal Employment (IE_t) , Self-employment (S_t) , Out of labor force (H_t)
- Transitions between states or flows
- Matrix Balance
- Transition rates, e.g., Transition Rate from Unemployment to Employment $(\lambda_t^{\mathit{UE}})$

$$\lambda_t^{UE} = \frac{U_{t-1}E_t}{U_{t-1}}$$



Additional Estimates

RD Estimates of First Job Act for individuals with high school degree or less

Dependent Variable	AII	Men	Women
Informality to Formality	-0.0299***	-0.0642***	-0.0115
to Tormanty	(0.00765)	(0.0137)	(0.00904)
Unemployment to Formality	-0.00595	-0.0450	0.00465
to Formality	(0.0135)	(0.0352)	(0.0142)
Inactivity	0.00999	0.00353	0.0130*
to Formality	(0.00537)	(0.0167)	(0.00629)
Informality	0.00446	0.0118	-0.000284
to Self-employment	(0.00644)	(0.0137)	(0.00873)
Unemployment	-0.00191	0.0282	-0.00984
to Self-employment	(0.0162)	(0.0260)	(0.0179)
Inactivity	-0.00591	-0.0151	-0.00468
to Self-employment	(0.00571)	(0.0148)	(0.00607)
N	204	204	204

Additional Estimates

RD Estimates of First Job Act for individuals with more than high school degree

Dependent Variable	All	Men	Women
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •			
Informality to Formality	-0.00877	0.0441	0.00756
	(0.0330)	(0.0932)	(0.0337)
Unemployment to Formality	0.0319**	0.0785*	0.0172*
	(0.0197)	(0.0390)	(0.0257)
Inactivity to Formality	-0.00441	-0.00177	-0.00632
	(0.0136)	(0.0280)	(0.0148)
Informality to Self-employment	-0.0142	-0.00176	-0.0133
. ,	(0.0251)	(0.0444)	(0.0272)
Unemployment to Self-employment	-0.0168**	-0.0170	-0.0151*
. ,	(0.0144)	(0.0274)	(0.0189)
Inactivity to Self-employment	-0.00549	0.0434	-0.0167
	(0.0105)	(0.0290)	(0.0125)
N	204	204	204

Placebo Estimates

RD estimates of placebo sample

Dependent Variable	All	Men	Women
Dependent variable			
Informality to Formality	0.00140	0.00321	-0.000367
22 1 22,	(0.00532)	(0.0104)	(0.00543)
Unemployment to Formality	-0.0172*	-0.0259	-0.0152
,	(0.00730)	(0.0159)	(0.00851)
Inactivity to Formality	-0.00643	0.00209	-0.00500
	(0.00348)	(0.0107)	(0.00373)
Informality to Self-employment	-0.00911	-0.00897	-0.00902
	(0.00701)	(0.0128)	(0.00699)
Unemployment to Self-employment	0.00278	-0.0136	0.00845
	(0.0162)	(0.0119)	0.00845
Inactivity to Self-employment	-0.00553	0.00852	-0.00746
. ,	(0.00332)	(0.00907)	(0.00372)
N	204	204	204