

JOÃO THEREZE

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OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION

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Department of Economics
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544

EDUCATION

Princeton University	<i>2016-present</i>
PhD Candidate in Economics	

Princeton University	<i>2016-2018</i>
M.A. in Economics	

Fundação Getúlio Vargas (EPGE)	<i>2014-2016</i>
M.A. in Economics	Rio de Janeiro - Brazil

Fundação Getúlio Vargas (EPGE)	<i>2010-2013</i>
B.A. in Economics	Rio de Janeiro - Brazil

REFERENCES

Pietro Ortoleva	Alessandro Lizzeri	Sylvain Chassang
Professor of Economics	Professor of Economics	Professor of Economics
Department of Economics	Department of Economics	Department of Economics
Princeton University	Princeton University	Princeton University
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FIELDS

PRIMARY	Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics
SECONDARY	Finance

JOB MARKET PAPER

“Adverse Selection and Endogenous Information”

We study markets with adverse selection where consumers can costly learn about their types. Information acquisition costs present a trade-off: they decrease the quality of consumers’ choices but alleviate selection. We prove information acquisition decreases welfare compared to exogenous information, and we find conditions such that equilibrium efficiency is non-monotonic in information costs. We show information decisions produce a negative externality in this economy, causing traditional methods to underestimate the welfare costs of selection. Finally, we connect the theory to applications by constructing tests to detect information acquisition, and by developing a partial framework for counterfactual analysis using sufficient statistics. Our solution method shows that changes in information costs translate into rotations of consumers’ demand and producers’ cost, lending the model to familiar graphical reasoning.

WORKING PAPERS

“Screening Costly Information” *Revise and resubmit at Journal of Political Economy.*

“Asymptotic Learning with Ambiguous Information” with Pëllumb Reshidi and Mu Zhang

“Insurance Contracts and Financial Markets” with Andrés Carvajal. *Revise and resubmit at Mathematical Social Sciences* (Pre-PhD work)

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Speed, Accuracy and Caution: the Timing of Choices under Risk Aversion” with Pëllumb Reshidi

“Endogenous Belief Updating” with Francesco Fabbri

TEACHING

Princeton FIN 502: Graduate Corporate Finance (TA, Spring 2022)

ECO 363: Undergraduate Corporate Finance (TA, Spring 2019, 2020 and 2021)

ECO468/FIN568: Undergraduate and Graduate Behavioral Finance (TA, Spring 2019)

ECO 406: Undergraduate course on Radical Markets (TA, Fall 2018)

EPGE Graduate Course on Real Analysis (I and II) for Economists (TA, Spring 2015)

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Presentations and Seminars (including scheduled)

- 2022 Princeton University; Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory
- 2021 University of California, Davis; Young Economist Symposium
- 2017 Young Economist Symposium (accepted), North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society (co-author presented)
- 2016 Public Economic Theory Conference; Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory Conference

Refereeing

American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Mathematical Economics

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND GRANTS

Princeton Graduate School Teaching Award	2021
Stephen Goldfeld Memorial Fellowship	2021
Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Grant	2020-2022
Princeton Graduate Economics Fellowship	2016-2022
FAPERJ Nota 10 Masters Fellowship	2014-2016
CNPQ Federal Masters Scholarship	2013-2014

LANGUAGES

Portuguese (native), English (fluent), Spanish (elementary)

Last updated: October 2022