Dualogue, Dialogue and Logic

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I

The term "dualogue" is borrowed from Abraham Kaplan, professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan and one of the ablest interpreters of Martin Buber. A dualogue occurs when two people are taking turns talking, each not really listening, but waiting his turn. I believe that both Chesterton and Shaw observed that most listening is actually thinking what you wish to say when you can get the floor, and I would add, using memory tricks so that you won't forget it when your turn comes on the unlucky chance that the other person says something interesting that diverts your attention.

There is nothing new about the concept of dualogue, but the term is useful, and Kaplan has added an analysis of the game rules, which he says, are unforgiving. That is, if you don't observe these rules you will not get your turn, because the game won't go on.

> You have to give the other his turn, and you give signals during his turn, like saying 'un huh' or laughing at what he says, to show that he is having his turn. You must also refrain from saying anything that really matters to you as a human being, as it would be regarded as an embarrassing intimacy. (**Time**, Jan., 24, 1969, p. 53)

It would be interesting to elaborate on the rules for dualogue in particular settings, like that of the pastoral call on a new family; the interview with the young man back from college, full of intense ideas about what is wrong with the way things are; and certain conversations we have at ministerial associations; or table-talk when we are invited to deliver the invocation at a gathering where we feel somewhat out of place.

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A couple of observations about the function of the dualogue may be in order. Sometimes it is a necessary technique, if not for survival, then at least for getting through an unproductive situation with as little wear and tear as possible. Small talk has its place in making the routines of life bearable and furthermore in bringing some transactions to an end, which otherwise would drag on and on. Indeed, Buber recognized the necessity for I-it relations in some settings for the sake of getting life's businesss taken care of.

Also, it must be admitted that dualogue serves a purpose where the real issue is not being talked about, and there does not seem to be any way of getting it brought out into the open or even of finding out what it is. And yet it remains important to keep the doors open and the channels free, for unexpectedly the time may come when a real issue **is** brought out and then it will be important to have left avenues of communication open. Let me give an example. Recently I had some correspondence with a college student in which there were occasional references to drugs. That was not the problem, I was convinced, and so I ignored these references, which I took to be attempts to bug a member of the establishment and to dramatize things. But finally I included in a letter a three page dissertation on LSD and Speed, separate from the personal letter and prefaced by a statement to the effect that I felt I had an obligation to say what I thought, since he had brought the subject up, and frankly I thought my views worthy of consideration, although I made no pretense of being an expert on the subject . Now I must freely admit that I do not **really** know whether my little dissertation proved of any value or not, although I was later told that it served as a the basis for a dormitory argument

late into the night. My point is merely that I was quite sure that this was not the real issue with this young person, and I was determined not to be drawn into a false argument that could go on at great length for the purpose of obscuring the real issues. So I resorted to the technique of a proclamation — a clear instance of dualogue, if you will —, rather than a pretended dialogue. If there is justification of my technique in this particular example, it must come from my own confusion as to what it really was about. I confess to you some distrust of ministers who claim to know exactly what is bugging any parishoner or colleague at any particular time. They have given me so many bum steers in my day, that I put their firm conclusions down as among the most unlikely hypotheses. I have found people who regard the behavior of particular human beings at least somewhat confusing to be far more reliable guides in the long run.

Job's comforters provide an excellent example of the dualogue. There is little by way of real engagement, either on Job's part with their arguments or on their part with Job's existential predicament. Not everything they say is absurd or irrelevant or lacking in wisdom. They have suffered from an unsympathetic exegesis, to say the least. The fact remains that their statements are in the nature of speeches, each waiting his turn, to vindicate his viewpoint, rather than responses to a human situation. Job emerges not only as a good man, righteous and human, but as a wise one for not attempting to engage in dialogue with their every point.

So the dualogue serves a purpose at times, still the main point of criticism against it stands. It is not a satisfactory life style nor is it a satisfactory professional mode. At best it is a gambit to get over a rough spot or through a period of confusion. It is quite possible to develop the techniques of dualogue to the point where one will be successful and avoid obvious failure, but the price is an absence of authentic encounter. And this is a heavy price, because it entails a certain loss of genuineness at the point of being a person, of having truly lived, in fact, of having being. For our particular, individual personal being, when all is said and done, is made up in significant measure of the ensemble of our genuine relations with others. Tennyson's "I am a part of all that I have met" needs to be revised to say I am the organized configuration of all the genuine life relations I have participated in or been nourished by, as contrasted with those I have simply met or bumped up against. There is more to be said, but it would be difficult to deny that authentic self-hood could be attained, sensed and enjoyed if this were not a part of it.

II

I need not discuss dialogue, or as Kaplan prefers to call it, "communion," because that is well known to all by this time. Particularly, considerable attention has been given to this subject from two disciplines. For example, semantics has helped us understand the overtones and side effects of language and other forms of communication. Starting back with **The Meaning of Meaning** and **The Tyranny of Words**, and on through the more recent studies of Carnap and latter day applications of Wittgenstein's theory of language games, we have been helpfully instructed in the subtleties of rhetoric. Then, too, psychology has been illuminating in helping us understand why much alleged communication is non-communicative and much nonverbal behavior is communicative. From three quarters that come to mind the psychological analysis of dualogue and dialogue has been enriched. First, the hippies — so much denounced in words and so much imitated in the very sedate worlds of advertising and TV programming — have made a valuable contribution in cutting through the academic jargon, and have given us such terms as "hang-up," "up tight,"

"turned on," "tuned out," "doing your own thing." Second, the various therapies and experimental sensitivity methodologies to help people be themselves and thus discover themselves. Third, existentialism, which made clear that systems and structures all too often serve the main purpose of preventing authentic encounter, of keeping us from thinking, of enabling us to see men as trees walking — human beings as abstractions that move.

We understand the dynamics of both dualogue and dialogue ever so much better because of these contributions.

One further point that Kaplan makes throws additional light on dialogue. You don't know how it will come out or what avenues it will pursue. It is, he says, never rehearsed.

> I don't know beforehand what it will be. I don't know beforehand who I will be ,because I am open to you just as you are open to me.

This unpredictable dimension is scarey, and little wonder that we often prefer the safe pattern of dualogue. But this leaves us with a problem, and it is to this problem that I will now address myself.

Once you have understood the dynamics and created the possibility of dialogue, there is the problem of content and structure of what it is that is to be communicated. As impactful as it may be, the message, "love, love, love, yeh, yeh," has its limits. We are concerned about particular subjects, and we wish to share our particular thoughts. Years ago Halford Luccock made this point in his Simeon Stylites column.

> Oratory is no substitution for fresh content. Preaching is like marriage in that respect. You may be married to the most beautiful girl in the world. . . yet there comes a time — and it need not be ten years after the honeymoon — and when you look across the table and say, "Yes, I know, you are beautiful. . ., but what are we having for breakfast this morning?
> That is true of a congregation. They can look up at their preacher and say, "Yes, we know your golden voice, your gift of tongues — but what are we having for breakfast this Sunday morning?"

It is not the golden voice, nowadays, that would be the substitute for substance, but "the empathic spirit," "the authentic authenticity," "the dialogic life-style," "the I-thou encounter." And whether in preaching or conversation or discussion, we sometimes want to say, "Fine, now we are in authentic I-thou dialogue, and you are affirming me and in agapaic relation, but what in the world is it that you are saying?" "Just what **is** your point? And how and why does it relate to the subject? You are a fine fellow, or at least I accept you in your humanness, and I am trying to respond in openness, but pray tell me **what** you think and **why** you **think it.**"

Some of the most irate laymen I have run into have been men whose complaint was not that they disagreed with their pastor's preaching, but that they simply could not understand what it was he was trying to say. And they felt cheated. I venture the opinion, which will sound reactionary, that much of the appeal of McLuhanism — the medium is the message — is a cover-up for sheer obscurantism, having little or nothing to say and being unable to make hang together what little there is that is being asserted.

Obviously the medium conditions the message, and form pervades and interacts with content and vice versa. That is as old as Aristotle's Rhetoric and was brilliantly expounded in Dewey's **Art as Experience.** And obviously there is a difference between linear thought and its logics and gestalt or holistic presentation and enjoyment, as was beautifully set forth in Bergson's **Introduction to Metaphysics.** But it is a long time since that logic has been limited to the syllogism, and whatever the form or character of the message or the medium, there remains a very important distinction between the cogent and the fal-

lacious, the logical and the illogical, the valid and the invalid. Analogously, the logic of a view corresponds to the skeletal structure of a body. Your bone structure is not your living body and it is far from being your authentic self-hood, but it happens to serve very important functions for body and self-hood to operate, as many an unhappy skier can testify. A body of thought or faith needs its skeletal logic and coherence no less than a physical body or institution, unless it is to correspond to the jellyfish.

III

At this juncture I would like to say something about how my concern with the logic of discourse has changed from an interest to an obsession. For three years I have been host on an educational television program that is supposed to be a conversation or dialogue rather than the panel discussion or interview format. And for two years now I have had a four hour Sunday morning radio program. It is a phone-in talk show. This does not make me an authority on the mass media by a long way, but my one strongest impression is that most people do not know how to reason clearly and cogently. Nor do they have any equipment for recognizing the fallacies they espouse. If you say, "now your defenses are showing, or you are projecting, or you have a hang-up," they know what you mean and are able to some extent to consider the possibility that psychological analysis may throw some light on what is occuring. Or if you say, "that is a loaded word, or you are taking that statement out of context, or this is a rhetorical question, or that is a value judgment," they have some idea of what the criticism means .

However, if you point to a logical error — "that is an imperfect dichotomy, or an enthymeme, or non-sequitur, or violates Occam's razor or the Law of the Excluded Middle, or is non-falsifiable, or moves from a some premise to an all conclusion, or reverses a non-reversible proposition" —, they haven't the remotest idea what you are talking about. "Ah," but you are thinking, "that is because these are technical terms and you can't expect that everybody will be acquainted with the technical vocabulary of every discipline." Let me concede that objection, although I do so grudgingly, in view of an ingenuous if vain hope that a populace which can learn such terms as Oedipus Complex and orbital mission, super-ego and supersonic, flanker-back and on-side kick, cholesterol and psychosomatic, psychedelic and extra-sensory, might be able to learn false dichotomy and simple enumeration. Of course psychology has an immense advantage in that it sometimes relates to sex, in which many people, I have noticed, take a certain interest.

One example will lend credence, if not provide proof, for that. If you did not happen to read this sentence in a recent **Christian Century** editorial, my guess is that you will now remember it much longer than any other sentence in this essay. "106-year old United Methodist Bishop Herbert Welch (complained), after noting that he had been plagued by a bad sense of timing all his long life, that he was going blind just as the miniskirt came along." (Jan. 15, 1969)

But I digress. The terminology of logic is not the point. Even when you explain carefully and in simple terms what the idea of a particular fallacy is, it is all too often evident that people have so little background that they are unable to grasp the idea. And this is almost as often true of educated people as uneducated. It is nothing short of appalling that with all the educational advance we have made, with all the communications paraphernalia we have, with all the groups that meet for dialogue or discussion, there should be this incapacity to deal with the structures of cogency. Of course, many people who reason well do so because they happen to have rather well ordered minds and not because they know anything about

logic . Also, no amount of logic is going to transform an unreasonable man into an efficient and reliable mental computer. But observe three serious handicaps posed by the lack of logical equipment.

First, if I am to learn as a result of discussion and debate, and if I have been making an error of reasoning, it will be very difficult for me to learn anything that can be used in another problematic situation, if I cannot locate the error and see why it was an error. Second, it is very frustrating in dialogue if you seem to me to be committing an error in your reasoning, and if I have no equipment for showing you precisely what it is in the chain of argument that I object to. Lacking that equipment, what comes out is that I feel differently from you about the subject, and that merely adds to the frustration, because the difference is not one of emotion. Third, in a democracy — and a democracy where advertising and public relations are pervasive and notorious in violations of logical rules —, it is dangerous to have a populace which lacks protection against exploitive and irrational arguments. Even more important than innoculation against the Hong Kong flu is innoculation against hokum and verbal legerdemain. Jefferson's dictum has become axiomatic: "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be." But presupposed in the Jeffersonian view was that education would include training in logic. If you read the Declaration of Independence with this in mind, I think you will be deeply impressed with the clear logical structure of the document. Few state papers would compare with it today in that regard.

IV

Where does the church fit into this? Both positively and negatively there are direct applications to be made.

Positively, the church is an educational institution. Not only in the church school classes and sermons and discussion groups, but in the official board and in the commissions there are groups of people meeting and seeking a meeting of minds, debating issues, making plans. The way these groups proceed, the way they handle disagreements, the way they examine one man's view and then another's becomes an educative process for good or ill. I would not suggest that the minister become a heavy-handed instructor in logic, calling people to book and setting them straight. But as we have been able to inject some of the principles of psychology and semantics, group dynamics and leadership, into church structures, so it might well be possible to raise the level of reasoning cogency. Let me put it bluntly and uncharitably: as I have gone about churches, especially in discussing social issues, I have found the level of reasoning coherence several notches below the level of charitable disposition. Our church groups, in all too many instances, do not know how to discuss, how to examine arguments, how to differentiate between a conclusion that is entailed and one that is non-sequitur.

If improvement seems hopeless, let me point to two adult education movements that have demonstrated that group discussion can be raised to a higher level: the League of Women Voters and the Great Books Movement. Especially in youth groups, I would insist, there is a very real opportunity in the church to import knowledge and skill in the art of cogency.

Negatively, it is necessary to examine the teaching situations in the church to see if they exhibit flagrantly fallacious forms of reasoning. Take sermons. One of the classical fallacies is found in the method of simple enumeration. A general idea is put forth, then illustrations confirming it are offered. What this proves is not that the idea is true or generally true, but that it is true in the instances presented, provided the facts are correct. Yet this is probably our favorite sermonic method. What can be done is to make clear that the examples

do not constitute proof, but illustrations. That more modest stance does not, I believe, weaken a sermon, but lends reasonableness and plausibility, whereas the more dogmatic pretense of final proof invites the man in the pew to think of exceptions or contrary examples, one of which is sufficient to demolish the claim.

An alternative method is to present a general idea and then apply it to different areas of experience to show that if the general idea has merit, this is what it would mean as applied to various areas. Let me give a sermonic example. Suppose that your basic principle is the idea of standing firm in a dark and discouraging day. You explain the idea, being faithful — faith-filled —, you enrich it, you give definitions and perhaps Biblical allusions. Then what do you do with it? If you have a proof compulsion, you insinuate the additional idea that standing fast will pay off, that it has a hidden guarantee in it. So, point one, you talk of applying this to the business world and pick your illustrations — and there are many — Carnegie, Rockefeller, Drew, Billie Sol Estes.

Point two, think of the men of science and exploration, and again the examples are numerous and many are inspiring. "Columbus found a world and had no chart save one that faith deciphered in the skies. . ." But more and more of your bright young people know that Columbus did have a chart. They have read Samuel Eliot Morrison, and they know that Columbus combed western Europe for maps, and some of them were very good maps, especially of the ocean currents and trade winds. They were not perfect; they had a couple of continents missing and on some of them Japan was larger than China. Columbus was a man of faith, and he did stand firm, but he was also learned as a man of navagational science. And so on the points develop, culminating with Jesus. If your clear implication is to prove a necessary connection between faithfulness and success, there are simply too many exceptions that can come to mind to leave a discriminating listener disillusioned. He has heard another implausible commercial, and a rather long one at that.

Suppose, however, after developing the basic idea and its meaning, you ask what this would mean as applied to two or three arenas of life. And then you explicate what standing firm, being faithful, would mean to a young man facing the draft in the midst of a war he believes to be basically wrong. Or to a young scientist who finds himself devoting his talents to the development of biological weapons of fantastically destructive proportions. Or to parents who have given lip service, and meant it, to racial integration, and find their city in a turmoil of debate over school plans — like Denver.

Or to a church in the midst of shifting population — or a church secure in suburban affluence Or any of a dozen other recognizable difficult problem assignments. Here you would be sharing your thinking and there would be room for disagreement, but there would also be this logical connectedness between the definition of faithfulness and what that would require in a given situation.

Now consider another sermonic form, based on the false logic of the method of residues. First you present a problem — any problem, youth, race, middle age, middle class, war, headaches, family life. Point one, science has failed to solve it. Point two, the UN has failed to solve it. Point three, the pursuit of pleasure has failed to solve it. Point four ,therefore only blank is the answer, and you fill that in with God, the church, Christ, the Bible or whatever you are selling that Sunday. You may recognize this as the basic method of a certain evangelist. In logic this is the pattern of A, B, C are false, therefore D must be true. This logic is valid if you know that there are four and only four possible alternatives, otherwise quite obviously it is invalid. This is pitchman

Christianity, and unworthy of a gospel which invites us to think and explore and above all utilize all our powers and instruments in the redeeming work of the faith.

Negatively, then, it is very much in order that we examine our own preaching and teaching performances to ask how they stand up under tests of cogency and logical entailment.

Now I hope I am not giving the impression that logic is the answer for everything or even that there is no place for the poetic and the mystic and the warmth of glowing and on occasion fiery emotion. Of course there is. I am simply saying that when we intend to present an argument, a conclusion that follows from assertions, or a viewpoint that claims coherence, there must be a logical structure running through it that hangs together and supports the claims that are made.

Abraham Lincoln was hardly a man lacking deep passion or eloquence. But he not only believed in disciplined, coherent thought, he was rather expert in nosing out fallacies. What is more, he did this with devastating clarity, as when in the Douglas Debate of August 21, 1858 he pointed to an extension of his view — reductio ad absurdum —, and said it was

> "but a specious and fantastic arrangement of words, by which a man can prove a horse-chestnut to be a chestnut horse."

On another occasion he used a point of contextual logic to say that his opponent's argument reminded him of the man who murdered his father and his mother and pled for mercy from the court on the grounds that he was an orphan. Somewhat weary of non-sequitur objections from his generals, when he had made use of capable Negroes, he wrote this note (Nov. 11, 1863) to Secretary Stanton:

> Dear Sir, I personally wish Jacob Freese, of New Jersey, to be appointed Colonel of a coloured regiment, and this regardless of whether he can tell the exact shade of Julius Caesar's hair.

Jerome Frank has reminded us that one of the tests of psychosis is the inability to detect an obvious absurdity. He says he has sometimes asked a patient to tell him what is wrong with this statement: "John Jones feet are so big he has to put on his pants over his head." The contemporary example is that of the officer who said, "We had to destroy the village in order to save it." Increasingly, I fear, we are going to find ourselves in need of the ability not only to defend ourselves against fallacies, but the patent absurdities of 1984.

V

Now turn to some of the helpful tools of thought that come from logic. One of these is G. E. Moore's principle that any reasonable structure is in effect an answer to a question, but we are given to supplying answers before we have determined just what the question is that we are answering. Whether writing a sermon or a lecture, leading a discussion or finding ourselves in controversy, it is exceedingly helpful to stop and ask what the question is, and then to frame that question as precisely as we can.

Another tool is the principle of falsification and the hotly debated question of whether it is applicable to theology. This principle holds that if you are asserting something, then you are necessarily denying something else. Thus you should be able to set forth the conditions or evidence which would prove your claim false. The British philosopher R. M. Hare has argued persuasively, I think, that we must go beyond this principle in religion. For religion involves an orientational view of concern, which he calls a blik.[1] But even with a blik, if it is making any claims, then we should be able to assert and

[1] *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, edited by Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1955).

spell out in some detail what the contrary of those claims would be, even though the claims may not be, strictly speaking, falsifiable.

This poses some serious problems for theology. For example, we often hear the phrase "God's acts in history," or "the mighty deeds of God" or "God's action in human events" or some such. Now an act is something that is done by an acting agent, and there are several kinds of theology — Tillich's denial that God is a being among other beings, for instance — where an act in that sense would not be applicable to God. Does this kind of God talk mean that God is an efficient cause, or material or formal or final? If God is in any sense an actor in history among other acting causes, then you have the problem of evil in its most acute form, namely God's failure to act in overwhelming disaster. We must examine whether on Sunday we say God acts in history and must be given credit for this good thing and that, and then on Monday say to the family in the grip of disaster, "Well, we live under natural law, and I hope nothing I have said ever gave you the impression that God intervenes in the natural order." This problem has been explored most vigorously by Rabbi Richard Rubenstein of the University of Pittsburgh, and I must say that he has forced me to do some painful re-thinking. The upshot of this is not necessarily that the phrase "God acts in history" must be dispensed with, but rather to press the point that there is need to clarify in our own minds what we mean by it, and to suggest that one way to do this is by spelling out what we do not mean and the conditions under which the assertion would be denied if not falsified. One or the things which I hope will occur in the new trend toward continuing education is that we will find occasion to press each other on some of our pet phrases. Just what do you mean? And what would constitute a denial or falsification of your view? And if that is what you mean, then how would it relate to this area? I suspect that this socratic method will lead to some rather sharp exchanges, as when Socraties said to Thrasymachus:

> God forbid (that I want to be spoonfed)! But I do want you to stand by your own words; or, if you shift ground, shift it openly and stop trying to hoodwink us as you are doing now.

It is perhaps only fair, having brought the subject up, to tell you where I am in my thinking on God as active in history. In any direct sense, I would say only as material cause, and indirectly only as formal cause; emphatically not efficient or final cause, in the Aristotelian terminology. But explication of that belongs in another paper at another time.

What I have attempted to do in this paper is to argue that dialogue sooner or later requires exchange of viewpoints and convictions as well as feelings and dispositions. And if so, the views require a structural integrity, which is to say, logic. And I am not thinking of formal logic as much as the canons of cogency for ordinary discourse. I have tried to indicate some of the frustrations that we have for lack of equipment on this score and what some of the advantages would be if we could improve our dialogic situations by the addition of some tools of logical analysis.

I have the uncomfortable feeling that the very introduction of the bloodless term, logic, makes this presentation seem impractical, when the whole purpose is to the contrary. So I would like to include in this final section one further illustration. One of the principles of logic is that a rule that is applicable one one side of a question is applicable on the other side. It is similar to the Euclidean axiom that things equal to the same thing are equal to each other, or to the Biblical statement that false weights are an abomination unto the Lord, or that with what measure you mete out it will be meted unto you. It is at the root of the Kantian categorical

imperative. Let me put it in this form: the criterion of judgment which you require for your own justice must be accorded unto others.

Last year I taught a course at Temple Buell College. I found these girls disarmingly candid about what they thought, but appallingly amoral in what it was they were candid about. Right is simply how you feel, what you want, what your class of people prefers, what pays off. Who's to say? I tried quite unsuccessfully in class to make them see that the real issue was not between absolutism and relativism, but between integrity and doubletalk. And if so, there were definite conclusions we could draw about justice and right. Then one day a group of them wanted to talk to me about a confrontation they were having with the administration. The administration, they said, was not being fair. So I played it dumb, which is to say, according to their professed views. "You mean," I said, "the school administration doesn't **feel** the way it is acting?" **No, it's not being fair.** "Oh, you mean it's not protecting the interests of the Trustees?" **No, that has nothing to do with it.** "Well, are you saying that the administration is not following a prudent policy that will pay off and improve its public image?" **No! it's simply not being fair — it's not what we would do if we were in their place.** "Then you think there is a standard of consistency and honesty and consideration that the administration should follow, quite apart from emotion and advantage and pay-off?" And they breathed a sigh of relief, that I had finally got their point. As you can imagine, I then gave a short dissertation on the inescapability of moral criteria and the necessity for even-handed application of those criteria. And they saw the force of Kant's argument in a way that they had never been able to get it in class.

The defense of reason has fallen on evil days. And for very good reason. For the inhumanities that have been committed in the name of logic and reason are manifold. But of what discipline or honored word is that not the case — honor, faith, truth, love, God? We have seen the attack on reason by neo-orthodoxy, and its demise — I read the death of God movement not so much as an assertion about God as the death of neo-orthodoxy. We have seen the existentialist attack, the McLuhan attack, the free speech attack, the anarchist attack. And I must say that each has made genuine contributions to our understanding. Yet it remains that if rational appeal is made, in some manner or other the criteria of cogency must inevitably be involved.

In the next to the last public statement that Whitehead made, he said that logic "is a superb instrument, but it requires a background of common sense." This is made more powerful when you are reminded that Whitehead was one of the half-dozen major contributors to modern logic. I am not, then, asking for a deification of logic, but merely increased and more skillful utilization of it as a tool for the clarification of thought. far from being a middle-class peculiarity, is a necessitv for humanness in dialogue.

In a subsequent paper I hope to set forth a schematization of logic in ordinary discourse. It is proving far more difficult to work out than had been anticipated. Meanwhile it is encouraging to report that discussion with colleagues has indicated that they believe this to be a very worthwhile and much needed project.