

References

- Introduction to Modern Cryptography
 - Katz-Lindell
 - Chapter 2, Perfectly Secret Encryption
- Cryptography, Theory and Practice
 - Stinson
 - Chapter 1: Classical Cryptography
 - Chapter 2: Shannon's theory

Plan

- Motivation and background
- Measure of secrecy
- Perfect secrecy
 - Requirements – long key
- ϵ -secrecy
 - Entropy
 - Statistical distance
 - Game-based definition

Information Theoretic Cryptography:

Confidentiality

- The oldest records from Julius Caesar (~100 BC)

- **Symmetric key**

- Caesar cipher:

- $\{a,b,c\dots z\} \rightarrow \{0,1,\dots,25\}$

- **Key** = 3

- **3** + plaintext $\text{mod } 26$

- Ciphertext - **3** $\text{mod } 26$



- Julius \rightarrow MXOLXV

- One-time-pad


- Gilbert Vernam - Joseph Mauborge : 1917

- Stream cipher

- Teletype+ tape



Wikipedia




Confidentiality (*Shannon 1949*)

- Goal: Message can only be seen by intended receiver
- Sender and receiver have a shared secret key

Enc (key, plaintext) = ciphertext

Dec (key, ciphertext) = plaintext




- Example: Ceasar cipher:
- $\{a,b,c\dots z\} \rightarrow \{0,1,\dots 25\}$
- Key = 3
- $\text{Enc}(k, \text{message}) = 3 + \text{message} \pmod{26}$
- $\text{Dec}(k, \text{ciphertext}) = \text{ciphertext} - 3 \pmod{26}$

Secrecy systems

Shannon 1949


- A cryptosystem is defined by a 5 tuple $(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}, \mathcal{K}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$
 - $\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}, \mathcal{K}$ are **sets** of **plaintext**, **ciphertext** and **keys**, respectively.
 - Enc, Dec are **algorithms** for encryption and decryption



*Reference: Cryptography, Theory and Practice,
Douglas Stinson*


Secrecy systems

Passive adversary
Eavesdropping the communication



Eve knows:

- X and $p(X)$
- K and distribution on K , $p(K)$ (chosen by Alice/Bob)
- $\text{Enc}(K, X) = Y$
- $\text{Dec}(K, Y) = X$
- Using these can calculate $p(Y)$
- $p(X), p(K) \rightarrow p(y_j)$ for all y_j




$$p(y_j) = \sum_{x_i} \sum_{\{k_t: \text{Enc}(k_t, x_i) = y_j\}} p(k_t) p(x_i)$$

Example

- $\mathcal{X} = \{a, b\}$, $p(X=a) = 1/4$, $p(X=b) = 3/4$
- $\mathcal{K} = \{1, 2, 3\}$ $p(K=1) = 1/2$, $p(K=2) = p(K=3) = 1/4$
- $\mathcal{Y} = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$

- $p(Y=1) = p(X=a) \times p(K=1) = 1/4 \times 1/2 = 1/8$
- $p(Y=2) = 1/16 + 3/8 = 7/16$
- $p(Y=3) = 1/4$
- $p(Y=4) = 3/16$




X \ K	a	b
k ₁	1	2
k ₂	2	3
k ₃	3	4

Breaking the cipher

Publicly known:


- The algorithms
- X, K : message and key spaces
- $p(X), p(K)$: A priori probability distributions

→ Eve can calculate distribution on Y



“Breaking” a cipher

- Eve sees a ciphertext y (e.g. $y=2$)
- Finding x
- Finding k
- Which goal is less demanding?
 - Achieving it, implies the other.



Perfect Security

- An encryption system $(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}, \mathcal{K}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is **perfectly secure** if for any probability distributions on X , we have

$$p(X|y) = p(X)$$

- That is for any message x , any ciphertext y satisfying $p(Y=y)>0$,

$$p(x|y)=p(x), \text{ for all } x,y$$

- observing y has not changed the original probability of x

→ Distribution of messages and ciphertexts are independent

- $p(x,y) = p(x)p(y)$