

The Christian and World Peace

II. Sterilizing the Military Conflict

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IN the preceding article five gigantic explosions, characteristic of our time, were delineated: Transportation and communication, population, nationalism, nuclear weapons, and Communism. It was proposed that what we have to look for is not static solutions to problems posed by these interlocking explosive forces, but directions and processes, with which and through which we can work toward the solutions that we hold to be desirable. Four fundamental steps, requisite for survival of a free industrial society, were suggested: 1. Sterilize the military realm of conflict; 2. Develop an effective social, economic and political counterthrust to Communism; 3. Change Communism at its source; 4. Turn the energies of mankind to providing an adequate livelihood for peoples everywhere. With that introduction, we turn to look at the problem of the achievement of peace in this complex international, socio-economic, political, military context that is the totality of our experience at the present time.

1. The Meaning of World Peace

There are several things that peace, as I am talking about it, is not. I would like to make a very clear differentiation between the peace I am talking about and the peace we mostly talk about when we go to church. I am not derogating either one of these, simply distinguishing between them. I am not

talking about peace of mind or inner serenity. Perhaps as Christians the real challenge of the decades that lie ahead in our personal lives is to have such deep rooted faith and such deep rooted understanding and such deep rooted commitment, that even as we stand in the midst of war and destruction we stand in personal serenity. This is one of the great messages that we have to learn and live by as Christians. But I am not talking about that problem. It is a problem that many of you are going to be working with. However, if we use this desire for inner serenity as a bomb shelter, to try to flee from the realities of the struggle for peace in the social complex, we will have proved the Communist's claim that religion is an opiate of the people.

Unless we can make the connection between this inner serenity and these complex processes by which we struggle for the survival of a free society, working toward the time—perhaps decades hence—when there is some sort of hope for a positive peace in the world, we will not have lived up to what I believe to be God's will for us. So the kind of peace I am talking about is not like war: it cannot break out some morning and just be here. I wish it could.

Peace, as we are considering it, is also much more than the absence of overt military conflict, although that is prerequisite to peace. If overt military conflict is eventually and effectively terminated in our world, then peace must reach far beyond that. Ultimately peace in international affairs can come only through the survival of the free industrial society, leading to the development of a system of law for the solution of the problems of con-

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flict that arise between nations. We are never going to achieve that perfection of human nature in which there will not be any conflicts of interest. The only hope is that some day we may succeed in being able to have non-violent techniques for dealing with conflict. I am not talking about anything that is going to happen in the next ten years. I am talking about something that has the sweeping certainty of decades in it—and perhaps even centuries.

2. The Dangers We Face

Now our first problem in building in this direction, from the point of view of our Christian and American traditions, is to try to look at the problems of the survival of the free industrial societies. The reason I put "industrial" society alongside of "freedom" as a value, which is important to maintain for the good of human life, is that it is only in industrial society that man has been able to organize himself to that point where he is at least able to produce those things which are fundamental for a good life. We are the first society in history—Western Europe and the United States and the few out-riding parts of that society—that has been so organized that the physical elements were achieved sufficiently to enable us to produce enough food, clothing and shelter, enough medicine and medical attention, enough school houses and books and communications systems, that we could say that no one in our society need be starved for any of these things. This is something that is so new that the question is: Can it survive in our world today? Thus we must consider how this free industrial society might be destroyed in this polarized world in which we live. Only so can we then begin to move toward a consideration of the processes by which we may preserve such a society.

I would list four major ways by which our free industrial society can be destroyed. First, it can be destroyed in the vast destruction of an atomic

war. Second, it can be destroyed by isolation and defeat through Communist, step-by-step military aggression on the Hitler pattern, isolating and chipping off one country after another, until eventually we find ourselves barricaded on the North American continent, with the rest of the world under the control of Communism. In that circumstance we might have to destroy freedom for ourselves in order to be able to stand up, even in a military sense, against these forces. Third, we can lose this struggle by isolation and defeat through step-by-step subversion and persuasion. Fourth, we can lose this free society by internal decay. What I am pointing to here is the tension of the struggle that exists between us and Communism as a philosophy. And, strangely enough, one of the very real problems we have is our overt emphasis on our involvement in the struggle with Communism. This is a paradox and a weakness. While our greatest danger comes from the challenge of Communism, our keen and concentrated focus of attention on our conflict with Communism is also one of the sources of weakness in our position. This weakness and its resultant dangers will be more apparent in connection with the subject, winning the socio-economic struggle. We must understand, however, that freedom can be lost by internal decay as well as by external force.

Thus, if we conduct our affairs in such a way that we precipitate an atomic war, this means defeat no matter who wins the war. If we conduct our affairs in such a way that, although we succeed in avoiding atomic war, under the threat of atomic destruction we are immobilized to the point that we are unwilling to meet the small world threats that can be brought to us, we can lose through a succession of limited wars. The Korean War was the first example of a limited war in our national experience. It came out as favorably as it did for us, because our major opponent, Russia, still did not physi-

cally command atomic weapons, and our atomic arsenal stalemated the willingness of Russia overtly to join the fight. She sent some volunteers, she supplied the military equipment, and so on, but that situation is rapidly changing. Then we can be successful with our whole military range of activity and still lose this struggle by being defeated on the socio-economic front, with the uncommitted and undeveloped peoples of the world finally deciding that they can get what they want out of life better by joining Communism than by working with us. And finally, we can decay from within, because of our involvement with our own wealth.

3. The Atomic Stalemate

Against this background, we turn now to the first process that we have got to carry through, down the decades into the future, if we are going to begin to seek a way to move through these dilemmas that lie before us. This first process is the process by which we must try to sterilize the military arena of conflict. Now stalemating atomic war is a technical matter of such extent and complexity that I am not going to be able to go into great detail, and I am not really competent to do so.¹ The point of greatest complexity is the rapid rate of change in the nature of weapons themselves, because on both sides scientific research is advancing so rapidly that each side is constantly under the fear that the other side is going to achieve a technological break-through. Such a break-through would certainly, completely throw the balance of power to one side or the other, so that in desperation the side having the greater destructive force would be tempted to risk everything in using that force in some kind of preventative action. The

only stalemate to this is retaliatory action.

Many complexities operate in this matter, but in basic outline it is relatively simple. I wonder if many people realize that we are in such an atomic stalemate right at this moment. To protect ourselves as a nation, we are dependent on the fact that every morning around the world as dawn approaches there are American airplanes with hydrogen bombs aboard in the air, so that if the glaring missile strength of the Russians should be used and an atomic bomb should land on the base of any of these planes, they would be safe to carry out a retaliatory attack. This off-ground maneuver occurs every day. It is a deterrent in that the time is coming in the not too distant future when the Russians may conceivably have enough rockets that by one touch of the button every one of our bases could be hit within ten to twenty-five minutes. This is what an atomic stalemate is. It keeps shifting. It costs enormous sums of money. It takes great steadiness of purpose.

Now what are the alternatives? You will often hear it said that this is an impossible situation; we must have disarmament. But if you will follow with care the actual processes by which disarmament negotiations move and have been moving since the Baruch plan was originally proposed, when we had complete and clear atomic superiority, down to the present, you will see that the same mistrust, the same issues which make us unable to arrive at any kind of settlement of the less explosive disagreements that we have with Russia are also the ones that make it impossible for us to agree on any specific system of disarmament which will work.² We have to spend a lot of time yet, living through a period of atomic stalemate before the conditions

¹ On this subject, Dr. Winfield recommends Henry A. Kissinger: *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper, 1957), as meriting careful study. (Ed.)

² It should be noted that the date on which this lecture was delivered was February 4, 1959. (Ed.)

within each of our blocks of countries and in the world shift to the point where we find a ground for depolarizing this polarized world.

Now at the same time that we maintain this stalemate, we have to prevent the Communist world from using military aggression in the form of limited wars to expand their area of control. To carry out both of these things, we, with our friends around the world, have got to build and maintain a system of military strength in the whole free world that will sterilize the use of military conflict to gain political ends. By this I mean simply that we must make the consequences of such usage so costly to both sides that neither will dare use it.

This is terribly risky business, because one of our real disadvantages in this whole atomic stalemate position is that we as a people know so much more about what atomic weapons are than the Russian people do. This was one of the key ways by which Stalin, in the years in which we had complete atomic superiority, avoided the necessity of having to come to some kind of agreement that would have made it possible for us to stop development of atomic weapons at that point.

He did this in two ways. First, he himself perhaps did not really understand the significance of the atomic weapons completely. Thus he went on believing that the long term operating factors of morale, of dedication to purpose, of cause, of determination and ability to fight with huge armaments—which had been the basis of Russia's defeat of Hitler—would continue to give Russia power sufficient to meet all of her problems. There was no attempt to re-evaluate the matter of military power. Second, he insulated his people from information. It was nearly ten years after the American public was fairly well aware of the significance of the destructive power of atomic weapons that the Russian people even knew, as a people, that

there really was such a thing in the world. Their leadership simply interpreted the Japanese surrender as having been caused by the entry of Russia into the war. They said nothing to the Russian people about the atomic bomb. If the bomb was mentioned, it was thought to be an experiment of some sort that had no effect on the course of the war. The Russian people believed them, and as a result the Russian leadership has, during this more recent period, been under great pressure of public opinion to modify its position.

This brings out one of the great advantages of dictatorship in this kind of struggle. Now they have begun to tell their people the truth about atomic power, but they are telling it in terms of their own possession of that power. All through both periods they have been painting a picture to the world of us as the war mongers, of us as the people who are dedicated to military power and military power alone, because we have been so acutely aware of this power. The very fact that we as a people know so much about the potential destructiveness of atomic weapons means that it becomes harder and harder for us to run the risk of having to use them.³ And we have to watch that the Communist leadership, again by virtue of the fact that they know this about us as a people, do not thereby come to misjudge the situation to the extent that they, on their side, decide to use these weapons.

4. The Interdependency of The Free World

Now the other great part of maintaining this military stalemate to a point that we can begin to sterilize the realm of conflict is the matter of our relationships to the rest of the Free World. We as a nation simply do not have enough space, enough manpower, enough wealth—even though we control

³ See Dr. Winfield's previous article in this journal, XVI (Spring, 1959), No. 2, pp. 5-7, and Kissinger, *cit. supra*, ch. 3 and 11.

such a large proportion of the total wealth of the world—to handle this situation by ourselves. So, whether we like it or not, even to maintain an effective military stalemate, we must have a huge complex, hard-to-maintain, set of relationships with the other countries of the Free World.

It is instructive to consider one of the inventions of the Chinese Communists, which they used in bringing about revolution in the villages, before they swept to power in the whole country. This was a major technique for gaining power by a process of isolation and destruction of the wealthy, the landowners, and the more substantial people in the community. They did not arouse hatred for all of these people at once; they isolated them one by one and focussed all the hatred that could be generated in a community upon that one person. They would go in and pick out the one landlord who made the most vulnerable subject. Perhaps it would be one who in his dealings with his peasants and tenants, and in his personal characteristics, had done those things which stirred up the most resentment over the past years. That initial resentment might have been small or great, justified or unjustified, but in any case the victim was selected and then all the hatred possible whipped up in the community, focussed on this one man, until everybody was ready to condemn and kill him. And then they would move on to the next one and the next and the next, one by one.

This is very much the way we stand in the world. The Communists recognize us perfectly clearly as the core of resistance to their world-wide control. Their policy is steadily directed at isolating us in the way described above. This is one of the reasons why we are continually bombarded with the flow of propaganda, about everything we do or say, designed to make us hated around the world. In various ways we give them enough excuses to exploit,

and then as a western power, predominantly white, we bear with us all the detriments of three hundred years of western, materialistic colonialism by association. The peoples of the world are keenly aware of these factors. Those of us who are working at this side of the problem are also keenly aware of them, as we attempt to strengthen, refurbish, and further develop a policy of partnership.

This is awfully hard for us as a nation to do. Our motivations are so economic at some points, that we are apt to say, "We are paying for most of this, and you will do it the way we want it done, just because we control the purse strings." Well, the peoples of the world are not going to take the risks and accept the sacrifices—let alone fight or run the risk of fighting—for policies that they do not feel are theirs and in their interest. They are just not going to do it. As leaders among the free nations, we have to work with a clear eye to the fears, prejudices, and weaknesses of our friends, as well as with understanding of the perfectly legitimate factor of their own self-interest. We must formulate, state, and act upon joint policies, so dedicated to the extension of the good that the peoples of the free nations want, and so firmly based on our own positive values, that the majority of people will whole-heartedly join in our program of a mutual policy of partnership.

There are price tags attached to this business of maintaining a stalemate and sterilizing the military arena of conflict. There is the cost in money, new weapons systems, maintenance of bases around the world, cooperative maintenance of the military power of our friends in NATO and in other parts of the world—all this on the military side. Then there is the cost of the risk involved, which has been called "brinksmanship." The last exercise in it was toward the end of the summer of 1958, when bombardment of the islands off China began. This is the probing pro-

cess: probing to see where we are weak, where we are willing to give, if we will ever give way. Then the probing follows the more quickly and with greater force. The probing is also aimed at those situations where we stand on weakest grounds morally, because the Communists know that we desire to be able to operate from unambiguous positions of righteousness, if possible. Thus they hit us hardest where we find ourselves having to support something we wish we did not have to support. Therefore, we have to put a cost on the risk that our calculations may go wrong.

There is also a cost in leadership and devotion: continuity of purpose. It is a cost in patience and duration of will as a people, not only for ourselves, but as well for our friends. Only out of such continuity can the leadership develop that makes it possible for our friends to be willing to stand fast in this situation. Obviously they must be able to feel that they can depend on our duration of will and continuity of purpose. These statements merely point to a set of systems of relationships and complexities in which we are involved and upon which we depend.

5. The Limitations of Military Success

Now having said all this, let us remember very clearly that sterilizing the military arena of conflict and keeping it sterile deals only with the negative half of our problem. We cannot win our struggle with military means at all. All military means can ever do is to give us time in which to win in other arenas. Success here means that we prevent the destruction of freedom by Communist expansion through military aggression and that we avoid an atomic war. This success will be delicately balanced, risky, expensive, dangerous. It will be not for two, three, or five years, but for ten, twenty—and perhaps a hundred—years. That is the most that military success can ever mean, and we may have to fight a whole series of small, limited wars to attain this. And yet that is less than half of our problem.

If we are going to win this struggle, the positive part of it lies completely on the other side of the coin. The second great process that we have initiated and must carry on far more effectively than we have in the past is the process of winning the socio-economic struggle in the world.

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