

# Fiscal Strength within a Framework of Institutional Independence

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# How Does the U.S. Finance Itself?

How does the U.S. pay for its

- Outstanding debt (100% of GDP)
- Current spending
- Expected future spending

An obvious option: revenues from distortionary **taxation**


U.S. debt pays out dollars → eroding debt using surprise **inflation**

**Tax/inflation mix** tightly linked **theoretically** (Sargent and Wallace, 1981; Leeper, 1991; Sims, 1994; Woodford, 1995)

- Higher taxes today/tomorrow → less aggregate demand today → lower prices

Are they tightly linked **historically**?

# U.S. Financing Mix



# U.S. Financing Mix

**Taxes**, **inflation** unpopular with households → politically costly

Costs internalized differently by Congress, Fed

- Raising taxes more costly to **fiscal policymakers**
- High inflation more costly to **central bankers**

Operationally independent institutions

- **Financing mix is jointly-determined**
- Both constrained by the others' policy
  - Somewhere between “fiscal dominance” and “monetary dominance”

# Implementing the Financing Mix

Intertemporal financing plan needs to be implemented by the U.S. maturity structure

- Control the **structure** → influence the **mix**

Treasury, Fed: biggest players in U.S. debt markets

## Treasury

- Issues debt to finance deficits

## Fed

- Issues reserves to purchase debt
- Redeems with debt sales

Privately-held **maturity structure** is **jointly-determined**

► Jointly-Determined U.S. Structure

# Evidence of Non-Cooperation?

What if **fiscal** and **monetary** institutions aren't fully cooperative?

**Treasury's** stated objectives: missing 'price stability'

**Fed** Gov. Waller: "Deficit financing and debt servicing issues play no role in our policy decisions and never will."

Greenwood et al. (2015): **Fed QE**, but **Treasury long-term issuance** post-GFC

Miran and Roubini (2024): **Fed QT**, but **Treasury short-term issuance** post-COVID

Separate objectives, offsetting debt management: not **proof** of non-cooperation

- But they are suggestive

# Preview of Results

Question: How do non-cooperative **FP**, **MP** choose a single **financing mix**?

- **Institutional strength** selects from a feasible set
  - **Fiscal** strength (relative to **MP**): Nash bargaining power
  - $\uparrow$  **Fiscal** strength  $\implies$   $\downarrow$  taxes,  $\uparrow$  inflation
  - First-best: powerful **central bank**
- Impute U.S. **fiscal** strength since WWII
  - Three episodes of heightened **fiscal** strength: 1947-1951, 1970s, 2021-2023
  - Lines up with data on **presidential** pressure on the **Fed**
  - Relative to first-best: **FP too strong** in the 1970s, **too weak** since GFC
  - Inflation **more powerful** in **high-debt** economies
- Benefits of a **maturity structure**
  - **Welfare-improvement**: govt. **smooths** surprise **debt devaluation** across time
  - **Insurance**: less welfare loss from **deviations** from first-best **fiscal** strength

# The Model

## Environment

Model: Lucas and Stokey (1983) with nominal debt

Infinitely lived households choose  $c_t$ ,  $n_t$ , nominally state-contingent government debt to maximize

$$W_0 = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \{u(c_t) - v(n_t) - w(\pi_t)\}$$

Production technology owned by households

- $y_t = n_t$
- Labor income taxed at rate  $\tau_t \in [0, 1)$

1 aggregated good market. Aggregate resource constraint (ARC)

$$n_t = c_t + g_t$$

where  $g_t$  transitions between  $g_h$  and  $g_\ell$  with known probabilities (e.g. war and peace)



# Market-Clearing

## Asset Markets, Budget Constraint

2 government debt markets  $B_t = \{B_t^{(h)}, B_t^{(\ell)}\}$

- Nominal Arrow securities

Bond prices  $Q_t = \{Q_t^{(h)}, Q_t^{(\ell)}\}$  adjust so that  $B_t = \mathbf{B}_t$

HH budget constraint (HHBC) when entering state  $s$

$$P_t c_t + \underbrace{\sum_{s'} Q_t^{(s')} B_t^{(s')}}_{\text{Savings}_t} \leq (1 - \tau_t) P_t n_t + B_{t-1}^{(s)} \quad , \quad s' \in \{\ell, h\}$$

# Government

## Two Optimizing Institutions

Two simultaneous-moving, committing government branches play a game

- **Debt-manager** chooses  $\tau_t, \mathbf{B}_t^{dm}$
- **Central bank** chooses  $\pi_t, \mathbf{B}_t^{cb}$
- $\mathbf{B}_t = \mathbf{B}_t^{dm} - \mathbf{B}_t^{cb}$

Each institution maximizes its own welfare-based objective

$$W_0^i = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ \left( 1 - \rho^i \right) \underbrace{[u(c_t) - v(n_t)]}_{\downarrow \text{ as } \tau_t \uparrow} + \rho^i \underbrace{[-w(\pi_t)]}_{\downarrow \text{ as } \pi_t \uparrow} \right\}, \rho^i \in [0, 1], i \in \{\text{dm}, \text{cb}\}$$

subject to ARC, HHBC, HH optimization and **opponent's choices**

Traditional economic theory:  $\rho^{dm} = \rho^{cb} = .5$

For today:  $\rho^{dm} = 0, \rho^{cb} = 1$

# Competitive Nash Equilibrium

A CNE is a **competitive equilibrium**

- Household optimization
- **Debt-manager** optimization
- **Central bank** optimization
- $P_t, Q_t$  clear commodity, debt markets

A CNE is a **Nash equilibrium** in time-0 state-contingent **plans**

- **Debt-manager's** plan optimal given **central bank's** plan
- **Central bank's** plan optimal given **debt-manager's** plan

Households, **debt-manager**, **central bank** have complete, perfect info., fully rational

- Understand one another's problems
- Understand underlying exogenous process

# Implementability Constraint

Inflation vs. Taxes

$$\text{Real debt: } b_t^{(s)} = \frac{B_t^{(s)}}{P_t}$$

Time 0 implementability constraint

$$\underbrace{\frac{1}{\pi_0} b_{-1}^{(s)}}_{B_{t-1}^{(s)} / P_0} = \underbrace{\frac{1}{u'(\mathbf{c}_0)} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u'(\mathbf{c}_t) \mathbf{c}_t - v'(\mathbf{n}_t) \mathbf{n}_t]}_{\mathbb{E}_0[PV(\text{primary surpluses})]}$$

**Implementability constraint** is the **key to the game**

- Strict  $\tau_t$ ,  $\pi_t$  trade-off
- **Debt-manager** constrains **central bank** through  $\{\tau_t\}$
- **Central bank** constrains **debt-manager** through  $\{\pi_t\}$

Welfare maximization (first-best): equate marginal welfare losses from tax distortions and inflation

# A Continuum of Equilibria

**Debt-manager** minimizes distortions from explicit taxation

**Central bank** minimizes welfare loss from inflation

Two policy choices, but only one implementability constraint

- Like having only one equation to solve for two unknowns

**Many finance mixes** consistent with equilibrium  $\rightarrow$  continuum of equilibria

Worst-case scenarios

- **Debt-manager**: finance all debt and spending with no inflation ( $\lambda_0^{cb} = 0$ )
  - “Monetary Dominance”
- **Central bank**: hyperinflate away all inherited debt ( $\lambda_0^{cb} \rightarrow \infty$ )
  - “Fiscal Dominance”

# A Unique Equilibrium

## Asymmetric Nash Bargaining

Want something that delivers a

- Unique equilibrium
- Measure of institutional **strength**

Asymmetric Nash bargaining (Harsanyi and Seltan, 1972)

$$\max_{W_0^{dm}, W_0^{cb}} \left( W_0^{dm} - d^{dm} \right)^\alpha \left( W_0^{cb} - d^{cb} \right)^{1-\alpha}, \quad \alpha \in [0, 1]$$

- $\alpha$  : **fiscal** strength, relative to **monetary** policy
- $d^{dm}$  = debt-manager worst-case payout
- $d^{cb}$  = central bank worst-case payout

# Baseline Calibration

## Utility


$$u(c_t) - v(n_t) - w(\pi_t) = \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - \frac{n^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} - \frac{1}{2}\theta \left( \frac{1}{\pi} - 1 \right)^2$$

## Calibration

Parameter/Variable	Value	Source
$\beta$	0.9875 <sup>4</sup>	Angeletos (2002), annualized
$\{\sigma, \varphi\}$	$\{2, 2\}$	Havránek (2015), Chetty et al. (2011)
$\theta$	1.22	$\pi_0^* = 1.032$ , avg. U.S. inflation rate (1943-2023)
$\{g_\ell, g_h\}$	$\{0.1764, 0.3568\}$	U.S. spending (1942-2024)
$b_{-1}^{(s)}$	0.521	Avg. U.S. debt, face value (1942-2022)

# Pareto Frontier


► Stationary Tax Rate






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


# Taxes, Inflation and Fiscal Strength

► Stationary Tax Rate



# Welfare and Fiscal Strength



# Some Intuition

Why is powerful **MP** consistent with welfare-maximization?

Central bank has more to lose

- **Debt-manager** worst-case: smooth taxes under  $\pi_t = 1$
- **Central bank** worst-case: hyperinflation

Is cooperation good?  $\rightarrow$  Who runs the show?

- Under **monetary control** ( $\alpha = 0$ ): Close to first-best
- Under **fiscal control** ( $\alpha \rightarrow 1$ ): Far from first-best

# Historical Fiscal Strength


Post WWII

Given U.S. spending and debt data, what does American inflation reveal about **historical fiscal strength**?

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
Comparing to an Existing Measure

Comparing to Drechsel (2024)'s data on **President-Fed interactions?**

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
Comparing to First-Best

Comparing to **first-best**?

# Historical Fiscal Strength

Comparing to First-Best

Comparing to **first-best**?



# Takeaways

Bargaining power as a measure of fiscal strength

- Stronger **FP** → lower taxes, higher inflation
- First-best calls for strong **MP**
- Historically, **FP too strong** in the 70s and **too weak** since the GFC

President Trump


- “I feel that the president should have at least [a] say in [making interest rate decisions], yeah, I feel that strongly.”
- “Because of its vastly expanded discretionary powers...the Fed lacks both operational effectiveness and political independence...Congress should limit its mandate to the sole objective of stable money.” (Project 2025)
- “ ‘Too Late’ Jerome Powell, who is always TOO LATE AND WRONG, yesterday issued a report which was another, and typical, complete mess!... Powell’s termination cannot come fast enough!”

**Thank you**

# Average maturities in the U.S. (2005-2022)

Treasury-issued, Fed-held, Fed-issued, privately-held

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# Fiscal, Monetary Objectives

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**Treasury** stated debt management objectives:

- 'Regular and predictable:' slow policy adjustments, advanced issuance notice
- 'Minimized borrowing costs:' facilitate, match debt demand

**Fed** mandate:

- Maximum employment
- Stable prices
- Moderate long-term rates

**Individual objectives**, yet both manage one **financing mix** and one **debt structure**

# Household FOCs

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FOC  $(c_t, n_t)$ :

$$1 - \tau_t = \frac{v'(n_t)}{u'(c_t)}$$

FOC  $(Q_t^{(t+j)})$ :

$$Q_t^{(t+j)} = \beta^j \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{u'(c_{t+j}) P_t}{u'(c_t) P_{t+j}} \right], \forall j$$

# Payoff Dominance

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When  $\lambda_0^{cb} \in [-N, 0)$ :

- Central bank runs deflationary policy
  - $b_{-1}$  more burdensome than under  $\pi_t = 1 \ \forall t$
- Debt-manager taxes more than it would under  $\pi_t = 1 \ \forall t$
- Given opponent's plan, deviation results in non-existence

Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) payoff dominance criterion:

- Rational, non-cooperative players coordinate to eliminate equilibria where both can be individually made better-off

Eliminate  $\lambda_0^{cb} \in [-N, 0)$  equilibria, which are payoff-dominated by  $\lambda_0^{cb} = 0$

- Central bank better off from increasing inflation until  $\pi_t = 1 \ \forall t$
- Debt-manager better off from decreasing tax rates



# Constant Tax Rate

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FOCs after  $t = 1$ :

$$\underbrace{\frac{[1 + \lambda_0^{dm} (1 - \sigma)]}{[1 + \lambda_0^{dm} (1 + \varphi)]}}_{\text{Debt-manager FOC}} = \frac{v'(n_t)}{u'(c_t)} \underbrace{= 1 - \tau_t}_{\text{HH FOC}} = 1 - \tau$$

$$\underbrace{\pi_t = \pi = 1}_{\text{Central bank FOC}}$$

# Disagreement Payoffs

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$$d^{cb} = W_0^{cb} \text{ under } \lambda_0^{cb} \rightarrow \infty$$

- Fed. Res. Act: "...wherever any power vested by this Act...appears to conflict with the the powers of the Secretary of the Treasury, such powers shall be exercised subject to the supervision and control of the Secretary"

$$d^{dm} = W_0^{dm} \text{ under } \lambda_0^{cb} = 0 \text{ gives us the most conservative results for } CB \text{ strength}$$