PREFACE

The material which follows constituted the basic content of four lectures delivered during the 1964 Iliff Week of Lectures. Since 1964 was my last year as a regular member of the Iliff faculty, I welcomed the opportunity to summarize the results of one phase of my work during the 35 years spent at The Iliff School of Theology. They were interesting, busy, and I hope somewhat fruitful years. The lectures which follow will give some readers an opportunity to judge.

When *The Iliff Review* was founded in 1944, it was expected that it would be used occasionally to publish more extended works than the articles regularly appearing. This is, I believe, the first time that this interest has borne fruit. I hope that this is but the first of many others yet to come.

For years, various students and alumni have urged me to put some of my lectures in more permanent form. This constitutes a modest move in that direction.

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TRUTH IN RELIGION

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LECTURE ONE

What is Truth?

More than thirty years ago, Ruth Benedict stated that "it is the characteristic of the present century to have made skepticism a special religious category and to have defined religion by means of it."[1] This appeared in her discussion of myth as used by religious thinkers at the time. Her judgment may be repeated today on a more expanded scale. Myth is still highly prized as a means whereby some of the philosophical problems in religion may be avoided. The view that myth contains "truths" but not "facts" is a convenient means whereby attention to stubborn facts can be disregarded. Also, the appeal, to socially-cohesive slogans such as "we must accept the Christian view in order to save civilization" suggests an inability or unwillingness to come to terms with situations as they exist. Still others relegate facts to the "technical reason," thus removing them from the purview of the religious thinker. The so-called technical reason is said to be incapable of treating ontological subjects. Here man's critical reason is reduced to minimal status and faith is exalted.[2] I suggest that in each of these instances, the appeal to myth, to socially cohesive ideas (ideologies), and to ontological reason, is a consequence of a basic skepticism on the part of highly regarded theological writers. And the emphasis placed upon revelation by still others presupposes a primary skepticism, a denial of the relevance of human reason in religious matters.

There is a tendency toward skepticism in religious matters in the approach of philosophical Analysts. One point of their attack is based upon the "falsifiability principle" expounded by Karl R. Popper. According to this, whatever cannot be denied cannot be affirmed. A statement to the effect that "God is love" would fall into the category of the non-falsifiable and therefore non-verifiable.

Some years ago I presented a paper to a faculty group on "The 'Nature' of God," in which I asserted that it appeared to be impossible at present to say anything significant about the "nature of God as such." This was based upon the view that thinking is relational and modal. By relational is meant that nothing exists in isolation; that the relationship to past and contemporary events is an essential ingredient in what is. Accordingly, to try to affirm something about the Divine which excludes such relationships is impossible. By modal, I meant that everything is in process, and that process itself is another essential ingredient in the Divine. To at-

tempt defining the Divine without taking both the Relational and the Modal into consideration seemed impossible to me then, and still does. Yet this is not fundamentally skeptical. The recognition of a limitation upon what the human reason can do does not mean it can do nothing. It is possible to do critical thinking about religious matters, something I hope to make more meaningful as these lectures proceed.

In these lectures, I shall not engage in polemics with either the Fideists, those who rely primarily upon faith, or with the Analysts, whose views on religion are antiquated. Given time enough, they will effectively refute one another, or what is more probable, unite. The task set for us in these lectures is something else. It is that of analyzing what we mean by truth; of discovering the facts with which religious thinkers need to concern themselves; of considering some of the "hidden persuaders" operative in our thinking, and of elucidating some of the language barriers to fruitful theological investigation.

This first lecture will elucidate what we consider to be the meaning of the word "truth." For a number of years I taught a course in Epistemology. Most of the books available sought to answer the question: "What is truth?" They did so in terms similar to "what is a stone?" or "what is reality?" Truth was treated as if it was something, that it had some kind of being or reality. After a number of fruitless years devoted to this question, I concluded that "truth" is a collective noun, the name we give to the sum-total of theories or beliefs which survived our critical investigations. Much after John Dewey's analysis, one encountered problems, investigated them and reached conclusions as to adequate ways of resolving them. When these conclusions were applied to situations, they were either confirmed or denied in that they fulfilled or failed to fulfill the expectations of predicted outcomes. If one views a cloudy sky and concludes that rain will fall, the outcome determines the accuracy or inaccuracy of the prediction, or to what degree it is accurate or inaccurate. This is probably a nominalistic theory of truth which can be expanded as follows: *truth is the name we apply to the facts we have established and to the legitimate inferences we may draw from them.* When I began writing these lectures, I added a third class to facts and legitimate inferences. It was "checkable consequences." It soon became apparent that checkable consequences is a means whereby facts are established and inferences supported or denied. It is a procedure rather than a result of cognitive activity. That "checkable consequences is a method of establishing facts" may itself be a fact, I should readily admit. But this does not deny the assertion that there are real differences between the methods we employ and the conclusions reached by them. Accordingly, "truth" will be viewed as a collective noun designating the facts and legitimate inferences developed by cognitive activity.

THE ROLE OF FACT.

By the "role of fact" we refer to the use or function of information in thinking. We may approach this by noting a distinction drawn by A. D. Woozley. He stated that there is a tendency to identify "event" with "fact."[3] An event, such as the atomic bombing of Japan in 1945, consists in activity with a date, location and duration. I believe these three elements are necessary. An activity occurs at some time, endures, and at some place or places. Insofar as events are activities, and I

believe they are, even though some may be mental, dating, timing and more or less precise locating are essential. Take the Iliff Week of Lectures as an instance for analysis. It may be described in terms of date, location and duration, among other things. But the *fact* that "The Iliff Week of Lectures occurred during the last week of January, 1964 at The Iliff School of Theology, in Denver, Colorado" *has no date.* We may make this statement anytime in the future, or any where, without changing or disturbing the fact. A fact is some form of awareness of events. There are events, and there may be facts concerning them. *Truth as fact consists in some qualifying of events.*

In his *Source of Human Good,* Henry M. Wieman identified truth with "specifiable structures" and knowledge with "structures specified."[4] In so doing, he identified truth with events. Truth would be that concerning which facts may be determined. Knowledge would consist in facts as we are using this word. I do not find it helpful to identify truth with ontological structures, and prefer to use truth and knowledge as synonyms for the results of cognitive acivity. I believe it simplifies matters if we restrict the use of the word events to happenings, and truth as the name for the sum-total of what facts we have established concerning such happenings. We may now state more precisely what we mean by fact. *Fact is some awareness of correspondence or congruence between a statement and that to which it refers.*

There are at least three elements in this view of fact. The first is that fact points to some degree of correspondence between a statement and some event, happening or state of affairs. Earlier in this lecture, I stated that "it is a fact that we are presently in the chapel of The Iliff School of Theology." Our actual presence there constituted the correspondence indicated. If we had not been there, or not at that time, the statement would have been false because it did not correspond to the indicated state of affairs. Facts as correspondences of statements and events requires some observation, direct or indirect, to confirm or falsify a statement. Fact as awareness of correspondence presupposes some experience, either that of the person making the statement or some other more or less competent observer. In so far as we rely upon facts in our religious thinking, we are committed to religious empiricism, to some reliance upon experience and observation. This may sound innocuous, since Intuitionists and Existentialists, among others, also claim to rely upon experience and observation. As I have indicated elsewhere, checking correspondences between statements and private or subjective experiences poses formidable problems. If the inability or unwillingness on the part of empiricists to take seriously the knowledge claims of those who depend upon analysis of *their* subjective states constitutes a handicap, it is one that we shall have to live with until more is known about such self-analysis.

The second element in the proposed view of fact is the matter of congruence. This is less precise than correspondence, although the two words are considered to be synonyms. Congruence, as here used, may be applied to specific areas of cognition. In the area of measurement or quantification, we may say that "the shortest distance between two points is a straight line, given a level plane for this observation." The correctness or incorrectness of this statement could be justified by actual measurement. The same result may be obtained by deduction from what we know about planes and lines, that is, an elementary knowledge of geometry.

Congruence may be useful at the inferential level of thinking. What we mean by this level will be discussed later. Here we may use an example. For some years in the past, the question of evolution tormented many theologians. Darwin and others suggested that the Genesis account of human creation was mythical, and that the evolutionary account explained more adequately the evidence from many fields. This theory is much more complex than that used to explain the simple fact of the presence of a group in The Iliff Chapel. It affirms something about activities on this planet during more than a million years. It is obvious that no direct observation of the suggested transformation of life is possible. Yet of the competing views, special creation and organic evolution, the latter is more congruous with the available evidence. The use of congruence to justify conclusions in philosophical thinking is more or less standard practice.

The third element in fact as here defined is the human. Facts are always the result of judgments, of hypothetical conclusions reached by some person or persons after comparison of the requirements of some inference with situations, states of affairs, or events. Our knowledge of such situations, states of affairs or events, may be immediate, in the sense that it is then being produced, or it may consist in inferences drawn from theories previously verified. It is obvious that the theory of organic evolution presupposes some conception of the age of the world, and perhaps of the universe. If creation occurred some six thousand years ago, as some have asserted, this reduction in time would preclude acceptance of the theory of organic evolution. Facts as asserted and supported relationships presuppose the activities of cognizers. There may be events as such, without the element of human judgment, but there can be no facts apart from it. Truth as fact consists in the body of relations believed to obtain beween human assertions or denials and some events, states of affairs or contexts.

There is a rather strong body of opinion that facts have no relevance to the realm of values. Philosophical Analysts develop this view in terms of language use. Science is concerned with the realm of fact. It uses a descriptive language, depicting more or less adequately correspondences and congruences among ideas and that to which they refer. As such, science is neutral so far as human interests, goals or ideals are concerned, with the possible exception of curiosity.

Religion and morality are said to require the use of another language, emotive, evocative, valuative. This language use may be noted in some recent works in religion and theology. E. R. Goodenough, in his *Toward a Mature Faith* (1955) speaks of his pious boyhood, his later disillusionment, and his eventual return to a deeper appreciation of his childhood faith. There was little by way of attempt to verify the basic ideas, but a renewed evaluation of them which made them more acceptable. The approach was evaluative rather than informative in some descriptive sense. Bernard E. Meland, in *The Realities of Faith* (1962) turns to the faith of the past, the biblical faith, as the only basis upon which modern man can build a more or less satisfactory experience. I suggest that both men, thoroughly competent students, have used evaluative rather than descriptive or informative language in reaching their conclusions. They develop their views without giving enough consideration to the factual basis of their "faith." And, to take one more, John Herman Randall, Jr., in *The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion* (1958) accepts the

view presented by John Dewey that the name God refers to our ideals for self and society. To the extent that this is accepted, the only role that fact would have in religion is in relation to what these ideals are. Since ideals are conceived or imagined future states of affairs, descriptive or informative language is of little use. Once again, fact becomes more or less irrelevant in this area.

Since "facts in religion" is the subject of the next lecture, we may leave this matter for the moment, and turn to the next item in our development of the meaning of truth.

TRUTH AS LEGITIMATE INFERENCE.

There is a level of truth closely related to the congruence level of fact. It consists in the inferences which are drawn from the facts established or from other inferences which have been legitimatized. What is inferred can be imagined or conceived. It cannot be perceived. In this sense, inferences are similar to memories. Six weeks from now we may remember something which happens today. We may recall the event imaginatively by remembering certain persons or events, or we may recall it verbally. But by that time, six weeks hence, both the day and its activities will be past. If one of us is a camera buff, he may have pictures of the events, but when we look at the film, we shall not be looking at the event. Inferences are imagined or conceived events, relationships or states of affairs.

Conceptions of God are inferential. It is still true that "no man hath seen God." Some insist that we can, but the issue normally turns upon the definition of inference rather than upon the type of experience under discussion.[5] It is true that we may speak of situations wherein the divine is experienced, or more preferably, wherein religious values are more readily available. In such situations there are perceivable objects or events. But unless one is prepared to identify the Divine with the situation within which religious values are realized, we had better retain the view that God, however defined, is an inferential object.

In order to define the distinction between the perceivable and the inferred more precisely, I coined the word heteroscopic to designate that level or type of existence or state which is presently beyond what is perceivable, to which truth as fact is appropriate. "Hetero" means other or beyond, and "skopos" means watcher or perceiver. Thus heteroscopic objects are beyond or other than can be watched or perceived. Gravity, curved space, ether, evolution are instances of what we believe constitute heterscopic objects. Incidentally, the word "object" means whatever is the focus of thought or attention. It does not mean, all of the time, some "thing" or "event." It could mean anything capable of attracting or holding attention. If we accept the view that the divine is an inferred reality, we may have to forego speaking of experiencing the divine and think rather in terms of realizing religious values. This has implications which require further consideration before I care to commit myself.

In the paper on "The 'Nature' of God" referred to earlier, I noted that the fact, if it is such, that we are no in a position to say "what God is as such," is not fatal to man's realization of religious values. It may be possible to identify situations more productive of religious values than others. Knowledge of this type may

be substituted for knowledge of "what God is." Thus the question or questions concerning the nature of God may be restated as follows: Where do religious persons normally experience the divine, or should we conclude this is not feasible, what situations or conditions further man's attempts to reorganize his value systems and habits when confronted by frustrative factors not subject to control or removal? It becomes a question of "where" rather than "what."

The literature of religion contains many answers to this question. Let me sketch four of them briefly. The first is literature. This is the basis for the distinction between the sacred and the secular writings. In the Augsburg Confession we find these sentences: "Also they teach that one holy Church is to continue forever. But the Church is the congregation of saints (the assembly of all believers), in which the Gospel is rightly taught (purely preached) and the sacraments rightly administered (according to the Gospel)." The Lutheran Church was a church of the Word. If persons were to become aware of God, they had to place themselves where the saints were assembled to hear the Gospel expounded.

A contemporary states this more bluntly. "Protestantism vigorously insists that the Bible is the authoritative basis for the knowledge of God who is revealed in Jesus Christ. It is the norm by which the Church must test its faithfulness to the mission it has to proclaim the Gospel. Read and interpreted within the church, it is, so to speak, the rendezvous which God has chosen for meeting and speaking with man, the 'holy ground' on which God confronts man with his humbling and forgiving word."[6] Here again we find an emphasis upon the "place where" the values of religion are best realizable.

A second location is the group. This was suggested in both of the preceding quotations. In an earlier century, Cyprian stated that "he cannot have God for his father who has not the church for his mother." A leader in the movement for church unity, Cyprian believed that the undivided church was a divine society and that apart from it salvation was impossible. More recently, Henry Nelson Wieman has asserted that God may be found most creatively in that form of interpersonal relations which he calls "creative interchange."[7] Those who engage in such creative interchange constitute a divine society wherein the divine is operative.

The third location is less precise. It consists in the "majestic" emphasized by Immanuel Kant. He asserted that two things filled "the heart with wonder," the "starry heavens above" and "the moral law within." Schleiermacher focused attention upon what evoked the feeling of absolute dependence; Einstein and other scientists are impressed by the magnitude, complexity and interconnectedness of things, and in this become aware of the divine.

The fourth locates the divine in the Imperative. This will remind one of Emil Brunner, but it found clear expression earlier in the ancient Stoics and in Spinoza. John Calvin may be added to the list. In other connections, I have often stated that whatever the divine may be, it is to be found in the moving, determining, controlling and directive activity wherever we become aware of it. "Imperative" may not be too happy a word for this. We use it here to refer to the Directional Momentum or Dynamic Determinism operative at all levels in known existence; to state in modern and more understandable language what the ancients referred to when they spoke of Creator, Almighty, and Lord of All.

Most of these "locations" have tangible or perceivable aspects. One may not "see" God in the Word, nor see the Word as defined, yet the Scriptures believed to contain the Word are tangible. One does not "see" a group, but he can become aware of the several individuals who comprise it. As for the Majestic and Imperative, the starry heavens are perceivable, and the moral law within makes itself evident in various ways. The Imperative, defined as the dynamism operative and controlling in many areas, can be felt and its effects observed. Yet I would doubt that any one who considers the matter seriously would identify God with any of these more or less observable objects, events or conditions. Take the case of those who believe the Church essential to salvation. Granting its instrumental role, it is questionable that any reputable theologian has ever identified God with the Church. And Mr. Wieman is careful to distinguish the members of a group engaged in creative interaction from creative interaction itself. In each instance, the divine is inferred from the effects upon those who participate. This leads me to reaffirm the belief that God is an inferred reality, and that what knowledge we have of God consists in legitimate inferences drawn from what is experienced.

CHECKABLE CONSEQUENCES.

There has been much recent discussion of the use of checkable consequences as tests of the legitimacy of inferences. Anthony Flew stated in a recent book that theistic conceptions of God which defined the divine as supernatural could not be justified. He told of two men wandering about a strange land who came upon a garden in a clearing in the wilderness. One stated that some gardener must be responsible for it; the other doubted this. So they decided to test the matter. If there was a gardener, he would in due time return to continue his work. They waited, but no gardener appeared. When this was called to the attention of the Supernaturalist, he shrugged it off by saying that since God was an extranatural being, He was invisible. One should not expect to see Him. So other tests were made, none of which produced the supposed gardener. After each test, the believer in the supernatural denied that the divine had charactristics such as could be tested. Finally the skeptic asked: "Just how does what you call an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener differ from an imaginary gardener or even from no gardener at all?"[8]

This question has bothered many serious minded people who find meaning in religion but have difficulty with the beliefs associated with it by those who presumably "know." In other fields, such as the scientific, experiments are devised to determine what effects follow from them. If nothing occurs, if there are no checkable consequences, the experimenter concludes he has no basis for either affirmation or denial. This was presented by Charles S. Peirce in the 1880s when he proposed that realities be defined in terms of their effects. Verification is the general name for this form of establishing facts or justifying inferences. Contemporaries often call it Operationalism, stressing the fact that it includes operations initiated to determine whether or not there are checkable consequences, and if so, what they are.

As a method of scientific and philosophic investigation, it consists in two steps. The first is clarification. This has four elements: (i) formulation of the problem; (ii) definition of terms (iii) development of hypotheses, i.e., formulating possible

solutions to the problem, or answers to the question; and (iv) stating the conditions which must obtain if the hypothesis is to be verified or falsified. The second step consists in active investigation, in the operations or experiments whereby the conditions specified in (iv) are met or not.

In my early teaching of theology at The Iliff School of Theology, I found myself with a number of conceptions of religion, the field within which theology has its place. The question emerged and persisted, why accept one rather than another? If the choice among definitions of religion was arbitrary, depending upon one's will or wish and not made necessary by evidence, perhaps religion had no body or substance whatsoever. Like Flew's invisible gardener, perhaps it was merely a name without anything named. But suggestions from many sources opened a way for testing the matter. Crucial was this from Epictetus: "We must make the best of what is under our control, and the rest as its nature is. 'How, then, is its nature?' As God wills."[9] This suggested an hypothesis concerning religion, namely, that it functioned in those areas of human experience where man's knowledge and skills were inadequate. *More precisely, that it functioned in the non-manipulable areas of human experience, those which included basic interests but were beyond the control of the persons and groups concerned.*

This provided areas for checking consequences. If religion tends to function in non-manipulative areas, then its interest should wane in any area which became controllable. One important area subject to such change is that of food production and preservation. Hunger and threat of starvation were the lot of most people until recently. Another variable factor is health and the deferment of death. Both agriculture and medicine are arts, skills employed to achieve given ends. As such, they are or have observable aspects. Their effectivenss or lack of it is a matter subject to observation by those knowledgeable in these matters. It is possible to determine their effectiveness, and also to discover if and to what extent they are subject to religious observances.

By observing the condition of the medical and agricultural activities among people of different levels of technological development, it should be possible to learn whether or not the hypothetical relationship between religion and technology obtains. An examination of gardening and fishing in the Trobriand Islands with their interest in magic, or what I call metatechnology — the attempt to introduce extra-natural factors into technological processes — proved that the proposed correlation occurred. Where fish were plentiful, and the waters safe, no metatechnology was employed; where it was hazardous and the catch uncertain, metatechnology was employed. The greater the hazard, the more metatechnology.

Similar conclusions were reached in a study of the gardening and medical activities of the Romans of the Augustan Age. Simple ailments were treated with home remedies, but dangerous and possibly mortal illnesses were given magical or metatechnological treatment. Instead of magic, the Romans relied heavily upon healing gods, and had at least 73 such gods named in their lists througout their history. Their medicine, though based upon the writing of Hippocrates, was crude and quite ineffective. They were excellent observers and left good descriptions of the symptoms and effects of various diseases, but their knowledge of the human organism and

their diagnostic skills were limited, resulting in somewhat fantastic conceptions of the causes and cures of diseases. And here again we found that where they lacked confidence in their medical knowledge and skills, they made free use of many forms of metatechnology to supplement what little they had.

A third level of technological development was examined to determine what happened to metatechnology when some of these health and food problems were subjected to medical and agricultural control. A study of the agricultural conditions in the United States in the 1930s indicated that we had moved from an economy of scarcity to one of abundance. The problem was that of surpluses rather than deficiencies. At the same time, agricultural metatechnology had practically disappeared. It is true that in a few areas, such as the dustbowls in the west and southwest, prayers were offered for rain in some communities. But such appeals to metatechnology were repudiated by reputable religious leaders. The same conclusion was reached in the case of medical practice. Interest in medicine left the churches and moved into the increasingly numerous and effective hospitals, clinics, and medical schools. It disappeared from the theological schools.

The details of the research sketched in the preceding paragraphs are available in my *Functional Philosophy of Religion* (1958). There are checkable consequences of some phases of religious activities as related to other areas of knowledge and skills. This suggests that the test of checkable consequences may be used more widely in defining religious activity and increasing its effectiveness in contemporary culture. The need for more effective help to persons facing an increasingly complex world should be evident to all thoughtful and concerned persons. Our present understanding of religion and its primary function is quite vague, and as a result is often ineffective because misapplied. The outmoded language used in the churches, and the orientation of many theological schools are diverting attention from the more pressing religious needs of the day. There is some groping for new methods as is suggested by the rising interest in personal counseling, one of the effective instruments in the creative reorganization of life in the presence of the current nonmanipulable or limiting factors. But as an instrument, is effectiveness depends in large part upon the clarity with which its users envision what they are seeking to do.

CHECKABLE CONSEQUENCES AND THE DIVINE.

It is possible to use the test of checkable consequences to determine *where* men have sought the divine, and to discover *what areas of life* are subject to religious orientation. What can be said about its application to such theological matters as the conceptions of God and the technique or worship phases? We suggested, in the section on "truth as legitimate inference" above, that our conceptions of God emerge among the inferences we draw from the facts at our disposal. We called attention to the charge of the Analysts that conceptions of God are not subject to the test of checkable consequences since God by definition is a supernatural Being, beyond the reach of human cognitive resources.

This problem is more complex than those with which we have concerned ourselves thus far. If God is by definition or common agreement "supernatural," that is, excluded from the realms of space and time to some Wholly Other realm, then

it is obvious that we cannot use the test of checkable consequences in any meaningful way. This means that truth as here defined becomes irrelevant in theology and philosophy of religion at those points where either the nature or the presence of the divine is under discussion. Before accepting this view, we should understand what is implied by it. The first question to be asked is this: *Why must the divine be defined in supernaturalistic or ontological terms?* There is a solid body of opinion to the effect that God is Activity and that activity is meaningless unless it has consequences. As the late Borden Parker Bowne once stated it: "If Christianity were not a world-power, a great spiritual force here and now, its origins and history would be a matter of profound indifference to all but a few antiquarians."[10] The same judgment may be made with reference to God. If God is not a factor operative in the world of men and events, perhaps theology should be relegated to the interest of antiquarians.

The second question is this: On what grounds is the judgment made that supernaturalism is an essential ingredient in any acceptable conception of the divine? It will not do to say that this is true because a number of persons have so decided. Important thinkers have been mistaken in the past, and it is not inconceivable that some of them are today. More important than this is the further observation that this judgment, like all affirmations or denials, is subject to investigation to determine its truth or falsity. Many years ago, Mr. Wieman and I debated this matter in the pages of *The Journal of Religion* (1943). We reached no general agreement, but if one will take the time to read the several articles in which this was presented, he will become aware of the fact that this is too complex a problem to be passed over by citing a few authorities. From the point of view presented in this lecture, truth consists in facts and legitimate inferences. The "authority" of any thinker consists in the use he makes of relevant facts and legitimate inferences, not in the esteem with which others may regard him. Such use of authority belongs among the non-rational factors supporting belief, not in the establishment of facts and the justification of inferences.

This means that the use of the test of checkable consequences may be legitimate in the investigation of some problems related to the divine. Before we are in a position to say anything further about this, we need to discuss the subject of the third lecture, depth philosophy or The Hidden Persuaders.

The third phase of religion consists in overt activities or techniques. We are using the word "techniques" to cover all that has been called worship, religious exercises, ways of salvation — in general the whole routine of religion. These overt activities, which I shall discuss as "the phenomena of religion" will be considered in the next lecture. Two comments may be in order here. The first is that such activities are neither right nor wrong, true or false. They are efficient or inefficient, effective or ineffective. Roman Catholicism has a long list of "holy acts." Protestantism reduced this list drastically during the Reformation, but more recently has begun the process of extensive elaboration, often with little imagination. Here the test is primarily pragmatic. If a given form of religious behavior has the desired result in personality reorganization, it is effective religiously. If it does not, then it isn't. Its justification, not its truth or falsity, consists in its capacity to produce or effect the desired or required changes in personality reorganization.

This is an area to which I have not given much attention. However, two suggestions may be in order. The first is that made by Shailer Mathews. He insisted that forms of worship have been and should be related to significant forms of behavior in the culture where they developed and in which they are used. In the past, fasting was an essential part of medical practice. It became a part of the technique of the church. Where the priorities lie, I do not know, but it is a fact that fasting was practiced in both fields. Contemporary practice suggests that feasting is more appropriate as the number of church dinners indicates. The next suggestion is that the tendency on the part of recent church leaders to reinstate the practices of Luther, Calvin or Wesley is questionable. These forms have historical interest. Whether or not they will serve the present age well should be determined by their efficiency or lack of it, and not by reference to the great historic figures who may have used them.

We began this lecture with the suggestion that Margaret Mead may have been correct when she said that contemporary religion in the West used skepticism as an organizing principle, and that some schools of thought exclude value from the realm of critical investigation and evaluation. We then suggested that it would be well to determine what the word "truth" meant. An examination of my investigations over the past thirty-five years led me to conclude that "truth" is a collective noun. As such, it does not refer to any independent reality or being. It is not a "thing" nor does it have "being" as such. It is similar to the word "life"; there is no such thing as life as such. It is a collective noun used to denote a great variety of existents. So also, "truth" is a collective noun used to designate the facts and legitimate inferences which emerged from our investigations and survived our critical examination. In the lectures which follow, we shall develop some of the implications of this theory of truth as applied to the field of religion.

LECTURE TWO

What are the Facts?

We defined fact as the state or condition of correspondence or congruence between a statement and that to which it refers. There are such facts in religious behavior. We shall consider three sets of facts which appear relevant to the philosophy of religion sketched in these lectures.

THE PHENOMENA OF RELIGION.

The word "phenomenon" is used deliberately. It means anything known through "the senses rather than through thought or intuition." Under the phenomena of religion we shall be answering this question: "What are the observable characteristics of religion wherever found?" Such phenomena are to be considered normal phases of religion and factors to be considered in religious thinking. We list seven of them.

1. *Group activity* appears to be a constant in religious behaviour. We may observe this in the activities of magicians in more primitive societies. Whereas a given magician may be working alone in preparing his magic, it is always directed toward another person, and often at the request of a third. Where magic is used to make fishing and gardening more effective, it is normally done in and for some group to which the magician belongs. In higher forms of culture, religious bodies are the rule. Even where one has a lonely prophet proclaiming the wrath of God, it is always directed toward other persons and most often in some public situation.

2. There is an *organizational structure* to religious activities. Group activity is seldom completely random. There are levels of power or hierarchies of authority and prestige. We observe this in some lay leader in the community, a magician in charge of a fishing contingent, the petty chief of a village who doubles as priest, the head of a family where family religion is the rule, to bishops and world rulers in religious bodies. These levels of leadership or degrees of authority point to the fact of organizational structure in religions at all levels of cultural development. The obvious marks of authority are the colors and styles of raiment worn, and the positions occupied in cathedrals or area headquarters.

3. There are *orders of efficiency.* We refer to the people who conduct worship, deliver sermons, counsel with others, administer affairs. There may be some question in this point among the Todas of the Neilgherry Hills in Southern India, yet even in this very simple society the milkman becomes a human god who has charge of the dairy which is the religious sanctuary. These orders of efficiency find expression in the multiplicity of names, from altar boys to bishops, archbishops and papal leaders.

4. There are *holy places and holy objects.* The word "sanctuary" refers to a place consecrated to the divine and as a center of activities oriented toward it. These holy places have many shapes and forms. They may be portions of caves walled off to house sacred objects by an Indian tribe. They may be reserved places in catacombs, or plots in cemeteries. They may be "little brown churches in the vale," or magnificent cathedrals on the boulevard. The holy objects include such things as altars, scriptures, crosses, foods, drinks, garments and whatever the imaginative mind of man can find wherein he believes some divine potency is exhibited.

5. Another phenomenon of religion consists in *sacred literature and song.* Among the more simple peoples, myths consisting in stories of the gods and the exploits of holy men function as do the Bible and the Koran among more highly developed people. There are chants, sacred poems, recitations and gospel hymns which appear to be found wherever religion is practiced.

6. *Holy Acts* are also part of the phenomena of religion. Among the Trobriand Islanders, the funeral services of an important figure reorganizes the activities of the whole community. The body is prepared for burial ritually, exhumed after its first burial, a bone extracted and saved, and then given final burial. During this process, every person has something to do, if nothing more than standing at the farthest edge of the group and joining in the continuous chanting.

Holy acts are noted in the preparation and administration of communion, the conducting of funerals and the administration of baptism. They are numerous and many are practiced almost unknowingly. Some folk cannot pray without closing the eyes, folding the hands, and kneeling. I suggest that there are more of these to which our attention has not been drawn, but which would disturb persons if we prohibited them. The degree of disturbance would indicate the significance of the practice to the persons concerned.

7. Religious people normally develop a *holy language.* The retention of Latin in the Roman Catholic liturgy is a good example of this. The recent move to permit the use of native tongues by the Church is considered revolutionary by many people. Holy languages are fossilized. They are the language used by some sainted or holy people in the past, and gradually absorb the sanctity associated with these saints. There is also what Whitehead called the "perfect dictionary" concept. This consists in the belief that all truth has been spoken, and nothing more can be added. The absoluteness of the truth tends to attach itself to the language, and an holy language is born.[1] For most of us who read this, Old English is a holy language. We are so accustomed to addressing God as "thou" that we are shocked when someone uses the familiar "you." This is another instance of how religious languages tend to become holy.

These seven types constitute some of a vast number of observable phases associated with religion. And note the word "observable" in this connection. It refers to something done or said, something which can be seen, heard, touched, tasted or even smelled. The number of such things and their complexity differs among people, but they are present in rudimentary or developed forms wherever men practice religion.We may speak of them as descriptive, that is, subject to verbal or graphic embodiment. The language used in so doing is descriptive or informative. It consists in statements, that is, affirmations or denials. To this extent the language appropriate to religion is descriptive rather than emotive or evaluative.

THE FACT OF HUMAN LIMITATION.

According to the third chapter of Genesis, man was created to live unlimited by pain, toil or death. There are no references to human mortality until after the Fall of man. Then it is written that the serpent is cursed, Eve would suffer in childbirth, and Adam would earn his bread by the "sweat of his face." He would do this until he returned to the ground, "for out of it you were taken; you are dust, and to dust you shall return."[2] Despite this interesting suggestion, all life has been and is terminable, mortal, subject to decomposition and decay. This is sometimes called man's finiteness, the basis of his ontological anxiety, the curse due to his refusal to recognize his dependence upon God. But more critical observers discover the cause of death in physiological and psychological factors inherent in the human organism and psyche. There is a "built-in obsolescence" in man as well as in buildings and machines. We are finite, and in spite of the fact that we have doubled our life-expectance since 1800, we still face death.

It is difficult to understand why this should be a matter of primary importance. Why should the fact that in time the elderly give place to the young be considered tragic? There are countless people who have exhausted much of their energy and all of their ambition who find life an increasing burden. Death to them is not tragic. They contemplate its coming with anticipation. Death is one of the limitations under which we live. When it comes too early, leaving responsibilities unprovided for, goals unachieved, and possibilities unexplored, then it may be tragic. In the mean time, all of us know that we shall presently die, but when, how, where and under what conditions, these are unknown or at least only imperfectly known.

Fashion dictates that we speak of this limitation in terms of anxiety. Rollo May asserts that "anxiety is the experience of the threat of imminent non-being."[3] Camilla Anderson analyzes it a bit farther. She contends that it has two common elements, "a sense of impending doom, and a lack of awareness of the disturbance or the means to alleviate it."[4] This condition strikes at one's self-esteem, and threatens to reduce him to nothingness. May develops this in terms of guilt. Men are involved in situations with possibilities of high achievement. Failure to realize them, or denial of their worth, leads to the feelings of guilt. Guilt may arise in relation to one's private or personal life (his *Eigenwelt);* or his social relations (his *Mitwelt);* or his environment (his *Umwelt).* Since no human being can exhaust all of the possibilities in these three areas, all men are guilty. This so-called guilt is considered to be ontological. It is ontological, it is said, because man is a self, a being, not an object or thing. Since ontology has been defined as "the theory of being," ontological guilt

is the guilt of some "being." It is assumed by some Existential psychologists, with whom May is associated, that what has "being" is in some sense original, that is, not derived from anything else. This is an assumption devoid of justification beyond what we shall consider in the next lecture.

This is a popular current interpretation of "the condition of man." He is a participant in Being, whatever that may mean. He is said to have freedom to accept or deny his potentialities, either to flee from them, or to devote himself unreservedly to their hoped-for realization. This is a "dreadful" freedom since conditions make its fulfillment impossible. This is the basis of wide-spread anxiety, and cause of the threat of "non-being." Granted that this is a possible interpretation of the predicament of modern man. I must confess that this leaves me quite cold. I have lived some three score years and ten; have faced the threats normal to human existence, but if I ever suffered the threat of "imminent non-being," I was not aware of it. One faces defeat, failure, ill-health and possible death, but not "non-being."

There are other ways of interpreting the Limitations under which we live. We may speak of them as imbalances. We become aware of disparities between what we believe to be essential to adequate living and what in fact is possible. We need a given amount of proper nourishment in order to function properly. Yet much of the work of the world is done by improperly nourished people. This poses the question: *What is there in the nature of the universe which makes it necessary for man to function perfectly if he is to avoid guilt?* The steam engines used to pull the trains across the forbidding West in the nineteenth century are said to have functioned at approximately 15% efficiency so far as their use of coal was concerned. Yet this low level of efficiency made possible the development of this wide continent and the growth of an highly productive civilization. Why condemn them because they wasted coal? They did what was necessary at the expense of some waste. Let me suggest, modestly, that the same judgment applies to man. We are incompetent when measured against perfection, but in the mean time we are getting some things done. *If it took millions of years to produce the human, perhaps we should be given some time to make the human humane.*

John Dewey called attention to the precarious aspects of existence. What is precarious, as he used the word, is uncertain, unpredictable, mysterious, risky, unstable, hazardous and uncontrollable. He contrasted them with the "stable" factors, those which were "sure, regular and finished." Thus the stable represents what is within our knowing and control, the precarious is not, or at least only imperfectly so. The precarious constitute areas where we are subject to limitation, actual or potential. For some years I have used the word "non-manipulable" to designate the limiting factors in human existence. It was restricted to those which impinged threateningly upon our interests and even our continued existence. There are many other limitations upon our knowledge and skills which do not threaten us. Until quite recently, it was impossible to examine the other side of the moon. It has now become possible. While interesting, the previous limitation posed no positive threats. But death (early and avoidable), ignorance, excessive social demands, protean desires, etc., are limitations to our existence which do pose threats. If one desired to develop a doctrine of Original Sin, this is a good place to begin. Although why one should wish to do so, I would not know.

These several analyses of the "predicament of man," assuming this phrase means something, calls attention to an interesting fact. It is that each interpretation of the human situation is colored, even determined by the type of therapeutic role an interpreter is prepared to assume. All such interpretations constitute representations of the situation from some points of view. Years ago, I was in a physician's office. In the desultory conversation normal to such situations, he remarked that "after all, health is the most important thing in life." To which I replied, "provided you have an adequate philosophy." Each viewed and valued life in terms of his professional competence.

These interpretations of the human situation, May's and Dewey's — among others — point to some fact about human beings. It is that there is more to man and his environments than we presently know or are able to control. One such limitation is the necessary choice among objectives. If a young man becomes an educator rather than a clergyman, he will pobably develop habits other than he would had he entered the ministry. And in so doing, he leaves unfulfilled the possible development of the personality normal to clergy. Life is a matter of choice. If you read Tillich, you will probably neglect Wieman; if Plato, then you may overlook Hegel. Choosing something means rejecting something else.

This is a simple observation, yet many contemporaries make it the cornerstone of imposing systems. They measure man against what they assume is divine, and find us wanting. Measured against some presumed omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent Being, we are obviously outclassed. So, we are guilty. I remember reading some work of a Jewish theologian who asserted that the doctrine of Original Sin had no place in Jewish theology. He admitted that "measured against perfection, all men fail." Yet many people are obsessed by the idea that the standards to which we must conform are divine standards, and we are held guilty if we fail in any degree. No wonder they feel guilty. These guilt feelings may be one of the reasons for the various responses religious people make to the facts of limitation.

RELIGIOUS RESPONSES TO LIMITATION.

Granted the fact of human limitations, and the guilt feelings often associated with them, what have religious persons done in order to make the situation somewhat more acceptable? We shall discuss four responses briefly. There are others, but these are at least typical. The first is *denial of the facts of limitation.* Take the case of death. Men die, but most people have refused to accept this as final. The Trobriand Islanders, for instance, provide man with a second self, one which survives physiological death. This "shade" takes up residence in an underground paradise where its every wish is granted immediately. Each year, it returns to the village from whence it came, there to be entertained by the living. Although it is invisible, it is tangible, and many prohibitions are in effect to prevent its injury. Even if a given shade wishes to return for another existence on its island, this also can be arranged. Analogous, if much more refined and sophisticated theories are found at all levels of cultural development.

This denial of limitation takes many forms. If the divine can interfere helpfully in matters of life and death, why not in matters of health, drought, victory, and so

on. During the dust-bowl period in eastern and southern Colorado in the 1930s, the governor of the state called for a day of prayer for rain. Implied in this call was the belief that God was directly implicated in cloud formation and rain-fall, that for some reason or other he withheld his hand and needed to be implored to do so. This approach was sufficiently widespread in Methodism to lead a leading Methodist theologian to deny it publicly, and to cause a leading interdenominational journal to run a symposium on "Can Prayer Change the Weather?" If the divine stands ready to assist whenever man faces limitations, then necessary limitation ceases to be a fact.

A second response to limitation consists in *reducing the significance of what is subject to it.* An example of this is found in II Cor. 4:16. "So we do not lose heart. Though our outer nature is wasting away, our inner nature is being renewed every day. For this slight momentary affliction is preparing us for an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison, because we look not at the things which are seen but to the things which are unseen; for the things which are seen are transient, but the things that are unseen are eternal." In early Buddhism, the cause of suffering was found in desire. To desire meant, in our language, the development of goals whose realization was restricted by personal and environmental factors. In order to deny the relevance of such desires, the Buddhists denied the existence of the substantial self. Since goals are always projects of persons, the denial of the person left no grounds for goal development.

The contemporary emphasis upon the subjective by Existentialists may be another instance of reduction of the significance of limiting factors in existence. If what is an "object" is unimportant, and since most of the limiting factors consist in or impinge upon the tangible, we have reduced the significance of the limiting. The phase of Continental theology which emphasized the transhistorical is another instance of this reductionism. It discredits man's interrelated life in the here and now.

A third religious response to limitation consists in *identifying the limiting factors with the divine.* In his *Future of an Illusion*, Freud stated that the principal task of culture, "its reason for being, is to defend us against nature," and that "nothing can be made of impersonal forces and fate; they remain eternally remote." Under such circumstances, man tends to "humanize nature," to transform it into some replica of man and society. This is one way of identifying limitation with the divine, thus robbing it of its terrors. Since God is good, any limitations imposed by or permitted by the divine must be considered beneficial. So argues Freud, interpreting this religious response.

But others have developed the same theme. In one of his finer statements, Cicero wrote that there was "sympathetic agreement, interconnection and affinity" in and among all things; that "these processes and this musical harmony of all parts of the world assuredly could not go on where they are not maintained in unison by a single, divine all-pervading spirit."[6] And Josiah Royce, some two thousand years later, echoed Cicero in these words: "Absolutely the *only* sure thing from the first about this world, however, is that it is intelligent, rational, orderly, and essentially comprehensible, so that all its problems are somewhere solved, all of its darkest mysteries are known to the Supreme Self."[7] So goes this religious response to limitations, transforming or reinterpreting the vastness of our cosmos and the inhabitants

of a minor planet into Mind, Self, Persons, Society; into what is humanly supportive and helpful.

A fourth response to limitation consists in some form of *submission to the divine*. As a boy, I often stated categorically what I intended to do or to become. My mother, long a member of the Missouri Synod of the Lutheran Church, normally added a postscript: "God willing, you will." This is the attitude characteristic of theologians and philosophers of religion who stress the power of God. Calvin emphasized this in his assertion that God was ultimately responsible for whatever occurred. The Stoics believed that one's powers over externals was drastically restricted if not wholly absent, that his responsibilities were limited to the control of his inner life. In these several instances, there is the conviction that "that wherein we lived, and moved and had our being" was the divine and that what occurred was his responsibility.

This may be stated in less traditional language. We may speak of this as the attitude of *respecting the conditions under which we live.* Some years ago a heavy snow fell quite early in the fall in Denver. Leaves were still on the trees. The wet snow stuck to them until the weight became unsupportable. The result was a general destruction of trees and shrubs, leaving the streets and lawns literally covered with broken trees and fallen branches. To see trees you have planted and nurtured through the years destroyed before your eyes is disheartening, to say the least. When we considered the situation, we discovered we had not acted intelligently. We had lived for some 18 months in Missouri before moving to Denver, and Mrs. Bernhardt and I learned to love its large-leaved trees. So, when we built a house in Denver, we planted trees native to Missouri rather than those native to the high plains. The native trees weathered the storm quite well because they had developed to meet such conditions. So our attempt to treat Colorado as though it was Missouri in selecting our trees led to their destruction.

This suggests a way of responding to human limitations. We must accept some limitations as facts, in so far as they cannot be removed or avoided, and then learn to make some form or forms of creative reorganization of values and habits to achieve a satisfactory way of living in their presence.

Here are four ways of living with limitations, Perhaps one's basic attitude toward life will determine in large measure which we will choose. Perhaps the reasons for a given choice are more subtle factors in our personalities, factors dimly recognized. In some cases, our theologies or philosophies may be rationalizations to justify them. Whatever the reasons may be, these are some of the ways whereby man faces the facts of his limitations.

WHAT RELEVANCE HAVE THESE FACTS?

Facts as such have no relevance. It is the context in which they are organized and the purpose or purposes of such organizations which gives them cogency or logical force. For the development of a philosophy of religion I found these facts significant for each of the three phases of religion.

First, so far as the function of religion is concerned, I accepted the view that institutions and personal habits are designed to serve human needs. Each of the

four ways of responding to limitation constitutes a way of defining the area or areas of religious interest. Some people deny limitation by attempting to conciliate or bargain with the divine. This comes to crude expression in metatechnology, but has many much more refined forms. Others identify themselves esthetically with what they consider the divine, and in so doing transform the limiting factors into divine goals or purposes. Still others find the limiting factors most pressing in the area of human misery produced by insensitive and immoral persons and groups. Here the divine becomes operative in developing ethical sensitivity and providing moral incentives. And others accept the conditions under which they live and seek to relate themselves to the divine in ways which make some creative reorganization of value systems and habit patterns possible. In each of these instances, the fact of human limitation is central. The areas of basic limitation are the areas in which religious interests center. The facts of human limitation and the types of responses made indicate that religions are means whereby we do come to terms with the nonmanipulable.

The second phase of religion consists in Reinterpretation. This consists in some intellectual reworking of experience and the experienced situation for support or justification of the search for the values sought. Out of this reinterpretive process there emerge such concepts as God, soul, sin, redemption, immortality, and a long list of related terms. The late Dean Shailer Mathews was fond of saying that theologies were developed to justify religious activities. We may restate this by noting that they are developed to justify man's several responses to limitation. If magic is to be used by more primitive peoples, then some form of magical world-view is essential. With little knowledge of such basic items as cells and cell-division, they rationalize plant growth as a result of magical practices. Diseases and their treatment are also interpreted in magical terms, and so a magical world-view emerges. At higher levels, where religion is shot through and throught with metatechnology, some explanation is required to account for God's failure to send rain. God must be capricious or else man must be blamed. So the conception of the Fall of Man emerges to account for limitation while maintaining that God is blameless. Sin is thus a reinterpretation of human thought and behavior designed to protect the divine from responsibility for limitation by placing responsibility upon the human.

The emergence of the concepts of demons and Satan is also understandable in this reinterpretive process. Some psychiatrists interested in frustration tolerance analyze frustrations into "frustrative segmental needs" in which the route to the satisfaction of some specific need is blocked, and those which pose threats to the personality as an whole.[8] Among the responses persons make to these frustrations are two, the extrapunitive and the intrapunitive. In the first, the individual blames other persons or beings for his limitations. In the second, he blames himself. The extrapunitive provides a possible psychological basis for the concepts of demons and Satan. Both are beings of some sort responsible for frustrations. The intrapunitive serves to justify the use of aggression toward oneself. Here self-blame becomes sin in religious terms.

The conception of God, or of the divine in other religions, is used to identify and individuate the saving, helpful and supportive elements or phases in man and his more inclusive environment. This may be observed better perhaps in the case

of polytheistic peoples. They develop or import Gods for specific purposes. One interesting situation developed in ancient Rome. During the six hundred years of more or less adequately recorded history culminating in the first century A.D., some 73 gods were worshipped which had healing functions. Most of them specialized in some one or very few ailments or diseases. Often they were named for the disease, such as Febris, the incarnation of fever. Thus the divine being was responsible for the disease, and also for its cure or removal. After we learned more about diseases, the factors responsible for them, and more adequate ways of treating them, healing gods lost their role and became obsolete. A new set of limiting factors became central as man's interests and values expanded. Interpersonal relations expanded greatly, and evils developed which were relatively unimportant earlier. The divine now took on moral attributes, and the ideal toward which men should aspire. More recently, among the sophisticated in our culture, it is "the eternally remote," the expanding universe whose dimensions have become frightening to many. God is now defined in intimate terms for those interested in interpersonal relations, and in cosmic terms by those who seek some *rapport* with the vastness in which we live and move and have our being. And for those who focus attention upon the development of new and terrifying forms of power, the return to Calvin in forms of Neo-Calvinistic theologies seems relevant. These several forms of theology indicate that our theologies are emergents from our reinterprtations of ourselves and and relevant situations —the existent and the Existential Medium—designed to make reasonable or at least understandable certain situations or conditions which pose problems for us.

Does this mean that our conceptions of God are merely projections of our hopes and fears, having no reality or substance beyond that? Many people accept this conclusion. But this is only one possible interpretation of the facts. Another, and that which I accept as I write this, is that the Divine in inexhaustibly rich and complex, and that changing needs bring into prominence aspects undiscovered before. This is true in many areas of research. In earlier times, our knowledge of man's body and psyche was quite limited. Today, we are aware of depths of the human spirit far beyond that of the ancients. And the same is true of the cosmos as well as of the tiniest bit of matter. These have changed little, but our awarenesses have changed greatly. So the changing conceptions of God are in line with the newer insights obtained in other areas. And, again, it is changing needs operative in all areas which often spark new types of research.

We have found facts to be relevant in the functional and reinterpretational aspects of religion. What about the third or technique phase? Here we refer to the overt acts described in part in discussing the phenomena of religion. Almost every type of act and many different things have been used for religious purposes at some time or other. The psychological function of techniques is, in part, that of transforming the theoretical reorganization of value systems and habits into functioning beliefs and renewed habits. The relevance of techniques as factual matters is at least two-fold. In the first place, they constitute the starting point for any empirical study of religion. When I first faced the task of locating religious institutions among the others which together form the stable part of our society, I discovered that it was impossible to "see" or observe directly what an institution was designed to do. I had to discover *what people had done, the circumstances under which they*

did this, and how they interpreted what they had done. Only by careful examination under changing conditions of these several items was it possible to arrive at some tenable view of the function of religion. These facts, the techniques of religion, are basic to any philosophy of religion which claims to be empirical.

Next, an examination of techniques as practiced by people at many cultural levels suggests that there are no final techniques or forms of worship. The time spent debating the relative merits of infant baptism, adult baptism, immersion or sprinkling and the whole gamut of such discussions was wasted. This is true also of the debates about the elements in communion, and most if not all others. The most which can be said is that helpful techniques must be socially acceptable acts at a given time among people at given cultural levels. And, there may be need for the development of newer and more effective ones at present. Mr. Wieman's insistence upon creative interchange and the growing interest in personal counseling are promising moves in this direction. But they too may soon prove to be temporal and subject to modification and change or even obsolescence as our understanding of personality increases, and new ways of relating ourselves to the divine are discovered. Rigidity is as harmful in the technique phase of religion as in the theological or reinterpretive area.

A former chancellor of a university I once attended had a sign on the wall back of his desk. It asked: "What are the facts?" This is the question we have faced in lecture two. What are the facts found normally associated with man's religious quests? We considered three: *phenomena,* objects or events which are observable and describable; *limitation,* a more subtle fact indicating that man lives under limitations, and that some of them constitute serious intellectual and emotional problems for him; *responses to limitation* — included were (i) denials of the necessity of such limitations by appeal to metatechnology at all levels of culture, (ii) discrediting what is subject to such limitation by denying either its reality or its significance, (iii) associating the limiting factors with the divine so that they ceased to be fearsome, and (iv) acknowledging their presence and finding ways whereby our beliefs and value systems may be reorganized to provide meaning and possible creativity in life as limited.

Thus far the waters have been relatively clear. We can arrive at some conceptions of truth as the name for our facts and legitimate inferences; we can discover some facts which are relevant to an intelligent philosophy of religion. The way would appear clear for a rational approach to religion in which our beliefs are supported by acceptable evidence. But this does not happen to be the case. There are factors which disturb the apparent placidity of the waters in which we sail. We shall consider two of them in the succeeding lectures.

LECTURE THREE

Depth Philosophy

We have heard much about "hidden persuaders," the devices and stratagems which induce us to buy what we do not need and in excessive amounts. Depth psychologists tell us that the decisions we make emerge from hidden operations of the mind determined by childhood experiences. A study by two Norwegian analysts of twenty theological students and one girl indicated that their conceptions of and attitudes toward the Divine were determined in large measure by their early experiences with their fathers. As an example, they noted that Luther's conception of God appeared to be based upon the ambivalent feelings of fear and love, attitudes which typified his childhood attitude toward his father.

Without committing myself to this analysis, since this is not the area of my competence, I may observe that my own researches in philosophy of religion suggest an analogous form of Depth Philosophy. These studies indicate that the factors responsible for our conceptions of God are often not clearly formulated nor adequate understood. We are unaware of them until something or someone forces us to come to terms with them. Until we identify these factors, examine them critically, and decide whether to retain or reject them, we are living "the unexamined life" theologically.

THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL BASIS OF THEOLOGY.

The facts we are prepared to accept as evidence and the significance or weight we attribute to them are determined by certain assumptions we hold. By "assumptions" we mean what is "taken for granted, accepted as important" in thinking. By way of an example, we may note an incident which occurred in the Trobriand Islands. An elderly man had married a younger woman whose sister was the wife of a magician, much younger than the old gentleman. In the course of events, the young wife spent some time helping her sister. In the mean time, the old man became ill. Being jealous, he accused his wife and the magician of wrong doing, and insisted that his illness was the result of magical attack by the magician. To prove this, he called attention to odd-shaped sticks and other objects found within and near his hut. They were data used to establish the fact that his brother-in-law

was using magic against him. A western physician, treating the old man, ignored these objects. He called attention to blood-pressure, temperature, family history, and related factors.

Why did the native think of magic and the western physician think of germs and other toxic agencies? The answer is clear: one had assumed a magical, the other a scientific world-view. The "facts" available to them were the same; the interpretations made of these facts were colored or determind by what they assumed to be important, real or operative in their worlds. In a world where magic obtained, any object could become a menacing factor used by some hostile magician. With a scientific world-view, other factors are believed to be operative, another set of facts accepted as relevant. There was nothing in the events as such, the visits of his wife to the home of the magician, the illness of the husband, and so forth, which made them data. It was what was taken for granted by the Islander and the Westerner which determined their selection as data and led to the conclusions reached.

An experience of mine as a graduate student could have helped me understand this much earlier than I did. I remember an argument with another graduate student in which I defended the view that only in terms of a Personalistic world-view could one account for human life. I assumed, and so asserted without comprehending what I was doing, that "life can come only from preceding life." This statement assumed a separation of the living from the non-living which could not be bridged. Yet I had spent much of my undergraduate time studying biology, evolution, genetics and related fields. The import of such studies was that "matter, life, and mind" are continuous; the primary differences were to be found in the growing complexity of the structures and the increase of modifiability and capacity to affect.

Yet these studies did not help me to see that I had accepted *an unsupported view of man and his world which separated life, or at least person, absolutely from that out of which it had emerged.* I had accepted an Atomistic or Mechanistic view of nature. The physical world was defined as incapable of producing life, and life was defined in non-physical terms. With such a world-view, my affirmation that "life can come only from life" was meaningful. Without it, the statement had no significance except as revealing a blind-spot in my philosophical outlook.

These assumptions or presuppositions are operative in the most highly sophisticated theologies as well as in the more primitive thought of savages. Some concepts and attitudes have been accepted uncritically and they determine the direction our theologies take.

In the first lecture, we noted that the existence of God is inferred. It is as true today as it was when the writer of the Gospel of John stated that "no man has ever seen God." Knowledge of God, in so far as we have it, comes either from revelation or from inferences drawn from experience. In the area of philosophy of religion, as I understand it, we are compelled to remain with natural rather than revealed theology. Whatever is said concerning God in philosophy of religion must be supported by evidence or accepted on faith. Perhaps what we presuppose is more important than revelation, faith or evidence. This is true since our reliance

upon one or more of these is a matter of what we presuppose, assume, or take for granted. By way of illustration, let me discuss two presuppositions which persuade some contemporary thinkers to hold certain views about God.

The first is that "Man was made for perfection, and this perfection must be realizable." This is one of the many possible ways of stating that human limitations are perversions of the Divine intent in creating the world and man. In Genesis, we are told that the evils we suffer are consequences, not of the conditions under which we live, but of our wrong-doing. If man had not sinned, we should still be innocent and unharmed. In recent Continental theology, we are told that history is non-redemptive, again because of man's sin or finiteness, but that man's goals, God's intentions for him, are realizable in some transhistorical realm.

The second presupposition is that man is finite, and must learn to live with finite goals and partial realizations. Perfection is viewed as some ideal limit toward which we may move, but any given conception of perfection is imperfect since it is based upon partial information and formulated by finite minds.

There are certain comments to be made concerning both of these assumptions. If one accepts the first, that man was made for perfection, he must explain the facts which point to man's limitations, including his moral lapses, his suicidal tendencies exhibited in warfare, and in the whole brood of evils discussed in the morning newspapers. This consideration probably gave rise to the doctrines of Original Sin and human Corruption. Such doctrines become prominent every time the evil in man and society raises its ugly head. There may be more than incidental connection between the Napoleonic wars and Kierkegaard's revolt; between the first world war and Barth's reaction.

Perfectionism makes necessary belief in some transhistorical realm where the desired perfection is made possible. From the Trobriand Islander's refusal to accept death as final by providing an erotic paradise beneath a nearby island to Immanuel Kant's belief in the immortality of the soul to justify making the moral will absolute, there is a long and fascinating tale of human hopes engendered by faith in the perfectibility of the human spirit. And the same may be said concerning Golden Ages in some misty past and New Ages in some beckoning futures. These conceptions are not incidental, the dreams of some world-weary or bored theologian. Once the view that man *was made for perfection and that this perfection must be realizable* is adopted, we are driven by this hidden persuader to formulate plans and programs whereby this becomes theoretically possible.

I wish to be understood at this point. I am not saying that such ideas are false. I am saying that they do not rest upon empirical evidence now available to us. They are attempts to bring consistency into our thinking. If we accept, critically or uncritically, the view that the human can and must be perfected, and then consider the problems which this poses, we must either deny the assumption or attempt to justify these hopes. But the need for such justification should not take the place of critical investigation of the present bases of such beliefs.

If one accepts the second presupposition, that we are finite, limited, and that life is an art of the possible, then we face the practical problems involved in mak-

ing the most of what man and his many environments have to offer. To accept the fact of human limitation and the need for doing our best within and with such limitations makes one wary of any doctrinaire approach to problems. We approach religious problems with the humility with which we approach other areas of thought. I have heard speakers in the fields of philosophy of religion and theology speak with much more certainty about God than they do when speaking about their teenage children. Here is an area where our limitations become evident at once. But it is easy to forget that such momentous matters as the Divine, human hopes and human destiny are more complex than our children, difficult as it may be to believe this. And it is in such momentous matters that presuppositions become so important. Exponents of Perfectionism as well as those of Finitism feel uncomfortable in the presence of those with opposing views. By their nature, presuppositions or assumptions appear to be incapable of direct proof or falsification. They precede thinking, and help to determine it. As such they may well be called persuaders, often hidden.

The significance of presuppositions in religious thinking came to clear expression in the writings of Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910). My doctoral work at The University of Chicago centered in the influence of Bowne on Methodist theological thought. It was supervised by one of the clearest minds of his time, the late Gerald Birney Smith. Yet it was some three years after I had completed this study that I discovered, and discovered is the proper word, what gave Personalistic metaphysics its cogency or compelling power. Bowne stated his presupposition simply: "Whatever our total nature calls for may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof."[1] He used this as a guide-line for much of his religious and philosophical thinking. It dictated his starting point, an examination of human needs, and his method, that of thwarting attempts at positive disproof of his theories.

If one assumes that the satisfaction of human needs and the fulfillment of human aspirations constitutes a basic purpose of creation, the investigation of such needs and aspirations becomes a matter of primary concern. The theologian or philosopher begins his work with this question: "What does man need to live as he ought?" The answer to this question results in a conception of person, society and nature which provides for the satisfaction of man's legitimate needs and the realization of his higher aspirations.

In so far as the normal conditions of existence served these purposes, Bowne's metaphysics was based upon experience. Where natural limitations closed the door to man's aspirations, Bowne added to the conceptions of reality provided by empirical knowledge whatever was required to make theoretically possible "what our total nature called for." More recently, D. C. Macintosh stated the position as follows: "We have the moral right to believe as we must in order to live as we ought — if we can (logically and psychologically), and more particularly, if we do."[2]

Then followed the second step, that of thwarting attempts to disprove the theories as formulated. As indicated, "we have the right to believe what we need to believe" "in order to live as we ought" unless such beliefs are definitely refuted. This led to the adoption of the debater's attitude. Arguments against the positions defended were stated, their weaknesses and inadequacies pointed out. If in this process, it could be indicated that the attempts to refute our theories failed, such failure was considered proof of their truth.

It should be observed that the only evidence the believer needs to present is that such views are needsd. This is, of course, a psychological matter, culturally conditioned. Once the believer showed that his views were essential to the satisfaction of human needs as formulated by a given group in a given culture, and to the fulfillment of its aspiration, again psychologically and culturally conditioned, the positive phase of his thinking was completed. All that was then needed was to thwart attempts at refutation of the theories.

This is one illustration of the way presuppositions control religious thinking. The same observation may be made with reference to other fields. As R. G. Collingwood noted, whenever we begin to feel uncomfortable in debate or reading, it is probably true that these basic presuppositions are in jeopardy.[3] Perhaps a more recent example may throw more light upon these hidden persuaders.

The late Dietrich Bonhoeffer caused quite a stir when he said that religion was outmoded and that Christianity was not a religion. As Bishop Robinson in *Honest to God* interpreted this, Bonhoeffer found little relevance in the routine of religious behavior. He had equated religion with what I have called metatechnology, the continuance into contemporary life of reliance upon extranatural powers to resolve our difficulties. He had discovered and remained anchored upon the first and most primitive religious response to Limitation. Had he been given time by Hitler's hordes for further research, he may have come upon other views of man's religious quest than this one. If one identifies religion with metatechnology, or analogously, astronomy with astrology, both religion and astronomy lose intellectual status.

Bishop Robinson was much impressed by Bonhoeffer's views. He proposed that we bring Christianity back to its dominant place in man's interests by viewing it as revealing to man "the dimension of depth in all of life's functions." But the adoption of the category of depth proposed by Tillich does not get man out of the spatial field. "Depth" refers to what is "down," "beneath," "below" and related spatial categories. There is no real difference between seeking the Divine in the "depths" than in the "heights" of the early Christians, or in the "out there" of the later Deists. In each case, these spatial categories serve to divert our attention from the "here and now" where we face limitation, and direct it to some "other sphere" where limiting factors are absent or where we have access to powers capable of circumventing them.

It is obvious that both Bonhoeffer and Robinson have identified religion with its more primitive forms, and were then forced to discard it as an anachronism in the modern world. The evidence indicates that religion shares primitive ancestors with other phases of human interest. Astronomy and medicine share disreputable ancestry with religion, yet we are prepared to permit them to outgrow their ancestry. Perhaps the men here discussed should be as charitable with religion. But more important than this is the fact that they have adopted depreciatory views of man and nature. They have in fact profaned the only area within which man lives and shares with his fellows his joys and sorrows, that is, the present, the here and now. There appears to be no other interpretation of the continued search for the

Divine "up there" or "out there" or now "in the depths" or "down there." It is possible that the divine is located — forgive the word — in some of the regions suggested, but if so, there is no way whereby we shall know it. There are no checkable consequences presently available.

We may summarize this phase of our discussion by noting that this "profanation of the present" is due to the presuppositions adopted, not by the evidence available. Here again, one's Depth Philosophy is showing.

INCREASING COGNITIONAL EFFICIENCY.

Some years ago R. G. Collingwood stated that a few presuppositions were absolute, that they could not be transformed into propositions. Propositions are statements which either affirm or deny something. As such, they are or may be subject to verification or falsification. If presuppositions are such that they cannot be so transformed, then they are not subject to investigation, to proof or disproof.

I believe Collingwood was right in so far as he dealt with ontic presuppositions. An "ontic" presupposition is one which assumes something about reality, or preferably, the Existential Medium, whatever affects us, or may affect us directly or indirectly. Many of our presuppositions are of this type. "Nature is orderly," "all effects have causes," "man was made for perfection," are assumptions concerning the nature of that in which "we live and move and have our being." They refer to what is "real," that is, the ontic.

There is no way of which I am aware whereby we can subject such assumptions to empirical or even rational testing so long as we remain at the ontic level. When Aristotle assumed that nothing moved without being moved, he had a principle in whose terms he could explain the world of motion and change. When Einstein assumed that "no effects have causes," that we can explain changes in terms of observed sequences without committing ourselves to any set of causes such as Aristotle proposed, he also had a principle which enabled him to explain the world of motion and change. And, as Collingwood pointed out, you either believed one of these presuppositions or you did not. Any attempt to prove or disprove one or the other was pseudo-metaphysics. In other words, the foundations of the method of verification or falsification consists in precisely such absolute presuppositions. Why search for causes or laws unless one believed that all change was due to cause or could be explained in terms of observed sequences or laws? The court of last resort in investigations consists in certain ontic presuppositions. As such, they are not testable. One either believed them or he did not. So Collingwood.[4]

When I first became aware of this problem, about 1930, I believed one could use the Principle of Economy to resolve it. According to this presupposition, one should not expand his explanatory principles unnecessarily. This was interpreted to mean that nature was orderly and efficient, that it took the shortest paths to its goals. But this is not true. Naure is prodigal and extravagant, wasteful in many areas. Millions of seeds are scattered to the winds, most of them to die and but few to take root to provide for new generations. But my attempts to use this principle bore fruit. I learned that what was implied in Occam's principle was that

thinking could become more efficient if we used some logical or epistemic devices, and that the principle of economy was one such device. We can find any number of possible interpretations or explanations of any body of facts. We may begin with the most fantastic explanation and disprove it, or we can begin with the most simple and learn whether or not it provides an adequate explanation of the facts at our disposal. Occam recommended that we take the latter method in the interests of efficient thinking.

Occam's principle of economy reduced the number of matters employed in solving problems. All extraneous items could be set aside. His principle was not an ontic presupposition such as Collingwood was considering. It was what we may call an "epistemic" or epistemological assumption. It regulated the methods of thinking about hypotheses, and provided one of the several tests normally applied in their selection. Perhaps there is an analogous epistemic device whereby we may select among primary presuppositions. If there is, then the attempt to test ontic presuppositions with epistemic assumptions may make sense. Epistemic assumptions refer to procedures rather than to beings or objects.

Proceeding upon this assumption, we may decide that *those ontic presuppositions which add to our cognitive efficiency are preferable to those which inhibit it.* This may be called the Principle of Efficiency applied to the realm of ontic presuppositions. It differs from Occam's Razor in that the latter was applied to the selection of hypotheses. Both principles are based upon the presupposition that *Knowledge is preferable to ignorance. Whatever inhibits human thinking or detracts from its worth is denied by this. Whatever encourages or adds to the efficiency of human thinking is affirmed and accepted.* This should provide a test whereby we may avoid the predicaments which beset the thinker so long as he remains at the ontic level in considering presuppositions.

If one adopts this procedural principle, the test of cognitive efficiency, it is evident that several practices in contemporary religious thinking should be discarded. Take the attempts to employ myth as a cognitive instrument. It may be true that myths provide what is personally satisfying and socially cohesive, but they do not provide instruments in whose terms precise questions can be formulated, programs of research instituted and knowledge increased. Yet these are the conditions which have made the great increase in knowledge possible. We shall consider myth in more detail in the next lecture. All we need to state here is that it does not add to cognitional efficiency.

Again, when men believe there is no middle ground between absolute truth and no truth, they spend their time searching for absolutes instead of attacking their problems piece-meal and increasing their knowledge bit by bit. The same is true in the search for perfection. The search for the perfect kept men from seeking to better conditions in specific situations and limited areas. Medical research, for example, is directed toward specific diseases to eliminate them if possible, to reduce their incidence as much as possible, and to relieve the suffering involved in them. It is not a search for perfection.

Our experience during recorded history points to the fact that "all-or-none" logics have not been particularly helpful. Aristotle's "true-false" logic has been

credited with hindering men in their investigations of nature. As one historian of science observed, the effects of the adoption by the Catholic church of Aristotle's logic led to the idea of "knowledge derived from intuitive axioms on the one side, and authority — that of the Catholic Church — on the other. It was singularly ill adapted to lead men to or guide them in the exploratory investigation of nature."[5] And, if we take it for granted that there is one and only one form of political-economic organizations of people, that of American-type democracy, and that all men must adopt this or we are doomed, we condemn ourselves to continued warfare. This is the basic fallacy in traditional communism, one which will destroy it unless we fall prey to the same. All-or-none thinking has outlived whatever usefulness it ever had, a lesson that churchmen are learning, and need to apply to their theological thinking.

Further, if some one era in human history is made absolute, that covered in the writings of the Old and New Testaments, or for that matter, the sixteenth century, we tend to close the doors effectively against any important development without an immense waste of time. I listened to an important theologian speak on the necessity of avoiding these "all-or-none" solutions to international problems. Most of his listeners, including this one, agreed thoroughly with him. Yet he was so bound by the finality of the scriptures that he spent most of his time trying to prove that they agreed with him. This was interesting historical information, in so far as it was information, but it kept this man from sharing some fine insights with his congregation. What he said was not false, but irrelevant. As such, it hindered him in his attempts to share significant insights. And, I would assume, this necessity of finding support from ancient writings for what he learned in the contemporary world kept him from contributing more than he has toward the solution of pressing social problems.

These suggestions should indicate that the search for finality is not the most fruitful way toward increasing our cognitional efficiency. What, then, are the consequences of the adoption of the alternate presupposition of Possibility? We spoke of it as that of Finitism, earlier in this lecture. To continue that use might confuse the position we are presenting with that of men like Tillich and others who use the conception of man as finite to support their perfectionistic views. Let me, then, formulate more precisely the position that life is an art of the possible with no necessary claims to perfection in any realms.

It includes two ontic assumptions. The first is that *Human needs, including the moral and religious, are natural needs. Their satisfaction, in so far as this is possible, is a result of adjustment and readjustment of the relations between man and his social and cosmic environments.* Man is organic to nature, as Idealists often say. This means that man and his cosmic environment are parts one of the other. Man has in his constitution all of the elements which make up the rest of the universe. He may "hunger for God," but this hunger is a human hunger, and its satisfaction must be found in "that in which we live and move and have our being." He may hunger for absolute truth, but our relatively long experience gives us little if any evidence that it has ever been found or that there is anything like that. Whatever we know is subject to revision in the light of reflection upon our unfolding experience.

The second assumption may appear to be epistemic, but is ontic in that it says something *about us as thinkers.* Since we are part of the Existential Medium, what is said about us *as thinkers* is ontic in nature as we are using this term. We may state the second assumption as follows: *Human knowledge consists in facts and legitimate inferences, established by various methods of checking consequences.* Man is believed to be a curious being whose curiosity is satisfied as he engages in various observations, experiments, and subjects himself to varied experiences. His knowledge is a consequence of his reflection on such observations, experiments, experiences. He may make brilliant guesses, develop fantastic and/or highly speculative hypotheses, but they remain guesses and hypotheses until they have been subjected to some type of investigation as suggested in this paragraph.

I believe we may take it for granted that what Whitehead called "the new mentality," the ways of thinking which have transformed our world during the past five hundred years, is much more efficient than the traditional, authoritative, intuitive or *metanoetic* (reliance upon supernatural knowledge or ways of receiving it, such as revelation). But many thinkers refuse to believe that these newer methods are applicable to the problems posed by religion. Toward the end of the first lecture, I suggested that this matter would be given further consideration later. This appears to be an opportune time to do so.

OPERATIONAL THEISM.

The methods of investigation which are here suggested have many different names. Among them, the more recent is Operationalism. It is both a theory of meaning and a method of investigation. As a theory of meaning, it restricts definitions to the activities or operations required to determine the relations and modes of existence which together constitute what may be known about anything. As stated in an earlier paper, "what can be known about existence or existents consists in their relations with one another and how they function as related (Modality)."[6] If one accepts a pluralistic metaphysics, as I do, there are few if any so-called "simples" found among existents. All things or activities appear more or less complex. Relations as here understood refers both to the interactions between or among "objects" and to the "parts" which constitute these objects. The same is true of modality. This is but to say that we do not appear at present to have analyzed anything in nature or man into its ultimate constituents, assuming there are such. The relations and modalities discovered or discerned operationally constitute the meanings attributed to existence and existents.

This method is used in many fields. In Field Theory psychology, the self is defined as a network of relations within the organism and between it and the environment. It is obvious that "networks of relations" are not observable phenomena. All that can be said about the self must be inferred from the activities of the self, including the language phase. Despite the fact that depth psychologists present elaborate schemes of what the self as such consists of, consciousness, the unconscious; id, ego and superego — they are constructs developed to explain behavior. They appear to be useful for some diagnostic and theapeutic purposes, yet may have no more correspondence to what is operative within than the luminiferous ether suggested as necessary to explain the passage of light. The progress in thought depends

to some degree upon the use of such "constructs." Much has been learned about "inner space," "subjectivity," and the "soul" or personality viewed internally rather than objectively. Yet there is no reason to believe that such knowledge provides special insight into reality. It gives us information which must be added to our growing stock in all fields so that a more complete synthesis of knowledge, what may be called metaphysics, may be made. In this matter, the operationalist occupies as good a position as any other serious investigator.

Furthermore, those who insist that the distinction between fact and value, objective and subjective, is absolute do so without adequate justification. If one defines fact as incapable of significant relationships with value, the distinction is meaningful to those who accept the definition, but is not binding on those who do not. I have indicated elsewhere that value may be defined in other terms, and have presented the reasons for so doing. At the moment, it is sufficient to observe that here again some presuppositions are operative. If one assumes that "nature" is incapable of producing life and value, he will act and think as if this were true. Those who have more adequate, or perhaps we should say, richer and more inclusive views of nature, do not feel compelled to exclude life and value from it. This is one lesson we should learn from Organismic metaphysics.

Another comment may be in order. If one will study the creeds and affirmations of the past, he may be surprised to learn that many of the statements made in them contain important operationally definable terms. The Symbol of Faith adopted by the Council of Trent, Feb. 4, 1546, reads in part as follows: "I believe in one God, the *Father Almighty, Maker* of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, . . . by whom all *things were made;* . . . and *again he will come* with glory to judge the living and the dead." The underlined words in this quotation refer to activities subject to the test of checkable consequences either directly or indirectly, and they refer to the Divine. If one asserts that Samuel Morse invented the telegraph, this included manufacturing since telegraphy uses instruments. It should be possible to check the truth or falsity of this claim. If one attributed creativity to God, once again we are in the realm where checkable consequences appear to be in order. Even if one defines the creative activity as a "lure" or "attraction" with Whitehead and Aristotle, there should be some evidence to support the claims. In the case of Aristotle, we are relatively certain that it was his "hidden persuader," the assumption that movement required a mover, which persuaded him that an Unmoved Mover was necessary. I suggest that this is the case wherever the Divine is sought "out there," "up there" or "in the depths."

We may conclude this lecture on Depth Philosophy by noting that there are hidden persuaders which control our thinking in many areas. We may have accepted the assumption that man was made for perfection and that he must realize it here or elsewhere, either in his own person, or with Luther and Tillich, attributively, that is, by having Christ's righteousness "attributed to us" (Luther); or with Tillich, that we are "grasped by" or accepted by the Divine. This presupposition dampens man's enthusiasm for the present, and for the "piece-meal" or Operational approach to knowledge. Yet the evidence indicates that this is the way we have added to our knowledge of ourselves, our fellows and our world.

Or we may assume, even with difficulty, the view that God, however defined, is within the world of present and possible experience, not shut off in some inaccessible height or depth of Being. From this vantage point, the whole of human experience is open to investigation for more fruitful relations with the Divine. Here we are not enclosed in some "theological circle" nor impounded in some uncriticized presuppositional corral.

LECTURE FOUR

Language Barriers

In this final lecture, I had intended to summarize the developments in language analysis during the past forty or more years in western philosophy. Such studies point to the fact that language can be used to confuse as well as to inform, to obstruct as well as to promote clear thinking in religion. But the intricacies of the subject-matter convinced me that it would be better to restrict attention to one phase of this rather than to cover the whole superficially. For that reason we shall consider myth as one of the language barriers to clear thinking in religious matters.

By way of introduction, let me remind you of one of the early stories about our country told to us as children. It is the tale of one of George Washington's childhood exploits. According to this, young George used a new hatchet given to him by his father to cut down a favorite cherry tree. When questioned about this by his father, George was said to have replied: "I cannot tell a lie. I did it with my little hatchet." Let me try to decode this tale to find its "truths." First, America is a young country, and so makes its quota of youthful mistakes. At the same time, when this is called to her attention, as the elder Washington did to the younger, America is honest enough to admit them, and to accept responsibility for them.

Did the young George ever cut down a cherry tree with a toy hatchet? Or was this one of the stories which gather about the activities of the prominent people in any generation? The accepted view today is that this is a baseless tale told by Parson Weems in a late edition of his biography of George Washington. So its truth-value in terms of correspondence with events is nil. It has survived because it suggested something about the Founder of our country and made children proud of their heritage. According to Charles Morris, in his *Signs, Language and Behavior*, "the general significance of mythical discourse lies in the fact that it informs the interpreter in a vivid manner of the modes of action approved and disapproved"[1] either by groups or individuals.

WHAT IS MYTH?

There is no generally accepted definition of myth. By glancing at several contemporary views, we may arrive at its approximate meaning. We begin with Miss

Benedict. She states that myths and folk-tales are novelistic stories. Myths may be distinguished from folk-tales in that they belong within the religious complex and extol supernaturalistic exploits. Folklore and folktales consist in "folk traditions, festivals, songs and superstitions" whose primary function is that of "crystallizing and perpetuating forms of culture." The George Washington incident belongs here rather than in myth.

Both myth and folklore use language designed to express and evoke emotions. It is evocative rather than informational language. Properly used, it has a significant role in the maintenance and enhancement of group life; improperly used, it may constitute a serious barrier to the advancement of truth.

A second important contributor to this subject is the late Bronislaw Malinowski. His extensive studies of the Trobriand Islanders convinced him that their discourses contained at least three forms. The first are folk-tales described as seasonal performances designed to increase sociability. The second are legends, designed to relate individuals and groups to their past. The third is myth, or stories told to justify rites, ceremonies or social and moral rules. Myth is "a hard-working, extremely important cultural force," employed to justify the rites used to pace the gardening activities, to enforce the code of exogamy, and to reinforce belief in the soul or *baloma* as beyond the possibility of final destruction.[2]

He was convinced that magic and religion function in the Trobriand Islands in preparing people to face personally and culturally disruptive events such as the death of important leaders, mysterious ailments or epidemics. This is another way of speaking about the non-manipulable factors which condition our existence, of the limitations which thwart our progress toward cherished and vital objectives. In this context, myth is a means, verbally and ritually communicated, whereby fears are reduced and hopes reinforced. As such, myths are or may be part of the creative reorganization of belief and action in the presence of important limiting factors, as I would define religion. Where myth belongs in the religious complex we shall consider a bit later.

A third contributor to the subject was Ernst Cassirer. He shared Malinowski's belief in the cultural significance of myth, and would extend its use beyond what the latter would. He wrote that "there is no natural phenomenon and no phenomenon of human life which is not capable of a mythical interpretation, and which does not need it."[3] As we shall observe, he modified this later.

He noted three characteristics of myth. The first is that it uses magical rather than descriptive or semantic language. Magicians believe in the efficacy of words. Symbolic language serves to objectify sense-impressions. We are aware of objects capable of stimulating our perceptive processes when we have named them, i.e., expressed them in symbols. The language used in myth expresses feelings rather than sense-impressions. As we normally use symbolized sense-impressions in our use and/or control of objects, early man used myth or symbolized feelings to control what he believed to be beyond ordinary methods of control. Myth and magic are united in primitive and savage societies.

Following Malinowski, Cassirer stated that myth becomes operative in the crises rather than in the routine of existence. Confronting crises, situations for which

there is no available response ready, myth and magic are used. In higher levels of culture, Cassirer observed that myth is used to integrate groups and to control their members. The Nazi myth of the German *Volk* was one instance of this use. Myth may be either social, its normal use in providing a basis for social order, or it may be anti-social, used by some Leader to exploit a people.

Finally, myth presupposes a more or less primitive metaphysics. For the scientifically minded, there are recognizable divisions between matter and life, vegetable and animal, species and genera. This is not true for the primitive. "Its view of life is a synthetic, not an analytical one."[4] Everything is indefinite and variable. One may observe that for the totemic people of Australia all people are organized into totems, based on blood relationships. These divisions control the relationships permitted or approved among the various members of a totem. But this "totemizing" is then extended to the world as they know it. Here, too, totemic relationships obtain. The world is totemized, and human relationships expanded to cover cosmic forces.

Here are several views of the use of myth. For some, they are folk tales comparable to the story of Kris Kringle in Europe or Santa Claus in our tradition. They are like the stories my mother often told her children about Frederich the Great, King of Prussia, who was some day to return to the homes of the poor. He would save them from their poverty and fears. Such tales have their place in the social life of a people, much as the Washington and Lincoln stories have in ours. They add some "depth" to our appreciation of America.

Malinowski viewed myths as practical devices, "products of living faith, which is in need of miracles; of sociological status, which demands precedent; of moral rule, which requires sanction."[5] Here again, myth is not a cognitional instrument. It is a motivational, supportive linguistic device designed to bolster hopes and aspirations, and to reduce fears or avoid panic. Cassirer made the same point by noting that myths use magical rather than semantic language. The distinction is based upon the belief that words have some power or potency. This is probably the basis of the distinction between "sacred" and "secular" in our language use. As anthropologists have pointed out, names are often identified with the character of human or divine persons. A name constitutes the person's outer or relational character. It is as sacred as the being to which it belongs.[6] This may be observed in the emergence of the profane in language use. Many words are taboo, restricted to certain situations and to certain persons. "Swearing" constitutes an unwarranted use of certain words.

Here again we note that mythical language is non-cognitive. It is used to produce effects, directed toward the feelings of the persons addressed, and usually expressing the emotions of the speaker. It is not informative or descriptive language, used to state facts, formulate inferences and to predict consequences.

LANGUAGE USE AND RELIGION.

There is an interesting tale in Genesis, that of the attempt to build a tower into the heavenly realms. This displeased God, and He confused the tongues of the builders. I suggest that this story is applicable, in part, to the problem before us.

The current skepticism basic to some theological thought is made tolerable by the misapplication of mythical thinking. I remember a comment made by the late Dean Shailer Mathews. He was fond of saying that theologies were developed to justify religious practices. He found little interest in the attempt to find a metaphysical or cosmological basis for theology. Its significance was derived from its efficiency in promoting religious behavior. The question of the correspondence of conceptions of God with the actual Divine was swept aside. I suggest that this is true of some of our most important theological thinkers today. They reject science and empiricism and appeal to myth and subjectivism. This is a position I have rejected consistently, and still do.

The analysis of religion into its phases of Function, Reinterpretation and Techniques provides a convenient approach to the question of language use in religion. By Function, we refer to the goals, ends or purposes of religious thought and behavior. Approached sociologically, religion is an institutionalized form of individual and group activity. In order to discover what its functons are, it is necessary to use the research methods employed in determining the functions of other institutions. The appropriate language will be cognitional, informative, descriptive, etc. Mythical language is not appropriate. When so used, it constitutes a confusion of language, of "tongues" if you will.

The second phase or aspect of religion is the Reinterpretive. Here our conceptions of God, soul, destiny, saviorhood, etc., emerge. From the point of view of an empirical philosophy of religion, illustrated in the writings of Samuel Alexander, Whitehead and many others in western history, these concepts are metaphysical. In another connection, I defined metaphysics as "the organization of knowledge of the all-pervasive characteristics, trends, tendencies and qualities of our cosmos (Existential Medium, if you wish) in order to provide an intelligible framework for our understanding of man and that in which he exists."[7]

So defined, a metaphysician is not a producer of knowledge but a processor of knowledge gleaned from his own experience and from every known field. In his search for and acceptance of some organizing principle or principles, he may find the hidden persuaders at work. Plato accepted the view that the Atomists were approximately correct so far as the changing world was concerned, that it was dead, meaningless and unintelligible. With this basic assumption, he had to find the Divine in the Intelligible, in some supersensuous, transcendent realm. Others, such as Alexander and Whitehead, had a more inclusive and appreciative awareness of the physical world. For them, the Divine could be operative within the total complex of events including man and society. Thus much of the language used by them and by empirical theologians is descriptive, informative and cognitional. Mythical thinking, if used at all, was excluded from their examination of situations, the formulation of problems, the development of hypotheses and the comparison of the evidence with the requirements of hypotheses.

The third phase of religion consists in Techniques. We refer to the activities where by we transform our conceptions of God, destiny, redemption, etc., into effective or functioning beliefs. Belief has been defined as an idea or pattern of action toward which positive attitudes are assumed. If we believe something, this

means we are prepared to do what is implied by it. Thus an idea may be true or false, believed or doubted. There is no necessary connection between these pair of alternatives. One may doubt some idea which happens to be true, or believe another which happens to be false. The technique or routine phase of religion is not concerned with truth or falsity. Its interest lies in transforming some accepted theory into an effective belief.

Beliefs are determined by both rational and non-rational factors. In these lectures we have emphasized the rational factors which promote or hinder the search for truth. This is to say, we sought to indicate some ways whereby ideas may be shown to be worthy of belief. The actual process of transforming an idea worthy of belief into a functioning belief opens up new areas of investigation. Many lists of such factors have been drawn up. Logicians emphasize four: guessing, impulse, emotion and authority. Others list personal opinion, public opinion, desire and satisfaction, teaching and training, and authoritative opinion. Some would lump these together as forms of *rapport* with persons, ideal or actual, and with nature. For our purposes, we may call attention to two which impinge upon the role of techniques.

The first is group-support. The importance of public opinion, of public approval of one's behavior is not subject to serious doubt. Belief has a corporate character. It must be linked up with many interests of the believer, and have either the active or passive support of members of the group or groups to which he belongs. If it is shared by the "experts" or "authorities" associated with the group, the effect is intensified. A second non-rational factor supportive of belief is action presupposed by the belief. Children are trained to act in certain ways, and in this process find their confidence in the correctness of these ways established. As Malinowski said about the Trobriand Islanders, "religion gives body and form to saving beliefs."[8]

When one considers these two non-rational determinants of belief in connection with the reliance upon myth in recent religious thinking, it soon becomes evident that its primary function is that of fixing belief rather than of discovering whether or not the ideas are factually grounded. Myths are products of group activity. Folk-tales and legends are told to groups. They are not soliloquies or monologues, a talking to oneself. They may be told to amuse, to entertain, to allay fears or enhance love, loyalty or faith. The myths used by recent theologians come from a distant and hollowed past; they point to heroic and majestic figures whose mighty deeds reputedly formulated our values and enhanced our lives. The further fact that these myths have been preserved by such significant institution as the church makes them more believable. And their place in the sacred literature and rites of the religious group means that whenever one participates in worship services he is acting in accord with the implications of such beliefs. One does not say that the language of contemporary religious ritual is "magical" language. But it must be said that it tends to be other than that used in our secular activities. It is a "sacred language" in some sense of that word. The tenacity with which the Latin language was retained by the Roman Catholic Church, and the retention of the archaic "Thou" in Protestant liturgy indicate this.

Myth may serve a very useful purpose in the technique phase of religion. It helps to fix beliefs, to transform tradition and contemporary theological formulations into functioning patterns of thought and action. When used to determine what beliefs are worth holding, it is misapplied. Here it becomes a barrier to clear thinking and a road block in the path of the development of an acceptable empirical philosophy of religion. Let us now examine one theologian's use of myth as an example of this. For this purpose we have selected Rudolph Bultmann's *Kerygma and Myth.*

He states that the real purpose of myth "is not to present an objective picture of the world as it is, but to express man's understanding of himself in the world in which he lives."[9] This includes the view that man is "fallen," as portrayed in *Genesis* 3. According to this myth, man was originally innocent. He disobeyed a divine command, and as a consequence, "in his present plight every impulse of man is the impulse of a fallen being."[10] This conception of an age of Innocence followed by the Fall does not find any support in "modern science," nor in logic or factual evidence. Bultmann states that it is grounded in faith that the Kerygma in the New Testament is true. One must accept this because for Bultmann the Kerygma constitutes the "only way whereby he can find some satisfactory understanding of his place in the world." And it must be believed despite the fact that it is not subject to investigation. As Ruth Benedict observed, here is a theology based upon a primary skepticism.

Let us look at this in terms of language use. When one speaks of "his understanding of himself in the world in which he lives," he may be saying one or more of several things. He may be speaking cosmically, referring to his place on the earth, a small planet of a second rate sun. Or he may be speaking psychologically, attempting to estimate his relative importance in the social context where he is or belongs. Man lives in two worlds, the public world of men and events and the private world of thought, feeling, emotion and appreciation. Man may consider himself a success even though the facts do not indicate this, or he may believe himself a failure despite obvious successes. This is a matter of subjective judgment, determined in part by the goals he set for himself. If his own capabilities and the situation he confronted were such that these goals were unrealizable, he either revised his estimates or considered himself a failure. Since Bultmann has an Existentialist orientation, it is probably the case that he was not concerned with the "objective" world, but with that of inner decisions and relations with the Divine as the "Other" in some subjective intercourse.

To speak of "his place in the world" without reference to the cosmos and society suggests a high degree of subjectivity. Granted that we hear much of "the world of Salem cigarettes," "the world of fine arts," and many other "worlds," it seems hardly forgiveable that a serious and competent student should adopt this practice. It is a fact that one's attitude toward himself and his achievements is highly important in *his own estimate of himself.* But no man lives alone, or unaffected by others. Nor does he enjoy complete immunity from the continuous rain of stimuli from the world about him. Both the social and the natural worlds consist in events which are there, in some real sense, and they have structure or character not subject to the wishes or imaginations of persons. No matter how one defines

the concept, "his understanding of his place in the world" has to come to terms with actual persons and concrete events. There may be those who can convince themselves that it is possible to restrict life to the subjective, or at least that this is the only phase of existence which is important. Eventually, however, they will discover that closing one's eyes to oncoming floods will not banish the waters nor save them from its devastating effects. Man lives in two worlds, one private and the other public, as Hogben pointed out, and can escape neither.

Myth, as used by Bultmann and others, may provide a satisfactory way of relating themselves subjectively to the world of events by denying their significance (one of the several ways of facing Limitation discussed above), but this still leaves man facing situations. But mythical language may not be used when speaking about situations, conditions, matters of fact. In so far as this language is non-descriptive, it is not appropriate in such areas. One must accept an appropriate language, appropriate to the subject-matter under discussion, or admit that he is using an inappropriate language for purposes perhaps not above reproach.

THE DRAMATIC VIEW OF EXISTENCE.

Myth is essentially story or tale. As such, it portrays existence in human or personal terms. It brings the divine to the level of earthly existence in order to suggest something about man, his destiny and the living forces presumably operative in determining outcomes. As in the Homeric tales, the divine is moved by feelings and sentiments characteristic of the human, and interferes in human affairs. We observed this in Freud's view of the "humanizing of nature," in Cassirer's view that reality consists in some unity of life, and in some recent Protestant theologians insistence upon a dramatic view of existence.

From this vantage point, we can understand much of the criticism levelled against Paul Tillich. He refuses to talk about "God the Father" as ultimate, but about the "Ground of Being," or "Being-itself" as ultimate and determinative. This constitutes a rejection of the dramatic view of existence fundamental to the ancient scriptures. When Whitehead has been accused of providing a theology which was not "available," once again we hear the voices of those who believe that religion without a dramatic view of existence is impossible. There is much in Whitehead which suggests this view, but when he states that both nature and God are in the grip of "Creative Advance" he left man at the mercy of Freud's "eternally remote." For some people, and I suspect most people, religion requires some humanizing of nature, some dramatic view of existence. This view was possible when men believed that the universe was earth-centered and humanity the highest of God's creations. Here the story of Adam and Eve in the Garden made some sense. But with the immensities of the cosmos of which we have recently become aware, the earth becomes "incidental" in Harlow Shapley's apt phrase.

I suggest that the recent return to mythological thinking was designed to provide a way whereby the dramatic view of existence could be maintained despite the fact that the growth of knowledge makes it highly improbable. There are also other means employed to protect or insulate religious thinkers from facing the facts of existence as presently known. Among them may be mentioned the sharp separation of "fact" from "value," the reductionistic view of science, emphasis upon

the "autonomy" of religion, and others. But this separation of man's religious interests from those of knowledge may have serious consequences. There are many folk, the "tough-minded" as William James named them, who will find a religion consonant with knowledge or they will do without.

Using the device of the "limited vocabulary," some years ago I tried to summarize what I then believed we could say with some empirical justification about God. I believed we could summarize our knowledge of the Existential Medium under three undefined terms: Existence, Relation and Modality. As to Existence, God is the religious name for the Directional Momentum immanent in the episodes which comprise that in which we live, move and have our being. The Divine activity is discoverable within episodes at all levels. As to Relation, God is compresent with all, engaged with and implicated in all that occurs. As to Modality, directionality is dominant over randomness, eventuating in a persistent succession of culminations which are more or less temporary. Though individually temporary, each leaves its effects upon its contemporaries and successors.[11]

This was an attempt to find a language which would avoid the "humanizing of nature" and the dramatic view of existence while preserving what was significant in their use. There is no reason of which I am aware that precludes the use of Directional Momentum or Dynamic Directionality rather than Creator. The evidence points to the fact that directional momentum was and is operative in any and all forms of creation or creativity. One may adopt terms such as Alexander's "Nisus toward Deity," of Whitehead's "Creative Advance," and on a less inclusive scale Wieman's "creative interaction" to designate the divine. Perhaps Tillich's "Being-Itself" may serve if one translates his metaphysics into more acceptable forms. I have found Directional Momentum or Dynamic Directionality preferable, but would feel comfortable with many of the other terms.

It may appear that the designations applied to the Divine are unimportant. This is not the case. Two possibilities must be avoided. The first is that of transforming the divine into an entity or being. Once a name is used for a designation, it is difficult to escape this. Names serve to identify and to designate. We can see this in the case of personal names. They restrict what is designated to some specific individual. When we speak of the "Russians" or the "Communists," we immediately separate a given group of people from ourselves. Those so named are somebody or somebodies. So with names applied to the divine. When we name the divine "Father," we may mean that in our Existential Medium which has qualities or characteristics similar to those we attribute to male parents at their best. But the tendency is to identify "Father" in this sense with some personal Being. Yet the implication of the thought of empirical theologians is that "God" is not an individual's name. It refers to creativity, dynamism, trends, tendencies or directionalities.

A second undesirable consequence of naming, in both the mythological and dramatic context, is related to Dean Shailer Mathews' suggestion that much "bad theology was a consequence of drawing corollaries from patterns." It consists in beginning with a name and asking what is implied or suggested by it. Let us examine one favorite appellation for the divine, namely, Creator. The corollaries derivable from it would constitute quite a theology. If God is creator, he must create.

So we have a view of the universe, in whole or in part, which is finite and came into being at some time. This is what creating means. Again, if one is a creator, there must be planning. One does not create without some purpose, goal or end. So the divine is invested with all of the mental and other capacities of an architect at their best. When the world is viewed as created, its obvious defects, from a human point of view, raise questions. So the problem of evil comes into focus. This leads to conceptions such as the "Fall of Man," "Limited God," and many others.

It is possible to use names and other devices for the purpose of eliciting significant hypotheses. If this is done, and an hypothesis is investigated critically, much may be learned positively or negatively about the divine. But the practice we condemned in the preceding paragraph does not use names for this purpose. The tendency is to stay within the area of words, without relating them to what they should refer. This fascination by language can be strong, and have serious effects upon thinking by diverting the thinker from the situations within which evidence should be sought.

These are some of the problems for clear thinking in the religious field posed by our use or misuse of language. There are too many problems involved in our attempts to formulate a reasonable religion to compound them by adding to them by the use of myth where it is not applicable. Stories, legends, folktale and myth are useful and helpful in enforcing belief once we have clarified what it is we hope to believe and have found a reasonable basis for so doing. But to accept beliefs because of their presumed emotional value without first establishing them on reasonable grounds opens the way for the most fantastic views and irresponsible thinking. It may be that we have to live by folktales and fiction, but if so, I do not know how this could be established. The combination of skepticism and myth as expressions of contemporary religious thought raises serious questions concerning both man and religion. The future for both lies elsewhere.

SUMMARY.

There has been a principle underlying these four lectures. It may be stated as follows: *It is preferable to live in terms of verified uncertainties than in terms of unverified certainties.* This assumption has determined much if not all of my work in the field of philosophy of religion. It led to the search for a way of defining truth, first as fact as correspondence and congruence; then as legitimate inference. With these meanings, philosophers of religion can cooperate actively with investigators in other related fields. They can learn from them, and make their own positive contributions to more adequate methods of investigation as well as to our increasing knowledge of man and his world, of human nature and human destiny, of the factors actually operative in the sphere of the human and of the divine. This will help to restore theology to its place in the field of humanities, and philosophy to its role as critic of methods and processor of knowledges from all areas of research.

That this is possible should be evident from the ground covered in these lectures. Facts as correspondence of event or situation with theoretical formulations are used in such fields as sociology, psychology, history and many others. Legitimate inferences as adequate explanations of available facts established by checkable consequences are also the stock in trade of these and related fields. Theologians

and philosophers of religion who rely upon this type of evidence and support for their theories may discover they have contributions to make to these related fields instead of merely borrowing from them. In order to bring this to pass, they will have to devote some serious study of the investigative methods in use today. We have discussed checkable consequences, a popular name for a large number of methods. Here is an area which needs attention to learn what possible consequences some of the views we hold could have. If they have none, perhaps they should be discarded, and attention directed toward more checkable forms of theology and philosophy of religion.

This reliance upon more verifiable theories will have to be protected against at least two insidious enemies. The first is that of the Unquestioned or Unrecognized Assumptions. We take many things for granted which determine our thinking, and more often than not we are unaware of this. These so-called "hidden persuaders" are necessary. We need to make ontic assumptions if we are to engage in thinking. But we need to be aware of what is being presupposed, and accept our presuppositions deliberately rather than unwittingly. Whether the test of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency for their selection is adequate remains to be seen. At the moment, I know of no comparable alternative. Until something better comes along, I suggest we make use of it.

Finally, it is necessary to understand the field of language patterns. It would be well to review some recent production to see what language we used, and where. It is relatively easy to employ normative or evocative language where descriptive or informative is called for. There is a constant temptation to attempt to persuade others of the worth and truth of some fact or inference rather than spend the time necessary to determine whether the fact or legitimate inference is what we report it to be.

Perhaps this cautionary word should be added. These lectures have had one theme — "truth in religion." We have not sought to develop a theology or philosophy of religion, nor to elucidate adequate methods for making religion emotionally satisfactory and effective. These are matters which require their own treatment, and are of equal importance with what we have considered this week. The normal course of events forces us to consider them, and to experiment with them. But the same urgency does not apply to the area covered by the lectures of this week. Yet I suggest that the value of the work done in the ministry and in counseling depends in large measure upon the accuracy with which we estimate situations, persons and needs. And this requires careful attention to the meaning of truth and ways whereby we may appropriate it most effectively.

Footnotes

Lecture I.

[1] Benedict, Ruth, "Myth," *The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933, VI, p. 179.
[2] Tillich, Paul, *Systematic Theology,* I. Introduction and chapter I. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951.
[3] Woozley, A. D., *Theory of Knowledge.* London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1949. Pp. 134ff.
[4] Wieman, Henry Nelson, *The Source of Human Good.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946, chapter VIII.
[5] See the series of articles in *The Journal of Religion,* 1943, in which Mr. Wieman and I considered this matter.
[6] Anderson, Bernhard, "The Bible," in *A Handbook of Christian Theology.* New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1958, p. 35.
[7] Wieman, Henry Nelson, "Naturalism," in *A Handbook of Christian Theology,* pp. 243ff., and elsewhere.
[8] Flew, Anthony, in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1955, p. 96.
[9] *Epictetus.* (Eng. trans. W. A. Oldfather.) London: William Heinemann, 1926, I, i, 17ff.
[10] Bowne, Borden Parker, *The Divine Immanence.* Boston and New York: The Houghton Mifflin Co., 1905, p. 85.

Lecture II.

[1] See my "The 'Perfect' Ttheological Dictionary," *The Christian Century,* November 28, 1956.
[2] *Genesis* 3, 19.
[3] *Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology.* (Ed. Rollo May and others.) New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1958, p. 50.
[4] Anderson, Camilla M., *Beyond Freud.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957, p. 139.
[5] Dewey, John, *Experience and Nature.* Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1925, chapter II.
[6] Cicero, *The Nature of the Gods.* (Eng. trans. H. Rackham.) London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1933, II: 19.
[7] Royce, Josiah, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy.* Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1892, p. 380.
[8] Rosenzweig, "An Outline of Frustration Theory," In *Personality and the Behavior Disorders.* (Ed. by J. McV. Hunt.) New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1944, II, p. 380.

Lecture III.

[1] Bowne, Borden Parker, *The Philosophy of Theism.* New York: 1887, p. 25.
[2] Macintosh, D. C., in *The Christian Century,* April 20, 1932.
[3] Collingwood, R. G., *An Essay on Metaphysics.* London: The Oxford University Press, 1940, p. 31.
[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 47ff.
[5] Dampier-Whetham, W. C. D., *A History of Science.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929, pp. 94f.
[6] Cf. my "Operational Theism," *The Iliff Review,* Winter, 1959, p. 21.

Lecture IV.

[1] Morris, Charles, *Signs, Language and Behavior.* New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946, p. 135.
[2] Malinowski, B., *Myth in Primitive Psychology.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1926, p. 13.
[3] Cassirer, Ernst, *An Essay on Man.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944, p. 73.
[4] *Ibid.,* p. 81.
[5] *Myth in Primitive Psychology,* p. 92.
[6] Fraser, Sir James G., *The New Golden Bough.* (Edited with notes by T. H. Gaster.) New York: Criterion Books, 1959, p. 220.
[7] Cf., "A Metaphysical Basis for Value Theory and Religion," p. 14.
[8] Malinowski, B., "Magic, Science and Religion," in *Science, Religion and Reality.* (Ed. Joseph Needham.) New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925, p. 50.
[9] Bultmann, Rudolf, et al., *Kerygma and Myth.* (Ed. Hans W. Bartsch; trans. by R. H. Fuller.) London: S. P. C. K., 1953, I, p. 10.
[10] *Ibid.,* p. 29.
[11] "Operational Theism," p. 29.