

# Cryptographic Hashing



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## Digest functions

- ▷ Give a fixed-length value from a variable-length text
  - Sort of text “fingerprint”
- ▷ Produce very different values for similar texts
  - Cryptographic one-way hash functions
- ▷ Relevant properties:
  - **Preimage resistance**
    - Given a digest, it is infeasible to find an original text producing it
  - **2<sup>nd</sup>-preimage resistance**
    - Given a text, it is infeasible to find another one with the same digest
  - **Collision resistance**
    - It is infeasible to find any two texts with the same digest
    - Birthday paradox




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## Digest functions: approaches



### ▷ Merkle-Damgård construction

- Iterative compression
- Collision-resistant, one-way compression functions
- Length padding (1, followed by zeros, followed by length)

### ▷ Sponge functions

- **Absorption**: update a finite internal state (entropy pool) from a variable-length, padded input stream
- **Squeezing**: produce an arbitrary-length output from the internal state



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## Digest functions: common algorithms

### ▷ MD5 (128 bits)

- No longer secure! It's easy to find collisions!
- Disclaimer: it can be used when collisions are not an issue

### ▷ SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm, 160 bits)

- Also no longer secure ... (collisions found in 2017)

### ▷ RIPEMD (128 and 160)

### ▷ SHA-2, aka SHA-256 / SHA-384 / SHA-512

### ▷ SHA-3 (Keccak)



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
## Rainbow tables

- ▷ We can invert a digest function with a table
  - ♦ For all possible input, we compute and store the digest
  - ♦ But the table size is given by the digest length
    - Not usually applicable
- ▷ Solution: rainbow tables
  - ♦ Trade space with time
  - ♦ Store only part of the outputs
    - For direct matching
  - ♦ Find for more matches using computation



## Rainbow tables

- ▷ They are based on a reverse function **R**
  - ♦ Which is not the inverse of **H**
  - ♦ The goal of **R** is to produce a new input given a hashing result



- ▷ R functions are likely to produce collisions
  - ♦ But we can use many different R functions
  - ♦ Collisions can still occur
    - But will not create a problem unless occurring at the exact same column
    - And that case can be identified (and discarded) by identical outputs
- ▷ A table with  $m$   $k$ -length rows can invert  $k \times m$  hashes
  - ♦ At most
  - ♦ Only  $I_0$  and  $I_k$  is stored per row



## Rainbow tables: exploitation

- ▷ A set of  $m$  random inputs is generated
  - ♦  $I_0 = \{I_{0,1}, \dots, I_{0,m}\}$
- ▷ A set of  $m$   $k$ -length chain outputs is computed
  - ♦  $I_k = \{I_{k,1}, \dots, I_{k,m}\}$
- ▷ Given a target  $o$ 
  - ♦ Look for  $R(o)$  in  $I_k$
  - ♦ If found in row  $r$ , compute chain from  $I_{0,r}$ 
    - until finding  $i$  such that  $H(i) = o$
  - ♦ If not found, compute  $o_r$  from  $o$  using  $H$  and  $R$  for each row  $r$ 
    - and see if  $o_r = I_{k,r}$
    - $H$  and  $R$  are applied 1 to  $k$  times, using different  $R$  functions




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## Message Authentication Codes (MAC)

- ▷ Hash, or digest, computed with a key
  - ♦ Only key holders can generate and validate the MAC
- ▷ Used to authenticate messages
  - ♦  $M' = M \parallel \text{MAC}(M)$




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## Message Authentication Codes (MAC): Approaches

- ▷ Encryption of an ordinary digest
  - Using, for instance, a symmetric block cipher
- ▷ Using encryption with feedback & error propagation
  - ANSI X9.9 (or DES-MAC) with DES CBC (64 bits)
  - CBC-MAC




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## Message Authentication Codes (MAC): Approaches

- ▷ Adding a key to the hashed data
    - Keyed-MD5 (128 bits)
      - $\text{MD5}(K, \text{keyfill}, \text{text}, K, \text{MD5fill})$
    - HMAC (Hashed-based MAC)
      - Generic construction, uses a hash function  $H$
      - Output length depends on  $H$
      - HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA, etc.
- $H(K, \text{opad}, H(K, \text{ipad}, \text{text}))$
- $\text{ipad} = 0x36$  B times
- $\text{opad} = 0x5C$  B times



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# Authenticated encryption

## ▷ Encryption mixed with integrity control

- ♦ Error propagation
- ♦ Authentication tags

## ▷ Examples

- ♦ GCM (Galois/Counter Mode)
- ♦ CCM (Counter with CBC-MAC)




# GCM

## ▷ CTR mode encryption

## ▷ Successive multiplications for integrity control

- ♦ Multiplications in  $GF(2^n)$
- ♦  $H = E_k(0)$



# Encryption + authentication

## ▷ Encrypt-then-MAC

- MAC is computed from cryptogram
- Should use two different keys
- IPSec uses it

## ▷ Encrypt-and-MAC

- MAC is computed from plaintext
- MAC is not encrypted
- SSH uses it

## ▷ MAC-then-Encrypt

- MAC is computed from plaintext
- MAC is encrypted
- TLS uses it

