

**Understanding the Bounds of Legitimacy:
Weber's Facets of Legitimacy and the Police Empowerment Hypothesis**

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ABSTRACT: *Despite considerable evidence that police legitimacy results in beneficial outcomes like compliance, cooperation, and empowerment, scholars have yet to agree on how to define and operationalize legitimacy. Drawing on Max Weber's facets of legitimacy, we developed and tested a measure of "traditional authority," reflecting the possibility that some people legitimate the police more so based on tradition than normative concerns regarding fairness. Confirmatory factor analysis of survey data from a national sample of 701 US adults revealed that our traditional authority items loaded separately from items commonly used to capture feelings of trust, obligation to obey, and moral alignment. Furthermore, although perceived legitimacy appears to flow from perceptions of procedural and distributive fairness regardless of how it is measured, traditional authority is more strongly associated with empowerment of the police. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings and urge researchers to replicate and extend our work.*

There is strong agreement among police, policing scholars, activists, and reformers that in democratic societies the institution of policing must be viewed as legitimate by citizens in order to maximize social control (President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015; Tyler, 2004, 2006b). People who view the police as legitimate feel a moral obligation to obey the law, and as a result are more likely to comply with officers (Reisig et al., 2018; Walters & Bolger, 2019) and engage with the criminal justice system by reporting crimes or testifying as witnesses (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Murphy et al., 2008). They may even be more willing to empower the police to investigate and control crime through invasive, coercive, and/or legally precarious tactics (Fox et al., 2020; Moule, Fox, et al., 2019; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). This legitimating process takes the form of an ongoing dialogue between police and the communities they serve (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012), wherein police continually enhance or diminish their legitimacy on the basis of their actions (Oliveira et al., *Forthcoming*). Indeed, the killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers in May 2020 reignited national debate about the appropriate role of the police and the authority and responsibilities they should be given. Some citizens want the police to be “abolished” (Vitale, 2017), some advocate defunding and reimagining the police (Fernandez, 2020), and still others have rallied to support expanded police powers under the slogan “Back the Blue” (Nagy, 2020). These characterizations of the appropriate role of police are likely linked to these individuals’ assessments of the legitimacy of the police, with individuals that “Back the Blue” granting high legitimacy and individuals seeking to defund or abolish the police granting low legitimacy to the institution of the police.

Despite its established importance, social scientists have yet to reach consensus on how to define the “abstract and unobservable psychological construct” of legitimacy (Jackson & Bradford 2019, p. 22-23). Throughout the extant literature, terms such as *rightful* or *proper* (Zelditch, 2006),

consent (Beetham, 2013; Coicaud, 2002), *obligation to obey* (Tyler, 2003, 2006b), *moral alignment* or *shared values* (Beetham, 2013; Jackson et al., 2012), *lawfulness*, *fairness*, and *effectiveness* (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe, 2013) have all been used to characterize legitimate authority. Still, while there is considerable variation in conceptualization and operationalization, the majority of studies have focused on the sources and outcomes of a specific type of legitimate power that Max Weber (1947) called “legal-rational authority,” or legitimation based on the legality and fair use of power. But Weber noted that authorities can also be granted legitimacy based on established *tradition*. Traditional legitimacy is “based on a long standing custom” of an authority holding power (Alpert & Dunham 2004, p. 177) and – to the extent citizens legitimate the police in this way – may involve different policy implications. In the United States, where formal policing has been present in many localities since the mid-1800s, many citizens may comply, cooperate, or even empower the police to fight crime just because they are the police, regardless of perceived fairness or moral alignment. Put simply, the established tradition of police presence may amount to legitimacy for at least some portion of the population independent of the fairness with which officers exercise their legal authority.

In this study, we draw on Weber’s concept of *traditional authority* to develop a new conceptualization of police legitimacy that takes into account important dimensions of police legitimacy not yet considered in the criminological literature. In developing this conceptualization we consider (1) whether there are different forms of legitimacy, (2) whether the sources of legitimacy vary by type, and (3) whether different forms of legitimacy have different impacts on outcomes of legitimacy, such as empowerment of the police. Using survey data collected in the summer of 2019, we propose a measure of traditional authority and consider its implications for the study of police legitimacy. We first examine whether survey items we developed to tap

“traditional authority” differ meaningfully from those often used to assess “legal-rational authority.” We then assess whether our traditional authority construct results in meaningful differences when analyzing the consequences of legitimacy, using empowerment as an example. Specifically, we consider whether the measures of legitimacy relate differently to global empowerment as well as situational empowerment of the police to investigate a hypothetical officer-involved shooting incident. This work allows us to provide a more well-rounded understanding of police legitimacy that offers nuance in the differences in perceptions that citizens might have of the police.

Conceptualizing Legitimacy

“Social scientists have in fact been thoroughly confused about legitimacy, and their confusion has its starting point in their failure to conceptualise it adequately.”

Beetham, 2013, p. 7

Legitimacy is, and has always been, challenging to define conceptually. Weber’s initial, somewhat tautological, description of legitimacy is that it is simply the belief that power is legitimate (Beetham, 2013; Weber, 1947). Weber continues with his conceptualization of legitimacy by describing legitimacy as a normative belief that an authority is entitled to be obeyed - an argument that has continued in modern criminological research on legitimacy (Weber, 1947). Since obedience – or compliance – is an outcome of critical importance to criminal justice scholars, this results in a situation where legitimacy is defined by its outcome.¹ To avoid this issue, social psychologists have traditionally considered legitimacy to be the belief that an authority’s claim to power is right or proper (Zelditch, 2006). In this vein, Tyler (2006a, p. 375) defines legitimacy as “a psychological property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, proper, and just.” Beetham (2013, p. 3) takes a

¹ This approach of defining legitimacy by one of its outcomes is one of the primary critiques of the legitimacy literature discussed by Tankebe (2013).

slightly different position, claiming “where power is acquired and exercised according to justifiable rules, and with evidence of consent, we call it rightful or legitimate.” Critically, this means that Beetham’s definition differs from the social psychological definitions, given its stipulation that power be exercised in a manner considered to be procedurally fair and with the consent of those subjected to it. Beetham goes on to identify various types of legitimacy, including legal validity (i.e., that legitimacy is predicated on an exercise of power consistent with established laws) and moral justifiability (i.e., that legitimacy is granted to authorities who wield their power in a way that is consistent with the moral principles of the group or society). In sum, while researchers often treat legitimacy as a concept with a single definition, throughout history theorists have proffered definitions with key distinctions.

These notable differences are undoubtedly why criminologists continue to debate the proper conceptualization of legitimacy (see e.g., Jackson & Bradford 2019; Posch, Jackson, Bradford, & MacQueen 2019; Tankebe 2013). Tyler’s (2006a) definition of a belief that an authority is right or proper is consistent with other social psychological definitions (e.g., Zelditch, 2006). Huq, Jackson, and Trinkner’s (2017) conceptualization of legitimacy as a normative alignment with police is similar to Beetham’s discussion of moral justifiability. Finally, Tankebe’s (2013) approach of defining legitimacy according to concepts many others consider its antecedents (e.g., procedural and distributive justice) aligns with Beetham’s (2013) contention that legitimacy be exercised according to justifiable rules. Clearly, more work is needed to continue pushing forward our collective thinking on what “legitimacy” means in the criminal justice context.

One way to advance legitimacy theoretically is to acknowledge that legitimacy and legitimation may not be a singular construct. That is, for some individuals legitimation may occur through a fair process, moral alignment, or other means. To consider this possibility, we return to

Weber's (1947) initial arguments about legitimacy. Specifically, Weber notes that legitimacy can be split into three facets – rational, traditional, and charismatic – based on *how* an authority is granted its legitimacy. Rational legitimacy is granted to an authority when it acts within the bounds of legally prescribed procedures. Traditional legitimacy is granted simply because an authority has always possessed power. Charismatic legitimacy is granted to an authority figure whose personality is appealing. There are arguably some examples of charismatic legitimacy in policing (e.g., Sheriff Joe Arpaio, Sheriff David Clarke, Jr.), but the concept predominately applies to the leaders themselves (e.g., sheriffs) rather than institutions (e.g., policing). Accordingly, we will not discuss it further – though future research exploring the possibility of charismatic legitimacy being granted to popularly elected sheriffs would be a welcomed addition to the literature. Rational legitimacy and traditional legitimacy are discussed in greater detail below.²

Rational Legitimacy

Rational legitimacy is defined by Weber (1947, p. 328) as “resting on a belief in the ‘legality’ of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.” Weber deems an institution receiving legitimacy on this basis to be a “legal authority.” Importantly, the rational basis for legitimacy is clearly reflected in works on legitimacy in criminal justice. Tyler (2006b) specifically deems legitimate authorities to be acting based on normative rules. Further, being granted this authority reflects an adherence to rules – or a process. It is foundational to theories of legitimacy in criminal justice that legitimacy be granted based on a fair process. Thus, to the extent that the legal rules of Weber are perceived as fair by

² To be clear, our purpose here is not to pick a side in the debate over how best to measure rational authority. Instead, we argue it is necessary to take a step back and consider Weber's point that rational authority is but one of at least three facets of legitimacy that people grant authorities.

individuals, the theories of Weber and Tyler are consistent. Beetham (2013) also joins this consensus as his definition of legitimacy is contingent upon the use of justifiable rules.

Weber differs from Tyler, however, in explicitly referencing the limited nature of the power granted to legal authorities. Specifically, Weber (1947, p. 328, emphasis ours) notes that “obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising the authority of office under it *only by virtue of the formal legality* of their commands.” Thus, when legitimacy is granted on a rational basis, if the agency or one of its representatives violates the legality on which their authority is based, obedience is not guaranteed. Practically, this suggests that an individual who receives an unlawful order from a police officer would not obey the command just because the police are granted legal authority.³ Thus, rational-legal legitimacy has a bounded relationship with the traditional criminological outcomes of legitimacy. Greater legitimacy leads to an increased likelihood of compliance, cooperation, or empowerment, provided the authority’s behavior is within the bounds of the law.

Traditional Legitimacy

Weber’s (1947, p. 328) traditional legitimacy rests “on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them.” Individuals and agencies granted legitimacy on this basis are simply called “traditional authorities.” In the realm of criminal justice, this can most obviously be seen as a loyalty to the institution of policing – or as it has been recently referred to, “back the blue.” In other words, the police are legitimate simply because they are the police. Police departments have been operating

³ Note that an unlawful order is critically different from measures of legitimacy that state an individual should do what the police say even if they disagree (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Jackson et al., 2012). Disagreement is a reflection that the tactic is not what the individual would want, not a statement that the tactic is not within the procedural authority of the official. For example, rational legitimacy would suggest that an individual could think that police officers should not arrest individuals for possession of marijuana but still recognize that it is within their legally prescribed authority to do so and feel obligated to comply. By contrast, an individual employing rational legitimacy would not necessarily comply with a search that the officer did not have legal authority to conduct.

in many U.S. jurisdictions for well over 100 years now. As such, some individuals need not legitimate the authority of the police based on established rules, and instead grant legitimacy based on the well-established and time-honored position of authority. From a theoretical standpoint, this is evident in the burgeoning literature on legal socialization, which has established a link between parental evaluations of criminal justice system legitimacy and children's evaluations of said legitimacy (Cavanagh & Cauffman, 2015; McLean et al., 2019; Tyler & Trinkner, 2017; Wolfe et al., 2017). This link shows that police legitimacy can be something passed down from one generation to the next, rather than granted through procedural means.

The critical result of granting police legitimacy based on tradition rather than rational or legal grounds is that the bounds of their authority are expanded. Officers need not restrict themselves to the bounds of the law, but instead continue to garner the benefits of legitimacy so long as they are acting as police officers. Colloquially, consider that many individuals who “back the blue” respond to incidents of questionable uses of force by saying things such as, “I don’t care who you are or what has happened, if the police order you to do something, you do it.” Such a statement explicitly refutes the need for officers to act within legal expectations and, instead, insists on obedience on the basis that the authority is a police officer. Consider also this headline from *The Washington Post*, written days after the infamous shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO: “I’m a cop. If you don’t want to get hurt, don’t challenge me” (Dutta, 2014).

Reconciling Traditional Legitimacy with Existing Research

Drawing primarily from the definitions of legitimacy identified by Tyler (2006b), but also Beetham (2013) and others (Weber, 1947; Zelditch, 2006), scholars have reached considerable consensus in describing the benefits of legitimacy. From Weber to Beetham to Tyler, legitimacy is important because it generates compliance and cooperation (Beetham, 2013; Tyler, 2006b;

Weber, 1947; Zelditch, 2006). In the realm of criminal justice, scholars have particularly focused on the potential for legitimacy to increase compliance and cooperation with the police (Hough et al., 2010; Metcalfe et al., 2016; Reisig et al., 2007, 2012; Reisig & Lloyd, 2009; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler & Fagan, 2008). Thus, police legitimacy has played a critical role in calls for police reform as a promising avenue for improving community-relations and reducing the use of force through the promotion of voluntary compliance (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015; cf. Nagin & Telep, 2017; Worden & McLean, 2017).

It stands to reason then, that one may question the utility of further fracturing the conceptualization of legitimacy. However, it is worth noting that criminal justice scholars have already begun to question whether current operationalizations of legitimacy represent ‘truly free consent’ (see e.g., Posch et al., 2019). For example, an item on Moule and colleagues’ (2019) trust in police scale states, “I respect the police and their authority.” This operationalization, in our opinion, undoubtedly taps into an individual’s assessment of police legitimacy, but is incapable of distinguishing the *type* of legitimacy being granted. In other words, both an individual who respects the police because it is tradition and an individual who respects the police because they operate within their legally prescribed bounds would respond positively to the item. This suggests that researchers should consider whether (and which) type of legitimacy matters for their research question when operationalizing legitimacy. To illustrate, we now turn to a discussion of empowerment, an outcome that requires understanding the type of legitimacy granted.

Empowering the Police: An Example of Competing Propositions

In addition to compliance and cooperation, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) argued that perceptions of police legitimacy increase public support for police empowerment. That is, individuals who believe the police are legitimate will support “policies that empower police to use

greater discretion in enforcing the law” (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003, p. 514). Research testing Sunshine and Tyler’s empowerment hypothesis is still in its infancy, but has generally supported the argument, demonstrating a positive relationship between perceived legitimacy and willingness to empower the police (Gerber & Jackson, 2017; Metcalfe & Hodge, 2018; Moule, Burruss, et al., 2019; Moule, Fox, et al., 2019). Yet, the empowerment hypothesis does present some challenges.

In particular, the empowerment hypothesis states only that individuals will grant more discretion to the police when they believe police are more legitimate. Greater discretion necessarily includes the possibility of police overstepping their procedurally designated authority.⁴ Some conceptualizations of legitimacy argue that violations of these procedures and overstepping of prescribed authority will *decrease* legitimacy (e.g., Beetham, 2013). Consider, for example, practices like stop, question and frisk (SQF). The empowerment hypothesis suggests that greater legitimacy should grant officers greater discretion in using stop and frisk. However, many citizens believe SQF is used in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner (White & Fradella, 2019). To the extent that individuals believe that SQF is discriminatory, procedural justice theory suggests that its use will decrease police legitimacy. In other words, a feedback loop is generated where greater perceptions of legitimacy lead to an increase in empowerment to SQF, but its increased usage leads to negative perceptions of procedural justice and a decrease in legitimacy (see Figure 1). As can be seen in the figure, something must be missing from this model for individuals to continue to grant police legitimacy and empower them to engage in SQF.

[Insert Figure 1 About Here]

⁴ This is not to suggest that all discretionary behaviors are problematic. Some, such as using discretion to generate fewer arrests and divert individuals in need to appropriate resources may, in fact, be viewed positively. However, the broader point is that with greater discretion comes greater opportunity for unfair treatment.

Similarly, critics have argued that police reforms centered on increasing procedural justice make people “feel better” about the police without actually addressing flawed policing practices (Cobbina & Vitale, 2021; see also Worden & McLean, 2017). To the extent that increasing procedural fairness and legitimacy results in individuals feeling better about behaviors that overstep the bounds of police authority, these practices may be counterproductive to the goal of improving policing. Remember, though, the bounded relationship between legitimacy and its outcomes when using Weber’s facets of legitimacy. If an individual legitimates the authority through legal-rational means and a criminal justice official or agency seeks empowerment to engage in behaviors beyond the scope of their legally prescribed authority, legitimacy will not be granted.⁵ Thus, we propose a bounded empowerment hypothesis, that individuals granting the police legitimacy as a legal authority will not empower them to engage in behaviors that overstep the bounds of the legal process on which the authority was granted. On the other hand, when an individual legitimates the authority through traditional means, an unbounded relationship exists. That is, they will empower the police to engage in behaviors that overstep the bounds of the legal process on which the authority was granted.

In sum, the empowerment hypothesis provides an opportunity to examine why acknowledging various facets of legitimacy is so crucial. More than developing a clearer understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of legitimacy, the type of legitimacy granted may be directly related to the relationships legitimacy has with important outcomes. While striving to maximize outcomes such as cooperation or compliance *ad infinitum* seems unproblematic on its face, empowering the police to the point they engage in harmful behaviors is of critical concern.

⁵ Note that other research has found respect for the boundaries of their legal authority to be an important predictor of police legitimacy (Huq et al., 2017; Trinkner et al., 2018). This is consistent with the bounded empowerment hypothesis, but distinct in using bounds to predict legitimacy rather than limiting empowerment.

As a result, understanding the bounded nature of legitimacy should be considered a priority for understanding the consequences of the theoretical construct.

Current Study

Having theoretically justified the conceptualization of different facets of legitimacy, we now turn to the empirical implications of this construct. To establish the relevance of traditional legitimacy empirically, we:

1. Assess the measurement structure of public perceptions of rational-legal and traditional police legitimacy scales based on previously used measures – trust in the police, obligation to obey, and normative alignment – as well as several items intended to tap into evaluations of traditional legitimacy.
2. Examine whether these measures differ in their antecedents (e.g., procedural justice, distributive justice).
3. Predict global empowerment of the police (i.e., general attitudes towards empowering the police to perform their duties) and situational empowerment of the police (i.e., attitudes regarding the empowerment of the police to perform a specific task) in a specific scenario to determine if the basis of legitimacy matters in evaluating Sunshine and Tyler's (2003) empowerment hypothesis.

Methods

Data

Data for the present study come from an online survey administered to 735 U.S. adults in the summer of 2019. The sample was obtained from a Qualtrics panel of online survey participants and imposed quotas so that the sample would match national estimates of age, race/ethnicity, and gender to obtain a more generalizable sample (see Table 1). Individuals entered into the survey on

a first come-first serve basis such that data was collected on all individuals entering into the survey until a quota was met, at which point they were removed from the survey immediately after the demographic questions and did not see or complete any additional questions. When recruiting for the study, no information was provided regarding the content of the study, so the decision to participate could not be based on any factors related to the study content. Using these criteria, 735 participants completed the survey, with 701 providing complete data (i.e., no missing cells). Given the small amount of missing data (<5%), we used listwise deletion.

[Insert Table 1 Here]

The survey began with a series of demographic questions before asking participants a variety of questions regarding their perceptions of policing – including procedural justice, distributive justice, police effectiveness, and police legitimacy (discussed in more detail below). Participants were then asked questions about their general willingness to empower the police. Next, to examine how different measures of legitimacy operate in an applied scenario, participants read a series of mock tweets and a brief news article about a hypothetical police shooting.⁶ Of particular interest to the present study, after reading about the police shooting, participants answered a series of questions about their willingness to empower the police to conduct an internal investigation. While police departments are often legally authorized to investigate their own, best practices recommendations from organizations such as the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) and the Major Cities Chiefs of Police Association (Kuhns et al., 2018) advocate shifting to external investigations of police shootings. Accordingly, the bounds of police authority are strained when investigating their own after a shooting. Thus, to the extent that rational

⁶ Full text of the mock tweets and news article is available in the Supplemental Online Materials. Note that although respondents were randomly assigned to 1 of 4 treatment conditions, the conditions are not the focus of this analysis and are not utilized to test any of the hypotheses related to the measurement of legitimacy.

legitimacy does not support empowering the police to engage in questionable behaviors, we expect these measures to have a weaker association with empowerment in the hypothetical scenario.

Measures

Legitimacy. To examine the key construct in a manner that was both reflective of prior literature and incorporated the proposed construct of traditional authority, items representing four previous subconstructs of legitimacy were utilized. *Trust in the police* contained three items intended to tap into individuals' perceptions of the trustworthiness of the police (e.g., "The police in my community care about the people in my community," adapted from McLean, 2019). *Obligation to obey* consisted of three items assessing individuals' perceived obligation to obey police orders (e.g., "You should do what the police tell you even if you do not understand or agree with the reasons," adapted from Jackson et al., 2012). *Normative alignment* contained three items intended to measure the degree to which individuals believed that police values are consistent with their own (e.g., "The police in my community act in ways consistent with my own moral values," adapted from Jackson et al., 2012). Finally, *traditional authority* was comprised of four items intended to assess support for the police due solely to their status as police, consistent with Weber's arguments (e.g., "It is difficult to imagine a situation where I would not support the actions of a police officer").⁷ Responses to these statements and all others ranged from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) and were combined using factor scores produced from a confirmatory factor analysis (discussed in the analytic strategy section).⁸

Empowerment. Empowerment was assessed in two ways. First, a measure of *global empowerment* contained five statements regarding respondents' willingness to empower the police

⁷ A full list of all items included in the study is available in the Supplemental Online Materials.

⁸ Note that descriptive statistics are not provided for these measures as they are factor scores which, by definition, are standardized with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.

to perform their general duties (e.g., “The police should have the power to do whatever they think is necessary to fight crime,” adapted from Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Second, after reading a series of mock tweets and a news article about a police shooting (discussed above), individuals were asked about their willingness to empower the police in that specific context (*OIS empowerment*). This measure consisted of three items regarding each respondent’s willingness to empower the police to conduct the investigation into the shooting (e.g., “There is little reason to be concerned about this incident before the investigation is completed”).

Antecedents. Consistent with prior research, the antecedents of legitimacy are expected to be *procedural justice*, *distributive justice*, and *police effectiveness*. Procedural justice was measured with seven items assessing individuals’ perceptions of police officers’ adherence to a fair process (e.g., “Generally speaking, the police give people a chance to tell their side of the story before they decide what to do,” adapted from Tankebe, 2013; Tyler & Jackson, 2014). Distributive justice was measured with three items assessing individuals’ perceptions of how police officers distribute outcomes (e.g., “Generally speaking, the police deliver different outcomes based on race,” reverse coded, adapted from Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). Police effectiveness was measured with five items examining individuals’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the police in dealing with a variety of crimes (e.g., “How well do the police do in tackling gun crime?” Responses here ranged from 1 – Very Poor to 5 – Very Well, adapted from Tankebe, 2013).

Controls. We included in our analyses several control variables to minimize unobserved confounder bias. Given the demonstrated importance of politics in the understanding of police empowerment (Moule, Burruss, et al., 2019; Moule, Fox, et al., 2019) we assess *political ideology* as measured by level of agreement with four statements about current political issues (e.g., “The government should provide free health care for all”) and *political identification* as measured by

two items asking individuals to self-identify their political tendencies (e.g., “On social issues, I would describe myself as:” responses ranged from 1 – Very Liberal to 7 – Very Conservative, adapted from Moule, Burruss, et al. 2019; Moule, Fox, et al. 2019). These measures were included in the analyses separately as prior research indicates being symbolically liberal (self-identifying as a liberal to an item such as is included in the identification measure) is different from being operationally liberal (agreeing with policies that are considered liberal) – with more individuals indicating they are operationally liberal than symbolically liberal (Ellis & Stinson, 2012).⁹

We also measured the respondents’ *age* continuously in years, self-identified gender (*male*=1, *female*=0), race (*Black*=1, *Hispanic*=1, *other*=1, with white serving as the reference category), and highest level of *education* (1=less than high school to 6=graduate degree). When predicting our second outcome (OIS empowerment), binary variables for the police information condition (*police information*, high=1, low=0) and presence of a witness condition (*witness present*, yes=1, no=0) were included to control for the design of the experiment.

Analytic Strategy

The analysis proceeded in three phases. In the first phase, the measurement properties of legitimacy were tested using factor analysis to accomplish the first research objective of establishing whether a traditional authority measure differs statistically from the commonly used legal-rational measures. The sample was randomly split in half using a random number generator in R version 4.0.2.¹⁰ The first half of the data was used for exploratory factor analysis to propose a factor structure for the measurement of legitimacy. This proposed factor structure was then tested on the second half of the sample using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Splitting the sample is

⁹ Variance inflation factors and conditional indices were estimated for all models and demonstrated no evidence of multicollinearity (Belsley et al., 1980; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).

¹⁰ All factor analyses (exploratory and confirmatory) were conducted in R version 4.0.2.

a recommended practice for conducting both exploratory and CFA within a single study (Fabrigar et al., 1999). Additionally, all CFAs used robust maximum likelihood estimation to account for any non-normality in the data (Finney & DiStefano, 2013). With a final model decided, CFA was then conducted on the full data set containing all measures to ensure adequate measurement properties of all measures involved in the study and generate factor scores for each measure to be used in the next phases of the analyses.

The second phase examined how each dimension of legitimacy was related to the proposed antecedents of legitimacy. That is, like prior work, ordinary least squares regression was used to regress the dimensions of police legitimacy identified in the first phase on measures of procedural justice, distributive justice, and police effectiveness, as well each control variable. This establishes whether the different constructs of legitimacy are related to different antecedents than previously established (Tankebe, 2013; Tyler, 2006b). All regressions in this phase of the analysis, as well as the third phase, were conducted in Stata v15. We expected that this analysis would reveal that the measures of legitimacy operate in a similar manner to each other, as they are each assessing the same broader concept of police legitimacy.

Finally, the third phase used empowerment as an example to consider the implications of studying different facets of legitimacy. First, OLS was used to regress a measure of global empowerment of the police on the dimensions of police legitimacy and all variables included in the second phase.¹¹ Then, a measure assessing public empowerment of the police in a hypothetical police shooting was regressed on these same measures and the two experimental manipulations used as controls as noted above. Both regressions were conducted over two sets of models, one

¹¹ Note that all measures are included from the second phase in an effort to be consistent with prior work on the police empowerment hypothesis. We acknowledge that their inclusion may seem redundant given their role in the second phase, but we believe there is value in conducting the analyses in a similar way to previous scholars who were not considering traditional authority.

limited to the legal-rational authority measures of legitimacy (i.e., trust and obligation to obey) and one with the traditional authority measure of legitimacy included. This allowed us to examine whether and how adding traditional authority as a measure of legitimacy impact analyses of legitimacy's outcomes.

Results

Phase 1

To begin the analysis, the properties and structure of the legitimacy measures were assessed. As mentioned previously, the sample was split in half with the first half being subject to exploratory factor analysis. To begin the exploratory factor analysis, parallel analysis was conducted on all items to determine a suggested number of factors present in the data using R's *parallel* function. Parallel analysis conducts a scree plot on the observed data and compares it to a scree plot of an equally-sized, randomly generated dataset (Horn, 1965). This eliminates the need to interpret the bends in scree plots as all factors for which the eigenvalue of the observed data set are greater than the eigenvalues of the simulated dataset can be considered as having covariance beyond chance. In this case, the parallel analysis indicated three factors (see scree plot in Supplemental Online Materials).

With a suggested number of factors proposed, principal axis factoring was conducted to extract measurement models for one, two, three, and four factors. Multiple models were extracted and compared to ensure that three factors was indeed the most appropriate way to measure the concepts. The cumulative variance explained was 0.56 for the one-factor solution, 0.62 for the two-factor solution, 0.66 for the three-factor solution, and 0.69 for the four-factor solution. This revealed that the proportion of variance explained increased only incrementally after the addition of the second factor. Further, in examining the factor structures (see Supplemental Online

Materials), it was apparent that the structure followed the theorized patterns with factors consistent with the concepts listed above – trust in the police, normative alignment, obligation to obey, and traditional legitimacy – with two exceptions. First, in each of the factor structures it appeared that our measure of trust in the police was tapping into the same latent construct as normative alignment. Accordingly, we combined these measures into a single trust scale in the CFA. Second, the first obligation to obey item created significant cross-loading issues in all multiple factor models. In order to achieve the goal of simple structure (Gorsuch, 1983), the item was removed from analyses in the CFA for all multiple factor models. Finally, we did not test the four-factor model in the CFA as its factor structure is not consistent with any prior theories of legitimacy.

To confirm the best factor structure for the data, the proposed structures from the exploratory factor analysis were imposed on the second half of the data for CFA. Despite appearing robust in the exploratory models, the single-factor CFA did not achieve acceptable levels of fit (CFI=0.88, TLI=0.85, RMSEA=0.13, SRMR=0.07). The two-factor model came closer but still failed to meet traditional thresholds of fit (CFI=0.92, TLI=0.90, RMSEA=0.12, SRMR=0.06). Finally, the three-factor model achieved acceptable fit (CFI=0.98, TLI=0.97, RMSEA=0.06, SRMR=0.03) and was therefore deemed the appropriate measurement model for estimating factor scores (see Figure 2). Critically, however, the three factors of legitimacy all co-vary substantially, indicating that they are measuring the same general construct of legitimacy. In other words, legitimacy may be most appropriately thought of as a higher-order factor that consists of several related factors: trust, obligation to obey, and traditional authority. For statistical purposes, these constructs should be measured independently as they are all distinct constructs (as indicated by the fit of the CFAs), despite being conceptually linked.

[Insert Figure 2 About Here]

Finally, an overall CFA containing all measures to be used in the study was conducted on the entire sample and used to estimate factor scores for the regression models in Phases 2 and 3. The fit for this model was slightly lower than the previous models (CFI=0.94, TLI=0.94, RMSEA=0.05, SRMR=0.07); however, it is important to consider that this model was exceedingly large with 10 latent constructs measured using 41 indicators.

Phase 2

The next phase of the analysis examined how the antecedents of legitimacy impact the different dimensions of legitimacy identified in the CFA. Accordingly, the dimensions of legitimacy were regressed on procedural justice, distributive justice, police effectiveness, political ideology, political identity, age, gender, race, and education level (Table 2).

[Insert Table 2 About Here]

As expected, procedural justice, distributive justice, and police effectiveness were significantly related to trust in the police and obligation to obey, with procedural justice having the strongest effect. Interestingly, the coefficient for distributive justice on obligation to obey was in the opposite direction of what we expected – with individuals perceiving greater *injustice* more likely to perceive an obligation to obey the police ($\beta = -0.09$). However, the effect was quite small in comparison to procedural justice. Turning to the new measure of traditional authority, the findings differed in subtle but meaningful ways. Procedural justice remained the strongest predictor of traditional authority ($\beta = 0.71$), but the effect of distributive justice was negligible ($\beta = 0.01$). Still, the police effectiveness had a strong and meaningful association with traditional authority ($\beta = 0.10$). While the dimensions of legitimacy are quite similar in their antecedents – procedural justice is the strongest predictor of all three dimensions – they do vary in some ways.

For example, perceptions of the police as a traditional authority are strongly related to political identification.

Phase 3

In the final phase of the analysis, we considered the practical implications of differing measures of legitimacy using empowerment as an example. For the first step in this phase, general police empowerment was regressed on trust in the police, obligation to obey, and each of the variables included in Table 2 (see Model 1, Table 3). Then, traditional authority was introduced into the analysis to determine if measuring legitimacy along the different dimensions changed any conclusions that would have been previously drawn about empowerment (see Model 2, Table 3).

[Insert Table 3 About Here]

The models operated as expected. In Model 1, trust in the police ($\beta = 0.24$), obligation to obey ($\beta = 0.19$), and procedural justice ($\beta = 0.40$) were strong predictors of police empowerment, consistent with prior literature. When traditional authority was included in Model 2, it became the strongest predictor of police empowerment ($\beta = 0.42$) with trust in the police ($\beta = 0.07$) and obligation to obey ($\beta = 0.07$) reduced to non-significance. Importantly, however, by looking at the small changes in the R-squared values from the model (Model 1: 0.67, Model 2: 0.69) we can tell that because all three measures are tapping into the same higher-order construct of legitimacy (consistent with the CFA), we gained little additional explanatory power from adding the measure of traditional authority to the model.¹² That is, when assessing global empowerment of the police, studies that have only included trust in the police and obligation to obey in their models have likely

¹² This is likely the result of what MacKinnon and colleagues (2000) call a confounding relationship. That is, the relationship between rational legitimacy and empowerment is confounded when traditional legitimacy is added to the model because rational legitimacy and traditional legitimacy are related constructs.

reached the same conclusion that we draw here, that Sunshine and Tyler's (2003) empowerment hypothesis is supported.

Next, we replicated the analyses in Models 1 and 2 using a situational measure of police empowerment (i.e., to investigate a hypothetical police shooting) as the dependent variable. Here again, we split the analysis into two models (with and without the traditional authority measure). When considering only rational legitimacy (Model 3), the model resembled the global empowerment models with few exceptions. Both trust ($\beta = 0.13$) and obligation to obey ($\beta = 0.21$) were positively associated with empowerment of the police to investigate a police shooting. Procedural justice ($\beta = 0.32$) was also related to empowerment. Differences between the global empowerment and situational empowerment models can be seen in the addition of the two political variables being significant (ideology, $\beta = -0.09$; identification, $\beta = 0.08$), both in the direction that more liberal respondents were less likely to empower the police. Finally, police effectiveness ($\beta = 0.21$) is strongly related to empowerment, suggesting that if citizens think the police are effective at investigating crime, they are more likely to empower them to investigate a police shooting.

Adding traditional legitimacy to the equation (Model 4) substantially altered the results. First, the standardized coefficient for traditional authority ($\beta = 0.68$) was the largest in the model. Obligation to obey was no longer significantly related to empowerment, and trust in the police ($\beta = -0.16$) became negatively related to empowerment. In other words, when traditional authority was included in the equation, having high levels of normative trust in the police was related to being *less* likely to empower the police to investigate a police shooting. Procedural justice ($\beta = 0.14$) and distributive justice ($\beta = 0.06$) were both related to empowerment in the expected direction, though the coefficients were relatively small. Again, police effectiveness ($\beta = 0.21$) had a strong relationship with empowerment. Political ideology ($\beta = -0.09$) was negatively associated

with empowerment such that individuals with more liberal ideologies were less likely to empower the police. Perhaps the most interesting result of adding traditional authority to this equation, however, was the change in the proportion of variance explained. When considering empowerment in the hypothetical scenario, adding traditional authority increased the R-squared for the model from 0.64 to 0.70 – three times the shift from 0.67 to 0.69 in the global empowerment models. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, this suggests that our measure of traditional authority taps into a broader construct of legitimacy and operates similar to measures of rational legitimacy, (such as trust and obligation to obey) when the police operate within the bounds of their authority. When police approach or exceed the bounds of their authority, traditional authority adds additional explanatory power.

Discussion

The notion of legitimacy is at the heart of policing in the 21st Century, in no small part because of the sheer volume of research pointing to its beneficial effects (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Walters & Bolger, 2019). The phrase “police legitimacy” returns over 8,900 hits on Google Scholar since Tom Tyler’s book *Why People Obey the Law* was first published in 1990.¹³ It should perhaps come as no surprise, then, that President Obama’s Task Force on Policing in the 21st Century suggested “building trust and legitimacy” as its first of six pillars of reform, using the term “legitimacy” 53 times throughout its final report. Yet curiously—and despite its widespread popularity among criminologists, reformers, and politicians—we lack consensus regarding what it means (Jackson & Bradford, 2019; Posch et al., 2020; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler, 2004).

With this study, we sought to expand the popular conceptualization of legitimacy. We argued that much of the extant literature focuses exclusively on Weber’s (1947) conceptualization

¹³ As of 9/18/2020.

of rational legitimacy or legitimacy based on the exercise of power according to normative rules. When studying outcomes that likely have a bounded relationship with legitimacy, such as empowering police to engage in various discretionary activities, scholars should consider Weber's conceptualization of traditional legitimacy in addition to rational-legal legitimacy. To test this argument, we developed a measure of traditional legitimacy, compared it to existing measures of police legitimacy, and then assessed its relationship with police empowerment.

These tests demonstrated that traditional legitimacy is distinct from previous measures of legitimacy including trust in and obligation to obey the police, but that all three measures tap into a common, larger, higher-order construct of police legitimacy. In predicting police legitimacy, procedural justice emerged as the strongest predictor regardless of the specific measure or conceptualization, further supporting Tyler's (2006b) theory of procedural justice and legitimacy. However, the observed relationship between procedural justice and the traditional authority measure stood at odds with the argument that legitimation as a traditional authority is not based on the use of fair or legal processes. Lest we dismiss this concept too soon, this finding could be the result of reverse causality: individuals come into encounters with pre-existing attitudes toward the police which in turn influence their perceptions of procedural fairness in the encounter (Nagin & Telep, 2017; Pickett, Nix, & Roche, 2018). Thus, it is possible that traditional legitimacy is garnered through a socialization process that recognizes the long-standing position of police in society, and those who legitimate the police in this way are in turn more likely to view the police as procedurally fair. This possibility should be explored in future research using designs that can establish temporal order of perceptions. Relatedly, future research should also consider the potential sources of traditional authority. While traditional authority is based on "long standing

custom,” individuals are likely socialized into recognizing this “long standing custom” by teachers, parents, peers, and others.

Returning to the results of our analyses, there were also some unique predictors of each measure of legitimacy with a liberal political ideology predicting greater trust in the police and conservative political identification predicting obligation to obey, and to a greater extent, traditional legitimacy. This provides needed theoretical context to both liberal and conservative political movements such as Black Lives Matter, Defund the Police, and Back the Blue. It seems possible that all three groups may consider the police “legitimate” but vary in how they *legitimate* the police. Liberal movements such as Black Lives Matter and Defund the Police legitimate the police using rational-legal legitimacy, which is compromised when the police behave unfairly or overstep their legal authority. Conservative movements such as Back the Blue legitimate the police through a focus on the obligation to obey and a recognition of the police as a traditional authority that does not put as much emphasis on the fairness or legality of police behavior.

In examining the empowerment hypothesis generally, our measures replicate the findings of previous studies (Gerber & Jackson, 2017; Metcalfe & Hodge, 2018; Moule, Burruss, et al., 2019; Moule, Fox, et al., 2019). Each measure of legitimacy was associated with global police empowerment. Furthermore, omitting traditional legitimacy and predicting global empowerment using only obligation to obey and trust in the police had little negative consequence as the estimated proportion of variance explained was similar. This further confirms that trust in the police, obligation to obey, and traditional legitimacy tap into the same general construct of police legitimacy. This finding also gives us greater confidence in prior work that indicates legitimacy is related to empowerment, regardless of the conceptualization and operationalization used.

Finally, in examining a specific scenario where a police department engaged in controversial behavior – specifically, investigating their own police shooting – traditional legitimacy was a powerful predictor of empowerment, while measures of rational legitimacy faded in importance. While both trust and obligation to obey positively predicted empowerment in the absence of a traditional authority measure, the direction of the *trust* coefficient flipped to negative and obligation to obey became non-significant when the traditional authority measure was included. Furthermore, when the traditional authority measure was included, the explanatory power of the model was greatly improved. These findings suggest that assessing the type of legitimacy is important when considering the relationship between legitimacy and its outcomes in a situation where police may be overstepping their authority in the eyes of the public.

Practically speaking, this again helps to explain divided political reactions to officer-involved shootings. As noted above, individuals with more liberal ideologies tend to legitimate the police through rational means, which has a bounded relationship on empowerment when police seemingly overstep their legal authority. Contrastingly, individuals identifying as more politically conservative scored higher on our traditional legitimacy index, which has an unbounded relationship on empowerment – predicting empowerment even when police act in ways that might overstep their legal authority. It makes sense then, that conservatives and liberals react differently to the police’s claim to authority when the police engage in controversial or illegal behavior.

Our study, as is true of all studies, is not without its limitations. First, the data came from an online convenience sample, which may limit its generalizability. Still, we see great value in developing and testing scales that measure traditional legitimacy, and our study is a first step toward that goal. Scholars should continue to hone measures of traditional legitimacy in future studies to test the generalizability of the construct. Furthermore, the use of an online convenience

sample to examine police empowerment is consistent with prior studies in this area (Moule, Burruss, et al., 2019; Moule, Fox, et al., 2019) and has been shown in other research to be generalizable to population-based samples (Mullinix et al., 2015). Future research should therefore consider exploring the empowerment hypothesis through other methodologies.

Second, the data used in this study was cross-sectional and, therefore, unable to establish causality. This limitation becomes particularly salient in considering the relationship between traditional legitimacy and procedural fairness. It is our assertion that traditional authority and procedural justice are related because individuals who are socialized into legitimating the police through traditional means will be more likely to view their actions as procedurally fair, but the cross-sectional nature of our study is unable to test this assertion. Still, as noted earlier, this is the first paper to empirically study the measure of traditional authority in policing and research into the empowerment hypothesis remains in its infancy so useful information can be gleaned from testing cross-sectional data.

Third, this paper focused on public perceptions of police empowerment as one outcome of legitimacy where Weber's facets may be particularly salient. Future research should consider whether other outcomes, such as cooperation, compliance, or even support for police funding also experience similar relationships. Additionally, it is important to recognize that public perceptions of police empowerment are distinct from and may not accurately reflect police feelings of empowerment (see e.g., Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012). If true, empowerment may have limited impact on actual police behaviors. This possibility should also be explored in future research.

Fourth, we focused on traditional and rational-legal authority, to the exclusion of charismatic legitimacy (Weber, 1947). Future studies should consider the extent that citizens legitimate police executives or other "institutional sovereigns" (Crank & Langworthy, 1992) based

on charisma, and whether such perceptions square with their broader perceptions of policing's institutional legitimacy. We could easily foresee scenarios where loyalty to a charismatic figure could moderate effects like the ones we observed here (i.e., the effect of traditional authority on police empowerment). For example, this may have been the case on January 6, 2021, when Donald Trump supporters stormed the U.S. Capitol while carrying "Blue Lives Matter" flags, only to assault police officers who stood in their way.

Furthermore, we would also like to acknowledge that the measures utilized here are far from perfect and represent a first step in assessing a previously understudied concept – traditional authority. We considered measures of trust and obligation to obey to be representative of rational-legal authority because these measures have been used by legitimacy scholars in the past when operating under the rational-legal framework of procedural justice theory (i.e., legitimacy is derived through the use of fair and legal procedures). As one thoughtful reviewer noted, however, there is some logical overlap between obligation to obey and the concept of traditional authority. This is further underscored by the empirical findings that obligation to obey did not neatly fit with the trust measures or the traditional authority measure in factor analysis. We offer no conclusive verdict on this measurement issue then, but rather encourage additional research in this area to consider the role that traditional authority may play in the legitimation of policing.

Finally, the examination of controversial police behavior used in this study is not actually illegal. However, readers should keep in mind that when Weber discusses overstepping legal authority, he is not speaking from a lawyer's point of view regarding what is legal in fact, but from a social psychologist's point of view regarding what is legal in perception. In other words, if individuals believe that officers are overstepping their constitutionally granted authority, the actual legality of the act is irrelevant (Stoughton et al., 2020). Still, exploring empowerment of the police

in other questionable situations, especially legally precarious tactics such as SQF, should be examined in future studies.

In the end, we hope this study can serve as a steppingstone to future studies of legitimacy in the criminal justice system. While the findings here show that the omission of measures of traditional legitimacy does not invalidate a large body of literature demonstrating a link between legitimacy and a wide variety of important outcomes, we believe that incorporating considerations of traditional legitimacy in future studies of the criminal justice system will help to provide nuance to the limitations of legitimacy. There are a variety of situations – such as protest policing or even certain aspects of judicial decision-making – in which the absence of a traditional authority measure may result in scholars misunderstanding a nuanced relationship between legitimacy and its outcomes.

It is critical for scholars to consider the limitations of legitimacy in explaining inappropriate police behaviors. While positive police-community relations are a desirable goal for police departments, empowering the police to engage in questionable behaviors is not. The bounded nature of legal-rational legitimacy demonstrates that scholars should not be concerned that increased procedural fairness will encourage individuals to empower the police to engage in questionable behavior (see e.g., Vitale 2017). On the other hand, blind loyalty to the police demonstrated via traditional legitimacy can be dangerous.

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Declaration of Interests

The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.

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Figure 1. Feedback Loop for Empowerment and Stop and Frisk




Figure 2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Legitimacy Items




Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Analytic Sample (N=701)

	N	%
Age	Mean = 46.07 (SD = 17.26)	
Race/Ethnicity		
White (Non-Hispanic)	438	62.48
Black (Non-Hispanic)	93	13.27
Hispanic	117	16.69
Other	53	7.56
Gender		
Female	363	51.78
Male	338	48.22
Education		
Less than a HS Diploma	23	3.15
HS Diploma	211	28.90
Some college	201	27.53
Associate's Degree	92	12.60
Bachelor's Degree	137	18.77
Graduate Degree	66	9.04

Note: Descriptives for latent constructs are not included because they were standardized when constructed by the confirmatory factor analysis. Thus, all means are 0 and all standard deviations are 1.

Quotas ensured that the sample matched Census estimates of the US population on age, race/ethnicity, and gender. Examining the education descriptives reveals that the sample also closely reflected Census estimates for HS Diploma, Associate's Degree, Bachelor's Degree, and Graduate Degree. Substantially fewer individuals had "Less than a HS Diploma" and substantially more individuals had "Some college." We do not anticipate that this results in any issues with the analysis as education was largely unrelated to the key outcomes in Tables 2 and 3.

Table 2. OLS Regression Predicting Dimensions of Legitimacy

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Trust in the Police</i>			<i>Obligation to Obey</i>			<i>Traditional Authority</i>		
	b	β	S.E.	b	β	S.E.	b	β	S.E.
Procedural Justice	0.676**	0.678	0.051	0.502**	0.533	0.059	0.686**	0.706	0.047
Distributive Justice	0.113**	0.110	0.027	-0.090**	-0.094	0.032	0.011	0.011	0.025
Police Effectiveness	0.181**	0.176	0.051	0.099^	0.101	0.059	0.101*	0.101	0.046
Political Ideology	0.105**	0.100	0.031	-0.019	-0.019	0.038	0.045	0.044	0.029
Political Identification	0.032	0.030	0.029	0.075*	0.077	0.036	0.180**	0.178	0.028
Age	0.003*	0.046	0.001	0.004*	0.071	0.002	0.001	0.020	0.001
Male	0.024	0.012	0.047	-0.021	-0.011	0.058	-0.030	-0.016	0.043
Black	0.006	0.002	0.070	-0.010	-0.004	0.090	-0.081	-0.029	0.074
Hispanic	-0.056	-0.021	0.052	-0.105	-0.042	0.071	-0.034	-0.014	0.048
Other	-0.104	-0.028	0.089	-0.262*	-0.075	0.131	-0.112	-0.031	0.087
Education	0.022	0.031	0.014	0.039*	0.058	0.019	0.007	0.011	0.014
F-Test	158.78**			48.15**			158.54**		
R-Squared	0.728			0.473			0.737		
N	701			701			701		

Note: Entries are unstandardized partial regression coefficients (b), standardized partial regression coefficients (β), and robust standard errors (S.E.).

^ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed test

Table 3. OLS Regressions predicting Global and Situational Empowerment

Variable	DV: Global Empowerment						DV: OIS Empowerment					
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	b	β	S.E.	b	β	S.E.	b	β	S.E.	b	β	S.E.
Trust in Police	0.233**	0.243	0.056	0.062	0.065	0.065	0.116*	0.126	0.052	-0.151**	-0.164	0.056
Obligation to Obey	0.192**	0.189	0.036	0.073^	0.071	0.038	0.200**	0.206	0.037	0.014	0.014	0.035
Traditional Authority	--	--	--	0.410**	0.416	0.068	--	--	--	0.639**	0.678	0.057
Procedural Justice	0.383**	0.400	0.059	0.277**	0.289	0.058	0.294**	0.321	0.054	0.128*	0.140	0.051
Distributive Justice	0.022	0.022	0.029	0.026	0.026	0.029	0.048^	0.051	0.028	0.055*	0.058	0.025
Police Effectiveness	0.074	0.075	0.052	0.076	0.076	0.050	0.196**	0.207	0.050	0.199**	0.210	0.046
Political Ideology	0.028	0.027	0.033	0.025	0.024	0.032	-0.083**	-0.085	0.031	-0.087**	-0.090	0.029
Political Identification	0.063^	0.063	0.032	0.003	0.003	0.032	0.080*	0.084	0.031	-0.013	-0.013	0.028
Police Information	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.049	0.028	0.042	0.060	0.033	0.038
Witness Present	--	--	--	--	--	--	-0.043	-0.024	0.041	-0.061	-0.034	0.037
Age	-0.005**	-0.093	0.001	-0.005**	-0.085	0.001	-0.004**	-0.079	0.001	-0.003**	-0.065	0.001
Male	0.058	0.031	0.048	0.072	0.039	0.047	0.030	0.017	0.046	0.052	0.029	0.042
Black	0.019	0.007	0.076	0.052	0.019	0.071	0.012	0.005	0.072	0.063	0.024	0.061
Hispanic	0.072	0.029	0.062	0.064	0.026	0.061	0.041	0.017	0.061	0.030	0.013	0.057
Other	0.037	0.010	0.075	0.033	0.009	0.072	-0.032	-0.010	0.087	-0.037	-0.011	0.077
Education	-0.005	-0.076	0.015	0.000	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.001	0.014	0.009	0.014	0.013
F-Test	93.42**			109.28**			75.56**			99.33**		
R-Squared	0.671			0.695			0.641			0.703		
N	701			701			701			701		

Note: Entries are unstandardized partial regression coefficients (b), standardized partial regression coefficients (β), and robust standard errors (S.E.).

^ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed test.