Secrect Sharing Progress

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Report

Let N be a finite set of participants. Let t be the threshold (authorized subset in N). A secret sharing scheme on N is a collection $(s_i)_{i \in N}$ of discrete random variables and satisfies the following condition:

1. Correctness:

$$\forall m \in N \ \forall S = \{i_1, \dots, i_t\} \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\} \text{ of size t,}$$

$$Pr_{\mathbf{share}(\mathbf{m}) \to (s_1, \cdots, s_n)}[\mathbf{Reconstruct}(s_{i_1} \cdots s_{i_t}) = m] = 1$$

Shamir's secret sharing scheme fits in the above definition because it has two algorithms share and reconstruct. The set here is \mathbb{Z}_p where p is prime. Share is a randomized algorithm:

- 1. Choose n distinct elements non-zero elements in \mathbb{Z}_p .
- 2. Choose randomly $a_1, \dots, a_{t-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$
- 3. Form $f(x) = m + \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} a_i x^i \mod p$

User P_i receives the share, $(x_i, y_i = f(x_i))$; x_i is public. Any authorized subset t can find the secret:

$$H(m|s_1,\cdots s_t)=0$$

Any subset of t-1 learns nothing about the secret

$$H(m|s_1, \cdots s_{t-1}) = H(m)$$

Correctness is satisfied that any t shares always reconstruct the secret.

Example:

Let $m \in \mathbb{Z}_7$. Let m = 6, t = 3, n = 5, $a_1 = 2$, $a_2 = 4$. The polynomial is:

$$f(x) = 6 + 2x + 4x^2$$

This polynomial will be used to generate shares. For instance: x=1 gives 5.

$$P_1: (1, f(1) = 5), P_2: (2, f(2) = 5), P_3: (3, f(3) = 6), P_4: (4, f(4) = 1), P_5: (5, f(5) = 4)$$

Reconstruction:


$$f(x) = m + a_1 x + a_2 x^2$$

Using the first 3:

$$5 = m + a_1 + a_2$$
$$5 = m + 2a_1 + 4a_2$$

$$6 = m + 3a_1 + 2a_2$$

Solving the system of equations will give the secret.



Thus correctness is satisfied. Any t-1 (2 with 3 unknowns) cannot solve the system thus security is satisfied.