of perceiving openness as a top problem as a function of mass media exposure and a vector of control variables:

Openness Problemi = α + β1ProblemAreai + β2Mediai + β3Controlsi + ei (2)

where the main variables of interest are the same as in Equation 1 except that here the dependent variable is the binary variable capturing whether openness is perceived as a top problem. If mass media affect blame attributions indirectly by making individuals more aware of international economic forces, which in turn would shift their blame toward international forces, then β2 should be positive and significant.

To test Hypothesis 2 regarding the effect of blame attributions on evaluations of the gov- ernment, I estimate a linear regression modeling how individuals evaluate the government’s handling of the problem they identified as one of the most important facing the country. I model evaluations of government handling as a function of respondents’ blame attributions and a vector of control variables. The equation is

GovHandlingi = α+β1ProblemAreai +β2OpennessProblemi +β3Blamei +β4Controlsi +ei

(3) where GovHandlingi measures, on a scale from 1 to 4, how the i th respondent evaluates the government’s handling of the top problem they identified. The theory predicts that for a particular problem such as the domestic costs of economic openness, blaming international forces rather than the government will make individuals less likely to hold governments ac- countable for that problem. If this is the case, then individuals who think a problem is caused by forces outside of the government’s purview should be less critical of the govern- ment’s handling of that problem. In this case, then, the theoretical expectation is that β3 will be positive and significant, reflecting that blaming international forces for a problem

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leads individuals to view the government’s handling of that problem more favorably than if they blamed the government for the problem.

To test Hypothesis 3, all state-level economic data are gathered from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank 2012), unless otherwise noted. Media penetra- tion rates come from the World Development Indicators and Arthur Banks’ Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks and Wilson 2005; World Bank 2012).10 The variable

Democracy is the conventional measure using the 20-point scale from Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011), reflecting a country’s score for democratic institutions minus its score for autocratic institutions. Most models have around 130 countries with an average of roughly 8 observations per country. To test whether mass media affects domestic compen- sation for globalization at the state level, I fit several variants of the pooled cross-sectional,

time-series regression equation:

Spendingit = α+β1Tradeit−1+β2MDIit−1+β3Tradeit−1∗MDIit−1+β4Controlsit−1+eit (4)

where the dependent variable, Spendingit, is a measure of final government consumption ex- penditure for country i in year t. Final government consumpiton expenditure is a standard measure of social welfare spending. Trade indicates imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP. MDI indicates an additive index of media density measuring television, newspa- per, and radios per capita (Warren 2014). Because the theory deals with the conditioning effects of mass media on domestic exposure to the global economy, I am most interested in

the multiplicative interaction of trade and mass media (Tradeit−1 ∗ MDIit−1) rather than

the independent marginal effects. If mass media exposure has the individual-level effects hypothesized above, then an increasing density of mass media technologies within a state should weaken the positive relationship historically observed between levels of trade openness and levels of domestic spending. In other words, the coefficient β3 should be negative and

10Summary statistics can be found in Supplementary Information.

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significant, reflecting that the predicted effect of trade on spending given high levels of mass media is less than the predicted effect that trade has on spending given low levels of mass media. In the first models testing Hypothesis 3, a battery of controls are included to account for non-trade and non-media determinants of government consumption expenditure. Data for testing particular rival explanations are more limited and therefore reduce the geographic and temporal coverage of the main economic and media data. For this reason, I check the robustness of my models against alternative explanations in a set of subsequent models.

4 Findings and Discussion

Before analysis, all numerical independent variables were de-meaned and divided by two standard deviations so that coefficients reflect the expected effect of a two standard deviation increase in the variable and are therefore roughly comparable to the coefficients for any categorical independent variables (Gelman 2008). The coefficient plots in Figures 2 and 3 show mixed statistical support for Hypothesis 1 regarding the expectation that mass media diffuse blame for national problems away from governments and toward international forces (directly and indirectly).11 Respondents who rely on the mass media as their most important source of information are significantly more likely to blame international forces for what they identify as one of the nation’s top problems (a logit estimate of .35 and standard error of .12), even controlling for perceptions of economic openness as a problem and the more general issue area in which a respondent locates that problem. To get a better sense of the effect size, consider probabilities. Based on 1000 simulations, the probability of blaming international forces for a typical individual who does not rely primarily on the mass media for information is .33. Relying primarily on mass media increases this probability to .41 (a mean change of .08 with a standard deviation of .03).12 Also as we would expect from previous research

11On the utility of graphs in lieu of tables, see Kastellec and Leoni (2007). Numerical model results are included in Supplementary Information. All models were estimated with the Zelig package in R (Imai, King, and Lau 2009).

12“Typical” refers to mean values on the numerical independent variables and the reference levels for categorical variables, i.e., in this case, a non-urban, non-university-educated, non-white-collar, non-left-

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