

Recursivity and the Estimation of Dynamic Games with Continuous Controls

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World Congress of the Econometric Society, Seoul, 20 August 2025

Introduction

We revisit the estimation of **dynamic games with continuous controls** (DGCCs)

- ▶ Investments in R&D, quality, capacity, advertising, political campaign spending ...

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First, we propose **estimators based on firms' optimal policies**.

- ▶ “Recursive Estimators” (REs).
- ▶ We evaluate their performance relative to Bajari et al. (2007) (BBL)
 - BBL: VF inequalities from randomly drawn policies.
- ▶ We establish
 - REs are computationally tractable.
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 - REs are computationally tractable.
 - They substantially outperform BBL.

Second, we construct a **semi-parametric estimator for DGCCs**.

- ▶ We establish
 - Misspecification of the cost shock distribution can bias estimation a great deal.
 - The SP estimator works reasonably well. More work needed, in progress.

Roadmap

- ▶ A **model** of entry, exit, and quality upgrading.
 - Introduce estimators based on recursive equilibrium conditions (REs).
 - Monte Carlo simulations of REs and BBL.
 - Semi-parametric estimation of DGCCs.

Model: Market Structure and Profits

Pakes and McGuire (1994)

\bar{N} single-product firms in the market

- N active firms, $N \leq \bar{N}$; N endogenous.
- $\bar{N} - N$ inactive firms.

Firms have quality levels $\xi_j \in \Xi \subset \mathbb{R} \cup \{-\infty\}$

- Being inactive indicated by $\xi_j = -\infty$.

The industry state is $\xi = (\xi_1, \dots, \xi_{\bar{N}})$.

Firms earn flow profits that depend on their qualities: $\pi_j(\xi)$.

- $\pi_j(\xi)$ are *symmetric* – Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010):
 - $\pi_j(\xi_j, \xi_2, \dots, \xi_{j-1}, \xi_1, \xi_{j+1}, \dots, \xi_{\bar{N}}) = \pi_1(\xi) = \pi(\xi)$ for all $j = 2, \dots, \bar{N}$
 - $\pi(\xi_1, \xi_{-1}) = \pi(\xi_1, \xi_{p(-1)})$ for any permutation $p(\cdot)$.

Model: Quality Transitions

Transitions:


- ▶ Firms can invest to affect the evolution of quality.
- ▶ Transitions are conditionally independent and depend only on own quality and investment:

$$F(\xi'|\xi, \mathbf{x}) = \prod_{j=1}^{\bar{N}} F(\xi'_j|\xi_j, x_j) .$$

Investment is costly: $c(x, \nu)$

- ▶ $\nu \sim F_\nu$ is an investment cost shock.
- ▶ $\partial_x^2 c(x, \nu) \geq 0$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}_+, \nu \in \text{supp}(F_\nu)$.
- ▶ $\partial_{\nu x}^2 c(x, \nu) > 0$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}_+, \nu \in \text{supp}(F_\nu)$.

Model: Timing and Equilibrium



Definition (Symmetric MPE)

A **Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium** (SMPE) is a tuple

$$(\alpha^E(\xi, \phi), \alpha^I(\xi, \rho), \sigma^x(\xi, \nu))$$

such that, given that all firms behave according to this tuple,

1. $\alpha^E(\xi, \phi) \in \{0, 1\}$ maximizes the potential entrant's ENPV of profits;
2. $\alpha^I(\xi, \rho) \in \{0, 1\}$ and $\sigma^x(\xi, \nu)$ maximize the incumbent's ENPV of profits.

Roadmap

- A model of entry, exit, and quality upgrading.
- ▶ Introduce estimators based on **recursive equilibrium conditions** (REs).
- Monte Carlo simulations of REs and BBL.
- Semi-parametric estimation of DGCCs.

Recursive Estimator

The firm's investment problem can be written as:

$$\max_{x \in \mathbb{R}_+} \left\{ -c(x, \nu; \theta_x) + \beta \int_{\xi'_1} \hat{W}(\xi'_1 \mid \xi, \hat{F}^\sigma; \theta_x, \theta_\rho) d\hat{F}(\xi'_1 \mid \xi_1, x) \right\}$$

► W, F^σ , concavity

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► W, F^σ , concavity

⇒ Predicted levels of investment $T_{\{\theta_x, \theta_\rho\}}(\xi, \nu; \hat{\Phi})$, where $\hat{\Phi} = (\hat{V}_I((\theta_x, \theta_\rho)), \hat{F}, \hat{F}^\sigma)$

► The rough **idea** is to compare these values with observed ones.

- Could do so in different ways.
- We obtain good results with an Indirect Inference estimator.

► Details

► \tilde{V}_I : Closed Form Solution

Roadmap

- A model of entry, exit, and quality upgrading.
- Introduce estimators based on recursive equilibrium conditions (REs).
- ▶ **Monte Carlo** simulations of REs and BBL.
- Semi-parametric estimation of DGCCs.

Monte Carlo Setup

We specialize the framework above following Hashmi and van Biesebroeck (2016) (HvB):

- ▶ We **add entry** to their framework.
- ▶ $\Xi = \{-\infty, \xi_{\min}, \xi_{\min} + \delta, \dots, \xi_{\max} - \delta, \xi_{\max}\}$.
- ▶ $\pi(\xi)$ is derived from
 - Single-product firms facing nested logit demand. [Mixed logit in HvB]
 - Constant marginal cost $mc(\xi)$.
 - Nash-Bertrand competition.
 - ▶ Flow Profit Derivation
- ▶ Transitions
 - $\xi' \in \{\xi - \delta, \xi, \xi + \delta\}$.
 - $P(\xi + \delta \mid \xi, x)$: $\uparrow x, \downarrow \xi$.
 - Our specification of P differs from HvB to ensure concavity of the investment problem.
 - ▶ Computational payoff of local transitions + absorbing exit
- ▶ $c(x, \nu) = \theta_{x1}x + \theta_{x2}x^2 + \theta_{x3}\nu x$.

▶ Setup details.




▶ First stage details.

Monte Carlo Results

	Value	Indirect Inference	BBL		
			Asymptotic	Multiplicative	Additive
θ_{x1}	2.625	2.872	6.888	1.944	0.08
		0.734	2.635	2.21	0.442
θ_{x2}	1.624	1.581	10.0	5.481	0.055
		0.148	0.004	0.813	0.335
θ_{x3}	0.5096	0.466	5.714	9.611	9.067
		0.097	2.694	1.142	2.003
μ_ρ	-1.0	-1.127	-1.329	-1.103	-2.0
		0.39	0.101	0.081	0.001
σ_ρ	0.75	0.746	0.69	0.589	1.038
		0.13	0.036	0.031	0.167
μ_ϕ	0.625	0.864	1.809	1.851	1.898
		0.616	0.074	0.063	0.268
σ_ϕ	0.5	0.735	2.998	2.998	3.0
		0.468	0.015	0.019	0.0

- Qualitatively similar results with sample size as in Ryan (2012).

Objective Function: Investment Cost Parameters



$$c(x, \nu) = \theta_{x1}x + \theta_{x2}x^2 + \theta_{x3}x\nu$$



θ_{x3}'' is minimized away from zero in this sample.

► Objective Function: F_ρ and F_ϕ

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- A model of entry, exit, and quality upgrading.
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- ▶ **Semi-parametric** estimation of DGCCs.

Semi-parametric Estimation

This is preliminary.

Model + data + θ induce an operator $T_\theta : \mathcal{F}_\nu \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_\nu$ as follows:

$$F_\nu \underbrace{\mapsto \sigma^x(\xi, \nu)}_{(i)} \underbrace{\mapsto \bar{V}_I}_{(ii)} \underbrace{\mapsto W(\xi' \mid \xi, F^\sigma)}_{(iii)} \mapsto F_\nu$$

(i) $F_X(\sigma(\xi, \nu) \mid \xi) = 1 - F_\nu(\nu)$. (ii) $\triangleright \bar{V}_I$ (iii) $\triangleright W$ (iv) FOC

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(i) $F_X(\sigma(\xi, \nu) \mid \xi) = 1 - F_\nu(\nu)$. (ii) \bar{V}_I (iii) W (iv) FOC

If T_θ has a unique fixed point $F_\nu(\theta)$ for all θ ,

Then, we can attempt estimation of θ by solving

$$\min_{\theta} Q(\theta, F_\nu(\theta))$$

► $Q(\theta, F_\nu)$ might be the II objective above.

► In the example below, $\sum_{\xi} d\left(\hat{F}_X(\cdot \mid \xi), F_X(\cdot \mid \xi, \theta)\right)$, where $d(F, G) = \|F^{-1} - G^{-1}\|_{\infty}$

Semi-parametric Estimation: Example


We test the feasibility of the idea above in a very simple setting.

- ▶ A monopolist solving a dynamic decision problem.
- ▶ $D(p; \xi) = \xi - p \Rightarrow \pi(\xi)$. Zero cost.
- ▶ $\xi \in \{\xi_L, \xi_H\}$.
- ▶ Monopolist controls dynamics of ξ via $P(\xi_L \mid \xi, x)$.
- ▶ $c(x, \nu)$ as above.

This is a rather difficult DGP for the semi-parametric estimator.

- ▶ Only two states.
- ▶ Stationary distribution has $P(\xi_H) = 0.9$.
- ▶ And still ...


Semi-parametric Estimation: T_θ



T_θ seems rather stable in this example.

- Convergence looks linear with a rather low error ratio.
- We have found convergence for all θ and F_ν^0 .

Semi-parametric Estimation: Monte Carlo with Misspecification



► Objective

Conclusion

Many of the firm decisions we wish to model are

- (i) **Dynamic**, and...
- (ii) Naturally treated as **continuous**.

Yet, applications of DGCCs are not as plentiful as one might expect. **Why?**

- ▶ Many barriers to estimating a DGCC.
- ▶ An important one, we hypothesize, is the performance of available estimators.

We **show** that estimators of DGCCs based on firms' optimality conditions

- ▶ Are sufficiently **cheap** to compute in an empirically-relevant setting.
- ▶ Deliver substantial **performance gains** relative to alternatives.

We have also given a preliminary outline of a **semi-parametric** estimator for DGCCs.

- ▶ They perform reasonably well in a simple example.
- ▶ We show that misspecification of F_ν can impart significant bias on $\hat{\theta}$.
- ▶ To-do list:
 - Proof of convergence.
 - Application based on Hashmi and van Biesebroeck (2016).

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- Pakes, A., Ostrovsky, M., & Berry, S. (2007). Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit examples). *RAND Journal of Economics*, 38, 373-399.
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Related Literature and Contributions

Related Literature

- ▶ Bajari et al. (2007) and applications, see references above.
- ▶ Srisuma (2013)
 - Similar intuition.
 - Known F_ν .
 - Concrete proposal has its challenges.
 - Non-smooth objective, requires a lot of data and computation.
 - ⇒ Simple, static, Monte Carlo experiments.
- ▶ Schrimpf (2011)
 - Identification and estimation in the fully non-parametric case.
 - Theory only.

Contributions.

- ▶ Estimators based on recursive equilibrium conditions are **computationally tractable**.
- ▶ Recursive estimators can **outperform** the BBL inequality estimator in a relevant model.
- ▶ **Semi-parametric** estimation of DGCCs (very much in progress).

A Modicum of Characterization – 1/3

Let

1. $V_I(\xi, \rho)$ be an incumbent's ENPV of profits given (ξ, ρ) .
2. $\bar{V}_I(\xi) := \int_{\rho} V_I(\xi, \rho) dF_{\rho}$.

It is possible to show that

$$\mathbb{E}_{\sigma}[V_I(\xi', \rho) | \xi, x] = \int_{\xi'_1} W(\xi'_1 | \xi, F^{\sigma}) dF(\xi'_1 | \xi_1, x),$$

where

- ▶ $F^{\sigma}(\xi'_j | \xi_j) := \int_{\varepsilon_j} F(\xi'_j | \xi_j, \sigma_j(\xi_j, \varepsilon_j)) dG_{\varepsilon_j};$
- ▶ $W(\xi'_1 | \xi, F^{\sigma}) := \int_{\xi'_2} \cdots \int_{\xi'_N} \bar{V}_I(\xi'_1, \xi'_{-1}) dF^{\sigma}(\xi'_N | \xi_N) \cdots dF^{\sigma}(\xi'_2 | \xi_2);$

▶ Back to recursive estimators.

▶ Back to timeline & equilibrium.

A Modicum of Characterization – 2/3

The investment problem can then be written as

$$\max_{x \in \mathbb{R}_+} \left\{ -c(x, \nu) + \beta \int_{\xi'_1} W(\xi'_1 \mid \xi, F^\sigma) dF(\xi'_1 \mid \xi_1, x) \right\}$$

Assumption (A1)

Let Ξ be a compact subset of the real line, and denote its minimum and maximum by ξ_m and ξ_M . Let Ξ° be the interior of Ξ . The family of distributions $F(\cdot \mid \xi, x)$ is such that

- (a) $F(\xi' \mid \xi, x)$ is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in x , for all $\xi \in \Xi$ and $\xi' \in \Xi^\circ$;
- (b) $F(\xi_m \mid \xi, x)$ is decreasing and convex in x , for all $\xi \in \Xi$.

A Modicum of Characterization – 3/3

Proposition

Assume

- (a) $c(x, \nu)$ is convex in x ;
- (b) $F(\xi' \mid \xi, x)$ is twice continuously differentiable in x for all ξ', ξ ;
- (c) $W(\xi' \mid \xi, F^\sigma)$ is increasing in ξ' for all ξ .
- (d) A1 holds.

Then the incumbent's investment problem is strictly concave in x .

- ▶ Useful for computing equilibria and for our approach to estimation.
- ▶ N.B.: F^σ is the one endogenous parameter to the investment problem.
 - Existence: suffices to establish the existence of a fixed point for F^σ .

▶ Back to solution concept.

▶ Additional characterization Details

▶ MPE Computation

Estimating Continuation Values

We show that

$$[I - \beta \mathbf{M}(\mathbf{P})] \bar{\mathbf{V}}_I = \pi - \mathbf{K}(\theta_x) + \Sigma(F_\rho)$$

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$$[I - \beta \mathbf{M}(\mathbf{P})] \bar{\mathbf{V}}_I = \boldsymbol{\pi} - \mathbf{K}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_x) + \boldsymbol{\Sigma}(F_\rho)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{K}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_x) &= \left[\mathbb{P}(\alpha^I(\boldsymbol{\xi}, \rho) = 1 \mid \boldsymbol{\xi}) \int c(\sigma^x(\boldsymbol{\xi}, \nu), \nu; \boldsymbol{\theta}_x) dF_\nu \right]_{\{\boldsymbol{\xi} \in \Xi_I\}} \\ \boldsymbol{\Sigma}(F_\rho) &= \left[[1 - \mathbb{P}(\alpha^I(\boldsymbol{\xi}, \rho) = 1 \mid \boldsymbol{\xi})] \mathbb{E}[\rho \mid F_\rho(\rho) > \mathbb{P}(\alpha^I(\boldsymbol{\xi}, \rho) = 1 \mid \boldsymbol{\xi})] \right]_{\{\boldsymbol{\xi} \in \Xi_I\}} \\ \mathbf{M}(\mathbf{P}) &= \left[\prod_{j=1}^{\bar{N}} F^\sigma(\xi'_j \mid \boldsymbol{\xi}) : \boldsymbol{\xi}', \boldsymbol{\xi} \in \Xi_I \right] \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ \bar{V}_I estimable up to $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ given $\hat{\mathbb{P}}(\alpha^I(\boldsymbol{\xi}, \rho) = 1 \mid \boldsymbol{\xi})$, $\hat{F}^\sigma(\xi'_j \mid \boldsymbol{\xi})$, and $\hat{\sigma}^x(\boldsymbol{\xi}, \nu)$.
- ▶ $\sigma^x(\boldsymbol{\xi}, \nu) = F_X(1 - F_\nu(\nu) \mid \boldsymbol{\xi})$.
- ▶ Similar calculations in Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) and Pakes et al. (2007).

Back to recursive estimator.

Recursive Estimator: Indirect Inference

Investment

We run

$$T_{\{\theta_x, \theta_\rho\}}(\xi_i, \nu_i; \hat{\Phi}) = \sum_{k=1}^B \lambda_k^x \psi_k^x(\xi_i) + \zeta_i^x \Rightarrow \hat{\lambda}_{\text{Investment}}(\{\theta_x, \theta_\rho\}; \hat{\Phi})$$

for draws $\nu_i \sim F_\nu$ and the analogous regression on observed investment.

Entry/Exit

Solving the max in the Bellman Equation yields $\hat{V}_I^A(\xi; \theta_x, \theta_\rho) \Rightarrow \hat{\mathbb{P}}(\text{Exit} \mid \xi; \theta_x, \theta_\rho)$.

- ▶ Run regressions of these probabilities on functions of ξ .
- ▶ Run analogous regressions on observed exit decisions.
- ▶ Similarly for entry decisions.

The Indirect Inference estimator solves

$$\min_{\theta} [\hat{\lambda}(\theta; \hat{\Phi}) - \hat{\gamma}]^\top \Omega [\hat{\lambda}(\theta; \hat{\Phi}) - \hat{\gamma}]$$

Flow Profit Specification

Demand

- ▶ Nested Logit:

$$u_{ij} = \begin{cases} \epsilon_i^{\text{out}} + (1 - \varsigma)\varepsilon_{ij} & \text{if } j = 0 \\ \alpha p_j + \xi_j + \epsilon_i^{\text{in}} + (1 - \varsigma)\varepsilon_{ij} & \text{if } j = 1, \dots, N, \end{cases}$$

- ▶ Inside and Outside good nests; $\epsilon_i^g + (1 - \varsigma)\varepsilon_{ij} \sim T1EV, g = \{\text{in}, \text{out}\}$.

Pricing

- ▶ Marginal cost: $\mu(\xi_j) = \exp(\theta_{c1} + \theta_{c2}\xi_j)$.
- ▶ Firms compete à la Bertrand
 - Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) $\Rightarrow \exists!$ Eqm $\Rightarrow \pi_j(\xi)$ well-defined.

▶ Back to Monte Carlo setup.

Monte Carlo Setup

Parameter	Value
Data Structure	
Number of Markets	100
Number of Periods	40
Maximum Number of Firms	5
Own State Space	$[-\infty, -1.4, -1.2, \dots, 1.2, 1.4]$
Model Parameters	
Discount Factor	0.925
Investment Cost Parameters	$[2.625, 1.624, 0.5096]$
Scrap Value Distribution	$\log N(-1.0, 0.75)$
Entry Cost Distribution	$\log N(0.625, 0.5)$
II Estimator	
Number of Investment Repetitions	5
Weight Matrix	Bootstrap
Number of Bootstrap Samples	1000
BBL Estimators	
Number of Inequalities	5000
Number of Simulated Paths	500
Simulation Horizon	80

Two-parameter F_ρ, F_ϕ , as opposed to common exponential.

► [Back to Monte Carlo setup.](#)

First Stage: II and BBL

- ▶ $\pi(\xi)$
 - We treat as known.
 - In practice, estimated offline.
- ▶ $P(\xi'_j \mid \xi)$
 - Flexible MNL on functions of ξ .
- ▶ $P(\xi' \mid \xi, x)$
 - Flexible MNL on functions of ξ and x .
- ▶ $\sigma^x(\xi, \nu)$
 - $\sigma^x(\xi, \nu) = F_X^{-1}(1 - F_\nu(\nu) \mid \xi)$
 - We estimate evenly spaced **quantile regressions** of investment on functions of ξ .
 - Commonly used $\mathbb{E}[x \mid \xi]$ ignores dependence on ν .
- ▶ Probabilities of entry and exit.
 - Logit on functions of ξ .

▶ Back to Monte Carlo setup.

Bajari et al. (2007)

If σ is a SMPE then $\forall \xi, \sigma'$

$$\bar{V}_I(\xi; \sigma, \sigma, \theta_x, \theta_\rho) \geq \bar{V}_I(\xi; \sigma', \sigma, \theta_x, \theta_\rho);$$

- ▶ Analogous condition holds for \bar{V}_E .

Define, for entrants and incumbents,


$$g(\xi, \sigma'; \sigma, \theta) := \bar{V}(\xi; \sigma, \sigma, \theta) - \bar{V}(\xi; \sigma', \sigma, \theta)$$

The **BBL estimator** is

$$\hat{\theta}_{BBL} = \arg \min_{\theta} \hat{Q}(\theta, \hat{\sigma}) = \frac{1}{n_I} \sum_{i=1}^{n_I} \left(\min \{ \hat{g}(\xi_i, \sigma'_i; \hat{\sigma}, \theta), 0 \} \right)^2$$

- ▶ For $n_I < \infty$, $\hat{\theta}_{BBL}$ may be a set even if the model is point-identified.
- ▶ Estimates are a function of the chosen **deviations** σ' .
 - How to choose deviations σ' ?
 - Choice does matter: Srisuma (2013) and simulations below.


Investment Cost Parameters Estimates



$$c(x, \nu) = \theta_{x1}x + \theta_{x2}x^2 + \theta_{x3}x\nu$$



Semi-parametric Estimation: Example



► [Back to distributions.](#)

Value Functions: The Incumbent's Investment Problem

The expected net present value (ENPV) to the incumbent entering the period is

$$\bar{V}_I(\xi) = \int_{\rho} V_I(\xi, \rho) dF_{\rho} = \int_{\rho} \max \left\{ \pi(\xi) + \rho, \int V_I^A(\xi, \nu) dF_{\nu} \right\} dF_{\rho}$$

where $V_I^A(\xi, \nu)$ is the ENPV of having chosen to be active next period, i.e.

$$V_I^A(\xi, \nu) = \max_{x \in \mathbb{R}_+} \left\{ \pi(\xi) - c(x, \nu) + \beta \mathbb{E}[V_I(\xi', \rho) \mid \xi, x, \sigma] \right\} \quad (\text{Investment})$$

and the continuation value is

$$\mathbb{E}[V_I(\xi', \rho) \mid \xi, x, \sigma] = \int_{\varepsilon_{-1}} \int_{\xi'} \bar{V}_I(\xi) dF(\xi' \mid \xi, x, \sigma_{-1}(\xi, \varepsilon_{-1})) dG_{\varepsilon_{-1}}$$

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$$V_I^A(\xi, \nu) = \max_{x \in \mathbb{R}_+} \left\{ \pi(\xi) - c(x, \nu) + \beta \mathbb{E}[V_I(\xi', \rho) \mid \xi, x, \sigma] \right\} \quad (\text{Investment})$$

and the continuation value is , by indep. of ε_j

$$\mathbb{E}[V_I(\xi', \rho) \mid \xi, x, \sigma] = \int_{\varepsilon_2} \cdots \int_{\varepsilon_{\bar{N}}} \int_{\xi'} \bar{V}_I(\xi) dF(\xi' \mid \xi, x, \sigma_{-1}(\xi, \varepsilon_{-1})) dG_{\varepsilon_{\bar{N}}} \cdots dG_{\varepsilon_2}$$

Value Functions: The Incumbent's Investment Problem

The expected net present value (ENPV) to the incumbent entering the period is

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and the continuation value is , by indep. of ε_j and by conditional indep. of $\xi' \mid \xi, \alpha, x$

$$\mathbb{E}[V_I(\xi', \rho) \mid \xi, x, \sigma] = \int_{\xi'_1} \int_{\xi'_N} \cdots \int_{\xi'_2} \bar{V}_I(\xi) \prod_{j=2}^{\bar{N}} \int_{\varepsilon_j} dF(\xi'_j \mid \xi_j, \sigma_j(\xi_j, \varepsilon_j)) dG_{\varepsilon_j} dF(\xi'_1 \mid \xi_1, x)$$

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$$\mathbb{E}[V_I(\xi', \rho) \mid \xi, x, \sigma] = \int_{\xi'_1} W(\xi'_1 \mid \xi; F^{\sigma}) dF(\xi'_1 \mid \xi_1, x) \quad (\text{Continuation})$$

$$W(\xi'_1 \mid \xi; F^{\sigma}) = \int_{\xi'_N} \cdots \int_{\xi'_2} \bar{V}_I(\xi) dF^{\sigma}(\xi'_2 \mid \xi_2) \cdots dF^{\sigma}(\xi'_N \mid \xi_N)$$

Value Functions: The Incumbent's Investment Problem

Value Functions: Exit

Incumbents must commit to exiting before knowing ν . Their ENPV given ρ is

$$V_I(\xi, \rho) = \max \left\{ \pi(\xi) + \rho, \int V_I^A(\xi, \nu) dF_\nu \right\} \quad (\text{Exit})$$

Hence the conditional probability of exiting is

$$\mathbb{P}(\alpha^I(\xi, \rho) = 1 | \xi) = 1 - F_\rho \left(\int V_I^A(\xi, \nu) dF_\nu - \pi(\xi) \right)$$

Value Functions: Entry

Entrants are short-lived: they either enter or perish. Their ENPV given ϕ is

$$V_E(\xi_{-1}, \phi) = \max \left\{ 0, \bar{V}_E^A(\xi_{-1}) - \phi \right\} \quad (\text{Entry})$$

where

$$\bar{V}_E^A(\xi_{-1}) = \int_{\nu} \max_{x \in \mathbb{R}_+} \left\{ -c(x, \nu) + \beta \int_{\xi'_1} W(\xi'_1 | (-\infty, \xi_{-1}), F^\sigma) dF(\xi'_1 | \xi_E, x) \right\} dF_{\nu}$$

where $\xi_E \in \Xi$ is an exogenously specified quality for the entrant.

Hence the conditional probability of entering is

$$\mathbb{P}(\alpha^E(\boldsymbol{\xi}_{-1}, \phi) = 1 | \boldsymbol{\xi}_{-1}) = F_\phi(\bar{V}_E^A(\boldsymbol{\xi}_{-1}))$$

Investment: First Order Condition

Consider firm 1's problem (wlog given symmetry and anonymity). Then

$$-\partial_x c(x, \nu) + \beta \partial_x \left(\int_{\xi'_1} W(\xi'_1 \mid \xi, F^\sigma) dF(\xi'_1 \mid \xi_1, x) \right) \leq 0 \quad (1)$$

where recall

$$W(\xi'_1 \mid \xi; F^\sigma) := \int_{\xi'_2} \cdots \int_{\xi'_N} \bar{V}_I(\xi'_1, \xi'_{-1}) dF(\xi'_N \mid \xi_{\bar{N}}, x) \cdots dF(\xi'_2 \mid \xi_2, x)$$

and

$$\bar{V}_I(\xi) = \int_{\rho} V_I(\xi, \rho) dF_{\rho} = \int_{\rho} \max \left\{ \pi(\xi) + \rho, \int V_I^A(\xi, \nu) dF_{\nu} \right\} dF_{\rho}$$

and

$$V_I^A(\xi, \nu) = \max_{x \in \mathbb{R}_+} \left\{ \pi(\xi) - c(x, \nu) + \beta \mathbb{E}[V_I(\xi', \rho) \mid \xi, x, \sigma] \right\}$$

Investment: Assumptions

Assumption (Technical)

$F(\xi' \mid \xi, x)$ is twice continuously differentiable: $\partial_x^2 F(\xi' \mid \xi, x)$ exists and is continuous.

Assumption (Diminishing Returns)

Let $\Xi^o = \Xi \setminus \{\xi_{min}, \xi_{max}\}$.

For all $\xi \in \Xi, \xi' \in \Xi^o$: $\partial_x F(\xi' \mid \xi, x) < 0, \partial_x^2 F(\xi' \mid \xi, x) > 0$.

$$\partial_x(1 - F(\xi' \mid \xi, x)) > 0 \Rightarrow FOSD$$

For all $\xi \in \Xi$: $\partial_x F(\xi_{min} \mid \xi, x) \leq 0, \partial_x^2 F(\xi_{min} \mid \xi, x) \geq 0$.

Assumption (Convex Costs)

$$c(x, \nu) \text{ is convex in } x: \partial_x c(x, \nu) \geq 0, \partial_x^2 c(x, \nu) \geq 0.$$

Investment: Uniqueness

Under the assumptions made in the previous slide,

$$\pi(\boldsymbol{\xi}) - c(x, \nu) + \beta \int_{\xi'_j} W(\xi'_j \mid \boldsymbol{\xi}, F^\sigma) dF(\xi'_j \mid \xi_j, x)$$

is strictly concave.

Proof

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{\xi'_i} W(\xi'_i | \boldsymbol{\xi}, F^\sigma) dF(\xi'_i | \xi_i, x) &= - \int_{\xi'_j} F(\xi' | \xi, x) dW(\xi' | \boldsymbol{\xi}, F^\sigma) \\ &\quad + W(\xi_{\max} | \boldsymbol{\xi}, F^\sigma) \underbrace{F(\xi_{\max} | \xi, x) - W(\xi_{\min} | \boldsymbol{\xi}, F^\sigma) F(\xi_{\min} | \xi, x)}_{=1} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\frac{\partial^2}{\partial x^2} \left(\int_{\xi'_i} W(\xi'_i | \xi, \sigma) dF(\xi'_i | \xi_i, x) \right) = - \int_{\xi'_i} \partial_x^2 F(\xi' | \xi, x) dW(\xi' | \xi, \sigma) - W(\xi_{min} | \xi, \sigma) \partial_x^2 F(\xi_{min} | \xi, x) < 0$$

Computing Markov Perfect Equilibria

1. Guess $\bar{V}_I(\xi)$ and $F^\sigma(\xi' \mid \xi)$.
2. Solve incumbents' investment problem at all ξ and judiciously chosen ν .
 - Gives $\bar{V}_I^A := \int V_I^A(\xi, \nu) dF_\nu$.
3. Compute incumbents' optimal exit decisions.
4. Use incumbents' optimal choices to update $\bar{V}_I(\xi)$.
5. Solve potential entrants' investment problems at all ξ_{-1} and judiciously chosen ν to obtain $\bar{V}_E^A := \int V_E^A(\xi_{-1}, \nu) dF_\nu$.
6. Compute potential entrants' optimal entry decisions.
7. Iterate to convergence in \bar{V}_I and F^σ .

N.B.:

- We need only compute \bar{V}_I .
 - Potential entrants' decisions depend on \bar{V}_I .
 - There is no continuation value conditional on not entering: short-lived PEs assumption.
 - Symmetry reduces the computational burden significantly: Pakes and McGuire (1994).

Indirect Inference I: Investment

Predicted investment $T_{\{\theta_x, \theta_\rho\}}(\xi, \nu; \hat{\Phi})$ can be used in multiple ways.

Our preferred estimator is based on Indirect Inference:

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2. Estimate

$$T_{\{\theta_x, \theta_\rho\}}(\xi_i, \nu_i; \hat{\Phi}) = \sum_{k=1}^B \lambda_k^x \psi_k^x(\xi_i) + \zeta_i^x \Rightarrow \hat{\lambda}_{\text{Investment}}(\{\theta_x, \theta_\rho\}; \hat{\Phi})$$

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3. Estimate

$$x_m = \sum_{k=1}^B \gamma_k^x \psi_k^x(\xi_m) + \eta_m^x \Rightarrow \hat{\gamma}_{\text{Investment}} := [\hat{\gamma}_1^x, \dots, \hat{\gamma}_B^x, \hat{S}_\eta^x]$$

Indirect Inference IIa: Exit

1. Compute

$$\hat{\mathbb{P}}(\text{Exit} \mid \xi; \{\theta_x, \theta_\rho\}) = 1 - F_\rho \left(\int_\nu \hat{V}_I^A(\xi; \{\theta_x, \theta_\rho\}) dF_\nu - \pi(\xi); \theta_\rho \right)$$

2. Estimate, as in Collard-Wexler (2013),

$$\hat{\mathbb{P}}(\text{Exit} \mid \xi; \{\theta_x, \theta_\rho\}) = \sum_{k=1}^B \lambda_k^E \psi_k^E(\xi_i) + \zeta_i^E \Rightarrow \hat{\lambda}_{\text{Exit}}(\{\theta_x, \theta_\rho\}; \hat{\Phi})$$

3. Estimate

$$\mathbb{1}\{\xi'_m = -\infty\} = \sum_{k=1}^B \gamma_k^E \psi_k^E(\xi_m) + \eta_m^E \Rightarrow \hat{\gamma}_{\text{Exit}} := [\hat{\gamma}_1^E, \dots, \hat{\gamma}_B^E]$$

Indirect Inference IIb: Entry

1. Compute

$$\hat{\mathbb{P}}(\text{Entry} \mid \xi; \{\theta_x, \theta_\rho, \theta_\phi\}) = F_\phi \left(\int_\nu \hat{V}_E^A(\xi_{-1}; \{\theta_x, \theta_\rho\}) dF_\nu; \theta_\phi \right)$$

2. Estimate, as in Collard-Wexler (2013),

$$\hat{\mathbb{P}}(\text{Entry} \mid \xi; \{\theta_x, \theta_\rho, \theta_\phi\}) = \sum_{k=1}^B \lambda_k^N \psi_k^N(\xi_i) + \zeta_i^N \Rightarrow \hat{\lambda}_{\text{Entry}}(\{\theta_x, \theta_\rho, \theta_\phi\}; \hat{\Phi})$$

3. Estimate

$$\mathbb{1}\{\xi'_m > -\infty \mid \xi_m = -\infty\} = \sum_{k=1}^B \gamma_k^N \psi_k^N(\xi_m) + \eta_m^N \Rightarrow \hat{\gamma}_{\text{Entry}} := [\hat{\gamma}_1^N, \dots, \hat{\gamma}_B^N]$$

Indirect Inference III: Estimator

Let

$$\hat{\lambda}(\theta; \hat{\Phi}) = [\hat{\lambda}_{\text{Investment}}(\theta_x, \theta_\rho; \hat{\Phi}) \quad \hat{\lambda}_{\text{Entry}}(\theta_x, \theta_\rho, \theta_\phi; \hat{\Phi}) \quad \hat{\lambda}_{\text{Exit}}(\theta_x, \theta_\rho; \hat{\Phi})]$$

and

$$\hat{\gamma} = [\hat{\gamma}_{\text{Investment}} \quad \hat{\gamma}_{\text{Entry}} \quad \hat{\gamma}_{\text{Exit}}]$$

The Indirect Inference estimator solves

$$\min_{\theta} [\hat{\lambda}(\theta; \hat{\Phi}) - \hat{\gamma}]^{\top} \Omega [\hat{\lambda}(\theta; \hat{\Phi}) - \hat{\gamma}]$$

Consistency conditions (dependence on $\hat{\Phi}$ omitted):

- $B_{MK}(\lambda, \theta) \rightarrow \mathcal{B}(\lambda, \theta)$ uniformly in λ, θ .
- For any θ , $\mathcal{B}(\lambda, \theta)$ has a unique optimum in λ , $\lambda(\theta)$.
- $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \hat{\lambda}(\theta) = \lambda(\theta)$.
- $\gamma = \lambda(\theta)$ has a unique solution, i.e. λ^{-1} is well-defined.

Bajari et al. (2007): Non-Linearity in θ

Note the model is not linear in parameters:

$$\bar{V}_I(\xi) = \int_{\rho} \max \left\{ \pi(\xi) + \rho, \int V_I^A(\xi, \nu) dF_{\nu} \right\} dF_{\rho}$$

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Note the model is not linear in parameters:

$$\bar{V}_I(\xi) = \pi(\xi) + \int_{F_\rho^{-1}[\mathbb{P}(\alpha'(\xi, \rho)=1|\xi)]}^{\infty} \rho dF_\rho + \mathbb{P}(\alpha'(\xi, \rho) = 1 \mid \xi) F_\rho^{-1}[\mathbb{P}(\alpha'(\xi, \rho) = 1 \mid \xi)]$$

$\int_a^\infty \rho dF_\rho$ is not generally linear in parameters (e.g. exponential is, lognormal isn't).

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Nonetheless, forward simulation can still be performed once.

- ▶ Draw $u \sim U[0, 1]$
- ▶ Exit: $\mathbb{1}\{u \leq \mathbb{P}(\alpha'(\xi, \rho) = 1 | \xi)\} \Leftrightarrow \mathbb{1}\{F_\rho^{-1}(u) \leq \int V_I^A(\xi, \nu) dF_\nu - \pi(\xi)\}$

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- ▶ Draw $u \sim U[0, 1]$
- ▶ Exit: $\mathbb{1}\{u \leq \mathbb{P}(\alpha'(\xi, \rho) = 1 \mid \xi)\} \Leftrightarrow \alpha'(\xi, F_\rho^{-1}(u))$
- ▶ Forward simulate, storing exit u_{τ_e} . As θ_ρ changes, only recompute $F_\rho^{-1}(u_{\tau_e}; \theta_\rho)$.
- ▶ Generalizes to investment, entry choices if wanted.

Computational Considerations

- ▶ $[I - \beta \mathbf{M}(\mathbf{P})] \bar{\mathbf{V}}_I = \boldsymbol{\pi} - \mathbf{K}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_x) + \boldsymbol{\Sigma}(F_\rho)$ must be solved for each $\boldsymbol{\theta}$.
- ▶ However, the matrix $I - \beta \mathbf{M}(\mathbf{P})$ is *banded*:



- ▶ The LU decomposition of a banded matrix has banded components.
 - Speeds up computation considerably.
 - Decomposition computed once and stored in memory.

▶ Back to Monte Carlo Setup.

Monte Carlo: First Stage and Deviation Details

- ▶ Empirical policy functions:

$$\hat{\sigma}^x(\xi, \nu_\tau) = f^x(\xi)^\top \hat{\chi}_\tau^x \quad \hat{\mathbb{P}}^E(\xi_{-1}) = \Lambda(f^E(\xi)^\top \hat{\chi}^E) \quad \hat{\mathbb{P}}^I(\xi) = \Lambda(f^I(\xi)^\top \hat{\chi}^I).$$

- ▶ BBL deviations: asymptotic,

We draw $\tilde{\chi}_i \sim N(\hat{\chi}, \hat{\Sigma}_\chi)$ for each deviation i . We then form deviations as

$$\tilde{\sigma}_i^x(\xi, \nu_\tau) = f^x(\xi)^\top \hat{\chi}_{i\tau}^x; \quad \tilde{\mathbb{P}}_i^E(\xi_{-1}) = \Lambda(f^E(\xi)^\top \hat{\chi}_i^E); \quad \tilde{\mathbb{P}}_i^I(\xi) = \Lambda(f^I(\xi)^\top \hat{\chi}_i^I).$$

▶ Back to Monte Carlo Results.

Monte Carlo: First Stage and Deviation Details

- ▶ Empirical policy functions:

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- ▶ BBL deviations: multiplicative,

We draw $\iota_i \in \{.95, .975, 1.025, 1.05, 1.075\}$ for each deviation i . We then form deviations as

$$\tilde{\sigma}_i^x(\xi, \nu_\tau) = \iota_i f^x(\xi)^\top \hat{\chi}_\tau^x; \quad \tilde{\mathbb{P}}_i^E(\xi_{-1}) = \Lambda(\iota_i f^E(\xi)^\top \hat{\chi}^E); \quad \tilde{\mathbb{P}}_i^I(\xi) = \Lambda(\iota_i f^I(\xi)^\top \hat{\chi}^I),$$

▶ [Back to Monte Carlo Results.](#)

Monte Carlo: First Stage and Deviation Details

- ▶ Empirical policy functions:

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- ▶ BBL deviations: and additive.


We draw $o_{is} \sim N(0, 0.5)$ for each deviation i and simulated decision s .

We then form deviations as


$$\tilde{\sigma}_{is}^x(\xi, \nu_\tau) = f^x(\xi)^\top \hat{\chi}_\tau^x + o_{is}^x; \quad \tilde{\mathbb{P}}_{is}^E(\xi_{-1}) = \Lambda(f^E(\xi)^\top \hat{\chi}^E + o_{is}^{\text{Exit}}); \quad \tilde{\mathbb{P}}_{is}^I(\xi) = \Lambda(f^I(\xi)^\top \hat{\chi}^I + o_{is}^{\text{Entry}}).$$

▶ [Back to Monte Carlo Results.](#)


Investment Cost Parameters II Estimates



θ_{x1}



θ_{x2}





θ_{x3}

$$c(x, \nu) = \theta_{x1}x + \theta_{x2}x^2 + \theta_{x3}x\nu$$



[Back to Investment Cost Parameters Estimates](#)



Scrap Value Parameters II Estimates



$$\rho \sim \log N(\mu_\rho, \sigma_\rho)$$




Entry Cost Parameters II Estimates



$$\phi \sim \log N(\mu_\phi, \sigma_\phi)$$





Scrap Value Parameters Estimates



$$\rho \sim \log N(\mu_\rho, \sigma_\rho)$$





Entry Cost Parameters Estimates



$$\phi \sim \log N(\mu_\phi, \sigma_\phi)$$




Objective Function: Scrap Value Parameters



$$\rho \sim \log N(\mu_\rho, \sigma_\rho)$$



Objective Function: Entry Cost Parameters



$$\phi \sim \log N(\mu_\phi, \sigma_\phi)$$

