Replicator dynamics with spatial structure for evolutionary games

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Evolutionary Games

Evolutionary Game Theory

Evolutionary game theory is a type of dynamic game theory in which the proportion of a population with a particular strategy changes in time based on the fitness benefit it provides

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Evolutionary game theory has many applications in all sorts of complex systems. It is important to the APPEX center because it comes up in

- Evolutionary Ecology
- Behavioral Ecology
- Collective Behavior
- Economics



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Replicator Dynamics

The most famous way to describe an evolutionary game is through the replicator equation. If you have a well mixed infinitely large population and each player plays a single pure strategy then the proportion of players using the ith strategy, p_i changes in time by

$$\frac{d}{dt}p_i(t) = p_i(f_i(p) - \varphi(p))$$

where $p = [p_i]_{i=1}^m$, f_i is the fitness of playing strategy i against the mixture p and $\varphi(p)$ is the fitness of an average individual in the mixture p.

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Replicator Dynamics

In the pure strategy coordination game your fitness is exactly the proportion of neighbors using the same strategy as you. Thus $f_i(p) = p_i$ and $\varphi(p) = |p|^2$

Coordination Example

For a pure coordination game. The replicator equation is

$$\frac{d}{dt}p_i=p_i(p_i-|p|^2)$$

All equilibria have the property that for all i such that $p_i \neq 0$ it is true that $p_i = |p|^2$. It is unstable when there is more than one such p_i .



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Shifting Key Assumptions

Consider the setting where each player takes on a *mixed strategy*, there are a finite number of players where are not well mixed.



Shifting Key Assumptions

Consider the setting where each player takes on a *mixed strategy*, there are a finite number of players where are <u>not</u> well mixed.

$$\frac{d}{dt}u_{v}^{i}=u_{v}^{i}(f_{v}^{i}(u_{v})-\varphi_{v}(u_{v}))$$

Is this model still meaningful?



I argue that it is meaningful.

Well posedness

For an initial value problem $\frac{d}{dt}u_v^i=u_v^i(f_v^i(u_v)-\varphi_v(u_v))$ where $u_v^i(0)=u_{v0}^i$ and $u_{v0}\in\Delta^{m-1}$ then $u_v(t)\in\Delta^{m-1}$ for all time t>0

Better reply dynamic

At any time for a solution to the initial value problem above, all players are changing their strategy to increase their fitness relative to the present strategy profile. That is: $\left\langle \frac{\partial}{\partial t} u_{v}, \nabla w_{v}(u_{v}|u) \right\rangle \geq 0$ where $w_{v}(u_{v}|u)$ is the fitness of player v playing strategy u_{v} against the strategy profile u.



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Computing the Jacobian

For a general normal form game with additive payoffs we write

$$\frac{d}{dt}u_{\nu}^{i} = f_{\nu}^{i}(u) = u_{\nu}^{i}(e^{i} - u_{\nu})^{\mathsf{T}}Au_{\Gamma(\nu)}$$
 (1)

where $u_{\Gamma(v)} = \sum_{w \in V} W_{wv} u_w$ For the pure coordination game in particular we can write

$$\frac{d}{dt}u_{\nu}^{i}=f_{\nu}^{i}(u)=u_{\nu}^{i}\langle e^{i}-u_{\nu},u_{\Gamma(\nu)}\rangle \tag{2}$$

so we have $m \times n$ equations. We will order them first by strategy then by player so we write

$$\frac{d}{dt}u = [f_1^1, f_1^2, ..., f_1^m, f_2^1, f_2^2, ..., f_2^m, ..., f_n^1, ..., f_n^m]^{\mathsf{T}}$$

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For pure strategy equilibria we know that $u_v^i u_v^j = \delta_{i,j}$ and thus $(\nabla_w f_v^\intercal)^\intercal = 0$ whenever $w \neq v$ which is great because the Jacobian becomes block diagonal

$$J(u) = \begin{bmatrix} \text{diag}(\langle e^i - u_1, u_{\Gamma(1)} \rangle) - u_1 u_{\Gamma(1)}^\intercal & \mathbf{0} \\ & \ddots & \\ \mathbf{0} & \text{diag}(\langle e^i - u_n, u_{\Gamma(n)} \rangle) - u_n u_{\Gamma(n)}^\intercal \end{bmatrix}$$

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
This is important because now we have a method to directly determine the stability of a coordinating system (indeed any matrix game) in linear time for 4 or fewer strategies.

- 1 We get local stability information easily
- Perviously checking stability was a quadratic process
- For more than 4 strategies, the eigenvalues cannot be computed in linear time but can we can find them in $\mathcal{O}(nm^2)$



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As a sanity check we can see that the consensus equilibrium $(u_{\nu}^{\star} = [1, 0, ..., 0]^{\mathsf{T}}$ for all v) has $J(u^{\star}) = -I_n$ so it is clearly stable.



For the above graph we can easily compute that

$$\hat{u} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$
 is stable because $\sigma(J(\hat{u})) = \{-2, -1\}$



For the above graph we can easily compute that

$$\hat{u} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$
 and the spectrum is $\sigma(J(\hat{u})) = \{-2, -1, 0\}$.

The $\bar{0}$ eigenvalues correspond to non-asymptotic stability in this case. We do not yet know if that correspondence is general.



Continuous space extension

Instead of a discrete system, we can take a non-local extension, replacing the sum over an adjacency matrix with an integral over some familiarity kernel and get a nonlocal equation

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial t}u^{i}(x,t)=u^{i}(x,t)\langle e^{i}-u(x,t),AK*u(x,t)\rangle$$

We may even take the typical zero horizon limit and say $\Delta u^i \approx K*u^i-u^i$ to write the system as a PDE

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial t}u^{i}(x,t)=u^{i}(\langle e^{i}-u(x,t),A\Delta u(x,t)\rangle+\langle e^{i}-u(x,t),Au(x,t)\rangle)$$



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Next steps




Figure: Continuous formulation admit interesting behavior like the traveling wave behavior shown here



Thank you

Questions?

