#### POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC BANKS

ELECTORAL EFFECTS OF SAVINGS BANKS IN GERMAN SUBNATIONAL ELECTIONS

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## BACKGROUND

#### **MOTIVATION**

- financial crisis 2007-8: increased interest in bank-politics interface
- politicians' participation in public banks understudied
- public banks are central element of Europe's banking sector

## Institutional Setting

- large number of public savings banks (Sparkassen) in Germany
- Sparkassen important providers of credit and public goods
- regional outlook of savings banks & close ties to local politics

### SPARKASSEN BUSINESS AREAS



# any ideas how to centre?



## Hypothesis

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 mayors with board seat in savings bank extract political rents from board membership

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Mayors with a board seat in a Sparkasse are more likely to be re-elected than mayors without a boardseat, holding all other explanatory variables constant.

#### STORYLINE

How does membership in a Sparkasse affect electoral success?

- direct channel: influence on strategic decisions of bank
  - credit volume
  - timing of consolidation and mergers
  - donations & payouts
- indirect channel: competence signal to constituency

# Empirical Strategy & Findings | Model & Controls

### DATA

- Data on all Bavarian mayoral elections conducted 1948-2014 were obtained from the Bavarian Statistical Office
- Hand collected dataset on board members in Bavaria's Sparkassen for 2006-2015

Data is matched on names to find mayors who were members of a Sparkassen governing board

## Subset & Statistical Model

#### Subset

- only elections from 2006 to 2014
- only elections with at least two candidates
- excluded elections where a run-off was necessary

Logistic regression to deal with binary dependent variable

- DV: Re-election of mayor yes / no
- main IV: Sparkassen board membership in year prior to election
- control IVs:
  - vote share received by the last winning mayor
  - gender
  - municipality size proxy: log(number of eligible voters)



### REGRESSION RESULTS


Table 1: Logistic regression results w/ odds ratios

	Dependent variable:
	Re-election of mayor
Sparkassen board member	1.228
	$t = 1.813^*$
Previous vote share	0.997
	t = -0.754
Female	1.157
	t = 0.834
Number eligible voters	1.242
	t = 4.453***
Constant	0.160
	t = -3.821***
Observations	2,547
Log Likelihood	-1,726.577
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,463.154

Note:

#### A CLOSER LOOK AT PREVIOUS VOTE SHARE

## Probability of Re-election over Previous Vote Shares



Thank you for your attention! https://github.com/jmarkgraf/PresentationAssignment