and scholars of public opinion and political behavior on the other, and to suggest how mass media research speaks directly to this gap. A second section develops specific hypotheses regarding how mass media is likely to affect individual perceptions, blame attributions, and electoral accountability around the politics of economic openness. A third section discusses the data and modeling strategy, the penultimate section discusses the core findings, and a final section concludes.

1 Mass Media Between Globalization and Domestic Politics

One of the most robust findings in international and comparative political economy is the positive state-level correlation between international trade and size of the public sector (Cameron 1978; Rodrik 1998; Garrett 1995; Adserà and Boix 2002). Most political scientists theorize this regularity as "embedded liberalism,” exemplified in the postwar proliferation of Keynesian social pacts that promoted open national markets with state-sponsored social protections (Ruggie 1982). Although social scientists widely agree that the expansion of in- ternational trade is welfare-improving in the long run, they also agree that the construction or expansion of markets often induces political backlash from domestic groups in the short run. This backlash requires policymakers in favor of increasing openness to compensate such groups through side payments, typically in the form of redistributive social spending, lest the necessary political support for increasing openness breaks down. Even across much disagreement about which aspects of economic openness have the most effect on the various components of welfare spending (Mares 2004; Ansell 2008; Burgoon 2001), in which countries the relationship holds (Rudra 2002), and even whether the focus on economic openness per se is misspecified (Kim 2007; Oatley 2011), scholars are generally in agreement about the expectation that liberalization of national markets elicits a corresponding political backlash from those domestic groups who would bear the adjustment costs.

Despite the leverage it provides to models of the relationship between globalization and

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welfare-state effort, there is surprisingly little evidence for the assumption that domestic groups harmed by economic liberalization exert sufficient political pressure on national pol- icymakers that policymakers provide welfare compensation to appease them. Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt (2005) find evidence that government spending helps sustain support for free trade, and Walter (2010) finds consistent evidence in Swiss survey data for multiple points in the individual-level causal chain of the compensation thesis. This current of research on the individual-level evidence for a compensation dynamic does not, however, answer the very different question of whether the economic insecurity induced by globalization induces an electorally significant threat for liberalizing policymakers. Margalit (2011) finds that job losses due to offshoring had a stronger negative effect on incumbent vote share than job losses not related to offshoring. Additionally, that study also finds that spending from the Trade Adjustment Assistance program significantly reduced the size of the effect. Still, it remains unclear whether and how other institutions moderate the public perceptions and electoral consequences of liberalization and if different dimensions of liberalization have the same domestic effects as offshoring in particular. For instance, Guisinger (2009) finds that trade policy may not be sufficiently salient, even to the most affected groups, to justify

voter-driven models of trade policy. Baker (2003; 2005; 2009) argues that, especially in the developing world, public support for trade openness remains high because it is associ- ated with relatively high-quality goods at relatively low prices, despite sometimes dramatic negative macro-economic consequences. Such findings from Guisinger and Baker highlight pathways through which certain negative effects of trade liberalization can have different effects on individuals, depending on how they are perceived. Baker’s finding of high support for free trade even in national contexts of dramatic negative macro-economic consequences, only adds scholarly interest to the puzzle of precisely how and why individuals come to find consumption effects more salient than other effects of trade liberalization.

Other research also suggests causal pathways through which citizens harmed by the adjustment costs of liberalization would not hold policymakers accountable for the political

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decision of liberalization. First, research mostly from advanced democratic countries finds that as the sources of economic growth shift, citizens accordingly adjust their expectations of government policymaking and their attributions of blame for national problems.1 Using

time-series data from France between 1985 and 2002, Hellwig shows that as exposure to trade and capital flows increase, citizens becomes less confident in the ability of national policymakers to solve national problems and the public demand for economic policy solutions decreases (Hellwig 2007). Voters also adjust their judgement of governments in predictable ways as other components of the institutional context change. For instance, when the Bank of England gained political independence, British voters were less likely to base their evaluation of the government on monetary policy and more likely to base it on fiscal policy (Sattler, Brandt, and Freeman 2010). Just as evaluations of government shift with the material and institutional sources of economic outcomes, so too does blame for national economic problems.

Secondly, perceptions and blame attributions affect political outcomes by altering what policymakers can be credibly held accountable for. Analyzing all 560 democratic elections between 1975 and 2002, Hellwig and Samuels (2007) show that as trade and capital flows increase as a share of gross domestic product, domestic economic growth rates have a smaller effect on incumbent vote share. Cross-sectional analyses of French and British survey data from 1997 and 2001, respectively, show similar effects of globalization on the determinants of vote choice, decreasing the effect of voter’s economic performance evaluations and party positions on economic issues (Hellwig 2008). Perceptual shifts in the ability of governments to affect economic policy also affect voter turnout. Analysis from the United States has found that individuals who suffer the economic adversity but do not blame the government are less likely to vote than comparable individuals who do blame the government (Arce- neaux 2003). In terms of policymaking, elite messaging in the mass media (Hellwig and

1Expectations of government policymaking and blame attributions are not only driven by material or institutional changes in the political economy but may also be endogenous to vote choice or the partisan composition of an incumbent government (Wlezien, Franklin, and Twiggs 1997).

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