In the Land of the Wackacobi

OLIVER READ WHITLEY

By now, I hope, some of you have been wondering what the word WACKACOBI means, and where it came from. Some of you may already know, but for the sake of those let me end the suspense immediately. The word WACKACOBI was invented by Roy V. Peel, of San Fernando Valley State College: it is his term for the extremists of the right in our society. Here is what he says about it. "The 'WA' in this term represents the supporters of Congressman Walter and General Walker; the 'CACO' the 'Christian Anti-Communists' with the 'K' thrown in to reflect the Ku Klux Klan ingredient; the 'BI' relates to the members and supporters of the John Birch Society. It is understood that the term is broad enough to cover all the 'rightist' crackpot movements, such as: Freedom Club, Freedom Forum, Project Alert, Survival U.S.A., Crusade for Americanism, We, the People, The All American Society, etc. It would certainly apply to the Minutemen and other militant organizations reminiscent of Hitler's storm-troopers. The term would apply also to lingering elements of McCarthyism and McCarranism in the armed forces and among retired and demobilized military personnel, as well as to recrudescent segregationalists and to economic illiberals, or 'economic royalists,' in F.D.R.'s phrase, who instinctively attach themselves to the new extremism."[1] Professor Peel points out that there are a number of precedents in American history for coining a new word to refer to a political extremist group; he mentions, for example, the Locofocos and the Copperheads. He also makes the point that a neutral word like WACKACOBI has the advantage that it does not require us to accept the self-serving claims often suggested in the names these groups call themselves by.

Unquestionably, the most serious and sustained effort to describe and account for the world-view and the strategy and tactics of the WACKACOBI is that to be found in the volume edited by sociologist Daniel Bell, first published in 1955 under the title of **The New American Right,** and then expanded and updated with the title **The Radical Right,** published in 1963.[2] The authors of this book have set forth in clear terms the motifs that recur again and again among the various species of the genus WACKACOBI. Daniel Bell suggests at the outset that the radical right social movement rests its appeal upon three basic themes: that a breakdown in the "moral fiber" of the United States has occurred; that the control apparatus of the national government has entered into a conspiracy to "sell out" the country; that we are about to experience a Communist takeover. These thems tend to be variations on the theme that "old-fashioned patriotism" has been subverted by the cosmopolitan intellectuals. According to Bell, the Right Wing is fighting, under the shadow of anti-Communism, 'modernity' — "that complex of attitudes that might be defined . . . as the belief in rational assessment, rather than established custom, for the evaluation of social change — and what it seeks to defend is its fading dominance, exercised once through the institutions of

[1] Peel, Roy V., "The Wackacobi: Extremists of our Own Times," *The Western Political Quarterly,* pp. 569-97.

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[2] New York, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963.

small-town America, over the control of social change."[3]

Recall now that one of the principles set forth in our overall theoretical orientation had to do with recognizing that what happens in society affects people in different parts of the social system differently. This idea helps us to understand Bell's other contention, which has to do with identifying the people most likely to be susceptible to WACKACOBI appeals. The social group most threatened by the structural changes in our society, Bells argues, "is the 'old' middle classes — the independent physician, farm owner, small-town lawyer, real-estate promoter, home builder, automobile dealer, gasoline station owner, small business man . . . and regionally its greatest political concentration is in the South and the Southwest, and in California. But a much more telltale indicator of the group that feels most anxious . . . is the strain of Protestant fundamentalism, of nativist nationalism, of good-evil moralism which is the organizing basis for the 'world view' of such people."[4] Notice that this does **not** say that people in the categories mentioned **are** WACKACOBI, but only that they represent a segment of the society that is likely to b susceptible to the WACKACOBI world view.

Richard Hofstader also underlines the theme that the WACKACOBI are fighting change, for "the extreme right really suffers not from the policies of this or that administration, but from what America has become in the twentieth century."[5] These are times, he says, when politics has become an arena into which all sorts of wild fancies are projected, and when paranoid suspicions and apocalyptic fantasies find a ready market.[6] The WACKACOBI, Hofstader indicates, readily employ a Manichaean style of thought, and their fears of the Communists are expressed in sometimes elaborately apocalyptic language.[7] Except for the fact that their hopes and expectations are very different, the semantics of the WACKACOBI often remind one of some of the dire prophecy and the imprecatory language of certain parts of the Bible.

Sociologist Talcott Parsons continues the emphasis of these interpreters on protest against change as a crucial factor in the emergence of the WACKACOBI. His is the language of social systems, to which reference was made in the first lecture, but his point is the same. "Common to all the multifarious aspects of the right wing," Parsons writes, "is a certain type of 'individualism' . . . the individualism of the small unit as against the large . . . (the) individualism (that) romanticies our earlier lack of involvement in the complex world of power relations."[8] We have been thrust into the complexities of the international situation at a time when American society is undergoing crucial internal changes, which, in effect, means that external strains upon our social system have been superimposed upon internal strains. Societies cannot, Parsons argues, undergo major structural changes without producing noticeable amounts of irrational behavior, and high levels of anxiety and aggression, as well as evidences of regressive wishful thinking.[9]

The most extensive interpretation of the emergence of the WACKACOBI on the American scene is probably that of Seymour Lipset, a University of California sociologist.[10] The radical right has to be characterized as radical (extremist) Lipset says, because they not only want to make extensive changes in

[3] Bell, Daniel, (Ed.), *The Radical Right,* p. 16.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 24.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 102.

[6] Cf. his article, "The Paranoid Style in American Politics," *Harpers* (November, 1964); and Chmaj, Betty, "Paranoid Patriotism," *Atlantic Monthly* (November, 1962).

[7] *The Radical Right,* pp. 99, 103.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 233.

[9] *Ibid.,* pp. 217-18.

[10] Cf. also his *Political Man* (New York, Doubleday, 1960), especially Chapters IV ond V.

our way of life, but because they want to eliminate anyone they believe threatens their values or economic interests.[11] Political extremism, for Lipset, rests upon **status** politics, not upon economic deprivation, as might be said of some kinds of protest. The term "status politics" is a reference to political movements the appeal of which is to the resentments of persons who desire to maintain or improve their social status, who are possibly frustrated because they have risen economically but have not succeeded socially, or who feel that rapid social change threatens their position. Economic protest movements are often born of periods of depression in the economy; status politics emerges in times of affluence and prosperity.

In addition to the status politics factor, Lipset suggests four other factors that throw some light on the emergence of the WACKACOBI. Historically, he says, the Americans have not been a tolerant people; there is among them an important strain of Protestant puritanical morality that tempts them to see issues in black and white terms. Then too, the concept of Americanism has become a rigid creed, a compulsive ideology, rather than simply a statement of our ideals. The sheer heterogeneity and size of our population promotes the emergence of all sorts of groups, since they can always find supporters, leaders, and finances. And finally, we must mention the influence of what might be called "the climate of opinion" upon the emergence of extremist groups. We have had a long period of prosperity and many changes in foreign policy, and many people seem to fear that these things are contradictory.[12]

With these factors as the background, Lipset proceeds to indicate the segments in our society that appear to supply sources of radical right recruitment. There is, first, the status-threatened old-family American, who tends to overemphasize his identification with conservative traditions; among the minority ethnic groups he has his counterpart in the upward-mobile person who needs to accentuate his claim to status. Second, there is the group of newly wealthy individuals, made possible by our current affluence; they have their counterpart in the small businessmen who have felt threatened by social legislation and the labor unions, and who tend to mirror the values of more powerful people, values that are often on the radical right side. Third, there is what Lipset calls the "Tory workers' who find tolerance for those with whom they disagree, and support of civil liberties, difficult, because they do not possess the high degree of material and psychic security, and the sophistication that these attitudes require. A fourth base from which some radical right strength has come is that provided by the continuance of the old isolationist-interventionist argument. Here one notes with interest the agony of the WACKACOBI over whether American objectives are best served by remaining isolated or by intervening. The fifth source of mass support for the radical right has been those Catholics who are impressed by the WACKACOBI use of the anti-Comunist issue to sustain or create hostility against social reform or "liberalism." Upward mobile Catholics, especially, might be expected to be susceptible to status-linked appeals.[13]

The map for the territory of the WACKACOBI drawn by the social scientists whose interpretations we have just reviewed has not been unanimously regarded as entirely adequate. It will be of some interest for our purposes to look into some of the reasons why this is the case. We are fortunate at this point in being able to turn to a recent study, done by Raymond Wolfinger and his associates, of the Oakland "Anti-

[11] *The Radical Right*, p. 307.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 308-9, 316-19, 320, 322, 327.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 336, 338, 340, 342, 344-45, 348, 350-51, 355.

Communism School," conducted by Fred C. Schwarz' Christian Anti-Communism Crusade in 1962.[14] In the course of studying what went on in this "school," attention was paid to several of the ideas about the sources of the radical right that I have already reviewed, and to one or two others that have not been previously mentioned. Some interpreters of radical right extremism have argued that modern man is uprooted, cut loose from his moral moorings, deprived of meaningful associations with his fellowman; that is, he is alienated and apathetic. He leads a life of quiet desperation, which finally gets itself expressed in some form of political extremism. Participants in the Schwarz Crusade school in Oakland, however, did not appear to be "social isolates," nor did they seem to feel powerless or alienated.

Reviewing specifically several versions of the status politics interpretation of the WACKACOBI, the Oakland study did not find that interpretation confirmed. Three versions of the interpretation were mentioned: that upward mobile people are inclined to support the radical right; that downward mobile people are attracted to the radical right because it provides an explanation for their plight and a convenient scapegoat for their hostility; that upward-mobile second and third-generation Americans affirm their patriotism and status by suporting the radical right. But, say the social scientists who did the Oakland study, the attack of the right is not on old Americans, but on intellectuals, and the radical right has been least successful in New England and the Middle Atlantic states where one is likely to find old-settler hostiity to immigrants and ethnic hatred at its bitterest. The notion that the WACKACOBI are fighting a rear-guard action against change and modernity had also to be rejected, since the Oakland study did not find a disproportionate number of participants who were from farm families or small towns. It was found, however, that the Crusade school attracted a significant number of fundamentalist Protestants: this was attributed to the fact that "the belief in the literalness and purity of Biblical teachings makes fundamentalists resistant to social and cultural change; they are affronted by moral relativism, increasingly lenient sexual mores, the decline of parental authority, and other aspects of the secular modern world."[15] Perhaps, then, it is not without significance that several "anti-Communist" leaders employ the style and the trappings of the evangelist and revivalist.

Wolfinger draws a series of conclusions about the Oakland Crusade school that are of great relevance for our concerns. The Crusade was not attractive to Jews, Orientals, Negroes, or Catholics; except for fundamentalists, it did not have much appeal for lower status people. Crusaders are not psychological or social cripples; while they may entertain some beliefs that border on the paranoid, they are functioning members of society. Indeed many of them have responsible positions in business or the professions, and they are active in community organizations. Finally, the Crusade was, apparently, not for Democrats. In their own interpretation of the radical right, these scholars emphasize two important points. They are inclined to think that the radical right is most successful in those states experiencing major economic growth, and noticeable changes in economic base, life styles, and cultural geography, and that the reason for this is not so much "individual gains and losses in objective social status" as "the strains produced by the interpersonal and institutional instability that comes with rapid economic growth."[16] They emphasize also

[14] Cf. Apter, David, *Ideology and Discontent* (New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), Chapter VII, "America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology," p. 262-93.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 281.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 286.

the point that the WACKACOBI thrive most in places where political party organization is weak and lacks continuity. The presence of strong party organization, they argue, impedes radical right activity, since the WACKACOBI are not able to take over.

Despite the findings of the Oakland study, the question of the sources of the radical right must remain open. The status politics interpretation has recently been put forward by Ira Rohter, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin, on the basis of a study of certain members of the John Birch Society and the Liberty Amendment Committee in a Northwestern city, in which 169 "rightists" were compared with a group of 167 non-rightists.[17] Rohter's major thesis is that "rightists are the victims of status frustration. . . . (T)hey are dissatisfied or insecure about their places in society and feel that others do not esteem them sufficiently; further, they express their frustration, and compensate for it, by political and social acts which give them emotional identity and support as well as real influence."[18] People who experience status frustration may be divided, generally, into three categories: the **decliners,** who are going down in the social scale; the **new arrivals,** who are victims of the time lag between their achievement of success and the recognition of that success by those already at that level; and the **value keepers,** who, whether moving up or down, find themselves among "aliens who know not the Lord." WACKACOBI, then, are people undergoing status frustration, who identify themselves with the older, traditional understandings of work, religion, and morality, who believe that their troubles are caused by an all-pervasive conspiracy (Communism), and who relieve their anxieties and feelings of resentment and inadequacy by radical right belief and activity.[19] WACKACOBI are not just conservatives. "What occupies them full time, what gives them their unique voltage and drive, is not their reverence for old-fashioned fiscal policies and morals, but. . .their 'paranoid style' — the overriding and galvanizing belief in a gigantic, insidious Communist conspiracy that has infiltrated and infected all levels of American government and most of its social institutions. The calm conservatives who would merely like to see a balanced budget and less welfare is not really a rightist. . ."[20]

The WACKACOBI seem to be preoccupied with a conspiratorial theory that constitutes the most prominent aspect of their world-view. People do not hold this, or any other, set of ideas unless such ideas are salient for them. The question might well be asked, then, as to what this conspiracy view of the world **does** for those who hold it. Social psychologist Hans Toch has provided us with a relevant and insightful answer. To begin with, this jaundiced view of society functions as a problem-solving device. It is attractive to those who have a need of it. Such an understanding of the world provides one with a ready-made, tangible, enemy on which to focus resentments. In addition, it makes the believer's intellectual task easier; he has available a simple, direct explanation for what is happening in society. The conspiracy theory centralizes social causation, since the events that a believer in conspiracy finds threatening can be blamed on one particular group of plotters, who know what they are doing and deliberately intend to do harm. Our kind of world **is** difficult to understand; its complexities **are** at times confusing. With the conspiracy theory at hand, however, things get sorted out, and with a minimum of effort. The world is still dan-

[17] Rohter, Ira, "The Righteous Rightists," *Trans-action,* IV (May, 1967), 27-35.

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 27.

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 30.

[20] *Ibid.,* p. 27. For critique, and further discussion of Rohter's work, see *Trans-action,* IV (July-August, 1967), pp. 78-79.

gerous, of course, but it is at least coherent, and it makes sense. Then too, the conspiracy theory gives those who hold it a feeling of possessing a secret open only to an enlightened few. The average consumer of conspiracies, Toch suggests, suffers from a condition akin to the pre-paranoid state; he is full of foreboding and the suspicion of foul play. He needs a "logical" and documented "plot." This can be supplied by his membership in a WACKACOBI type of organization, through which he can be provided with the trappings of eyewitness reports and authoritative references. At this point, there is a convenient market arrangement between the conspiracy consumers and the conspiracy producers, the WACKACOBI leaders. The consumer is supplied with "explanations" concerning who is responsible for the fear and suspicion he feels, and the producer is rewarded by being acknowledged as an "expert" in ferreting out and classifying this world's hidden dangers. This acount of the situation applies only to the extreme case and should not be taken as a description of all members of WACKACOBI groups. As Toch points out, "conspiracy beliefs respond to a real need only for persons who cannot preserve their self-esteem unless they conceive of themslves as victims of a plot."[21] Yet the conspiracy belief syndrome seems to have some degree of saliency for most members of WACKACOBI movements.

In addition to the conspiratorial theory of the society, a second major motif in the WACKACOBI world-view is a special kind of **ahistoricism.** As sociologist Eugene Schneider has pointed out, "the ahistorical position is that history is without meaning or design; it is the accidental, meandering, aimless result of powerful will, or chance, or an unchanging human nature. It is not social forces such as the development of economic relations, the progress of technology or science, the concentration of men in cities, the struggles of people for freedom, which are the prime movers of history: it is individual men who make history, and some of them, at any rate, can make it as they choose."[22] To this basic view, the radical rightists give a special twist. For them, a particular order of society, especially its economic arrangements, is the natural, sane, morally correct, viable order. Any deviation from it (such as what happened in the New Deal and after) is insane, unnatural and immoral. But social change is continually fouling up things. So, if the society is perfect, change must be the result of the machination of imperfect, perverse, nay, subversive men. Here ahistoricism and conspiracy theory come together, for change is really the outcome of chicanery, fraud, progaganda and plot, perpetrated largely by the longhairs and eggheads.

To complete this account of the WACKACOBI world-view, it will be instructive describe certain personality characteristics that seem to turn up with some regularity among people in these groups. The syndrome consists of four main items: simplism, extra-punitiveness, powerlessness, and alienation. Ira Rohter, in his study, found the WACKACOBI he dealt with to be intolerant of ambiguity, opposed to compromise, and closed-minded, and thus much in need of simplistic explanations of what is happening in the world. They also displayed a noticeable amount of strident negativism and combativeness, and a tendency toward vehement scapegoating, which is one aspect of the defense mechanism known as extra-punitiveness. Radical rightists tend to believe that individual freedom — in their understanding of it — is disappearing, and that the ordinary citizen (like them-

[21] Toch, Hans, *The Psychology of Social Movements,* p. 69. The interpretation of the conspiracy belief situation is in Chapter III, "The Benefit of Perceiving Conspiracies."

[22] Schneider, Eugene V., "The Radical Right," *The Nation* (September 30, 1961), p. 199.

selves) is getting a raw deal or being ignored. They feel powerless, in other words. They tend also to be alienated or estranged from society, in the sense that they are unable to trust others. As Rohter says in summary, we are dealing here with "particular kinds of closed-minded, insecure, authoritarian persons undergoing particular kinds of status crises. And that is who the radical rightists are."[23]

While there are, unfortunately, all too few studies of WACKACOBI groups in action, the findings of Mark Chesler and Richard Schmuck, based upon their "Participant Observation in a Super-Patriot Discussion Group,"[24] are of interest in the light of our presentation of the radical right world-view. They attended fifteen meetings of a small discussion group informally associated with the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade, identifying themselves as graduate students interested in educational research, and being perceived as young and sympathetic citizens concerned about politics. In this group, they found, anti-Communism is an umbrella for such other antis as anti-welfarism, anti-liberalism, anti-intellectualism, and anti-internationalism. This syndrome of antis apears to be related to the fact that the participants were "losing their feelings of personal effectiveness in relation to social organizations in which they are participating," and to the fact that they feel "they have worked hard for their current social status," which is now threatened by "new groups and alien conspirators." They seemed to be searching for reasons why they cannot regain a sense of power usefulness, and involvement.[25] The frustrations of these people, Chesler and Schmuck point out, are to be accounted for in terms of three factors: that the growth of large-scale organizations has changed the kinds of skills required to achieve success in American society; that new groups have risen to positions of wealth and influence, replacing older, established families and power groups; that the current tendency to acknowledge "gray areas" in personal and national morality are putting into question the older moral standards. For these Super-Patriots (these researchers' name for WACKACOBI) the defense against the forces that threaten traditional American values is in retention of traditional values, resurgence of power and pushing back the ideas and armies that are against us.

One aspect of the WACKACOBI life style is revealed in what was discovered about this discussion group's way of handling the question of the validity of sources of information about what is happening in our society, and the question of what the love ethic in Christianity implies about their hatred of others. Asked about the sources of information, the school teacher leader of the group referred to "reliable" government documents, especially those produced by the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities. Good sources of political information are, it was found, reactionaries and military elitists: poor sources are domestic liberals and internationalists. As for the implications of the love ethic, the group displayed a noticeable defensiveness. A number of ploys are used in regard to this issue, such as denying that reactions to Communists have any religious implications, holding that we must set aside the ethic temporarily in order to preserve it, or using some version of a devil theory to dispose of the matter. Participants in such a group receive full psychic value for their involvement. They are afforded a sense of mission because of their stance as defenders of the true Americanism; they obtain affective and evaluate support for their frustrations by contact with people who have similar feelings. The ethos of this group is well expressed in the words of one of them. "We're building a beautiful house," he said, "while termites work within. It's

[23] Rohter, Ira, *op. cit.*, p. 35.
[24] *Journal of Social Issues*, XIX (1963),
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

as though you're moving slowly through a dream while evil spirits work like a machine."[26] The termite metaphor is a quite vivid expression of a slightly paranoid conspiracy theory.

Several aspects of the description of the WACKACOBI world-view strongly suggest that there is a connection between right-wing extremism and religious fundamentalism. This connection has been explored from two or three different angles. David Danzig, writing in **Commentary**, for example, points out that "in fundamentalist eyes, departures from 19th century capitalism have carried with them the corruption of virtually sanctified socio-economic doctrines and have consequently helped to undermine the Christian society. Thus, the fundamentalist's apocalyptic conception of the world as strictly divided into the saved and the damned, the forces of good and the forces of evil, has readily lent itself to reactionary political uses. Fundamentalism today supports a super-patriotic Americanism; the conflict with Comunism is not one of power blocs but of faiths, part of the unending struggle between God and the devil. . . . '(C)ollectivism'. . .(is) the modern fundamentalists's secular counterpart of atheism."[27] This is, of course, simply to **state** the connection, and to fill in some of the details of what connection implies.

The whys and the wherefors of the relationship between fundamentalism and the radical right have been explored by theologian Walter D. Wagoner, in a paper entitled "From the Right — the Wrong Gospel," which appeared in **Theology Today.** First, Wagoner says, "rigid fundamentalism and to some extent also more conventional and pietistic Protestantism do not seem to think in societal terms. The overemphasis on a personal salvation ethic has atrophied the ability and willingness to analyze and criticize the terribly complex and social issues of our day."[28] To the extent that this atrophy of analysis and criticism has taken place, susceptibility to the simplistic and conspiratorial views of right extremists is more likely. Secondly, "this political movement permits the rigid fundamentalist to express under the **imprimatur** of patriotism (and of faith!) his defensive reaction against and frustrations about the twentieth century. . . .The twentieth century has 'deviated' from much of the cosmology, theology, anthropology, and comparative coziness of nineteenth century rural Protestantism. So the literature of the Ultra Right is nostalgic."[29] If those who deviate depart not only from what is dear to me, but from what is precious to God, it is more easily believed that the deviants are either devils or dupes. Then, in the third place, "the geography of salvation, fundamentalist Right style, is largely Southern in terms of its power centers. This fact helps in understanding the prominence of segregationists in this political coalition. . . .There is no doubt that this movement has attracted many fellow-travelers who are more anti-Negro than anti-communist."[30] This is sometimes denied, but the evidence for it is not difficult to come by, since it is not really hidden deeply beneath the surface of right extremism.

At least one scholar whose field is speech and communications has interested himself in the connection between the far right and religious fundamentalism. Barnet Baskerville, Professor of Speech at the University of Washington, in an article in **Western Speech** dealing primarily with Hargis, Schwarz, and McIntire, suggests that "to refer to these men as political evangelists is not to employ a more figure of speech. They are revivalists in a most literal sense;

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[27] Danzig, David, "The Radical Right and the Rise of the Fundamentalist Minority," *Commentary*, XXXIII (April, 1962), p. 292.

[28] Wagoner, Walter D., "From the Right—the Wrong Gospel," *Theology Today*, XIX (1962-63), p. 19.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

they are seeking to bring about a great awakening. But it is revivalism with a difference. . . .While evangelists of old preached the gospel (the 'good news') of Christ's saving grace, the new gospel emphasizes the very worst of bad news. The Church of Christ, this nation, the world, are in imminent danger of destruction by a godless Communist conspiracy. . . .Revivalists have always understood the tremendous tactical advantage in having a specific enemy. Dwight Moody fought the devil; Billy Sunday was most effective when attacking booze. Schwarz, Hargis, and McIntire battle Communists and liberals with the same zest. . . .It was also Billy Sunday who, in his post-World War I fight against radicals, social gospelers, and the League of Nations, discovered the efficacy of linking patriotism and fundamentalist religion. "I think that Christianity and Patriotism are synonymous terms,' he said, 'and hell and traitors are synonymous.'. . . . The Doctors Hargis and McIntire. . . .discover in the holy scriptures warnings against the United Nations, the New Deal, medicare, the income tax, Krushchev, social security, and the World Council of Churches."[31] In a sense, then, our latter-day Billy (Hargis, not Graham) has made some embellishments on what the earlier Billy started. Whether the result is an improvement no speech professor, and certainly no sociologist, as such, is likely to say.

It is clearly appropriate, and I think it will be helpful, to bring this lecture to a close by referring to what Walter Wagoner has presented as a strategy for astute Christian citizenship in response to this kind of evangelism. The strategy is: **one,** study what is abroad in the land. . . .read the source documents of these anti-democratic groups and scout the opposition; **two,** be sensitive to the first signs of programatic inroads by these extremist groups in your community. . . .Don't wait for a forest fire to start before igniting your own backfire; **three,** in sermon, intra-congregational study groups, and by literature, make it crystal clear where you stand on the issues; **four,** be extremely careful to distinguish between **bona fide** fundamentalism, patriotism, and conservatism. . . .and these questionable groups and tactics; **five,** insist upon the democratic process in a community-wide discussion of these issues; **six,** as a Christian make clear that anti-communism is not **the** greatest virtue in life, but Christian obedience is; **seven,** work out a thoughtful program of study and action on how to fight communism effectively; **eight,** analyze the nature of the syndrome or disease with which we are dealing (a task to which this lecture has been intended as a contribution); **nine,** do not assume that these anti-democratic forces are necessarily irrational, for many who participate are 'normal' people, who see rightist activities as an effective outlet for their confusions; **ten,** if you become caught in this maelstrom, be reconciled without self-pitying martyrdom to the fact that you probably will get hurt.[32] Extremists, left or right, do not, to our sorrow, follow Marquis of Queensbury rules in the political ring. I find myself very much in agreement with what is indicated in this strategy. In the final lecture we shall be making some additional comments about what might be a viable way of responding to the extremists in our midst.

[31] *Western Speech,* XXVII (1963), pp. 202-3.

[32] Wagoner, Walter D., *op. cit.,* pp. 23-25.