FREUDIAN PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

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Few writers of the recent past have been criticized more severely and unfairly than the late Sigmund Freud. It is often remarked, and with some justification, that even the most ardent of his critics have not bothered to read his works. That is nothing new in the history of criticism, but it has become somewhat amusing to note that the louder anti-freudians are not correctly informed—even in a superficial way—as to what Freud taught. The crude simplifications one finds of psychoanalysis are more unjust than were the ones applied in the nineteenth century to the doctrine of natural selection. It will be the purpose of this discussion, therefore, to correct a few of the common misinterpretations and to present some of the implications of Freudianism which are of interest to the student of religion.

There is some excuse for the violent uncritical reaction against psychoanalysis. No one cares to have his most intimate mysteries delved into or explained. It was bad enough to have the hidden secrets of the race's history brought to light by Darwin, but it is simply too much, say some, to have the light of analysis turned on private motives and mechanisms—motives and mechanisms so delicate that we hide them from ourselves! If such analysis were only a game perhaps much fun could be derived from it. But the minister cannot be playing at such games with his parishioners, whether it be in the sly attitude of "I know all about you," or the blunt attitude of "Now the trouble with you is such and such." The minister, we maintain, has less business in the psychiatrist's realm than he has in the surgeon's. Psychiatrists may not be angels, but the familiar proverb about fools rushing in is not altogether inappropriate when ministers rush into a troubled mind that would give the specialist cause for cautious treading.

Of course the minister has good reason to read in the field of psychiatry. Let him understand all he can about it. He must recognize the more neurotic and psychotic symptoms. For to understand the 'abnormal' is to understand more adequately the so-called 'normal personality.' The minister might make recommendation for psychiatric examination in extreme cases, if his suggestion is apt to be appreciated and taken seriously. But in the matter of treatment, the minister has no business entering the field of correcting personality malfunction. These two fields are by their very nature mutually exclusive. The moment one becomes psychiatrist in function, he ceases to be pastor. The distinction is emphasized as one recalls that the pastor's work is made more effective if he is a familiar friend of the parishioner, whereas the psychiatrist is generally more effective if he begins his treatment as a comparative stranger to the patient.

Although a study of Freud cannot make us self-styled psychiatrists, there is still much to be gained from a study of his writings. Our method is inductive, and one of the important sources of knowledge is human nature. Whatever we learn by way of incidental psychological information will have its value for the student of religion. What is learned about the more universal behavior tendencies, drives and patterns is of yet greater value. Freud's works provide the minister with rich source material on both counts—indeed, material not duplicated else-

where, except to a degree in mythology.

It is necessary to observe that Freud's methodology is disappointing from a logical standpoint. One might say without facetiousness that psychoanalysis has won its present status in spite of Freud's arguments for it. He presents, in some cases, co-existences as if ipso facto related casually. He often uses the method of simple enumeration of positive instances to support a thesis, citing but a few cases for his empirical generalization. At other times he uses the invalid "method of residues," as in the book on wit. The originality and depth of his insights, not his method of substantiation, account for the influence of his work.

Freud possessed that insatiable curiosity which inevitably characterizes true genius, calling to mind the observation of William James that "genius means little more than the faculty of perceiving in an unhabitual way." Darwin once wrote, "I think that I am superior to the common run of men in noticing things which easily escape attention, and in observing them carefully." The same might be said of Freud. He is quite as outstanding for the unusual questions he raised as for the answers which he gave to them. He asked: "Why do we forget our early childhood years? Why is a joke humorous? Why do we laugh? Why do we forget names which we know perfectly well? Why do the actions of neurotics have things in common with our dream dramas? Why do we have tabus?"

We may observe in passing that the minister does well to borrow some of this inquisitiveness. Should listening to the troubles of people become sheer routine, it would bode ill for one's pastoral effectiveness. When one ceases to be puzzled here and there, stereotyped sermons follow. It may be noted further that the great preachers have possessed a fresh childlike curiosity. Perhaps it is significant that the word denoting 'failure to notice something' is **over**look, not **under**look. Again, the words **ignore** and **ignorant** have a practical as well as an etymological relationship.

I. Summary of Freud's Basic Writings

No summary of Freud's writings can be substituted satisfactorily for the primary sources. Nevertheless, a brief summary of his basic writings[1] may have some value for those unacquainted with his works, and in addition may serve to challenge some of the absurd reductions occasionally encountered in popular psychological literature.

Until rather recently psychology has not given adequate attention to the very early years of life. From the first rude shock of birth (if not earlier!) the organism experiences desires and satisfactions. Pleasant sensations attend the satisfactions of warmth and nourishment. Soon the small infant **anticipates with pleasure** both the activity and the sensations. Before long he is pleased by a wide variety of things and by the expectancy of them: e. g. bright colors, stimulation of the lips, other infants, rhythmic motions, rocking, falling games, elimination, sounds and vocalization, grasping and touching objects with interesting surface textures. These pleasurable activities may be called libidic com-

[1] These are now available in one volume, *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud.* (Modern Library ed., N. Y., 1938, A. A. Brill, ed.) In the present article undesignated numbers will refer to this anthology, with pagination as follows: pp. 35-178, *Psychopathology of Everyday Life;* 181-549, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (3rd Eng. ed.); 553-629, *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex;* 633-803, *Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious;* 807-930, *Totem and Taboo;* 933-977, *History of the Psychoanalytic Movement;* (3-32 "Introduction" by A. A. Brill).

ponents[2] or life forces. They are **not** non-sexual as is commonly supposed. For they are definitely related to later and more specifically sexual behavior.[3] Some of these infant gratifications are deemed socially undesirable, viz. thumb-sucking, intense squealing, unbridled curiosity and investigation, exhibitionism, pugnacity and autoeroticism. For a time these activities continue, more or less unopposed and undisguised, but parental disapproval gradually disciplines the child until the 'objectionable' activities are apparently forgotten. There follows a latency period, as Fliess terms it.[4]

Actually, however, these 'objectionable' ways of satisfying basic desires of the child have been merely suppressed (and subsequently are automatically repressed by the child himself). The desires meanwhile remain active but thwarted. Thus some of the life drives are forced to find devious routes of gratification which are socially acceptable. This is sublimation. Therefore the so-called latency period is actually the time in which the mind begins to separate its conscious and unconscious functions. For many desires cannot be admitted to conscious attention—the child having been painfully conditioned against them—except they be disguised and expressed within some 'harmless' activity. These repressed desires are known truthfully only by the "unconscious."[5] The bulk of infant actions deemed objectionable, at least by our prudish society, are sexual in nature. Thus in the regression of the neurotic or the invert or the hysteric back to aspects of early childhood, where he is enslaved to the tyranny of repressions **or** to the tyranny of desires previously inhibited, the sexual tendencies of extreme avoidance **or** indulgence are easily understood. Psychoanalysis, Freud says, has emphasized the sexual factors of personality because, in the first place, the infant activities which are most consistently and severely suppressed by society are those which are sexual in some way, and in the second, the sexual drives are so persistently active in the face of that opposition. To be sure, there are other types of behavior which are inhibited—egoism, cruelty, intense emotion, absolute security, domination, et al. These are not, however, unrelated to the former.[6]

It is inevitable in restraining the natural impulses of the child that certain fears, distastes, shame, nausea,

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2 Freud uses "libido" in two senses, I believe: A comprehensive life-drive term (not as far from Jung's notion as he has insisted), and a more particular drive among other life drives. Many interpreters of Freud would not accept this observation. However, in all cases the libido is held to be basic in behavior, and in all shades of meaning the libido is a plexus of forces. Cf. 620, 391f., 610.

3 This fact is brought out by the analysis of dreams, wit, poetry and psychiatry, where a definite and consistent association is found between these activities and others unquestionably sexual.

4 On this paragraph see 580, 62, 533, 582 n2.

5 The term now in more general use, "subconscious," is usually taken to include what Freud calls the "unconscious" and the "preconscious" operations of the mind.

6 On this par. see 288, 581, 584, 747, 754, 627, 620, 391f. Freud is most frequently misrepresented at this point. He does not hold that "sex is everything," or that all behavior is a direct expression of sex-libido or its sublimation. This is explicitly denied. (392, 110, 621) Freud does hold that sexual drives are omnipresent, and that they are especially dominant in malfunction of personality. His critics often betray an unwholesome depreciation of the fundamental drives. There is a tendency to treat the libido as an unfortunate extraneous drive which attaches itself to personality at puberty. Freud has shown conclusively that sexuality is part and parcel of life from the very first, that it serves as a motive force throughout the different stages of life, that it manifests itself in various ways, combining with other drives, and that no real understanding of human behavior is possible without recognizing its presence.

and false ideas will result. Albeit when personality is damaged, it is not so much due to restraint as to the manner in which the child is restrained. It is little wonder that overly-solicitous parents are apt to inflict mental anguish on their offspring. In awakening active sexuality prematurely (by tickling, jiggling, stimulating the mouth and cheeks, cuddling in response to crying, kissing and what not), only to punish the child somewhat later for seeking more of the same and seeking to express himself similarly, a conflict is set up which will rule the whole personality thenceforth, and perhaps destroy it.[7]

The primal state of the ego is one in which self-gratification is dominant—what Havelock Ellis calls "narcissism."[8] The infant does not look outside himself for satisfactions; his lips are excited equally by the touch of a plastic rattle, his own thumb or his mother's breast. Vestiges of narcissism are found in every adult life. It is interesting to note, for instance, how many people in a group will unconsciously run their fingers over their lips periodically, or stimulate their lips by aimless sucking on a pipe or pencil.

Between the age of three and five the child becomes emotionally attached to those around him. Usually this attachment is most intense with regard to the parent of the opposite sex. Where that is not the case it may be difficult for the child to make wholesome social adjustments later on. The normal child, then, often assumes the role of that parent's mate in superficial ways. The boy plays 'daddy,' the girl, 'mama.' This fixation is normal unless it becomes too strong, or unless a parent encourages it unduly. Freud calls this pattern the Oedipus complex in honor of the mythological character who unwittingly slew his father and married his mother. The counterpart might be called the Electra complex. As a rule these complexes carry with them a resentment—often amounting to hatred, though seldom recognized as such—for the parent of the same sex. The important thing about this period of "libidinal object-selection" is that the child identifies pleasure with things and persons **outside** himself. This growing process begins in the early months of life unless the child is thoroughly spoiled, but it becomes pronounced only later.[9]

With puberty there comes considerable Sturm und Drang.[10] The youth goes through various transitional stages of enthusiasm for the gang and disparagement of the opposite sex, of puppy love, loneliness and hero-worship. These reactions are not difficult to explain, but Freud insists that the important point is that the individual is seeking a substitute for his earlier Oedipus complex object. "The task before each new human being is to master the Oedipus complex; one who cannot do this falls into a neurosis." (617 n2) In other words, a person develops his own patterns of behaving and thinking and enjoying and directing his desires during the earliest years of life. The more fundamental of these behavior patterns are his 'tools' for living the remainder of his life. These behavior tools are seldom modified to any great extent, but they are (or should be) flexible enough to be applied to new situations and demands. Thus the Oedipus complex, so basic in personality, is revised and centered

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[7] 595f., 619, 615, 929.

[8] Technically speaking Freud recognizes a stage prior to narcissism (the anacilitic, p. 587). Both of these belong to the ego-libido. This material has been greatly condensed and necessarily omits some distinctions.

[9] 599, 308, 906.

[10] Margaret Mead has gathered anthropological data which requires modification of this theory.

about new persons, expressed in ways suitable to one's age, adapted to the social structure. But in abnormal personality, what Freud calls "inversion," the individual has failed to adapt his **former** behavior patterns to the **new** situation, and consequently attempts to return to the former satisfactory state of affairs. Although psycho-affective growth is gradual and constant, it has definite steps. One who fails to make the grade on the next step may slip back a step or two.[11] "All morbid disturbances of the sexual life," Freud says, "may justly be considered as inhibitions of development." (604)

It is the pressure of repressed life drives and the form of release which furnish the power for living, much as ignited compressed gas-vapor furnishes the power for a heat engine when connected to a drive shaft. What mind and environment do with the power at their disposal will determine the self and its achievements. "The theory of repression is the pillar upon which the edifice of psychoanalysis rests." (939) The unconscious, Freud claims, harbors repressed wishes, some of them old and scarcely active, others recent and intensely active. The 'censorship' which has been built up through the years keeps these from reaching consciousness. However, they get past the censor as sublimated energy, and also in various disguised forms: in dreams, slips of tongue, of action, of pen, in witticism, and in symbolism.[12] The abbess Heliose, writing to Abelard, stated this common sense doctrine as clearly as it will be found in any psychiatric literature.

> Sometimes the cogitations of my mind are manifested in my motions and expressions, and words escape me which betray the irregularity of my thoughts ... And in my dreams, all the past returns.

Every dream represents the fulfillment of a repressed wish. Some event of the previous day has been stirring in the mind since its occurrence. It may be unimportant but its activity is enough to serve as the cloak for some stronger unconscious wish. The actual dream (as one recalls it) is called "manifest dream content." But recalling it will bring to mind also a complex bundle of associated thoughts —"latent dream content." The latent content often shows that the dream was connected with slumbering childhood desires, as well as with the unsettled trivial thoughts of the previous day. But these wishes which were fulfilled in the dream were so distorted and symbolically represented that they are unrecognizable to the dreamer, and thus manage to pass the censorship and enter consciousness. This process of transforming, condensing, displacing and even reversing material of the latent content into the confused manifest dream content is called "the dream-work." It is hardly necessary to add that such a theory will strike every person who has not investigated it as utter nonsense. As with most scientific discoveries, the proof is in the experiment—and only those who have tested it carefully have a right to an opinion in the matter.[13]

Wit is similarly a release for repressions. Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious is certainly Freud's most enjoyable book, and in many ways his best. Inferiority, exhibitionism, homosexuality (as in obscene humor in stag company), the desire to engage in alogical thinking, ridicule of superiors or of the sacred, are repressions which

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[11] 614, 618 f., 554 ff., 626. A. Gesell's "developmental psychology" is of interest at this point. (*Infant and Child* ...)

[12] 110, 548, 500, and Psych. of Everyday Life, *passim.*

[13] Interp. of Dreams, *passim.* (485, 511, 500, 538, 249) The best summary of Freud's dream theory (which he considered his greatest contribution) is found in *Wit and ... Uncon.* 745-750.

find their satisfaction in wit. The clue is "economy of expenditure," so that with a minimum of effort a cathexis[14] of the fore-conscious or of the unconscious is released under cover of some conscious associations, just as happens in the dream. The release will vary according to the type of repressions involved, and how successfully they are disguised. In every day life we find other examples of repressions which escape. There is no doubt that many of the errors which we attribute to pure accident were actually motivated and directed by the unconscious, whose vigilance is quick to take advantage of the lax moments of consciousness.[15] As one student remarked, "We sometimes say what we mean."

In Totem and Taboo Freud claims that the Oedipus complex is at the root of our mythology, religion, and other social institutions. This work had the misfortune to be based on inferior anthropological sources, and as a result has not been taken very seriously. The treatment of the subject of tabu is useful, and there is at least something, if not everything, to be said for the 'recapitulation theory.' Freud's reconstruction of past history via psychoanalysis is not convincing.[16] Several anthropologists are making a more critical and restricted use of psychoanalysis at the present time to noteworthy effect.

In Moses and Monotheism[17] this theory is applied to the Hebrew people. Again Freud entered a foreign field rather naively. The field of Hexateuch criticism is not adequately relied upon, which makes the book appear somewhat foolish at various points to the biblical scholar. In spite of these defects of wilderness wanderings, some valuable insights are contributed, for example, concerning the intellectual and emotional values of religion (194), and the function of the sense of guilt in Hebrew religion (212). It is possible that the principles of psychoanalysis may be used to greater advantage in New Testament study than has heretofore been the case. Riddle's work on Paul is certainly a step in that direction.

II. Of Human Nature

1. The first implication of Freudianism to which I wish to call attention is that the human being is a unified phenomenon. There has been a tendency, similar to that found in Woodrow Wilson's essay, On Being Human, to think of human nature in select terms—viz.

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[14] The term "cathexis" is employed by A. A. Brill, the translator of *The Basic Works* in place of Freud's term *Besetzung*, which means 'a charge or investment of energy.' Cf. note 1, p. 493.

[15] On this par. see *Ibid*, 697, 761, 712, 803; and 39 f., 138, 64, 582, 617.

[16] One must also take exception to his doctrine of a mass psyche and of the transmission of acquired traits (915, 927f., 925). The claim for absolute psychic determinism is also open to logical objections (164ff.). In the probing of the fore-conscious for related latent thought material (to explain some obscure mental function) it is always possible that the associations drawn forth will be suggested by the act or by the theory being considered, and not the material which actually caused the phenomenon in question.

Present psychiatric practice deviates from Freud at two main points: 1. In methods of treatment; 2. In giving more attention to biological functions as related to mind (hence "psycho-biology"). Logically and historically, however, the study of the subconscious is most profitably begun with Wundt and Freud. Considering the date of Freud's early work (the magnum opus on Dreams first appeared in 1899), it is remarkable to consider how little most schools of psychiatry have found it necessary to modify the basic principles of orthodox psychoanalysis.

[17] Although this work is not one of the "basic writings," it is of interest as a study in the psychology of religion.

More detailed summaries of Freud's work are to be found in the Introduction to the *Basic Writings* (reprinted in Shapley, *A Treasury of Science*, N.Y., 1943), and *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (14th ed.) "Psychoanalysis."

its higher expressions and better moods. Freud, along with common sense, argues that we had better consider the whole self. Even in cases of multiple-personalities, it is possible to understand self-B adequately only when accompanied by knowledge of self-A. Considered as a whole Jekyll and Hyde present no paradox, but those who knew only Dr. Jekyll must have found him puzzling at times.

To say that a person is unified is not to say that he is integrated. In fact, the presentation of 'integrated personality' (as often occurs in popular works and what we may politely call speech-psychology) is a dangerous as well as questionable ideal. The most integrated personalities to be found are those of persons whose conscious minds are thoroughly concentrated on some obsession. Analysis of their subconscious thought processes will bring to light seething conflicts, all of which are transformed, as their energy passes into action and conscious thought, into some connection or other with the obsession. The solution is not to integrate the subconscious. Even if that could be done it would not be desirable—a fairly healthy state of affairs in the unconscious is invariably attended by behavior which is characterized by diversity, imperfect efficiency, conflicts in the conscious mind, and shifting interests. The future is ominous for a personality which successfully relegates all its conflicts to the subconscious for the sake of conscious integration. Like Paphnutius in Anatole France's tale, the 'completely integrated person' must reckon sooner or later with the devil who dwells in his subconscious, then to discover that his 'Thais-ideal' was an obsession not precisely identical with his suppositions about it.

The 'ideal integrated personality' is usually presented as one whose (conscious) parts are all drawn together around one central factor, as iron filings cluster about the nearest pole of a magnet. Everything is subordinated to that central factor and operates in accord with its lines of force. What better picture, we ask, could be drawn of obsession? And it is worthy of remark that there are no magnificent obsessions. Reflection on this picture of integration will indicate that here is an attempt to crystallize behavior patterns in violation of life's essential flux. The most characteristic symptom of the integrated person is that he does not know how to play—everything is taken seriously. To him every item of experience is intensely important because of its crucial relation to the integrated pattern or center of that pattern. Thus talk about the ideal type of personality seldom rises above humbug.

By saying that human nature is unified, I merely mean that it is a plexus whose parts are interwoven and related. A tangled piece of string may be unified in this sense, but not arranged in an integrated pattern. Human nature is normally not altogether orderly in arrangement, nor does it give absolute authority to one dictatorial element of life. I do not deny the evil of marked disintegration, but it does not follow that complete integration is the summum bonum. Complete integration is also an evil to be avoided.

That human nature is unified is brought out further by Freud's discovery that the life drive, with its complex components, is active from the first days of life to the last. Whereas life is not a perfectly gradual growth —but includes crises and definite 'steps'— it is nevertheless unified and related through time as well as through its field of experience. There is much of the child in the adult, and vice versa. We are bound up with our individual history and carry a large amount of it along with us, consciously or unconsciously. The fallacy of

morbidity is that it gives undue emphasis to small matters and keeps central in consciousness things which ought to be allowed to sift into the non-conscious realms. To suppose that we can escape the force of yesteryear's self, or can easily change it, is—as has been stated[18]—to rely upon an unrealistic doctrine of forgiveness. It is, therefore, unwise for the minister to dwell on ideals unrelated to the lives of his congregation and beyond their reach. For the conscientious listener, admitting the abstract worth of the ideal and unable to understand his concrete falling short of it, has no recourse except self-condemnation. This prepares the ground for "malingering personality disorders."

2. Freud has also called to our attention the fact that we must give far more consideration to psychological determinism. A man may be able to do what he wants to, but he cannot always control his 'wants,' so to speak. A given action is the resultant of forces within the self. The whole personality may not be involved in every choice, but there is no voluntary act which does not originate in some cathexis of the self. There is no such thing as a choice or impulse absolutely free from past conditioning. It seems that a certain amount of freedom can be proved, and that it is an exceedingly important part of behavior. But it may be doubted whether the capacity for psychological freedom is used very often. "Not all are free," so Freud quotes Lessing, "who mock their chains."

Such freedom as we do have must be realized indirectly. A man can't lift himself by his boot straps, but he can lift himself by block-and-tackle properly arranged. One can modify his behavior and direct his inclinations in a similar way. To list some of them:

By deliberately placing oneself in an environment which will tend to encourage the desired effect;

By acting outwardly in a way contrary to one's real feeling, which will (as Ovid observed long before James and Lange) tend to modify the inward feeling;

By systematically conditioning oneself.

By the use of make-believe games not unlike those of childhood;

By exerting the measure of control at one's disposal in selecting which factors shall be given the dominant voice in a given situation.

But it is to no avail to urge a man to climb to a higher plane of living unless he is also given the wherewithal—the psycho-social block-and-tackle equipment—with which to maneuver the change. To use a more familiar figure, we might well spend less time urging people to grow into this or that ideal, and more time cultivating the environing soil and pruning irrelevant branches, trusting meanwhile the laws of psychological growth to produce the desired effect.

3. The counseling movement in the ministry has been conspicuously superficial in many cases for the reason that the minister is not well suited for probing into the unconscious thought processes. The confessional—Protestant or Catholic—has serious limitations for dealing with fundamental personality disorders. Freud had to learn from many failures that it does not cure a patient merely to lead him to an understanding of the etiology of his difficulty. He also learned that his responsibility as physician did not end with diagnosis. Oftentimes, self-analysis merely deepens guilt feelings and adds knowledge of one more failing for which to feel inferior. For there is a tendency toward hypochon-

[18] Cf. Potthoff, "Some Comments on the Doctrine of Forgiveness," this journal, I, p. 22.

dria which has psychoneurotic manifestations as well as physical. Occasionally a minister can, in the right circumstances, channel some objectionable symptom of a psychoneurotic condition into a less objectionable expression. But let him be under no illusion that he has SOLVED that person's problem. Religion can act as a block-and-tackle type of mechanism, thus aiding people with their problems. Religion accomplishes this by clarifying and strengthening faith in powers beyond and greater than self, faith in one's direct and dependent relation to life's sustaining powers, faith in the positive aspects of existence, and by helping the individual develop appropriate and realistic religious techniques. Introspection—such as is emphasized in much counseling literature—is often the thing which the consultant needs least; whereas religious activity and meaning can put him somewhat at peace with himself. Not only must a WORKING religion stabilize one during critical outward nonmanipulable situations, it must also keep the spirit zestful in the face of small and almost negligible nonmanipulables.[19] The subconscious is for all people nonmanipulable and somewhat disturbing. If the counselor utilizes the method of introspection (as must be done occasionally), he runs the risk of merely confusing the consultant or else having to probe to the very depths of the self, a task for which the minister is ill suited. It is well to keep in mind that many psychological results can be achieved through the discriminating use of religion's interpretations and techniques, which cannot be accomplished by the boot-strap-lifting method of introspection.

A study of Freud will surely contribute to one's psychology of religion at other points. It should increase one's understanding of people and their peculiarities; it will impress upon the minister the importance of doing his job carefully and well; it will tend to accentuate the alternation of being fascinated and sympathetic, amused and cautious, as one deals with the delicate phenomenon of mind; and it will, or should, make one more reserved about himself. There is no more disturbing fact about the Christian ministry than the obvious exhibitionism which sometimes goes by the name of clerical duties. Again, acquaintance with Freud should save one from the fallacy of 'classifying' personalities as introvert, extrovert, manic, recessive, etc. Each person must be understood as an individual case, no case being simple. Of course there will be similarities and general tendencies. But classifications are of doubtful value, not alone for their inaccuracy, but also since they tend to blind one to the important deviations from type. It is more accurate and useful to speak of types of traits which appear under certain conditions in a given personality. For usually a marked tendency carries with it, somewhere in the self, its exact opposite.[20]

III. Of Metaphysics

1. There are implications in psychoanalysis for metaphysics as well as for religious psychology. Truths have been brought to light which are rather awkward for some schools of thought. Personal Idealism, for example, finds that it has used an inadequate conception of personality. If personality is the proper analogy for grasping deity, then God had better be given a subconscious, repressions and means of sublimation, not to mention complexes and cathexes to be expressed. For these phenomena, we discover from Freud's evidence, are at the root of

[19] Assuming the view of religion stated in "God as Dynamic Determinant," by W. H. Bernhardt (*Journal of Religion*, xxiii, 4)

[20] Freud, 570.

the highest achievements of the self, and are basic to anything worth calling mature personality. The function of the subconscious could be met by Brightman's doctrine of the "Given," but he does not allow that.[21] Generally speaking it has marked an advance in theology when a popular concept of deity has been made subject to some higher or inviolable order, whether Jahweh calling heaven and earth to witness, or Pan calling the river Styx to witness, or W. E. Channing's implication that God is obligated to the logical and moral order. This ideological progress is furthered when the deity-concept is enlarged and de-personalized to include the higher and more determinative order. As rapidly as personalism makes room for the unconscious in God, it will become more closely allied with naturalistic-immanentalism, and further removed from the notion of a hyper-conscious deity. Leaving such apocalyptical matters, we note that hitherto personalism's diety has been one whose conscious facilities were emphasized, in spite of the discovery of modern psychology that consciousness merely skims the surface of personality.[22]

Philosophies which hold that reality is mind encounter a similar difficulty. For mind develops amid the tensions and pressures of living. If mind is in any sense cosmologically prior, it is difficult to understand why mind should appear and behave the way it does in human life. Either 'mind' and 'personality' as applied to the Cosmos by Idealists have meanings altogether different from their human application, or they had better be discarded for better terms. Organismic philosophies do not face this embarrassment since they are not committed to a superficial notion of unconscious functions. But the majority of metaphysical idealisms are in the position of having used human nature in whole or in part as an accurate symbol for reality, only to discover of late that they did not fully understand the nature of their symbol. If the symbol is accurate, then they have erroneously conceived reality. If the symbol is inaccurate, a futile battle of words has been waged.

Materialism (in the mechanistic sense) runs into the opposing difficulty. The emergent quality of the stuff of the universe is too persistent to be credited to matter as conceived by traditional materialism. The life-drive, in human existence for example, is basic—more so than consciousness. It appears that there are in the very stuff of reality impulses toward organization, experimentation (i. e. variation), and energetic release. Materialism fails to account for these.

Panpsychism is one school of thought which has given much consideration to Freud's work. One reason may be that Freud himself leaned heavily in that direction at times. However, they too

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[21] Cf. E. S. Brightman, "Personality as a Metaphysical Principle." He says, "It seems most reasonable to regard the subconscious as a complex of relatively transient or relatively permanent other selves which are related to the normal self by interaction, *without being a part of it.*" (*from Personalism in Theology,* N. Y., 1943, p. 44f.; italics mine.) On the basis of this argument he does not feel that it is necessary to give much attention to the place of the subconscious in that personality or self which is "the key to reality," and which "is the first principle which unites and explains all other first principles." (*Ibid,* 49, 42) Be it noted, however, that the subconscious is removed more by definition than by function.

[22] Brightman is aware of the danger of this criticism. ".... the personality that psychologists talk about does not seem to be identical with the personality that personalists take to be the key to reality. Let us probe into this embarrassment;..." (*Ibid,* 49) It is only fair to add that he meets the problem directly, and, granting the personalistic presuppositions, effectively.

meet with an embarrassment. In order to make room for the findings of psychoanalysis their psychism must be reduced to a rather blind urgency. This reduction robs panpsychism of its emphasis on consciousness which has been prized. Furthermore it leaves unexplained the differentiations in psychic manifestation, especially differences in degree of mental function. Vitalism is less involved in these difficulties.

The point to which we are brought seems to be that many of the types of activity which we associate with consciousness (due no doubt to a natural human provinciality) are to be found on less complex levels of organization than the human. A few of these can be stated on the basis of present knowledge:

The drive which gathers energy and exploits it;

The stair-step aspect one finds in growth (or emergent evolution);

Differentiation, or the tendency which resists complete integration;

The phenomenon of component forces losing themselves in a resultant action.

These, I submit, are characteristics which may be found in the human mind, in a flower, in a galaxy, in a dream. The DEGREE of truth in the recapitulation theory of psychology and biology, that a child relives symbolically the history of the race, is no longer mystifying. For the phenomenon of recapitulation runs through the universe. Neutral realism, a philosophy which holds that the determinant factors of reality are immanent in the neutral stuff and/or behavior of reality, is well suited to incorporate the valid discoveries of psychoanalysis and their metaphysical implications. If the "Philosophy of the Unconscious" is restated for this century, it will have to be by some such neutral and naturalistic metaphysics. In other words, the creative and orderly aspects of nature which have sometimes been claimed to presuppose a directing CONSCIOUSNESS, presuppose no such thing. The analogy applied to the Cosmos was drawn of course from human life, but psychoanalysis has shown that this function of teleological activity does not reside in consciousness nearly so much as is commonly thought.[23] No longer can the objection be leveled at philosophies which hold God to be absolutely immanent in the natural universe that they are incapable of accounting for the teleological character of reality (i. e. the end-relating and end-producing activity).

2. Again, psychoanalysis offers fresh reasons for reconsideration of the old and inescapable problem of the one and the many. A common fallacy in thought (also in 'feeling') is the assumption of absolute individuality of the self. It is another instance of what Whitehead calls "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness," similar to the assumption of simple location. A person, thought of as AN INDIVIDUAL, is an abstraction of rather high order. A person is rooted in the race and all but completely enmeshed in his society, and intimately related to his physical surroundings. It is impossible to say just where the person leaves off and the environment begins, for there is much overlapping and common property in this process of interaction. Moreover, in a person's particular life processes the general tendencies of human nature are active. Thus a person presents the problem of the one and the many dramatically when our attention is turned to these commonplace facts. For psychoanalysis has brought out more clearly than any

[23] As Freud says, "... the most complex mental operations are possible without the cooperation of consciousness." (529) By "mental" he means intelligible operations capable of teleological interpretation.

other serious psychology the universal patterns which cooperate in particular lives. The feeling of absolute individuality has a certain protective value, but self-consciousness does not give an accurate account of the facts.

It is an assumption of Freud, and now generally accepted, that the psychotic personality is not different in kind or quality from the normal, and that the normal personality includes the very same elements—but functioning differently.[24] Healthy personality keeps the forces at work within it somewhere near an equilibrium. Dysfunction occurs when one set of forces predominates completely, or when a state or perfect equilibrium is achieved and maintained. Here, too, then, is a characteristic which seems to run through many phases of reality. It may be called the **Principle of Imperfect Equilibrium,** which states that in a complex of forces at work within an event, the condition most favorable for preserving a fundamental stability and yet admitting continual (even radical) change is that of near but not perfect equilibrium of the forces involved. John Dewey has observed this principle in the field of social relations.[25] Hooton has observed its operation in biological evolution:

> As a matter of fact the secret of progress appears to be the ability of the animal to utilize the advantages of an environment without molding its organism too narrowly to the requirements of any particular mode of life. The really progressive animal must if possible adapt environment to itself and not become too malleable to its influence.[26]

In other words, perfect equilibrium or complete adaptation has not been of chief survival value in evolution. Further environmental changes render the perfect adjustment obsolete. Adaptability and ingenuity have had more value in the long run than a specific adaptation.

In fine, one is apt to conclude a study of Freud's works with little enthusiasm for ministerial counseling, but better aware of the increasing possibilities and values in the less glamorous duties of the ministry. And above all, one finds there additional evidence for and meaning in "the indwelling God." In the words of the poet, Robert P. Tristram Coffin,

> There is a strange holiness around
> Our common days on common ground.

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[24] 563, 571, 578. The opposing position is taken in such works as C. D. King, *Psychology of Consciousness* (N. Y., 1932), p. 25.

[25] "Authority and Social Change," (*Intelligence in the Modern World,* J. Ratner, ed., N. Y., 1939, pp. 347 ff.)

[26] In Shapley, *op. cit.,* 483.