Alienation and Dissent in the Affluent Society: The Extremism of the New Left

OLIVER READ WHITLEY

IN THE preparation of this lecture on the extremism of the left I found it necessary to make a choice, since it was clear that there would not be sufficient time to deal with the entire subject. The use of the phrase "the new left" seems to imply that there is an "old left," and that the two **lefts** are to be compared or contrasted with each other. Since the **new left** is of the most current interest, and since it is most likely that it will be exponents (and opponents) of the **new left** that we are most likely to encounter in our work, I decided to concentrate for the most part of what might be said about the new, rather than the old left. These two versions of the left are, however certainly related, and something needs to be said about the old left as a basis for what I shall have to say about the **new left.**

Undoubtedly, when the extremism of the left is mentioned, one thinks immediately of Communism, and of the variety of targets which the adherents of Marxism-Leninism have had among the population of American society. Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, in their excellent discussion of **What We Must Know About Communism,**[1] have pointed out that there have been five main target groups at which Communist efforts have been aimed. These groups are, respectively, the working class, the Negro community, the armed forces, the youth, and the intellectuals. Despite all the efforts that have been made to win adherents in these groups, it is perhaps reassuring to note that the Communists have not, in the last analysis, had very good results, from their point of view. To be sure, the Communists did make inroads into certain labor unions, and they have by no means given up their efforts, yet "the frequency with which Communist writings refer to the American trade-union movement as corrupted by the 'prosperity illusion' and as 'bourgeois reformist' tells us that the Party knows the enormity of the set-back it has suffered at the hands of organized labor in this country."[2]

The Negroes have been a Communist target because the ideology of Marxist-Leninism holds that an underprivileged minority group is ripe for revolution. Here the story is, in terms of its outcome, the same as with the labor unions. The Communists tried every possible way of gaining adherents in the Negro group. Apparently, many Americans have accepted the Communist claim of overwhelming success in this effort. Yet those who have taken the trouble to study the matter seriously are unanimous in their opinion that the overwhelming majority of Negroes have emphatically rejected the Communists. The Communists have apparently mis-read the American situation; they have exploited, rather than seriously attempted to solve, the Negroes' problems. With regard to the armed forces, they seem to have given up on the idea of trying to bring about a general mutiny of servicemen that would make a **coup d'etat** possible, but they continue to exploit petty grievances in the effort to undermine morale or upset discipline. One hears of few, if any, successes in this effort.

The Communists approach youth with an interesting image of what their target is. That image includes such items as the following: our youth have a great fear of war and are thus susceptible to a "peace offensive;" they know little of their heritage and do not have much stake in what is happening in the world; they blame the older generation for messing up the situation, and they believe that our economic and political problems could have been solved were it not for the fact that we put selfish interests above human values; they are impatient with piecemeal methods of reform and susceptible to the idea that our reform efforts are timid and "bourgeois;" and they can be reached through a flattery that suggests that the future belongs to them.[3] These characteristic ingredients of the Communist image of American

[1] Overstreet, Harry and Bonaro, *What We Must Know About Communism* (New York, Pocket Books, Inc., 1960).

OLIVER READ WHITLEY is Professor of Sociology of Religion, The Iliff School of Theology. This is the third paper in his series, "Extremism in America: Some Rips in the Fabric of Consensus."

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 174.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 178.

youth are of real importance for our present concern, since they reflect some aspects of the situation of the **new left.** But, we shal see later, even the fact that the image is at certain points accurate does not mean that the Communists have been successful with our youth.

The fifth target group, the intellectuals, has been important to the Communists because their ideology points to the need for such people to supply respectable intellectual backing to the work of the masses in bringing about revolution. Here too, an image based in part on caricature has been employed. The intellectual, according to the Communists, likes a kind of theory that encourages man to believe that he can take charge of his existence; feeling undervalued by the power groups in the society, the intellectual will respond favorably to the flattery involved in his being needed; he has a tendency to identify, at a distance, with people; perhaps feeling a sense of guilt about the advantages he enjoys and about the fact that he is often too preoccupied with ideas to be actively involved in the world, he is open to the possibility of accepting offers of painless ways to become a part of things; he likes to be with his own kind, the people who are highly verbal and can solve all sorts of problems with words; he often sees himself as being threatened by the anti-intellectuals; and to top all this off, he is very reluctant to admit having made errors.[4] Intellectuals may, and sometimes do, have characteristics such as those indicated in this image, but this has not, by and large, enabled the Communists to make much headway with American intellectuals as a group.

The five groups already mentioned constitute standard targets for the Communists. In America, they have also made attempts to get to veterans, poor farmers, and the religious groups. Of these, the most important in terms of our interest is no doubt the religious groups. On the question of the Communists' dealings with American church groups, it is helpful to refer to a scheme suggested by Ralph Lord Roy, which traces the situation in terms of eight time periods.[5] The years from 1919 to 1931 were years of indiscriminate attack, during which time churches were crudely and sharply ridiculed. Between 1931 and 1935, the Communists learned to their surprise that some churchmen's support on critical issues (such as the Scottsboro case) could be gained. From 1935 to 1939, the Communists made great efforts to involve churchmen, to "use" them in whatever ways were possible. In 1939 to 1941 were years of retreat and isolation for the Communists; the hard-core members of the Party continued to try to influence clergymen, and their "capitalist war" theme was in some ways successful. During World War II, following Germany's attack upon Russia, the Communists became super-patriots, even attacking religious pacifists as traitors. From 1945 to 1950, the Communists again opposed the leadership of the churches, suggesting that such people as John Foster Dulles were trying to draw the Council of Churches (national and world) into the orbit of what they called "Vatican-inspired fascism." In the years from 1950 to 1956, the great issue was again peace, and the Communists made efforts to exploit the pacifism which was still to be found in the churches. Since 1956, the Communiss have had no significant contact with the churches, and their contacts with churchmen have been limited to perhaps two dozen clergymen. De-Stalinization, the discovery of anti-semitic excesses in the USSR, and the Hungarian revolution have perhaps dulled the edge of Party enthusiasm.

The Communists have employed, Roy tells us, at least four different strategies in their efforts in the churches. One was **denunciation,** in terms of which the notion of religion as the opiate of the people and the stress on atheism were important.. Another was that of **selectivity,** which divided clergymen into progressives who were to be treated with respect, and reactionaries who were to be villified. A third strategy was **exploitation,** the idea of which was not to **abuse** the churches but to **use** them. Here a favorite device was to inveigle clergymen into signing petitions or allowing their names to be used on the letterheads of front organizations. A few ministers, such as Harry F. Ward, William B. Spofford, and Claude C. Williams, were apparently persuaded of the rightness of the Communist cause. The fourth strategy was **infiltration.** This has been used only rarely, but it use did create much suspicion and many false charges. The upshot of the matter is this. "Despite these efforts at infiltration, there was never any serious Communist influence in our churches, even at the height of the united front period. Today that influence is almost at the zero mark. There is only

[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 180-81.

[5] Cf. his chapter in Lee, Robert and Marty, Martin, *Religion and Social Conflict* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1964), "Conflict From the Communist Left and the Radical Right," pp. 55-68.

one identifiable Communist minister, the Reverend Eliot White of Arlington, Massachusetts (has not been in a pulpit since 1931, is 92 years old, and is blind). There are at most two dozen clergymen who can be fairly describred as fellow travelers. None of them is influential. Indeed, only two or three of them occupy pulpits at this present time."[6] This does not square with the understanding of the situation that is often presented by persons who follow the conspiracy theory of the WACKACOBI, but it does square with what reliable information we have on the subject, if one does not accept, as I do not, the idea that people who disagree with me are to be divided into two classes—Communists and fellow-travellers, and dupes.

In the light of our present concerns, I think it is of more relevance to try to see what can be learned about the **new left.** The emergence of this movement is new enough that a variety of attempts has been made to account for it. All of these attempts can, however, be brought within the frame of reference suggested by our earlier discussion of the theory of social systems. Whatever else it may be, the **new left** is a highly visible, and noisily vocal, illustration of the truth of the proposition that a social system always manages, one way or another, to produce deviance from its norms, values, beliefs, and goals. The available descriptions of the movement make this very clear. By the spring of 1965, it was evident that a particular kind of mood was growing among a certain portion of our youth, especially in the colleges. "It was," writes Jack Newfield, who has perhaps given us the most perceptive account of the movement, "the phenomenon of students rejecting the dominant values of their parents and their country; becoming alienated, becoming political, becoming active, becoming radical; protesting against racism, poverty, war, Orwell's 1984, Camus' executioner, Mills' Power Elite, Mailer's Cancerous Totalitarianism; protesting against irrational anti-Communism, nuclear weaponry, the lies of statesmen, the hypocrisy of laws against narcotics and abortion; protesting against loyalty oaths, speaker bans, HUAC, **in loco parentis** — and finally, at Berkeley, protesting against the computer, symbol of man's dehumanization by the machine; in sum, protesting against all those obscenities that form the cryptic composite called the System."[7] One does not have to have to accept the implied value judgment indicated by the title of Newfield's book, which he calls **A Prophetic Minority,** in order to see that he has captured some of the essence of the **new left** way of seeing the world.

Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, whose report on the **new left** was published under the title of **The New Radicals,**[8] refer to it simply as "the Movement." They point out that The Movement is "a melange of people, mostly young; organizations, mostly new; and ideals, mostly American,"[9] and that the young people who are involved believe that "they must make something happen, that they are part of a movement stirring just below the surface of life hitherto accepted all over the world." The Movement consists not only of organizations, but of an unknown number of unaffiliated supporters. It would be a mistake to think of The Movement as being simply political, as fitting neatly into one of the categories suggested earlier in the presentation of Rossiter's typology of political positions. Civil rights demonstrations, anti-Vietnam marches, and student sit-ins are only the most visible, and widely publicized, aspects of what goes on here. Perhaps more important is the emphasis in The Movement upon the search for a psychic community in which a viable identity, not based upon the success goals usually sought for in America, can be established. For The Movement, the enemy is not only the authoritarian or totalitarian society; it is also what participants regard as the administered, bureaucratic, dehumanized, rhetorical-liberal society as well. There is here a strong emphasis upon rejecting the "overdeveloped society," the tendency for bureaucracy to take over not only the government, but also the corporations, the trade unions, and the universities. Many in the Movement regard the value system that our efficient technology has created as false, and they reject most of the symbols of affluence. These are not, be it noted, young people who come from economically depressed situations, and whose bitterness toward the society in which they live is an expression of resentment because of their lack of opportunity in it. Many participants come from backgrounds in which they have enjoyed the best that middle-class comfort can offer, and they are not to be written off as a disgruntled minority who do not have it or cannot make it, for they are often among the top students in our colleges and universities.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 62.

[7] Newfield, Jack, *A Prophetic Minority* (New York, Signet Books, 1966), pp. 21-22.

[8] New York, Vintage Books, 1966.

[9] *The New Radicals,* p. 3.

Because it is multi-faceted, pluralistic, and somewhat amorphous, the **new left** is difficult to paint a portrait of in broad sweeping strokes. Jack Newfield has suggested that it needs to be understood on three levels: **politically,** it is an anti-Establishment protest against the glaring inequities in our society; **morally,** it is a revulsion against a society which new left adherents believe is becoming increasingly corrupt; **existentially,** it is a revolt against the remoteness and impersonality of a society that is not responsive to human need.[10] While some of the values represented by the so-called Beatnik group have found their way into the **new left** sub-culture, the new radicals should not be lumped together with the Beatniks. Beatniks were children of futility, rebels without a cause, who had to "cop out" of the Rat Race because they could not perform, and who could not find any way to act out their discontent in a relevant political manner. **New leftists,** generally, are rejecting a society in which they could succeed, and they are seeking, even if they have not really found, relevant and adequate political menas to express and implement their convictions. Some of the new radicals **have** adopted what most of us would regard as modes of extreme permissiveness in personal behavior — matter-of-fact acceptance of sexual freedom, and on openness to experimentation with marijuana and the hallucinogenic drugs, for example — but it seems apparent that this extreme permissiveness is related to the self-identity search in which these people are engaged, and to their rejection of technological, bureaucratic and middle-class success values.

Jacobs and Landau argue that the **new leftists** presently are restlessly seeking to find "a new politics and a new ideology that will permit them to link existential humanism with morally acceptable modes of achieving radical social change."[11] The **new leftists** appear to be "hung up," both ideologically and in terms of devising viable strategy and tactics. They have some difficulty deciding where the points of leverage are that might enable them to realize their objectives. As Steven Kelman has pointed out in a perceptive article in **Harpers,** "the predicament of today's small band of American radicals concerns the tactics they are going to use in promoting their programs. Should they work for a coalition of the largely powerless Negro masses and poor people, with groups already sharing power — the labor unions, liberal organizations . . . and progressive religious movements? Or should they reject alliances with such forces and attempt instead to organize those 'unspoiled' by power as a potential revolutionary force independent of 'The Establishment'?"[12]

Kelman goes on to suggest that radicals have usually divided among themselves on the question of whether it is possible to accomplish radical change within the existing political structure, and they might be sorted into three groups — Can'ts, Cans, and Communists — in terms of how they deal with this question. The Can'ts, as might be surmised, think that the existing society is hopelessly corrupt, and that therefore any alliance with established groups is at least useless, if not dangerous or immoral. The Cans are equally adamant in the demands for change that they make, but on particular issues they are often willing to accept less than unconditional victory. The Cans want, in the words of Bayard Rustin, to move from "protest to politics," for they understand that independence is not necessarily an intrinsic value. "The issue is which coalition to join and how to make it responsive to your program. . . . (T)he difference between expediency and morality in politics is the difference between selling out a principle and making smaller concessions to win larger ones. The leader who shrinks from this task reveals not his purity but his lack of political sense."[13] The really basic difference between Cans and Can'ts has to do with their attitudes toward power. The Cans do not steer clear of attaining power, for they believe that, after all, to have power is the aim of political action. The Can'ts are perhaps best described as being ambivalent about power. They appear at times to be trying to escape power; at other times they seem to be trying to get hold of it. While the Cans tend to follow what they take to be the implications of a pluralistic model of American society, according to which a variety of groups compete for and share power, and are attempting to shift the center of power toward the emergence of a new liberal majority, the Cants regard coalition with any part of the Establishment as a kind of political immorality. At this point, Kelman suggests an interpretation that reminds us very much of Clinton Rossiter's idea that the various

[10] *A Prophetic Minority,* pp. 23-23.

[11] *The New Radicals,* p. 7.

[12] "The Feud Among the Radicals," *Harpers* (July, 1966), p. 67.

[13] Rustin, Bayard, "From Protest to Politics," *Commentary* (February, 1965), pp. 25-31, quotation from p. 29.

political positions are not arranged along a continuum but in a circle, with the extremes of left and right next to each other. "(A) fundamental reason that Cant's refuse to enter into coalitions with liberals or unions is that these have **power.** They are part of the same Establishment that General Motors and Governor Wallace are part of. In fact, the New Left's most significant contribution to modern political paranoia is their increasingly prominent belief (strangely parallel to that of the John Birch Society) that The System against which they are railing is none other than American liberalism."[14] The Cans say that the Cants attitude means giving up the struggle, and it leads to quietism and do - nothingism, which makes the Cants really conservatives. The Cants regard the Cans stance as a cop-out, a sell-out to the Establishment. The Moscow-type Communists do not quite fit either group, for ideologically they are Cants, but practically they are often Cans, when it suits their purposes.

This discussion of the **new left** may, by this time, have struck some of you as suggesting an image of American youth remarkably like the one presented earlier as indicating how the Communists see our youth. To a certain extent, the Communists may have understood the mood of American youth correctly, but if so, they have not been able to capitalize on their understanding very effectively. The older versions of Marxism have had some appeal to youth concerned about civil rights and peace, but the four groups that represent the remnants of old left influence have only minimal strength in The Movement. Two of the groups, Progressive Labor Party and W. E. DuBois Clubs, act out the split between the Chinese and Soviet versions of Communism. The PLP's believe in revolution, and they think that America should become a workers' state following the revolution of the workers (and those who join them) against the ruling class. PLP's regard other **new left** groups, such as SNCC and SDS as being ideologically confused and naive. Emphasis upon revolutionary action distinguishes the PLP from the DuBois Clubs, whose members tend to favor coalition with liberal forces and are willing to moderate their socialist ambitions in specific cases. DuBois clubbers often idealize the Soviet Union, seeing it as a viable socialist state. But they emphasize the practical rather than the utopian. They follow the line of what might be called "cautious" Communism, and can thus accept as a kind of official policy the sort of statement made in **Political Affairs,** an organ of the Communist Party. "Our new policy should be to join in struggle with the New Left whenever it is possible and prudent for us to do so. . . . In our disagreements with the New Left, we are confident that we are right, and that history will prove us right. But truth in a vacuum is no truth at all. In order to be able to criticize the New Left effectively, and to teach it what we know, we must be accepted and admired by it. This can only happen when Communists are known to be on the picket lines and in the jails."[15]

The third of the remnant groups is the Young Socialist Alliance, the youth group of the Socialist Workers Party, which is dedicated to the perpetuation of the "pure" Communist ideology of Leon Trotsky. For YSA people, the messianic class, the workers, has been betrayed by both Russia and China, and classic Marxism must be defended against deviations. The remaining group, the Young People's Socialist League, functions as a kind of anti-Communist socialist opposition, regarding other Marxist groups as totalitarian. Neither YSA or YPSL has much influence in The Movement, and neither seems to have much potential for growth. These groups that are connected by way of ancestry with the old left occasionally come together with new radical groups in **ad hoc** committees formed with respect to organizing demonstrations against HUAC or the war in Viet Nam, but such encounters tend to be short-lived and do not produce any very effective action.

Beneath all this discussion of the New Left, especially since it has taken as a point of departure the sociological theory that social systems always tend to to produce deviance from their norms, values, beliefs, and goals, lies an issue fraught with tremendous significance for those who are concerned to arrive at some genuine understanding of what is happening in a society that seems, at this time, to be producing more than a normal quota of deviance. The issue to which I am referring has been brought most forcefully to our attention by the work of psychologist Kenneth Keniston. In his study of **The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in American Society,**[16] Keniston has made clear some of the reasons why so many of our youth have, in a variety of ways, and for different motives, felt

[14] Kelman, Steven, *op. cit.,* p. 72.

[15] Quoted in Jacobs and Landau, *op. cit.,* p. 53.

[16] New York, Delta Books, Dell Publishing Company, 1967.

compelled to reject, or at least to become alienated from, the basic values of the society in which they have grown up. He did not, of course, study an aggregate of typical American youth, for his subjects were Harvard undergraduates, products of a sub-culture of affluence and privilege. Thus it is not possible to extrapolate the findings of this study in any simple way. Yet it **is** possible to argue that a great deal can be learned about the typical by studying the extremes. As Keniston puts it, "while the study of extremes should not lead to generalizations about the **behavior** of others who are not extreme, it can be used to understand the **problems** and **stresses** of more typical typical lives, and the **processes** by which others attempt to cope with these problems and stresses. . . . (T)he major themes in the lives of these alienated youths are but extreme reactions to pressures that affect all young Americans."[17]

The problem that Keniston was specifically concerned with was alienation of a kind quite different from that of most of the adherents to the life-style of the New Left. Nevertheless the clear and immediate relevance of what he says for our concern is shown by the context in which his study is placed. Pointing out that alienation is not uniquely modern or American, Keniston goes on to argue that every era and society produces its quota of those who spurn their society, and that "from the ranks of the alienated in every age have come the misfits, malcontents, innovators, or revolutionaries who have changed their worlds the better to suit their discontents and idealisms."[18] We are not, perhaps, very surprised to find the poor, the unemployed, and the rejected being somewhat alienated from society, but what are we to make, Keniston asks, of the alienation of the average, affluent, adjusted American, or the estrangements of those who are able, fortunate, and priveleged? Recall now that many of the **new left** people are among the most able of the present generation of students, and that many of them come from fairly affluent, middle-class backgrounds, and you can see the importance of what is being said here. What is "new" about contemporary American alienation is not that those at the bottom of the society have not very much commitment to its goals, but that "a sense of estrangement pervades the rest of our society, an alienation that has few apparent roots in poverty, exclusion, sickness, oppression, lack of choice and opportunity."[19] We have not done justice to this situation when we seek its causes in personal pathology alone. For alienation, as our theory of social systems might indicate, is often the result of the stresses, inconsistencies, and even the injustices of the social order. Rejection of society may take a variety of forms: delinquents and criminals reject society by refusing to follow its rules and laws; misanthropes and psychotics, and perhaps certain other types, such as the beatniks of the 1950's and the hippies of the 1960's, reject society by acting out a particular version of withdrawal from its processes; reformers and revolutionaries reject their society through protest, civil disobedience, and various other political or quasi-political means. Alienation is a multifaceted phenomenon, expressing itself in different ways according to the operation of a complex web of personal, societal, and cultural factors. It is "a response to major collective estrangements, social strains, and historical losses in our society, which first predispose certain individuals to reject their society, and later shape the particular ways they do so. . . . Between the individual and the human condition stand the complex structures of society, the traditional currents of culture, and the legacies of history; and **these** determine which of the many human potentials are to be realized, which will be neglected, and what form they will take."[20] The **new left** must, I think, be seen as one part of this very complex picture, as an important current manifestation of the tendency of social systems to produce deviant behavior.

In the discussion of the extremism of the left, as in that on the extremism of the right, I have not dealt in any great detail with the origins, history, beliefs, and activities of specific groups. This has been quite deliberate, and it was a conscious choice on my part in planning these lectures. For one thing, there are too many groups to do justice to in the time available. Then too, some of these extremist groups change so rapidly that before I could get this lecture presented, some of my information about specific groups would be inaccurate. For example, Jack Newfield points out that there have been at least four different versions of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, an important **new left** organization, since it began in 1960; it began, he says, as a band of middle-class, religiously motivated integrationists interested in civil rights; by 1962 it was already a non-violent guerilla army, ready

[17] *The Uncommitted,* pp. 17-18.
[18] *Ibid.,* p. 6
[19] *Ibid.,* p. 8
[20] *Ibid.,* pp. 204-5

to take on not only segregation, but voter registration campaigns, protest marches, and community organization projects in urban slums; after the summer of 1964 the keynote words for SNCC became freedom, community, and participatory democracy; during 1965 and 1966 a very different, a nationalistic and ominously revolutionary, SNCC began to emerge, in which the emphasis was on race pride and the semantics of black power.[21] The symbol of this latest, and still continuing version of SNCC was the election of militant Stokely Carmichael to be its President, and he has been followed in that post by a seemingly more militant H. Rap Brown. As you can see from this brief account of one organization, if I were to attempt to deal adequately with the mass of sheer empirical and descriptive details concerning each of the many groups on both the left and the right, I would have had to write some parts of these lectures while reading a newspaper on the flight from Denver to Tulsa. There is an even more important reason for the concentration upon a more general, and interpretive, approach — namely, my conviction that what would be more helpful to you would be an attempt to provide a viable, relevant frame of reference from within which to seek an understanding of extremism, an intellectual context, in other words, that might have the function of preventing us from being overwhelmed by the avalanche of facts that might be presented.

The brief review of developments in SNCC does raise, in an important way, a crucial question: what is the future of the **new left?** On this question, Sidney Lens is probably correct in his statement of the possibilities. "What the future holds for the new young leftists and their indigenous radicalism is uncertain. The New Left may be the beginning of an important movement in the development of a new type of American democracy. Or it may fade with the passing of the immediate concerns of civil rights and controversial war."[22] In the next few years, the motivation for **new left** activity will probably continue, for what that activity opposes — war, bureaucracy, racism, the smugness of affluence, the hypocrisy of the Establishment, and increasing signs of moral rotteness — is not very likely to disappear any time soon. There is the possibility, of course, that **new left** activity will be curtailed, if we have a new outbreak of mccarythyism, or domesticated, if the **new left** critique of our society can be absorbed into the output of the mass media. There is another possibility, devoutly to be hoped for — if I may express at this point my own feelings about the matter — and that is that the civic unrest and violence through which we have passed in the summer of 1967 will convince us that we have to do something about the basic underlying realities of the operation of the American social system, something that will render **new left** activity irrelevant. I may as well be very plain in what I am saying here. After what we have been through this summer, anyone who thinks that the answer to our difficulties is the enlargement of the national guard so that more men are available for riot duty, or giving the police in our cities training in the handling of civil disturbances, or passing a law making it a crime to cross a stateline for the purpose of inciting a riot, must also believe that you can cure a brain tumor by taking aspirin for the headache it produces. Whether this possibility to which I have referred becomes in any meaningful sense a reality depends in part upon the kind of job that President Johnson's recently appointed committee of prominent citizens does in directing attention to basic causes rather than to palliatives aimed at the temporary relief of symptoms.

[21] Newfield, Jack, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

[22] Lens, Sidney, "The New Left — and the Old," *The Progressive* (June, 1966), p. 24.