Dear Dr. Gaddie,

Thank you for accepting our article subject to minor revision. We are grateful to you and the reviewer for the thoughtful feedback. We generally agreed with all of the requested changes and have revised our article accordingly. This letter outlines all of the changes in our resubmitted article. Below we refer to the reviewer as R1, we refer to you as Editor, and we follow your notation in your last email by referring to each of the key three requested revisions as #1, #2, and #3. This letter outlines the changes beginning with the simplest and moving to the more demanding, before closing with a short list of corrected typos and language improvements. All of the changes are relatively minor; the reason this letter is rather long is that, because one of the requested changes involved initial modelling decisions, it had some consequences for all of the reported results and so these had to be dealt with thoughtfully.

For the one potential revision which you did not consider necessary but left to our discretion, (#2) that the desire for action may supplant ideology in support for the Tea Party, we were unfortunately constrained by data availability. We returned to the ANES codebook–re-reading it manually and searching for several key words such as "action," but we found no measure or suitable proxy of the desire for action to be taken. While we therefore believe this question cannot be addressed in the present study, we agree it is a valuable point which future researchers may wish to address.

This leaves two necessary changes which you asked us to make, #1 and #3. #1 is "clarification of the misarchism construct" (Editor), and #3 is "relocating the discussion section regarding robustness" (Editor). #3 is more straightforward so we address this first.

As requested, we simply relocated the three subsections presenting robustness checks to the Supplementary Information document (online appendix). To be exact, the subsections in the original manuscript labeled "Bayesian Model Averaging," "Multiple Imputation," and "Matching and Sensitivity," are now in Supplementary Information. Now, at the end of the section "Analysis," where these subsections were originally placed, we leave only a short paragraph stating that these robustness checks were executed, found to be consistent with the findings presented in the main text, and available in the online Supplementary Information.

Finally, this leaves requested change #1, “clarification of the misarchism construct” (Editor), which refers to multiple sub-points listed by R1. To formalize the discussion, we have itemized the distinct sub-points. First, let us denote as sub-point A the concern that it is “difficult for a reader to imagine someone who simultaneously has an aversion to government, but also supports the state.” This is also echoed later in R1’s paragraph before “Other Thoughts.” Sub-point B is that this should be addressed by “creating a figure that graphically demonstrates how misarchism comports/fails to comport with traditional conservatism and libertarianism.” Sub-point C is that “any latent variable created to measure this construct does not include the standard measure of ideological self-placement. This measure should be maintained in the models as a standalone control variable.” Sub-point D is that “much more needs to be devoted in terms of connecting the creation of these constructs with the existing literature. Why did the authors pick these particular questions over others? Are these the specific questions typically employed to create these measures? Have other social scientists relied on additional variables?” R1’s sub-point E is that the estimated effect size is perhaps insubstantial because a shift toward misarchism would not so increase the probability of supporting the Tea Party as to effect a transition from not supporting to supporting.

In short, issue #1 on clarifying the misarchism construct is composed of the following distinct sub-issues:
A. It is hard to understand how someone can be averse to governmet and support the state
B. Need for a figure to show how misarchism comports with conservatism & libertarianism
C. Any latent variable construct should not include standard measure of ideology
D. More needs to be done to connect our construct to previous research on this
E. The substantive significance of the estimated effect size

We agree with all of these points and have made a series of revisions to meet them. Because the sub-points are somewhat overlapping and some of our changes intended to satisfy one have proven to have effects on some of the others, an extended discussion is required. First, revising our models to respond to R1's sub-point C (that we should control for ideology in the regression, post the factor model) unsurprisingly leads to an even smaller effect size than the original estimate. This is as we would expect, simply because the predictive power of ideological identification is not only removed from the factor model but our factors are made to compete with it in the regressions, not to mention all of these ideological variables are correlated (see below). Second, the size of the estimated effect cuts to the heart of R1's sub-point A regarding how misarchism comports with traditional conservatism, because the estimated effect plotted in Figure 2 considers the effect of misarchism for all levels of conservatism. That is, as I itemize below in the revisions made, one reason the effect appears modest is because the models originally presented do not specifically estimate how misarchism comports with conservatism in particular. Therefore, a natural response to point B about how misarchism comports with conservatism is also a natural solution to point E about the seemingly small effect size (made even smaller in the revised version due to point A): as a complementary second layer to the main model, to estimate the model on only those with an ideological self-placement to the right of center on the ideology variable. As we discuss in the paper, this turns out to be very clarifying on concern A (it shows how misarchism clarfies conservatives into or away from the Tea Party based on individuals' levels of moral statism and governmentalism) and is also just a theoretically and practically relevant subset for which to consider the effect of misarchism. Because the original main model is a much harder and more general test, we still maintain it as the main model for discussing results of interest.

Having provided the rationale and discussion, we now offer you an itemised list of all changes in response to R1's issue #1 on clarification of the misarchism construct:

1. We remove ideological self-placement from the factor model and we include it as a stand-alone control variable in the regression model. As noted above, this has the predictable effect of making our estimated effect smaller. The discussion of Conservatism as a variable in the factor model setup is revised accordingly (the last sentence of paragraph one in Research Design, with its footnote, is relocated to the introduction of control variables for the regression, in the last paragraph of Research Design). Importantly, of course, this modeling change must change the exact numerical results of all the other subsequent analyses but nowhere have we found it to change the substantive interpretation of our main effect of interest (i.e. the sign and statistical significance of the interaction between moral statism and governmentalism) in our original manuscript.

2. After presenting the results of the factor model, we add a new graph (now Figure 2) that effectively responds to both A and B. The graph is preceded by one new paragraph framed by R1's concerns and explaining the graph. To help visualise how many people are averse to government and yet supportive of moralistic state power, and to what degree—while also demonstrating how misarchism "comports/fails to comport with conservatism and libertarianism," the natural choice is a scatterplot of moral statism and governmentalism (numerical variables) faceted by levels of conservatism (originally an ordinal categorical variable). An important point of clarification in response to R1s comments, however, is that for us, "libertarianism" is a loose concept that we believe incorrectly conflates attitudes toward government and the state. Our measure of what we believe represents "libertarianism" (aversion to government) is the factor from our factor model that captures attitudes toward government. Additionally, on R1's suggestion we did revisit the ANES codebook but found no straightforward measure of "libertarianism," so incorporating an alternative measure of attitudes toward this as a concept is not possible here as far as we can tell. We believe this new Figure 2 very efficiently illustrates how moral statism, governmentalism, and conservatism are related but crucially distinct, and to what degree, with some substantively revealing implications we discuss in the text.
3. Because of the suggested modeling change, the problem of multi-collinearity looms larger for our regression analyses. As another way to better clarify the relationships between the various measures of conservatism (B) but also to show how the suggested change to our models (C) likely makes the confidence intervals for our main relationship of interest larger (E) because of multi-collinearity, we added to the Supplementary Information a correlation plot including all of the various measures of ideology, including our constructs. This plot reveals all of them to be correlated and so in our discussion of our regression model we cite this as something to keep in mind about the estimated effect sizes in Model 2.
4. To respond to B and E (exacerbated by changes to satisfy C) we add a third model to our main regression results table, which shows the results of estimating Model 2 on conservatives only. A discussion of this new model and a new effect plot is added to the discussion of the regression table and the effect sizes, respectively. We also revised our discussion of Model 2 accordingly, including the addition of a short discussion on why Model 2 is unlikely to yield a very large effect size, which segues into the consideration of the conservative subset only. Also, we remove our original discussion of Conservatism as a potential control variable which we originally tested in an additional model previously placed in the Supplementary Information, because that would now be redundant. We also remove those now unnecessary additional model results from the Supplementary Information.

5. On the point that our approach in the factor analysis could be better grounded in previous scholarly efforts, we concur. Indeed our approach was very much guided by previous work, but we agree this could be better explained. We have added to our discussion of the variables included in the factor analysis, in the second paragraph in Research Design. The paragraph improves the explanation of why we chose the variables we did, indicating previous scholarly precedent for them, and acknowledging how and why we diverge from some previous approaches based on our particular theoretical perspective. In particular you will note previous work by Feldman; Feldman and Johnston; Bradberry and Jacobson; and Ellis and Stimson has been weaved into the rationale for our factor modeling strategy. As is the case with most aspects of research design, our approach is not the only conceivable approach but we think the improved discussion greatly improves the persuasiveness of our rationale. We are grateful for the encouragement to have made this more explicit.

We fixed typo of "Wiretapping measure" to "Wiretapping measures" in Research Design.

We fixed typo of "governemntalist" to "governmentalist" in first part of Analysis.

We changed rounding in effect sizes to 3 digits instead of 2, to remedy some confusing arithmetic results (where 4+8 appeared to equal 11); added rounding to some not previously rounded, as in factor model test statistics in Supplementary Information.

We made a minor clarification of ambiguous language in the statement describing p-value of Chi-square test in Supplementary Information.

We standardized references to the "governmentalism" variable some of which were slightly different. We opted for the somewhat awkward "governmentalism" because it best reflects that it is an artificial construct we are using to capture a particular set of attitudes.

We made a minor change to the design of our effect plot(s). Whereas the original effect plot showed different lines for the 90th, 50th, and 10th percentile of governmentalism, we now simply use the raw values of –1, 0, and 1. We did this because, given that we are now looking at effects estimated from the whole dataset and also a specific subset, it would be confusing and potentially misleading to look at percentiles within each group (i.e. different absolute magnitudes) in visualising and describing the effect estimates. Additionally, because our discussion of effect sizes is doubly conservative for reasons listed above, we do not want to ignore the important information at the extreme values of our variables. We think it is better to plot effect sizes by using these straightforward magnitudes of governmentalism because the whole point of such a plot is to show readers the variation across the entire scale. Of course, these values do represent extremes at which relatively very few respondents are located, but this is substantively appropriate precisely because the Tea Party is an extreme party with relatively few supporters. Finally, we note this change is nicely balanced by the rug plot included at the bottom of each plot, which shows how many respondents there are at each value. In short, we believe the conservative effect size discussions based on simulations of our conservative modeling approach indicate the more modest estimated effect of misarchism on most people; this minor change of plotting options is more intuitive for comparing across groups and it shows the full substantive significance of our estimated effects, including in the substantively important extremes.

We removed matching for the independent effect of moral statism because after the modeling change it is no longer significant in the main regressions. We also changed the matching strategy because there were already a large number of variables used for matching. To now include Conservatism as R1 believes is important (and we agree), we think the best solution was to now only include the main variables identified by the Bayesian Model Averaging. We find this preferable also because it allows us to use exact matching which is generally seen as the ideal (see Imai K, King G, Stuart EA. Misunderstandings among experimentalists and observationalists in causal inference. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A. 2008;171(2):481–502), rather than Mahalanobis distance. Therefore the matching analysis is changed to only balance on the strongest and most reliable competitor explanations of Tea Party support: FoxNews, Obama, BornAgain, and Conservatism. The results do not appreciably change, although the effect for governmentalism is significant only at the 90% level. Our main interaction term of interest also remains signed as expected and statistically significant. The estimated effect sizes are smaller but this is not surprising given that they are estimated with only the relatively small subset of respondents who are exactly the same on FoxNews, Obama, BornAgain, and Conservatism; and it is considering a “treatment” which is defined as only the difference between below and above the mean of the misarchism variables. In any event, as its place in the Supplementary Information suggests, this is only a check on the general relationship observed in the main text.

We capitalised all figure and table captions.

We removed discussion of effect sizes in the introduction to save space and because of the somewhat increased complexity.

We added Zelig citation to Supplementary Information.

We also added to Supplementary Information the regression results we obtained in our initial modeling strategy (including Conservatism in the factor model). We do this only to note that the main model we report in the text is a conservative estimate and alternative approaches generate larger effect estimates. We agree that R1s suggestion is better but only wish to include the alternative in the Supplementary Information. The rationale and the difference of results is mentioned in a footnote in Analysis.

Once again we are very grateful for the suggested revisions and we hope you and R1 will agree that the article is now all the better for them.

Kind regards,
The author(s)