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Trabalho Prático 1

Grupo 17, constituído por:

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Pergunta 3:

Use o Sagemath para:

- a) Construir uma classe Python que implemente o EdDSA a partir do "standard" FIPS186-5
- i. A implementação deve conter funções para assinar digitalmente e verificar a assinatura.
- ii. A implementação da classe deve usar uma das "Twisted Edwards Curves" definidas no standard e escolhida na iniciação da classe: a curva "edwards25519" ou "edwards448".

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In [ ]: import os
   import hashlib
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Curva de Edwards25519

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In [ ]: # Edwards 22519
        p = (2^255)-19
        K = GF(p)
        a = K(-1)
        d = -K(121665)/K(121666)
        ed25519 = {
        'b' : 256,
        'Px' : K(15112221349535400772501151409588531511454012693041857206046113283949847762202),
        'Py' : K(46316835694926478169428394003475163141307993866256225615783033603165251855960),
        'L' : ZZ(2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493), ## ordem do subgrupo primo
        'n' : 254,
        'h' : 8
In [ ]: def EdDSA():
            # Função que inicializa toda a instância e os valores globais necessários à sua execução
            def init (self):
                # EdDSA has 11 parameters:
                # 1) An odd prime power p. EdDSA uses an elliptic curve over the finite field GF(p).
                # 2 ) An integer b with 2^(b-1) > p. EdDSA public keys have exactly b bits, and EdDSA signatures have exactly 2*b bits.
                # b is recommended to be a multiple of 8, so public key and signature lengths are an integral number of octets.
                # 3) A (b-1)-bit encoding of elements of the finite field GF(p).
                # 4) A cryptographic hash function H producing 2*b-bit output. Conservative hash functions (i.e., hash functions where it is
                # infeasible to create collisions) are recommended and do not have much impact on the total cost of EdDSA.
                # 5) An integer c that is 2 or 3. Secret EdDSA scalars are multiples of 2°c.
                # The integer c is the base-2 logarithm of the so-called cofactor.
                # 6) An integer n with c \le n \le b. Secret EdDSA scalars have exactly n + 1 bits, with the top bit (the 2^n position)
                # always set and the bottom c bits always cleared.
                #7) A non-square element d of GF(p). The usual recommendation is to take it as the value nearest to zero
                # that gives an acceptable curve.
                \# 8) A non-zero square element a of GF(p). The usual recommendation for best performance is
                \# a = -1 \text{ if } p \mod 4 = 1, \text{ and } a = 1 \text{ if } p \mod 4 = 3.
                # 9) An element B != (0,1) of the set E = { (x,y) is a member of GF(p) x GF(p) such that a * x^2 + y^2 = 1 + d * x^2 * y^2 }
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10) An odd prime L such that [L]B = 0 and 2^c * L = #E. The number #E (the number of points on the curve) is part of the standard # data provided for an elliptic curve E, or it can be computed as cofactor * order. # 11) A "prehash" function PH. PureEdDSA means EdDSA where PH is the identity function, i.e., PH(M) = M. # HashEdDSA means EdDSA where PH generates a short output, no matter how long the message is; for example, PH(M) = SHA-512(M). $self.p = 2^255 - 19$ self.K = GF(self.p)self.Px = self.K(15112221349535400772501151409588531511454012693041857206046113283949847762202)self.Pv = self.K(46316835694926478169428394003475163141307993866256225615783033603165251855960) $self_L = ZZ(2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493)$ self.requested security strength = 128 self.a = self.K(-1)self.d = -self.K(121665)/self.K(121666)self.n = 254self.c = 3self.h = 8self.b = 256self.chave privada = os.urandom(self.b/8) #H é uma função usada durante a derivação #SHA512:Ed25519 ou SHAKE256:Ed448 def H(pk): return hashlib.sha512(pk).digest() def bit(h,i): return ((h[int(i/8)]) >> (i%8)) & 1 def expmod(b,e,m): **if** e == 0: return 1 t = expmod(b,e/2,m)**2 % mif e & 1: t = (t*b) % m return t def inv(x): return expmod(x,q-2,q) def scalarmult(P,e): if e == 0: return [0,1] Q = scalarmult(P,e/2)0 = edwards(0,0)if e & 1: Q = edwards(Q,P) return O def ed2ec(x,y): ## mapeia Ed --> EC **if** (x,y) == (0,1): return EC(0) z = (1+y)/(1-y); w = z/xalfa = constants['alfa']; s = constants['s'] return EC(z/s + alfa , w/s) def encodeKey(self, x): return mod(x, 2) def compute point(self,point): x = point.xy()[0]y = point.xy()[1]#bit menos significativa leastBit = self.encodeKey(x) encoded = bin(y) + chr(leastBit) #Fazer o encode do ponto: $(h[0] + 28 \cdot h[1] + ... + 2248 * h[31])$ return sum(2^i * bit(self.private key,i) for i in range(0,len(encoded))) #EdDSA Key Pair Generation def generate public key(self): #Para gerar a chave pública é preciso gerar a chave privada #1. Gerar uma string de b bits aleatória +

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#2. Calcular o Hash da string aleatoria para gerar a chave privada
    self.private kev = H(os.urandom(32))
       #3. Calcular e modificar o hdigestl: 3 primeiros bits a 0. ultimo bit a 0
       #e penultimo a 1
        #4. Calcular um inteiro do hdigestl usando little-endian
   d = 2^(self.b-2) + sum(2^i * bit(self.private key,i) for i in range(3,self.b-2))
       #5 Calcular o ponto
   point = d * self.P
       #Public key ponto
    self.public key point = point
       #Computar o ponto para obter a public key
   d2 = self.compute point(point)
   self.public key = d2
def bytes to int(bytes):
    result = 0
    for b in bytes:
       result = result * 256 + int(b)
   return result
def convert to ZZ(message):
   raw = ascii to bin(message)
   return ZZ(int(str(raw),2))
#Calcular o hash em hexadecimal
def HB(m):
   h = hashlib.new('sha512')
   h.update(m)
   return h.hexdigest()
def bit(h,i):
       return ((h[int(i/8)]) >> (i%8)) & 1
                  ----- SIGNATURE -----
# EdDSA signatures are deterministic. The signature is generated using the hash of the private key and the message using the procedure below or an equivalent process.
# 1. Bit string M to be signed
# 2. Valid public-private key pair (d, Q) for domain parameters D
# 3. H: SHA-512 for Ed25519 or SHAKE256 for Ed448
# 4. For Ed448, a string context set by the signer and verifier with a maximum length of 255
# octets; by default, context is the empty string
# Output: The signature R | | S, where R is an encoding of a point and S is a little-endian encoded value.
# As specified in IETF RFC 8032, the EdDSA signature of a message M under a private key d is defined as the 2b-bit string R | | S. The octet strings R and S are derived as follows:
# 1. Compute the hash of the private key d, H(d) = (h0, h1, ..., h2b-1) using SHA-512 for Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448 (H(d)= SHAKE256(d, 912)). H(d) may be precomputed.
# 2. Using the second half of the digest hdigest2 = hb | | ... | | h2b-1, define:
       2.1 For Ed25519, r = SHA-512(hdigest2 \mid \mid M); r will be 64-octets.
       2.2 For Ed448, r = SHAKE256(dom4(0, context) | | hdigest2 | | M, 912).
           In IETF RFC 8032, dom4(f, c) is defined to be ("SigEd448" | octet(f) ||
           octet(f) is the octet with value f, and octetlength(c) is the number of octets in string
# 3. Compute the point [r]G. The octet string R is the encoding of the point [r]G.
   4. Derive s from H(d) as in the key pair generation algorithm. Use octet strings R, Q, and M to define:
       4.1 For Ed25519, S = (r + SHA - 512(R | Q | M) * s) \mod n.
       4.2 For Ed448, S = (r + SHAKE256(dom4(0, context) | | R | | Q | | M, 912) * s) mod n.
           The octet string S is the encoding of the resultant integer.
# 5. Form the signature as the concatenation of the octet strings R and S.
def signature gen(self, M):
   r = H(self.chave privada)
#EdDSA Signature Generation
def sign(self, msg):
       #1. Computar o hash da chave privada
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key hashed=HB(self.private key)
        #2. Concatenar essa chave com a mensagem
   key msg=key hashed.encode('utf-8') + msg
    k = convert to ZZ(HB(key msq))
   r = mod(k, self.n)
   r int=ZZ(r)
       #3. Computar o ponto R
    R = r int * self.P
       #4. Derivar a partir da chave pública
       # Concatenar - R + chavepublica + mensagem
    prov = R + self.public key point
   msg total = str(prov).encode('utf-8')+msg
        #Calcular o hash msg total
   msg hashed = HB(msg total)
    msg usada=convert to ZZ(msg hashed)
   h= mod(msg usada,self.n)
       #Calcular o mod da soma de r com o hash anterior com n
   s=mod(r int+ZZ(h)*bytes to int(self.private key),self.n)
       #5. Concatenar R e s e fazer o return disso
   return R, s
# Inputs:
# 1. Message M
# 2. Signature R | | S where R and S are octet strings
# 3. Purported signature verification key 0 that is valid for domain parameters D
# 4. For Ed448, a string context set by the signer and verifier with a maximum length of 255
# octets; by default, context is the empty string
# Output: Accept or reject the signature over M as originating from the owner of public key Q
# Process:
  1. Decode the first half of the signature as a point R and the second half of the signature as an
       integer s. Verify that the integer s is in the range of 0 \le s < n. Decode the public key Q into a
       point Q'. If any of the decodings fail, output "reject".
# 2. Form the bit string HashData as the concatenation of the octet strings R, O, and M (i.e.,
       HashData = R \mid \mid Q \mid \mid M).
# 3. Using the established hash function or XOF,
       3.1 For Ed25519, compute digest = SHA-512(HashData).
       3.2 For Ed448, compute digest = SHAKE256(dom4(0, context) | HashData, 912)
       Interpret digest as a little-endian integer t.
# 4. Check that the verification equation [2c * S]G = [2c]R + (2c * t)Q. Output "reject" if
       verification fails; output "accept" otherwise.
def signature ver(M, sig, Q):
   #(...)
   return 0
#EdDSA Signature Verification
def verify(self,msg,R,s):
        #1. Obter R e s separadamente
        #2. Formar uma string com R, chave publica e mensagem
   msg intermedia = R + self.public key point
   msg total = str(msg intermedia).encode('utf-8')+msg
        #3. Computar o hash da string anterior
   msg hashed = HB(msg total)
    msg usada=convert to ZZ(msg hashed)
    h= mod(msg usada,self.n)
       #4.Calcular P1 e P2
   P1=ZZ(s)*self.P
    P2=R+ZZ(h)*(self.public key point)
        #Comparar P1 e P2
   print(P1==P2)
```

1) Ver: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5-draft.pdf

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- 2) Ver: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8032#appendix-A
- 3) Ver: https://github.com/HarryR/ethsnarks/blob/2020dec635ee606da1f66118a5f7c6283a4cb6a0/src/jubjub/README.md
- 4) Ver: http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html
- 5) Ver: http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/python/ed25519.py
- 6) Ver: http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/python/sign.py
- 7) Ver: http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/python/checkparams.py