

Ideology and Terrorism

Victor Ferrao

Patriarchal Seminary, Rachol, Goa

Abstract: While avoiding reductionism, we strive in this article to blend the spiritual as well as the material, the positive as well as the pejorative content of ideology and indicate its constitutive role in the identity-formation of a particular group or an individual. Basing ourselves on this concept of ideology we seek to explain how terrorism is married to a violent ideology. Therefore to dislodge it we need to evolve an ideology that will effectively lead us all to value human life and the virtue of justice.

Keywords: Ideology, terrorism, philosophy, formation

Today, violence has become a life-style. It has become increasingly difficult to distinguish a friend from a foe. As the torch of terror burns bright and the flag of those who claim themselves to be waging a war on terror, flies high, nothing seems to be in a position to free us from the folly of self-annihilation. We have come to know that it is not only guns and bombs that create terror, but also the 'powder', the planes, the *trishuls* and the pickaxes, which have already proved their mettle on this battleground. A deeper reflection on our world reveals that our present scenario is racked by many aggressive ideological conflicts.

Paradoxically, the very notion of ideology seems to have evaporated without any trace, from the writings of the scholar popularly known as Postmodernism and Poststructuralism (Eagleton 1996: xi). Moreover, the concept of ideology is not free from controversy and dispute in the religious arena, although the tribe of those who teach, that no religion is ideologically free is on the increase. 'Let him who has no ideology cast the first stone' was the pebble that one Latin American bishop tossed back at one of his colleagues who charged

that the liberation theologians were ideologically biased. Every religion, then, is embedded in some sort of ideology.

In this paper I wish to take up this controversial and conflict-laden topic. The term 'ideology' defies exhaustive description and unequivocal definition. We shall strive to enter into its evolutionary history first and then try to arrive at a bird's eye-view of the same and finally, we shall attempt to unravel the relationship between ideology and terrorism.

Towards an Understanding of Ideology

The term 'ideology' has a long and complex history. Hence, it is important to walk through the lanes and the by-lanes of its troubled history.

Articulation

The exact history of the genesis of the concept of ideology is shrouded in mystery. Attempts have been made to trace it back to Beacon's *idola*, Hume's *feigning* and Napoleon's contemptuous smacking of it as the unrealistic *doctrinairism* (Mukerji 1955: 13). Today, scholars appear to agree that the concept of ideology had reached its full expression a few centuries ago. Hence, it is by hindsight that some of them teach that religion was always mixed with ideology. It is said that the word entered our lexicon due to the labours of the French philosopher A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, who is said to have employed it for the first time, in 1796 merely as a name for his own 'science of ideas'. It is said that he hatched this 'science of ideas' in his prison cell. Hence, Terry Eagleton pithily remarks, "the notion of ideology was thus brought to birth in thoroughly ideological conditions: ideology belonged to the rational politics, in contrast to the irrationalist barbarism of terror" (Eagleton 1996: 66). De Tracy and his followers called themselves *ideologistes*. Their program aimed at the creation of a democratic, rational and scientific society. Incidentally, this key concept was born at the time of the French Revolution. It was the French Revolution that saw the power of the three ideas-equality, fraternity and liberty (Pieris 1990: 26). Ideology in this sense was a critique of the irrational dogmatism of the *ancien regime* and an attempt to build a society entirely trans-

parent to reason, free of prejudice, superstition and obscurantism of every kind.

Pejorativisation

The *ideologues* enjoyed a key policy-making position in the *Deuxieme Classe* (moral and political sciences) at the Institute National. As one would expect, they clashed with Napoleon Bonaparte. He, therefore, dismissed its members as impractical visionaries and persecuted them with ridicule, allegedly under the name of *ideologues* (Eagleton 1996: 67-68). Karl Marx preserved this Napoleonic bias, although he did not deem them as impractical. He, along with his companion, Friedrich Engels, considered the views of 'Young Hegelians' like Ludwig Feuerbach and Max Stirner ideology. They opined that these thinkers were endlessly preoccupied with ideas and the critique of ideas and failed to see that the ideas and other 'products of consciousness' are based on the material conditions of life (Thompson 1984:1). Marx's theory of ideology is mainly embodied in his celebrated work *The German Ideology* 1846. Perhaps his concept of alienation might throw light on this point. He argues that under certain social conditions, human powers, products and processes escape from the control of human subjects and come to assume an apparently autonomous existence, estranged in this way from their agents. Such phenomena then, come to exert an imperious power over them, as a result of which humans submit to what are in fact, the products of their own activity, as an alien force. Thus, ideas are grasped as autonomous entities and readily accepted as belonging to the natural order of things (Eagleton 1996: 70-71). This view has been assimilated and appropriated by sociologists, anthropologists, political analysts, and today we notice that it has been integrated into the corpus of concepts employed by the social sciences (Thompson 1984:1). In this context we, should note that Marx and Engels were not the first thinkers to see consciousness as socially determined; in different ways Rousseau, Montesquieu and Condorcet had arrived at this view before him (Eagleton 1996: 71-72). Marx and Engels viewed certain forms of consciousness as false and falsehood as somehow structural and necessary to a specific social order. That is, they taught that sometimes consciousness operates as a system of illusion that justifies the politics of status quo. Thus, within the Marxist tradition,

ideology is a term that attempts to picture or map out how cultures are structured in ways that enable the group holding power to have maximum power with minimum conflict. This is not a matter of a conspiracy or a hidden plotting on the part of the ruling elite, but is a matter of how the dominant group works through institutions, values, and conceptions of the world, symbol / ritual networks, in order to legitimise the current state of affairs (Mukerji 1955: 13-14). Hence, one can see why Marx referred to it as false consciousness that provides a canopy to oppression and exploitation

Refinement

Several scholars took seriously these Marxist insights. Considering their insights and a host of others, we have come to understand that all thought is partial, partisan and provisional, and in fact all thought is ideological. Hence, in the next section let us trace how this concept undergoes extension and enrichment under the aegis of some of our eminent thinkers. Slowly we discover that ideology is not merely a matter of consciousness. It is not just a false reflection, a screen between reality and us. Such thinking is regarded as belonging to the outmoded 'philosophy of the subject'. Hence we look at ideology in terms of lived relations, rather than mere theoretical cognitions.

George Lukacs

In his great work *History of Class Consciousness*, George Lukacs, the Hungarian Marxist thinker, attacks the correspondence theory of truth. "It is true", he writes "that reality is the criterion for the correctness of the thought but reality is not, it becomes and to become the participation of thought is needed" (Eagleton 1996: 94). Hence thought is both cognitive and creative. This means that we never simply know 'something', since in the very act of knowing we already transform it into something else. Therefore, to know myself is no longer to be the self that I was, the moment I knew it. Hence, it seems that our consciousness is essentially active and dynamic, in which case the notion of ideology as false consciousness, or as some lag or gap between the way things are and the way we know them, stands in need of refinement. He unembarrassedly views Marxism as the ideological expression of the proletariat. So also

science, truth or theory are no longer to be strictly counterposed with ideology. On the contrary, they are just expressions of a particular class ideology. Truth is just bourgeois society coming to consciousness of itself as a whole, and the place where this momentous events takes 'place' is the self-awareness of the proletariat. Thus truth for Lukacs is always related to a particular historical situation and never a affair beyond history altogether. But the proletariat being forced to sell their work in order to survive is uniquely in position to unlock the social order, based on commodity fetishism (capitalism). Hence, ideology for Lukacs is not merely a discourse untrue to the way things are, but one true to them only in a limited and superficial way, ignorant of their deeper tendencies and connections (Eagleton 1996: 93-106).

Karl Mannheim

Karl Mannheim in his book *Ideology and Utopia* teaches that, with the rise of the middle-class society, the old monological world view of the traditional society has fallen away. An authoritarian priestly and political caste that once dominated the field, which determined what is deemed as knowledge, has now yielded ground to a 'free' intelligentsia, caught on the hop with conflicting theoretical perspectives. Such a scenario could definitely be hit by relativism. Contrary to this relativism, Mannheim speaks of what he calls 'relationism', meaning the location of ideas within the social system that generates them. In this context, he makes an interesting observation. He says that ideas are internally shaped by their social origins but their truth-value is not reducible to them. The inevitable one-sidedness of a particular view can be corrected by synthesising with the rival view, thus building up a provisional and dynamic totality of thought. Truth for him remains adequate only to a particular stage of historical development. Hence, preserving the pejorative sense, he refers to ideology as the antiquated beliefs in a set of obsolete myths, norms and ideals, unhinged from the real (Eagleton 1996: 107-110).

Antonio Gramsci

Another thinker on whom the Lukacsian mantle descends, is the Italian Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci. The key category in his thought is *hegemony*. He uses the word to mean the ways in which

a governing power from wins those it subjugates consent to its rule. To win hegemony is to establish moral, political and intellectual leadership in social life by diffusing ones 'world view' through out the social fabric of society as a whole, thus equating one's own interest with the interest of the society at large. Basing themselves on this insight, scholars opine that the concept of hegemony is broader than ideology: it includes ideology but is not reducible to it. A ruling group may secure and remain in power by ideological means. But the concept of hegemony enriches the concept of ideology. It lends this otherwise somewhat abstract term a material body and political cutting edge. Hence, Eagleton says " it is with Gramsci that a crucial transition is effected from ideology as a 'system of ideas' to ideology as lived, habitual, social practice-which must then presumably, encompass the unconscious, inarticulate dimensions of social experience as well as the working of the formal institutions". Moreover, hegemony being never a once-and-for-all achievement, but a process that is continuously renewed, recreated, defended and modified, offers its dynamism to the concept of ideology, which perhaps lacks the overtones of struggle and often refers to some kind of ossified and ossifying false consciousness (Eagleton 1996: 112-123).

Theodor Adorno

Theodor Adorno of the Frankfurt School teaches that ideology is a form of 'identity-thinking'. He teaches that we are controlled by identity principle, which strives to suppress all contradictions. Our thought is revolted by the sight of 'otherness', that which threatens to escape our closed system and hence, we strive violently to reduce it to our own image and likeness. He views identity as the primal form of all ideology. The opposite of ideology is not truth but heterogeneity or difference. Thus one can trace the echo of the post-structuralist of our days in him. In the face of homogenisation in ideology, he affirms an essential non-identity of thought and reality, the concept and its object, and posits a negative dialectic, which strives perhaps to include within thought, that which is heterogeneous to it (Eagleton 1996: 125-128).

Jurgen Habermas

Habermas, the second generation Frankfurt school thinker, calls ideology a form of communication systematically distorted by power. That is, ideology is a discourse that has become a medium of domination that serves to legitimate relations of organized force. Unlike hermeneutical philosopher like Hans-Georg Gadamer who views misunderstandings and lapses of communication as textual lapses to be rectified by sensitive interpretation, Habermas draws our attention to the possibility of deformity of the entire discursive system. Hence, he says, ideology marks the point when the language is bent out of communicative shape by power interests that impinge on it. Thus, a distorted communication tend to present the appearance of justness and normativity, for it successfully conceals or deform the very norm by which they might judged to be deformed (Eagleton 1996: 128-136).

Louis Althusser

The French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, propounds his theory mainly in his celebrated essay 'Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses' as well as, in scattered fragments of his volume *For Marx*. He says that all thought is conducted within the terms of an unconscious 'problematic' which silently underpins it. A problematic is a paradigm that organises particular categories at any given historical moment, which constitute the limits of what we are able to utter or conceive. A problematic is not an ideology, but is ideological. Althusser does not speak of the discourse of true science, which, for him is free from all ideological taint. But he does speak of the possibility of talking about the problematic of specific ideology or a set of ideologies. This means, that we need to refer to the underlying structure of categories so organised as to exclude the possibility of a certain conception. Its fundamental structure is thus closed, circular and self-confirming: where one moves from within it, one will always be ultimately returned to what is securely known, of which what is known is merely a extension or repetition. A scientific problematic by contrast is open-ended: it can be revolutionised as a new scientific object emerges and a new horizon of questions opens up. Science is an authentically exploratory pursuit, whereas ideology

gives the appearance of moving forward while marching stubbornly on the spot.¹ Thus ideology cannot qualify as knowledge. It denotes a realm of lived relations rather than theoretical cognition. It is not a matter of not knowing or failing to know reality at all. It involves a kind of self- misrecognition. Hence, he defines ideology as a ‘representation of the imaginary relationships of the individual to their real conditions of existence’. ‘Imaginary’ here does not mean ‘un-real’ but pertaining to the image.² ‘In ideology’ writes Althusser, ‘men do indeed express, not the relation between them and their conditions of existence, but *the way* they live the relation between them and their conditions of existence: this presupposes both a real relations and an ‘imaginary’, ‘lived’ relation... in ideology the real relation is inevitably invested in the imaginary relation’ (Eagleton 1996:142). Thus ideology causes us to think that the world is naturally oriented towards us, spontaneously given to the subject and the subject conversely feels itself as the natural part of the world. Hence, in a way, ideology brings us into being as individuals mainly through what he calls the ideological state apparatus-school, family, church, media and the rest. These ideological structures support the dominant powers and ensure the submission of the oppressed (Eagleton 1996: 136-154).

Pierre Bourdieu

The term ideology is not particularly central to French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s work but one can trace a relevant concept of *habitus* by which he attempts to map the inculcation in humans of a set of durable dispositions which generates particular practices. Individuals in society act in accordance with what he calls the ‘cultural unconsciousness’ that lends consistency and unity to their actions without any reference to some conscious intention. In the very spontaneity of our habitual behaviour we reproduce certain tacit norms and values. Thus, habitus he says, is ‘history turned into nature’, it is a mechanism through which we feel spontaneously disposed to do what social conditions demand of us. A social order strives to naturalise its own arbitrariness and becomes apparently unquestionable through the operation of what he calls habitus. Social life contains a number of different habitus, each system is appropriate to what he calls *field*. A field, he holds, is a competitive

system of social relations which functions according to its own internal logic, composed of institutions or individuals that are competing for the same stake. What is generally at stake in such fields is maximum dominance within them. The achieving of such dominance depends on a set of unspoken rules that structure what can be validly uttered or perceived within it. It is the 'cultural capital' appropriate to the field at a particular time that determines this power play. Hence, we can say that Bourdieu presents ideology as a way of life, not just false consciousness (Eagleton 1996: 156-158).

Towards a New Synthesis

We can see that the concept evolved and got complexified over a period of time due to the efforts of many brilliant thinkers. Our study also reveals to us that the term evades all kinds of reductionist definitions for it appears to be a shorthand term for an immense range of things scattered in time and space. Hence scholars like Terry Eagleton says, "the word 'ideology', one might say, is a *text*, woven of a whole tissue of different conceptual strands; it is traced through by divergent histories, and it is probably more important to assess what is valuable or can be discarded in each of these lineages than to merge them forcibly into some Grand Global Theory" (Eagleton 1996: 1). Hence it is probably more useful to think in terms of Ludwig Wittgenstein's doctrine of 'family resemblances'-of a network of overlapping features rather than a constant essence. Let us pass on to some of this interwoven aspect of this multifaceted concept.

A Worldview

Ideology indicates a specific worldview. This spells its traditional essential relationship with ideas. Hence it is often linked with the idea of false consciousness. The view that is regnant today readily ideology as thoroughly evaluative. That is why ideology is thought to be something shady, deformed, distorted or contaminated and as such, has to be dispelled from our mind. Yet, we cannot deny its role in providing meaning for our life. But it is not merely a coherent view meant to explain the world (may be deemed as generating false perspective from our standpoint). That is, it is not just explanatory but in true spirit of Marx it aims at the transformation of the world.

Hence, besides being a 'vision' that conveys meaning to our existence, it seeks to missionize us to shape both our present and the future. Thus, it is concerned about a supposed radical amelioration of the socio-political order with concomitant changes in the psycho-spiritual sphere. Perhaps, the distinction made by Raymond Guess between the descriptive, pejorative and positive definitions of the term indicates what we have stated above. In the descriptive sense, ideology is a belief system characteristic of certain social groups or classes composed of both discursive as well as non-discursive elements. In its pejorative meaning ideology is viewed as a set of values, meanings, and beliefs that are contaminated to its very roots, because they create massive social illusion that legitimate an unjust form of power. Finally, in a more positive sense, ideology is seen as a set of beliefs that cohere and inspire a particular group in the pursuit of political interests deemed as desirable to it. Hence, we can view ideology in summary as unifying³, rationalising⁴, legitimising⁵, universalising⁶, naturalising⁷, action orienting⁸ worldview. (Eagleton 1996: 46).

Materialization

The traditional talk of ideology is couched in terms of consciousness and ideas. These terms have their appropriate use but they unwittingly nudge us in the direction of idealism. In this context the Soviet philosopher V N Voloshinov in his *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* offers an important insight when he says, "without sign there is no ideology". In his view, the domain of sign and the domain of ideology are co-extensive. Consciousness can arise only in the material embodiment of the signifier, and since the signifiers are themselves material, they are not just reflections of reality but an integral part of it. Thus consciousness is less something within us than something around us and between us, a network of signifier that constitutes us through and through (Eagleton 1996: 193-194). Hence, Ideology does not merely have ideal or spiritual existence but it is very much material. This means that the ideal realm is not separated from the material realm. Hence, ideology does not consist of ideas as opposed to matter but they have material existence in the sense that they are fully expressed in the objective social forms. Hence like Athusser and others we do not accept the

ideal as the something pure isolated from the social practices, relations and structures. This insertion or inscription of ideology in our life process is carried out through the operation of the ideological state apparatus (Madhu 1995: 339-343).

Identity Formation

Ideology affects our volitional behaviour. It creates us as persons: it calls us and calls us into being. Ideology forms us in as much as we form it. This is achieved through a process of rationalisation and naturalisation. Ideological structure appears natural, 'according to the order of things', innocent and even 'good'. It appears to be a logical conclusion of a historical era. It has an air of progress. Hence, it is internalised and assimilated by individuals as a result their volitional behaviour, is shaped and influenced by it, as we have already seen in the work of Bourdieu. Thus, ideology secures its own reproduction by a manipulative incorporation of the logic by which human subjects are reduced to mere obedient effects.

Terrorism as an Ideology

As the war against terrorism is rising, we are confronted with the politics of Adam's right of naming and blaming a people. While the US puts up a strong face of infinite justice and sustaining freedom, others, particularly the Islamic people, are defined as inherently brutal and uncivilised. Hence, the question of the definition of terrorism itself becomes important. Unfortunately it is next to impossible to find an universally satisfactory definition of terrorism, and the reasons for this are political rather than semantic (Wanek 1978: 1) That is why 'who' defines whom as a terrorist is deeply significant. One man's terrorist is often another man's freedom fighter (Long 1990:10). Isn't the very act of calling someone a terrorist, at times, an act of terror? Hence, the complexity of the issue reveals that it has all the ingredients of an ideology.

Terror as a Philosophy

The terrorists claim that they are struggling for a cause, which they deem to be liberative. Terrorism is motivated by a deeply held sense of grievance over some form of injustice. To achieve these

political goals, the terrorists indulge in a systematic transformation of the political ends into moral imperatives that are used to justify whatever means are deemed necessary to attain those goals. Some see terrorism as the weapon of the weak because the strong also control the doctrinal system and their terror does not count as terror (Chomsky 2001: 9). Therefore, although many eyebrows might be raised as regards the justification of the violent means employed, they operate as though they are often performing a saintly act. Think of the pilots who crashed the planes onto the twin towers or consider the conviction of the Kashmiri militant that liberation of Kashmir is a sacred act or even the perpetrators of the war on terrorism who are apparently on an avenging path which seems to say 'give war a chance' (Arokiasamy vidya jyoti 2002:3). Hence, one can clearly notice the ideal or the spiritual element, which is constitutive ideology. This becomes evident if we understand that the impact of terrorism on the general public is more psychological rather than physical (Long 1990: 1). The terrorist's worldview is heavily dependent on the insider-outsider dialectics as every other fundamentalist group. It identifies and recognises the outsider as an enemy. Thus the Islamic militants share a common conviction that western countries, particularly the U.S., Russia, India and Israel as Satan's agents and by that, token enemies of Islam (Ansari:Frontline Aug 2001 : 66). U.S and its allies view the Islamic terrorists as the depraved opponents of western civilisation and consider its massacre in Afghanistan as an act of just war (Chomsky 2001: 8). It is this insider / outsider dialectics that provides the fire-power that motivates and sustains terrorist activities

The Organising of Terror

Like biological organisms the terrorist groups are born, mature and die. Hence in the Marxist sense the production and continuation of terrorist activity needs the production of the conditions that produce and sustain them. Hence, the terrorist ideology needs to be materially inscribed and inserted in structural forms that will constitute the ideological apparatus that would lead to the reproduction of the life and activity of the respective terrorist groups. This ideological apparatus includes both the tacit as well as the active support of

agents. Mainly, it includes recruiting strategies, doctrinization, training in terror tactics, financial support base etc.

The Making of a Terrorist

Terrorist perspective although largely collective –held by the entire group - is deeply personal - held by the individual member. Each individual terrorist is shaped and made by the worldview of the group he / she belongs to. Hence, the development of the terrorist behaviour, links the psychology of the individual terrorist to the environment in which the individual lives. Erik Erikson's concept of identity might provide us a framework to understand how the terrorist ideology plays its role in forming the identity and personality of the terrorist. Erikson teaches that the development of personal identity is basic to the integrity and continuity of the personality. Identity is not something that is developed in a vacuum but in the collective experience of one's ethnic, familial, communal, and national past (Long 1990: 17-18). No terrorist is a lunatic or an evil monster but he / she is a human being quite often the innocent victim of our society. Hence, we cannot refer to the terrorist behaviour as antisocial, psychopathic and totally ignore the political, social, economic and even religious factors that make up the ideology which in its turn becomes the breeding ground of individual terrorists. It is said that the Islamic terrorists are even given names of the 'Islamic warriors' of the past. " These names are given to them not only to conceal their identity but also to create a jihadi spirit in them" declares a militant (Ansari: Frontline Aug 2001 : 70).

Conclusion

Our study reveals that we do not have an all-encompassing monological definition of ideology. To compress this multivalent term would be unhelpful even if it were possible. Therefore, while avoiding reductionism, we have striven to arrive at a more or less general understanding of the term, that blends the spiritual as well as the material, the positive as well as its pejorative content and indicates its constitutive role in the identity-formation of a particular group or an individual.

Basing ourselves on this understanding, we are enabled to see how terrorism is married to a violent ideology. Therefore to dislodge it we need to evolve an ideology that will effectively lead us all to value human life and the virtue of justice.

Notes

- 1 Such an opposition between science and ideology finds few defenders today and is clearly open to a range of cogent criticisms. For instance, science as such can be viewed as the triumph of the technological way of seeing the world which acts as an important part of the ideological legitimisation of the bourgeoisie, which among other things successfully translate moral political questions into technical ones answerable by the calculations of experts. Thus it appears that Althusser is mistaken to view all ideology as pre-scientific, a body of superstitions and prejudices with which science effects a preternaturally clean break.
- 2 Jaques Lacan in his essay, 'The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I' teaches that an infant in front of a mirror identifies with its on image, feeling itself at once within and in front of the mirror. Similarly Althusser point out that in the ideological sphere a human subject transcends its true state of difuseness or de-centredness and finds a coherent image of itself reflected back in the 'mirror' of a dominant ideological discourse.
- 3 Ideology is unifying in the sense that it is homogenising not necessarily homogeneous. There can be many ideologies and sub-ideologies hanging together. It is said that the ideology dominates to the extent it is able to enter the consciousness of its subjects by recognising the 'other' to itself and by inscribing this 'otherness' as a potentially disruptive force. Thus for instance we might say that militant Islamic *jihad* thrives on by picturing the non-islamic world as the enemies of God or that the Hindutva forces live on rendering the non-Hindus aliens in their own land.
- 4 Ideology does not merely express social interests but rationalises them. In this context we understand the term rationalisation, taking clue from psychoanalysis. J. Laplanche and J.B Pontalis define rationalisation in terms of psychoanalysis as a procedure whereby a subject attempts to an explanation that is either logically consistent or ethically acceptable for attitudes, ideas, feelings etc., but whose true motives remain hidden. Therefore when we refer to ideology as rationalising we are already discrediting it. Those who hold such an ideology try and defend the indefensible, cloaking some disreputable motives in high sounding ethical terms. Thus for instance America believes that the throwing of

its military weight around in the name of war on terror is in the interest of global freedom.

- 5 Legitimisation refers to the process by which the ruling power comes to secure from its subjects a tacit consent to its authority.
- 6 Universalisation or eternalization is a process by which the values and interests that are specific to a certain place, time or group are projected as values and interests of all humanity.
- 7 Naturalisation is a process by which ideologies are thought to belong to the natural order and as such self-evident. Therefore they are identified with the common sense of a society so that nobody could imagine how they might be different. Thus, for instance, one could say that the Ram temple issue exhibits tendencies that attempt to reduce the controversial into the obvious
- 8 However metaphysical the ideas may appear to be they are always capable of furnishing their adherents with motivation, prescription, imperatives and so on.

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Article received: Dec 17, 2002

Article approved: Feb 6, 2003

No of words: 5,520