Semi-Metaphysical Views of Values

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SO FAR in discussing the problem of value the focus has been on moral values and even in that limited area on the meanings of the term 'good,' in the hope that such an approach would clarify what is meant by the more general term value or values. At the conclusion of the first article on Value-Views, there may be found a brief bibliography of references pertinent to five major areas of human interest and activity in which may be found a variety of historical and philosophical answers to the question of the 'good.'

In this way, we have established that a diversity of answers to the meaning of the term 'good' can be found and that on examination the answers appear to be systemic in character. Speaking analogically, a specific moral theory is related to a general value-view as the fingers are related to the palm of the hand and the general value-views are related to the other views as the hand is related to the body. Therefore, the classification of value-views as Type I vs. Type II was suggested.

In the article on "Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Views of Value" the roots of the Pattern #I type of value-views were sought in the history of philosophy. Plato, Spinoza and Kant were chosen to illustrate the former, and Russell, Feigl and other metaphysical skeptics for the latter. On the basis of these discussions of ethics and axiology, it was proposed that the ways of asking and answering questions on three value theory topics be explored. They are concerned with:

(1) The location of human values in the world-as-conceived.
(2) The selection of human values in the light of the knowledge-views.
(3) The recommendations for realizing the agreed-upon-ends of the position.

In other words, what are the ways of **locating, choosing** and **achieving** human values in a particular pattern?

After considering some affirmations (or denials) of general and specific theories, it was suggested that the term **Value,** with a capital 'V,' would be used to refer to the value-views of the Pattern #I type and that such value-views possessed the quality of absolute Uniformity. This means that they are characterized by the affirmation (or denial) of unconditional and absolute Truths about Reality according to which values could (or could not) be arranged in permanent hierarchic form. The former or affirmative type are designated as I^a (or I +) and the latter or negative type as I^z (or I—).

In order to facilitate identification of Type II value-views, the term "values" will be used, not capitalized and usually plural. Used collectively this general theory of value refers to qualities in concrete situations—to things valued by human beings because of certain characteristics. Thus, 'values' have both objective and subjective aspects. While the existence of an objective 'thing' is not dependent on its being valued, as a 'value' there is a relationship of some type that is objective-subjective.

This way of defining these and other value-terms is a corollary of the cosmological approach to world-views previously referred to as contextual in nature. Because such an approach excludes the absolute a priori's of traditional metaphysics, it is referred to as a semi-metaphysical approach. In this Pattern of Thinking (#II) the issue is

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not one of choosing either metaphysical or anti-metaphysical views, but is in a sense "in-between" the two extremes. Such value-views have metaphysical aspects, but human and non-human aspects of the total existential situation are equally 'real.' However, human values are viewed contextually as emerging primarily out of the personal social matrix. While as a species man is surrounded by other species, as well as by the world of the non-living, the locus in value-views is in certain kinds of **human** experiences. Instead of talking about what things really are or about the nature of Reality-as-such, on the basis of analysis an analogy or key-concept is suggested. The concept is then subjected to empirical test by comparison with theories of the universe, of society and of personality.

Pattern #II types of value-views share with spokesmen for the anti-metaphysical view skepticism regarding the belief that definitions of ontological entities like God, Reality, The Good, The Unmoved Mover, The Absolute, furnish a factual base from which specific value-judgments can be deduced. They are equally skeptical of over-hasty generalizations from some concept taken from a specialized discipline—psychologisms, etc. Interpretations or views of all types are considered to be **proximate,** rather than ultimate. Hence, deductions are of a hypothetic-deductive type, rather than a categorico-deductive type. The views are treated as operational definitions, subject to change as knowledge of the situation grows, having such characteristics as provisionality, functionality, etc. No special privileged position is given to some reified particular. The question is not 'the place of value in a world of fact' with fact given a prior preferred status. Both terms are treated as abstractions—values are certain kinds of facts and facts are certain kinds of values. Human values are values of humans and may or may not be the values of animals or gods. Our interest in this particular species lies in the fact that it is the one to which we happen to belong. This human situation need not cause us however to make man-the-measurer, the measure of all things.

It is always difficult to find a generalized term to refer to the views of any pattern. However, the term **situationalism** has been chosen to refer to the assumption aspect of Type II value-views. According to Webster's the term 'Situation' may be defined as: a) "manner in which an object is placed; location, especially as related to something else"; b) "state of being situated or located; position as regards conditions and circumstances"; c) "relative position or combination of circumstances at a moment . . . specifically in narrative or drama, a particular complex of affairs at a given moment in the action, especially one of striking interest." Hence, in using the term to refer to value-views of the Pattern #II type, values are viewed relationally, defined in terms of conditions and circumstances and focus on a complex state of affairs of striking interest at a given moment in action. This implies, of course, that in life as in drama the action shifts, the conditions and circumstances change, yet there is continuity between the old and the new and there are relationships in time and in place. The norms of standards are situational —their meaning is a function of these and other relationships.

A similar but much more detailed approach to the problem of general value theories as well as their implications for philosophy of religion can be found in three relatively recent articles by William H. Bernhardt in this Review.[1] While the term 'meta-physical' is used in the title of the second article, according to the present classification it would be called 'semi-metaphysical'

[1] "Value Theory and Religion" *The Iliff Review,* Vol. XV, #I, p. 1-18; . . . "A Metaphysical Basis for Value Theory and Religion," *Ibid.,* Vol. XV, #II, p. 11-36; . . . . "Operational Theism", *Ibid.,* Vol. XVI, #I, p. 21-33).

in order to distinguish it from traditional types of theories. Not only in these articles but in discussion of his position over a period of more than forty years Dr. Bernhardt has expressed his preference for an intermediate approach between the two extremes discussed in the last article on value-views. These three articles of his are particularly pertinent to our present interest in classification because they focus on the kind of **data** that are to be included in any classification.

On the basis of a careful analysis of the views of Aristotle, Bosanquet, Hartman and Dewey, Dr. Bernhardt hypothesizes that the kinds of experiences characterized by humans as of value are both **culminative** and **appreciative** —"culminative," in the sense of achieving some desired/desirable end through the use of some means. In other words, there is value in moving from some undesirable tension to the reduction or elimination of that tension. Hence, what causes tension is viewed as 'bad' and what reduces tension is viewed as 'good.' "Appreciative," in the sense of a satisfactory feeling tone that accompanies the achievement of the desired goal. Here in value-views, as in the rest of the position, the cognitive and non-cognitive, while separated for purpose of analysis, are viewed as two aspects of a single kind of human experience.

A **value-fact** is then, "an experienced episode marked by satisfying culmination," **values** are "culminative episodes which satisfy some need, interest or momentum of living" and **dis-values** are "things that thwart or prevent the satisfaction of some need, interest or momentum of living."[2]

In the writings used to illustrate the classification of data and the value-views of a Pattern #II type, especially Aristotle's and Dewey's, the focus will be on ethical rather than theological values ("ethical" referring to man-to-man relationships, rather than on man-to-God relationships).

ARISTOTLE ON 'THE GOOD LIFE'

The interpretations by Aquinas and Dante have given us much of what we know of Aristotle, although since the Renaissance, there has been some awareness of their biases. They focused on the more formal parts of the **Organon** and the substance part of the "metaphysics," and largely ignored Aristotle's naturalistic approach to morals. Recently, however, a somewhat more functional and contextual interpretation of Aristotle's total position has come to the fore. Whether the earlier or the later interpretations, or whether either or neither, represent what Aristotle really thought and taught is not our present concern.

Our focus is on the views of 'values' as they appear in the **Nichomachean Ethics** and in the **Politics**, especially with what is called a Pattern #II approach to morals. In these books we find Aristotle's empirical concern for particulars, yet an awareness that they do not classify themselves; his concern with the human situation, yet an awareness that human values are in some way related to the more-than-human context; his effort to collect and then to classify, not only specimens of flora and fauna but also one-hundred and fifty-eight constitutions of actual city-states; his search for some model of the good life that transcends tribal limitations and yet maintains the old virtues. While today we could not, like Chaucer, think of Aristotle as "the master of all who know," nevertheless even today to all those who believe, like Socrates, that 'the unexamined life is not worth living,' the breadth and depth of Aristotle's mind is almost unbelievable.

In these two books on Practical Science, in comparison with the Theoretical Sciences on the one hand and the Productive Sciences on the other, the concern is with the clarification of the

[2] "Value Theory and Religion." pp. 17f.

meaning for man of "the good life," in order that it may be realized by man. His answers to the three basic topics of any value-view previously proposed will be considered in reverse order: his recommendations of moral virtue as a 'mean,' his appeal to the man of practical wisdom when a more objective basis for selection is needed and the location of human good in the world-as-known.

Aristotle's Recommendation of "The Golden Mean"

According to a man's actions or attitudes toward time, objects, people, motives, manners, etc., he is called a man of vice or a man of virtue. But exactly what is meant by a moral virtue and how is virtue related to vice? The doctrine of the mean is that each of the moral virtues is an intermediate state between extremes of excess and defect. The following chart is illustrative:[3]

In other words, the virtues of courage, temperance, liberality, proper pride, truth telling and ready wit are virtues or excellencies lying between the two vices or extremes. While 'the mean and extremes' constitute a mathematical analogy, the mean is no merely quantitative matter than can be applied easily and absolutely to every situation. As Oates puts it, "This mean is not to be considered in rigid objective arithmetical terms as is the mean between 10 and 12. Rather it is 'relative to us' in that in any situation involving moral choice, the individual and the circumstances in which he finds himself, must be taken fully into consideration.[4] A business man, for example needs less food than a wrestler, so each must choose in the light of **his** situation. Virtue is the state of the soul from which action emanates—a relational ethic that avoids objective and subjective extremes. There is an objective aspect in the situation (food) there is a subjective aspect (man) and there is the choice of how much to eat.

The concept of the mean is offered as an 'operational' definition to deal reflectively with certain moral situations. In dealing with problems of this type Aristotle feels no need for any kind of non-human sanction for ethical values. He is concerned with human good. The mean is the locus of **value** while the extremes are the loci of **disvalue.** No claim of universality is made for this doctrine—there is no mean or virtuous way of committing adultery or murder; they are always vices.

Moral virtue or excellence becomes a habit—an art won by training and habituation. The age of extremes is the age of youth: "If the young commit a fault it is always on the side of excess and exaggeration." The greatest problem then is to get out of one extreme without falling into its opposite. When one is at one extreme the other extreme may look like virtue, rather than the mean. Extremists, especially unconscious ones, look upon the golden mean as the greatest vice; they expel toward each other the man in the mid-

[3] Adapted from Magill, Frank N., Ed., *Philosophy,* Salem, 1961.

[4] Oates, Whitney J., *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Value,* Princeton, 1963, p. 272.

Activity or Attitude	Vice of Excess	Virtue	Vice of Defect
Facing death:	Rashness	Courage	Cowardice
Experiencing pleasure/pain:	Self-indulgence	Temperance	Insensibility
Giving and taking money:	Prodigality	Liberality	Meanness
Attitude toward honor/dishonor:	Empty vanity	Proper pride	Undue humility
Assertion:	Boastfulness	Truth telling	Mock Modesty
Giving amusement:	Buffoonery	Ready wit	Boorishness

dle position; the brave man is called rash by the coward, and cowardly by the rash man.[5]

It is obvious as Durant pointed out many years ago that this doctrine of the mean is the formulation of a characteristic attitude which appears in almost every system of Greek philosophy. Plato had it in mind when he called virtue harmonious action; Socrates when he identified virtue with knowledge. The Seven Wise Men had established the tradition by engraving, on the temple of Apollo at Delphi, the motto, 'Nothing in Excess.'"[6]

But the golden mean is not the entire secret of happiness. A fair degree of worldly goods, external aids to happiness such as friendship—all these and many more are possible only in a stable state. Yet even here the same concept of virtue as a mean is applied, in the **Politics,** to good and bad states. A good state is "in-between" oligarchy and democracy. Even as the morally virtuous man performs acts according to a mean between extremes; so also does the state. Legal and social means are used to promote the moral ends of man. To apply this ideal is again not easy, for at least 4 types of oligarcy and 5 types of democracy are noted. Thus, we see that Aristotle not only collected constitutions, but studied and classified them. He is not content to discuss political theory in a vacuum. He criticized Plato for failing to deal with actual or "second-best" states. The political philosophers must consider specific citizens—butchers, bakers, and candlestick makers—in actual states with certain geographical and financial resources, certain traditions and customs. He states the case for a middle way between 'statism" and "rugged individualism." Man is not only a social being but a political animal who can realize his true self only in a good state. There is a golden mean between complete subjugation of the individual to the state and individual license—complete irresponsibility of the individual for the actions of the state. So much for the doctrine of the "mean."

"Reason, or the Man of Practical Wisdom" As an Aid in Selection.

According to Aristotle the choice is to be "determined by reason or that by which the man of practical wisdom would define." Or as Randall puts it, "There is no human good that is or could be common to all men on all occasions—save that of always acting intelligently. What is good is always something plural, specific, and relative to a particular situation or context."[7] Note here the term practical as used by Aristotle and human as used by Randall. In the next section this type of calculative reason will be distinguished from 'scientific' reason. Here there is added to the general attitude of "Nothing in Excess" the necessity of a man's using his head. To live a life of virtue a man needs to develop the ability to evaluate—habits in which not merely how he feels about the choice which he unreflectively desires, but also what the man of practical wisdom would recommend, are involved. This appeal to the man of practical wisdom implies that one gets norms neither by merely consulting one's emotional state nor by taking public opinion polls. For Aristotle, the actual does not equal the ideal. After he has collected the constitutions, studied them and classified them, he selects parts from each that according to his criteria are 'best' and then proposes concrete ways in each instance of moving from what is to what ought to be. Incidentally, he devotes only a few pages to the topic of how to succeed in a tyranny, compared to a book on how to proceed in a democracy.

However, Aristotle recommends that

[5] *Nichomachean Ethics,* 11, 8.

[6] Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy,* 1926-1950, Simon & Schuster, p. 61.

[7] J. H. Randall, Jr., *Aristotle,* Columbia, 1960, p. 251.

if one doubts his ability to make cognitive choices he should go to the man of practical wisdom for assistance particularly in defining the issue. (This appeal to the man of practical wisdom is roughly equivalent to the appeal to the expert in Dewey's thinking, however much the content of thought in the 20th century A.D. differs from the thought of the 4th century B.C.). Such a man is roughly equivalent to Plato's philosopher-king in the Republic, who having mastered music when he was young and mathematics and metaphysics by the age of thirty-five, has had at least 15 years of experience in applying the theory to practical situations. Granted that in the 'practical' sciences only **probable** knowledge is possible, there is no assumption that one man's opinion is as good as another. Such an idea is no more applicable in politics than in medicine. In both instances one is dealing with the art of the possible, with specific citizens in specific states, with specific patients in a certain condition of ill health. In both instances the man of practical wisdom brings to bear on the problem both his past store of knowledge in the field and the specifics of the actual situation.

"Three kinds of Science": Theoretical, Practical and Productive.

It has been indicated that there are no sharp distinctions between the two practical sciences, Ethics and Politics. It is recognized that the conduct of the individual is influenced by the state and that the character of communal institutions is determined by traits of the men who compose them. In both instances, however, the argument is that the basis for moral habits lies in the fact that men are influenced by repeated actions and that the basis for the habits that make a good state lies in the fact that man needs human associations for living well. In the practical sciences, the goal is not merely to know, but to act. The object can be modified by human behavior.

A second working category in knowledge for Aristotle includes the theoretical sciences: mathematics, physics and metaphysics. The goal of these sciences is based on a distinction between processes of doing (virtues) and of making (arts), advocating not merely to know, but also to produce in the light of knowledge. The arts include not only painting, music and poetry, but also medicine, architecture, cobbling and rhetoric. The aim of art is to represent the inward insignificance of things. In these as in the practical arts there is a combination of thinking and feeling.

McKeon suggests that this classification of the sciences, unlike many since that time, makes no effort to reduce all sciences to theory or practice or art, but rather allows for functional variations between the artistic, moral and theoretical. Although there are differences between the artistic and the moral, the productive and the practical, the main contrast is between these and the theoretical sciences. Perhaps this contrast can best be seen if we compare the man of philosophical wisdom (the theoretical scientist) with the man of practical reason. The former lives in the world of the non-contingent, the invariable, the One and the Unified, in the world of Reality or Being. The latter, as we have seen, lives in the world of the contingent and the variable, of the many and the diversified, in the world of becoming. The former is dealing with the non-human—with objects not affected by being known, Nature and Super-Nature—thus, clearly belonging to Pattern #I. Aristotle, however, having denied the existence of Pure Forms in a Platonic Heaven (with the exception of an Unmoved Mover needed to get things started—a kind of do-nothing God), must in some way start with the particulars and yet find in them ultimates. If, then, there is to be unity, the mind or soul of man in the process of knowing, must be able not only to control the irrational part through the

habits of moral virtue, but must also be able to transcend the temporal world and know the eternal.

In other words, as long as Aristotle deals with human good, or Ethics, he is largely in Type II. However, in contemplating the Eternal, he is in Type I. The men of philosophical wisdom lives, then, a life of contemplation, contemplation of God, and thus achieves the highest good. On the other hand, the man of practical wisdom lives a life of action, action in the world of man, which is, after all, in the total system a 'second-best' kind of life. Man, as a rational animal, stands then between the beasts and God and in his soul are parts of both extremes and of an in-between. The soul has an irrational aspect or vegetative part over which reason has no control. It has a a 'mean' in which the calculative part of reason exercises some control over the semi-controlable aspect of human affairs. Granted that this position is a transitional one between, say, Platonism and Pragmatism, the amazing thing is the refusal to settle for either unity or diversity, but to find some schema that includes both.

Summarizing the answers to our three value-view questions in this semi-metaphysical aspect of this philosophy, it appears (1) that ethical value terms are meaningful at the human level—that is when the concern is with man-to-man relations as long as man is considered a mean between animals and gods; (2) that beginning with particular precepts one can use concepts to organize them in meaningful ways. Such concepts do not exist as things but as names. Outside us is a world of individual and specific objects—men, trees and animals—but man in general does not exist, except in thought (mankind is a handy mental abstraction used conceptually by the man of practical wisdom); (3) that moral virtues or excellencies should be developed until they become habitual using the mathematical model of the mean between extremes, but using it situationally as an instrument in achieving the good life.

DEWEY AND 'SITUATIONALISM'

So far we have noted that as long as Aristotle was dealing with moral virtues, was defining virtue as a mean, was using his arithmetic model as an instrument, was accepting the relativity of judgments made in ethics and politics, was focusing on human goods, was comparing particulars, so long he had a view of values that fit Pattern #2. (When he tried to relate these to "intellectual" virtues, however, he mixed patterns as these dealt not with semi-metaphysical particulars, but with metaphysically defined ontological objects).

My present thesis is that about two thousand two hundred and fifty years later the next step in the process of transition has been taken in the area of the theoretical sciences so that it is possible to deal with all the "sciences" in a more unified way. (Oddly enough, however, at the practical level, the tables seem to have been turned—the man of practical wisdom in our culture is continuing the quest for certainty that Aristotle had abandoned.) Stated more simply by using the methods of analogy and inquiry one can develop a cosmological scheme that furnishes the basis for a **situational** rather than a final or absolutistic view of values. As in Type II, all knowing has both a subjective and an objective aspect—the same is true of valuing. Such an approach reaffirms Aristotle's belief that moral values have their base in the relationship between man and his surroundings, in the man-to-man part. However, man is also a part of the universe and can develop other types of satisfactorily felt relationships to certain aspects of the universe on which he feels himself dependent (the functional equivalent of the man-to-God or religious values in the theological type traditional world-view approach), as well as aesthetic values, both creative

and appreciative, as well as a half dozen or so other kinds of values.

However, such vast areas are beyond the confines of this article, so the focus will again be on the ethical or moral with Dewey as our guide from Aristotle to the present. Noting only a few similarities and differences between the two 'systems,' it has been suggested that Dewey is Aristotle without an absolute.

When traditional ways of believing and customary ways of behaving that had been developed in separate tribal communities confronted each other in military and commercial centers like Athens, various thinkers attempted to find some basis for commonality. However, as Dewey put it, "reason as a substitute for custom was under the obligation of supplying objects and laws as fixed as those of custom had been."[8] This search for fixed and final, ultimate and unquestionable theories, laws, rules, etc., has characterized the traditional approach, not only to ethical theory, but other views of value typical of Pattern #I.

Dewey argues that such theorists have been able "to dispute with one another only because of their common premise... of a single, fixed and final good." In a previous article on "Classical World-Views," this same affirmation concerning traditional theological, philosophical and scientific views of the nature of things was made and in the previous article on "Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Views of Value" we noted that spokesmen for both extremes held that Value or No Value was the issue.

We have called Aristotle a transitional figure because while he moved all but one of the Absolutes out of the heavens into particular things with his doctrine of substance, usually such absolutes were not appealed to in dealing with human goods. Here instead of any appeal to non-human realms a man-to-man relational ethic was accepted which began with specific situations and never expected to arrive at final knowledge. With Dewey, even Reason itself is humanized and relativized. Thinking, like talking, is a function of human living, not a substance that man shares with the Unmoved Mover. Like all other things associated with the human realm such calculative reasoning was contingent, pluralistic and fallible. However, for Dewey there is no realm left for the single, final and ultimate, rather there is the belief in a "plurality of changing, moving, individualized goods and ends" as values resting on the assumption "that principles, criteria, laws are intellectual instruments for analyzing individual situations." A moral situation is one in which there is judgment and choice before overt action. Such value-judgments require inquiry and inquiry is intelligence. The implication for values of these views of 'knowing and the known' becomes evident in defining and discussing values.

Dewey, like Aristotle, begins with special or particular cases, with a man functioning as a physician, or artist, a citizen or parent, a worker or a worshiper, a thinker or actor, etc. The word 'virtue' is a generalized term whose meaning is derived from a series of specifics, not a capitalized abstraction that has lost its existential mooring. The hierarchic concept of the highest good as some permanent independent entity, with all other goods organized in ranks subordinate to it, is repudiated. As there is no such heavenly hierarchy, neither should there be any here on earth. Instead of inequality between fixed, final, permanent and ultimate classification of higher and lower values, there is theoretical equality. Any ordering of goods or values is determined situationally. This does not mean concern merely with the immediate situation. Continuity rather than discontinuity is stressed with the past furnishing a vast display of previously successful and unsuccessful ex-

[8] John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Beacon, 1920, p. 161.

perimentation in living and thinking. The successful ones are selected initially because in the past they have reduced tensions, solved problems and led to satisfactions.

However, the past also indicates that 'new occasions teach new duties.' Therefore decisions are hypothetical and tentative. "No past decision nor old principle can ever be wholly relied upon to justify a course of action." The present consequences and probable future ones must also be considered. A decision is a working hypothesis. Even happiness itself is viewed dynamically—it is a feeling that accompanies a relative condition of harmony between a multitude of factors both external and internal to the individual viewed in relation not only to the present, but to the past and the future.

Not mere contemplation, but action is advocated. Meliorism advocates a golden mean between pessimism and optimism. Optimism, "in declaring that good is already realized in ultimate reality, tends to make us gloss over the evils that concretely exist... It beckons men away from the world of relativity and change into the calm of the absolute and the eternal." On the other hand, pessimism, is a paralyzing doctrine. "In declaring that the world is evil wholesale, it makes futile all efforts to discover the remedial causes of specific evils and thereby destroys at the root every attempt to make the world better and happier." Between these 'vices' is the virtue of meliorism which "is the belief that the specific conditions which exist at any one moment, be they comparatively bad or comparatively good, in any event can be bettered."[9] In other words the view of Pattern #II is that the world can be made better by human effort—at least the world of human affairs. The relative amounts of good and evil are not fixed. Both are capable of increase. The choices every man makes, make a difference!

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 178.

Dewey also argued that until the last few hundred years when the natural sciences became mechanized, values had a legitimate place on the cosmic stage. Since this split between the quantitative and the qualitative only took place in modern times, and as the ideas that furnished the basis for the dichotomy have been repudiated by the natural sciences themselves, such a cleavage in our culture is no longer justified. Not only this, but the emergence of the behavioral and social sciences provides the foundations for a view of the world which might be called a humanistic naturalism or a naturalistic humanism. Such a view makes possible the substitution of Type II for Type I views of value. Type I views if not dealing with a pseudo-problem, offer a pseudo-solution—results are promised that cannot possibly be attained. Questioning then the necessity of choice between some type of ontological realism with its essences, substances, and entities on the one hand, and the idea that values have no existence or factual support but are merely emotional epithets, Dewey presents one of several intermediate positions between these two extremes. In such views values emerge in the process of change from an unsatisfactory situation—a process that appears unending. Rather than a final state of satisfaction for man there is a series of partial states of satisfaction. In making such decisions, no man stands alone, the men of practical wisdom can aid us in distinguishing between the desired and the desirable.

In 1939 in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science in **Theory of Valuation,** Dewey summarized his position. Grossly oversimplified, value language is appropriate in individual-societal matters, therefore the category of 'valuing' is restricted to means-ends in human affairs. The focus is on extricating oneself from an unsatisfactory situation. Not only is the present situation unsatisfactory but presumably some other situation would be prefer-

able. One seeks to free himself from the first and to realize or achieve the second. The term 'good,' therefore, refers to whatever helped one to extricate himself and the term 'right' to whatever was necessary to maintain the process or activity. This aspect of value-views is a corollary of the knowledge-view of the system; especially of the problem-solving process. There is the awareness of an unsatisfactory situation and the desire for relief, alternative programs to extricate oneself from one and realize the other are proposed. Action after reflection leads to at least temporary satisfaction, derived from having solved the problem or dealt with the unsatisfactory situation. Hence this view of value may appropriately be called **Situationalism,** (II) in contrast with Absolutism (I).

Summary of Value-Views

Stated in summary form, the third aspect of VALUE-VIEWS is beliefs about the location, selection and realization of human values. Assuming that both the theoretical affirmations of ends and the practical recommendations concerning means are systemic in character, the value view of Pattern #I, is called Absolutism or absolute Uniformity while that of Pattern #II, is called **Situationalism** or relative Multiformity.

The location of human values in the world-as-conceived, is a corrolary of the world-view of the Pattern. Therefore, for the Absolutist, values are grounded in changing events (II). In making value judgments, the primary concern is with the cognitive criteria, which is a corollary of the knowledge-view of the Pattern. Therefore, in Type I positions, value-judgments rest on standards that possess the quality of eternal Verity while for the Type II positions the standards possess the quality of credibility.

In the actual realization of values, the primary concern is with the use of appropriate **means** to attain the agreed upon **ends.** Therefore, in Type I positions absolute Uniformity—the conformity (or non-conformity) of means to ends is assumed, while in Type II relative multiformity—varying degrees of conformity of means and ends are assumed.

In other words, value-views that advocate absolute Uniformity believe in the ultimate Truth about Unchanging Reality—and they believe Unconditionally. On the other hand, value-views that advocate relative multiformity believe in proximate truths about changing events—and even these they believe conditionally.

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