JPJRS 14/2 ISSN 0972-3331, July 2011 161-176

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.4284242
Stable URL: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4284242

Folly by Another Name: Foucault and Lyotard on Knowledge

Nishant A. Irudayadason

Jnana-Deepa Vidyapeeth, Pune 411014, India

Abstract: This paper attempts to study the nature and significance of knowledge. He treats the subject from the perspectives of postmodern authors Foucault and Lyotard. The paper discusses first the ideas of Foucault followed by Lyotard's understanding of knowledge. Then it tries to show how their perspectives on knowledge affect the information-knowledge distinction and their relevance for contemporary society. Foucault's and Lyotard's extensive treatment of knowledge rests on a very important principle, that is, knowledge is necessarily a matter of social relation. They differ in their view of what type of social relations underlies knowledge. While for Foucault, it is power and techniques associated with power, for Lyotard, it is related to the shifting language games. However it is quite clear from their analysis that the distinction between information and knowledge gets blurred in postmodern perspectives. Knowledge is not pre-given or internalization through appropriation but is already and always interwoven with information we receive depending on our social position and on the language game we are playing.

Keywords: Knowledge, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Social nature of knowledge, postmodernism.

Introduction

We live in the age of information and we often speak of the right to information. With the computerization of the contemporary society and with the easy availability of information, there emerges a need

to redefine our understanding of knowledge. In a certain sense the way we understand knowledge also shapes our understanding of information. From a common sense point of view, it seems that while information in as much as it is data remains exterior to the knowing self, knowledge because it is appropriation of information becomes part of the knowing subject. Knowledge is a result of the conjunction of the knower and the known. Knowledge and knower, through they are different, are nevertheless inseparable. However, knowledge because it needs to meet the criteria of certainty and truth must necessarily be free from the subjective influence of the knower. Irrespective of who the knowing subject is, knowledge must be the same. Knowledge cannot be false because falsity belongs to error while knowledge by definition is true. Thus knowledge is presented as an objective commodity available to all intelligent beings.

This paper attempts to study knowledge from the perspectives of Foucault and Lyotard. We shall first discuss the ideas of Foucault followed by Lyotard's understanding of knowledge, trying to show their perspectives on knowledge affect the information-knowledge distinction.

I. Michel Foucault

Foucault employs the term "archaeology" to his study of knowledge. Archaeology does not deal with origin but probe into archive. Archive is a set of discourse that determines what can be accepted in a particular period. It refers to certain rules and practices, in a specific historical period, which are necessary in dealing with what can be accepted as scientific knowledge. However, in order to understand Foucault's ideas on knowledge, we need to turn to his understanding of folly or madness.

1. The History of Madness

His well-known book *The History of Madness* is an account of why and how madness came to be identified with mental illness in contemporary society. To achieve this purpose, he analyses history and identifies exclusion and confinement of the mad people – the significant features of the classical age, distinct from the ancient

and middle ages – as responsible for the present intolerable situation. He draws a parallel between leprosy in the Middle Ages and madness in the classical age. Just as leprosy induced fear among people and those affected by leprosy were expelled from the city in the middle ages, in the classical age, madness grew as an object of fear, and the mad people were excluded from others and were confined to a mad house.

Thus, the modern age is characterized by the monologue of reason on madness. Psychiatry is a clear example of monologue construed by reason to dominate insanity. In fact, psychiatry can thrive only on the dominance of reason over unreason. The moralizing psychiatrists exercise control over the mad people who resist domination. Thus Foucault's The History of Madness is characterized by the struggle between dominating psychiatrists and resisting mad people. According to Fink-Eitel, the instrument of suppression is no longer a specific social structure, but rather an entire culture (from the time of 'classical period') in which the dominant rationality, philosophy and science combine together to form, through social and political practices, a single repressive complex. Knowledge in the modern age has come to be a monologue of reason exercising power and domination. Thus knowledge is inevitably related to power relations.

2. Power-knowledge Relationship

Power is one of the central concepts in Foucault's Philosophy though he does not give a clear definition of power in his writings. However, he describes power in many ways. Power, for him, is not an outcome of political structures or social institutions. It is not primarily an imposition of authority of the dominant on the subjects; it is not merely a force exerted on the periphery by the centre. This does not mean that Foucault denies the relation between political structures and power. But power does not originate from the political structures. In fact, power underlies all human relationships in which one directs the behavior of another. He argues that power is omnipresent . . . because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere . . . because it comes from everywhere" (Foucault 1990, 93). However, Foucault is careful not to reify power:

"power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised at innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations" (Foucault 1990, 94).

In *Discipline and Punish*, he examines the disciplinary power. "Discipline 'makes' individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise. It is not a triumphant power, which because of its own excess can pride itself on its own omnipotence; it is a modest, suspicious power, which functions as a calculated, but permanent economy" (Foucault 1991, 170). Disciplinary power involves new techniques of surveillance. Gradually these techniques are so internalized that each person becomes his/her observer. Foucault claims that the disciplinary power is exerted continuously and is subtler and more immense than power that underlies all forms of human relationship. It is "absolutely 'discreet,' for it functions permanently and largely in silence" (Foucault 1991, 177). It is more in this sense of disciplinary power that Foucault speaks of knowledge as related to power. He contends that knowledge is used to define others and thus it becomes another mode of surveillance. The Latin root of the word (*disciplina*) has a dual meaning: it refers both to an area of knowledge and to issues of control or power. Important to discipline are the techniques of individualising, ranking, ordering and tabulating, spatially, administratively and in a multitude of other ways: "The organisation of serial space was one of the great technical mutations in elementary education... by assigning individual places it made possible the supervision of each individual and the simultaneous work of all. It organised a new economy of the time of apprenticeship. It made the educational space function like a learning machine, but also as a machine for supervising, hierarchizing, rewarding" (Foucault 1991, 147). Knowledge, as a tool of control, opens up further possibilities for intrusive inquiry. Power and knowledge are so intertwined that one intensifies the other.

Foucault contested the conventional view that acquisition of knowledge makes us more powerful, and stated that the relationship between power and knowledge is more complex than this. He proposed that a more accurate representation of the relationship was

the term *pouvoir-savoir*, which he believed more appropriately reflected the single, inseparable configuration of ideas and practices that constitute educational discourse. The discourses of schools and other institutions serve to define and perpetuate "normal" and "acceptable" behaviour through a process of discipline that is imposed simultaneously from a variety of sources, including the individual's self-discipline. In educational institutions, not only are the participants subject to the usual constraints of any social discourse, they are additionally involved in the propagation and selective dissemination of discourses for a variety of social contexts outside of education: "Every educational system is a political means of maintaining or modifying the appropriateness of discourses with the knowledge and power they bring with them" (Foucault 1991, 46).

3. Normalisation

The education system monitors our progress, passes judgements on us and moulds our attitudes and behaviours in certain ways to ensure that this exercise of arbitrary power is largely undetectable, yet tacitly accepted. "The Normal is established as a principle of coercion in teaching with the introduction of a standardized education" (Foucault 1991, 184). The punishment of misdemeanours and gratification of desirable behaviours ensures that the arbitrary definitions of behaviour as 'good' or 'evil,' 'normal' or 'abnormal' becomes, in the first instance, possible, then enforceable, and lastly, presumed to be 'natural' and incontestable; The classification and ranking of individuals – their reward and punishment are taken as the normal or natural order of things.

> The art of punishing, in the regime of disciplinary power, is aimed neither at expiation, nor even precisely at repression. It brings five quite distinct operations into play: it refers individual actions to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation and the principle of a rule to be followed. It differentiates individuals one from another, in terms of the following overall rule: that the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected or as an optimum

towards which one must move. It measures in quantitative terms and hierarchises in terms of value the abilities, the level, the 'nature' of individuals. It introduces, through this 'value-giving' measure, the constraint of a conformity that must be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that will define difference in relation to all other differences, the external frontier of the abnormal. The perpetual penalty that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchises, homogenises, excludes. In short, it normalises (Foucault 1991, 182-3)

4. Examination

Disciplinary techniques reach their educational pinnacle in the examination. It is through the examination, the test, that the 'economy of visibility' is transformed into the exercise of power and of control. "The examination combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalising judgement. It is a normalising gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them. That is why, in all the mechanisms of discipline, the examination is highly ritualised." (Foucault, 1991, 184)

The exercising of power has to do with knowledge, its ownership and transmission: "the examination in the school was a constant exchanger of knowledge; it guaranteed the movement of knowledge from the teacher to the pupil, but it extracted from the pupil a knowledge destined and reserved for the teacher." (Foucault, 1991, 187) The examination holds teacher and pupil in 'a mechanism of objectification'. Examinations lock into place the disciplines of the school, creating of them a ritual, a spectacle, a ceremony. Marks and scores 'formalize' or fix the child within power relationships.

II Jean-Francois Lyotard

Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition* addresses issues raised by the rise of modern science, particularly the legitimation of scientific

knowledge. It is a reflection on the conditions of legitimation as such. Lyotard looks at the changing relationship between science and philosophy in the course of the unfolding of modernity.

1. Language Games and Social Bonds

Lyotard attempts to analyze different responses given to the question of legitimation of the scientific knowledge from the perspective of the philosophy of language. This method, however it may seem to adopt the approach of the analytical philosophy that brings together language and logic, falls in line with reflections on the language of the continental hermeneutical tradition according to which language as the very possibility of existence and of openness to Being. In so far as the legitimation of the scientific knowledge depends on discourses formed by different types of enunciations ordered coherently, scientific knowledge adopts the method of language games to address the specific problem of research. This method classifies enunciations as denotative, performative, prescriptive, interrogative, narrative, literary, etc. The transition from one type of statement to another, says Lyotard, is a playground marked by linguistic rules legitimized by a tacit agreement among the participants of this game. In this sense, for Lyotard "to speak is to fight, in the sense of playing, and speech acts fall within the domain of a general agonistics" (Lyotard 1984, 10). The speech acts are indeed engaged in a struggle that requires a confrontation between players, although it does not result in a direct opposition among protagonists.

However, according to Lyotard, these very speech acts form the social bond. The language game is constitutive of social relations that define society by bringing together individuals. The representations of modern society can be grouped into two sets, either society as a unified organic whole or as divided into class groups. Lyotard seeks to avoid this dichotomy by proposing a third alternative. Termed as the postmodern perspective on the nature of social bonds, it gives specific emphasis on language games in order to define the bond between individuals. According to the modern approaches to the nature of social bonds, the organization of society is based on the integration of individuals, either through unity and totality or

through division and dissent. In both cases social bonds cannot account for the society as it has developed in the second half of the twentieth century.

Towards the turn of the twentieth century, society has undergone dramatic changes thanks to the technological development leading to the volatility of social attachments and to the instability of identity in individuals. Hence there is a need to adopt other approaches to envisage the nature of social bonds. The volatility of social bonds characteristic of our times is symptomatic of society's mutation since society no longer remains as a unified whole or as divided groups. Changes introduced in social practices represent a transformation of social relations, a shift from modernity to postmodernity. Individuals, therefore, are no longer part of a fixed and permanent social group or class. The postmodern approach to the nature of social bonds, as defined by Lyotard in *The Postmodern Condition*, lays emphasis on the mobility of individuals within the linguistic space in relation to knowledge. From this perspective, "a *self* does not amount to much, but no self is an island; each exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever before (Lyotard 1984, 15). Society consists of individuals participating in various language games. Social institutions also participate in language games by regulating the constraints of these games and the social relations established under their influence. Thus the principle of legitimacy is essential for understanding social change. Among the social institutions influenced by the principle of legitimation, Lyotard is interested in the institutions of contemporary knowledge, specifically scientific knowledge.

2. Narrative and Scientific Knowledge

In order to understand the Lyotard's arguments on the legitimacy of scientific knowledge, it is important to understand the distinction he makes between narrative and scientific knowledge. Science, in its modern development, was constantly confronted with the question of its own legitimacy, an issue having both socio-political and epistemological implications. In this sense, scientific knowledge makes use of other types of knowledge to ensure its legitimacy. In Lyotard's own words,

> Knowledge [*savoir*] in general cannot be reduced to science, nor even to learning [*connaissance*]. Learning is the set of statements which, to the exclusion of all other statements, denote or describe objects and may be declared true or false. Science is a subset of learning. It is also composed of denotative statements, but imposes two supplementary conditions on their acceptability: the objects to which they refer must be available for repeated access, in other words, they must be accessible in explicit conditions of observation; and it must be possible to decide whether or not a given statement pertains to the language judged relevant by the experts (Lyotard 1984, 18).

Neither science nor learning thus defined can claim to account fully for knowledge. The criterion of truth adjusts both, since they are organized according to the difference between true and false statements under different conditions. According to Lyotard, both learning and scientific knowledge based on the criterion of truth are only part of knowledge in general, which includes also other types of knowledge based on other criteria such as efficiency, justice, beauty, happiness, etc. It is therefore necessary to distinguish scientific knowledge from narrative knowledge, the latter involving criteria other than truth.

Narrative knowledge is opposed to scientific knowledge in many ways. It is generally associated with traditional forms of knowledge, and thus it brings together denotative, prescriptive and evaluative knowledge. The best form of narrative knowledge is story telling or narratives. Lyotard identifies four main features of such stories, which characterize narrative knowledge. First, stories give legitimacy to social institutions and enable people to be integrated into these institutions. In deciding upon the socially accepted criteria both for institutions and for the participation of individuals in these institutions, stories contribute to the formation of social relationships by defining what is considered a success or failure based on the rules of language games. The second feature of stories, as opposed to scientific knowledge, is that they allow plurality of language games. Thirdly, the special relationship between narrator, narratee

and narrative involved in stories, therefore narrative knowledge is remarkably different from that of the scientific knowledge. "The knowledge transmitted by these narrations is in no way limited to the functions of enunciations; it determines in a single stroke what one must say in order to be heard, what one must listen to in order to speak, and what role one must play (on the scene of diegetic reality) to be the object of a narrative" (Lyotard 1984, 21) Thus, the roles of the participants in the language games of stories are not clearly distinguished from one another as is the case in scientific knowledge, they are rather embedded in the specific dynamics of narrative knowledge. In this sense stories and narrative knowledge lay foundation to social relations by defining the very rules of language games. Finally, stories bridge the present time of the individuals in a given society and the age-old culture that gave birth to them. The pragmatics of narrative knowledge therefore determines the conditions for legitimizing discourses in a particular culture to which this knowledge belongs.

In the case of scientific knowledge the relation between the sender, addressee and referent is very specific. First, the sender must speak the truth about the referent; this means that he must be able to prove his claim and refute contradictory claims. The addressee must accept or refuse what he hears; this means that the addressee must be able to judge the evidence presented by the sender, formulate his own position and turn out to be a potential sender. Finally, the referent about which the enunciation is made is deemed to provide necessary proofs to validate or refute enunciations made by different senders. Moreover, the referent should not be capable of providing contradictory proofs. Thus the referent, even though not considered to be in full conformity with supportive enunciations about it, is still supposed to provide the necessary elements to develop a coherent set of enunciations on the subject matter.

This specific relation between sender, addressee and referent, which is characteristic of scientific knowledge determine two main components of this knowledge: they are research and teaching. Concerning research, the referent deemed to be consistent and is supposed to provide proofs for this consistency, allows the possibility of a consensus among various individuals who are both senders and

addressees with regard to the referent. In teaching, the participants are trained on the language game involved through didactics, that is through the transmission of enunciations on which consensus has been reached in research. A sender can now teach these enunciations to an addressee and this is a one-way relationship.

While there are major differences between the pragmatics of narrative knowledge and those of scientific knowledge, these two types of knowledge are not isolated, but are in fact related. With the development of modern science, the space occupied by scientific knowledge has reached extraordinary dimensions, entering into conflict with other kinds of knowledge grouped here under the term narrative knowledge. However, the relation between these two forms of knowledge is not confined to conflicts. The problem of legitimation of scientific knowledge paves the way for us to identify a close relation between these two kinds of discourse. Scientific discourse consistently makes use of narratives to justify its methods and to legitimize its knowledge. Lyotard gives Plato's allegory of cave as an example. Scientific knowledge, in its quest for legitimacy, bases itself on the narrative form, hence on narrative knowledge. In classical science, the use of narrative in the legitimation of scientific knowledge is characterized by a reference to God or other transcendent principles. Modern science rejects all such transcendent principles. The language game of the modern science does not appeal to a transcendent authority to establish rules. Its rules rely instead on the complementary relation between the sender and the addressee, both supposedly qualified to be enunciators about a certain referent. The rules of the language game of modern science are considered to be immanent in that game. However modern scientific knowledge, according to Lyotard, appeals to narrative knowledge, to legitimize its discourse. He claims that the advent of scientific modernity has accentuated the recourse of scientific knowledge compared with the classical science that operated under the aegis of a transcendent principle. In the absence of a transcendent principle, authority of legitimation is shifted to human narratives as history. "Narration is no longer an involuntary lapse in the legitimation process. The explicit appeal to narrative in the problematic of knowledge is concomitant with the liberation of the bourgeois classes from the traditional authorities. Narrative knowledge makes a resurgence in

the West as a way of solving the problem of legitimating the new authorities" (Lyotard 1984, 30). In its modern form, scientific knowledge is equally dependent on narrative knowledge, when it comes to its legitimacy.

3. Modern Legitimation and Delegitimation

Lyotard is particularly interested in the narrative knowledge, the source of the legitimation of modern science. There are two main legitimizing narratives that have shaped the development of scientific knowledge in modernity: the narrative that emphasizes practical knowledge in the pursuit of the freedom of humanity and the narrative thatgives a major role to speculative knowledge in the development of the Spirit as was the case in Hegel's Idealism. Both narratives have contributed to the legitimation of the tremendous growth of science during the last two centuries.

The first of these two narratives focuses on the practical knowledge as a means to achieve human freedom. In this version of the legitimation of scientific knowledge, science contributes to the stabilization of learning, of the social order and of social behavior. Thus it helps improve the lives of individuals in a society ruled by the State that relies on scientific knowledge in the conduct of the affairs of the City. This scientific knowledge is then legitimized by freedom and progress made possible by scientific knowledge itself. "The State resorts to the narrative of freedom every time it assumes direct control over the training of the 'people,' under the name of the 'nation,' in order to point them down the path of progress" (Lyotard 1984, 32). Science educates people to get out of superstition and ignorance, thus leading to greater autonomy, and the training of administrators and professionals who can lead the society in its march towards freedom. This is the narrative that has been the hallmark of the Enlightenment and many liberation movements that spanned over the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Scientific knowledge is legitimized because in its practical form it contributes to the achievement of these goals of liberation.

The second narrative which legitimizes of modern science is that which emphasizes the contribution of scientific knowledge to the development of the Spirit. Here, there is no question of placing

science at the service of the liberation of humanity, as in the first story. Rather, the individuals by participating in the development of science are at the service of the Spirit, or Life. "In this perspective, knowledge first finds legitimacy within itself, and it is knowledge that is entitled to say what the State and what Society are. But it can only play this role by changing levels, by ceasing to be simply the positive knowledge of its referent (nature, society, the State, etc.), becoming in addition to that the knowledge of the knowledge of the referent – that is, by becoming speculative. In the names 'Life' and 'Spirit,' knowledge names itself" (Lyotard 1984, 34). Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher and Hegel are, according to Lyotard, the main founders of this narrative of legitimation. Nietzsche and the hermeneutics of the twentieth century also participate in this narrative. According to this narrative, the legitimation of scientific knowledge is based on its participation in the development of the Spirit in which human person takes part in so far as he gets integrated into the language game of science and he thus exercises the Reason of science.

However, Lyotard argues that in the contemporary society, these grand narratives can no longer fulfill the role of legitimation they assumed in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The technological development that followed World War II and the computerization of society have greatly undermined the credibility of these legitimizing narratives. The two world wars, the Holocaust, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the globalization of the economy have also done significant damage to these grand narratives, especially to their promise of emancipation and freedom. This loss of credibility of the modern meta-narratives marks the contemporary issue of the legitimacy of scientific knowledge. The contemporary society is characterized precisely by the disbelief in the grand narratives of legitimation. Thus, as the social bond consists of language games and since the particular language game of the modern science has occupied a considerable space in the language games of modernity, the illegitimacy of these grand narratives is often interpreted as a disintegration social bonds. For Lyotard, it is irrelevant to mire in nostalgia of the modern legitimation of science, but it is necessary to take note of the process of de-legitimation of the discourse that prevails in our contemporary society if we are to

properly consider the problem of the legitimacy of scientific knowledge in this society.

4. Contemporary Legitimation

Given this contemporary disbelief in the modern meta-narratives of legitimation of scientific knowledge, several new approaches emerge to envisage the legitimacy of science. Lyotard identifies two approaches, functionalism and consensus through communication, both of them unsatisfactory for him and then proposes a postmodern perspective of a legitimation of scientific knowledge and the language game of science.

The first contemporary approach identified by Lyotard is functionalism whose principle is performativity. Luhmann, for example, adopts this approach. The criterion that gives the language game of science its legitimacy is the power made possible by technology. Science, from this point of view, is considered a self-referential system, so it would work according to its own rules and only in fortuitous relation to other social systems. Scientific knowledge would be accountable only to itself in terms of its optical performance. The second approach to contemporary legitimation of scientific knowledge discussed by Lyotard draws on the second modern narrative of legitimation, that of emancipation. It is consensus through communication proposed by Habermas. This approach legitimates scientific knowledge through its contribution to a search for social consensus and to the unity of society. It focuses on the empowerment of individuals through transparent communication that allows everyone to participate, and as the results of this communication to establish universal standards that are democratically defined.

Lyotard rejects both these approaches as unsatisfactory. As regards functionalism and performativity, he holds that the technological criterion does not adequately justify scientific knowledge since it remains silent about the criterion of the truth of the enunciations of the scientific language game and about the criteria of other language games such as justice, happiness, etc. As regards consensus through communication, Lyotard argues that the universality implied by consensus through a transparent

communication does not reflect the diversity of language games of the contemporary society. This approach allows neither dissent nor invention residing in the heterogeneity of language. Both these approaches remain close to the modern grand narratives of legitimation, which are de-legitimized.

The postmodern response to the contemporary problem of the legitimation of scientific knowledge proposed by Lyotard lays stress on sensitivity to differences and search for instabilities. It does not promote efficacy or optimal performance of a scientific system, nor does it subscribe to the idea of science as an instrument for human emancipation, but promotes the invention of counter-examples, the discovery of the unintelligible and the research of paradox. Unlike the narratives of modern or contemporary legitimation, which assume the stability and permanence of science, the postmodern perspective of the legitimacy of the scientific knowledge is in favour of mobility and volatility which are characteristics of the contemporary era. And the model of legitimation it suggests is not one of optimal performance, but of difference understood as paralogy. Thus the postmodern science and the postmodern perspective of legitimacy of science highlight the scope of the ineffable, the unknown, the Other. They invite us to bear the incommensurable in determining the forms of knowledge, especially the forms of scientific knowledge. In this sense, "the postmodern would be that which in the modern alleges the unpresentable in presentation itself, which refuses itself the consolation of good forms, the consensus of a taste which would allow nostalgia for the impossible to be felt in common, which requires new presentations, not in order to enjoy them, but the better to convey that there is the unpresentable" (Lyotard 1984, 32).

5. Conclusion

Both Foucault's and Lyotard's extensive treatment of knowledge rests on a very important principle, that is, knowledge is necessarily a matter of social relation. They differ in their views of what type of social relation underlies knowledge. While for Foucault, it is power and techniques associated with power, for Lyotard, it is related to the shifting language games. However it is quite clear from their analysis that the distinction between information and knowledge gets

blurred from postmodern perspectives. Knowledge is not a pre-given or internalization through appropriation but is already and always interwoven with information we receive depending on our social position and on the language game we are playing. If there are any differences at all, they are only superficial as at the depth dimension, they are closely linked. If knowledge is based on power relation, information is one important technique that maintains the power relation; if knowledge stands in need of legitimation, information plays a vital role in the process of legitimation, whatever the language game may be. There is a paradigm shift from either-or to both-and.

Reference

Fink-Eitel, Hinrich (1991). *Foucault: An Introduction*. Translated by Dixon. Pittsburgh: Pennbridge Pub.

Foucault, Michel (1990). *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*. Translated by Hurley. New York: Vintage Books.

Foucault, Michel. (1991). *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of a Prison*. Translated by Sheridan. London, Penguin Books.

Lyotard, Jean-François (1984). *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Translated by Bennington. Manchester: Manchester University Press.