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4 SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
5 JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL,
6 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
7 WASHINGTON, D.C.

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11 INTERVIEW OF: YOGANANDA PITTMAN
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15 Thursday, January 13, 2022

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17 Washington, D.C.
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20 The interview in the above matter was held via Webex, commencing at 1:01 p.m.
21 Present: Representative Aguilar.

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2 Appearances:

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5 For the SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE

6 THE JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL:

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8 [REDACTED], SENIOR INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

9 [REDACTED], INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

10 [REDACTED], INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

11 [REDACTED], PROFESSIONAL STAFF

12 [REDACTED] RESEARCHER

13 [REDACTED], CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

14

15

16 For USCP:

17

18 LISA N. WALTERS

19 TAD DIBIASE

1

2 [REDACTED] This is an interview of Yogananda Pittman, conducted by the
3 House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
4 Capitol, pursuant to House Resolution 503.

5 Chief Pittman, could you please state your full name and spell all of it for the
6 record?

7 Chief Pittman. Yogananda Pittman. Y-o-g-a-n-a-n-d-a, last name Pittman,
8 P-i-t-t-m-a-n.

9 [REDACTED]. Good afternoon. Thank you.

10 I'd like to ask everyone in the virtual room today -- well, I'll introduce my side,
11 actually, for the record. Present here, myself, [REDACTED]. I'm an investigative
12 counsel for the select committee. [REDACTED] is present and will be asking questions.
13 He's also investigative counsel for the select committee. And I see present and
14 potentially going to participate as well, [REDACTED], senior investigative counsel
15 for the select committee, and [REDACTED], who is a researcher for the select committee.

16 I'll ask now -- I think there's only your counsel present for the United States
17 Capitol Police. If she, Lisa Walters, would introduce herself for the record.

18 Ms. Walters. Hi. Can you hear me?

19 [REDACTED]. Yes.

20 Ms. Walters. Lisa Walters, senior counsel with the Office of the General Counsel
21 for the United States Capitol Police. Tad DiBiase, the general counsel, will also be
22 joining us shortly.

23 [REDACTED]. Thank you so much.

24 And to add on our side as well, I see present is also [REDACTED], professional
25 staff member for the select committee.

1 I believe I've gotten everyone outside of administrative staff.

2 Chief Pittman, this will be a staff-led interview, and members, of course, may
3 choose to also ask questions if they join the call.

4 Before we begin, I'd like to describe a few ground rules. There is an official
5 reporter transcribing the record of this interview. Please wait until each question is
6 completed before you begin your response. And we will try to wait until your response
7 is complete before we ask our next question.

8 The stenographer cannot record nonverbal responses such as shaking your head,
9 so it is important that you answer each question with an audible, verbal response. We
10 ask that you provide complete answers based on your best recollection. If the question
11 is not clear, please ask for clarification. If you do not know the answer, please simply
12 say so. And I also want to remind you that it is unlawful to deliberately provide false
13 information to Congress. You will have also an opportunity to review the transcript
14 once it is complete.

15 EXAMINATION

16 BY [REDACTED]:

17 Q So I'll begin. Chief Pittman, if you can just tell us where you currently work.

18 A I currently work in the chief's office. My area of responsibility includes the
19 Protective and Intelligence Operations side of the House.

20 Q And what's your current title?

21 A Assistant chief of police.

22 Q What was your position back on January 6th of 2021?

23 A On January 6th, 2021, I was the assistant chief of police for the Protective
24 and Intelligence Operations.

25 Q When did you assume that title?

1 A I believe that I was promoted in late 2019, somewhere between October and
2 November of '19.

3 Q And may you briefly describe your professional experience leading up to
4 your appointment as assistant chief.

5 A Absolutely. I came on to Capitol Police 2001. Started as a PFC right after
6 9/11, the day of 9/11. From there, I worked numerous divisions throughout the
7 department, to include the Capitol, House, and Senate division. Went through a steady
8 stream of promotions starting in 2005 or 2006. In 2012, I was promoted to captain and
9 assigned to the Capitol division. From there, I went to the Office of Improvement and
10 Accountability I believe in 2015. After that office, I worked for the Command and
11 Coordination Bureau within Capitol Police. And from that position, I attained the rank of
12 assistant chief of police for Protective and Intelligence Operations, a role that I occupy
13 now.

14 Q I want to talk to you about the intelligence and -- leading up to January 6th.
15 As the assistant chief of the Protective and Intelligence Operations back on January 6th
16 and before, can you describe the role you served in relation to the Intelligence and
17 Interagency Coordination Division, which I will refer to going forward as IICD?

18 A Yes. IICD is a division within the Protective Services Bureau. And under
19 my area of responsibility, prior to January 6th, Protective Services Bureau as well as the
20 Security Services Bureau fall -- fell under my purview. And IICD is one of those divisions
21 within the Protective Services Bureau.

22 Q So can you briefly describe what your job description as it relates to IICD?
23 So what sorts of things got elevated to you? What sort of things were you involved in
24 dealing with the IICD?

25 A Absolutely. So for IICD, when I first came over, I was in charge of the

1 division itself. There were conversations about making changes to IICD in terms of the
2 organizational structure, but I would say in a nutshell they were responsible for many of
3 the things that they are responsible for right now, and that is to develop intelligence
4 products.

5 They have an open source section that does various assessments for any type of
6 large scale events. There's daily demonstrations, as you know, on Capitol Hill. They do
7 assessments of those events. They do assessments of events of DPD for specialized
8 Members may be on travel and such. And so when those assessments are done, those
9 products are completed. They essentially come up through the deputy chief that's
10 responsible for Protective Services Bureau as well. After that person reviews that
11 information, it is sent to me for signatures.

12 Q Who was in the role of the deputy chief of Protective Services Bureau on
13 January 6th and before that?

14 A That would have been Deputy Chief Sean Gallagher.

15 Q And outside of signing certain products, how -- how was your role as the
16 assistant chief different in the day-to-day treatment of IICD than Deputy Chief Gallagher's
17 would be?

18 A Deputy Chief Gallagher is going to probably have a more hands-on role, so to
19 speak. Even in the positioning of where he sits, his office is housed within those
20 particular units that he's in charge of. So there's day-to-day communication. Sean and
21 I are having conversations about the products, if there's any question. I review his work.
22 If I have any questions for him, it may get sent back. But he has a more hands-on role
23 with the director of IICD reporting directly to him.

24 Q Only a few months before January 6th the new director and assistant
25 director were hired for IICD. How would you characterize the reputation of IICD within

1 the department and potentially more broadly before the hiring of those two new hires?

2 A I'm not sure how to answer how I would characterize the reputation of IICD.
3 I can -- what I can say is that when I was assigned to the Protective Services Bureau, it was
4 made clear to me by the former chief, as well as several stakeholders within the
5 congressional community, to include the Sergeant at Arms, that change was
6 recommended and change was necessary.

7 Q Why? What were you told that -- as to why change was necessary, and
8 what sort of change?

9 A I would say that the reasons why is because intelligence is a crucial and key
10 component to the organization. These stakeholders demanded more from the
11 intelligence operations. They were seeking information. They wanted to expand the
12 partnerships between the department as well as their respective units that do
13 intelligence. They were not satisfied with the performance of the previous intelligence
14 director.

15 Q So how did you conceive of IICD's role? And I'll give you some options that
16 limit it to that, but did you -- at the time, did you perceive it as an intelligence gathering
17 operation, an intelligence sharing operation, merely an intelligence consuming operation,
18 neither, all three? What was its objective? What was its aim at least before any
19 changes were instituted to the leadership there?

20 A I would say that it was supposed to be all three. I think that prior to those
21 changes being implemented, there were significant improvements that needed to be
22 made. So your intelligence unit should be gathering, consuming, and disseminating
23 information to the workforce, to its partners. And to a large extent, they did. It just
24 was -- it needed to be more effective.

25 There were training gaps, communication gaps. There were several gaps that

1 were identified, and the department leadership wanted to go in a different direction.
2 IICD had largely, prior to January 6th or when Jack Donohue came on, had the same
3 director probably for 10 to 15 years. So it was time for a change, and the direction was
4 that change was going to start at the top.

5 Q Before the hiring -- and you've mentioned Jack Donohue as director of IICD
6 and Julie Farnam as assistant director -- did IICD have a say on the operational side of the
7 department, or have a seat at the table is more the language I think I would use? How
8 would you characterize that?

9 A If there are major events or planning where you're looking for your IICD to
10 give you the intelligence that they're hearing about a specific event, yes, that information
11 is definitely considered.

12 Q And I'm sorry if my question was not clear. I was talking before January
13 6th, I think because you used present tense. I meant was -- how did that work before
14 the hiring even of the two new heads of IICD in terms of whether IICD was listened to,
15 how much of a role they had in operations, or the intelligence that they gathered in
16 operations? How would you characterize that?

17 A I would say that they did have a role. There was communications between
18 the IICD director at that time and the operational assistant chief of police.

19 Q Were there any issues of silos, of the IICD being siloed off from other
20 sections of the department?

21 A I would say yes.

22 Q And before I'm going to ask you to go into that, I just want to acknowledge
23 that Congressman Pete Aguilar has joined the conversation.

24 Good afternoon. You let me know, Congressman, of course, if you want to
25 interject with any questions.

1 So, Chief Pittman, if you could, you said yes, so can you describe that for me?

2 What was that issue in terms of silos?

3 A I think there were silos within the department on how information was
4 particularly shared. One of -- or there are several OIG recommendations for how IICD is
5 operating and functioning now, but some of those things that were identified were that
6 we needed to have specific detailed standard operating procedures and policies on how
7 we're going to share the information between IICD and the operational components of
8 the department, who that information was going to be reported to. For example, there
9 were gaps in how far the information was being shared up the chain. So I think those
10 are a couple of examples of where we've identified gaps.

11 Q So if you could just describe, how was intelligence shared with the
12 leadership before January 6th?

13 A There would be communications. There were command staff meetings
14 with Chief Gallagher. If there is a special event assessment that was to be completed,
15 you want to know if there's going to -- how many people are going to be involved,
16 whether these groups involved civil disturbance of any sort, were there any Members
17 going to be either targeted or participating in a particular event. There is information
18 shared from and between our law enforcement partners within the region. Capitol
19 Police belongs to a couple of working components. For example, the mutual council of
20 governments. We do a law enforcement brief with law enforcement partners in the
21 area. So those things were taking place prior to January 6th.

22 Q In terms of you mentioned Deputy Chief Gallagher would be at some of
23 these meetings and that would be -- would he be the conduit by which intelligence would
24 get shared with leadership?

25 A I would say yes.

1 Q I know that there were two calls, and we'll get into them, conference calls,
2 though, with IICD's head, so Mr. Donohue and Ms. Farnam, prior to January 6th. But
3 can you help me, were there -- was there a weekly -- before January 6th, a weekly or a
4 monthly or a consistent call on which the heads of IICD were present with the leadership
5 of Capitol Police, or did that -- was that not instituted before January 6th?

6 A Not in the manner in which it's instituted now. So there are -- it's a daily
7 call now that the IICD director hosts every day at 12 noon, and we have operational
8 commanders as well as leadership from the department, those that have the clearances
9 to be on the call, as well as members of the Sergeant at Arms or Capitol Police force.

10 So they weren't happening that frequently. There were calls prior to January
11 6th, but it's definitely been a significant improvement post-January 6th compared to what
12 we were doing before.

13 Q And Assistant Chief Gallagher has told us that it was two, one in December
14 and then one on January 4th. Does that sound right to you, calls in which --

15 A On January 6th?

16 Q Any calls in which Ms. Farnam and Mr. Donohue were both present in terms
17 of giving a threat landscape to leadership.

18 A I don't have the information in front of me, but I don't doubt that it would
19 have been two calls in reference to January 6th to give a landscape picture to the
20 department, to those commanders that were participating in that call.

21 Q Did you approve or oversee any changes in IICD in the period after Ms.
22 Farnam and Mr. Donohue's hiring and before January 6th?

23 A Did I approve -- what -- I'm sorry, repeat that.

24 Q Sure. Were there any changes in IICD in which you had a hand in either
25 approving or overseeing in the period between when Ms. Farnam and Mr. Donohue were

1 hired on January 6th? And I know that that is a very brief period, so if there were none,
2 there were none. I was just wondering if any of the changes that you and other
3 members of the leadership team were seeking from IICD, whether any of those were
4 implemented before January 6th and if you had a role in that?

5 A I think the question is a little broad. There were numerous changes from
6 bringing on Jack and Julie. And I would say absolutely I had a role in that. I directed
7 that entire process. So prior to January 6th, U.S. Capitol Police did a nationwide search
8 to bring on Jack and Julie, but that was a whole process in and of itself.

9 There were a number of meetings with pretty much everyone in the IC
10 community. I went to several different Federal agencies to meet with directors, share
11 with them some of my challenges, what I was looking for, what I wanted to do here at
12 Capitol Police. And just seek out information, if you were looking for a new director,
13 these were your challenges, what would you suggest to me?

14 And so after completing that process, of course, we conducted the interviews.
15 And there was one selection that didn't quite pan out for Capitol Police. And through
16 the course of that, instead of going with just selecting Jack, I asked the chief -- the former
17 chief at that time could we bring on an assistant director as well, because we knew there
18 were a number of significant challenges that that new director coming on was going to
19 have to face to start to implement change.

20 And I don't know that I'm touching on your question, but I do feel it was a little
21 broad, so hopefully that answers. If not, if you could give me some more specifics, I'll
22 attempt to answer that as well.

23 Q Sure. So I'm actually looking for specifics. And if the only change is in
24 bringing on Mr. Donohue and Ms. Farnam, that's fine. But, you know, you said that they
25 were brought on to bring about changes in IICD. My question is, what changes were put

1 in place in IICD, if any, before January 6th?

2 A Well, I think that there was limited time for change, but I do think there
3 were a number of things that were requested and expectations that were set. We had
4 staffing challenges prior to them coming on. So there was an expectation that we would
5 bring on additional staff. There were training challenges prior to them coming on.
6 After a review of many of the analysts' records and performance evaluations, I did have
7 concerns about the training or lack thereof. So I wanted them to develop a training
8 program.

9 So all of those things that we were looking for to expand our collaboration in the
10 intelligence community, I want to say that Jack had only probably been here maybe 60
11 days. I'd have to go back and look at the record, but there definitely had to be a time to
12 assess what he had. I wanted a review of the intelligence products that they were using
13 to make sure that we were using the best things on the market, a review of our policies to
14 make sure that our policies and procedures were kind of best practices of others in the
15 business.

16 But you're essentially, [REDACTED], talking about a very narrow window of time. So,
17 yes, there were expectations set forth, but as far as the implementation of those things, it
18 wasn't just a hiring of them. It was all the things that we sat down and discussed these
19 [inaudible] 90-day plan. In 90 days we need to come back, oh, you've had time to
20 assess? We've looked at A, B, C, and D, and then this is going to be the roadmap to
21 going forward.

22 So while we identified those gaps prior to January 6th, January 6th happened.
23 And then, of course, there's a change in plans, so to speak. And we went in a different
24 direction as far as some, I guess, immediacy. It had to happen a lot faster. And we
25 were under a lot of more reviews by outside entities to say these things need to happen.

1 But they weren't unbeknownst to Capitol Police prior to the insurrection.

2 Q And so, I guess, to put a finer point on it, precise as you said, my question
3 deals with only a matter of about maybe 70 days. Were the problems leadership sought
4 to solve by hiring new leaders within IICD still present by January 6th? And did those
5 problems, in your opinion, result in being less prepared in the lead-up to January 6th?

6 A I think that there were challenges prior to January 6th. I don't necessarily
7 know that that resulted in Capitol Police being less prepared on the 6th. I think as with
8 any organization, you're always looking to improve. And there are challenges now, but
9 once you acknowledge those challenges, then you have to take about some type of
10 actionable change. And that doesn't necessarily happen overnight.

11 So I do think that they did a good job in gathering information. We were
12 probably one of the only law enforcement agencies that produced the type of intelligence
13 product prior to January 6th that -- that detailed -- I mean, we've gone over a lot of those
14 details in our assessment. But, with that said, could there have been better
15 communications? Absolutely. The way we distributed that information, absolutely
16 those were challenges. And the conflicting information from the different reports.

17 So those are all improvements that we've made since, but we own them and
18 acknowledge that those things could have and should have been done better.

19 Q And a lot of our conversation today will be about all the improvements that
20 Capitol Police has made since January 6th. I'm starting off chronologically, so a lot of
21 this is going to be backward looking. If you would, you know, humor me, bear with me a
22 little bit since I know that there are, again, a lot of things moving forward that have been
23 improved upon and changed.

24 But in terms of still looking back at the period before January 6th, you mentioned
25 sharing. So I want to ask about that. What was the level of sharing, let's start with

1 outside groups, your partners, and the lead-up to January 6th? Was it at the level that
2 you think was sufficient or was that still a problem, a challenge that IICD was working
3 through and trying to improve when January 6th happened?

4 A I think that that was a problem that they were still trying to improve when
5 January 6th happened. There was limited team -- regular team meetings.
6 Expectations for the analysts were starting to be communicated, particularly by assistant
7 director at that time, Farnam, reviewing of those individual analysts, what their training
8 had been previously, how they were assembling those products that they were
9 distributing to officers. A lot of the communication was via email, so --

10 And then I know you're going to ask about the changes going forward, so I'll leave
11 that for what are we doing differently today.

12 Q All right. I would like to talk about the threat assessment you mentioned at
13 the January 3rd bulletin produced by IICD for January 6th. I know you've had -- I'm sure
14 you've had an opportunity to look at that final threat assessment for quite a bit, but if you
15 have it in front of you, if you want to, you know -- if I refer to anything that you want to
16 look at, you may of course.

17 Let me ask you generally and, again, it may be that this was sort of drafted and
18 developed at a level below you, but what role, if any, did you play in the drafting, editing,
19 or development of that document?

20 A I did not play a role in the drafting of the document. We do play a role in
21 the editing of the document. And when I say we, if it comes up and I have a question
22 about something I'm not quite comfortable, or if I see some analysis and I'm like, well,
23 why would we say A, B, C, or D, then there would be a conversation, and it could be sent
24 back for additional edits or analysis.

25 Q And I think you were describing how that might happen generally, right?

1 You're saying you don't think that that happened in this case, at least as it pertains to you
2 in terms of editing or sending anything back. Is that right?

3 A In terms of edit -- no. No.

4 Q And so when -- yeah. I'm sorry. Go ahead.

5 A Let me put that in context. In terms of editing or sending anything back,
6 no. But to say that there wasn't conversation between Chief Gallagher and I on what he
7 saw, what he was suggesting to have my concurrence, that wouldn't be accurate. But
8 specifically for me to say, oh, you should change this paragraph, no, I did not.

9 Q Okay. Tell me about those conversations. What was it that you recall
10 Deputy Chief Gallagher talking to you about, you know, what he was seeing, what he
11 wanted to say in the assessment, and what did you respond back?

12 A I would say that they mostly involved around the differences between MAGA
13 1, MAGA 2. And then this being a -- more of a situation where the rhetoric or feeling or
14 sentiment that Congress was going to be the target, and folks received this as a last
15 chance attempt to disrupt the counting of the votes.

16 I thought I had the assessment. I don't think I need it.

17 Q Okay. And so -- and I know this was a long time ago. Can you recall
18 maybe how -- around what time it was -- you know, this final assessment was published
19 on January 3rd. What -- around what time was it, what days, what period that we are
20 talking about that Chief Gallagher comes to -- assistant -- Deputy Chief Gallagher comes
21 to you and tells you about stresses, the fact that the third, January 6th, was going to be
22 different than MAGA 1 or MAGA 2?

23 A [REDACTED] I don't remember the specific days or times. I just know that we had
24 those conversations about the assessment. But to remember specifics, I don't.

25 Q Is it fair to say that it would have been near the time that the assessment

1 was published, so -- within that period?

2 A Oh, yes. Yes, that's absolutely fair to say. And if I'm not mistaken, it
3 wasn't sent out until maybe later in the evening. So there were conversations taking
4 place right up into the very end -- evening hours before that information was even
5 pushed out.

6 Q Okay. And so then -- and the reason I ask is that I kind of want it know,
7 then, before that period, let's say if the assessment comes out January 3rd, let's say we're
8 doing this in the new year. In 2021 is when Deputy Chief Gallagher is coming to you and
9 talking to you about these things.

10 Did you have a sense before that or was this the first time you had heard? Was
11 it shocking or alerting to you -- alarming to you, excuse me, that, as you mentioned, this
12 third event would be different and that potentially Congress would be the target this
13 time?

14 A I don't know that I remember it being shocking or alarming. There was
15 always an undertone of violence associated with MAGA 1 and MAGA 2. But I would say
16 that the change is that Congress was going to be who the demonstrators were feeling this
17 sense of animosity towards versus with MAGA 1 and MAGA 2 there were numerous
18 groups that were engaging in civil disobedience against each other.

19 Q Were there any pieces of intelligence that you recall either being brought to
20 your attention, either by Deputy Chief Gallagher in those conversations or in the period
21 leading up to when the assessment is put out, that stand out to you as forming the basis
22 for the assessment?

23 A I don't know if it was Chief Gallagher or Jack and Julie that may have brought
24 that to all of our attention. And I don't remember, like, it was one specific thing.
25 There was a lot of open source kind of analysis, if you will, but a lot of emails, a lot of

1 traffic that led them to conclude that Congress was going to be the target. So there was
2 discussions about that. And I don't know that it was just from Sean and myself, but
3 those conversations were taking place. I would say yes, and then from Jack and Julie as
4 well.

5 Q And so I guess I'm trying to get a feel for how much of the traffic comes
6 across your desk, how much of it you lay eyes on, and then how much of it gets to other
7 leadership in Capitol Police all the way up to Chief Sund. Is it synthesized and analyzed
8 within Deputy Chief Gallagher and below so that really it's just an assessment and the
9 product that comes across your desk? Or did you have an opportunity to see specific
10 traffic, specific posts that paint the picture that is forming the basis for the assessment?

11 A I would say no. We -- I am not an intelligence analyst, and that takes
12 specific training and usually years of training. There's a whole process and procedure to
13 that. That is not my role.

14 When they have analyzed this information from various platforms, from various
15 entities and they have all of that together and they send a product up, that's when Chief
16 Gallagher and myself are going to start asking questions based on the information we've
17 received, based on the intelligence calls we're having with our partners. Sometimes we
18 may receive calls directly from the Washington Field Office, from MPD, et cetera, saying
19 certain things are exchanged at an executive level.

20 But, no, to answer your question, that analysis is taking place by those persons
21 that are trained to do so.

22 Q So is it fair to say in the January 3rd final assessment had earlier versions in
23 December? Is it fair to say that that product, as it is being shaped through December
24 and then ultimately when the final one is developed on January 3rd, that is what you are
25 relying on, in essence, for your intelligence picture into January 6th? There's no other

1 either written, there are no emails of specific intelligence that are sent to you at your
2 level. It really is the assessment that you are using for January 6th. Is that fair?

3 A I think that's fair. I think that if there are additional conversations between
4 the director and the analyst, the director may have a conversation with -- if it was
5 something that was jarring or jumping out at them. But overall, they're using that
6 information to develop that assessment.

7 So, no, we're not getting those individual emails. I'm not scanning open source
8 to see what groups are saying on Gab or 4Chan or what have you. I'm depending on my
9 analysts to look at that, come up with a product. They're verbalizing their concerns and
10 so forth. And then there is some oversight over them, and then we push that product
11 out to the masses.

12 Q And that is true of not just you, but then other parts of Capitol leadership, I
13 would assume. They are also not reading -- being sent or reading through any sort of
14 specific lines, specific posts. They are also relying on sort of that threat assessment to
15 make operational decisions. Is that fair?

16 A I think that's fair.

17 Q Can you tell us the reason that the threat assessment for January 6th was
18 final by January 3rd and not continually updated as more intelligence came in on the 4th,
19 5th, and the morning of the 6th?

20 A I think there were some silos and gaps that we have identified, as we've
21 discussed. There was information that came in that did not make it to the director of
22 IICD. But I also think that some of that information -- if there were conversations about
23 that, it was largely based on information that we already were aware of. A, there was
24 going to be violence. B, we expected people to be armed. There were going to be
25 hundreds of folks in town. We're looking at all of the hotels, camp sites, et cetera. So

1 a lot of the information that was received was consistent with what the information was
2 already provided in the assessment.

3 Q And so I just want to make it clear, because -- are you saying, then,
4 the -- because my question was what was the reason, what was the rationale. Is the
5 rationale that anything that came in after January 3rd was consistent with what had been
6 produced in terms of the assessment and that is why no update was generated between
7 then and January 6th?

8 A No, that's not what I'm saying. What I initially said was there were silos
9 and gaps. So we know that there was information that came in, for example, to our task
10 force officers that was not distributed up the chain, so the assistant director or a director
11 didn't even have that information. But even after, you know, hindsight being 20/20,
12 looking back at it, the information was consistent with the information that we already
13 had. And then I named a couple of those variables, such as violence, individuals being
14 armed, et cetera.

15 So I would say that there were gaps that we didn't have information. But looking
16 back, that information was still consistent with what was in the assessment.

17 Q Okay. And so then I guess you can't tell me the reasoning why the threat
18 assessment at the time, what the thinking at the time was for having the final one be on
19 January 3rd and not updated?

20 A I think -- I don't know any other way to answer your question, [REDACTED], other
21 than I do think that they didn't have the information in some instances. So there
22 wouldn't have been a reason there. If I don't have a document to add to it, I don't have
23 anything to update it with. And looking back, we identified within some of those
24 documents that it was consistent with the information that we had.

25 Q Okay.

1 Mr. DiBiase. [REDACTED] this is Tad. Can I just follow up on that question? I think
2 something that may help.

3 Chief Pittman. Okay.

4 Mr. DiBiase. What was our practice with putting out these types of assessments
5 in the past in terms of when we issued them?

6 Chief Pittman. So I don't have off the top of my head, like, do we have a specific
7 date it has to be out 2 days prior or 3 days prior. If we get something significant that
8 comes in, we're absolutely going to push out a revised assessment. So I don't know if
9 that helps or not.

10 [REDACTED]. I'm satisfied. I think I'll have a way of asking it as we move on.

11 BY [REDACTED]:

12 Q So you mentioned, you know, what Deputy Chief Gallagher highlighted to
13 you, which is what the overall analysis is as part of the threat assessment on January 3rd.
14 For the record, I'll read it, a concluded quote: "This sense of desperation and
15 disappointment may lead to more of an incentive to become violent. Unlike previous
16 post-election protests, the targets of the pro-Trump supporters are not necessarily the
17 counter-protesters as they were previously, but rather Congress itself is the target on the
18 6th," end of the quote.

19 Do you think that warning, particularly that Congress itself was the target and not
20 counter-protesters like the previous two MAGA marches, do you think that warning was
21 properly heeded by leadership at Capitol Police?

22 A I think that warning was listened to. I think there were operational
23 changes that were made, but it's hard to say properly heeded to when you have a January
24 6th. So if the tables were turned and we could go back, would there have been more
25 done if you knew that that was going to happen? Of course you're going to do more.

1 But I think that at that particular time, the plus up of the CDU, civil disturbance
2 units, the changes to the security posture, the changes that were made within Dignitary
3 Protection, the deployment of with the exception of a few things here and there,
4 essentially everything the department had, it wasn't enough. And there were some asks
5 made after the fact. But, you know, knowing what we know now, it just wasn't enough.

6 Q I'd like you to run through those operational changes that were specifically
7 made, in your mind, in response to this warning from the IICD. So -- and you ran
8 through some of them. So if you could in detail, what changed, what was operationally
9 changed because of this warning?

10 A So I don't have all of the lists right in here in front of me, but I can tell you
11 that the times of the civil disturbance units were altered. The number of civil
12 disturbance units, I believe we went from four platoons to seven. The number of
13 officers assigned to patrol the grounds as well as the buildings, the number of special
14 operations divisions officers that were deployed, whether it is patrol mobile response, the
15 guys that drive around the grounds, our K-9 officers, having additional HDU, hazardous
16 device units, that would deploy to investigate any type of bomb threats.

17 On the PSB side, plussing up all of our dignitary protection teams. I believe we
18 went from four-man teams to six. We added additional supervisors, giving them
19 additional weaponry, long guns. We had our countersurveillance units deployed from
20 an operational period I believe up to 2 days before. Gosh, without having the total
21 listing in front of me, that was assessed.

22 Chief Sund and Chief Thomas did an assessment of the grounds as far as the
23 deployment of the bike rack on January 5th. They asked that that be redeployed, they
24 thought, to give them a better tactical advantage over the demonstrators. There was a
25 call on January 5th where all of those concerns were expressed from Chief Sund. He

1 was the host of the call, if I'm not mistaken. And there was probably every law
2 enforcement agency within the National Capital Region participating on those calls, to
3 include all of the Federal agencies, as well as the State and locals, and the D.C. National
4 Guard.

5 So on those calls it was -- the call was designated for the inauguration planning,
6 but before they went into that, they went into January 6th. And that's when Chief Sund
7 also requested additional resources on that particular call from Metropolitan Police
8 Department as well as the D.C. National Guard.

9 Q And so let's unpack that a little bit. Staying within Capitol Police and what
10 its resources, it sounds a lot of what you mentioned is plussing of resources, right, of
11 manpower in certain divisions and areas. So I want to actually compare that to --

12 First, I want to make clear on the record, is it your testimony then that those
13 pluses were not -- went into effect after the threat assessment? That is to say that the
14 levels they were at before the pluses would have been before and then the levels
15 afterwards is in response to the warnings by IICD.

16 A Yes.

17 Q Okay. And then the other end of it that I want to ask about is, on the
18 morning of January 6th, before obviously there was any breach, before even members,
19 people who are listening on The Ellipse even marched over to the Capitol, was the United
20 States Capitol Police at full deployment at that morning or not?

21 A Were we at full deployment?

22 Q Right.

23 A Yeah. I'm not sure what you mean by full deployment.

24 Q Sure. I mean -- and, you know, I need you to sort of help me in terms of
25 what the language might be, but was every single member of the police force working

1 that day?

2 A So to answer your question, no. We planned for an operational period that
3 was going from approximately 6 a.m. on January 6th through the morning of -- or through
4 the day of January 7th. So, naturally, you can't have officers here working 24-hour
5 periods. So you stagger. We use what we call a staggering approach.

6 And I believe when the question was asked before for peak hours when we expect
7 the groups to arrive on the campus and to cover that operational period that we think
8 Congress is going to be in to count those electoral votes. We had 1,200 of the -- maybe
9 it was 1,600 or -- I'd have to go back through the numbers -- of those 1,500, 1,600 officers
10 available to us during that peak period. You save a certain reserve of those officers to
11 come in and supplement those officers that have been here 12, 15 hours.

12 And for us, us as a department, typically we would do not work officers past a
13 16-hour period. So we try to stagger the group so that we are able to have full coverage
14 throughout the night pulling from the 6th into the 7th.

15 Q And so, can you tell me, if you know, if you can ballpark for me, before the
16 resources were plussed, what percentage of the force was that plan put in place for
17 January 6th? What percentage of the force would be working on the morning of
18 January 6th, and then what percentage did it shift to once you made all the pluses and
19 planning?

20 A I cannot put that into numbers. One of the most significant ones was the
21 plus up of the CDU. If we went from four platoons to seven, a platoon for us is 40
22 persons. And some of that, I believe we ended with 276 CDU hard platoon officers.
23 And what I mean by hard is they have specialized gear that was on the campus that day.

24 But to break it down in terms of how many we actually had that were strictly soft
25 and hard to go to the plus up, I don't have it broken down in front of me or in my mind

1 that way.

2 Q And taking into account your answer about keeping some for reserves, right,
3 for -- for the second sort of shift, I take it that from four to seven, seven is not the
4 maximum number of CDU platoons, that there are others that were reserved for that
5 potential second shift. Is that right?

6 A No. I would not say that that was necessarily accurate. Because in
7 addition to CDU, Congress is in full session. And for Capitol Police, that means we're
8 staffing all our garage posts, all our entry door posts throughout the campus. So CDU is
9 just one component that would be dealing with, you know, the demonstrators. But
10 we're also screening staff. We're making sure that the Members can go to and from.

11 So there's a routine operations that Capitol Police is conducting at the same time
12 while they're dealing with any mass type of demonstration.

13 Q So I think my question is, is seven CDU platoons the maximum? Is that full
14 deployment for CDU?

15 A I believe so, but I will have to double-check.

16 Q So I want to go back to the threat assessment, that sort of, you know, overall
17 analysis. That warning came on effectively the last substantive page of the threat
18 assessment, page 13 of 15, where the last two pages were largely footnote citations.

19 So my question to you is: In hindsight, do you think that had an effect either on
20 the ability for leadership or maybe the full department even rank and file, whomever,
21 could that have affected people not reaching that last paragraph, that being the most
22 critical piece of the threat assessment?

23 A I think that in hindsight -- well, not even in hindsight. It's probably a matter
24 of opinion. And you tell me if I'm wrong. It sounds like you're asking should that have
25 been on the first page, or should it have been put in red, or should it have been

1 put -- that's just one entity of the assessment. You're also depending on those
2 conversations that you're having with your staff.

3 So, yes, you have this on paper, but I need to be talking to my leadership team to
4 say, this is the concern. When I'm giving it to my operational commander, I'm
5 depending on my operational commander to have a meeting, so to speak, with his
6 deputies, that that gets pushed down to the rank and file.

7 So whether or not it's placement within the paper, to me, is only one aspect of
8 how you're communicating or what medium you're using to distribute any type of
9 messaging. It has to be a holistic approach. It can't be just where you put it in the
10 assessment. It has to be that communication.

11 And I think when PSB hosted -- or not PSB -- IICD hosted a call briefing to those
12 operational commanders, and they're going over that assessment, they're not only
13 distributing it via email so that someone has a paper they can hold in their hand and read,
14 but I'm telling you, on a call, whether it's Webex or you're dialing in, what have you, I'm
15 telling you that these are the concerns, and I'm providing you an opportunity to have any
16 questions. I'm addressing those questions. So that personal touch or discussion is a
17 component of that -- an important component of that as well.

18 Q So then, for example, on the second page of the assessment -- and I'll read it
19 to you for the record, the quote. It says: "The protests/rallies are expected to be
20 similar to the previous Million MAGA March rallies in November and December 2020,
21 which drew tens of thousands of participants," end of quote.

22 What do you think about how -- you know, you've told me that a big thing that
23 Deputy Chief Gallagher was highlighting was that January 6th was going to be
24 substantively different than the first two Million MAGA Marches. And that is in the
25 overall analysis, on the third to last page, that this was going to be different than those

1 previous two marches. But that assessment, that paragraph on the second page reads
2 somewhat differently, right? It says it's expected to be similar to the previous marches.

3 So what do you --

4 A █ I don't see what you're referencing.

5 Q No problem. Let me get it for you. My apologies. I know it's difficult
6 because we're not in the same room.

7 But if you look at the second page of the assessment -- you have it in front of you?

8 A Yes.

9 Q And under expected protests overview, the second sentence.

10 A Okay. I'm with you.

11 Q Okay, cool. And then, you know, obviously the overall analysis you've seen
12 before, that's on 13 of the 15, in which it says that this event is unlike the events on
13 November 14, 2020, and December 12, 2020, which are of course the Million MAGA
14 March rallies in November and December.

15 So, you know, I guess, can you explain to me whether that is problematic, could be
16 confusing, particularly when one indication that there are similarities more -- it's earlier in
17 the document versus the heart of it, the part that IICD wanted leadership to take away at
18 the end?

19 A I think that it could. And I think that's where that in-person or command
20 brief comes in. If I'm saying it similar in terms of the numbers that are coming but not
21 similar in terms of those numbers directing the violence toward each other or opposing
22 groups, counter-demonstrations, counter-demonstrators. But then I'm ending that
23 conversation with, you all should know that this -- what we are expecting now is that
24 they've had it out with each other, this is the last and final stop.

25 So I think that's why I said it's a holistic approach. But I don't deny that it should

1 be crystal clear so that there are no discrepancies. And those are the things that we
2 worked hard to change and clean up, so to speak, so that there's no -- so if somebody had
3 to come back a year from now and read it, you're going have the same perception as
4 when we put that information out, and we're not going to -- we won't have to depend on,
5 oh, but I had these conversations with them and I told them. Because we see now I'm
6 having this conversation with you what that can result in.

1

2 [2:00 p.m.]

3 BY [REDACTED] :

4 Q And maybe you can help me also in terms of where maybe the breakdown of
5 conversation happened with this -- my last example with this is, I sent over the CDU
6 Operational Plan, published on January 5th, 2021. So it was put together, obviously,
7 after the threat assessment was finalized, and after that the January 4th conference call
8 that I will ask you a little bit about in which, you know, it is being verbally expressed
9 despite, you know, where it is placed in the text. Your point being, of course, those
10 conversations were had and Ms. Farnam and Mr. Donahue are speaking at that
11 conference call about the concerns that they had.

12 So if you turn to the CDU Operational Plan on the first page, and it says, the
13 expected protests overview. It is in essence lifted. It's lifted basically, word for word,
14 from that second paragraph we read in the assessment.

15 A Can you tell me where?

16 Q I'll just read it, but it's exact same sentence. The protest's/rallies are
17 expected to be similar to the previous Million MAGA March rallies in November and
18 December 2020, which drew tens of thousands of participants.

19 So what, ultimately, gets put in the CDU plan is that first indication of similarity
20 between the protests. And nowhere -- nothing else is lifted from the threat assessment.
21 So not that final paragraph that actually says, as you've said slightly different, that the
22 January 6th is going to be different in kind and degree than the two previous MAGA
23 Million March rallies.

24 So my question is for you is where, if you know, where did that breakdown
25 occur -- at least how it got translated to the leaders over at CDU where the important

1 part of the threat assessment is not what gets copied and pasted into their plan, but it's
2 that earlier version that makes it seem as though January 6th is going to be just the third
3 of the two previous MAGA marches?

4 A Thank you. Ask me the question again, Robin, just so I am clear.

5 Q Sure. It was long, so I understand. To make it more brief, why do you
6 think -- what do you think it led to the incorrect or the less salient, the not the important
7 part of the threat assessment being reproduced in the CDU Operational Plan, given that
8 you mentioned that there were conversations that there is this conference call, what do
9 you think was the breakdown in communication? If you do -- and of course, if you
10 disagree with the premise, let me know -- as to why, what was the meat of what was
11 supposed to be taken by the threat assessment doesn't make it into the CDU operational
12 plan?

13 A I would have to say that there were silos. And I -- operation CDU
14 Operational Plan did not fall under our area of responsibility. Were those -- that this
15 does fall within their purview given the information, yes, they were. I would say I don't
16 know. I don't have an explanation for why they didn't put it in or why that wasn't
17 caught at some point. For that, I can't say, and look -- going back to the 5th and what
18 was happening, there are definitely things that stand out, but the details of -- for lack of a
19 better term, for someone else's operational plan and why they did or did not put that in
20 there, it would be hard for me to speak on their behalf to say, we had these
21 conversations, why did that information did not transfer to this document? I don't
22 know.

23 Q And one way, I guess, I can ask is did you or did Deputy Chief Gallagher or
24 did Ms. Farnam or Mr. Donahue, the way it was set up previously -- and this may go to
25 what you were saying about silos -- did you guys have an opportunity to have a say, to

1 read, to edit this CDU Operational Plan; to look at it and say, oh, you know, that was the
2 wrong thing to take from the threat assessment; I'm sorry, this should be the right thing?

3 Was that put in place, you know, before January 6th, or was that opportunity not
4 there for you folks who know what the most sort of important parts of the intelligence
5 are to affect what gets written in those plans?

6 A That communication was not there. So whereas we have IAP, we do now.
7 We have a specific bureau that is funneling all of that information. I will say there is
8 probably in the past, there was verbal communication between the executives that say
9 this is what's important. But if that was someone's oversight for the CDU Operational
10 Plan, like you're saying the meat of that assessment, what was most important, why that
11 wasn't within the operational plan, and I don't know. Maybe Tad has it. I'm not sure
12 who all received the operational plan.

13 So as I was stating before, this is just one form of communication. But if I am
14 having a command staff brief, and I have my IICD director on there giving the meat of our
15 assessment to them, regardless of what is in the operational plan, if I verbalize to them
16 that this is what we think is going to happen, we still expect that information to be
17 pushed out at the roll calls when they're getting together the masses that this is what we
18 expect.

19 So I think to look at it individually, yes. And I agree with the assessment or the
20 folks that have evaluated us and made recommendations that we should streamline
21 things and make it so it's crystal clear, whether you are reading it today or a year from
22 now how this information was gathered, how it was distributed, et cetera. But I do
23 think it's still only one medium that that communication is taking place.

24 Q Okay. So you brought up distribution. Now, I want to talk -- this is I think
25 my last question -- about the threat assessment itself. I want to talk about how it got

1 distributed. So the hardcopy got distributed in terms of leadership of Capitol Police,
2 where?

3 A I know it was distributed to the command staff, but I would have to go back
4 and pull that particular email or document to see exactly where it went. I believe it was
5 command staff -- operational commanders, let me clarify. Operational
6 commanders -- folks that would have been on the campus and having some role in the
7 event on that day as well as to some stakeholders, which I believe included the Capitol
8 Police Board, House and Senate Sergeant At Arms, as well as the Architect.

9 Q Okay. And what about to the rank and file? What is your understanding
10 of how it got distributed, if at all, to them?

11 A It's my understanding, now, that they did not receive a copy of the
12 assessment. The way Capitol Police had operated in the past is that information would
13 be shared with those commanders. Those commanders would post a roll call where
14 they're sharing that information to the rank and file. But it is our clear understanding
15 after the fact that that did not happen on January 6th.

16 Q Let's talk about -- well, let me make sure -- well actually, no. Let's talk
17 about a conference call, the conference call briefing on January 4th with Ms. Farnam and
18 Mr. Donahue highlighting, you know, what they put together in that January 3rd
19 assessment. Do you recall who spoke at the briefing?

20 A I believe both Jack and Julie spoke at the briefing. I believe that Chief
21 Gallagher? I wouldn't want to be a hundred percent because I don't remember all the
22 specifics. I know that normally when we host a call, Sean is kicking it off, whether he
23 gave any detail -- the specifics of who gave what, I'm not sure. But that's generally
24 speaking how we do those calls.

25 Q And you were present. Is that right?

1 A Yes.

2 Q Do you know who was invited to attend and who was actually present, if
3 those two are different?

4 A I believe all operational commanders. So that would have been our
5 inspectors and above. And then in some elements like, for example, our hazardous
6 device section or unit is led by a captain. So there may be onesies, twosies for captains
7 here and there because we don't have an inspector. But anybody that is operationally
8 in charge of a unit would have been invited. I don't remember right off the top of my
9 head who didn't participate on the call, but I do believe that most of them did.

10 Q Okay. And I know this isn't a video conference, so is the way that you
11 would have known whether someone attended or not is if their sort of name comes up?

12 A We have an executive officer kind of in an administrative role that would
13 have been hosting it. That person keeps or is able to -- almost like the call we're doing
14 now, you can see the participants and maybe identify them either by name or number.
15 And I'm sure that that's what happened in that instance. We would have known from
16 the person that was hosting the call who called in and who didn't.

17 Q You are saying, basically, operational inspectors and above, maybe a couple
18 of captains on the bottom end. Can you tell me from the top down who you know was
19 present?

20 A No, not off the top of my head. I don't remember everybody that was on
21 that call. I believe Chief Sund myself, Chief Thomas, Deputy Chief Waldow, Deputy Chief
22 Bowen. Gosh, I'm trying to think of who else. I can't remember exactly how many
23 deputies we had at that time that would have been on there. I feel like I'm missing
24 somebody. Of course, Deputy Chief Gallagher, who was then deputy chief at the time.
25 So maybe that's all of them. As far as the inspectors, it's quite a few of them. And I

1 don't remember who all was on. But I do think that, for the most part, they
2 participated.

3 Q All right. And so all those names you listed, starting with Chief Sund, those
4 were names of people you believe were on the call, correct?

5 A Yes. That is correct.

6 Q Okay. Perfect. After Ms. Farnam and/or Mr. Donahue finished their
7 presentation, do you recall if anyone asked them any questions at the end of the
8 presentation of them?

9 A No. Now, Ms. Harper may have remembered what I ate yesterday. The
10 days run together. I certainly don't remember what questions they would have asked a
11 year ago, you know.

12 Q No problem at all. And so whether they asked a question or not, you don't
13 know? You don't recall either way?

14 A No.

15 Q Okay. And I actually kind of want to make a distinction about when, you
16 know, the operational changes were made. Was it your understanding that it was after
17 this phone call, which was January 4th or earlier, or was it the highlighting of the threat
18 assessment? Was it the threat assessment itself or the highlighting of the threat
19 assessment, if you know, that changed the security posture for Capitol Police?

20 A I believe that there were different changes at different times. So as
21 information was incoming. Based on the information we're receiving, it was changing.
22 So whether it was the 3rd, 4th, each day right up to the 5th -- I do remember on the 5th
23 riding with Chief Sund and Chief Thomas around the perimeter of the campus, so to
24 speak. And Chief Sund was not -- he was not satisfied with the placement of some of
25 the bike racks, and it could have been snow fencing.

1 But there were certain physical barriers that were placed around the campus that
2 he and Chief Thomas discussed having them adjusted. And that was the day before. I
3 do remember that. But there were other changes as information was coming in that
4 folks were making.

5 Q Can you tell me about that sort of movement of the bike racks? What
6 information was it that led to that change?

7 A As we traversed the perimeter, Chief Sund was concerned with the amount
8 of traffic. We were expecting that whatever way that bike rack was laid out at the
9 time -- and I don't remember the particulars -- there weren't proper egress routes.
10 There weren't proper -- it wouldn't be proper ways to tactically defend the campus. I do
11 remember there was an exchange between Chief Sund and Chief Thomas on how far the
12 bike racks should be placed out, closing of the plaza versus not closing the plaza. And I
13 believe some of this discussion was guided by the Sergeant at Arms at the time.

14 And there were disagreements or a back-and-forth exchange. But I don't
15 remember all of the particulars of what information and criteria they were using. But it
16 definitely was discussed as we get towards the ground.

17 Q Oh, okay. So what I am asking in essence is, I believe I heard you say, or
18 you brought up this example when I am asking about how intelligence drove a change in
19 operations. So I was wondering what piece of intelligence, what new information was it
20 that made Chief Sund feel as though the bike racks needed to be moved?

21 A So if you have intelligence that is saying that thousands of people are going
22 to be traversing Constitution Avenue, and you see that you have the bike racks that could
23 essentially set up traps for your officers, and/or for the pedestrians, if you have
24 intelligence that says that -- and I'm just going to just kind of do some hypothetical.

25 Antifa is going to be traversing this route versus Black Lives Matter is going to be

1 coming down First Street, I want to make sure that I have a tactical positioning to keep
2 these groups separate. If I needed to encircle them or keep them closed off from one or
3 the other, I'm going to make changes to my security posture. If I have intelligence that
4 says that individuals may be trying to enter the buildings through the tunnels, or they're
5 trying to come underground, there may be a tactical decision to plus-up the number of
6 officers and supervisors that were posted at the Cannon tunnel or Rayburn tunnel, et
7 cetera, so that you have additional resources there to handle anything that may come
8 your way.

9 Q I am going to guess in terms of the placement of the bike racks on
10 January 5th, was there any new intelligence, or was there something new that came out
11 that drove that operational change? I think you mentioned -- you mentioned in the
12 hypotheticals, but I am trying to pin down what actually you heard, or you received in
13 terms of intelligence that led to that change. You mentioned numbers. I think
14 thousands of people and potentially the movement over from the Ellipse. Was that new
15 information? Or was that information that you guys had had long before the shift in
16 bike racks on January 5th?

17 A I would say some of the information was new, but some of it was from a
18 tactical perspective, Chief Sund was not -- he didn't like the setup. And then there was
19 the Sergeant at Arms that weighed in on tactically positioning. If you have these groups
20 coming, and they may be aggressive or violent, where should that bike rack be placed out
21 to; how much ground should we be defending; what are we willing to give up? So I do
22 think that those are, from an intelligence perspective, you're using that information
23 provided by intel.

24 If I know a certain number of people are going to be armed, I'm going to move
25 things, strategically, even where the placement of my teams, whether it's my CDU

1 response teams, the placement of the bunches, and things of that nature. So those
2 things were -- those conversations were had. All of the particulars of the operational
3 tactical changes I wasn't necessarily a part of, but I do know that those conversations
4 were taking place.

5 Q I want to go into some individual intelligence received by IICD. First, I want
6 to ask if [REDACTED] has anything that she wanted to ask about at this point.

7 [REDACTED] I am sorry. Can you hear me?

8 [REDACTED] Yes.

9 [REDACTED] Okay.

10 BY [REDACTED]

11 Q Just one quick question about the Sergeant of Arms -- Hi, Chief Pittman.
12 How are you?

13 A Hi. How are you?

14 Q -- what his role was or any conversations during the time period of preparing
15 for January 6th? I know you just mentioned him. So I am wondering what the
16 communication was with the Sergeant at Arms.

17 A I'm sorry, [REDACTED] And how do I pronounce your last name?

18 Q It's [REDACTED] thanks for asking.

19 A [REDACTED]. It looks so much like mine. It's like, I feel like I should know.
20 But I believe your question was to what extent was the Sergeant at Arms playing a role in
21 the security posture?

22 Q Correct.

23 A The true honest answer is I don't know to what extent Chief Sund accepted
24 their recommendations. I do know that they had concerns, particularly, with the plaza.
25 Naturally, the Members are going to be coming back and forth. I do know that there

1 were conversation and kind of going back to [REDACTED]'s question between the Sergeant at
2 Arms and Capitol Police about encouraging Members to stay underground so that they
3 wouldn't be interacting with the protesters on game day.

4 But the specifics of those conversations and how much he may have adhered to
5 their advice or if it was a collaborative effort, I wasn't privy to that.

6 Q So those conversations would have been from Chief Sund to Mr. Irving and
7 Mr.?

8 A Stenger.

9 Q Stenger. Okay. Thank you.

10 BY [REDACTED]:

11 Q So Chief Pittman, I want to draw your attention to an email that was
12 forwarded to John Donahue, the director of IICD by an NYPD official on December 28th of
13 2020. The email notes, quote, assume you have. And it is sort of a listing of social
14 media posts. That site put together in the run-up to January 6th.

15 I'll just read some of them for you. I know I think you're trying to find it. So
16 while you do that -- well, you tell me if you want me to wait until you find it.

17 A You can start reading it.

18 Q Yeah, because it's --

19 A Okay.

20 Q No problem. It's in paragraph form. But, in essence, a lot of the postings
21 say this. It's protesters should, quote, start marching into the Chambers. Quote, show
22 up with guns and threaten them with death. They indicate that Trump's tweet, The Wild
23 Protests, the one user said, quote, I read that as armed. Another said that violent
24 insurrection has, quote, always been the plan. Another one says, quote, Trump can't
25 openly tell you to revolt. This is closest he'll ever get.

1 Another says, quote, there is not enough cops in D.C. to stop what is coming.

2 Another says, quote, this is war, and we're clearly in a post-legal phase of our society.

3 Another quote, be there on the 6th ready for 1776. Another, quote, fun fact, no

4 revolution has ever been won without violence. And quote, kill the opposition.

5 I was wondering if these sort of postings, if you recall seeing stuff like this before
6 January 6th?

7 A I don't. I don't recall.

8 Q Okay. And do you think -- and, again, this may be speculation, but do you
9 think other members of Capitol Police or the operational side of the department saw
10 specific intelligence like this, specific lines, the specific line of rhetoric?

11 A If they would have seen these emails or just the general chatter? Do I
12 know if they saw that?

13 Q Yeah. In specifics. So having read things like this themselves, these sort
14 of specific rhetoric being brought to their attention.

15 A I don't know that to be true.

16 Q Okay. And so take something like, you know, indications of marching into
17 the Chamber, do you think that that sort of -- those sort of specifics -- well, do you know
18 why they weren't included in the January 3rd assessment? Let me ask it that way.

19 A No. No.

20 Q Okay. And you tell me if this is wrong, but do you think that it would be
21 helpful? Obviously, a threat assessment puts things together. There is general sort of
22 conclusions and thoughts and a threat landscape that gets put out there. But do you
23 think it would be helpful, that would have been helpful for leadership and maybe even
24 the rank and file to be able to see what is forming the basis of the warning; to see the
25 actual language that is being used such as marching into the Chambers, the other things

1 that I indicated? Do you think that that would have been helpful?

2 A I think that's a tough question. You don't want to say that any information
3 would not be helpful first and foremost. However, with that said, you do have
4 conversations with your executive team, your executive staff to say, how am I going to
5 mitigate any type of threat? What threat is most likely to happen on this campus?

6 So if I have a threat that suggests individuals want to march into a chamber, okay,
7 how can I mitigate that? I have got CDU, Civil Disturbance Units. I've got hundreds of
8 officers deployed. They have got less lethal munitions, or they've been trained to
9 tactically defend the Capitol building. I have also put out calls to local law enforcement
10 to say, I can probably get 500 more of these same level of trained officers to defend that
11 type of threat.

12 So to say that that one specific, I think it's more looked at in terms of holistically,
13 what am I going to do to mitigate if there's a suspicious package on the campus? Okay.
14 I've got my hazardous response units deployed on the north side and south side. What
15 am I going to do if there is an active shooter? So you train for these scenarios. I have
16 got counter snipers strategically positioned around the campus.

17 So do I isolate one or a hundred emails? No, I'm looking for that analyst.
18 They're sifting through thousands of pieces of information. And so I need them to come
19 up with that holistic picture. And then I am going to deploy resources that can handle or
20 mitigate multiple types of scenarios. And I'm going to have conversations with my
21 operational staff that say, hey, if (A) happens, this is what we're doing to do. And those
22 were gaps that were identified that those conversations should have definitely have been
23 more robust. And whenever we get into changes that have been made, those are things
24 that I think we have addressed going forward.

25 Q So let me ask about what, you know, those conversations, in particular, was

1 the scenario of storming into the Capitol, occupying the Capitol, was that hypothetical, or
2 was that contingency discussed?

3 A No, not in the manner of thousands of people storming or breaching the
4 building, flanking it on both sides at the same time. That particular scenario was not
5 discussed.

6 Q And so you put a caveat in, not to that extent. So my question is, was the
7 scenario of anybody storming the Capitol in any amount of numbers discussed?

8 A To me it's the same question, and the answer is no.

9 Q Okay. Let me ask you about -- there is an email sent to you on January 5th,
10 2021. I think you're familiar with it, at 4:10 p.m. That WashingtonTunnels.com had
11 been receiving dramatic upticks in new visits. This was sent to you by Deputy Chief
12 Gallagher. That the site, the Donald.win had been active in promoting photos of the
13 tunnel system. And that Capitol Police had identified numerous open source comments
14 by groups of their intention of finding tunnel entrances and in confronting or blocking the
15 Members of Congress, including setting up a perimeter to block entry or escape.

16 And in that thread, once deputy chief sort of alerts you to this uptick in views with
17 the tunnels, that same day, January 5th, at 4:55 p.m. you forward that piece of
18 intelligence to Chief Sund, saying that you should hold a call regarding that intelligence.

19 Were you aware of that particular intelligence, the uptick in visits to the tunnels
20 prior to that email that you forwarded to Chief Sund on January 5th?

21 A Yes. There had been previous conversations about individuals having
22 information about the tunnels. And, Robin, I don't have the email in front of me. I'm
23 very familiar with it. Does it also include Chief Thomas on it, too? Because I don't
24 think it was just Chief Sund.

25 Q For sure. Let me get you that. It is -- and I did send --

1 A You did.

2 Q Okay. No worries. I just wanted to make sure.

3 A I have a printout of materials in front of me. I do remember, and it's not
4 the first time that I have been asked about this particular email. So I'm familiar with
5 what you're talking about, but I wasn't certain that it didn't go to just Chief Sund.

6 Q No. You're right.

7 A Okay. I make that distinction because you want to really have that
8 conversation with the operational side of the House as well. And I apologize, but I had
9 forgotten your original question.

10 Q No worries. Just to answer your question, yes, the Deputy Chief Gallagher
11 sends it just to you at 4:10. You forward it at 4:55 to Chief Sund as well as Chad Thomas
12 and as well as counsel, Tad.

13 A Okay.

14 Q So I'm sorry, my original -- so my question to you, but my first question -- I
15 think you answered it though -- was whether you had that information that intelligence
16 prior to January 5th. And I think you said yes. Right?

17 A Yeah, I believe -- excuse me. There were conversations about individuals
18 having -- being aware that these tunnels existed. I believe there was chatter, excuse
19 me, about some of the demonstrators saying things like the Members were going to try
20 to hide and not come out -- traverse the plaza to go vote. They were going to try to use
21 these tunnels.

22 I also remember that, I believe, it was Assistant Director Farnam, when they did
23 their homework and research on that, that information had been posted on the internet,
24 I believe, for at least the last 5 years. So with all that being said, that's when the Capitol
25 Police did make the determination to what we call plus-up the manpower at the tunnels.

1 And it was also taken into consideration that the buildings were closed on the campus at
2 the time due to COVID. So it's nothing the public would have access to getting down to
3 the tunnels anyway.

4 Q And so you said that the intelligence had previously been sort of discussed.
5 Why then are you -- why is it being forwarded to you by Deputy Chief Gallagher? Is
6 there something new that is being forwarded on January 5th that you say, quote, I know
7 everyone is busy, but I think we may want to have a really brief call on this intel. PSB is
8 seeing a significant uptick on groups wanting to block perimeter access to the Capitol
9 tomorrow, starting as early as 600 hours. I know we are already spread thin, but even if
10 we don't start CDU earlier, we may want to see what midnight teams we can pull
11 together to address. I will come over to your office shortly.

12 Does this not indicate that at least at the level of Chief Sund he hadn't been made
13 aware about this tunnel intel? Or at least you seem to indicate that this is new
14 information that you want to discuss?

15 A I don't know that I indicated that it was new information. And I don't know
16 that I agreed that he wasn't aware of conversations prior to. But I do think that to air on
17 the side of caution, even though the buildings were closed, there may have been
18 conversations and a concern that specific -- and Tad, you tell me if I can't talk about this.
19 But there may have been Members that would bring individuals into the buildings
20 through the tunnels that would cause some concern.

21 So that's when, again, you'll see the plus-up for the tunnels themselves, to put
22 additional manpower or resources. And now I'm thinking back, there probably were
23 additional grounds, patrol officers to traverse the grounds to address, to mitigate that as
24 well. So I don't know that it was necessarily new.

25 Q So then I guess my question is this, if everything in this email, the

1 intelligence in this email is already known, why is Deputy Chief Gallagher sending it to
2 you, if it's already something that he knows you know? And why are you forwarding it
3 to Chief Sund, if it's something that you know Chief Sund already knows?

4 What is the purpose of on January 5th, near the close of business, sending this
5 intel saying, we need to talk about this intelligence, if all of this is old hat and already
6 been discussed?

7 A Let me give clarification. So I don't think that there were no conversations
8 before. With that said, and this is -- I don't know the particulars from a year ago just
9 specifically about that, but even if I put it into a hypothetical perspective to give it
10 context, if we did not make operational changes to the tunnels because the buildings
11 were closed to COVID-19, based on the information that we had before, if you see an
12 uptick from the intelligence saying, there may be more people trying to come into these
13 buildings and breach our security using the tunnels -- I know it's last minute. I know
14 we're throwing everything at CDU or our operational posture outside. But maybe we
15 should have a conversation about what can we do down in the tunnels, just in case there
16 is a breach at a door, or we got Members bringing in certain groups that are causing a
17 disturbance, or breaching our security protocols, and things of that nature. So I hope
18 that kind of puts it into context.

19 Q What that sounds to me is that potentially you're saying that the uptick
20 would have been new. That that is something that was different. There was an
21 increase, and you wanted to highlight that increase and potentially do something about
22 the increase.

23 A It could have been that that was new, [REDACTED]. I don't remember,
24 specifically. And I don't know that the email captures the entirety of the conversation.
25 But I do know, operationally, we did things differently, so there was a concern.

1 Q Okay. And then in terms of then -- back to the January 3rd assessment, this
2 is something that, you know, you are bringing to the attention of the chief again, the day
3 before, January 6th, late into the -- almost close of business. Deputy Chief Gallagher has
4 raised it to you as well. This was not a particular piece of intelligence that was included
5 in the January 3rd assessment. And you're highlighting it, obviously, 2 days later.

6 Do you think that -- how would this piece of information get out to the
7 department if the assessment that was completed days before is the only thing that is put
8 out by the IICD?

9 A That's where that holistic approach comes in. It's not just the one
10 document or the one form that you're communicating or messaging. If I'm having a
11 conversation -- if I get some information January 6th at 3:00 a.m., and it needs to be put
12 out, it's highly unlikely that you're going to go back and change your assessment unless it
13 just has to be changed. But there is other ways of communicating those concerns.

14 So, you know, for law enforcement, a lot of times that information is going to be
15 shared at our roll calls by those operational commanders; those folks with boots on the
16 ground. You're giving it to them. You are holding those. And sometimes we do.
17 And I know this particular conversation is in reference to the 6th. But if you have some
18 information that comes in last minute, you host an operational -- we have a protocol set
19 up to call the command center. Everybody dials in. It's same thing. Those
20 operational commanders are receiving that information so that when they're going back
21 out into the field, they're sharing it with the folks that are more than likely that are going
22 to have to engage these individuals.

23 Q Was the uptick in views to the tunnels, the tunnel system, was that shared,
24 in your understanding, at roll call on January 6th?

25 A I don't know. That wasn't my area of responsibility. I didn't have a

1 conversation with that side of the House about what they shared at the roll call. And
2 those individuals are no longer here.

3 Q And is it fair to say then at that late period, January 5th, when you
4 mentioned January 5th, at 3:00 in the morning, let's say, the only way that it would get
5 down to -- because there is no update on the threat assessment, because there is no sort
6 of new product that gets put out, the way the person -- the only person who would be
7 able to communicate it down, the only other person on the chain would be Chad
8 Thomas?

9 A Not the only person. So Chad is at the top of the organizational chart. If
10 he receives it, then he could host a conference call with his deputies. If it's last minute,
11 there is information that needs to go out. We have radios. We send messages to
12 communications. There are other means of communicating that not just he has to say
13 it. He is giving it to his people.

14 And I don't know if that happened, but I'm just saying it doesn't have to come
15 direct from him. But he does have a means to communicate messaging. And no
16 different than you would as things are changing, operationally, during while you're
17 commanding an incident. And communications is one of the areas that broke down that
18 day. But there are ways to communicate messaging. In situations as the information
19 is changing or the threat is changing, you need to make adjustments.

20 Q I want to call your attention to another email, January 1st of 2021. In it,
21 Ms. Farnam forwards to Deputy Chief Gallagher, and others, some inspectors on the
22 intelligence side. The intelligence that was sent by Shane Lamond from the D.C.
23 Metropolitan Police Department. And it came in from a civilian. That tip says -- this
24 civilian says he lives right outside of D.C. -- I found a website planning terroristic behavior
25 on January 6th during the rally. Agitators from out of state will arrive and will try to stir

1 up trouble in D.C. There are detailed plans to storm Federal buildings, dress incognito,
2 and commit crimes against public officials. I strongly encourage that the D.C. Police
3 Department look at the links below."

4 And one of the links is a detailed plan on storming the Capitol in D.C. on
5 January 6th. And the link is from the Donald.win site. Other links include direct threat
6 to D.C. cops, calling for violence on January 6th, calling for shooting, calling for war in D.C.
7 So on and so forth.

8 I just want to first ask that particular piece of intelligence, including the supposed
9 detailed plan on storming the Capitol. Did you see it, that particular piece of
10 intelligence, before January 6th, of course?

11 A I don't remember. I do remember a conversation about the Donald.win,
12 but I don't remember the particulars. But I do -- that website is not foreign to me. It's
13 not like, you know, this is the first time I've heard of it.

14 Q Okay. And I think I have already asked about whether in terms of storming
15 the Capitol the conversations that were held with leadership on the operational side of
16 the department. So on this one, you said, you don't recall if you saw that particular
17 piece of intelligence, right?

18 A No, I don't recall.

19 Q I just want to also point to December 28th of 2020. It's an email from a
20 so-called internet expert tracking far right extremism. She indicates that there are
21 indications of storming the Capitol online for January 6th. Do you recall if you saw that?
22 It was sent to the Public Information Officer Or Office inbox at Capitol Police. Do you
23 recall if you saw that particular piece of intelligence?

24 A I would say that I did not see this.

25 Q And why is it that you feel confident saying you did not this versus the earlier

1 piece, you said you weren't sure if you had? What about this makes it clear to you that
2 you know you did not see this?

3 A When I received your packet, like I said, the Donald.win is not foreign to me.
4 I remember hearing that, maybe having a conversation about it. But this, when I
5 received this in the documentation that you sent over, I know I didn't see this prior to.

6 Q Okay. In terms of storming the Capitol, just in terms of the intelligence,
7 you do recall not specific pieces referring to it, but that there -- you knew that there were
8 chatter about it online before January 6th? Or that particular scenario, storming the
9 Capitol, you are not quite sure if you had been told that there was chatter about it?

10 A I don't remember the specific details about storming the Capitol. I
11 remember having conversations about the Donald.win. If that encompassed storming
12 the Capitol, I'm sure that it was probably said. I forget the second part of your question.
13 But, yeah, that term or conversation is -- I am confident that that's not the first time I
14 have heard it.

15 The PIO document would have gone to the Public Information Officer, and it says
16 it's on the 28th. I don't remember this document at all. So I wasn't familiar with it.
17 But the Donald.win, I am familiar. But the specifics, the conversations at that time, I
18 don't remember.

19 Q The last email I want to point your attention to is one sent by Ms. Farnam,
20 December 31st of 2020, in which she raises a concern that the permit requests for One
21 Nation Under God and Bryan Lewis may just be proxies for Stop the Steal. And then she
22 indicates her concern that Stop the Steal is the generally more violent group. And, you
23 know, sort of indicating that this may -- it maybe more coordinated. Right? That
24 putting in permits under different names. That really some of these, at least, are the
25 same group. It's a larger group than what they're putting out there.

1 I want to ask you about what was made of this warning, but not in terms of
2 denying the permit. It's my understanding Capitol Police has not denied a permit
3 previously. So I am less interested in denying the permit. I'm more interested in that
4 warning. What, if anything, operationally, was done about it? The concern that we
5 previously think that these groups that are demonstrating at the Capitol are separate
6 groups, but potentially some of them might actually be the same group, and they might
7 be Stop the Steal, which is known to be violent.

8 A I know that there were conversations about this. I know that there was an
9 inquiry with Tad, a general counsel either between Chief Gallagher and Tad. It could
10 have been Chief Gallagher, myself, and Chief Sund. But I know that there was a
11 conversation about this concern with general counsel.

12 Mr. DiBiase. And, of course, don't talk about what that was. But I think he is
13 asking were there any operational changes.

14 Is that your question, [REDACTED]? Did we make any operational changes as a result of
15 deciding not to deny this permit?

16 I think that's [REDACTED]'s question.

17 Ms. Pittman. Okay. Got you.

18 I don't know that they made any operational changes. I would have to go back
19 and look through my notes. And you said that we've already answered the question.
20 We wouldn't have denied the permit. But I don't remember the particulars on it. I do
21 remember the conversations.

22 BY [REDACTED]:

23 Q Okay. And so then you did -- at least for the record, you did, you were
24 aware about this warning that Ms. Farnam sort of elevated up the chain. I think it was
25 first to Deputy Chief Gallagher, but it made its way to you. Yes?

1 A Yes. Yes.

2 Q And were you a part of the conversations? And I think I get that the
3 conversations mostly centered on whether to deny the permit or not. But you were a
4 part of those conversations. Is that fair?

5 A I think that's fair.

6 Q The last thing I wanted to ask you is about the National Guard. What did
7 you think of the role of the D.C. National Guard was originally set to play on January 6th?
8 I know for a different department, the Metropolitan Police Department which works to
9 assist with traffic control points.

10 And did you agree, at least with the lack of a request by Capitol Police before
11 January 6th, did you before heading into January 6th see or envision or would prefer the
12 larger role for the D.C. National Guard, either outside the department in the streets of
13 D.C. but also potentially to assist Capitol Police with civil disturbance?

14 A I want to be sure I'm clear because you mentioned that National Guard had a
15 different role with -- I think you didn't say MPD, but it was with MPD to do traffic.

16 Q Yes.

17 A You're asking if -- or what did I think about National Guard either being
18 requested here to do traffic or be a part of the Civil Disturbance Unit? I just wanted to --

19 Q Yes let me put it more simply. Let me put it more simply. Should there
20 have been a larger role for the National Guard heading into January 6th?

21 A I know that the National Guard was requested. And I believe that the
22 National Guard was needed on January 6th.

23 Q And when you say it was requested, I'm sorry, do you mean by Capitol
24 Police; do you mean by Metropolitan Police Department? Who did you mean by you
25 knew that it was requested?

1 A I knew that it was requested by Chief Sund to the Capitol Police Board.

2 Q And, of course, you mean that prior to January 6th, in the lead to?

3 A Yes, sir.

4 Q And what was your view about that request and what role they would play in
5 your ideal world leading into January 6th?

6 A I agreed that we should make the request, and I also agreed that they should
7 not be here in a traffic control -- and I don't even think that that was ever even entertained like
8 we were even thinking about bringing -- that was totally for Metropolitan. And maybe
9 some from the Department of Defense may ask those questions, because usually they
10 want to know what role you want to use them in. But Tad is, of course, our -- gives us
11 guidance on what title we ask them for; if they're here in a law enforcement capacity.
12 And I think there is some different requirements. But I don't know that Capitol Police
13 ever made the suggestion that they should come here in a type of traffic control situation.
14 That wasn't our concern. It was more CDU.

15 Q Right. No, of course. And I know that that role was for Metropolitan
16 Police Department.

17 My last question is about offers of assistance, if you're aware. You've been
18 asked previously about it, and I know you were -- sometimes you had mentioned that you
19 weren't familiar with it. I wonder if now that some time has passed you have become
20 familiar with whether Capitol Police -- you know, some people use the word quote
21 rebuffed or denied, let's -- more neutral. Denied assistance from DHS, from FBI, or
22 DOJ - DOJ/FBI officials, from Park Police, some resources that they extended during
23 January 6th. Do you recall those offers of assistance and whether or not they were
24 accepted, and why or why not?

25 A First, let me say, you said that previously I said that I didn't remember if Park

1 Police, Metropolitan, and the FBI offered assistance?

2 Q It was not being familiar. I can quote. And previously: Are you familiar
3 with Loudoun County reaching out to Capitol Police to offer assistance? I am not
4 familiar with Loudoun County was your answer. Are you familiar with DHS reaching out
5 to Capitol Police to offer assistance? I am not familiar with DHS was your answer.

6 And so that's only those particular two. But I'm wondering if either you have
7 insight into either of those two or Park Police, FBI, and DOJ offering resources?

8 A So my answers are still the same. I am not aware of Loudoun County or
9 some of the other local police departments reaching out to Capitol Police. I'm not
10 aware of the FBI or the others that you mentioned as well. What I can say is that on
11 that call on January 5th, that was really geared towards the inauguration. There was
12 conversations about January 6th. And individuals on that call said they would be
13 available to Capitol Police. One specific I know was General Walker for the D.C. National
14 Guard.

15 I believe that there were offline conversations between Chief Sund and different
16 persons, whether it was Sergeant at Arms. But to whatever extent he may have had
17 direct requests from specific local law enforcement, I'm not aware of that.

18 And then I can also say that there was a discussion amongst the leadership,
19 and -- well amongst the leadership about making a request for local police departments.
20 We talked about it a little bit. The COG, the Mutual Council of Governments, and how
21 law enforcement makes that request. I do remember those conversation. And, of
22 course, that went into play on January 6th. But those specific ones you named, no, I'm
23 not aware of.

24 Q And in terms of the D.C. National Guard, you said that Chief Sund -- you are
25 aware of requests he made to the Capitol Board to have the D.C. National Guard be of

1 assistance. Is it your understanding that those requests were denied?

2 A That is my understanding, yes.

3 Q And you aren't yourself a part of those conversations. Is that correct?

4 A I was not on the phone. Like I said, a conference call or anything like that.

5 No, I was not.

6 Q And the source of this information would have been Chief Sund? To you?

7 A Yes.

8 Q Perfect. Thank you so very much. I am going to ask now that my
9 colleague, [REDACTED], continue with the questioning. I appreciate your time, Chief
10 Pittman.

11 A Thank you. All right.

12 [REDACTED] Good afternoon, Chief Pittman. How are you today?

13 Mr. DeBiase. Hey, [REDACTED] it's Tad. Could we just take a little short break for
14 her, if that's okay? I mean, for all of us.

15 [REDACTED] Absolutely. Do you want to take a 5-minute break?

16 Mr. DiBiase. Yeah, that would be great.

17 Chief Pittman. Perfect. Thank you, Bryan.

18 [REDACTED] You're welcome.

19 [Recess.]

1

2 [3:05 p.m.]

3 [Brief audio malfunction.]

4 BY [REDACTED]

5 Q And these -- this first bucket is not just limited to intelligence. Okay? But
6 having the benefit of your experience and the hindsight of January 6th, all the OIG flash
7 reports that have come out, all of the information that we've learned to date, from your
8 perspective, what are some things that need to change within the Capitol Police in order
9 to better prepare it to defend against something like this from happening again or
10 prevent something like this from happening again?

11 And then the second bucket of questions, after we deal with the first is, what
12 impediments, if any, do you think are in the way, whether they be political or social or
13 fiscal, are in the way of the Capitol Police being able to achieve some of the changes that
14 you think might be helpful?

15 So, with that table setting, let's start with the first bucket of questions, which is,
16 what do you think -- and I'm asking you from a broad perspective. Again, I'm not
17 limiting it specifically to intelligence, but given your current position, your former
18 position, your time as the acting chief, what do you think are some of the changes that
19 need to happen within the Capitol Police in order to better prepare it to prevent
20 something like this from happening again?

21 A Thank you, [REDACTED], for the question. There are a number of areas that
22 needed to be reviewed from top to bottom or changed. But I would say some of the
23 highlights would be communications, training. I would say technology. And maybe I'd
24 throw in infrastructure under that technology piece. Staffing is a big concern, and then
25 the equipment for the department.

1 Q So let's take each of those in course. So what is it about communication
2 that you think needs to be changed within the Capitol Police?

3 A It crosses a number of bureaus. I'll give you several examples. Just within
4 intelligence, and I know you said not limited to that, but the way that we were
5 communicating within IICD, in particular, the relationship between the director, assistant
6 director, supervisors, and the analysts, how they were communicating with the task force
7 officers that are embedded with the FBI on their respective units, whether it's behavioral
8 health analysis, violent crimes, the cyber task force, but making sure that those silos don't
9 exist.

10 The sharing of information between the intel side of the House to threats and how
11 countersurveillance is doing its operations. When you have a large scale event moving
12 over into more so the Operational Services Bureau or the Uniformed Services Bureau, the
13 way you're communicating with your officers, the rank and file. In law enforcement, we
14 have what's called the incident command system. And it's basically a hierarchy of who's
15 in charge, who's giving orders, who's giving direction.

16 But one of the lessons learned from January 6th is when you have a crowd of
17 thousands of individuals communicating via radio, give either direction to your officers or
18 to the crowd becomes particularly challenging. You cannot do that with just a bullhorn.
19 The radios became overwhelmed, so the traffic is getting jammed. And then officers in
20 the field are compromised if they can't hear, if they have on a ballistic helmet. So
21 making sure that they have the proper equipment so that they can communicate
22 effectively.

23 So I think those -- I think that was the first piece that you asked me about in terms
24 of communication.

25 I would say as far as the executive team or the leadership, making sure that the

1 leadership is communicating effectively first internally with each other and its staff, but
2 also externally with the stakeholders. Are they getting the intelligence briefs? Are
3 they being updated with the security posture? Are they being updated with the
4 assessments so that everybody is pretty much on the same page.

5 Q Could we talk a little bit about the executive senior leadership team, since
6 you brought that up. You know, it's clear to me in the time I've got to spend with your
7 organization that the Capitol Police has a diverse portfolio of responsibilities. The
8 people that you are charged to protect within the Capitol Grounds come from diverse
9 backgrounds. And within the sort of line officer level, there seems to be a great deal of
10 diversity in officers.

11 What are your thoughts about -- do you think that that diversity is represented in
12 the senior leadership team? And if yes or no, why? And if not, what are some things
13 we can do to address that?

14 A So, no, I do not think that diversity is represented enough within the senior
15 leadership team. I think we've made stride -- strides to start to address that. We're
16 really happy about the changes that we have made, but I think that we could always
17 improve. And I think that we have to review our policies and procedures to make sure
18 that from hire to retire you're looking at that and always keeping diversity in the
19 forefront.

20 So once you're getting a diverse group of officers in the door or even on your
21 civilian side, do we have specific programs in place that promote career development?
22 Who are those individuals coming from diverse backgrounds? Are we having individuals
23 review our policies and practices for promotions, for example, to make sure that they're
24 fair and equitable to a diverse population so that I have just as much as an opportunity as
25 other individuals to be on that scale, if I so choose? Are we recognizing -- do we have

1 any type of talent acquisition that we're recognizing talent? And what are we doing in
2 terms of mentorship or internship to make sure that we're developing that talent so that
3 one day they would be in those executive chairs?

4 So I think that there is accomplishments that have been made, but there's
5 definitely more work to do.

6 Q I appreciate that. And I appreciate you going through that explanation.
7 And it raises, in my mind, a question: What are some of the changes that you have
8 made in that regard, in terms of the diversity in the senior leadership -- on to the senior
9 leadership team issue?

10 A So I would just say, just in the last year, within this last year, we -- it hasn't
11 been rolled out yet, and I see Tad giving me the eye.

12 Mr. DiBiase. No.

13 Chief Pittman. Okay. We have selected a diversity officer. That person will
14 be reporting directly to the chief of police. And like I said previously for intelligence, we
15 believe that the change starts at the top. So that person is in the process of completing
16 background. So we believe in the next, you know, coming weeks or so we'll have
17 somebody here that will specifically be looking at those policies, procedures, asking us as
18 the executives, what are you all doing, what have you done? And then bringing us a
19 plan, a roadmap, so to speak, where do we want to be 5 years from now, 3 years from
20 now, and what things are we going to put in place to get there?

21 For example, on Tad's side of the House with general counsel, we've brought in
22 some new folks to his side of the House with diverse backgrounds. Eventually, Capitol
23 Police will be doing a promotional process. I know it's a priority of Chief Manger to
24 make sure that there is more diversity within those upper ranks, your deputy chiefs and
25 above. So all of those things will continue to develop.

1 On the recruitment side, I believe that the changes we've made is, maybe
2 somewhere around March after January 6th, I assigned an inspector over the Office of
3 Background and Investigations and Recruiting. We previously had a lieutenant. But as
4 we all are aware now, we knew that from the recommendations from the OIG, as well as
5 General Honore's report, there were hundreds of officers that Capitol Police have
6 identified that were short. So we knew that we had to have a senior leader oversee that
7 program from FY '22, I believe, to FY '26. We now have a roadmap to bring in hundreds
8 of officers. And, with that, we are considering diversity at the forefront.

9 So we want to make sure we're tapping into historically Black colleges and
10 universities, we're tapping into our Asian communities, we're tapping into officers from
11 various geographic regions because members are all over the country. We've
12 established regional field offices since January 6th. The first two are in Florida and
13 California. So with the different regions, we know that there's different climates of
14 threats. We want to have those relationships with local law enforcement so that we're
15 addressing those members' concerns with boots on the ground.

16 So bringing in a holistic approach and having someone help create that roadmap
17 for us from the time we bring them in on up to their career development I think is going
18 to be key going forward. And we have done numerous things to start to address those
19 concerns.

20 Q I appreciate that, Chief Pittman.

21 And that actually addresses the staffing question that I had. I'm sorry, I don't
22 think we talked about that because I think you covered that well.

23 One of the other categories you mentioned that you saw a potential for
24 improvement was technology. Tell me what your thoughts are about that.

25 A So when it comes to technology, one of the things that we did relatively

1 quickly after the 6th was we issued all of our officers cell phones. As █ asked the
2 question and as well as others, how are we distributing or disseminating that intelligence
3 information? Should we still be having kind of old school conversations and just passing
4 out information at roll calls? As we know that there are generational differences, a lot
5 of times the senior management, like myself, are a lot older, but young people
6 communicate a lot via technology, very -- you don't often see them without their cell
7 phones. So that's a great platform to use to quickly disseminate intelligence
8 information.

9 So now that they have those phones, we are able to give them a daily intelligence
10 report. They receive daily products. And I believe the chief testified just the other day
11 so much so that some officers feel like, whoa, you're giving me too much information.
12 But we, as the chief stated, rather give too much than not enough. And we're able to
13 quickly put out information as, you know, this threat environment around here is
14 dynamic. It's constantly changing. So we're able to quickly push that information out.

15 I think more work has to be done in terms of the infrastructure and using
16 technology to really survey this campus. And I know there has been a lot of discussion
17 or displeasure expressed in regards to having an open campus. As we know, some of
18 our peers or counterparts down at the White House, they have fencing. And I don't
19 think that fencing is an only option to say that we can mitigate any challenges to the
20 campus. But I do think there's a lot of other technology that other companies use,
21 embassies use, other countries use that we should at least explore those possibilities. I
22 think it's going to take a significant amount of financial resources.

23 If we did have some type of underground structures that could come up, if we
24 change the landscaping to buy law enforcement agency time to slow down a crowd size
25 the magnitude of January 6th. But I think now is the time to have those conversations

1 and say how much are we willing to invest in our safety to prevent a January 6th from
2 happening again.

3 Q I appreciate that, Chief. And that does cover nicely the infrastructure
4 question which I had next.

5 So having spent some time talking about the things that need to be -- that need to
6 be addressed and the changes that you've already made in that regard, looking
7 prospectively towards the future, understanding, as you said, there's still work to be done
8 in many areas, what, if any, impediments or obstacles are in the way of Capitol Police
9 achieving that?

10 You know, one of the responsibilities of the committee is not just to identify what
11 went wrong and how it went wrong, but also to identify and make recommendations for
12 what we can do to prevent it from happening again, you know. And that's a pretty
13 broad ledge, right?

14 And so, you know, from your perspective, based on your experience, what things
15 do you think are in the way that we should be thinking about ways to either get under or
16 over or through in order to help the Capitol Police get to where it needs to be or wants to
17 be in the future?

18 A I think that one of the ways -- and, of course, there are many -- that the
19 Congress could help Capitol Police is maybe some of that cultural change. And by
20 cultural change I mean, some of it has to be a mind-set that we're not just going to be a
21 reactive force, but we're going to proactively address future challenges that relate to
22 security.

23 So I'm not just responding or I think by and large Capitol Police was taking an
24 incremental approach to addressing security needs. And we -- we get that you have to
25 be stewards of the budget, good financial stewards. However, sometimes there are

1 limitations that I think that that has put us in that we've had to make hard choices. I've
2 got to -- the budget is only so big, and I can only address so many things within that.

3 So maybe constant analysis and review on what are we looking to address in the
4 future, not just what's in front of us but what we think is on the horizon, what's coming,
5 whether it be some type of cyber type of threats, what are we doing to address, again,
6 the infrastructure?

7 By and large, I've been here over 20 years now. I came on right at 9/11. And I
8 believe that was probably under Chief Terry Gainer that we first started to change some
9 of the infrastructure around the campus. So prior to that, those barricades and barriers
10 in the streets and things, none of that existed. It was much more open. And I
11 remember the opposition that he faced when he made those suggestions back then.
12 Folks did not want those things in place. And now we've adjusted. But by and large,
13 it's been the same.

14 So maybe a cultural mind-set that says security has to be constantly evolving and
15 you don't want to be behind the eight ball, you want to be in front of it. So what are we
16 doing as a community to address our needs before these types of events have a
17 possibility of happening?

18 Q Understood, ma'am.

19 And it raises a question in my mind. You know, the United States Capitol Police
20 is unique in that you have over 400 individual clients, right? And each of those clients
21 have support and staff. And so there's a lot of, at least from the outside looking in, a lot
22 of sort of external -- what I'll call external input into Capitol Police operations.

23 From a perspective of who has the final say in what the security posture should
24 be, whether that is strategic, to your point, being proactive and strategic thinking about
25 stuff in the future or tactical, do you feel as if there's a right balance between the Capitol

1 Police as sort of the people with the expertise to carry that out and the clients, or is there
2 some sort of imbalance that maybe we need to think about addressing?

3 A I think that it's somewhat balanced. I think that there's a great relationship
4 between the chief of police as well as the Capitol Police Board. I do think that it is a
5 challenge, particularly at times for the chief to make security decisions, when you can
6 be -- when you have a lot of folks that you have to answer to. So I do think the chief
7 needs to have a certain level of autonomy to make security decisions. Because, for me,
8 at the end of the day, the chief is going to be held accountable for whatever successes or
9 failures take place relating to security on the campus.

10 So, in my mind, if I am going to be held accountable for having CDU and posturing
11 them, or bike rack, or fencing, I want to own that. And I don't mind taking on the
12 responsibility, and I know others don't as well, but give me that flexibility to do my job.

13 Q Thank you, Chief. I appreciate your time. I think those are all the
14 questions that I have for you. So, again, thank you for your time.

15 I'll turn it back over to Robin to see if he has any additional questions.

16 A Thank you.

17 BY [REDACTED]:

18 Q Yes. Chief Pittman, I just kind of wanted to run through your day on
19 January 6th. So if you could just start with where you were from the morning until you
20 started to get word or you started to see the crowds from the Ellipse move over, march
21 over to the Capitol.

22 A The morning of January 6th I responded, and I don't know what time. I'm
23 sure it was in the wee hours of the morning. Responded, and I believe there were a few
24 briefs or meetings, but primarily the command staff was in the command center. And
25 there were incidents happening. And I don't have my timeline in front of me, but very

1 early on, Capitol Police was taking calls of a man with a gun in this part of D.C.
2 Metropolitan was making arrests.

3 So as we are taking in information, we're pushing out that information to our
4 officers. I had countersurveillance teams out and deployed. We also had some
5 Members, if I'm not mistaken, down at the Ellipse, so we had dignitary protection
6 deployed outside as well as inside of the campus.

7 But as the morning continued, I believe that it started with the bomb threats. I
8 don't remember the exact time of the first one. I believe it was around between 10 and
9 10:30, 10:38, something like that. We started making decisions to handle each of those
10 threats. So it started with the bomb threats. I think there were several arrests of
11 individuals with guns. And then we had the suspicious person in vehicle where there
12 were explosives found. So all of this is occurring before the crowds started to come on
13 the grounds.

14 Q Do you recall whether Vice President-elect Harris was in the DNC at the time
15 that one such device was found outside of the headquarters there?

16 A I don't recall that from that day, but I've since, of course, seen that in various
17 reports. But I don't recall that from that particular day.

18 Q So as you're sitting there in the command center through this morning,
19 hearing these reports, as you said, of the explosive devices, purported explosive devices
20 and certain arrests, who's there at the command center with you?

21 A Chief Sund, Chief Thomas, I believe Chief Gallagher, Tad, probably Jack
22 Donohue -- not probably -- Jack was there. I can't remember if Julie was there. Maybe
23 they both were in the command center. It was a full house around the dais, so pretty
24 much all of the operational commanders, with the exception of Deputy Chief Waldow was
25 out in the field. And I can't think of anybody else right now. I'm pretty sure I'm

1 forgetting somebody. But for the most part, the command staff was in the command
2 center. The executive team was in the command center. And we did have an
3 operational -- a couple of field commanders out in the field.

4 Q And so as these, you know, calls are being fielded, what are -- what is your
5 role that day as you understood it? What was it that you were sort of going to be
6 heading?

7 A So my primary role is always going to be for the Dignitary Protection Division
8 and being responsible for the congressional leadership. So within Protective Service
9 Bureau, if there is a hierarchy, so to speak, DPD and making sure that the leadership is
10 safe is going to be priority number one. Making sure that you have sufficient resources
11 in place to ensure their safety, if you needed to relocate to another position, what have
12 you. That's the primary responsibility.

13 All of those other, whether it's countersurveillance, threat units, intelligence units,
14 they are feeding the beast, so to speak. They're feeding that operational center to
15 ensure that you can make sure that priority number one is taken care of.

16 Q So as we're still here before any of the crowds have shifted over and there
17 were, as you said, some bomb scares elsewhere and some arrests, is there anything that
18 requires you to either shift resources or as it pertains to your area of responsibility, or is
19 everything sort of -- again, before the crowds are moved over, nothing is either out of
20 ordinary in terms of your sort of area?

21 A No. There are requirements that -- tactically speaking, there were some
22 changes made that I probably wouldn't go into detail on this call in an open forum. But,
23 yes, tactically speaking, there were changes made as the crowds became more violent or
24 there's more people. We need to move differently so that we make sure that we have a
25 backup plan if things go left.

1 Q So can you just go through, without getting into details, to who was moved
2 where? Just what were your concerns I guess? Again, this is before, and if there's any
3 marching from the Ellipse before the President's speech, what were -- in terms of, you
4 know, your area of responsibility protecting the Members of Congress, what were your
5 concerns that you were seeing out there that made -- that precipitated these tactical
6 changes?

7 A You're always concerned if you need to have movement of the leadership as
8 well as the congressional body. You need to have routes in place or resources in place
9 to make that happen. And so you make tactical decisions based on the information
10 you're receiving. So if there is a need to get folks out that, you can do that and do that
11 in a safe and efficient manner.

12 Q But I guess my question is about what was happening on January 6th. Was
13 there anything, at this point in the story, that led you to think that you needed to either
14 change those plans or go through with those plans in moving congressional leadership?

15 It's my understanding at this point the certification is still scheduled to move
16 forward. The Vice President makes his way to the Capitol around noon. Is it fair to say
17 that nothing major is changing at least until or before the crowds move over from the
18 Ellipse?

19 A Yes. Yes. That is correct. Yes.

20 Q Okay. So maybe lead me to the first moment that something does change
21 in terms of the security picture in your area of responsibility, of course, on January 6th,
22 whenever that happens, whenever it is that you first start to realize that there is
23 something afoot.

24 A I don't know if it's when maybe we're at the third device -- and all of these
25 things are kind of happening simultaneously, so it is hard to pick apart, oh, this was the

1 trigger, and when this happened, we did B. It wasn't necessarily one thing, but things
2 are happening pretty quickly and at the same time.

3 But at some point, there was an evacuation of the Cannon -- or part of the
4 Cannon. And I'd have to go back through my notes, Robin, to see when we started to
5 say, you know, we need to reposition. I would say it had to probably be a little later as
6 the crowds are getting larger and more aggressive. And what exact time that happened,
7 I don't know. I used to have the timelines remembered from the hearings, but I don't
8 have it off the top of my head.

9 Q I'm less interested in times and more just what you're observing.

10 A Okay. We're observing aggressive behavior. The officers at this point are
11 being attacked.

12 Q Well -- Capitol Police officers at the Capitol Grounds?

13 A Yes.

14 Q Okay. Well, let me back up a little bit then. Were you guys -- were you
15 listening at all to the President's speech at the Ellipse?

16 A We had it on. It was on in the command center.

17 Q And, again, you tell me if you recall this, if it stood out to you when the
18 President mentions, you know, we're going to go march now, right, he made it appear as
19 though he himself was also going to go from the Ellipse to the Capitol. Did that stick out
20 in your mind? Did that worry you? Did that concern you? What did you think about
21 that?

22 A To put it in context, we have phone lines blowing up, radios blowing up,
23 hundreds of officers starting to engage, and that was well before the President's speech
24 ended. I do remember that from the timeline. So if the protesters started marching
25 here at 12:30ish or 12:38, 12:40, for some reason that sticks out in my mind, I don't think

1 the President's speech concluded until 1 o'clock or 1:10. So we were having problems
2 on the campus well before his speech ended. So we would have been mitigating threats
3 before he says whatever he said. So we're putting out fires well before that speech
4 ends.

5 Q Okay. And so you're alluding -- how did you figure out that some of the
6 group at the Ellipse were peeling off and already starting their march to the Capitol
7 before the President's speech had even ended? Who -- how'd you get that intelligence?
8 How did you figure that out?

9 A We have folks in the field. We have a robust camera system within the
10 communication or command center. We have every law enforcement agency in the
11 region represented. So on days like that, you're getting intel from MPD. MPD has an
12 operations center or a JOC set up. Park Police, Secret Service, all of those commanders
13 are housed within the Capitol Police Command Center. So you're getting information.
14 That way you're getting information from our folks that we have out in the field, we're
15 getting information from their folks, and we're monitoring the campus via the camera
16 system.

17 Q And so had you -- was that a surprise to you at all the sort of marching from
18 the Ellipse to the Capitol or was that -- was everyone basically anticipating that that was
19 going to happen?

20 A Yes.

21 Q You guys foresaw that -- previously -- that that was going to happen. That's
22 what you're saying yes to?

23 A Yes, I am saying that we foresaw that there was going to be demonstrations
24 on our grounds.

25 Q Okay. And so before -- as you see these crowds peeling off, before they

1 interact with any Capitol Police officers, is there any warning that you receive intelligence
2 as you could see plainly before your eyes with the cameras or from your partners there,
3 anything that tipped you off about the tone or the mood, let's say before they get
4 aggressive with the officers at the racks, at the bike racks?

5 A We were getting information about the tone, some of the things that people
6 are marching and saying. But we're also aware of the arrests that are being made, and
7 that is a serious concern to us, those individuals that are armed. So we want to address
8 those things.

9 But as far as a crowd itself being violent before they reached the grounds, there
10 was no intelligence that were saying we've got a group of 30 that are armed and they're
11 doing A, B, C, and D. So it's, like I said, a lot of moving parts on the day of, between that,
12 the pipe bombs being placed around the city, around -- adjacent to the campus, as well as
13 that vehicle that had the explosives and ammunition in it as well.

14 Q And so before there's any interaction between the protesters and police, it
15 sounds as though there were two things, the sort of arrests from that day, which I take it
16 dealt a lot with folks being armed. Is that right?

17 A Yes. Arrests, reports of folks being armed, reports of MPD arresting
18 individuals with weapons. Then the first suspicious package I believe was in front of the
19 court. That was the very first one. And then the pipe bombs that we had to address as
20 the day progressed.

21 Q And the second piece of that you mentioned is you were hearing reports
22 about rhetoric, violent rhetoric. Do you recall some of what you remember hearing?
23 Do you recall or did anyone advise you of threats to the Vice President or maybe animus
24 towards law enforcement officers being traitors or so on and so forth? Anything like
25 that that you -- was being told to you?

1 A I don't recall the specifics from that day, like in the manner in which you
2 asked the question, no.

3 Q In terms of the rhetoric, you don't recall what sort of -- but you do recall
4 being told about some of the rhetoric. Is that right?

5 A Yes. Yes, I do. Yeah.

6 Q Okay. And then you -- so now at this point you mentioned that there was
7 aggression between, once they reached Capitol Police, between Capitol Police and the
8 rioters. So just walk me through what you're seeing and what you're doing -- you
9 yourself of course -- throughout the -- throughout the attack.

10 A So I want to say initially they started to engage the officers. We're
11 watching it on the west side of the campus, probably on the Pennsylvania Avenue
12 walkway. You'll see the exchanges between those -- and those officers kind of back up.
13 We also are watching the engagements or interaction between those on the east side,
14 because it's happening almost at the same time.

15 So my role doesn't change as far as what my primary area of responsibility. At
16 that time, the leadership is safe. The building hasn't been breached. The legislative
17 process continues. So -- but we are paying attention. There's definitely
18 communications between the countersurveillance units and the DPD agents, inside,
19 outside, making sure that we are tracking the movement of leadership and such.

20 Q So walk me through when maybe something does change in terms of
21 potentially when backup from MPD is called. When is it that the aggression escalates
22 and a change in resources is required or requested?

23 A I would say that the aggression escalates between -- 1 o'clock and 2 o'clock
24 would be probably the peak times of the aggression. MPD is called probably around
25 12:58, 1 o'clock, give or take, you know, a few minutes here or there. They arrive.

1 They -- very quickly they start to engage. At that time, they are still -- the Capitol still
2 hasn't been breached. But DPD is starting to posture as they're moving closer to the
3 buildings. And I don't remember the exact time of the breach, but then that's when we
4 start to say, okay, we've got to make moves to get the leadership out.

5 Q And so is that when -- is that sort of your area of responsibility?

6 A That is exactly my area of responsibility. Yes.

7 Q Okay. And so what do you start coordinating and doing?

8 A I wouldn't feel comfortable having that conversation on this call about how
9 we evacuate the leadership or how we maneuver to put things in position to move them.
10 I -- I'd rather have that in a more closed forum.

11 Q I guess I'm less interested, again, in where people ended up or who led them
12 where. I'm interested in what you did. So what are -- what are you literally physically
13 doing? Who are you calling? Who are you talking to? What are you -- I'm
14 making -- what are you making? What are you constructing? What are you
15 coordinating? That's what I'm interested in you talking about, if you could.

16 A Yes. And I think for me it's probably one and the same. So I am giving
17 direction to Chief Gallagher and I believe it's Inspector Snyder. They're reporting back to
18 me. We need to move person A to a specific location. We need to reposition vehicles
19 and stage so that they get out safely. So I'm coordinating those movements. And then
20 I need to have accountability so that we can report back to the Sergeant at Arms that
21 these individuals have moved to location X and they are safe.

22 Q Who are you speaking with mostly on the ground over at the Capitol?

23 A The Sergeant at Arms representatives, as well as intermittently Chief Sund
24 and the Deputy Sergeant at Arms for both the House -- well, I'll say for the Senate. I'm
25 not sure of the individual's title on the House side. But I have a House side Sergeant at

1 Arms represented as well. That communication is constant.

2 Q Are you aware of who maybe Chief Waldow is -- Chief Waldow is at the
3 grounds of Capitol, right?

4 A Yes.

5 Q And I think he's sort of also serving as a person on the ground, kind of
6 feeding information back to the command center. Is that correct?

7 A He's -- I don't know if he's feeding information back to the command center.
8 He is on the grounds at the Capitol because he is the CDU commander. So those guys
9 out there that are fighting and having -- being attacked by the protesters, he is in charge
10 of those individuals.

11 Q Within the command center, I guess, and I think you mentioned maybe
12 Deputy Chief Gallagher, but is there any one else who you're sort of corresponding with
13 and speaking to?

14 A It would be Inspector Snyder. There were probably -- and I can't remember
15 who the DPD supervisor that was in the command center that day, but there was a DPD
16 supervisor. There was also a supervisor that's in charge of this countersurveillance unit
17 that came into the command center. Inspector Mitchell was in charge of the threat
18 assessments section, so she was there.

19 So I'm communicating with them from Protective Services Bureau, as well as the
20 Sergeant at Arms representatives that are in the command center.

21 Q If you could just then go on now. You know, we've had the breach you
22 mentioned and you're coordinating moving Members and leadership to safe places. If
23 you could just go on as to what happens next in the day for you.

24 A So what happens next in a day for me is I start coordinating with those same
25 Deputy Sergeant at Arms and a House side representative on the movement of the actual

1 body, the entire Congress, you know, the House and the Senate. So we have specific
2 locations that are designated that we trained, that if there is some type of compromise of
3 those Houses, we need to move individuals to their safe location.

4 And, of course, that was challenging that day because a lot of individuals were
5 barricaded in their offices, locked in, or routes may have been blocked. So I'm
6 coordinating with the Sergeant at Arms as well as the boots on the ground. We had
7 CERT teams within the building that were going in and extracting Members, as well as
8 their staff, to get them to those safe locations.

9 Q You mentioned to us previously that the command center was
10 overwhelmed, some people were not making decisions, and so you started making
11 operational decisions outside of your area of responsibility, which included locking down
12 the Capitol.

13 A Yes.

14 Q Can you go into that, please?

15 A Yes. So I believe the time at this point is maybe a little before 2, right
16 around 2 p.m. I ordered a -- the first lockdown was of the Capitol Building itself.
17 Based on my operational experience and years that I spent in Uniformed Services Bureau,
18 the Capitol division is trained in that respective area that procedurally they can lock the
19 building down. And what that means for us is nobody in and nobody out. And that's
20 regardless if it's police officers that are outside of those doors and what have you. It
21 could be Members. It doesn't matter. When you order a lockdown, nobody in and
22 nobody out.

23 In addition to that, I started the coordination for getting the law
24 enforcement -- additional law enforcement assets here on the campus and then getting
25 them deployed. So I do remember that General Counsel Tad was doing the

1 administrative part of sending over the paperwork that needs to be signed so that we can
2 start to call in PG County, Arlington. We had folks come -- law enforcement agencies
3 come from as far away as the New Jersey State Police.

4 So coordinating that is pretty -- a pretty large responsibility because, not only do
5 you have to make sure that they are protected under the law, they have to be sworn in.
6 There are some basic principles that you need to go over regarding use of force and how
7 you're going to deploy. There are specialized units. But you need to have
8 accountability. If you are bringing in, I believe -- looking back, we probably brought in
9 about somewhere between 1,200 and 1,400 outside police officers. We have to know
10 where those officers are and what they're doing.

11 So we started -- so I started to take Protective Services Bureau resources, as well
12 as the chief's staff, to set up operations adjacent to headquarters building, specifically lot
13 16, so that we could have a check-in procedure for those units so they could stage
14 vehicles. We know from previous large scale events, for example, the Navy yard, one of
15 the things that can happen is if you have hundreds of resources coming in and you don't
16 stage them appropriately, now you lock up the whole campus. Nobody can move
17 because you got cars here, fire trucks there, ambulance. It has to be done in an orderly
18 fashion.

19 So I started staging those resources and coordinating with FBI as well as
20 Metropolitan. I had several conversations with Chief Contee throughout that time
21 period, during that -- during the peak of what I would say were the breaches during that
22 day. So coordinating those outside resources.

23 And then I also pivoted to coordinating, how do we go to our plan B? We have
24 rehearsed or practiced and trained to have alternative locations and sites set up so that if
25 Congress decides continuity of government -- if they decide that they want to convene

1 somewhere else, I started putting in -- or giving direction to put assets and resources in
2 place so that when that decision was made, we've already enacted those plans.

3 Chief Pittman. Is that okay? That's not too far?

4 Mr. DiBiase. Uh-uh.

5 BY [REDACTED]:

6 Q In terms of lot 16, did you go there personally or coordinating by phone with
7 someone over at lot 16?

8 A No, I did not go there personally. I directed my staff to go there.

9 Specifically it was Inspector Jeanita Mitchell and Lieutenant Maria Willis.

10 Q And you talked about that sort of being the place to stage vehicles but also
11 as the location maybe for swearing in of certain officers. Is that where the D.C. National
12 Guard ultimately were sworn in before responding, if you know?

13 A I cannot say that all of the D.C. National Guard was sworn in at that location.
14 There may have been a large contingent of D.C. National Guard, because D.C. National
15 Guard came much later. And I don't have the timeline of which groups came when.

16 But to start the process going, I put the Protective Services Bureau out there. I
17 can tell you they didn't even have appropriate attire. We dress in plain clothes or the
18 folks that work for us. But they grabbed whatever they could find, police jackets, went
19 out and set up the tables so that they can track each and every officer that's here.
20 They're giving the appropriate swearing in and use of force messaging, and then
21 deploying them, sending them where we need them to go.

22 Because like we know now, there were breaches on both sides of the buildings
23 and these folks are inside of the Capitol. So you have to deploy them with your officers.
24 They don't know the layout of the land. We're telling them to respond to north
25 barricade. They don't know the north from the south. So how do you communicate

1 with them? You have to have an officer with a radio and so forth. So all of that takes
2 quite of bit of coordination before you can start deploying those units. So that's what I
3 started doing in addition to the Protective Services Bureau responsibilities.

4 Q Were you a part of any conversation or had the opportunity to overhear a
5 conversation between Chief Sund when he was making a request for the D.C. National
6 Guard? There's been a lot of it in the press, a 2:30 phone call to DOD officials. I'm just
7 wondering if you had any visibility into that call.

8 A I did not. I saw Chief Sund on the phone, but I -- no.

9 Q Okay. If you could just wrap up by -- you know, I think you've laid out what
10 you were doing during much of the breach, during much of the sort of the peak moments
11 of the attack. How did the rest of your night basically end?

12 A Chaotic. Bringing in those additional resources. By that time, as the
13 evening progressed, there was constant communication between myself and the
14 deputies. At some point, I knew that they were to their safe locations. You're getting
15 less reports of folks being barricaded. Then the Congress has to make a decision on
16 whether they're going to reconvene that night or are they going to reconvene here or in
17 another location. So still putting in resources, assets in place, if they determine they
18 want to reconvene elsewhere.

19 But in addition to that, we need to now conduct sweeps and continuously get
20 these folks out of the building with the help of Metropolitan and all the other law
21 enforcement agencies. We were able to bring in, I can't tell you how many K-9 teams
22 from around the region. The FBI helped us out tremendously.

23 But the Capitol Building, as you know, is a huge building. And we need to search
24 every square inch where we know these individuals have gone, that they didn't leave any
25 devices -- we had dealt with the bombs all day -- behind, so that if and when the Congress

1 does reconvene, they can do so in a safe manner. So we continue to push individuals
2 out.

3 There were, I think, 40 -- 40 or so arrests toward the end of that evening. I can't
4 remember exactly what time. I do remember sitting with the MPD commander, it was
5 Jeff Carroll, and -- Assistant Chief Carroll and Assistant Chief Morgan Kane in the
6 commander center. But I can just remember seeing the last of the CDU units pushing
7 those folks out, down the avenues. And once we concluded the sweeps, the Congress
8 did convene. And I don't know -- I think that could have been 3 in the morning. It
9 is -- that was a long day. So I don't remember the exact time, but they did reconvene
10 and they reconvened here.

11 Q And were you still at the command center at the point that they reconvened
12 to continue the session?

13 A We were still here, yes.

14 [REDACTED] Okay. I'm going to now ask if [REDACTED] -- I said it wrong.

15 [REDACTED] I say it always wrong -- if she has any questions.

16 Chief Pittman. I think you're muted.

17 [REDACTED] She's muted.

18 [REDACTED] Okay. I just have one question about the kind of towards the
19 end of the clearing of the Capitol. Did you have any interaction with or remember who
20 in particular you interacted with from DOJ or the Bureau or DHS for any matters, anyone
21 stand out at you?

22 Mr. DiBiase. [REDACTED], it's a hill hard to hear. I don't know, something maybe
23 with your mike. We're having -- a little hard hearing you. We cranked it up too.

24 [REDACTED] Let me see. Can you hear me now?

25 Mr. DiBiase. That's definitely better, like, leaning in maybe.

1 BY [REDACTED]:

2 Q I just want to ask if you have any sense of who took over kind of leading the
3 coordination to clear the Capitol. Was it your sense that Federal agencies were taking
4 that role or was Capitol Police in charge?

5 A No. It was definitely Capitol Police. I assigned, and I don't think he was
6 deputy chief at the time, but it was Jason Bell.

7 Mr. DiBiase. He was not.

8 Chief Pittman. He was not. Okay.

9 So it was Inspector Jason Bell that coordinated with the individuals that we had
10 from the Federal asset. So I believe Steve D'Antonio(ph), and I know I'm probably
11 royally messing up his last name. Steve came up, was in the command center. We
12 probably had some ATF representative. And I don't remember -- I work with Steve all
13 the time, so that's why I know he was there. But there were some other Federal
14 agencies that came up and offered their assistance. But Jason Bell was the lead
15 coordinator, along with our Capitol Police assets, our dogs going over and participating in
16 those sweeps.

17 Q So it's your understanding that Jason Bell was coordinating with those DOJ,
18 FBI, ATF reps on the ground?

19 A He was.

20 Q Okay. That's great. I'd been wondering who that person was, so I
21 appreciate you identifying him.

22 [REDACTED] I don't have anything else, [REDACTED]

23 Thank you again for your time. I know this is probably the -- multiple times
24 you've testified about this issue.

25 Chief Pittman. Thank you.

1 [REDACTED] Great.

2 My last question is if there's anything that we didn't ask you that you wanted to
3 share with the committee.

4 Chief Pittman. Nothing that I can think of.

5 [REDACTED] With that, we very much thank you for your time and your
6 frankness in speaking with us.

7 Have a good afternoon, everyone.

8 Chief Pittman. All right. You too.

9 [Whereupon, at 4:04 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

1 Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee

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4

4 I have read the foregoing ____ pages, which contain the correct transcript of the
5 answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.

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10 Witness Name

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Witness Name

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Date