# APT3 Uncovered: The code evolution of Pirpi

Your functions are showing (and leaving a trail)

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#### Your functions are showing

- · Persistent Code Reuse
- . Finding The Trail
- · Pirpi.201x vs Operation Clandestine DoubleTap
- . Just give me all the Pirpi you have
- . EXEProxy

## Persistent Code Reuse: function 1

```
int __cdecl sub_40A4D0(LPCSTR lpFileName, LPCSTR
                                                                                    eTime= _FILETIME ptr -18h
ssTime= _FILETIME ptr -10h
Time= _FILETIME ptr -8
                                                                                esp, 18h
eax, [esp+18h+1pFileName]
                                                                       push
push
                                                                       push
                                  8B 3D D0 A0 49 00
                                                                                   edi, ds:CreateFileA
                                                                                                              hTemplateFile
                                                                       push
push
                                  68 A7 00 00 00
                                                                                                             : dwFlagsAndAttributes
: dwCreationDisposition
                                 6A 83
                                                                       push
push
                                 6A 01
68 00 00 00 80
                                             pop
pop
xor
pop
add
04084FD 5E
04084FE 33 C0
0408500 5B
0408501 83 C4 18
                                                                                       8D 4C 24 9C
8D 54 24 14
                                                                                                                             lea
lea
push
lea
push
push
push
                                                                                                                                      ecx, [esp+24h+LastWriteTime]
edx, [esp+24h+LastAccessTime
                                                                                        8D 44 24 20
                                                                                                                                                                    ationTime]
lpLastAccessTime
                                                                                                                                                                     1pCreationTime
                                                                                        8B 1D D8 A0 49 00
                                                                                                                             mov
push
                                                                                       A 68 A7 00 00 00
F 6A 03
                                                                                                                             push
push
                                                                                                                                                                    dwFlagsAndAttributes
dwCreationDisposition
                                                                                                                                                                     1pSecurityAttribute
                                                                                                                             push
push
                                                                                        68 00 00 00 C0
                                                                                        pop
pop
xor
pop
add
retn
                                                                                                                                                                       lea
lea
push
lea
push
push
push
                                                1546 33 CO
1548 5B
                                                                                                                                  8D 54 24 0C
8D 44 24 14
                                                                                                                                                                                 edx, [esp+24h+LastWriteTime]
eax, [esp+24h+LastAccessTime
                                                                                                                                  52
8D 4C 24 20
                                                   9 83 C4 18
                                                                                                                                                                                                          ; lpLastWriteTime
                                                                                                                                                                                   ecx, [esp+28h+0
                                                                                                                                                                                                              : lpCreationTime
: hFile
                                                                                                                                                                                                              : hObject
                                                                                                                                                                                   short loc_48A573
                                                                                           9A56C 33 CO
                                                                                                                                                                                             B8 01 00 00 00
```

```
int __usercall sub_10006DE0@<eax>(int _EBX@<ebx>, void *a2)
void ×v3; // esi@1
HANDLE v5; // esi@3
struct FILETIME LastWriteTime; // [esp+0h] [ebp-30h]@1
struct _FILETIME LastAccessTime; // [esp+8h] [ebp-28h]@1
struct _FILETIME CreationTime; // [esp+10h] [ebp-20h]@3
LPCSTR lpFileName; // [esp+20h] [ebp-10h]@3
_EAX = a2;
LastAccessTime.dwLowDateTime = 0;
LastWriteTime.dwHighDateTime = 167;
LastWriteTime.dwLowDateTime = 3;
BYTE1(\_EBX) \times = 2;
__asm { xlat }
U3 = _EAX;
if ( _EAX == (void *)-1 )
GetFileTime(_EAX, &CreationTime, &LastAccessTime, &LastWriteTime);
CloseHandle(v3);
v5 = CreateFileA(lpFileName, 0xC0000000, 1u, 0, 3u, 0xA7u, 0);
if ( v5 == (HANDLE)-1 )
 return 0:
if ( !SetFileTime(&LastWriteTime, (const FILETIME *)0x80000000, (const FILETIME *)1, 0) )
CloseHandle(v5);
return 1;
```

#### Persistent Code Reuse

- What is Pirpi?
  - Targeted malware delivered via 0-days
    - (CVE-2010-3962)
    - (CVE-2014-1776)
    - (CVE-2014-4113)
    - (CVE-2014-6332)
    - (CVE-2015-3113)
    - (CVE-2015-5119)
  - Appended to a valid gif
  - Obfuscated Command and Control
  - Compromised infrastructure

#### Finding a Trail


- . Why are you doing this?
  - . It's fun
  - . You don't know what you don't know
- . Pick 2 binaries by:
  - . Family
  - · Compile Times
  - · File Size
  - . % similarity (ssdeep)

# It started out with a diff, how did it end up like this?


- . Inspect Binaries w/ IDA Tools
  - . Bindiff Hex Rays
  - . IDAScope Plohmann/Hanel
- . Bindiff two known Pirpi samples
  - . fb838cda6118a003b97ff3eb2edb7309
  - . e33804e3e15920021c5174982dd69890

File		Ratio	First sub.	Last sub.	Times sub.	Sources	Size
	89390b83250cdf898d6eb627e035bc7b1202aa6bbbc8fd394223da2d4f7317a8 fb838cda6118a003b97ff3eb2edb7309 <b>②                                   </b>	35 / 55	2014-05-01 18:12:26	2014-07-25 17:04:41	3	3	84.0 KB
	4ce90c9a49ee026618ffe9741d958a764419389492e4c231e61f0a6f4932789c e33804e3e15920021c5174982dd69890 <b>⊕ ≡ Q peexe</b>	7 / 56	2015-08-25 22:44:02	2015-09-09 14:34:55	4	2	788.0 KB


#### It was only a diff



#### It was only a diff



### Aside: Putting the FUN in Function



### Pirpi.201x vs Operation Clandestine DoubleTap

Sample MD5	Pirpi.2014 Bindiff		Pirpi.2015 Bindiff		
	Similarity	Confidence	Similarity	Confidence	
FA3578C2ABE3F37DDDA76EE40C5A1608	89.5%	98.6%	29.8%	69.5%	
1A4B710621EF2E69B1F7790AE9B7A288	92.7%	98.8%	29.4%	69.5%	
F4884C0458176AAC848A911683D3DEF5	91.4%	98.7%	29.6%	71.6%	
4CA97FF9D72B422589266AA7B532D6E6	93.7%	98.7%	30.7%	71.6%	
B48E578F030A7B5BB93A3E9D6D1E2A83	100%	100%	34.3%	73.0%	
1B0E6BA299A522A3B3B02015A3536F6F	34.3%	73.0%	100%	100%	
Table 4	4. Resulting	Similarity and	Confidence	e Rates of Pirp	

Name	Address	Ordinal		
IePramGet	10002BC0	1		
IeSet	10002B30	2		
DIIEntryPoint	1000E87A	[main entry]		


File		Ratio	First sub.	Last sub.	Times sub.	Sources	Size
	89390b83250cdf898d6eb627e035bc7b1202aa6bbbc8fd394223da2d4f7317a8 fb838cda6118a003b97ff3eb2edb7309  ● I Q armadillo pedll via-tor	35 / 55	2014-05-01 18:12:26	2014-07-25 17:04:41	3	3	84.0 KB
	4ce90c9a49ee026618ffe9741d958a764419389492e4c231e61f0a6f4932789ce33804e3e15920021c5174982dd69890  ● III Q peexe	7 / 56	2015-08-25 22:44:02	2015-09-09 14:34:55	4	2	788.0 KB

#### Pirpi.201x vs Operation Clandestine DoubleTap


```
5A
                                                edx
58
                                                 eax
5B
                                                 ebx
9D
59
                                                ecx
5F
                                                edi
                                                ecx, [esi+220h]
8B 8E 20 02 00 00
                                         mov
                                                 dx, [esi+21Ch]
66 8B 96 1C 02 00 00
                                         mov
66 8B 86 24 02 00 00
                                                ax, [esi+224h]
                                         mov
                                                 dword ptr [ebp-114h], 8
C7 85 EC FE FF FF 08 00+
                                         mov
                                                 [ebp-110h], ecx
89 8D FO FE FF FF
                                         mov
                                                 [ebp-10Ch], dx
66 89 95 F4 FE FF FF
                                         mov
                                                 [ebp-10Ah], ax
66 89 85 F6 FE FF FF
                                         mov
55
                                        push
                                                 ebp
90
                                        pushf
52
                                        push
                                                edx
C1 DD 10
                                                ebp, 10h
                                         rcr
66 85 D2
                                                dx, dx
                                         test
33 ED
                                                ebp, ebp
85 ED
                                         test
                                                ebp, ebp
                                                short loc_40CDA4
76 18
                                        jbe
77 00
                                                 short $+2
```

```
rule purpi_anti_disasm
{
meta:
author = "Micah Yates"
description = "Anti-disassembly instructions used by Pirpi malware"
strings:
$re1 = { 5? 9c 5? } // push, pushf, push
$re2 = { 5? 5? 5? 9d ?? ?? } // 3x pop, popf
$re3 = { 33 ?? 85 ?? 7? ?? 7? 00 } // xor, test, jge, jl
condition:
all of them
}
```

## Just give me all the Pirpi you have: function 1




## Just give me all the Pirpi you have: function 1





#### function 1 - minor versions



#### function 1 - minor versions

98011f5b7b957a142f14cbda57a5ea82

@00401FC0




272cb6c16e083ca143d40c63005753a2

@00403110

acd8d34d8360129df1c8d03f253ba747

@100016A0

#### function 1 - minor versions



MD5:


c006faaf9ad26a0bd3bbd597947da3e1 @0040B320 MD5:

f683cf9c2a2fdc27abff4897746342c4 @00401D60 MD5:

07b4d539a6333d7896493bafd2738321 @00404A20




```
int sub_402B30()
    struct _OSUERSIONINFOA UersionInformation; // [esp+0h] [ebp-94h]@1
    UersionInformation.dwOSUersionInfoSize = 148;
    GetUersionExA(&UersionInformation);
    if ( VersionInformation.dwPlatformId == 1 )
      if ( VersionInformation.dwMajorVersion == 4 )
        if ( !UersionInformation.dwMinorUersion )
          return 95;
        if ( VersionInformation.dwMinorVersion == 10 )
          return 98;
        if ( UersionInformation.dwMinorUersion == 90 )
          return 19781:
    else if ( VersionInformation.dwPlatformId == 2 )
      switch ( VersionInformation.dwMajorVersion )
        case 3u:
          return 20052:
        case 5u:
          if ( !UersionInformation.dwMinorUersion )
            return 2000;
          if ( VersionInformation.dwMinorVersion == 1 )
            return 22608;
          if ( VersionInformation.dwMinorVersion == 2 )
            return 2003;
          break:
        case 6u:
          return 22121;
35
36
37
    return 0;
```



```
; int __cdecl sub_401160(LPSTR lpCommandLine, char)
 00401160
                                        sub_401160 proc near
                                       ProcessInformation= _PROCESS_INFORMATION ptr -54h
StartupInfo= _STARTUPINFOA ptr -44h
lpCommandLine= dword ptr 4
                                        arg_4= byte ptr 8
00401160
00401160 83 EC 54
00401163 57
                                                esp, 54h
                                        sub
                                        push
                                                edi
                                                 ecx, 11h
 00401164 B9 11 00 00 00
                                        mov
 00401169 33 CO
                                        xor
                                                 eax, eax
                                                 edi, [esp+58h+StartupInfo]
 9040116B 8D 7C 24 14
                                        lea
 0040116F F3 AB
                                        rep stosd
                                                 su
[esp+58h+ProcessInformation.hProcess], eax
[esp+58h+StartupInfo.cb], 44h
[esp+58h+ProcessInformation.hThread], eax
 00401171 89 44 24 04
                                        mov
 00401175 C7 44 24 14 44 00 00 00 mov
 0040117D 89 44 24 08
                                        mov
 00401181 5F
                                        pop
                                                 ed1
[esp+54h+ProcessInformation.dwProcessId], eax
[esp+54h+ProcessInformation.dwThreadId], eax
al, [esp+54h+arg_4]
 00401182 89 44 24 08
                                        mov
 00401186 89 44 24 0C
 0040118A 8A 44 24 5C
                                        mou
 9040118E 84 CO
                                                 al, al
                                                 short loc_4011A1
 00401190 74 0F
                                        jz
      90401192 66 C7 44 24 40 00 00 mov
                                                      [esp+54h+StartupInfo.wShowWindow]
[esp+54h+StartupInfo.dwFlags], 1
      90401199 C7 44 24 3C 01 00 00 00 mov
  loc_4011A1:
                                                   ecx. [esp+54h+ProcessInformation]
eax, [esp+54h+1pCommandLine]
edx. [esp+54h+StartupInfo]
ecx ; lpProcessInformation
   004011A1 8D 4C 24 00
   004011A5 8B 44 24 58
                                          mov
   904011A9 8D 54 24 10
                                          lea
   004011AD 51
                                          push
   004011AE 52
                                          push
                                                                          1pStartupInfo
   004011AF 6A 00
                                          push
                                                                          1pCurrentDirectory
    04011B1 6A 00
                                          push
                                                                          1pEnvironment
   004011B3 6A 00
                                                                         dwCreationFlags
                                          push
   904011B5 6A 01
                                          push
                                                                         bInheritHandles
   004011B7 6A 00
                                          push
                                                                         lpThreadAttributes
    04011B9 6A 00
                                          push
                                                                          1pProcessAttributes
   004011BB 50
                                                                        : lpCommandLine
                                          push
  004011BC 6A 00
                                          push
                                                                        ; lpApplicationName
      011BE FF 15 30 20 40 00
                                                   ds:CreateProcessA
ecx, [esp+54h+ProcessInformation.hProcess]
                                          call
  004011C4 8B 4C 24 00
                                          mov
   904011C8 F7 D8
                                          neg
sbb
   004011CA 1B CO
                                                   eax. eax
   004011CC 23 C1
                                                    eax, ecx
   904011CE 83 C4 54
                                          add
   904011D1 C3
                                          retn
                                          sub_401160 endp
```

```
__cdecl sub_401160(LPSTR lpCommandLine, char a2)
    B00L v2: // eax@3
    struct _PROCESS_INFORMATION ProcessInformation; // [esp+0h] [ebp-54h]@1
    struct _STARTUPINFOA StartupInfo; // [esp+10h] [ebp-44h]@1
    memset(&StartupInfo, 0, sizeof(StartupInfo));
    ProcessInformation.hProcess = 0;
    StartupInfo.cb = 68;
    ProcessInformation.hThread = 0:
    ProcessInformation.dwProcessId = 0;
    ProcessInformation.dwThreadId = 0:
    if ( a2 )
14
      StartupInfo.wShowWindow = 0;
      StartupInfo.dwFlags = 1;
    v2 = CreateProcessA(0, lpCommandLine, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, &StartupInfo, &ProcessInformation);
    return v2 != 0 ? ProcessInformation.hProcess : 0;
20
```




#### EXEProxy

```
2812816 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY CnC Beacon (INBOUND) 1 || md5,4d3874480110ba537b3839cb8b416b50
2812817 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY CnC Beacon (INBOUND) 2 || md5,4d3874480110ba537b3839cb8b416b50
2812818 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY CnC Beacon (INBOUND) 3 || md5,4d3874480110ba537b3839cb8b416b50
2812819 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY CnC Beacon (INBOUND) 4 || md5,b94bcffcacc65d05e5f508c5bd9c950c
2812820 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY CnC Beacon (INBOUND) 5 || md5,b94bcffcacc65d05e5f508c5bd9c950c
2812821 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY CnC Beacon (INBOUND) 6 || md5,b94bcffcacc65d05e5f508c5bd9c950c
```

- b94bcffcacc65d05e5f508c5bd9c950c
- Contains function 1
- Contains Anti-Disasm
- OpenSSL included
- Requires cmd line params to run

```
String
ipconfig /all
net localgroup administrators
net localgroup administrators /domain
net group "domain admins" /domain
netstat -an -p tcp
nbtstat -a 📟 💮
netstat -an -p tcp
      96/img/1111101.exe
dir c:\
c:\aos.exe -in N111
net start aos
netstat -ano -p tcp
tasklist /v
              296/ima/
dir c:\
c:\dh.exe
del c:\dh.exe
```

## EXEProxy: pirpi\_EXEPROXY



#### EXEProxy 2: Electric Boogaloo

- 4d3874480110ba537b383 9cb8b416b50
- Contains function 1
- Server tool
- Requires Cmd Line Params
- No other notable anchor functions

```
2812549 || ETPRO TROJAN Possible EXEPROXY SSL Cert
2812788 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY DNS Lookup || md5,b94bcffcacc65d05e5f508c5bd9c950c
2812812 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY Possible HTTP CnC Beacon 1 || md5.b94bcffcacc65d05e5f508c5bd9c950c
2812813 | ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY Possible HTTP CnC Beacon 2 | md5,b94bcffcacc65d05e5f508c5bd9c950c
2812814 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY Possible HTTP CnC Beacon 3 || md5,b94bcffcacc65d05e5f508c5bd9c950
2812815 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY Possible HTTP CnC Beacon 4 || md5,b94bcffcacc65d05e5f508c5bd9c950c
2812816 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY CnC Beacon (INBOUND) 1 || <mark>md5,4d3874480110ba537b</mark>3
2812817 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY CnC Beacon (INBOUND) 2 || <mark>md5.4d3874480110ba537b3839cb8b416b50</mark>
2812818 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY CnC Beacon (INBOUND) 3 || md5.4d3874480110ba537b3839cb8b416b50
2812819 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY CnC Beacon (INBOUND) 4 || md5,b94bcffcacc65d05e5f508c5bd9c950c
2812820 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY CnC Beacon (INBOUND) 5 || md5,b94bcffcacc65d05e5f508c5bd9c950c
2812821 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY CnC Beacon (INBOUND) 6 || md5,b94bcffcacc65d05e5f508c5bd9c950c
2812841 || ETPRO TROJAN EXEPROXY GET Session CnC Beacon || md5,4d3874480110ba537b3839cb8b416b50
 ">Ltime %2d:%2d:%2d Disconnect >"
 "%2d:%2d:%2d >Cback:"
 ">LTime: %2d:%2d:%2d"
 ">Cback: %s:%d"
 "H:%s "
 "Ok. "
 "K:%d"
```

#### EXEProxy 2: Electric Boogaloo

- a85f9b4c33061ee724e59291242b9e86
- OpenSSL Server
- Contains Public/Private Keys

```
0402EB7 2B C2
                                                         ; Size
                                lea
                                        eax, [esp+188Ch+D
                                                          Val
                                                          Dst
 402ECA 89 74 24 28
 402FD3 68 00 0C 00 00
                                                         ; Size
 9402ED8 8D 8C 24 94 0C 00 00
                                        ecx, [esp+1898h+Bu
0402EDF 6A 00
                                                         ; Val
                                push
                                        ecx
                                                         ; Dst
                                        offset aBeginCertifica
                                push
                                push
                                        edx
                                push
                                        esi
0402EFB 8D 84 24 AC 0C 00 00
                                lea
                                        eax, [esp+18B0h+Buffer]
0402F02 68 A8 FA 45 00
                                                                  "----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----\r\nMIIE
                                push
                                        eax
90402F0D 83 C4 30
                                add
                                        esp, 30
0402F10 85 ED
                                test
                                        ebp, ebp
```

Certificate Information:

Common Name: marryks

Organization: www.bhpbilliton.com Organization Unit: BHP BILLITON

Locality: Melbourne State: Melbourne Country: AU

Valid From: December 25, 2013 Valid To: December 23, 2023

Issuer: marryks, www.bhpbilliton.com

Serial Number: 0 (0x0)

#### In Summary:

- Some families never change
- Anchor Functions are Fun!
- Use public info
- Pirpi malware active since at least 2006
- Unintended findings

#### • Thanks:

- Richard Wartell Palo Alto Networks
- Mike Scott Palo Alto Networks

#### • Biblio:

- MITRE:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0063
- FireEye:
  - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/11/ie-0-day-hupigon-joins-the-party.html
  - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/06/clandestine-fox-part-deux.html
  - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation doubletap.html
  - https://www.fireeye.com/bloq/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html
- Symantec:
  - https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/new-ie-zero-day-used-targeted-attacks
  - https://www.symantec.com/connect/bloqs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong
  - http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security response/docs/Symantec-Buckeye-IOCs.txt
- EmergingThreats:
  - https://rules.emergingthreats.net/changelogs/suricata-1.3.etpro.2015-09-10T21:29:38.txt
  - (cached by other sites, search for hash 4d3874480110ba537b3839cb8b416b50 and EXEProxy)
- Palo Alto Networks:
  - https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/apt-group-ups-targets-us-government-with-hacking-team-flash-exploit/
  - https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-andthe-pirpi-payload/