

SS224/A16-3
Serial 014

U.S.S. COD (SS224)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

29 May 1945.

DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States
Fleet.
Via: Official Channels.
Subject: U.S.S. COD (SS224) - Report of War Patrol
Number Six.
Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart (ComSubPac only).
(C) U.S.S. COD TOP SECRET Serial No.
0001 of 23 May 1945.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the Sixth War Patrol
of this vessel conducted in the EAST CHINA SEA during the
period 24 March 1945 to 29 May 1945 is forwarded herewith.

J. A. ADKINS.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY OP-09 RRC DATE 5/25/72

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CONFIDENTIAL(A) PROLOGUE

U.S.S. COD arrived Pearl Harbor, T.H. from War Patrol No. 5 on 20 November 1944. Departed Pearl Harbor, T.H. 23 November 1944. Arrived Navy Yard, Mare Island, California for overhaul 1 December 1944. Left Navy Yard, Mare Island 20 February 1945. Arrived San Diego, California 22 February 1945. Furnished daily services to West Coast Sound School. Left San Diego 28 February 1945. Arrived Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H., 7 March 1945. Received voyage repairs and training, fired 10 exercise torpedoes and several torpedoes in special exercises.

During overhaul period detached with great regret Lt.(jg) Samuel M. FAHR, USNR and Radio Elec. John K. LUDWIG, USN. Received on board Ens. John J. PARK, USNR and Lieut. John H. WICKERT, USN.

(B) NARRATIVE

Officers and Chief Petty Officers attached.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK or RATE</u>	<u>NO. OF PATROLS (Including this Patrol)</u>
ADKINS, J. A.	Comdr.	6
LAWRENCE, W. H.	Comdr. (PCO)	5
BECKMAN, K. F.	Lieut.	10
PODOREAN, C.	Lieut.	5
HURST, T. C. III	Lieut.	4
WICKERT, J. H.	Lieut.	1
CLOUGH, R. H.	Lt.(jg)	2
KRUBEL, F. J.	Lt.(jg)	2
SMITH, W. K.	Lt.(jg)	3
KIMBALL, F. S.	Lt.(jg)	11
PARK, J. J.	Ens.	1
WALLACE, J.	Ens.	6
HOWARD, J. D.	CTM(AA)	9
HUSTER, R. E.	CMoMTI(AA)	6
KING, B. L.	CMoMTI(PA)	10
PURTILL, R. M.	CPHII(T)	6
RUNGE, C. E. H.	CEM(PA)	11
YAFBER, P. J.	CQM(PA)	6

24 March

0635 VW Underway from PEARL in accordance with ComSubPac Operation Order No. 44-A-45. Conducted exercises with outgoing convoy and set course for GUAM. Conducted daily dives and

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24 March (Cont.) drills. Arrived GUAM 6 April 1945. Sailing delayed due to repairs to stills and trim pump controller panel.

9 April
1504 K Underway from GUAM in accordance with ComSubPac Operation Order No. 75-45 to conduct coordinated patrol and lifeguard operations for 5th Air Force with U.S.S. POMPON in East China Sea.
1710 K Trim dive, battle problem.
1738 K Surfaced.
1951 K Released escort.

10 April
0757 K SD contact 20 miles, bogey. Made trim dive.
0822 K Surfaced.
Noon Position - Lat. 15-43.6 N, Long. 141-18.3 E.

11 April
1009 I Made trim dive.
1036 I Surfaced.
Noon Position - Lat. 19-00.2 N, Long. 137-48.9 E.
1501 I Sighted friendly submarine southbound. Could not establish communication by searchlight or SJ.
1545 I Sighted friendly submarine southbound. Exchanged messages by searchlight with TENCH. Was informed that friendly search planes to the northward answered readily on VHF channel one.
1820 I Lockout sighted ships bearing 316 T. Ship contact No. 1. Commenced tracking. Contact developed into convoy of about 16 ships in 4 columns with escorts on flanks and ahead. Base course 120 T, speed 13 knots. Numerous APR contacts on friendly shipborne air search radars. COD was directly ahead of formation, range 17,000 yards. In a Joint zone. Stood by with all recognition signals and pulled off target's track to northward. Nearest escort passed astern of COD at range 7,500 yards. Convoy's course was on direct route away from OKINAWA. No challenge of any sort received. Secured from tracking stations.

12 April
Noon Position - Lat. 24-05 N, Long. 137-32 E.
1424 I Made trim dive.
1503 I Surfaced.

13 April
0240 I SD contact 12 miles, friendly. Plane closed to 3 miles, turned on running lights and opened out.

CONFIDENTIAL13 April (Cont.)

0939 I Made trim dive. Battle problem.
 1030 I Surfaced.
 Noon Position - Lat. 28-29.9 N, Long. 137-16.5 E.

14 April

0609 I Lookout sighted plane dead ahead, position angle $1\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$, estimated range 5 miles, angle-on-bow zero, large 4-engine float type. Submerged. Lat. 29-16 N, Long. 133-42 E.
 0616 I One bomb. Jarred loose one electrical connection in after torpedo room.
 0728 I Surfaced.
 Noon Position - Lat. 29-16.1 N, Long. 132-28.9 E.
 1212 I Lookout sighted plane, land based type, position angle 1° , angle-on-bow zero, range not determined, closing fast. Submerged.
 1310 I Surfaced.
 1343 I Lookout sighted mine, our position Lat. 29-12.8 N Long. 132-13.2 E. Mine was round, no barnacles, floating about two-thirds submerged, four (4) horns visible. Appeared fairly new with only light coating of rust. Took pictures. .30 Cal. carbine shots bounced off the mine's case. Detonated mine with .50 Cal. fire. Range about 125 yards. Several pieces of spent shrapnel hit us.
 1438 I Struck submerged object, heard throughout boat, loudest in forward torpedo room. Pit log out of commission. Rod meter bent. We were unable to pull in the rod meter with a chain fall. Jettisoned rod meter and installed spare; completed repairs by 2012 I.
 1518 I SD contact 8 miles, bogey. Submerged.
 1608 I Surfaced in midst of much floating debris and oil slick. Apparently heavy diesel oil. Lat. 29-14 N, Long. 132-50.5 E.
 1941 I SJ contact, 3 pips, 22,830 yards, went to tracking stations. Contact developed into 8 pips, opening rapidly, obviously aircraft. Secured from tracking stations.
 2025 I Aircraft flare over horizon, astern, bearing 070T.
 2028 I Another flare.
 2034 I Airplane flare on same bearing, closer, estimated range 5 miles.
 2105 I SD contact 8 miles, bogey. Closed to 6. Submerged. SJ range 11,000 yards during submergence.
 2152 I Surfaced.
 [2214 I First of many contacts by SJ on floating objects, birds and phantoms. Ranges of initial contact varied from 600 to 4500 yards. None could be

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14 April (Cont.)

sighted in the starlight with slight haze. Some were obviously phantoms since they would disappear, others tracked as birds, and still others gave good solid echoes in the same position down to range 400. We maneuvered to avoid them all.

15 April

0333 I Entered strait south of AKUSEKI JIMA.
0425 I Airplane flare astern beyond horizon.
0723 I SD contact 12 miles, bogey. Closed to 10. Submerged. Periscope patrol.
1002 I Sighted mine, round horned type, many barnacles, took pictures through periscope. Lat. 29-58.5 N, Long. 128-47.2 E.
Noon Position - Lat. 30-05.7 N, Long. 128-47.2 E.
1500 I Held memorial service in after battery for the late FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, President of the United States.
1728 I Surfaced.
1753 I Sighted tracer fire beyond horizon astern.
1849 I SD contact 12 miles, bogey, closing fast. Submerged.
1912 I Surfaced.
2111 I SD contact 12 miles, bogey. Closed rapidly to 8 miles. Submerged. Picked up by SJ at 12,900 yards on way down.
2135 I Surfaced.
2136 I SD contact 10 miles, 18,000 yards by SJ. Closed to 7 miles. Submerged.
2220 I At periscope depth picked up plane on ST radar, tracked him down port side, losing contact at 7,800 yards.
2238 I Surfaced.
2316 I SD contact 6 miles, closing. Submerged.

16 April

0013 I All clear by ST, surfaced.
0022 I Observed flicker of light on bearing 230 T, believed from plane.
0108 I SJ contact 030 T, 8,850 yards. SJ interference on same bearing. Thought he was keying us but 8 minutes later interference disappeared. When interference reappeared, exchanged challenge and calls with SPADEFISH. Many floating objects during night which we maneuvered to avoid.
0135 I Sighted floating object which might have been a mine; cur position Lat. 31-23.3 N, Long. 128-55.1 E.
0210 I Interference on SJ. Not SPADEFISH. Later decided this was a possible 10 centimeter radar on TORI SHIMA.

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- 0745 I Sighted floating mine. Our position Lat. 32-27 N, Long. 128-17 E.. 3 horns and lifting hook. Commenced firing with .50 Cal. machine guns and .30 Cal. carbines; made several hits with no effect on mine. Gave up after expending 400 rounds of .50 Cal. ammunition. Decided we had better improve our mine shooting technique which we did by holding carbine target practice and by putting sights on our .50 Cal. aircraft guns. Also decided to try 40 MM and 5 inch on the next mine.
- 1000 I Lookout sighted 2 planes, probably T-33's, angle-on-bow zero. SD contact 9 miles, closing, at same time. Submerged. . .
- 1042 I Heard a loud explosion.
- 1145 I Heard a distant explosion.
- Noon Position - Lat. 32-33.5 N, Long. 127-36.7 E.
- 1208 I Surfaced.
- 1508 I Sighted object thought to be a mine. Investigation disclosed it as a bucket. Exercised rifle shots with .30 Cal. carbines at range of 150 yards.
- 2225 I Passed mine close aboard to starboard, plainly seen in moonstreak by lookout and OOD. Our position Lat. 32-22 N, Long. 125-27 E.
- 2226 I Stopped and commenced maneuvering to pick up mine with intention of sinking it. This maneuver in the darkness was not as foolhardy as it sounds. The SJ radar was very sensitive, and by coming to a course 170° to the left of the moon's azimuth, I knew that I had the mine on the port hand and could pull clear to the right with no danger if unable to locate the mine. It was my intention to silhouette the mine in the moon and sink it with gun fire. SJ radar picked up the mine at range 1000 yards, but as soon as I had maneuvered it into the moonstreak, the moon became obscured by low clouds on the horizon. Resumed course and speed, maneuvering to avoid floating objects.
- [2352 I SJ contact 2400 yards, closing rapidly, crossed astern, lost at 2250 yards. Believed to be a bird.]

17 April

- 0024 I Submerged to work on hydraulic plant.
- 0134 I Surfaced.
- 0614 I Sighted mine; our position Lat. 31-45 N, Long. 134-35 E. Fired at mine with .30 Cal. carbines and sub-machine guns. Hits bounced off with a noise like that of hitting the bulls-eye in a

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shooting gallery. Manned 5 inch. Decided that the mine was worth 3 rounds. First round was on in deflection, but short 5 yards. Second round was on in deflection and about 4 yards short. The third round was on in deflection and about 2 feet short. This round was a dud and exploded when it hit the water after ricochetting. Secured the 5 inch, manned the 40 MM guns. Exploded mine with a direct 40 MM hit.

GUN ATTACK NO. 1

0748 I Lookout sighted two ships in haze, bearing 170 T. Ship contact #2. Our position Lat. 31-45 N, Long. 124-35 E. Set tracking stations. Could not get radar range on target. Maneuvered to keep them just in the haze and got up ahead. Course about 030 T from bearings and estimated ranges. Could hear no pinging; took a sounding; 17 fathoms. PCO and others looking through binoculars and high periscope were convinced that we had a large two-masted ship with one escort. The CO was unconvinced and submerged ahead of targets at 0909. Set section watch and waited for targets to show up.

0925 I JP picked up target's screws.

0935 I Sighted target through periscope. Set battle stations. Sea was glassy. Went to silent running. Made approach. Made ready the bow tubes. Due to the glassy condition of the sea I was too economical with the periscope exposures, and ST was unable to get a range. Sighted a cable extending between the two ships. One was 3 islands, MFM, the other one was an engines-aft vessel. I was undecided about shooting torpedoes at these targets. PCO took a look for the express purpose of helping me decide and so did the Executive Officer. They were both very positive in asserting that the targets were worth torpedoes. I was still unconvinced, and let the targets go by, not because of size, but for the following reasons: (1) Did not have a good speed solution and, in fact, had no range in which I felt any confidence, (not being at all sure of the mast head height), until the first ping range of 2900 yards. (2) I had not been able to see any gun larger than an estimated 20 MM on top of the bridge of the MFM. (3) I didn't feel that the targets had any chance of getting away from us. (4) I was still mystified by the cable between the ships. Actually the MFM was towing the engines-aft, but due to the yawing of the tow, at times through the periscope they appeared to be almost abreast of each other, and I

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was not sure that they were not sweeping. JP reported two sets of screws, JK reported only one. Accordingly I had the 5 inch gun pointer take a look at the targets, got a good set-up by ST when abaft their beam, and set stations for battle surface, 5 inch and 40 MM guns.

1052 I Surfaced 3750 yards astern of targets. It was apparent that one was towing the other. Maneuvered to keep the towing vessel (with the gun), masked by the tow. Closed the range and opened fire at 3200 yards with the 5 inch gun. Intercepted radio transmission on 500 kcs, (see radio section). Opened fire with 40MM at range about 2000 yards. 5 inch hits set tow on fire. He obviously had a cargo of oil. Great clouds of black smoke poured out and flames roared forth as if from jets. Shifted 5 inch fire to towing vessel.

1108 I SD contact 15 miles, bogey. 2 planes. Closing slowly. An observer on the bridge thought he saw a torpedo. Towing vessel let go his tow and decided to shoot it out with us. SD contacts closed to $13\frac{1}{2}$ miles. The great weakness of a battle surface as we conduct it with only 1 hatch open is in getting the gun crews back down below in a hurry. Sent 40 MM crews below and turned away from towing vessel. He was now headed directly for us, making about 10 knots and was on in range with his 20 MM gun. Opened range to 3700 yards, which left his fire falling about 50 yards short. SD contacts opened to 16 miles and were lost. Maneuvered around tug while shooting slow fire with the 5 inch. A very close over put his rudder, or screws, or both, out of commission. He abandoned ship. We closed him and before the 5 inch shells started pounding into him at every shot, we could see that shorts had riddled him with shrapnel. Closed range and sank the tug with 5 inch and 40 MM fire. Then went back to the oiler and sank it with three 5 inch hits along the waterline.

Noon Position - Lat. 31-52 N, Long. 124-55 E.

There were several survivors. Picked up one prisoner from each vessel, apparently both military. Picked up a second survivor from the tug, apparently a mercantile sailor. Picked up a life ring from tug with lettering CHOYO MARU. The identity is uncertain. We took pictures, both moving and still, and I would prefer to have the damage assessment made from them. However, the available

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data is: The tug while transmitting used the call JUJV. This may be an indefinite call. The life ring was inscribed CHOYO MARU SHIMONOSEKI. I questioned the mercantile prisoner and he confirmed the name CHOYO MARU for his ship and also gave the name BAISHI MARU. One of the other prisoners drew a rough picture of a tug and tow for his guard later and in English wrote KARI MARU by the tug and BANSHI MARU by the tow. Until more accurate information is available from the photographs and from the prisoners the CO's estimate of the damage is:

SUNK:

One SMC. Tug. Wooden hull with steel deck house. Possibly CHOYO MARU (EU), 2000 tons.

One SMC. Oiler. Wooden hull. Possibly BAISHI or BANSHI MARU (EU), 2000 tons.

The mercantile marine prisoner was shown a chart and indicated that the vessels were out of KEELUNG for SHIMONOSEKI, without stop, and that their route was to the north of QUELPART ISLAND.

The prisoners were stripped and placed in the 5 inch magazine.

1300 I Resumed course and speed, enroute to area.

1319 I JOOD sighted 3 planes. Submerged.

1532 I Surfaced.

1551 I JOOD sighted plane. Submerged.

1646 I Surfaced.

18 April

0517 I Sighted mine. Lat. 29-05.4 N, Long. 123-32.2 E. Mine had 7 horns, 6 arranged around the outside and 1 sticking up vertically on top. Detonated mine with 40 MM fire. 34 rounds.

1137 I Submerged for trim.

Noon Position - Lat. 28-28.5 N, Long. 128-23.3 E.

1227 I Surfaced.

1808 I Sighted mine. Lat. 27-27.5 N, Long. 122-36.6 E. 4 horned type. Commenced firing with .30 Cal. carbines which rattled off the mine's case with loud pings as before. Fired 62 rounds of 40 MM with no hits. Finally exploded mine after expending 225 rounds of .50 Cal. ammunition.

1948 I Sighted a flash of light bearing 215 T. Headed over to investigate and sighted a flash again at 200 T, but could not find anything else.

19 April

0935 I Lookout sighted ship bearing 276 T. Set battle stations surface and closed to investigate. Turned out to be a fishing sampan.

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19 April (Cont.)

- 1010 I Sighted a second sailboat with two masts, apparently a junk.
1019 I Fired one round of 40 MM across bow of sampan. Maneuvered in close and examined him. It was a typical Chinese fishing boat, eyes painted in the bow, oldest man at tiller, youngest and smallest at the sculling oar, one small boy hiding under deck boards, lots of yammering. Had the sampan come alongside. Chief of the Boat boarded her and found one sack of beans, a half-bushel of potatoes and one fish. Gave the occupants 5 packages of cigarettes with which they were highly pleased. Took pictures.
Noon Position - Lat. 26-06 N, Long. 121-00.5 E.
1230 I Could not get to life uard station but raised covering plane by VHF, gave him our position and received receipt. No business.
2034 I Submerged to work on hydraulic plant.

20 April

- 0134 I Surfaced.
Noon Position - Lat. 26-12.6 N, Long. 122-13.8 E.
1821 I SD contact 3 miles, bogey. Submerged.
1909 I Surfaced.

21 April

- 1034 I SD contact 12 miles, bogey. Closed to 8 miles. Submerged.
Noon Position - Lat. 25-35.9 N, Long. 120-09.5 E.
1225 I Surfaced.
1333 I SD contact on land, closed. Sighted various fishing vessels. Headed north.
1822 I SD contact 11 miles, bogey. Closed to 8 miles, sighted by JOOD. Submerged.
1911 I Surfaced.

22 April

- 0426 I SJ contact 326 T, 7,450 yards. Our position Lat. 26-05 N, Long. 120-23.0 E. Showed two pips, course 230 T, speed 2 knots. Apparently sampans.
0443 I TONGSHA ISLAND bearing 375 T, 13,680 yards.
0620 I Several fishing boats sighted in vicinity of TUNGYUNG ISLAND.
0903 I SD contact 14 miles, bogey, closing. Sighted by lookout at $10\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Westerly course, headed for the coast. Looked like a TESS. Plane opened out and then started back in again. Submerged at 0913.
1025 I Surfaced.

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1047 I Sighted fishing fleet off TUNGYUNG again - 8 sails in sight.
Noon Position - (DR) Lat. 26-23 N, Long. 120-48.8 E.
1709 I SD contact 11 miles, bogey. Closed to 8. Submerged.
1740 I At radar depth SD contacts at 14 and 8 miles.
1801 I All clear, surfaced.
2101 I Suspicious trace on TDM bearing 345 relative. All ahead flank. Left full rudder. Nothing developed.
2212 I Completed converting #4MBT. Flushed out by blowing and flooding several times on surface.

23 April

0617 I Submerged. Flooded and blew #4MBT several times at 80 feet.
0728 I Sighted PB4-Y through periscope.
0900 I Surfaced.
0903 I Suspicious trace on TDM, relative bearing did not change with maneuvers.
Noon Position - (DR) Lat. 25-32 N, Long. 121-04.5 E.
1255 I Commenced circling on lifeguard station.
1311 I SD contacts 30 and 52 miles, friendly. One sighted from bridge by OOD. Broken clouds, poor visibility. Worked planes by VHF. Numerous friendly planes. Sighted PBM with P-38 cover.
1649 I SD contact 8 miles, bogey, closing. Submerged.
1734 I Surfaced.
1745 I SD contact 10 miles, bogey, closed to 7. Submerged.
1851 I Surfaced. Headed over to investigate HAITAN HARBOR.

24 April

0105 I Secured SD radar while approaching harbor.
0124 I Stopped. Searched HAITAN HARBOR with the SJ expanded sweep in a dense fog. All clear. Then ran north off HAITAN ISLAND about 3 miles off the beach.
0230 I Resumed SD search.
Noon Position - (DR) Lat. 25-16.3 N, Long. 120-47.1 E.
Inside restricted area.
1217 I Circling on lifeguard station.
1219 I SD contacts 12 and 16 miles, friendly. Heavy overcast. We made this rendezvous with the lifeguard plane by telling the plane when we could hear him pass overhead.
1250 I Sighted mine. A new and larger type. Four (4) horns with a hand hole on top. Told lifeguard plane what we were going to do and fired 43 rounds of 40 MM. The mine took two 40 MM hits before exploding. The second hit caused a puff of black smoke and a flat burst of yellow flame near the

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24 April (Cont.)

- water with very little noise. Possibly one of those "second order" explosions. Our position Lat. 25-09.8 N, Long. 120-45.0 E.
- 1320 I Sighted an oil drum. Position Lat. 25-07.9 N, Long. 120-45.5 E.
- 1323 I Headed out of mine field.
- 1338 I Sighted lifeguard plane for first time.
- 1619 I Lookout sighted object on horizon bearing 339 T. Our position Lat. 25-20.7 N, Long. 120-48.5 E. Investigated. Turned out to be a bow of a sunken sampan. Opened range to 2800 yards and bore-sighted 5 inch gun.
- TORPEDO ATTACKS NOS. 1, 2 and 3.
- 2130 I TDM picked up pinging. Checked with JK. Bearing 110 T. Headed over to investigate. Ship contact No. 3.
- 2154 I SJ contacts - two ships, 115 T and 120 T, range 9,450 yards. Our position Lat. 25-42.4 N, Long. 121-15 E. Battle stations. Two sets of pinging, 15.6 kcs. Closed target. Base course 355 T, speed 11.75 knots. Larger ship was the nearer, with a smaller ship on his starboard quarter. Could make them out from the bridge at 4,000 yards range. Planned to shoot 4 torpedoes at the leading ship and 2 at the trailing ship. Set depths 2 feet. Opened outer doors, came to course for an 80° track and waited for favorable gyro angles, and about 3,000 yard torpedo runs. Accepted a sharper track in the early part of a zig toward. Just before firing, radar picked up a third ship in the formation on the starboard bow of the trailer. Tried to raise POMPON with contact report. Broadcast it.
- 2253 I Fired 4 torpedoes forward. COD speed 4.5 knots. Gyro angles 000.5 to 001.5, average track angles, 46 P., average torpedo run 3100 yards; shifted to trailing ship. Each torpedo jumped out of the water as soon as launched and then proceeded down the range like a porpoise, alternately broaching and plunging with a rhythmic tempo. Glassy, calm sea with haze. Decided against shooting any more torpedoes with this depth setting. Turned right and went to flank speed. Commenced reload. The target turned left shortly after the torpedoes were due to hit and gave chase. At 19 knots we opened him slowly. He commenced shooting with one gun at a range of about 3700 yards. Very small gun flash. At times I was unable to see the flash at all.

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Splashes were short in the main with the closest two falling about 40 yards from the bow and 20 yards to the starboard of the after engine room hatch. This one splashed water on us. The splashes were white and were accompanied by a deafening detonation. The COD has been used for a target by probable Japanese 3.15 inch guns previously but these splashes and accompanying bursts were many times stronger and louder. This leads me to believe that the guns were of about .4.7 inch calibre. No fuzed shrapnel was fired; all shells detonated on impact. Target ceased fire with his main battery and opened up with machine guns and tracers. At this time I felt that we would be able to outrun this chap and get in another attack on his convoy. The tracers that I saw were well to port (although on in range), so I was feeling very happy about their marksmanship. The following day, however, we dug a lead slug out of the bridge rail immediately in back of where I had been standing. The target next commenced yawing 30° at a time and giving us a broadside of 2 guns. These splashes were mostly ahead. He then came left to a steady course, showing us about 80° angle-on-bow and settled down to two-gun salvos. When he placed a salvo one hundred yards ahead of us with one splash on either bow, I decided that he was just playing with us and would soon be on. During this time tried to raise POMPON again.

2317 I Submerged. Tracked target by sound, periscope and ST. Manouvered to get ahead of him and went deep - 150 feet. There was 270 feet of water.

2334 I Commenced receiving a close depth charging of 18 charges. All below us by the DCDI. Conducted evasive tactics, trying to maneuver away from two anti-submarine vessels.

2346 I When it appeared that one vessel was starting in for a good run, fired an NAE beacon. This was apparently a dud. At any rate, we could not hear it on any sound gear, and it was followed by 10 more close depth charges, laid up and down our port side, ahead and astern, but all fortunately below. No major damage was experienced. The boat was shaken, conning tower was banged about, cork knocked off, light bulbs shattered, overloads knocked loose, several of the crew were converted, two sea valves backed open, and one sea valve operating gear was sheared. After this run one of the anti-submarine vessels shoved off, leaving one who was milling about on our port quarter and pinging.

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25 April

- 0031 I Came up to periscope depth to look over the situation. The anti-submarine vessel was there on our port quarter, about 4,000 yards, apparently lying to. The depth charging had knocked out the tuning of the ST. Made ready 3 torpedoes forward and 3 aft, depth setting 3 feet and waited for the ST to get tuned before starting in on the target. The target saved us the trouble by commencing a sweep in our direction, zigging about 60° from side to side. Ensign WALLACE and THOMAS, W.H., RTlc got the ST back in commission when the range was down to 3500 yards, and there was enough light to estimate the angle on the bow when it was 15° or less. It looked for a minute or two as if we would get a nice stern shot from about 300 yards on his port beam, but the target kept swinging more and more to his left, toward us. We speeded up to 80 r.p.m. to get off his track. Target countered at once by reducing his pinging interval from the 7,000 yard scale to the 3,000 yard scale and by showing a steady 5° port angle-on-bow. We slowed to 50 r.p.m. and steadied up. Lt. PODOREAN on the TDC, did not like the gyro angles, and neither did I, but with the torpedo run down to 400 yards there wasn't much to be done about it except hold her steady and use a spread.
- 0056 I Fired 3 stern torpedoes, gyro angles 235 to 228, average track angle 15° S (due to curved run of torpedo), average torpedo run 310, with target swinging slowly to his left to head directly at the periscope. I assumed that the torpedoes would make a wider and slower curve than the one set up in the TDC and spread them accordingly by periscope, the first one a full target width (as foreshortened to view) to the right, the second at the right tangent, and the third at the bull nose. With ST range 490, pulled down the scope and went to 150 feet.
- 0056-44 I One explosion. Pinging and screws from target stopped. Sound tracked two torpedoes running. Commenced to come up to periscope depth. Loud noise from our own screws.
- 0104 I Loud explosion from target.
- 0105 I Breaking up noises in direction of target. Sound could still track two torpedoes running.
- 0126 I Surfaced. Ran through oil slick. Heard the breaking up noises beneath us. Sighted many men in the water. Our position as rectified by next

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fix - Lat. 26-02 N, Long. 121-11-7 E. 76 heads were counted in the water on one side only as we passed through the oil slick. There were more than this swimming. Most of them were shouting and moaning in a melancholy manner. Picked up one prisoner. I was in a hurry to get off after the rest of the convoy, so did not investigate his condition before sending him below. He was badly injured internally and had no will to live. On the afternoon of his being brought aboard he was questioned by the CO and he was later questioned by the Executive Officer and gave out the following information: Name - ALYEEMA, 1st class petty officer, engineering branch. (KI-KAN). His ship had no name, but was "So-kai'-te yo-en-ju-itsi, gol'", This appears with very little doubt to be minesweeper No. 41, although the "gol" remains unexplained. The prisoner wrote the number 41 along with several Japanese chops which will be given to the first available language officer. He was very insistent about pointing to the paravanes in the pictures of minesweepers in the Recognition Manual, although his exact ship could not be found. Prisoner indicated on a chart that his route had been from KEELUNG to NINGPO. The CO's best estimate of damage inflicted is:

- SUNK: AM No. 41 (EC). Approximately 1000 T.
- 0155 I Tried to raise POMPON again. Broadcast contact report.
- 0200 I Set out after remainder of convoy on their base course.
- 0240 I Tried to raise POMPON to tell him to patrol across southeast approaches to NAMKWAN and that we would run search curve to northeast. Broadcast it.
- 0255 I SJ interference.
- 0318 I APR contact 118 mcs. Indications were that this was the POMPON. Tried to raise him. Broadcast a signal to shift to SCR 610-A. Then tried to raise him on the assigned frequency with this equipment.
- 0407 I Slowed to 10 knots to listen on JK.
- 0410 I SJ contact 027 T, 11,920 yards. Two pips. Battle stations. Targets were tracking on the same base course, 355 T. Heard echo ranging from one source only. Set depth 3 feet and commenced end-around to port. Target was zigging on 5 minute legs. Pinging on 15.3 kcs, shifting between 5,000 and 7,000 yard scale. At range 3600 could make out targets from bridge. The leading target was the largest, both by radar and visually. Could get TBT bearings out to about 4,000 yards, but could not make out types of ships until just before firing.

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The trailing target was about 1,000 yards on the starboard quarter of the leader. Tentatively decided upon surface attack, shooting 3 torpedoes at each target. Perhaps I was too optimistic in thinking that because the last submerged attack with a 3 foot depth setting had been successful, that the torpedoes would run properly with the 3 foot setting when fired from the surface. Asked fire control party and PCO if they had any better plan and none was forthcoming. Perhaps the recent close depth charging, the failure of the NAE beacon, etc., had influenced me against a submerged attack. But the surface attack did appear to give the best chance of getting both targets. The targets' speed was unchanged - 11 3/4 knots. They were still zigging on 4 to 5 minute legs. Ran up their port side to get a firing position near the beam.

- 0512 I Lookout picked up a sailboat on the port hand.
Ran by it.
- 0519 I Slowed to 5 knots.
- 0521 I Fired 3 bow tubes at leading ship. Average gyro 352. Average track 122 P. Torpedo run 3470 yards.
- 0522 I Fired 3 bow tubes at second ship. Average gyro 009. Average track 116 P. Torpedo run 2900 yards. Turned right and went around stern of formation. Each torpedo jumped out of the water once, right after firing. The propellers made a loud whirring sound while they were in the air, similar to a high speed sewing machine. Two of the torpedoes made wide hooks to the left. One observer on the bridge thought we had a circular run from this. I watched them, however, and they all settled down eventually on a straight course, although the initial hooks had dispersed them somewhat. Both targets continued on their previous course and speed. At about the time the torpedoes were due to hit the leader, a large cloud of black smoke came from his direction which totally obscured him from view for a time. There was no appreciable difference in his radar pip however. He soon came out of the circle following his regular zig plan. The second target could be said at the time of firing to be an engine-salt ship of about SB size or smaller. The JM which we had previously sunk was the largest ship in this convoy. Dawn was beginning to break out there were scattered low rain clouds. Commenced end-around on starboard

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- side of target. Got a look at the leading ship through high periscope. It appeared to be a PC. The targets were headed for the inland route up the coast and we could not head them off.
- 0648 I Abandoned chase.
- 0712 I Having been unable to work POMPON directly after many attempts, cleared message to POMPON through NPN telling him to take lifeguard station until we got back.
- 0714 I Submerged. Periscope patrol.
Noon position - (DR) Lat. 26-01.7 N, Long. 121-52.7 E.
- 1233 I Surfaced.
- 1357 I Sighted overturned sampan.
- 1431 I Sighted mine. Our position - Lat. 26-35.2 N, Long. 121-51.8 E. Usual four (4) horned type. Exploded after expending 8 rounds of .50 Cal.
- 1507 I Sighted floating object, proved to be a crate trussed up heavily with line.
- 1535 I Sighted floating object, proved to be a rusty oil drum without any barnacles.
- 1639 I Sighted floating object, a mine. Our position - Lat. 26-19.5 N, Long. 121-56.1 E. Commenced firing 40 MM's at mine.
- 1658 I A 40 MM hit blew a large jagged hole in the top of the mine. This hole was 10 inches in diameter. Commenced firing with .50 Cal. which splashed water into the hole. The mine slowly sank.
- 1717 I TDM trace. Bearing remained constant as we swung ship.
- 1807 I Sighted mine. Our position - Lat. 26-08.5 N, Long. 121-57.2 E.
- 1814 I SD contact 10 miles, bogey. Closed. Lost contact. Regained at 14. Opened to 26 miles. Lost at 23. Regained at 24, faded. During this time opened fire with .50 Cal. on mine. One hit made a hole in the mine from which thin smoke came out. It is believed that other hits made holes. The mine slowly sank from view.
- 1921 I Sighted what was thought to be a mine. Proved to be another crate.

26 April

- 0050 I Heavy traces on TDM. Checked with JK - nothing but fish noises.
- 0143 I SD contact 10 miles, bogey. Closed to 8. Submerged. Picked up by SJ on way down.
- 0303 I Surfaced.
- 0803 I Sighted POMPON by high periscope. Closed him. Passed over patrol instructions. Assigned patrol stations and parted company.

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Noon Position - (LR) Lat. 26-00 N, Long. 121-47.2 E.

1554 I Sighted mine. Our position - Lat. 26-15 N, Long. 121-24.9 E. Four (4) horns. Usual type. Exploded mine with 25 rounds of .50 Cal.

1745 I SD contact 25 miles, bogey. Closed to 12. Submerged.

1822 I Squeak in shaft again noted on JP. This may have been started by the depth charging, but became progressively worse throughout the patrol and reached the point where it could be heard through the hull in the after torpedo room at 65 turns. At 80 turns at periscope depth the noises by JP grew to alarming proportions. Both shafts were bad, with the starboard being markedly the worse. The noise sounds like a bearing squeal, and will, I think, be tracked down to unseasoned lignum vitae. However, I don't know of any treatment for this in the area except to run at slow speed during the attack and evasion. Made mental note to do so on next submerged approach.

1920 I Surfaced.

2041 I Flash of SJ interference bearing 000 T. This phenomenon occurred several times during patrol and could not be traced to friendly SJ, nor to an enemy radar, nor to any other source.

2135 I Fire in after torpedo room. Went to fire quarters. Stopped. Secured battery charge. Readings were being taken after the completion of the charge on the Mk. 18 torpedoes which were partially withdrawn from tubes 8 and 10. An explosion occurred in torpedo No. 99264 in tube No. 8. The battery of this torpedo burned with a very hot fire which could not be extinguished with the CO₂ extinguishers. The after torpedo room was filled with a dense, suffocating smoke. The smoke lungs were totally inadequate. This left our two rescue breathing apparatus and one shallow water diving mask which could be used and which thus permitted only 3 men to enter the torpedo room to fight the fire. The torpedo itself was too hot to touch. The battery was burning fiercely. The torpedo tube was warm. The Executive Officer at the scene of the fire requested permission to open the after torpedo room hatch in order to fight the fire. This was granted. An engine was loaded up on propulsion to try to clear the smoke. I was in the conning tower with a hand telephone getting my information from the maneuvering room.

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26 April (Cont.)

FOLEY, L.E., QM2c, was in the conning tower and had just been relieved as Quartermaster-of-the-Watch. He immediately asked my permission to go down on deck and assist in opening the after torpedo room hatch. Granted. He took the life jacket from the conning tower, told the OOD, and went aft. After FOLEY had gone down on deck the Executive Officer asked for help from the outside in opening the hatch. The OOD was watching FOLEY and saw him having difficulty with the hatch. JOHNSON, A.G., Slc had come to the bridge to warm up for lookout. The OOD had a wrench passed up, gave this to JOHNSON and sent him aft to help FOLEY. JOHNSON carried the wrench aft, returned to the vicinity of the conning tower, told the OOD that the hatch was clear except for the depth charge dogs and then went back aft to further assist FOLEY. A wave washed both men over the side. JOHNSON had no lifejacket. I went up to the bridge at this point, marked ship's head, made a complete circle to the left and stopped. The fire, meanwhile was blazing with increasing intensity and was leading to thoughts of grave danger with respect to the warhead. I was fully prepared to flood the after torpedo room, even by bottoming with the hatch open if necessary. The Executive Officer requested permission to fire the torpedo. This was granted and the torpedo was fired with a propeller lock, after the handhole plate, warped by the explosion, had been torn loose, and through efforts which were no less than heroic on the part of Lt. K.F. BECKMAN, KRUSENKLAUS, D.H., TM2c and GRENNER, J.A., Slc. These efforts included working in intense heat and smoke, rigging jiggers to the torpedo which was too hot to touch, and holding their thumbs over the hydrogen burner hole in the torpedo tube door during firing. It is truly impossible to express my feelings in regard to the actions of these men. It is a privilege to have been their shipmate. Meanwhile on the bridge, I had two life rings tied together with an automatic floating electric lantern and tossed over the side. After the torpedo was fired, I sent the OOD down to shut the after torpedo room hatch. Resumed power steering and commenced searching in the vicinity of the life rings. We would make circles in all directions from the life rings and return to the rings for another departure. The sky was overcast, mattress about 1000 feet, obscuring the moon. There were only a few scattered whitecaps.

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26 April (Cont.)

but there were many small waves which showed up black with no white crest. We had many volunteers on the bridge, listening and searching. All binoculars were in use.

2300 I SD contact 10 miles, closing. I decided to give this plane one free pass at us. He showed friendly, however, and replied to us on VHF. He was a PBM from OKINAWA, using the call 55V464. We told him we were looking for two of our men in the water and he offered to help. He dropped flares which illuminated well but only when they were very close to us. He also dropped a life raft. He said that he thought his base could send another plane out in the morning, (in reply to my question), and took our message giving the number of men and position in accordance with the standard operating procedure. This plane was very helpful. The pilot was worried for fear he had been the cause of the men going overboard. In reply to our thanks he said that it was a pleasure to help the submarines out. After the departure of the plane at 2344, I returned to the life rings and commenced a systematic search, using the DRT. Injection temperature was 74° and I refused to give up hope of recovering these men. Our searchlight did not improve our visibility, but we kept it on, sweeping abaft the beam as a beacon for the man in the water.

27 April

0034 I Skies cleared, giving us bright moonlight. Decided we would not be able to see a man at more than 250 yards, and altered search accordingly. The life rings were drifting faster than us from our DRT positions. When passing by the liferings on one occasion, there was a dark shape in one of the rings. This turned out to be a bird.
0114 I Sighted object in the water. Turned out to be a wave.
0214 I An elusive TDM trace faded out.
0520 I Heard FOLEY calling us. He was utterly exhausted, and remembered nothing from this point on. Lt. (jg) W. K. SMITH did an excellent job of keeping FOLEY in sight while we maneuvered to pick him up.
0540 I Took FOLEY on board. He reported that JOHNSON and he had been together when they went over the side, that he had helped JOHNSON take off his heavy clothing and had supported him in the water

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until about two hours before we picked him up. He and JOHNSON together had seen the ship go by twice, one time very close aboard. About two hours ago, JOHNSON had said good-bye, had slipped down off FOLEY's back and FOLEY had not seen him come up. I decided to lie to until daylight and then continue the search for JOHNSON. Had already told POMPON to rendezvous at daylight to assist in search.

- 0602 I SD contact 16 miles, faded; regained at 10 miles, closing. Submerged.
- 0649 I Surfaced. Resumed search using DRT.
- 0729 I SD contact 9 miles, opening.
- 0731 I SJ interference bearing 000 T. POMPON coming to the rendezvous. Assigned him area to search.
- 0811 I Sighted POMPON. Had him take departure on us to orient his search.
- 0830 I SD contact 10 miles, closing. Bogey.
- 0835 I Sighted plane coming out of clouds. "SALLY". Angle on the bow, about 80 port. Passed us at 3 miles and continued on his way. POMPON confirmed that it was a "SALLY" but did not submerge either. Told POMPON to patrol at discretion after completing search at dark.
- Noon Position - (DR) Lat. 26-00 N, Long. 121-33 E.
- 1217 I SD contact 8 miles, friendly. Picked up planes on SJ, worked them by VHF. This was a PBM using call "RODEO 4" and four fighters using call "PONTIAC". These planes came down under the overcast which was 500 feet from the water and took up the search. The fighters told the PBM that they were reaching the limit of fuel, but offered to stay on and search. PBM told the fighters to return and that he would stay on and search without them. The fighters replied that they needed PBM for navigation, but that they would be very glad to stay beyond their limit of fuel. The PBM apparently had bogies on his radar when he was trying to send his fighters home without him. The weather at this time was getting worse, ceiling was closing in, and the wind was gusty. It appeared to me that the planes were taking considerable risk to even attempt to fly under the overcast. In view of the weather I thanked them and told them to leave. They searched for an hour anyway and said they were only too glad to be of any assistance. We felt that we were being backed up by a pretty fine organization when these fliers came out in this stinking weather to help us.

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- 1317 I Investigated floating object.
1416 I Investigated floating object.
1720 I SD contact 10 miles, bogey. Closed to 8.
Submerged.
1759 I Surfaced.
1856 I SD contact 6 miles, bogey, closing. Submerged.
Discontinued search. We did not sight the life
rings nor the plane's liferaft.
2038 I Surfaced.

28 April

- 0143 I Transmitted message to ComSubPac reporting
casualty and sent message of appreciation to
OKINAWA planes.
0645 I SD contact 12 miles. Closed to 6, bogey. SD
contact 25 miles, friendly. Submerged. Con-
ducted investigation as to source of torpedo
explosion. Could not determine cause of spark.
The charge had been already secured and gravity
and temperature readings had already been taken
when the torpedo battery exploded. PhM reported
that the Jap prisoner, now in the forward torpedo
room, was in a very serious condition.
0941 I Surfaced.
1145 I Prisoner died. Diagnosis: Peritonitis, general,
acute, originating from explosion on board his
ship, probably due to depth charge not having
been set on safe.
Noon Position - Lat. 26-17 N, Long. 121-24.5 E.
1330 I Completed overhaul of torpedo which had been
in tube #10 during the fire and placed it back
in commission.
1500 I Held funeral services for the deceased prisoner
and committed his remains to the deep.
1851 I SD contact 2 miles. Submerged.
2026 I Surfaced.
2234 I Fire in forward torpedo room. This was in the
safety relay in the WCA motor generator panel
and was quickly cleared by the Executive Officer.

29 April

- 0028 I OOD sighted what appeared to be a green flare
beyond horizon, bearing 090 T. Our position Lat.
25-54.2 N, Long. 121-15.8 E. He just caught this
in the corner of his eye, but the flare had a
rise and a fall, more like a Very star than a
meteor. Headed over and commenced searching in
a gradually increasing square. I reasoned that
any one shooting such a flare would be in a
rubber boat, so continued the search until the

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- following sunset, gradually moving the square down-wind.
- 0452 I SD contact 10 miles. Closed to 8. Submerged. Made repairs to pit log and BN. Completed repairs to WCA.
- 1156 I Surfaced. Resumed search from where we had left off.
- Noon Position - Lat. 26-09.5 N, Long. 121-30.5 E.
- 1500 I Conducted burial services for Andrew Gordon JOHNSON, S1c.

30 April

- 0639 I SD contact 7 miles, showed bogey. Closed to 6. Submerged. Sighted while clearing bridge; it appeared to be a B-24.
- 0832 I Surfaced.
- Noon Position - Lat. 26-11 N, Long. 121-33 E. Overcast and rain.
- 2137 I APR contact 100 mcs.
- 2339 I SD contact 3 miles, bogey. Submerged.

1 May

- 0025 I Surfaced.
- 0205 I SJ contact on plane, 5750 yards. Submerged. SD contact at 2 miles while submerging.
- 0330 I Surfaced.
- Noon Position - (DR) Lat. 25-58.3 N, Long. 121-07.8 E.
- 1831 I SD contact 8 miles, bogey, closed to 7 miles. Submerged. Sighted on way down, possibly a SALLY.
- 1918 I Broached in heavy seas.
- 1921 I Surfaced.
- 2219 I Land on SD at 31 miles. Tried to get fix in FORMOSA Channel off HAITAN ISLAND.
- 2220 I SD contact 11 miles, closing. Bogey. Submerged.
- 2259 I Surfaced. Heavy seas.

2 May

- 0624 I SJ interference bearing 045 T. Followed by brief contact at 4500 yards. Attempted to challenge unsuccessfully.
- Noon Position - Lat. 26-25 N, Long. 121-28.6 E.
- 1523 I High periscope sighted two sampans or junks bearing 212 T. Opened out.
- 1654 I SD contact 9 miles, bogey. Closed to 7. Submerged.
- 1819 I Surfaced.
- 1932 I High periscope sighted two junks bearing 047 T. Opened out.

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CONFIDENTIAL2 May (Cont.)

- 2040 I SJ contact bearing 035 T, 9300 yards. Our posit. Lat. 26-10.4 N, Long. 121-11.2 E. Set battle stations and commenced tracking. Two targets. Six knots. Course varying between 170 T and 200 T. Very dark night. Overcast. Rain. One target smaller than other by SJ. Range difference about 100 yards. Maneuvered to a position 2300 yards off track and let targets go by. Listened. Could hear no screws nor pinging. Could not see targets in darkness. Fell in astern and closed range to 1500 yards. Could make out the sails of a large junk and a smaller one. No pinging, no screws. Finally removed doubt from all hands that these were the same junks which had been sighted at 1922 and ceased tracking.
- 2241 I SJ contact on POMPON. Exchanged challenge and calls. Attempted to communicate by SCR and VHF with no success.
- 2329 I SD contact 10 miles, closing. Friendly. Raised PBM from OKINAWA on VHF. Told him that his other pip was the POMPON. Ascertained that he had seen no targets. Told him of the two junks to the south of us. PBM flew off and illuminated junks with flares, came back and reported that he could not identify them as anything but friendly. This plane also said that he would be in the area most of the night and to call on him if needed.

3 May

- 0050 I Sent message to POMPON giving instructions for forming a scouting line across the middle of the EAST CHINA SEA, retiring the line each day.
- 0200 I Sighted another flare from PBM.
- 0510 I Lookout sighted light thought to be a star until SD made contact at 3 miles. Plane had running lights on and appeared to be circling. Showed bogey. Picked up by SJ. Watched him out of sight from bridge, at estimated range of nine miles. This plane was very low, SD making and losing contact at 3 miles.
- 0652 I High periscope sighted what he thought was another sampan bearing 215 T. This rapidly developed into a properly marked hospital ship on northerly course at about 1/4 knots. Ship contact No. 4. Our position Lat. 26-44 N, Long. 121-27 E. Composite superstructure, 4 coalposts. KMFMK. Very similar to TATUHARU MARU. Pulled off his track into the sun and watched him go by.

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- 1140 I Sighted two junks bearing 316 T. Our posit. Lat. 27-06.4 N, Long. 121-09.1 E. Avoided.
 Noon Position - (DR) Lat. 27-08.3 N, Long. 122-09.5 E.
 1640 I Sighted sampan bearing 296 T. Avoided.
 1647 I Sighted three sampans bearing 293 T. Avoided.
 1845 I Sighted sampan bearing 268 T. Avoided.
 2025 I SJ interference bearing 043 T.
 2106 T SD contact 7 miles, bogey. Closed to 6. Submerged.
 2206 I Surfaced. More flashes of SJ interference from 043 T, to 075 T. Headed over to investigate.
 2212 I APR contact 161 mcs. Swung ship on this one to try and get a minimum. No success.

4 May

- 1159 I Sighted mine. 4 horns, 2 lifting pads. Apparently new. Low in water.
 Noon Position - Lat. 28-43.5 N, Long. 123-57 E.
 1223 I Detonated mine with .50 Cal. fire. The JOOD claims to have heard a .50 Cal. hit bounce from the mine prior to the hit which detonated it. No one else observed this but all observers did report a delay between the activating .50 Cal. hit and the detonation. This delay was variously estimated as being up to 3 seconds and so was probably of about one second's duration. The explosion, when it occurred, was strong and scattered shrapnel well beyond us.
 1530 I Sighted small lifering in water near a piece of wood. Picked up lifering. Painted light green, no marking. Our position - Lat. 28-57.9 N, Long. 123-48.9 E.
 2314 I APR contact 162 mcs. Swung ship. No difference in signal strength.

5 May

- 0401 I Submerged.
 Noon Position - Lat. 28-55.5 N, Long. 124-02.3 E.
 1243 I Surfaced.
 1553 I Sighted 2 sailboats.
 2000 I Formed scouting line with POMPON.

6 May

- 0624 I Sighted sailboat. In order to retire our scouting line we had to run through a Chinese fishing fleet today. Decided to investigate some of them and see if we could pick up some fish.
 0722 I Fired one 40 MM across bow of junk. Went close aboard, looked them over, took pictures. This

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- was a good sized, three-masted junk with license number 5797. Nothing suspicious. Passed over a bag of food and some cigarettes.
- 0907 I Called sampan alongside, exchanged bread and canned goods for a batch of fresh fish. Apparently salt water eels. Very good.
- 0955 I Sighted many sailboats. A large junk with sampans working out from it.
- 1042 I Fired one round of 40 MM across bow of junk, went alongside. Exchanged a bag of food for fish. They must have started a process of drying these fish in the sun as we had to throw them over the side.
- Noon Position - Lat. 27-50 N, Long. 121-49.2 E.
- 2000 I Formed scouting line with POMPON.

7 May

- Noon Position - Lat. 26-11 N, Long. 120-34.5 E.
- 1627 I Made trim dive.
- 1726 I Surfaced.
- 1854 I OOD and lookout, in fog, heard what sounded like two explosions, apparently coming from 250 T, the direction of HAITAN ISLAND. Nothing whatever was heard below decks in any compartment. Stopped, listened on JK. Headed over on that bearing for one-half hour. No reoccurrence. Resumed course and speed.
- 2000 I In scouting line with POMPON.
- 2124 I TDM commenced acting jittery. Straight line traces would show up but would remain on the same bearing as we swung ship. We could not verify any of the TDM phenomena with the JK.
- 2135 I SD contact 14 miles, bogey. Closed to 8. Submerged.
- 2200 I Surfaced.
- 2317 I APR contact 160 mcs.
- 2350 I Commenced swinging ship at one-third speed, steadyng up at every 45° change of head. Checked APR signal and found no appreciable difference in signal strength.

8 May

- 0225 I SJ operator had a momentary pip as he swept by bearing 000 T at a range of 8 to 10,000 yards. Swept carefully on same bearing and could not regain contact. Changed course to 000 T, ran for 2 miles and then searched in a small parallelogram. No contact by sound, radar, or APR.

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- 0330 I Swung ship to investigate 150 mc. APR contact.
No results.
- 0636 I Submerged for periscope patrol off HAITAN ISLAND, north of TURNABOUT ISLAND. Sighted numerous fishing sampans and nothing else. Two of these fishing boats sighted the periscope when they passed close aboard; one of them decided to retrieve it from the water and made two passes at the scope, one with a boat hook and one by a man leaning out of the bow of the sampan. Our pink periscope camouflage is apparently better than I had thought.
- Noon Position - (DR) Lat. 26-36.5 N, Long. 119-59.3 E.
- 1926 I Surfaced. Formed scouting line with POMPON.
- 2028 I Sighted searchlight beams on clouds from direction of FORMOSA. This continued for over an hour.

9 May

- 0032 I SD contact 19 miles, bogey. Closed to 8 miles.
Submerged.
- 0119 I Surfaced.
- 0500 I SD contact 17 miles. Friendly. Did not reply to VHF. Closed to 5 miles, submerged.
- 0535 I Surfaced.
- 0758 I Submerged for patrol off HAITAN ISLAND. Numerous fishing boats but none so close as yesterday. Had a good look in HAITAN BAY and along the beach. All clear.
- Noon Position - Lat. 25-30 N, Long. 120-00 E.
- 1900 I Surfaced. Found fish net and line draped over boat. Made them up into a bundle.
- 1935 I Closed nearest fishing sampan and called him alongside. Passed over net and line. Hoped he would return them to the owner, but it was apparent that our contribution was accepted as a gift. This was also the best gift we had made to any Chinaman yet. The fishermen were all smiles and chased us for several minutes when we shoved off, attempting to give us their fish.
- 1946 I Circling a fishing sampan without sails. This was a good example of how imagination lends color to reports. While we had been returning the fish net, the high periscope had picked up this sampan and had reported it as a power boat. One officer, the CQM and a QM2c had agreed that the boat was "definitely under power". It had even been reported as similar in appearance to a Navy motor launch. Upon closing to investigate, of course, it turned out to be the typical fishing

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9 May (Cont.)

- sampan, mast not stepped, sculling oars, eyes in bow, and all. Returned to scouting line in FORMOSA STRAIT.
2255 I Swung ship to investigate APR contact at 220 mcs. No results. This interference disappeared. Believed to have been airborne.

10 May

- 0206 I Challenged by POMPON on SJ.
0339 I SD contact 8 miles, bogey, closing. Submerged.
0446 I Surfaced.
0520 I SD contact 6 miles, closing, bogey. Submerged. Periscope patrol.
Noon Position - (DR) Lat. 25-08.5 N, Long. 120-24.5 E.
1552 I Surfaced.
2152 I SD contact 7 miles, closing, bogey. Submerged.
2258 I Surfaced.

11 May

- 0040 I First of several floating objects on SJ radar.
0610 I Set course into blind bombing zone for lifeguard station.
0735 I On lifeguard station. Heavy overcast.
1025 I SD contact 22 miles, friendly. Raised lifeguard plane on VHF and directed him to our position at the edge of the overcast.
1042 I Sight contact with PBY. No business.
1158 I Submerged to clear blind bombing zone. Periscope patrol.
Noon Position - Lat. 24-52.5 N, Long. 120-20.5 E.
1519 I Broached in heavy sea.
1530 I Surfaced.

12 May

- 0159 I Took over POMPON's lifeguard station for remainder of patrol, telling him to work the area at discretion.
0643 I Submerged. Periscope patrol. Depth control difficult due to swells.
Noon Position - (DR) Lat. 25-47.9 N, Long. 121-01.9 E.
1850 I Surfaced. Mountains of northern FORMOSA visible at 40 miles. The clearest weather we have had in the area.
2111 I Observed searchlight drill on FORMOSA.
2259 I OOD, JOOD and lookout sighted green flare with orange tail, bearing 090 T. Headed over to investigate. Listened on JK.
2321 I SD contact 8 miles, closing. Bogey. Submerged. This flare was explained.

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0029 I Surfaced.
 0549 I SD contact 7 miles, bogey. Submerged. Periscope patrol.
 0930 I Heard possible explosion.
 0940 I 2 more possible explosions.
 0945 I Another possible explosion.
 Noon Position - (DR) Lat. 25-49.5 N, Long. 121-36.5 E.
 1851 I Surfaced.
 1951 I JOOD heard 2 explosions from bridge - nothing heard below decks, nor by anyone else.

14 May

0435 I SD contact 8 miles, bogey. Submerged.
 0524 I Surfaced.
 0607 I SD contact 9 miles, bogey. Closed to 8. Submerged. Periscope patrol.
 Noon Position - (DR) Lat. 25-43.2 N, Long. 121-31.8 E.
 1727 I At 55 feet OOD sighted object which he thought was a periscope, bearing 132 T. This was allegedly complete with feather.
 1733 I I sighted the alleged periscope but with a more judicious length of own periscope exposed. The alleged feather was on the opposite side from that originally reported. This object did not form a silhouette against the sky as a submerged periscope should and does, with the proper amount of own periscope exposed. The sea was calm with an easy swell and an occasional whitecap. All clear by sound. Headed over to investigate on last bearing.
 1842 I Reversed course.
 1845 I OOD (a new one), sighted what he thought was a piece of wood with a bird sitting on it.
 1925 I Surfaced. Went close aboard of object with bird on it. This was a pear shaped object similar to an airplane belly tank or wing-tip float. It was probably the "periscope".
 2120 I Forward torpedo room and conning tower heard what sounded like distant explosions. These are believed to have come from misalignment or other disarrangement of the QB-TDM head.
 2130 I Set course for lifeguard station.

15 May

0112 I Observed searchlight drill on FORMOSA.
 0259 I Searchlight display.
 0810 I SD contact 11 miles, bogey, closing to 8. Submerged. Set course in the blind bombing zone for lifeguard station.
 1017 I Surfaced.

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15 May (Cont.)

- 1150 I Heard first of several rumbling explosions from direction of FORMOSA, 20 miles away. Probably due to our strikes.
1151 I On lifeguard station. SD contacts, 28 and 32 miles, friendly. Faded.
Noon Position - Lat. 24-58.9 N, Long. 120-27.3 E.
1422 I Submerged. Headed out of blind bombing zone.
1552 I Surfaced. Headed over for western side of FORMOSA STRAIT.
2023 I SD contact 7 miles, bogey. Submerged.
2109 I Surfaced.
2203 I Observed strange pip on "A" scope of SJ. At a range of about 6000 yards there was a persistent pip on a steady true bearing, which stayed on the screen no matter what our heading. The pip for the most part remained at a constant height of about $\frac{1}{4}$ inch. Occasionally, however, it would rise to saturation. It was 900 yards wide and plotted by rough check as stationary. The most peculiar feature was that the pip was fuzzy at all times on both sides and on the top. The sky was absolutely clear with no clouds, and with a quarter-moon at about 170 degrees from the bearing of the pip.
2215 I After everyone had a look at the pip and couldn't make anything out of it, we went to tracking stations and started an end-around on the pip, intending to get it up-moon and look at its source. The pip immediately disappeared. We ran through its former position and found nothing.
2300 I SD contact 6 miles, closing. Bogey. Submerged.

16 May

- 0013 I Surfaced.
0659 I Submerged. Periscope patrol off LAMYIT, working up toward TURNABOUT.
Noon Position - (DR) Lat. 25-00.9 N, Long. 119-32.5 E.
1530 I Observed object through periscope, was not well seen, might possibly have been a mine. Attempted to copy 8KC lifeguard sked on SD antenna. Could hear NPN and other stations but was unable to hear 8KC.
1917 I Surfaced.
2000 I SJ interference bearing 078 T. The radar officer was sure that we had a Japanese 10 centimeter radar at this point. We had built up a little reserve of fuel so I decided to chase this will-o-the-wisp. We maintained a search on the ST radar, and would break off from this and listen on the SJ at frequent intervals. The interference

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remained on the same true bearing and kept growing weaker as we drew closer. There was no land on this bearing. After remaining steady for 2 hours the bearing of the interference drifted to the right to 100 T, where it remained for the rest of the night. At 0145 SJ interference was picked up from another source, bearing 260 T. This bearing too, remained constant for the remainder of the night despite our maneuvers of steaming in a square in the middle of FORMOSA STRAIT. My conclusion is that interference on the SJ radar does not necessarily indicate another SJ, nor even another 10 centimeter radar. I believe that we have quite a bit to learn about skip distances, harmonics, refraction, reflections, side lobes, back lobes, and general atmospheric conditions in connection with this radar. During the night, APR contacts were noted on the following frequencies: 200, 203, 222, 230, 226, 160, 164 mcs.

17 May

- 0049 I Brief searchlight display from FORMOSA.
- 0704 I SD contact 6 miles, submerged.
- 0854 I Sighted three-masted junk bearing 180 T. He was right on our lifeguard station.
- 0908 I Surfaced. Manned 40 MM and .50 Cal. guns and started in to investigate junk. It was a fairly large three-master with no markings nor pennants nor paint of any kind except for the eyes in the bow. Circled him and looked him over. He was making 4 knots with the wind headed for FORMOSA. Position: Lat. 25-09.5 N, Long. 120-40.3 E, which is a point 20 miles off the FORMOSAN west coast. His course and speed thus aroused my suspicions. In over a month in the area this was the first time that we had seen a junk of this size, this far from the CHINA coast.
- 0952 I Fired two 40 MM shells across bow of junk. The junk made no attempt to lower his sails, but maintained his course and speed.
- 0957 I Shot down mainsail. He still made no attempt to lower his other sails. Shot down all sails. No other damage was done. Went close aboard junk, told the occupants to get into the sampan. They launched the sampan readily enough, but only half the crew of 14 threw in a few personal belongings and jumped in. They sculled over and came alongside of us and swarmed aboard like flies. They were happy to be aboard. We managed to keep them all from getting out of the sampan and to put some

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17 May (Cont.)

back in and sent it back to the junk. This left about 3 Chinamen on board. Went alongside junk. About 4 more Chinamen jumped right aboard the submarine. Pulled clear from junk and directed rest of crew by megaphone to man the sampan. They thought they were all being invited over to the submarine so they climbed into the sampan without delay and came alongside. We had the boarding party down on deck waiting for them this time. Took their painter and secured it, and by threats with guns and main force, prevented the occupants from boarding us. We then forced all 14 Chinamen to get into the sampan with their bags and baggage. This was a feat of no mean suasion on the part of the Chief of the Boat. Those who were on board went to their knees and protested while those who were in the sampan joined them in moaning and sighing. We finally got them all loaded. The sampan, although it was taking water over the gunnels from time to time, was in no danger of sinking. The occupants protested, however. While we kept the sampan secured alongside to starboard with a guard with a carbine keeping the occupants in their places, we went alongside the junk and secured it alongside to port. Boarding party examined it thoroughly. It had a small amount of fish, very little fishing tackle, about 3 bags of rice, a few papers, one suitcase of fairly good civilian clothes, but nothing more suspicious. The papers will be turned over to the language officer. It now appeared that the junk might be actually engaged in the fishing trade. His movements were still unexplained but it was obvious that he was not carrying cargo for the enemy. Decided not to sink the junk. Cast loose both junk and sampan. Told the middle-aged leader of the group to head west, not east, and backed clear. Gave them a gunny sack full of canned food and a whole carton of cigarettes, which should more than make up for the holes in their sails and the damage to their halyards.

- 1121 I SD contact 20 miles, friendly. Never sighted this plane but talked to him on VHF. He was not our cover.
- 1137 I SD contact 19 miles, bogey, closing, and by the rate of closing, apparently headed right for us. SD contact 27 miles, friendly, closing, at the same time. We were working one plane

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on the VHF at this time but did not know whether it was the bogey or the friendly. The bogey kept coming right in.

1142 I Sighted plane, position angle 40, nearly up-sun, angle on bow about 10. Range 4 miles. This plane had 4 engines but neither the OOD nor myself could see any other friendly characteristics. Tail and fuselage were not visible. Submerged. On the way down "JUKEBOX ONE" informed us that he should now be about 3 miles southeast of us. Assumed that "JUKEBOX ONE", (who was our B-17 cover) was the bogey that we had just sighted. Went to periscope depth and searched for him. He was not visible. This was the only ill-mannered plane that we had yet encountered. All the time we were down he hovered overhead so that we were not able to see him. I finally realized that this what he was doing. Raised the SD mast and immediately got the plane at 4 miles. Came up to 46 feet and raised him on the VHF. Asked him to make his cockerel crow and to keep it crowing while he was near us. He did. We surfaced. The plane said that he had a report that a B-25 was in trouble at 34 GOLDEN GATE 21(sic). We finally got settled that 34 GOLDEN GATE 021 was the place to search. "JUKEBOX ONE" said that he would make a brief search and come back and let us know. We set course for the spot in question.

Noon Position - Lat. 25-23.5 N, Long. 120-48 E.

1305 I Sighted plane, 4 engines, position angle 5°, about 10 miles, headed directly for us. Called "JUKEBOX ONE" on VHF and asked him to turn on his IFF again. He did. He was the plane in sight. He reported negative results of his search. We continued on to the spot and on the afternoon sked received word that no plane was down.

1819 I SD contact 15 miles, bogey. Closed to 10. Sighted from bridge a formation of one bomber and about seven fighters headed south for FORMOSA. Submerged.

1915 I Surfaced. Sighted floating object. Headed over to investigate.

1926 I Lookout sighted "BETTY" about 15 miles, headed south for FORMOSA.

1934 I Lookout sighted second "BETTY" about 10 miles, headed south for FORMOSA.

1938 I Floating object identified as metallic object almost a cube in shape, about 4 feet on a side. Very similar in appearance to a pontoon of type used in making up our pontoon barges.

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17 May (Cont.)

1930 I Copied LUZON sked which included no lifeguard for us for tomorrow. Had tried to raise MUSKALLUNGE unsuccessfully to determine his ETA at the lifeguard station, but now decided that since he was due on the 18th and there was no business scheduled for that day, that, even if he were delayed 24 hours he would be in plenty of time. There was very little prospect of the lifeguard station being left unguarded. Set course out of area in accordance with orders already received from ComSubPac.

2000 I SD contact 15 miles, bogey. Closed to 10, sighted from bridge. Angle on bow 10. Submerged.

18 May

0515 I SD contact 5 miles, closing. Submerged. Lost power on stern planes.

0612 I Surfaced. Set course north along China coast for search by daylight of the area which has now become blind bombing by night. Sighted many junks.

0730 I Circled close aboard junk #11704. He doused his sails at our approach. All hands showed considerable alarm until we broke out the colors, at which the occupants smiled and waved at us.

0740 I Flying flag for junk #9407. Sighted more junks during morning but did not investigate any more of them closely.

1150 I Decoded orders from ComSubPac, directing COD and MUSKALLUNGE to rendezvous in vicinity of 32 N - 126 E to transfer PCO from COD to MUSKALLUNGE to assume command and to transfer CO of MUSKALLUNGE, who was ill, to COD, for further transfer to GUAM.

Noon Position - (DR) Lat. 27-38.8 N, Long. 121-35.8 E.

1215 I Commenced first of several attempts to raise MUSKALLUNGE on area frequency to arrange time of rendezvous.

2114 I Decoded 5th Air Force request for lifeguard submarine on 19 May. There was nothing we could do about this and the information was available to ComSubPac.

2130 I Worked MUSKALLUNGE. From his reply it was apparent that he had not received the orders to the rendezvous. Referred him to the message. In reply received request for rendezvous closer to base. Assigned new rendezvous at Lat. 32-23 N, Long. 127-30 E. This rendezvous was as far east as I thought it advisable to prescribe

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and still be in the open sea west of DANJO GUNTO. Asked MUSKALLUNGE whether he was proceeding on surface, and held in abeyance the matter of shifting the rendezvous to the south of DANJO GUNTO. MUSKALLUNGE replied that he was proceeding submerged on the 20th but would try to run surface the reaftor.

19 May

- 0405 I Immediately upon changing the location of the rendezvous which had been designated by ComSubPac, I sent a message to ComSubPac informing him of the new location and of my estimated time of arrival. I did this because the MUSKALLUNGE was in communication with ComSubPac and was sending him information without making it available to me. Communications between the MUSKALLUNGE and COD had not been reliable. My experience with rendezvous has shown that it is best to keep all parties concerned fully informed.
- 0430 I Decoded message from ComAir OKINAWA telling submarines in vicinity of Lat. 32, Long. 127 to be alert for planes in trouble during the afternoon of the 19th. Apparently a strike at the KOREAN coast. Sent message to OKINAWA telling them our estimated noon position, course, and speed, and volunteering to serve as lifeguard.
- 0806 I Sent message to ComSubPac telling him all available information that I had obtained from the MUSKALLUNGE with my plans for rendezvous.
- 0910 I SD contact 7 miles, bogey. Submerged. Rain and general poor visibility all day today.
- 0935 I Surfaced.
Noon Position - (DR) Lat. 31-14.8 N, Long. 125-13.1 E.
- 1254 I SD contact 23 miles, friendly. Worked him on VHF. No targets.
- 1934 I Decoded message from radio OKINAWA saying the strike had been delayed until the 20th.

20 May

- 0034 I Worked MUSKALLUNGE, getting his position, course, speed and estimated time of arrival at rendezvous of 0200 I on the 21st. A plot showed that he was intending to run submerged on the 20th. This factor ruled out a rendezvous south of DANJO GUNTO. Accordingly I did not change the rendezvous and sent a message to OKINAWA telling them we would be in the rendezvous position on 20 May and would like to lifeguard.

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20 May (Cont.)

0245 I Exchanged calls with SEGUNDO by SJ.
0804 I Arrived at rendezvous station. Ran a short line up towards QUELPART ISLAND during the day and returned.
Noon Position - Lat. 32-41.1 N, Long. 127-26 E.
1245 I Lookout sighted two planes, distance 4 miles, apparently Coronados. Submerged.
1319 I Surfaced.
2239 I Exchanged signals with MUSKALLUNGE by SJ radar.
2329 I SJ contact on MUSKALLUNGE. Worked him by VHF. Ascertained that CO would be able to make trip in rubber boat. Fairly heavy seas. Had MUSKALLUNGE lie to and pump oil while we circled him, spreading oil.

21 May

0040 I Cast loose rubber boat containing Comdr. W. H. LAWRENCE, 73367, USN with SOP orders to assume command of MUSKALLUNGE and with Lt. HURST as Cox. Spread 5 more gallons of oil from the Forward Torpedo Room head, backed clear, and withdrew to leeward. Sent MUSKALLUNGE in to recover boat.
0110 I MUSKALLUNGE received boat alongside.
0116 I MUSKALLUNGE cast loose boat and pulled clear to windward. Commenced maneuvering to recover boat. The oil slick proved reasonably effective in keeping the waves from breaking. Lt. HURST reported that his chief difficulty came from the fish nudging him through the bottom of the boat. He turned off his light for a short time when this happened but turned it on again as soon as we started playing the searchlight.
0150 I Recovered boat and occupants, taking aboard Lt. Comdr. L. A. LAJAUNIE, Jr., 78819 USN., the former CO of the MUSKALLUNGE.
0155 I MUSKALLUNGE departed on patrol. We set course for GUAM.

Noon Position - Lat. 31-19.7 N, Long. 128-58 E.

We had been experiencing squally weather all day with wind and sea from the northeast, gradually veering to eastward, and with a falling barometer. When the barometer dropped 0.30 inch in one hour, it was apparent that we were in the northeast quadrant of a cyclonic storm. At 1600 the barometer steadied at 29.60 inches. The winds decreased in intensity and rapidly veered to southwest, and for a short period we had an almost calm sea with a slight up and down movement and the sun shining overhead.

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By 1700 wind and sea had commenced picking up again from the southwest as we passed the storm center.

2124 I Commenced uneventful transit of the NANSEI SHOTO using the passage south of AKUSEKI JIMA. Our control of the air was well demonstrated. I had judged that the weather was too poor for any plane contacts this night. In actuality we had no enemy plane contacts and had one contact with an OKINAWA-based search plane. After receiving his report of no targets we told him about the typhoon to the north-westward. He replied that he knew about it since he had been flying around in it for the past 3 hours. I doubt that the American public will ever fully realise the risk and hardships involved in the non-glamorous aspects of the air war.

22 May

0515 I Submerged. Unable to maintain depth control at periscope depth. Commenced watering batteries and making routine repairs.

1009 I Surfaced.

1141 I Passed floating oil drum.

Noon Position - Lat. 29-11 N, Long. 131-55 E.

23 May

0530 I Made trim dive.

0611 I Surfaced.

Noon Position - (DR) Lat. 29-16.9 N, Long. 136-56.5 E.

1421 K Sighted 2 mines. Our position - Lat. 29-18 N, Long. 137-15 E. Usual type. Reddish color, light rust; not many barnacles. Exploded 1 mine with 40 MM. Holed second mine with .50 Cal. A small amount of smoke came out of the hole in the mine. It sank very slowly and was watched out of sight.

24 May

0051 K SD contact 23 miles, bogey. Closed steadily to 8. Submerged.

0154 K Surfaced. Had SD contact shortly after surfacing, but this time it showed friendly.

0524 K Friendly planes passed overhead.

0853 K SD contact 7 miles, bogey. Submerged.

1007 K Surfaced.

Noon Position - Lat. 27-20.8 N, Long. 139-16.8 E.

1351 K SD contact 10 miles, bogey. Closed to 8. Submerged.

1437 K Surfaced.

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24 May (Cont.)

1655 K Intercepted message from a plane to AGATE BASE telling of 3 Corsairs last seen 75 miles from our position. Raised AGATE BASE and offered to help in the search. AGATE BASE did not understand our Victor call, so we had to explain to him that we were a submarine. He replied that he could use us the next day, told us to stay in the joint zone and that the Dumbo planes would contact us in the morning. Sent message to ComSubPac advising him that we were doing this.

2041 K Conducted battery discharge at 6-hour rate.

25 May

0155 K Received messages from ComSubPac and ComTask Group 17.7 permitting us to search a 90-mile square surrounding the reported position, and informing us that an emergency submarine notice had been issued to cover us. Entered air-surface zone and commenced search. Reported our movements to AGATE BASE as soon as he came up on the lifeguard frequency in the morning. Sighted Dumbos. Worked them by VHF and on lifeguard frequency.

Noon Position - Lat. 25-47.3 N, Long. 138-30.3 E.

1932 K Sunset. Discontinued search. Returned to Joint zone and resumed course for GUAM.

26 May

0758 K Made trim dive. Routine tests prior to refit. Indications that excessive cavitation as well as bearing squeal exists in propellers.

0929 K Surfaced.

Noon Position - Lat. 23-21 N, Long. 139-47 E.

27 May

Noon Position - Lat. 18-53:8 N, Long. 139-42.2 E.

1232 K Submerged. Battle problem.

1329 K Surfaced.

28 May

0927 K Sighted two friendly submarines. Exchanged messages with CREVALLE.

Noon Position - Lat. 15-29.9 N, Long. 141-43.5 E.

1403 K Sighted friendly submarine. Exchanged challenge.

29 May

Arrived GUAM.

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(C) WEATHER

No extreme weather conditions were encountered during the patrol. The weather, in general, agreed with the predictions of the H.O. publications for this time of year (overcast and misty). One typhoon was encountered, with a barometer of 29.60 at the center.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

The tides and currents encountered during this patrol conformed to those indicated on the current charts and in the H.O. publications for this area and time of year. A set of about 0.6 knots to the northeast was experienced in the middle of FORMOSA STRAIT, and a set of 0.5 knots to the south within twenty miles north of KEELUNG, FORMOSA.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

No navigation lights were observed to be burning on the FORMOSA or CHINA coast. Navigation was accomplished mostly by sunsights, radar fixes and soundings. Soundings checked closely with H.O. Chart 5495.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS

* Additional information for Contact No. 3: Original contact was by traces on TDM bearing 020 relative, which were identified as echo-ranging signals on 15.6 kcs; depth of water then being about 48 fathoms. Submarine was surfaced, making 5.5 knots on auxiliary engine. No other sound gear was in use at time.

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(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

More than 170 contacts were made on planes or groups of planes. From an analysis of those which were believed to be enemy, the following surmises are made and are probably already out of date: In the area to the north and west of FORMOSA numerous air patrols are encountered with regularity, probably operating from the airfields at TAKHOKU and SHINCHIKU on northern FORMOSA. Contacts further indicate that the majority of the patrols to the north and some of those to the west emanate from TAIHOKU, with SHINCHIKU taking the remainder of the westerly patrols. In the area to the north early morning and early evening planes can be expected; those observed were either type SALLY or BETTY. On a line from TAIHOKU to FOOCHOW contacts were very regular at about two hour intervals from 1800 I to 1000 I, with the greatest number of contacts around 1800 I. The shuttle patrols from FOOCHOW and FORMOSA probably overlap considerably during the evening sweeps. On several occasions a transport was observed heading for TAIHOKU in the evening coming from the direction of the Chinese mainland. This plane is scheduled to arrive FORMOSA at about 1900 I. This plane was several times identified as a DOUGLAS DC-2 (TESS).

Close in to FORMOSA a great number of contacts were encountered in the morning at about 0600 I. On some occasions the planes were observed visually and were in the majority of cases BETTY bombers. Planes are numerous about 1700 I and 2100 I, type SALLY being observed on several occasions. The evening patrols are also carried out along the CHINA coast from 1700 I to 2000 I.

There was no evidence of seaplanes operating from the reported bases at TANSUI KO or FOOCHOW.

One evening at sunset, after a strike by our planes, we sighted a bomber accompanied by at least seven fighters, and several lone bombers, all headed south at a point 20 miles north of KEELUNG. The presence of the fighters was extraordinary; a report of their presence was included in a routine despatch to ComSubPac.

Prior to our westward passage through the NANSEI SHOTO, a four engine land plane with round fuselage and mid-wing bombed us. This plane was probably based on KYUSHU and searching the area to the east and south of TOKARA GUNTO. He was a little slow at his trade; we

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(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Cont.)

we were at 200 feet with the ventilation running when the bomb exploded. As we proceeded further westward we had more contacts the same day and throughout the transit.

No new tactics were encountered.

On only one occasion did we encounter bad manners on the part of a friendly plane. The difficulty arose, ironically enough, with a IJZON B-17 (call. JUKE BOX ONE) who was our air cover on a lifeguard mission. It was apparent that he just didn't know any better than to close right in on us from up-sun with his BK secured, and then, after driving us down, to hover directly overhead. (See narrative for 17 May.) This was in marked contrast to the behaviour of all other IJZON planes, OKINAWA planes, and MARIANAS planes encountered east of the NANSEI SHOTO. We found it very easy to exchange information with most of them by VHF.

It is indeed a privilege and a pleasure to witness the feats of skill and airmanship which are apparently routine with the search squadrons based on OKINAWA.

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CONFIDENTIAL(H) TORPEDO ATTACKS (SHIP CONTACT NO. 3)

U.S.S. COD (SS224) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 6

Time 2156 I Date 24 April 1945 Lat. 25-50 N.
Long. 121-16.1 E.

Description: AM No. 41

Ship(s) Sunk: None

Ship(s) Damaged: None

Damage Determined by: None

Target Draft 6' Course 325 Speed 11 3/4 Range 3100 yds
(Torp.Run)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 4.5 Course 098 Depth Surface Angle 0

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Night surface attack using radar ranges and
TBT bearings. Divergent spread.

Tubes Fired	3	4	5	6
Track Angles	45 $\frac{1}{4}$ P	45 $\frac{1}{4}$ P	46P	47.3P
Gyro Angles	001 $\frac{1}{4}$	001 $\frac{1}{4}$	001 $\frac{1}{2}$	001 $\frac{1}{2}$
Depth Set	2'	2'	2'	2'
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic (yes or No)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mk. Torpedo	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2
Serial	99236	99357	99243	99365
Mk. Exploder	8-7	8-7	8-7	8-7
Serial	15929	15925	15832	15812
Actuation	CONTACT			
Mk. Warhead	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2
Serial	5707	5631	5698	5648
Explosive	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX
Firing Interval	0	12	12	13
Type Spread	0	0	$\frac{1}{4}^{\circ}$ R	$\frac{1}{4}^{\circ}$ L
Sea Conditions	FLAT SEA			
Overhaul Activity	U.S.S. ORION			
Power	27.15	27.15	27.20	27.20

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(H) TORPEDO ATTACKS (Cont.)

U.S.S. COD (SS224) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL NO. 6

Time 0056 I Date 25 April 1945 Lat. 25-53.9 N.
Long. 121-08 E.

Description: AM No. 41

Ship(s) Sunk: One

Ship(s) Damaged: None

Damage Determined by: Prisoner of War.

Target Draft 6' Course 308 Speed 11 Range 490 yards
(at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 3.6 Course 240 Depth 60' Angle 0

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Submerged attack using periscope radar ranges and
periscope bearings.

Tubes Fired	8	9	10
Track Angles	7 S	16 S	22 S
Gyro Angles	235	232	228
Depth Set	3'	3'	3'
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Hit
Erratic (Yes or No)	No	No	No
Mk. Torpedo	18-2	18-2	18-2
Serial	99218	99317	99375
Mk. Exploder	8-7	8-7	8-7
Serial	11602	15962	15918
Actuation	Contact	Contact	Contact
Mk. Warhead	18-2	18-2	18-2
Serial	5721	5709	5602
Explosive	TPX	TPX	TPX
Firing Interval	0	9	10
Type Spread	0	45 Ft.	61 Ft.
Sea Conditions		FLAT SEA	
Power	28.40	28.40	28.40
Overhaul Activity		U.S.S. ORION	

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(H) TORPEDO ATTACKS (Cont.)

(SHIP CONTACT #3)

U.S.S. COD (SS224) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3 PATROL NO. 6

Time 0522 I Date 25 April 1945 Lat. 26-54.7 N.
Long. 121-10.7 E.Description: PC and engine aft vessel,
SB or smaller.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.

Ship(s) Damaged: None.

Damage Determined by: None.

Target Draft 6' Course 323 Speed 11 3/4 Range 3500
6' 335 11 3/4 2900
(Torp. Run)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 9.4 - 6.3 Course 030 Depth Surface Angle 0

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Night radar surface attack using radar ranges
and TBT bearings.

Tubes Fired	3	4	5	6	1	2
Track Angles	121.5 P	121 $\frac{1}{4}$ P	124.5 P	115.6 P	115.8 P	117 P
Gyro Angles	353 $\frac{1}{2}$	353 $\frac{1}{4}$	349 $\frac{1}{2}$	009 $\frac{1}{2}$	010 $\frac{1}{4}$	008
Depth Set	3'	3'	3'	3'	3'	3'
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic (Yes or No)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mk. Torpedo	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2
Serial	99274	99262	99397	99215	99267	99260
Mk. Exploder	8-7	8-7	8-7	8-7	8-7	8-7
Serial	15849	15866	15854	15700	15911	15961
Actuation			CONTACT			
Mk. Warhead	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2
Serial	5714	5712	5747	5682	5666	5726
Explosive	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX
Firing Interval	0	12 $\frac{1}{2}$ R	13 $\frac{1}{2}$ L	0(50)	13 $\frac{1}{2}$ R	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ L
Type Spread	0			0		
Sea Condition				FLAT SEA		
Power	27.50	27.50	27.50	27.70	27.70	27.70
Overhaul Activity				U.S.S. ORION		

U.S.S. COD (SS224)

CONFIDENTIAL

ATTACK DATA

U.S.S. COD (SS224) GUN ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 6

Time 1101 I Date 17 April 1945 Lat. 31-51.5 N.
Long. 124-51.5 E.

Target Data - DAMAGE INFILCTED

SHIPS SUNK: One tug, possibly CHUYO MARU
One loaded wooden oiler.

DAMAGED OR PROBABLY SUNK:

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY: Observed to sink.

DETAILS OF ACTION

USED: (1) 5"25 cal. gun; Expended 69 rounds, fuzed HC.
(2) 40 MM guns; 316 rounds expended.

Surfaced astern of tug with tow at range of 3750 yards. Closed range, maneuvering to keep tow between COD and tug, to 3200 yards and opened fire with 5" gun. Third round struck in waist of oiler and a great ball of flame enveloped the midship section of the ship, followed by dense clouds of black smoke rising immediately. About 17 more rounds were fired rapidly and approximately 90% were observed to hit the forecastle, poop, and sides, sending new sheets of flame aloft and a pall of oil smoke several hundred feet high, enveloping the target. Tug had meanwhile cast loose the tow and placed herself in protected position with oiler between COD and herself, at the same time attempting to clear the area. COD speeded up, closed oiler, raking entire length with 40 MM fire, and opened fire on tug. Crews of tug and oiler were observed mounting and manning machine guns at this time, many splashes around COD.

First seven to ten rounds were observed to fall close aboard tug, who at this time was swerving wildly from side to side, finally presenting a zero angle on bow to COD. Tug was firing at COD with 20 MM or heavy Hotchkiss gun mounted on wheelhouse and two other guns, when a near miss on tug's starboard side caused her to lose steerage way and steering. Sharp turn to her port and marked reduction in speed indicated this as she presented 90 starboard angle on bow. Crew of tug abandoned ship. At this time target was observed to be completely riddled by fragments from H.E. shells.

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ATTACK DATA (Cont.)

The metal superstructure was shredded and from the vicinity of the engine room arose many small streamers of smoke. Several hits were observed on various parts of the vessel further rending the deck houses and hull. 40 MM opened up on tug at this time, raking hull and 5" put several rounds in the engine rooms starting additional fires and causing several violent explosions believed to be boilers. COD closed to 2000 yards putting several rounds in waterline which sent ship to the bottom.

Closed oiler to about 500 yards, firing into hull along waterline on side and stern, causing it to sink. During this firing several bright flashes were noticed amidships followed by sheets and jets of flame. As the oiler sank, drums which were on deck floated off into the water and the crackling and popping noises continued for some time.

While at MARE ISLAND we adopted the 5" fire control system which had been promulgated by Comdr. D. C. WHITE. This consists of telephone control from the conning tower, with control and spotting officer on a periscope. Target is kept set up on TDC, using gun as a range finder after initial salvo. Range spots are by SJ radar. Every 40-yard increment is sent to the gun. The system has many advantages. The control party is behind armor in the conning tower in relative quiet, yet in easy communication with C.O. on the bridge by 7 MC. The gunnery officer on the periscope shears is free to control all rapid fire guns by voice. The executive officer at the other periscope is free to watch all targets and pick up any item being overlooked by the commanding officer.

In an effort to simplify ammunition stowage and supply, this vessel mounted the following secondary guns for this patrol: Two 40 MM, four .50 cal., zero 20 MM. This decision was made against the advice of the force gunnery officer, who pointed out that the 20 MM is a more reliable gun than the 40 MM. It required most of our training period to learn about the 40, especially to find the best weight and amount of grease to be used. The guns during this patrol were thoroughly reliable and their performance is a fitting tribute to the industry and attention to duty of Lieut. Charles PODOREAN and ALDRIDGE, J. E., GM2c.

CONFIDENTIAL(I) MINES

Summary of mines sighted and results obtained.
For additional information see narrative and photographs.

14 April	Lat. 29-13 N	Long. 132-13 E	Exploded
15 April	Lat. 29-58 N	Long. 128-47 E	Sighted through periscope.
16 April	Lat. 31-23 N	Long. 128-55 E	Doubtful night contact.
16 April	Lat. 32-27 N	Long. 128-17 E	Failed to sink it.
16 April	Lat. 32-22 N	Long. 125-27 E	Night. Lost at moonset.
17 April	Lat. 31-45 N	Long. 134-35 E	Exploded.
18 April	Lat. 29-05 N	Long. 123-32 E	Exploded.
18 April	Lat. 27-27 N	Long. 122-37 E	Exploded.
24 April	Lat. 25-10 N	Long. 120-45 E	Large type mine. Low order explosion.
25 April	Lat. 26-35 N	Long. 121-52 E	Exploded.
25 April	Lat. 26-19 N	Long. 121-56 E	Holed with 40 MM. Sank.
25 April	Lat. 26-08 N	Long. 121-57 E	Holed with .50 Cal. Smoked. Sank.
26 April	Lat. 26-15 N	Long. 121-25 E	Exploded.
4 May	Lat. 28-43 N	Long. 123-57 E	Delayed action explosion.
23 May	Lat. 29-15 N	Long. 137-15 E	Exploded.
23 May	Lat. 29-15 N	Long. 137-15 E	Holed with .50 Cal. Smoked. Sank.

No conclusions as to enemy mining operations have been drawn. It is my opinion that floating mines are apt to be encountered anywhere in the CHINA SEA or in the waters off JAPAN. All of them are potentially dangerous.

The paucity of mine contacts during the latter part of the patrol is attributed neither to the absence of mines in the locality nor to reduction in vigilance on our part. It is readily explained by increased submerged patrolling and by rougher weather, which made very difficult the sighting of mines or any other floating objects by lookouts.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~(J) ANTISUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

During attack No. 2, (the submerged attack on AM #41), the target was using a modulated signal with automatic keying, shortening range scale as the range closed. He continuously shortened the keying interval as the range closed under 800 yards, indicating the use of equipment similar to the chemical range recorder of our own A/S vessels. The frequency of his equipment and that of the PC in company was 15.6 kcs. During attack No. 3 a zero beat was obtained on the same PC at 15.3 kcs.

Evasion tactics consisted of steering a continuously curving course at 50 r.p.m., running silent at 150 feet with depth of water 270 feet. Serious damage was avoided by reason of the depth setting of the charges, which were all too deep. We could have done a much better job of avoiding the first depth charge attack. When it was apparent that one A/S vessel was starting in for a good run on the second depth charge attack, we fired an NAE beacon and speeded up. The NAE beacon was a dud, as had been the one which we fired during the training period at PEARL.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGEHULL AND MACHINERY

QB The QB sound head installation as presently connected with the TDM is unsatisfactory. The high speed training of the QB head has caused noticeable wear on the shaft, which in turn, creates excessive vibration due to the increased clearances. The vibration keeps the hydraulic lines to the sound head loose.

There is present in the QB sound head installation a pounding noise, the cause of which is unknown. The fault may be with a loose spider and drum or the outer door.

SHAFTS The starboard shaft has a squeal when running at speeds of 65 r.p.m. & higher. The intensity of this squeal has progressively increased throughout the patrol. Investigation has revealed no abnormal high temperatures at the stern tube bearing. The squeal may originate in the strut or possibly the stern tube bearing and its frequency is one per revolution. A lesser noise is present in the port shaft.

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM The hydraulic plant acquired a pounding noise in the accumulator. This defect was traced to faulty packing. Upon disassembly the leather packing was found hard and dry despite proper maintenance. The oil side was repacked and the shaft stoned. This eliminated

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(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (Cont.)HYDRAULIC SYSTEM (Cont.)

the noise for a period of about sixty hours' operation but it has since reappeared.

TRIM PUMP PANEL While charging batteries, an attempt was made to run the trim pump. This blew the line fuses and tripped the circuit breaker on the forward distribution panel.

Investigation showed that the first accelerating contactor "1A" was closing simultaneously with the line contactors, starting the dead motor with "1R" cut out. The resultant overload blew the fuses and tripped the circuit breaker. The panel overload relay dash pot was too full of oil causing too long a lag in the operation of this relay. The oil level was corrected, and adjustment made on contact "1SR" to slow down the operation of "1A". As this adjustment had no effect, the panel was taken to the tender and thoroughly checked, both electrically and mechanically by ship's force and tender repair force. No defect was found that could cause the above condition. A new "1SR" coil was wound using more turns and this coil upon pulling up the relay armature would not release it again. The number of turns was gradually reduced until the same number remained as were originally wound. As a result of this experiment it was found that "1A" operated regardless of the "1SR". The wiring was checked with the blueprint, new coils were installed and all moving parts renewed without effect. The panel was reinstalled and operated manually by holding "1SR" open until the line surge dropped off. It is desired that this panel be broken down completely during the forthcoming refit and if the faulty operation cannot be corrected a new panel be installed. It is to be noted that this panel previous to the installation of the Gould type trim pump operated satisfactorily. When the Gould type trim pump was installed at MARE ISLAND the pump motor was modified, but no modification was made in the starting panel.

#2 LIGHTING MOTOR GENERATOR SET. An excessive increase in D.C. voltage was caused by loss of speed control on this set. Automatic speed control failed due to "idler plate assembly" (Pc #45) becoming loose and allowing the V-belt to slip. The piece was tightened up in its proper position and normal operation of the set resumed.

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(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (Cont.)

#1 EVAPORATOR Due to a leaky vapor seal, the complete compressor was replaced with a spare by the tender repair force. After 6 hours operation a leak developed on the pulley end and was renewed by parts from ship's spares.

MASTER GYRO COMPASS The follow-up system of the master gyro was out of commission twice during this patrol. On 18 April, the left hand vacuum tube failed causing all the repeaters to be out of commission. The faulty tube was replaced and the gyro was placed back in commission. On 12 May the bakelite drum holding the automatic speed correction slip rings short circuited due to carbon dust and dirt. The drum was removed, cleaned with alcohol, scraped, built up with sealing wax and replaced.

HEAD SEA VALVES During the depth charge attack on 24 April the first string of charges was of such intensity as to cause the discharge sea and stop valves in the officers' head to open violently; the sea valve operating handwheel was observed to spin rapidly and the stop valve operating lever was thrown to the open position with such force as to shear the pin joining the hand lever to the vertical operating shaft. Fortunately this was detected immediately by personnel in the forward torpedo room and the sea valve was shut after having taken enough water aboard to fill the bowl and run several inches on deck. The stop valve was shut with difficulty by using a wrench, and the sheared pin was removed and replaced.

During our overhaul at MARE ISLAND a job order had been issued to remove this opening in the hull by running the head discharge into the No. 1 Sanitary Tank. The job was cancelled by the yard without reference to the ship, but with the approval of certain administrative officers who have never been depth charged. At this stage of the war priority of submarines for overhaul is low. It is recommended, therefore, that the delays in overhaul schedules be accepted in order to accomplish all essential work.

TORPEDO AND GUNNERY

Four hydrogen burner casualties were experienced during this patrol, three being the result of voltage surge when I.C. motor generator speed regulator failed to function.

No grounds were noted on any of the torpedoes and no dead cells were located.

A major torpedo casualty occurred on the 26 of April. A hydrogen explosion in torpedo #99264 started a battery fire and also detonated hydrogen in torpedo #99218

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (Cont.)TORPEDO AND GUNNERY (Cont.)

which resulted in damage or destruction of 75% of its cell caps. A careful check was made of #99218 but no further damage noted. Ruptured cell caps were replaced by rubber gloves.

Torpedo #99264 was fired from #8 tube with propeller lock in place and with stop valve shut. The great heat of battery fire and resulting smoke made this necessary for the safety of the ship.

At this point this ship would like to point out the inadequacy of the present submarine allowance of the rescue breathing apparatus. The old type smoke

canister, as every one knows, is of no value whatsoever. At PERL HARBOR this ship attempted to draw four of the Rescue Breathers but only two could be obtained. (The ship's allowance). Thus, when this fire occurred as a result of the torpedo battery explosion, only two rescue breathing apparatus were available (one at each end of the ship), and only two men could work in the compartment, plus one other wearing a shallow water diving mask.

At one time a smoke cannister and lung was authorized for each compartment. It would seem to follow, therefore, that a rescue breathing apparatus should be authorized for each compartment on the ship. This change is recommended for submarine allowances.

Investigation indicates that the explosion occurred as a result of hydrogen accumulation during charge. The battery charge had been completed on #99264 and #99218 torpedoes, readings had been taken on #99264 and hand hole covers replaced. When the charging cable was removed from #99264, a spark resulted, flashing through to battery compartment and causing hydrogen explosion. Number 7 hand hole cover was blown off and an intense battery fire was started. The hydrogen in the room and in #99218 was detonated as the hand hole covers had not yet been replaced on this torpedo.

It is highly recommended that during charge, Mk. 18 torpedoes be ventilated continuously, using low pressure air through ventilation plug with at least two hand hole covers off. No exhaust lines in ship's ventilation system except at the torpedo room bulkheads makes for high concentration and accumulation of hydrogen gas in the torpedo rooms, especially around the torpedo tubes. This boat now has portable blowers rigged for exhausting this gas. Tests with portable hydrogen detector indicate that an explosive mixture exists at nearly all times in the torpedo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (Cont.)TORPEDO AND GUNNERY (Cont.)

during charge even if ventilated immediately before charge, and that concentration of hydrogen as high as 2% forms in torpedo room overhead during charge.

(L) RADIO

Radio reception was normal and satisfactory with a few exceptions. On several occasions NKN was blanked out completely by GKU4 or BAMS skeds. In the vicinity of Lat. 27 N, Long. 122 E, we were unable to copy Fox skeds on any frequency from NPM or 9090 kcs from GUAM as the signal gradually faded to zero for periods over an hour in length at times around 0300 - 0400 Item.

In clearing ship-shore traffic, NKN proved invaluable while we were in the area. On several occasions NPN could read us only strength 2 or 3, which is hardly adequate with so many Japs coming in strength 5, and NKN would break in to offer her reliable and helpful service.

Wolfpack communications left something to be desired. ComFairWing 2 (OOV4) in OKINAWA made every effort to assist submarine communications on Submarine Area Frequency Plans, by giving call-up, and, in fact, by rendering every service except relaying a message to a boat which he was unable to raise at the time. If he would offer delayed relay service in the form of an hourly broadcast schedule of those wolfpack messages which boats were unable to clear to the addressee it would speed up inter-submarine communications in the areas, and lighten the load on the ship-shore frequencies. This local SAFFPLAN SKED could also include the aircraft contact reports which ComFairWing 2 sends to submarines, thus eliminating the need of NPM handling these reports. Use of SAFFPLAN frequencies as a voice circuit by OKINAWA fighter director stations sometimes overloaded the circuit, but not seriously. The alternate SAFFPLAN frequencies were comparatively free of enemy jamming and generally more satisfactory.

For its designed purpose, the VHF proved a completely satisfactory piece of gear. It was our primary circuit in lifeguarding, and many SD and sight contacts were identified as friendly by its use.

The SCR 610-A equipment was tried on several occasions and functioned successfully once. At that time the two submarines were within 50 yards of each other and the commanding officers were in communication by megaphone.

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(L) RADIO (Cont.)

EXTRACT FROM RADIO LOG ON 17 APRIL DURING BATTLE SURFACE
500 Kcs.

0152 Z Battle surfaced.
0200 Z Jap sending close.
0202 Z CZ DE JUVJ UHP JUVJ ND CDJP OZL
(A message was sent here; could not copy due to
loudness of key clicks and unfamiliarity with
Japanese code.)
0205 Z CZ DE JUVJ.
0206 Z Ceased sending on 500.
0207 Z Sending again close.
0208 Z Ceased sending.
0220 Z Jap sending signal strength S2 not close.
0223 Z TYBT TYBT DE TOWJ TOWU QRK IMI K (not close.)
0232 Z Sending again but not close.
0245 Z No signals.
0300 Z No signals.
0315 Z No signals.
0330 Z No signals.
0400 Z No signals.
0415 Z No signals. Secured watch on 500 as ordered.

(M) RADAR

COD carried a specially trained radar officer for the first time on this patrol. This came about at GUAM when JOHN WALLACE, CRT(AA) received his commission as Ensign. The performance of the radars during patrol, naturally, was commensurately improved. Less than one hour was lost on the SJ and about 3 hours were lost on the SD.

Troubles experienced were: Routine tube failures, fuse failures due to fluctuations of line voltage, a break in the flexible cable drive to the PPI unit of the SJ, and a short in the high voltage winding of the power supply transformer of the BN. The winding burned out and had to be removed. High voltage for the BN was then obtained from a spare SD radar high voltage transformer which had to be stepped down from 18,000 volts to 4,500 volts by means of a resistance net work. The BN gave satisfactory performance for the remainder of the patrol.

During this patrol, as in previous ones, the SD radar was keyed for a brief period every 30 seconds, day and night. It is my opinion that no planes were attracted by this.

(N) SONAR GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

Sound conditions were average and performance of material normal except as noted.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~(N) SONAR GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS (Cont.)

TDM The Torpedo Detection Modification to the QB gear is a significant step forward both offensively and defensively. In tests at PEARL all of our conning tower watch standers had opportunity to observe its ability to detect torpedoes, and on patrol initial contact on one-half of our enemy contacts was made by TDM. During evasive tactics it gives a graphic picture of the bearing change of all A/S craft (except creepers). But considerable work remains to be done on the design of the equipment. I have seen more rugged contraptions made from a meccano set. Breakdowns averaged about three a day, and no attempt is made to list them here. The gold braid contactors on the QB head slip rings were completely unsatisfactory and had to be replaced after two weeks by scalloped rings of heavy brass wire designed by Ensign WALLACE. None of the gear was designed for continuous high speed operation. It is suggested that two double pole double throw switches be installed to enable either training motor generator set to be used with either sound head. The QB training motor generator could be shifted to a different training motor generator set each day, letting the other cool down.

Excessive vibration of the QB training motor and a burned out bearing in the training motor generator set occurred. The vibration once caused the forward torpedo room watch to report that we were aground, and led to several reports of distant depth charging. The training motor overheats. The Sangamo chemical recorder is apparently not designed for continuous operation. The transparent plastic became opaque. Many failures occurred in the springs and cord of the stylus fly-back system. From the large number of spares which were supplied us with the equipment, this would appear to be a weakness of long-standing.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

Density layers in this area were found to conform with the information given in the Submarine Supplement to the Sailing Directions for the Japanese Empire Area. They consisted mostly of small positive gradients of approximately 0.5 degrees between thirty and forty feet and larger positive gradients of approximately two degrees between sixty and eighty feet. Few negative gradients were obtained and then only in deep water of forty-five fathoms.

DATE	TIME	LAT. NORTH	LONG. EAST	SOUNDING F,THOMS	TEMP. AIR	TEMP. Surface	TEMP. Intake	GRADIENT °F	DEPTH Ft.	KEEL DEPTH Ft.	REMARKS
4/13/45	0039	28-07	137-18.2	--	82	67	-0.5	38	40	300	Flooded in 2000# at 60 ft.
4/14/45	0312	29-13.1	132-24	--	74	72	-0.5	38	40	220	
4/15/45	2110	29-16	133-42	--	79	72.5	--	--	--	280	
4/17/45	0300	31-52.5	124-51	27	75	52	-2	20	25	90	
4/19/45	1124	35-40	121-16	40	85	72	--	--	--	100	
4/20/45	0921	25-49.4	121-28.1	45	80	72	+0.5	20	25	200	
4/21/45	0136	25-32.4	120-21.5	32	77	72	+2	60	80	100	Flooded in 1500# from 80 to 70 Ft.
4/21/45	0923	25-34.7	120-05	24	76	65	+2	50	80	100	
4/22/45	0003	26-21.2	120-48.2	35	75	64	--	--	--	100	
4/22/45	0810	26-14.5	121-23	35	73	64	-1	20	25	100	
4/23/45	0841	25-23.2	120-49.8	46	81	73	-0.5	40	50	150	
4/24/45	2214	27-02.9	121-25.2	30	80	60	-5	40	50		
							+3	60	65	80	
4/25/45	1646	26-03.2	121-35.5	42	80	72	-0.5	38	40	140	
4/27/45	2155	26-42.2	122-00.2	50	84	68	+2.5	5	75	150	
4/28/45	1000	25-36.5	120-50	40	83	76	-4	75	180	200	
4/29/45	0300	25-26	121-18.6	45	77	76	-0.5	60	80	100	
4/29/45	2240	25-48.5	120-51	42	82	74	-3	50	110	150	
4/30/45	1706	25-50	131-13.2	--	83	77	-2	30	80	150	
5/1/45	0931	25-42.6	120-54	48	81	75	-1	40	42	100	
5/2/45	0755	26-15.3	120-53.1	45	76	70	-2	110	140	160	
5/5/45	0300	28-55.5	124-02.3	45	73	62	+1.0	10	50		
							-2.5	50	95	170	
5/7/45	0727	25-34	120-15.5	27	83	67	+4.5	40	60	80	
5/9/45	2020	25-09	120-25.7	--	80	74	+0.5	38	42	170	
5/10/45	1840	25-14.2	120-28	45	80	71	+0.5	30	32	65	
5/11/45	0258	24-47.6	120-12	35	82	76	-0.5	50	55	80	
5/12/45	2049	25-50	121-22.3	43	81	76	+0.5	10	20	130	Flooded in 3500# coming to 65 Ft.
5/13/45	2107	25-55.8	121-34.8	55	81	74	--	--	--	125	Flooded in 3000# coming to 65 Ft.

DATE	TIME GCT	L.T. NORTH	LONG. EAST	SCOUNDING FATHOMS	TEMP. AIR Surface	TEMP. - 4°C - °F	GRADIENT Dpth Ft.	KEEL DEPTH Intako	KEEL DEPTH Ft.	REMARKS
5/15/45	0700	24-59.0	120-20.4	30	78	74	40.5	18	21	120 Flooded in 1500# coming to 60 Ft.
5/15/45	1500	25-23.9	120-15.9	25	78	74	40.5	35	45	100
5/16/45	2204	25-20.5	120-38.1	45	79	76	-1.0	100	120	140
5/17/45	0244	25-09.3	120-38.9	45	79	75	-1.0	0	30	100
5/17/45	1100	25-41.1	121-23.0	43	82	78	-0.5	0	25	Flooded in 1000# coming to 65 Ft.
5/17/45	2015	26-40.4	120-59.2	35	80	70	-1.0	25	60	150
5/19/45	0638	30-58	124-43	23	80	61	42.0	75	85	110
5/20/45	0346	32-34.4	127-26.7	70	78	68	--	5	60	Pumped out 2000# coming to 60 Ft.
5/21/45	2015	29-17.5	130-51.2	2200	86	77	--	--	120	150
5/22/45	2030	29-21	135-22	--	80	69	-2	100	130	Flooded in 2500# coming to 60 Ft.
5/23/45	1451	29-11.2	139-07	--	76	70	+1	10	60	Flooded in 1500# coming to 65 Ft. (55)
5/24/45	0352	26-58.1	139-17.7	--	80	71	-1	60	130	150
5/25/45	2158	25-57.5	138-07.1	--	80	82	-3	120	280	No change in trim coming to 65 Ft.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY

Health of the crew was below par, eleven sick days being noted. FOLEY required a few days of rest after spending eight hours in the water, but was soon back on the watch list. Days were lost from calculus, right kidney; urethritis acute, non-veneral; and second degree burn, resulting from the torpedo battery explosion. Treatment was given for cellulitis; chronic appendicitis; scabies; a possible fracture of the wrist; fungus infection; constipation; heat rash; eye strain; and gingivitis.

Health of the first three prisoners was good. One case of otitis media responded to treatment by sulfa drugs. The prisoner from the AM showed no desire to live, and on one occasion, by signs, asked his guard to shoot him. The day after he was received he was placed in the forward torpedo room and the Pharmacist's Mate was removed from the watch list in order to be in almost constant attendance upon him. Every effort was made to save him. A diagnosis was made of peritonitis, general, acute, resulting from underwater explosion. He showed evidence of being syphilitic. He expressed tenderness in the abdomen. He refused food. He was treated with sodium pentobarbital and morphine sulfate. He was fed intravenously. Penicillin therapy was given, a total of 180,000 Oxford units being administered by intramuscular injection. The prisoner kept spitting and passing blood and slowly failing, finally expiring three days after being received on board. Adrenalin was administered with no reaction. Burial services were conducted.

Food was excellent and well-prepared. Too much credit cannot be given to SACCO, G.J., SC1c, WERRBACH, G.A., Jr., SC2c and HORAN, G.J., SC2c.

Habitability normal.

(Q) PERSONNEL

(a) Number of men detached after previous patrol.	22
(b) Number of men on board during patrol.	80
(c) Number of men qualified at start of patrol.	55
(d) Number of men qualified at end of patrol.	63
(e) Number of unqualified men making their first patrol.	18

I was unable to detect any difference in performance on the part of personnel that could be attributed to the effects of our visit to the United States. Everyone seemed just as aggressive and the commanding officer was just as stupidly willing as ever to let the Japanese use us for a target.

U.S.S. COD (SS224)

CONFIDENTIAL(Q) PERSONNEL (Cont.)

STUART, D.J., S1c, USNR was received at MARE ISLAND. He is a recent graduate of the West Coast Sound School, without previous experience at sea. He was given a battle station on the JK. His performance was worthy of a veteran and reflects great credit on the Sound School. He was absolutely reliable and unperturbed during the most trying conditions. Most striking to me was his ability to give accurate range estimates from the sound of the target screws alone. All hands received a great deal of benefit from the ship's week of services to the same school. Instruction was given us both on shore and on board. I believe that all prospective submarine commanding officers would profit from a course of instruction in the surface ASW school.

During this patrol, for the first time, I encountered a Naval Academy graduate whose goal was to attain a 2.5 in the theatre of war. 2.5 is not passing with me. This is a game for experts. To raise a man's sights from 2.5 to 4.0 entails a shift of 60% in his point of aim. Making that shift is tantamount to acquiring a new philosophy of life. The process is painful.

I would like to recommend that the Executive Officer of a fleet submarine on war patrol, if he be in the grade of lieutenant, be issued a spot promotion to lieutenant commander. The billet is one of considerable responsibility; the officer holding it is in training for command.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

PEARL to GUAM	3,096.2 miles	42,665 gals.
GUAM to AREA	2,505.2 miles	32,120 gals.
In AREA	4,509.3 miles	41,350 gals.
AREA to GUAM	2,651.6 miles	37,885 gals.

(S) DURATION

Days enroute PEARL to GUAM	12
Days in GUAM	3
Days enroute to AREA	9
Days in AREA	30
Days enroute to GUAM	11
Days submerged	8

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

<u>Torpedoes</u>	<u>Fuel</u>	<u>Provisions</u>	<u>Personnel Factor</u>
7	5,000 gals.	10	Unknown

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~(U) COMMUNICATIONS, RADAR AND SONAR COUNTERMEASURES

1. Radio: The usual enemy countermeasures, keyed and unkeyed CW and "howler" jamming, were heard on all circuits continuously, but, with a few exceptions, were more bothersome than effective. On at least three occasions 8KC (LUZON) was completely blocked out by unkeyed CW jamming. Jamming on the fundamental and secondary harmonic of the ship-shore primary frequency series made it very difficult to work NPN, but NKN was very helpful on most of these occasions and was able to read us well above the intensive keyed CW used by the Japs. On one occasion while lifeguarding, channel one of the VHF was jammed with fair effectiveness by an intermittent unkeyed CW tone. There is the possibility, however, that this was interference from an enemy radar in the 140 mc band rather than intentional jamming.

2. Radar: The APR performed reliably, though no information from it was usable. Several careful attempts were made to get a directional indication from the APR by swinging ship, without success. A simple directional antenna would make the APR more useful. No attempt is made to list all of the APR contacts made on this patrol. Instead, the following list shows those contacts which we were unable to identify by means of the information furnished us. There may be some previously unrecorded signals in the lot.

U.S.S. COD (SS224)

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LOCATION Lat.	Long.	Freq. Mcs.	Pulse Rate (Pulses/sec)	Pulse Width (Microseconds)	Remarks
15-40 N	141-22 E	230	75	8	Probably Shipborne
29-15 N	132-52 E	92	400	20-25	Possibly British Shipborne
29-14 N	132-36 E	138	500	7	Possibly Jap Air- borne
29-12 N	131-07 E	220	800	15	Probably Jap Shore Based
29-18 N	131-04 E	150	600	15	Probably Jap Shore Based
29-15 N	129-45 E	580	1400	2.5	Possibly U.S. Air Search
29-16 N	130-47 E	205	1000	5-6	Possibly Jap Air- borne
31-43 N	124-59 E	43	25	30	Probably Jap Land Based
25-39 N	121-24 E	68	500	50-60	Probably Jap Land Based
26-01 N	121-28 E	100	500	22	Probably Jap Land Based
25-16 N	120-22 E	155	500	5	Probably Jap Air- borne
25-16 N	120-22 E	265	1250	--	Possibly Jap Land Based
25-16 N	120-22 E	127	1000	4	Possibly Jap Land Based
25-02 N	120-15 E	157	500	8	Possibly Jap Air- borne
25-24 N	120-20 E	220	300	3	Possibly Jap Air- borne
25-24 N	120-20 E	128	1250	2	Possibly Jap Air- borne
25-25 N	120-28 E	65	250	27	Probably Jap Land Based
25-25 N	120-28 E	157	500	5 & 2.5 (Double Pulse)	Possibly Jap Air- borne
25-26 N	120-16 E	97	500	25	Probably Jap Land Based
25-26 N	120-16 E	320	300	3	Possibly Jap Air- borne

3. Sonar: No sonar countermeasures were encountered. A zero beat was obtained on two enemy sonar equipments at 15.6 kcs. One of them later was on 15.3 kcs. See section (J).

U.S.S. COD (SS224)

CONFIDENTIAL

(V) REMARKS

ANDREW GORDON JOHNSON, 812 17 02, Seaman lc, V6, USNR, was my lookout, shipmate and friend. He died heroically in the line of duty, in order to save his ship. The commanding officer derives no satisfaction from recording the events of the patrol, nor from the meagre damage inflicted on the enemy. The only satisfaction lies in recording the acts of heroism that were performed by JOHNSON, and by his shipmates at the time of the casualty which led to JOHNSON's loss.

FB5-201/A16-3

Serial (020)

SUBMARINE DIVISION TWO HUNDRED ONE

jrw

Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California
30 May, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO COD Report of 6th
War Patrol dated 5/29/45.

From: The Commander Submarine Division TWO HUNDRED ONE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. COD (SS224) - Report of War Patrol Number Six.

1. The sixth war patrol of the U.S.S. COD, under the command of Commander J. A. ADKINS, U.S. Navy, was conducted in the East China Sea, in company with the U.S.S. POMPON; both vessels participating in coordinated patrol and lifeguard operations.

2. The patrol was of sixty six (66) days duration, of which, thirty (30) days were spent on station. Thorough area coverage was maintained. The patrol was terminated by a dispatch from Comsubspac. Four ship contacts were made. The first contact was on a friendly convoy while enroute from Pearl to Guam. Contact number two, a tug and tow, was developed into a successful gun attack. Contact number three on 24 April, was developed into three torpedo attacks. A properly marked enemy hospital ship was the fourth contact, and it was avoided.

3. A summary of the attacks follows:

GUN ATTACK NUMBER ONE - 17 April, 1945.

In the late morning of 17 April 1945, two ships were sighted and after carefully inspecting them, it was decided to battle surface and engage them with the deck guns. Upon surfacing, it was apparent that one vessel was towing the other. The two was engaged with 5" gunfire at a range of 3,200 yards, and with the 40 mm at a range of about 2,000 yards. 5" hits set the tow on fire. The tow obviously had a cargo of oil as great clouds of black smoke poured out and flames engulfed the vessel. The towing vessel let go his tow, and decided to shoot it out. The 40 mm crews were secured due to aircraft contacts and the towing vessel was taken under fire at a range of about 3,700 yards, and was sunk with 5" and 40 mm fire. The COD then returned to the oiler and sank it with three five inch hits along the waterline. Three prisoners were picked up. It is estimated that the following damage was inflicted. SUNK: One (1) SMC Tug; Possibly CHOYO MARU (EU), 2,000 tons; and One (1) SMC Oiler; Possibly DAISHI or BANSHI MARU (EU), 2,000 tons.

FB5-201/A16-3

SUBMARINE DIVISION TWO HUNDRED ONE jrw
Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California
30 May, 1945.

Serial (020)

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. COD (SS224) - Report of War Patrol Number Six.

TORPEDO ATTACK NUMBER ONE - 24 April, 1945.

On the evening of 24 April, 1945, SJ contacts were made on two ships at a range of 9,450 yards, base course 355 T. Upon closing, four Mk 18-2 torpedoes were fired from the bow tubes at the leading ship, with depth settings at two feet, gyro angles 000.5 to 000.1, average track angles 46 P, torpedo run 3,100 yards. Just before firing, radar picked up a third ship in this convoy. Each torpedo jumped out of the water as soon as launched and then proceeded down the range like a porpoise, alternately broaching and plunging. No hits were obtained. The trailing ship was not fired upon considering the performance of the torpedoes at a depth setting of two feet. The target detected the COD and gave chase. The increasing accuracy of the target's gunfire forced the COD to submerge and a severe depth charging followed.

TORPEDO ATTACK NUMBER TWO - 25 April, 1945.

Upon coming to periscope depth after torpedo attack number one, the same target was observed on the port quarter, range about 4,000 yards, apparently lying to. The previous depth charging had knocked out the tuning of the ST, which terminated when the target commenced a sweep in the direction of the COD, which terminated when COD fired three stern tubes with gyro angles 235 to 228, average track angle 15° S, depth setting three feet, average torpedo run 310 yards. With range 490, COD submerged to 150 feet. One explosion was heard which stopped pinging and target screws. Upon surfacing, COD passed through an oil slick and heard breaking up noises beneath her. Over 70 men were observed in the water and one prisoner was picked up. The internal injuries sustained by the prisoner resulted in his death three days later. However, from interrogation of the prisoner, it is estimated that the following damage was inflicted by this attack. SUNK: One (1) AM No. 41 (EC), approximately 1,000 tons.

TORPEDO ATTACK NUMBER THREE - 25 April, 1945.

At 0410 I, on the morning of 25 April, 1945, the remaining two ships of the convoy were contacted by SJ on the same base course of 355 T, after a three hour chase. Three bow tubes were fired at the leading ship, which was the larger of the two, with average gyro 352, average track 122 P, torpedo run 3,470 yards, and three bow tubes were fired at the second ship with average gyro 009, average track 166 P, torpedo run 2,900 yards. Each torpedo broached once immediately after firing and two of the torpedoes made wide hooks to the left. All torpedoes eventually settled down on a straight course, although the initial hooks had dispersed them. No hits were obtained. The leading ship appeared to be a PC and the trailing ship an engines aft ship of about SB size or smaller.

SUBMARINE DIVISION TWO HUNDRED ONE
Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California
30 May, 1945.

FB5-201/A16-3
Serial (020)

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. COD (SS224) - Report of War Patrol Number Six.

4. The major torpedo casualty which occurred on the 26th of April was indeed unfortunate and the Commander Submarine Division 201 regrets exceedingly with the commanding officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. COD, the loss of their shipmate and friend Andrew G. JOHNSON, S1c, USNR, who was washed overboard while assisting in opening the after torpedo room hatch to alleviate the serious condition caused by the torpedo casualty. The commendable manner in which the torpedo casualty was handled by all hands is deserving of the highest praise.

5. Many floating mines were sighted. Eleven were sunk by gunfire.

6. The U.S.S. COD returned from her patrol in an excellent state of cleanliness. There are no major material defects which will necessitate extending the refit period, and the COD will be refitted in the normal refit period.

7. The Commander Submarine Division 201 congratulates the commanding officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. COD upon their return from the long, tenacious and well conducted patrol. It is recommended that the COD be credited with inflicting the following damage upon the enemy:

SUNK

J. T. SAUNDERS

FC5-20/A16-3

SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY

Serial: 0130

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

5 June 1945

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO COD ltr. A16-3
Ser: 014, Rept of 6th
War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. COD (SS224) - Report of War Patrol Number SIX.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks and recommendations of damage assessment by Commander Submarine Division TWO HUNDRED ONE.
2. It is of interest to note that on 24 April the TDM picked up pinging twenty-four minutes before the SJ radar made contact with the targets. Under section (N) the commanding officer states that "...on patrol initial contact on one-half of our enemy contacts was made by TDM".
3. The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and men of the U.S.S. COD upon this boldly prosecuted and extremely active patrol.

L. S. PARKS.

FF12-10(A)/A16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

1d

Serial 01472

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,

16 June 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 04571

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
COD Report of Sixth
War Patrol.

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 779
U.S.S. COD - SIXTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. COD (SS224) - Report of Sixth War Patrol
(24 March to 29 May 1945).

1. The sixth war patrol of the COD, under the command of Commander J. A. Adkins, U. S. Navy, was conducted in the East China Sea off the northwest coast of Formosa. The POMPON and COD operated as a coordinated attack group with the commanding officer of the COD as task group commander.

2. This long, arduous, and well conducted patrol resulted in the sinking of a minesweeper by torpedo attack and in the sinking of a tug and an oiler, which was being towed, by gunfire. Three prisoners were taken, one of whom subsequently died. In addition to offensive patrol, the COD was engaged in lifeguard duties.

3. The Force Commander sympathizes with the commanding officer, officers, and crew of the COD in the loss at sea of Andrew Gordon Johnson, seaman first class.

4. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew of the COD upon the completion of this aggressive, well planned, and productive patrol. The COD is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

S U N K

1 - Minesweeper (AM-41 Class) (EC)	-	1,000 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Tug (EC)	-	2,000 tons (Gun Attack No. 1)
1 - Oiler (EC)	-	2,000 tons (Gun Attack No. 1)

TOTAL SUNK	-	5,000 tons	EXTRA - ORIGINAL
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SORG. MICRO
PHOTO-LAB OP-16

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RETURN TO F-4253
E. E. YEOMANS.

FF12-10(A)/A16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

1d

Serial 01472

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
16 June 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
COD Report of Sixth
War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 779
U.S.S. COD - SIXTH WAR PATROL.

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

Subject: U.S.S. COD (SS224) - Report of Sixth War Patrol
(24 March to 29 May 1945).

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