Mass Media and the Domestic Politics of Globalization

Abstract

Much is known about the domestic politics of globalization but political scientists have largely ignored one critical link between the international economy and many individuals around the world: mass media. Considering the likely effects of mass media on public perceptions of responsibility, this article develops an argument about the effects of mass media on individuals' blame attributions for the adjustment costs of economic globalization. The article then develops a simple formal model of how these effects on blame attributions affect the incentives of policymakers, illustrating that mass media undermine the political pressures which have traditionally required policymakers to compensate domestic groups harmed by globalization. Individual-level implications of the theory are tested on survey data from France in 1992-1993 and state-level implications are tested on data from most countries around the world from 1960 to 2010. The evidence shows that mass media diffuse the political backlash from groups harmed by globalization, leading to weakened welfare-state responsiveness. By providing novel evidence of the socially-constructed nature of international politics using formal and quantitative tools within a rational-choice framework, the article contributes to bridging the divide between rationalism and constructivism in international relations and comparative politics.

Although the relationship between economic globalization and modern welfare states has been one of the most studied issues in political economy over the past three decades (e.g., Gourevitch 1978, Garrett 1995, Rodrik 1998, Burgoon 2001, Adserà and Boix 2002, Oatley 2011, 316), recent research on public opinion and political behavior in open economies raises serious questions about the assumptions of this tradition (Hellwig 2007, 155). A fundamental assumption in globalization-welfare research, which dates back to Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation,* is that policymakers who wish to liberalize economic markets are held accountable by those groups who would suffer the adjustment costs (Polanyi 2001, Ruggie 1982). Scholars have shown that to sustain political coalitions in favor of opening national economies, national policymakers have to compensate protectionist domestic groups with side payments in the form of social welfare programs (Katzenstein 1985, Rodrik 1998, Adserà and Boix 2002, 1028-29).

However, one current of research in comparative political behavior shows that as domestic economies become increasingly integrated, citizens perceive that governments have less "room to maneuver" and accordingly shift their blame away from domestic policymakers to the unaccountable pressures of the global economy (Alcañiz and Hellwig 2010, Hellwig 2012). Furthermore, citizens in countries highly exposed to the global economy are less likely to punish incumbents for a poorly performing economy (Hellwig and Samuels 2007) and more likely to base their vote on non-economic issues (Hellwig 2008). If domestic groups do not punish politicians for economic losses made possibile by the political decisions to maintain open national economies, then an essential causal link in current accounts of the globalization-welfare nexus would appear to be broken. Furthermore, this current of research has yet to take seriously the stylized empirical fact that economic globalization does not *inherently* constrain policymakers' "room to maneuver" but rather has been *socially constructed* as such by elites and often through the mass media (Hay 2011, Hay and Smith 2005, Hay 2002) .

At the same time, previous research has shown that mass media have direct effects on perceptions relevant to how citizens are likely to understand the politics of globalization. Specifically, mass media have direct effects on perceptions of responsibility (Iyengar 1987; Iyengar 1991), the politicization of economic hardship (Mutz 1992; Mutz 1994), and civic engagement more broadly (Putnam 1995; Norris 2000; Hooghe 2002). Certainly, these effects are still debated and, in fact, the conventional wisdom in the political economy of media associates robust mass media systems with government responsiveness and accountability (Snyder and Strömberg 2012, Besley and Burgess 2002, Adserà et al. 2003). Yet, in the specific context of the distributive domestic politics of globalization, the preponderance of previous research strongly converges on a set of counter-intuitive arguments: *By amplifying the dominant construction of globalization as an external imperative constraining policy-*

makers and therefore shifting citizen blame attributions away from governments and toward international forces, the mass media play an independent causal role in reducing the ability of domestic groups to hold national policymakers accountable for the effects of economic openness. In turn, as the global economy and mass media penetrate states, national policymakers face less pressure to compensate protectionist domestic groups for economic hardships linked to the global economy. As states become increasingly penetrated by both the global economy and mass media, the state-level outcome is a weakened compensatory relationship between economic openness and welfare spending.

These expectations are tested with survey data and state-level economic data ideally suited to assess the implications of these arguments at both levels of analysis. A Legidoscope survey from France in 1992-1993 provides a unique opportunity to test the argument that mass media has independent effects on individuals' perceptions, blame attributions, and behavior around issues of economic openness. The findings show that mass media exposure is positively associated with individuals' perceptions of economic openness as a problem and then, controlling for whether economic openness is perceived as a problem, the attribution of blame to international forces. For comparability with respect to previous research on the globalization-welfare nexus, the state-level implications of the theory are tested on pooled cross-sectional, time-series data from most countries in the world between 1960 and 2010. Using penetration rates of information-communication technology (ICT) as a proxy for the prevalence of mass media within states—in particular, the number of newspapers, televisions, and radios per person—several analyses across multiple model specifications suggest that the spread of ICT and the mass media they carry is associated with a weakening of the positive relationship between economic openness and social welfare spending. The dampening effect of mass media holds after controlling for several rival explanations and when included in the replication of previous, influential studies. Consistent with the survey analysis, the state-level associations are interpreted as evidence for the argument that policymakers are more likely to neglect domestic groups harmed by political decisions to liberalize markets the more prevalent is mass media within their states. Specifically, this is because mass media tends to shift the perceptual and behavioral response of protectionist individuals away from blaming and acting against the government on the politics of openness.

These findings alter the prevailing wisdom in at least three ways. First, they provide new evidence for the claim that economic openness makes citizens less likely to blame, and less likely to punish, incumbent governments for poor economic performance, but they also reveal that mass media exposure is an alternative and independent causal path to the same effect, controlling for perceptions of economic openness. Second, this is the first systematic investigation of mass media as a political *institution* that conditions the domestic

politics of the global economy. As such, it directly responds to calls for more truly political accounts of the domestic effects of globalization (Kayser 2007, 341) and for a more rigorous examination of the micro-foundations of work in this tradition (Hays et al. 2005, Wal 2010, 474). Third, this research bears important implications for debates between rationalism and constructivism as analytical frameworks for the study of international relations and comparative politics. It directly challenges the conventional dichotomy wherein the former is supposed to focus on strategic incentives or the "logic of consequences" and the latter on over-arching norms or the "logic of appropriateness (Dessler and Owen 2005)." The article shows that some dynamics in the logic of appropriateness (in this case, the reality-constructing power of the mass media) can also be modeled for the logic of their consequences. This approach permits quantitative tests of deductive hypotheses from rational-choice models in the service of an essentially constructivist argument. Thus the article provides a novel contribution to the long-standing project of bridging the divide between constructivism and rationalism in the study of international and comparative politics (Katzenstein et al. 1998, Checkel 1997, Zürn and Checkel 2005).

The article proceeds as follows. In the first section, previous literature is reviewed to reveal a gap between comparative and international political economists on the one hand and scholars of public opinion and political behavior on the other, and to suggest how a formidable history of mass media research speaks directly to this gap. A second section develops specific hypotheses regarding how mass media is likely to affect individual perceptions, blame attributions, and electoral accountability around the politics of economic openness. That section concludes by incorporating the expected effects of mass media into a baseline model of the globalization-welfare nexus typical of the most influential work in this area (Adserà and Boix2002). A third section discusses the data and modeling strategy, the penultimate section discusses the core findings, and a final section concludes.

1   Mass Media Between Globalization and Domestic Politics

Despite the quantity of studies on the relationship between economic openness and the public sector, the individual-level assumptions in this line of research remain largely untested (Hays et al. 2005, 474). At the same time, findings from various subfields in political science together suggest that public perceptions and attributions of blame with respect to economic openness have affected citizen's evaluations of government, the political behavior of voters, and ultimately, policy outcomes. Finally, apart from the effect of objective levels of economic openness, a review of mass media research suggests how mass media can independently affect citizen perceptions and blame attributions around the politics of economic openness, thereby

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altering the expected outcomes of globalization-welfare models.

One of the most robust findings in international and comparative political economy is the positive state-level correlation between international trade and size of the public sector (Cameron 1978, Rodrik 1998, Garrett 1995, Adserà and Boix 2002). Most political scientists theorize this regularity as "embedded liberalism," exemplified in the postwar proliferation of Keynesian social pacts that promoted open national markets with state-sponsored social protections (Ruggie 1982). Although social scientists widely agree that the expansion of international trade is welfare-improving in the long run, they also agree that the construction or expansion of markets often induces political backlash from domestic groups in the short run. This backlash requires policymakers in favor of increasing openness to compensate such groups through side payments, typically in the form of redistributive social spending, lest the necessary political support for increasing openness breaks down. In the 1940s, Karl Polanyi first advanced this perspective in his famous notion of the "double movement" that characterizes market expansions and corresponding expansions of state welfare provision (Polanyi 2001, 79, 385;). Even across much disagreement about which aspects of economic openness have the most effect on the various components of welfare spending (Mares 2004, Ansell 2008, Burgoon 2001), in which countries the relationship holds (Rudra 2002, ?), and even whether the focus on economic openness per se is mistaken (Kim 2007, Oatley 2011), scholars are unanimous in the expectation that the increasing openness of national markets elicits a corresponding political backlash from those domestic groups who would bear the adjustment costs.

Despite the leverage it provides to most models of the relationship between globalization and welfare-state effort, there is surprisingly little evidence for the assumption that domestic groups harmed by economic liberalization exert sufficient political pressure on national policymakers that policymakers provide welfare compensation to appease them. Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt[2005] find evidence that government spending helps sustain support for free trade, and Walter (2010) finds consistent evidence in Swiss survey data for multiple points in the individual-level causal chain of the compensation thesis. This current of research on the individual-level evidence for a compensation dynamic does not, however, answer the very different question of whether the economic insecurity induced by globalization induces an electorally significant threat for liberalizing policymakers. Margalit (2011) finds that job losses due to offshoring had a stronger negative effect on incumbent vote share than job losses not related to offshoring. Additionally, that study also finds that spending from the Trade Adjustment Assistance program significantly reduced the size of the effect. Still, it remains unclear whether and how other institutions moderate the public perceptions and electoral consequences of liberalization and if different dimensions of liberalization have the

same domestic effects as offshoring in particular. For instance,Guisinger [2009] finds that trade policy may not be sufficiently salient, even to the most affected groups, to justify voter-driven models of trade policy.

Indeed, diverse perspectives in the social sciences suggest causal pathways through which citizens harmed by the adjustment costs of liberalization would not hold policymakers accountable for the political decision of liberalization. First, research mostly from advanced democratic countries finds that as the sources of economic growth shift, citizens accordingly adjust their expectations of government policymaking and their attributions of blame for national problems.[1] Using time-series data from France between 1985 and 2002, Hellwig shows that as exposure to trade and capital flows increase, citizens becomes less confident in the ability of national policymakers to solve national problems and the public demand for economic policy solutions decreases (Hellwig 2007). Voters also adjust their judgement of governments in predictable ways as other components of the institutional context change. For instance, when the Bank of England gained political independence, British voters were less likely to base their evaluation of the government on monetary policy and more likely to base it on fiscal policy (Sattler et al. 2010). Just as evaluations of government shift with the material and institutional sources of economic outcomes, so too does blame for national economic problems. In their study of seventeen Latin American countries, Alcaniz and Hellwig (2010) show that as exposure to international trade increases, citizens are more likely to blame international actors and less likely to blame the government for the country's economic problems.

Secondly, perceptions and blame attributions affect political outcomes by altering what policymakers can be credibly held accountable for. Analyzing all 560 democratic elections between 1975 and 2002, Hellwig and Samuels (2007) show that as trade and capital flows increase as a share of gross domestic product, domestic economic growth rates have a smaller effect on incumbent vote share. Cross-sectional analyses of French and British survey data from 1997 and 2001, respectively, show similar effects of globalization on the determinants of vote choice, decreasing the effect of voter's economic performance evaluations and party positions on economic issues (Hellwig 2008). Perceptual shifts in the ability of governments to affect economic policy also affect voter turnout. Analysis from the United States has found that individuals who suffer the economic adversity but do not blame the government are less likely to vote than comparable individuals who do blame the government (Arceneaux 2003). In terms of policymaking, elite messaging in the mass media (Hellwig and

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[1]It should also be noted that expectations of government policymaking and blame attributions are not only driven by material or institutional changes in the political economy but may also be endogenous to vote choice or the partisan composition of an incumbent government (Wlezien et al. 1997).

Coffey 2011) and interviews with party elites in Europe (Hellwig 2012, 206) confirm that politicians consciously stress globalization constraints on their own behavior. Additionally, changes in the institutional setting are found to have predictable moderating effects on the responsivness of policy to public opinion. For instance, Sattler, Brandt, and Freeman (2010) show that before central bank independence, British fiscal and monetary policies were responsive to aggregate voting intentions and government approval ratings but, after central bank indepedence, monetary policy was no longer responsive. Interestingly, however, Sattler, Brandt, and Freeman [2008] find mutual responsiveness between public opinion and policy *outputs*, despite a lack of responsiveness in policy *outcomes* such as inflation and economic growth. That this responsiveness is observed outside real economic outcomes is accredited to the difficulty of identifying the effects of policies in open economies.

Given that public perceptions of the institutional context have been shown to affect political consequences of the economy, it is puzzling that scholarship on the domestic politics of economic globalization has largely neglected a serious inquiry into political communication and the mass media in particular. *Prima facie*, it is hard to believe that many individuals *directly* monitor levels of economic openness independent of some political communication channel. It is equally hard to imagine policymakers as passive victims in globalization's encroachment on their room to maneuver, as if room-to-maneuver constraints are an objective development which the mass media simply reports. Rather, scholars of American politics have shown that national policymakers actively engage in strategies of "blame avoidance" through the mass media (Weaver 1986, Jacobson and Kernell 1983), diffusing blame horizontally toward other equals or vertically upward in the chain of authority (McGraw 1990, 1991).[2] Variation in blame attributions, in turn, has predictable effects on how individuals judge both policies and policymakers (McGraw et al. 1995). "Indexing" theories of news coverage suggest that the mass media are most likely to convey elite issue-framings (Bennett 1990, Zaller and Chiu 1996, Bennett et al. 2006). Applied to the domestic politics of globalization, an indexing theory of news coverage suggests that mass media is more likely to publicize the perception (which policymakers have strategic incentives to espouse) that economic openness constrains policymaker autonomy than alternative narratives placing responsibility on governments. Other work has shown that under certain conditions mass media can diffuse blame through issue framing (Iyengar 1987;Iyengar 1991), depoliticize personal experience in favor of sociotropic perceptions (Mutz 1992), and exacerbate inequalities in political participation (Norris 2000). More generally, a formidable and highly critical tra-

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[2]Hood [2002, 20]suggests that by lowering the potential costs of communicating malign policy effects to harmed groups, mass media may increase the incentives for politicians to avoid blame. See alsoHood et al. [2009].

dition of observers have advanced richly argued but largely untested propositions converging on the expectation of profoundly antidemocratic tendencies in the modern mass media (Herman and Chomsky 1988, Adorno 1991, McChesney 2000). In light of these research currents, it is a surprising omission in previous research on the domestic politics of globalization that testimony by party elites in research interviews (Hellwig 2012, 206-07) and via the mass media (Hellwig and Coffey 2011, 420-21) is more often cited as evidence of room-to-maneuver constraints than questioned as possible strategic communication or media bias. Especially because evidence for opinion-policy responsiveness in open economies can be observed apart from and despite the objective economic effects of policy [Sattler et al., 2008], a necessary next step in studying the domestic politics of globalization is to theorize more specifically how political communication—in particular, the mass media—directly and indirectly affects the relationship between objective patterns of economic openness and domestic economic outcomes.

2   Theory and Hypotheses

The central premise of this article is the stylized empirical fact that issues of economic openness have been socially constructed by elite opinion-leaders as an external and objective process, typically known as "globalization," which shapes policymakers' room-to-maneuver (Hay 2002, 2011). The novel and central theoretical *claim* of this article is that the mass media diffuse responsibility for policies of economic liberalization over and above whatever diffusion of responsibility is created by the objective realities of economic openness. The warrant for this claim is straightforward: the mass media amplify and extend the reach of dominant social constructions beyond the reach they would have in the absence of mass media. This section develops the reasoning which moves from this premise to the central claim and then deduces a series of hypotheses regarding how mass media should be expected to affect individuals' perceptions of economic openness, blame attributions for national problems, and ultimately the decisions of national policymakers.

Previous research amply demonstrates that the dominant social construction of economic globalization is that of an external, objective pressure on policymakers—an image of economic globalization which commands a relative consensus among elites—standard indexing theory implies that mass media reportage will tend to mirror this relative elite consensus. In addition to the multiple studies by Colin Hay and associates on elite discourse from multiple European countries, empirical evidence for an elite consensus is also ample from other research on the domestic politics of globalization, which finds that party elites consistently invoke room to maneuver constraints in research interviews (Hellwig 2012, 206-07) as well

as media messaging (Hellwig and Coffey 2011)[3].

Given this elite consensus regarding the dominant social construction of globalization, standard theories of media coverage lead to the expectation that the media will tend to amplify this particular social construction. One of the standard theories of political news coverage, the theory of indexing, suggests that the distribution of news coverage of political issues tends to follow the distribution of elite opinion. Elite consensus on a particular issues tends toward consensus in the reportage of that issue, but elite dissensus constitutes the space in which competing views will be reported (Bennett 1990, Zaller and Chiu 1996, Bennett et al. 2006). Adding to the indexing theory the general responsibility-diffusing tendencies inherent to mass media discussed above, such as its episodic nature and its nature as a platform for generally blame-avoiding political elites, the overall implication is the expectation that mass media will amplify the dominant construction of economic globalization as an external pressure which imposes itself on domestic policymakers, rather than an outcome of international economic policymaking.

This basic indexing theory leads to two different versions of a first hypothesis, one implying a direct effect and the other implying an indirect effect. First, mass media will have an indirect effect on how individuals attribute blame for national problems, by informing individuals of objective problems pertaining to economic openness (merely transmitting information about any objectively constraining realities pertaining to economic openness). The stronger version of this argument is that mass media will have a direct effect on how individuals attribute blame for national problems, uniquely diffusing responsibility in their perception of national problems above and beyond its effect of making individuals more aware of the problems of economic openness per se.

Hypothesis 1: Individuals more exposed to mass media are more likely to blame international forces for national problems than individuals less exposed to mass media. This effect is expected directly (by diffusing political responsbility in general, controlling for perceptions of openness as a problem) and indirectly (by increasing awareness of openness as politically problematic).

Hypothesis 2 captures implications of previous research suggesting that perceptions of a policymaker's room to maneuver affect how individuals evaluate government performance. If the effect of economic perceptions on vote choice weakens because increasing economic

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[3]In their study of *The Guardian, The Times, The Daily Telegraph, and The Independent* from September 2008 to May 2009, Hellwig and Coffey find that most statements from the incumbent Labor Party diffused blame for the 2008 financial crisis toward the United States, the global financial system, and domestic bankers, although toward the end of the period under study the Labor Party appeared more willing to publicly take blame. Conservatives were more likely to blame the government than Labour. SeeHellwig and Coffey 2011, 420-421.

openness shifts blame attributions toward the global economy and away from governments, then blame attributions should be associated with evaluations of government economic performance. Thus, I hypothesize that individuals who blame international forces for national economic problems should be more favorable toward incumbent governments than those who blame the government.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals who blame international forces for national problems evaluate incumbent governments more favorably than individuals who blame the government for national problems.

To assess how mass media enters into models of the globalization-welfare nexus, consider the model of Adserà and Boix [2002, 231-236] as a baseline. The model explicates the conditions under which national policymakers must provide welfare compensation to protectionist interests in order to secure political support for opening the domestic economy. Adserà and Boix consider an economy of three groups of identical individuals with distinct trade interests. Groups *C, P*, and *O* are groups that can be thought of as classified by factor endowment, sector, or firm. *C* is a group that prefers a closed economy, with utility decreasing in a linear fashion as the economy opens. *O* is a group that prefers an open economy, with utility increasing in a linear fashion as the economy opens. *P* is a group the preferences of which are contingent on the state of the international business cycle. Formally, these preferences are written as

$$U_C = (1 - \lambda)C_C + \lambda C_O \tag{1}$$

$$U_O = (1 - \lambda)O_C + \lambda C_O \tag{2}$$

$$EU_P = (1 - \lambda)P_C + \lambda[\pi P_g + (1 - \lambda)P_b], \tag{3}$$

where C_C and O_C are the returns to C when the economy is closed and open, respectively; C_O and O_O are the returns to O when the economy is closed and open, respectively; P_C is the return to P when the economy is closed; P_g is the return to P if the economy is open and the international business cycle is in growth; P_b is the return to P if the economy is open and the international business cycle is in recession; π is the probability the international business cycle is in growth; and, importantly, $P_g > P_c > P_b$. It is assumed that the distribution of π is such that the expected return of a closed economy for P is greater than that of an open economy: $\pi P_g + (1 - \lambda)P_b < P_c$.

Groups *C, P,* and *O* choose one of two parties at a national election. A protectionist party, Σ, receives the votes of C and a pro-trade party, Ω, receives the votes of O. Neither

C nor O represent a majority of voters, so P is the median and swing vote. Both parties, Σ and Ω , credibly commit to a level of openness, λ, and a publicly-funded compensation package, α, for P in cases of international recession. Voters then vote.

In this model, it can be shown that to open the domestic economy under competitive elections, a pro-trade political party must offer domestic spending to compensate P for the increased risks of international openness (Adserà and Boix 2002, 236). P voters vote for the pro-trade party, Ω, if the expected value of an open economy plus the compensation package α_O promised by Ω is greater than the the expected value of a closed economy plus the compensation package offered by Σ. Because P's gains from trade are always lower than the expected gains from a closed economy *ex ante*, the pro-trade party Ω always offers a compensation package α_O to draw P voters (Adserà and Boix 2002, 236).

Because this model assumes full and equal participation of voters, as Adserà and Boix point out in a footnote, if turnout varies across domestic groups then the incentives driving the provision of compensation should change. Intuitively, the incentives for pro-trade party Ω to offer a compensation package decrease as the voter turnout of either C or P decreases, because the opposition of these groups only matters for the policy outcome if that opposition has electoral salience for them; Ω is required to provide compensation to P only to the degree that C and P would vote against Ω because of its position on trade policy. If mass media increases the *perception* that economic liberalization is a process occurring external to domestic policymakers and is therefore domestically blameless, the effect would be to reduce the electoral salience of liberalization for those otherwise opposed to it. This is functionally equivalent to reducing the voter turnout of C and P around trade policy.

Thus, insofar as mass media tend to diffuse blame attributions for the negative effects of economic liberalization, this decreases the incentives for harmed groups to oppose liberalization by voting, and thus should have an effect equivalent to decreasing their turnout in this electoral game. To illustrate this formally, let the voter turnout for C and P be a linear function $t(m)$ with the characteristic:

$$t'(m) < 0, \tag{4}$$

where m represents the level of mass media and the negative derivative $t'(m)$ reflects that levels of mass media have an inverse relationship to the voter turnout of C and P, for reasons explained above. Let it also be assumed that $m \in [0, \bar{m}]$ and $t(m) \in [0, 1]$.

If Ω wins, then P's expected return is:

$$ER_p = \pi P_g + (1 - \pi)P_b + (1 - \pi)\alpha_o \tag{5}$$

If $\sum$ wins, then P's expected return is:

$$ER_p = P_c + \alpha_c \tag{6}$$

P voters choose Ω if

$$\pi P_g + (1 - \pi)P_b + (1 - \pi)\alpha_o > P_c + \alpha_c \tag{7}$$

In addition, α_c must satisfy two conditions:

(a) C voters have incentive to choose $\sum$, that is

$$t(m)P\alpha_c < (C_c - C_o)t(m)C \tag{8}$$

$\Longrightarrow$

$$\alpha_c < \frac{C}{P}(C_c - C_o) \tag{9}$$

(b) O voters have incentive to choose Ω, that is

$$OO_c < OO_c - (1 - \pi)\alpha_o t(m)P \tag{10}$$

$\Longrightarrow$

$$\alpha_o < \frac{O}{t(m)P(1 - \pi)}(O_o - O_c) \tag{11}$$

Based on (8) and (10), (6) becomes:

$$\pi P_g + (1 - \pi)P_b + (1 - \pi)\frac{O}{t(m)P(1 - \pi)}(O_o - O_c) > P_c + \frac{C}{P}(C_c - C_o) \tag{12}$$

$\Longrightarrow$

$$\frac{O}{t(m)P}(O_o - O_c) > P_c - \pi P_g - (1 - \pi)P_b + \frac{C}{P}(C_c - C_o) \tag{13}$$

Equation 12 is consistent with the result of Adserà and Boix (pp. 257), with the exception that mass media condition the strategic pressure on Ω to provide a compensation package. Specifically:

Proposition: As mass media increases and the turnout of P decreases, Ω is more likely to win the electoral game *without* providing a compensation package.

Proof: Letting

$$F_l(O_o - O_c) = \frac{O}{t(m)P}(O_o - O_c), \tag{14}$$

Figure 1: Effect on F_l from an Increase in Mass Media

the slope of function F_l is

$$F_l'(O_o - O_c) = \frac{O}{t(m)P}. \tag{15}$$

Holding all else constant, let the right-hand side of equation (9) be a constant value R. From this, one can visualize how the slope of (9) changes as the value of m changes.

As the value of m increases and the turnout of C and P decreases ($t(m)$), the slope of function F_l increases. This is reflected in Figure 1, where a hypothetical increase in m such that $m^{new} > m$ increases the slope of F_l to that of F_l^{new}, and thus the area under F_l^{new} is greater than the area under F_l. Therefore, an increase in m increases the left-hand side of (9) relative to the right-hand side. The greater area under F_l^{new} compared to F_l demonstrates that as m increases, Ω is more likely to win the electoral game while holding the compensation package constant.

The main implication of this proposition is that, to the degree mass media has the predicted effect of diffusing blame attributions for hardships inflicted by economic liberalization, it reduces the pressure on liberalizing policymakers to provide compensation in the form of public spending. Thus, rational policymakers will condition the provision of compensatory public spending on levels of mass media, providing less public spending to the degree that mass media neutralizes the threat of electoral backlash. The final hypothesis encapsulates

Figure 2: Summary of the Hypothesized Effects of Perception and Mass Media in Domestic Responses to Economic Liberalization

this implication.

Hypothesis 3: At the state level, the interaction of economic globalization and mass media penetration will be associated with lower levels of domestic welfare spending than predicted by the level of economic globalization alone.

3   Data and Method

Given the individual-level and state-level implications of the theory, data is gathered from both levels of analysis.[4]The individual-level data come from a Legidoscope survey of public opinion in France between 1992 and 1993 (Chrique 1997). The survey asks respondents several questions tapping blame attribution, media exposure, and political mobilization.[5] Respondents are asked to identify their main source of information from among the following:

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[4]Full summary statistics for both datasets can be found in the online appendix.

[5]See the online appendix for the text of the survey questions.

friends, family, opinion leaders, and mass media. Respondents are also asked to identify the top two problems facing France, and whether individuals, social institutions, the government, or international forces beyond government control are to blame for the problem.[6] Finally, respondents are asked about their satisfaction with President Mitterrand, how well they think the government is handling the problem identified by the respondent as a top problem, and their intention to turnout for the March 1993 elections. There are several reasons why French survey data from the early 1990s is an attractive testing ground for the individual-level hypotheses. First, while other surveys gauge perceptions of responsibility on many issues, and many other surveys gauge media exposure, this is the only survey known to the author which effectively gauges both perceptions of responsbility for issues of economic openness and media exposure. Second, although the survey data is limited to France and therefore limits our ability to generalize to other countries, France is a relatively hard case for testing the hypotheses, and so evidence for the hypotheses would suggest such a process is likely to occur in other countries as well. First, the survey takes place around the time of the Maastricht Treaty, a time when the problems of economic openness are highly policy-related, relative to exogenous changes in openness such as global fluctuations of trade. If media diffuses blame away from governments and onto international forces in France in the early 1990s, it would seem even more likely to do the same in situations where problems of economic openness are less related to particular policy decisions. Additionally, France has relatively high rates of political engagement, and a statist, egalitarian political culture in which elite opinion claims more control over globalization than in countries such as Italy or the United Kingdom (Hay 2011, 159). Thus, evidence that mass media leads French citizens near the time of Maastricht to blame international forces rather than their government suggests that such a relationship is even more likely in the countries in which globalization is seen as more ineluctable. Although ideally the hypotheses could be tested in multiple countries at once, this particular survey data from France in the early 1990s represent a unique opportunity to test the hypotheses under conditions relatively favorable to generalization.

To test the direct and indirect effects of mass media on blame (Hypothesis 1), I estimate two logistic regression models. The first estimates the probability a respondent will blame international forces as a function of mass media exposure and a vector of control variables including controls for the nature of the problem. The equation is

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[6]Respondents were asked to identify national problems in an open-ended fashion; their answers were then coded by the interviewer and into the general problem types listed here. To create the binary variable which measures whether the respondent sees some aspect of international economic openness as a top problem, I coded respondents as 1 if they identified one of the following issues as one of the "second most important problems": "Int'l economic competition," "EC-92, economic integration," "Foreign trade," "Ratification of Maastricht," and "Maastricht Treaty." All other respondents were coded as 0 for the variable *Openness Problem*.

$$Blame_i = \alpha + \beta_1 General\,Problem\,Type_i + \beta_2 Openness\,Problem_i + \beta_3 Media_i + \quad (16)$$
$$\beta_4 Controls_i + e_i, \quad (17)$$

where $Blame$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for respondents who blame international forces and 0 for respondents who blame the government for whichever national problem they have identified.[7] $Problem\,Area$ is a categorical variable with four levels indicating whether the problem deals with social, economic, political, or foreign issues;[8] $Openness\,Problem$ is a binary variable I constructed to take a value of 1 for respondents who identified a problem specifically related to economic openness and 0 otherwise. If the mass media have an independent effect on diffusing blame away from government policymakers and toward international forces, then we would expect β_3 to be positive and significant.

Then, to assess the indirect effect of mass media on blame as its channeled through perceptions of economic openness, I estimate a logistic regression modeling the probability of perceiving openness as a top problem as a function of mass media exposure and a vector of control variables:

$$Openness\,Problem_i = \alpha + \beta_1 General\,Problem\,Type_i + \beta_2 Media_i + \quad (18)$$
$$\beta_3 Controls_i + e_i. \quad (19)$$

where the main variables of interest are the same as in Equation 1 except that here the dependent variable is the binary variable capturing whether openness is perceived as a top problem. If mass media affect blame attributions indirectly by making individuals more aware of international economic forces, which in turn would shift their blame toward international forces, then β_2 should be positive and significant.

To test Hypothesis 2 regarding the effect of blame attributions on evaluations of the government, I estimate a linear regression modeling how individuals evaluate the government's handling of the problem they identified as one of the most important facing the country. I

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[7]Because of space constraints and for ease of interpretation in light of the hypotheses under consideration, I consider here only the difference between blaming the government and blaming international forces, omitting respondents who placed the blame on "society" or "people like you and me." However, the results obtained here are robust to multinomial specifications which include these alternative blame attributions and alternative binary codings (included in the online appendix).

[8]In the first wave of the survey, so many respondents identified unemployment as the top problem facing France that a question was added to measure what respondents identified as the "second most important problem facing France today." All the analyses here, including the variables measuring blame attributions and evaluations of government handling, refer to this second most important problem.

model evaluations of government handling as a function of respondents' blame attributions and a vector of control variables. The equation is

$$Gov\ Handling_i = \alpha + \beta_1 General\ Problem\ Type_i + \beta_2 Openness\ Problem_i + \quad (20)$$
$$\beta_3 Blame_i + \beta_4 Controls_i + e_i, \quad (21)$$

where $GovHandling_i$ measures, on a scale from 1 to 4, how the ith respondent evaluates the government's handling of the top problem they identified. The theory predicts that for a particular problem such as the domestic costs of economic openness, blaming international forces rather than the government will make individuals less likely to hold governments accountable for that problem. If this is the case, then individuals who think a problem is caused by forces outside of the government's purview should be less critical of the government's handling of that problem. In this case, then, the theoretical expectation is that β_3 will be positive and significant, reflecting that blaming international forces for a problem leads individuals to view the government's handling of that problem more favorably than if they blamed the government for the problem.

To test Hypothesis 4, state-level economic data are gathered from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (World Bank 2012). Media penetration rates come from the World Development Indicators and Arthur Banks' Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks and Wilson 2005, World Bank 2012). Most models have around 130 countries with an average of roughly 8 observations per country.[9] To test whether mass media affects domestic compensation for globalization at the state level, I fit several variants of the pooled cross-sectional, time-series regression equation:

$$Spending_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Trade_{it} + \beta_2 MDI_{it} + \beta_3 Trade_{it} * MDI_{it} + \quad (22)$$
$$\beta_4 Controls_{it} + e_{it}, \quad (23)$$

where the dependent variable, $Spending_{it}$, is a measure of final government consumption expenditure for country i in year t. Final government consumpiton expenditure is a standard measure of social welfare spending; *Trade* indicates imports plus exports as a percentage of

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[9]See online appendix.

GDP and *MDI* indicates an additive index of media density measuring television, newspaper, and radios per capita (Warren 2014). Because the theory deals with the conditioning effects of mass media on domestic exposure to the global economy, I am most interested in the multiplicative interaction of trade and mass media ($Trade_{it} * MDI_{it}$) rather than the independent marginal effects. If mass media exposure has the individual-level effects hypothesized above, then an increasing density of mass media technologies within a state should weaken the positive relationship historically expected between levels of trade openness and levels of domestic spending. In other words, the coefficient β_3 should be negative and significant, reflecting that the predicted effect of trade on spending given high levels of mass media is less than the predicted effect that trade has on spending given low levels of mass media. In the first models testing Hypothesis 4, a battery of controls are included to account for non-trade and non-media determinants of government consumption expenditure. Data for testing particular rival explanations are significantly more limited and therefore significantly reduce the geographic and temporal coverage of the main economic and media data. For this reason, I check the robustness of my models against alternative explanations in a set of subsequent models.

4   Findings and Discussion

Before analysis, all numerical independent variables were de-meaned and divided by two standard deviations so that coefficients reflect the expected effect of a two standard deviation increase in the variable and are therefore roughly comparable to the coefficients for any categorical independent variables (Gelman 2008). The coefficient plots in Figures 2 and 3 show mixed statistical support for Hypothesis 1 regarding the expectation that mass media diffuse blame for national problems away from governments and toward international forces (directly and indirectly).[10] Respondents who rely on the mass media as their most important source of information are significantly more likely to blame international forces for what they identify as one of the nation's top problems (a logit estimate of .35 and standard error of .12), even controlling for perceptions of economic openness as a problem and the more general issue area in which a respondent locates that problem. To get a better sense of the effect size, consider probabilities. Based on 1000 simulations, the probability of blaming international forces for a typical individual who does not rely primarily on the mass media for information is .33. Relying primarily on mass media increases this probability to .41 (a mean change

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[10]Numerical model results are available in the appendix. All models were estimated with the Zelig package in R (Imai et al. 2009)

of .08 with a standard deviation of .03).[11] Also as we would expect from previous research on public opinion and voting in open economies, the perception of economic openness as a problem also increases the probability a respondent will blame international forces for that problem.[12] Indeed, of all the variables considered here, the perception of economic openness as one of the nation's top problems is the strongest determinant of whether a respondent will blame international forces for that problem (a logit estimate of 1.1 and standard error of .14). In this case, for a typical individual who identifies a top problem other than one of openness the probability of blaming international forces is .41 but for the same individual who identifies a top problem related to openness, that probability increases to .68 (a mean increase of .26 and standard deviation .03). To fully appreciate how mass media shifts blame from government to international forces, I also investigate the degree to which mass media accounts for perceptions of openness.

Model 2 considers the indirect effect of mass media on blame attributions through their effect on perceptions of openness as a problem. Reliance on mass media has a positive marginal effect on the perception of openness as a problem (a logit estimate of .33 and standard error of .17; p=.06). For a typical individual who does not rely primarily on mass media, the probability of perceiving an issue of openness to be a top problem is .08; relying on mass media increases this probability by a mean of .03 (standard deviation = .01) to .11. Thus, the indirect effect of mass media on blaming international forces, through its slight marginal effect on the perception of openness as a problem, is .01 (.26*.03). The small size of this effect and its statistical significance near the conventional cutoff of 95% confidence suggest only weak evidence that mass media exerts much indirect effect on blame attributions by increasing awareness of openness as a problem.

The coefficient plot for Model 3, testing Hypothesis 2, reveals statistical evidence for the expectation that blaming international forces, in turn, has a positive effect on evaluations of the government (logit estimate = .38, standard error = .03).[13] Simulating quantities

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[11]"Typical" refers to mean values on the numerical independent variables and the reference levels for categorical variables, i.e., in this case, a non-urban, non-university-educated, non-white-collar, non-left-party male at the mean age and with mean levels of political interest, who identifies the second top problem as "Economic" and not related to economic openness.

[12]It could be the case that individuals with cosmopolitan outlooks are more interested in mass media *because* of their greater interest in global issues, in which case mass media exposure could be endogenous to knowledge of issues surrounding economic globalization. Although the survey data used in this paper provide no measure of overall interest in international affairs, the analyses below control for the best predictors of cosmpolitanism: education, class, and general interest in politics. Because these are the best predictors of cosmpolitanism, it is unlikely that a partial, independent effect of mass media exposure would be spurious due to this particular risk of endogeneity.

[13]There is reason to suppose that blame attributions could be endogenous to evaluations of how the government is handling a problem, in the sense that poor or satisfactory government handling could actually increase or decrease the government's culpability. First, however, it should be recalled that survey question

Figure 3: Determinants of Blaming International Forces

Figure 4: Determinants of Perceiving Openness as a Top Problem

of interest suggests that blaming international forces for a top problem increases a typical individual's evaluation of government handling by .38 (standard devation = .03), from 1.6 to 2.0 on the four-point scale of the dependent variable.[14]

Thus the results provide evidence consistent with each essential step of the causal chain at the individual level, though the estimated indirect effect of mass media on diffusing blame (through increasing perceptions of openness as a problem) is very weak. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that mass media directly diffuse blame away from governments toward international forces (increasing the probability of blaming international forces by about 8%) even controlling for the general issue area in which the respondent locates a top problem and whether it is related to openness.

Table 1 displays results from three regression models which provide initial support for the state-level expectations regarding the effect of mass media on the globalization-welfare relationship. In each of the three model specifications, the variable Trade*MDI is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that media density decreases the effect that trade has on government consumption expenditure. The coefficient of -.97 for Trade*MDI in Model 1 suggests that, on average, a two standard deviation increase in media density (109.3 points) in the long-run decreases the effect that a two standard deviation increase in trade openness (85.2% of GDP) has on government spending by .97% of GDP. Model 3 estimates that this negative conditioning effect of media density is as little as .61% of GDP. Moving from the minimum density of media (0) to the maximum in the sample (313.3) is associated, on average, with a decrease of as much as 2.78%, and as little as 1.8%, in the expected effect of an 85% increase in trade openness on government spending as a share of GDP. Although the estimated effect appears relatively slight, it should be kept in mind that the mean level

I am using to measure blame attributions refers specifically to the cause of the problem. Thus, strictly speaking, evaluations of how the government handles the problem should not affect who or what individuals identify as the cause or source of the problem. Second, it is much harder to believe that evaluations of government handling could drive individuals' blame of international forces or blame of the two alternative targets from which respondents were able to choose (individuals "like you and I" or social institutions) simply because it is hard to imagine how government handling of the problem could make any of these other targets more or less culpable. Thus, I estimate an additional model which has separate binary independent variables for blaming government, international forces, or "other" as the baseline (see Online Appendix). The coefficient for blaming government is larger than that for blaming international forces but both remain signed as expected and significant. This alternative specification mitigates the possibility that blaming international forces merey reflects (endogenously) respondents who are less likely to blame the government. Finally, if it can be assumed that endogeneity between evaluations of handling and blame would be most likely among partisans, then the control for partisanship and the two separate controls for support of President Mitterrand likely absorb much of this endogeneity.

[14]These results also hold when the dependent variable refers to satisfaction with the President. See supplementary information.

Figure 5: Determinants of Government Evaluations

of government consumption expenditure in the sample is only 15.7% of GDP. Thus, for a country that begins with no mass media and becomes as fully penetrated as the most penetrated (the United States in 1986), the roughly 1-3% of GDP by which we would expect the country to reduce its compensatory public spending in the long-run for an 85% increase in trade openness is a substantial portion of what a typical country spends.

Models 1 and 2 consider variable levels only, while Model 3 is an error-correction model using first-differences or year-to-year changes in the dependent variable and lagged levels of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation, with levels and first-differences of the key independent variables. Although a level dependent variable with a lagged level on the right-hand side is formally equivalent to a differenced dependent variable, the error-correction specification is useful here because it allows us to separate short-run and long-run effects.[15] The differenced independent variables reflect immediate, short-run effects and the level independent variables reflect the long-run effect after the short-run effects decay. All three models include fixed effects for country and year to account for unobserved differences in countries or unobserved temporal shocks in any particular year. To control for the clustering of errors within countries and the possibility of downwardly biased standard errors, I subsequently calculated panel-corrected standard errors following Beck and Katz [?]. Panel-corrected standard errors did not appreciably change the statistical significance of any estimates reported in this paper.[16]

Columns 2 and 3 test the conditioning effect of media density against the conditioning effects of democracy on the trade-welfare relationship, which previous research has found to increase the redistributive responsiveness of domestic welfare spending to international trade (Adserà and Boix 2002), suggests that media density has a robust conditioning effect on the relationship between trade and spending, while the interaction found by Adserà and Boix no longer appears statistically distinguishable from zero.

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[15]The error-correction specification is useful here for another reason. Although government spending and media density are not quite co-integrated, they are nearly cointegrated as both trend upward over time. In such situations, error-correction specifications are ideal for insuring against the possibility of spurious correlations driven by that shared integration.

[16]It is common to display the panel-corrected standard errors rather than the untransformed errors, but it is not obvious that treating them as a default has improved our use of cross-sectional, time-series data. On this point, seeWilson and Butler 2007, with whom I take the view that panel-corrected standard errors are only one of many checks against difficulties common in cross-sectional, time-series data. Fixed effects, lagged dependent variables, and dynamic specifications are some of the other techniques stressed by those authors. Here, I employ all of these techniques, and in some cases all together.

Table 1: Determinants of Government Consumption Expenditure

	4 (Spending)	5 (Spending)	6 (ΔSpending)
$Trade_{t-1}$	0.144	0.147	0.38*
	(0.213)	(0.213)	(0.222)
MDI_{t-1}	-0.157	-0.114	0.612*
	(0.402)	(0.403)	(0.318)
$Democracy_{t-1}$	0.025	-0.03	
	(0.152)	(0.157)	
$GDPPerCapita_{t-1}$	0.615***	0.608***	
	(0.189)	(0.189)	
$Dependency_{t-1}$	-0.218	-0.235	
	(0.231)	(0.232)	
$LandArea_{t-1}$	13.921	20.356	
	(191.648)	(191.676)	
$Spending_{t-1}$	0.717***	0.716***	-0.164***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.01)
$Spending_{t-2}$	0.11***	0.111***	
	(0.016)	(0.016)	
$Trade_{t-1}$ X MDI_{t-1}	-0.97***	-0.883***	-0.611*
	(0.32)	(0.325)	(0.317)
$\Delta Trade_{t-1}$ X ΔMDI_{t-1}			8.139
			(15.681)
$Trade_{t-1}$ X $Democracy_{t-1}$		-0.428	-0.434
		(0.303)	(0.294)
$\Delta Trade_{t-1}$ X $\Delta Democracy_{t-1}$			-3.557*
			(1.963)
$\Delta Trade_{t-1}$			-0.946**
			(0.388)
ΔMDI_{t-1}			0.562
			(1.716)
$\Delta Democracy_{t-1}$			-0.056
			(0.284)
$\Delta GDPPerCapita_{t-1}$			0.668
			(0.723)
$\Delta Dependency_{t-1}$			2.4
			(1.794)
$\Delta Spending_{t-1}$			-0.104***
			(0.016)
R^2	0.672	0.672	0.104
$adj.R^2$	0.638	0.638	0.098
N	3911	3911	3914

Standard errors in parentheses

* (p $\leq$ 0.1), ** (p $\leq$ 0.05), *** (p $\leq$ 0.01)

4.1 Rival Hypotheses at the State-Level

To check for the possibility that the above models are spuriously driven by some different but unobserved process distinct from the effects of mass media, I gather additional data to test my state-level argument against a series of rival explanations. Specifically, it is argued that left parties and union density are aspects of the domestic institutional environment which lead to more redistributive responses to economic liberalization (Garrett 1995, 674); that electoral systems defined by proportional representation are more redistributive than majoritarian systems (Iversen and Soskice 2006); and that the degree of unitarism or government centralization affects welfare spending (Crepaz 1998, 72). Finally, of particular interest in the literature relating economic globalization to the politics of welfare is the argument of Iversen (2001) and Iversen and Cusack (2000) that deindustrialization rather than globalization has driven the expansion of welfare spending since the 1960s.

In Table 2, I re-estimate the error-correction model (as in Column 3 of Table 1) controlling for each of the rival explanations above.[17] The interaction of trade levels and media density levels is robust to the inclusion of each potentially confounding variable, suggesting that the conditioning effect of media density on the trade-spending relationship is not a spurious correlation due to an omitted variable. Rather, the state-level models overall furnish another level of robust evidence that mass media shape perceptions and blame attributions around economic globalization in a way that diffuses the domestic political pressure required for compensatory, redistributive policy response.

5 Conclusion

This study has presented individual- and state-level evidence that mass media functions as a political institution which conditions the domestic politics of economic globalization. Because the dominant social construction of economic globalization is that of an external constraint imposed on policymakers by impersonal and international forces, by amplifying this construction mass media decrease the accountability of national economic policymakers who pursue liberalization. Survey evidence from France shows that individuals most reliant on mass media are less likely to blame top national problems on incumbent governments, and more likely to blame international forces, for indirect and direct reasons. Mass media *indirectly* deflects blame away from incumbent governments and toward international forces by making individuals more aware of economic openness as a political issue, but it also

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[17]See Supporting Information for more information on variable descriptions and sources.

Table 2: Rival Explanations: Electoral System, Centralization, Left Party Seats, Union Density, and De-Industrialization

	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
$\Delta Trade_{t-1}$	-0.668	-0.429	-2.431**	-1.362	-1.376***
	(0.458)	(0.467)	(1.055)	(0.879)	(0.482)
MDI_{t-1}	0.045	-0.014	-0.278	-0.589**	0.177
	(0.416)	(0.416)	(0.262)	(0.242)	(0.609)
ΔMDI_{t-1}	0.814	0.743	2.258***	2.839***	-0.866
	(1.743)	(1.741)	(0.775)	(0.821)	(2.256)
$GDPPerCapita_{t-1}$	0.472**	0.509***	0.556***	0.427***	0.776***
	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.137)	(0.117)	(0.273)
$Spending_{t-1}$	-0.233***	-0.234***	-0.071***	-0.075***	-0.253***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.013)
$Trade_{t-1}$ X MDI_{t-1}	-0.662*	-0.641**	-0.891**	-1.184***	-2.048***
	(0.342)	(0.324)	(0.354)	(0.314)	(0.549)
$\Delta Trade_{t-1}$ X ΔMDI_{t-1}	5.072	4.268	-39.462	-41.014	40.023
	(18.142)	(18.194)	(25.394)	(25.531)	(25.338)
PR_{t-1}	0.476				
	(0.359)				
$Trade_{t-1}$ X PR_{t-1}	0.296				
	(0.334)				
$\Delta Trade_{t-1}$ X ΔPR_{t-1}	-11.343***				
	(3.858)				
$Unitarism_{t-1}$		-0.695			
		(0.681)			
$Trade_{t-1}$ X $Unitarism_{t-1}$		0.651			
		(0.536)			
$\Delta Trade_{t-1}$ X $\Delta Unitarism_{t-1}$		-12.632*			
		(6.579)			
$UnionDensity_{t-1}$			-0.086		
			(0.167)		
$Trade_{t-1}$ X $UnionDensity_{t-1}$			-0.8**		
			(0.393)		
$\Delta Trade_{t-1}$ X $\Delta UnionDensity_{t-1}$			-14.819		
			(21.369)		
$LeftSeats_{t-1}$				0.208*	
				(0.125)	
$Trade_{t-1}$ X $LeftSeats_{t-1}$				0.441	
				(0.343)	
$\Delta Trade_{t-1}$ X $\Delta LeftSeats_{t-1}$				-2.568	
				(4.755)	
$Industry_{t-1}$					0.007
					(0.25)
$\Delta Industry_{t-1}$					-0.361
					(0.469)
$Trade_{t-1}$ X $Industry_{t-1}$					0.151
					(0.339)
$\Delta Trade_{t-1}$ X $\Delta Industry_{t-1}$					-2.183
					(2.792)
R^2	0.125	0.123	0.194	0.147	0.142
$adj.R^2$	0.115	0.114	0.17	0.131	0.133
N	2224	2224	544	673	2736

Standard errors in parentheses. For space constraints, estimates for land, dependency rates, levels of trade and democracy are included but not displayed (all were indistinguishable from zero at 95% confidence).
* ($p \leq 0.1$), ** ($p \leq 0.05$), *** ($p \leq 0.01$)

directly decreases individuals' propensities to blame incumbents relative to international forces (controlling for the awareness effect), most likely due to the responsbility-diffusing framing effects previously found in mass media studies. In turn, individuals who blame international forces rather than the government evaluate the government more favorably. Cross-sectional, time-series data reveal that mass media is associated with a decrease in the relationship between economic openness and welfare-state spending, providing further evidence that mass media diffuses the domestic political pressure against liberalization that has historically elicited welfare-state compensation for aggreived domestic groups. The state-level evidence is consistent with the individual-level evidence that mass media shifts blame attributions away from governments and toward international forces, which weakens the strategic pressure on national economic policymakers to provide welfare-state compensation to harmed domestic groups.

The findings have several implications for the study of international and comparative politics and for the prospects of democracy in a globalized world. First, the results provide some of the first evidence that mass media can be understood as a political institution that conditions the domestic politics of the global economy, thus placing on the agenda a source of cross-national and temporal variation typically omitted from previous analyses of comparative and international political economy. As such, they contribute to current research agendas seeking more finely-tuned political accounts of the domestic effects of globalization (Kayser 2007, 341) and a better understanding of public opinion and voting behavior in the context of economic openness (Hellwig 2008, Freeman et al. 2008). Specifically, the article suggests that mass media is an independent cause of voters discounting their evaluations of policy-makers (by increasing the probability they will identify economic openness as a top problem, but also by directly diffusing blame attributions toward international forces *even holding constant the types of problems they perceive to be most important*). The findings should be of particular interest to scholars seeking to develop more rigorous micro-foundations for the relationship between economic openness and welfare states (Hays et al. 2005, Wal 2010, 474). Methodologically, the article employed a novel application of a rational-choice framework, simple formal modeling, and quantitative analyses at multiple levels of analysis in the service of an essentially constructivist argument about the social construction of the international political economy. The approach taken here, and its findings, should therefore be of interest to researchers seeking to bridge the divide between rationalist and constructivist approaches to the study of international and comparative politics (Katzenstein et al. 1998, Checkel 1997, Zürn and Checkel 2005).

Finally, the state-level findings in particular have an important substantive implication, for they suggest that the omission of mass media in previous studies has led to biased conclu-

sions which over-estimate the egalitarian responsiveness of welfare states in the globalization-welfare nexus. The evidence suggests that from the standpoint of democratic values, mass media can have subtle but perverse effects on the distributive politics of open economies, disempowering domestic groups from holding national policymakers accountable for the unevenly distributed costs of globalization.

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Supplementary Information

Contents

Text of Key Survey Questions

Variable: Media

Q-15. (ASK IN EVEN NUMBERED WAVES ONLY: Thinking about what is going on in our country today, which ONE of the following is the most important source of information for you? (Interviewer: Ask in Rotating Order; Circle First Response Only).

1. Family
2. Co-workers and friends
3. Opinion leaders (e.g., religious leaders, teachers, government officials)
4. The media (TV, radio, newspapers, magazines) 5. None (Volunteered Only)
6. Other (Volunteered Only)
7. Don't Know/No Response (Column 23)

Variable: First and Second Most Important Problem (After the respondent selects an issue area, they are given a list of specific problems from which they can identify the top problem. See full codebook for the complete list of problems provided.)

Q-22. What in your opinion is the top problem facing France today? (Interviewer: Record One Response, Circle One Pre-Coded Reponse Only; First Mention).

Q-27. What in your opinion is the second most important problem facing France today? (Interviewer: Record One Response, Circle One Pre-Coded Response Only; First Mention).

1. Social Issues (Go To Q.23)
2. Economic Issues (Go To Q.24)
3. Political Issues (Go to Q.25)
4. Foreign Affairs (Go to Q.26)
5. Other (Specify):
6. Don't Know/No Response (Column 31)

Variable: Blame

Q-32. Which ONE of the following statements do you think best describes the cause of the second most important problem you just mentioned? (Interviewer: Read Statements in Rotating Order; Press Respondent to Make One Choice Only; Ask if They Have Anything Specific in Mind). (Note: This question referred to the top problem in Waves 1 and 2 and the second problem from Wave 3 forwards.)

    1. "The cause Iies in the behavior and attitudes of people like you and me."

    2. "The cause Iies in our society, that is our institutions and enterprises."

    3. "The cause lies in the current policies of the Government."

    4. "The cause lies in international affairs and is beyond the control of our country."

    5. Don't Know/No Response (Column 49)

Specific Mention:

Variable: Government Handling

Q-33. How would you rate the performance of the Government in handling the second most important problem that you just mentioned? Are you... (Note: This question referred to the top problem in Waves 1 and 2 and the second problem from Wave 3 forwards.)

    1. Completely satisfied?

    2. Somewhat satisfied?

    3. Somewhat dissatisfied?

    4. Completely dissatisfied?

    5. Don't Know/No Response? (Column 50)

Variable: Presidential Satisfaction

Q-20. How do you feel about the performance, overall, of President Mitterrand? Are you completely satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or completely dissatisfied?

    1. Completely satisfied

    2. Somewhat satisfied

    3. Somewhat dissatisfied

    4. Completely dissatisfied

    5. Don't Know/NoResponse (Column 29)

Table 3: Individual-Level Summary Statistics for Continuous Variables

Variable	n	Min	q_1	$\widetilde{x}$	$\bar{x}$	q_3	Max	s	IQR	#NA
x.age	29009	1	2	3	3.1	4	5	1.3	2	0
x.interest	28997	1	2	2	2.3	3	4	0.9	1	12
x.pressat	26911	1	2	2	2.2	3	4	0.8	1	2098
x.govhandle	22559	1	1	2	2.0	2	4	0.7	1	6450
x.newspaper	29009	0	0	0	0.1	0	1	0.3	0	0

Table 4: Individual-Level Summary Statistics for Categorical Variables

Variable	Levels	n	%	$\sum \%$
x.registered	no	1568	5.4	5.4
	yes	27441	94.6	100.0
	all	29009	100.0	
x.gender	Male	13891	47.9	47.9
	Female	15118	52.1	100.0
	all	29009	100.0	
x.urban	Not Urban	16095	55.5	55.5
	Urban	12914	44.5	100.0
	all	29009	100.0	
x.college	No university	12465	75.7	75.7
	University	4011	24.3	100.0
	all	16476	100.0	
x.occ	Not white collar	17059	78.6	78.6
	White collar	4637	21.4	100.0
	all	21696	100.0	
x.turnoutint	No	2036	9.1	9.1
	Yes	20241	90.9	100.0
	all	22277	100.0	
x.turnout88	no	2729	13.0	13.0
	yes	18294	87.0	100.0
	all	21023	100.0	
x.leftcand	Not left	4931	45.5	45.5
	Left	5899	54.5	100.0
	all	10830	100.0	
x.leftparty	Not left	11558	45.2	45.2

	Left	14001	54.8	100.0
	all	25559	100.0	
x.infosource	family	708	4.6	4.6
	friends	791	5.1	9.7
	opinion leaders	303	2.0	11.7
	the media	13606	88.3	100.0
	all	15408	100.0	
x.media	Other	1802	11.7	11.7
	Media	13606	88.3	100.0
	all	15408	100.0	
x.tv	Other	7332	47.2	47.2
	TV	8194	52.8	100.0
	all	15526	100.0	
x.radio	Other	13300	85.7	85.7
	Radio	2226	14.3	100.0
	all	15526	100.0	
x.magazines	Other	14784	95.2	95.2
	Magazines	742	4.8	100.0
	all	15526	100.0	
x.openprob1	0	21358	96.0	96.0
	1	888	4.0	100.0
	all	22246	100.0	
x.openprob2	0	19880	92.4	92.4
	1	1627	7.6	100.0
	all	21507	100.0	
x.econprob1	Other	25384	89.0	89.0
	Economic	3153	11.1	100.0
	all	28537	100.0	
x.socialprob1	Other	4499	15.8	15.8
	Social	24038	84.2	100.0
	all	28537	100.0	
x.polprob1	Other	27885	97.7	97.7
	Political	652	2.3	100.0
	all	28537	100.0	
x.foreignprob1	Foreign	694	2.4	2.4
	Other	27843	97.6	100.0
	all	28537	100.0	
x.econprob2	Other	16465	66.4	66.4
	Economic	8317	33.6	100.0
	all	24782	100.0	
x.socialprob2	Other	10958	44.2	44.2

	Social	13824	55.8	100.0
	all	24782	100.0	
x.polprob2	Other	23880	96.4	96.4
	Political	902	3.6	100.0
	all	24782	100.0	
x.foreignprob2	Foreign	1739	7.0	7.0
	Other	23043	93.0	100.0
	all	24782	100.0	
x.allcauses	personal choices	3326	14.2	14.2
	society	5301	22.7	36.9
	government	6694	28.6	65.5
	outside forces	7497	32.1	97.6
	other	558	2.4	100.0
	all	23376	100.0	
x.cause.gov	not government	16682	71.4	71.4
	government	6694	28.6	100.0
	all	23376	100.0	
x.cause.intl	not international	15879	67.9	67.9
	international	7497	32.1	100.0
	all	23376	100.0	
x.causes	government	6694	47.2	47.2
	outside forces	7497	52.8	100.0
	all	14191	100.0	

Additional Individual-Level Model Results

Table 5: Results Table for Model 1

|	
Age	0.38***
	(0.09)
genderFemale	−0.02
	(0.08)
urbanUrban	0.03
	(0.08)
Interest	0.03
	(0.08)
collegeUniversity	0.36***
	(0.11)
occWhite Collar	0.43***
	(0.11)
leftpartyLeft Party	0.53***
	(0.08)
mediaMedia	0.35***
	(0.12)
genprob2Problem:Social	−0.28***
	(0.08)
genprob2Problem:Political	−0.89***
	(0.20)
genprob2Problem:Foreign	0.15
	(0.15)
openprob2Problem:Openness	1.10***
	(0.14)
Constant	−0.45***
	(0.13)
N	3252
Log Likelihood	−2090.45
AIC	4206.90

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Figure 6: Model 1 with Alternative DV: Blame Government vs. All Others

Table 6: Results Table for Model 1 with Alternative DV: Blame Government vs. All Others

|	
Age	−0.38***
	(0.09)
genderFemale	0.02
	(0.08)
urbanUrban	−0.03
	(0.08)
Interest	−0.03
	(0.08)
collegeUniversity	−0.36***
	(0.11)
occWhite Collar	−0.43***
	(0.11)
leftpartyLeft Party	−0.53***
	(0.08)
mediaMedia	−0.35***
	(0.12)
genprob2Problem:Social	0.28***
	(0.08)
genprob2Problem:Political	0.89***
	(0.20)
genprob2Problem:Foreign	−0.15
	(0.15)
openprob2Problem:Openness	−1.10***
	(0.14)
Constant	0.45***
	(0.13)
N	3252
Log Likelihood	−2090.45
AIC	4206.90

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Figure 7: Model 1 with Alternative DV: Blame Government vs. All Others

Table 7: Results Table for Model 1 with Alternative DV: Blame International vs. All Others

Age	0.38***
	(0.09)
genderFemale	−0.02
	(0.08)
urbanUrban	0.03
	(0.08)
Interest	0.03
	(0.08)
collegeUniversity	0.36***
	(0.11)
occWhite Collar	0.43***
	(0.11)
leftpartyLeft Party	0.53***
	(0.08)
mediaMedia	0.35***
	(0.12)
genprob2Problem:Social	−0.28***
	(0.08)
genprob2Problem:Political	−0.89***
	(0.20)
genprob2Problem:Foreign	0.15
	(0.15)
openprob2Problem:Openness	1.10***
	(0.14)
Constant	−0.45***
	(0.13)
N	3252
Log Likelihood	−2090.45
AIC	4206.90

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 8: Results Table for Model 2: Openness as a Problem

Age	−0.19*
	(0.11)
genderFemale	−0.40***
	(0.10)
urbanUrban	0.07
	(0.09)
Interest	0.44***
	(0.10)
collegeUniversity	0.02
	(0.12)
occWhite Collar	0.34***
	(0.12)
mitterandMitterand	0.12
	(0.11)
leftpartyLeft Party	0.14
	(0.11)
mediaMedia	0.33*
	(0.17)
Constant	−2.56***
	(0.18)
N	5214
Log Likelihood	−1723.94
AIC	3467.88

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

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Table 9: Results Table for Model 3: Government Handling

|	
Age	0.08***
	(0.03)
genderFemale	−0.004
	(0.03)
urbanUrban	0.004
	(0.03)
Interest	0.03
	(0.03)
collegeUniversity	−0.03
	(0.04)
occWhite Collar	0.02
	(0.04)
mediaMedia	0.05
	(0.04)
leftpartyLeft Party	0.005
	(0.03)
mitterandMitterand	0.07**
	(0.03)
PresSatIV	0.47***
	(0.03)
genprob2Problem:Social	−0.01
	(0.03)
genprob2Problem:Political	−0.08
	(0.06)
genprob2Problem:Foreign	0.19***
	(0.04)
openprob2Problem:Openness	0.21***
	(0.04)
causesBlame International	0.38***
	(0.03)
Constant	1.64***
	(0.05)
N	2398
R-squared	0.30
Adj. R-squared	0.30
Residual Std. Error	0.60 (df = 2382)
F Statistic	68.09*** (df = 15; 2382)

*** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .1$

Figure 8: Model 3 with Alternative IV: All Causes

Table 10: Results Table for Model 3 Alternative IV: All Causes

|	
Age	0.08***
	(0.03)
genderFemale	−0.004
	(0.03)
urbanUrban	0.004
	(0.03)
Interest	0.03
	(0.03)
collegeUniversity	−0.03
	(0.04)
occWhite Collar	0.02
	(0.04)
mediaMedia	0.05
	(0.04)
leftpartyLeft Party	0.005
	(0.03)
mitterandMitterand	0.07**
	(0.03)
PresSatIV	0.47***
	(0.03)
genprob2Problem:Social	−0.01
	(0.03)
genprob2Problem:Political	−0.08
	(0.06)
genprob2Problem:Foreign	0.19***
	(0.04)
openprob2Problem:Openness	0.21***
	(0.04)
causeoutside forces	0.38***
	(0.03)
Constant	1.64***
	(0.05)
N	2398
R-squared	0.30
Adj. R-squared	0.30
Residual Std. Error	0.60 (df = 2382)
F Statistic	68.09*** (df = 15; 2382)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Figure 9: Model 3 with Alternative DV: Presidential Satisfaction

Table 11: Results Table for Model 3 Alternative DV: Presidential Satisfaction

Age	−0.02
	(0.03)
genderFemale	0.0003
	(0.03)
urbanUrban	−0.02
	(0.03)
Interest	−0.10***
	(0.03)
collegeUniversity	−0.01
	(0.04)
occWhite Collar	0.08**
	(0.04)
mediaMedia	−0.08*
	(0.04)
leftpartyLeft Party	0.41***
	(0.03)
mitterandMitterand	0.44***
	(0.03)
GovHandling	0.31***
	(0.02)
genprob1Problem:Social	−0.01
	(0.04)
genprob1Problem:Political	−0.02
	(0.07)
genprob1Problem:Foreign	0.17**
	(0.08)
openprob2Problem:Openness	−0.05
	(0.04)
causesBlame International	0.17***
	(0.03)
Constant	1.12***
	(0.05)
N	2392
R-squared	0.41
Adj. R-squared	0.41
Residual Std. Error	0.62 (df = 2376)
F Statistic	111.30*** (df = 15; 2376)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 12: State-Level Variable Details

Variable Name	Description
spending	General government final consumption expenditure as a share of GDP. World Bank.
trade	Imports and exports as share of GDP. World Bank.
dependency	Under 15 and over 64 as share of working-age population. World Bank.
land	Land area in square kilometers. World Bank.
mdi	Newspapers, radios, TVs over population. Arthur Banks and World Bank.
gdpcap	Gross domestic product divided by midyear population (current USD). World Bank.
polity2	Democracy - autocracy scores from the Polity IV database. Marshall et al. (2010)
industry	Value added by manufacturing as share of GDP. World Bank.
pr	0 = majoritarian, 1 = mixed-member majority or bloc, 2 = list-PR. Gerring and Thacker (2005).
unitarism	Average of nonfederalism and nonbicameralism. Gerring and Thacker (2005).
netden	Total union membership weighted by total dependent labor force. Golden et al. (2009).
lefts	Percentage of seats held by left parties in the legislature. Swank 2006.

Table 13: Descriptive Statistics for State Level Economic Variables

Variable	n	Min	q_1	$\widetilde{x}$	$\bar{x}$	q_3	Max	s	IQR	#NA
scode	12379	2.0	155.0	350.0	375.5	572.0	950.0	247.1	417.0	0
year	12379	1815.0	1893.0	1958.0	1937.2	1983.0	2003.0	54.6	90.0	0
polity2	12289	-10.0	-7.0	-3.0	-0.9	6.0	10.0	7.0	13.0	90
spending.wb	4908	3.0	10.7	14.4	15.7	19.1	76.2	6.9	8.4	7471
trade.wb	5088	0.4	38.0	56.3	65.3	82.6	412.2	42.4	44.6	7291
mdi	5696	0.0	8.2	23.9	46.1	66.5	313.3	53.4	58.3	6683
gdpcap.wb	5222	37.5	306.2	849.2	3636.2	2833.4	49263.5	6880.6	2527.2	7157
dependency.wb	5806	30.0	58.9	81.3	76.6	91.8	112.8	18.5	33.0	6573
land.wb	5675	670.0	68890.0	248360.0	831892.2	743530.0	16389950.0	1843918.4	674640.0	6704
pr	2974	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.9	2.0	2.0	0.9	2.0	9405
unitarism	2973	0.0	1.0	2.0	1.5	2.0	2.0	0.7	1.0	9406
industry.wb	3718	0.2	9.0	14.5	15.1	19.9	45.3	7.7	10.9	8661
netden	779	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.2	0.2	11600
lefts	1010	0.0	30.0	41.0	37.0	48.9	69.6	16.2	18.9	11369