

Returns to Scale and Productivity in the Macroeconomy

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Abstract

We investigate the puzzle of rising returns to scale but stagnating productivity in several advanced economies. To do this, we develop a model of heterogeneous firms with endogenous returns to scale. Our model shows that growing returns to scale driven by variable production (‘span of control’), rather than fixed costs, weakens firm selection which allows low-productivity firms to survive. Our empirical analysis shows that productivity and returns to scale are negatively related, and in aggregate returns to scale have increased whilst productivity has weakened.

JEL: E32, E23, D21, D43, L13.

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There is evidence of rising market power, measured by price markups, in many advanced economies, whilst productivity is stagnating (De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger 2020). An important element of rising market power is growing returns to scale which support price markups (Basu 2019; Syverson 2019). Rising returns to scale allow firms to expand at lower cost, and they can increase through higher fixed costs or lower marginal costs. We show that the channel matters for aggregate outcomes. Specifically, we show that broadening span of control – which lowers marginal costs – can jointly explain higher overall returns to scale *and* lower productivity. We show that when returns to scale increase through span of control, it enables lower productivity firms to survive, thus reducing average productivity. On the other hand, fixed-cost driven returns to scale strengthens selection. Our theory complements applied research which shows that information technologies have widened span of control (Bloom, Garicano, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2014). It is also consistent with evidence that shows a major cause of low productivity in the UK is survival of small unproductive firms (Barnett, Batten, Chiu, Franklin, and Sebastia-Barriel 2014; Riley, Rosazza-Bondibene, and Young 2015).

The intuition for our paper is as follows. Consider a firm with two employees. If span of control improves, employing a third employee is less costly than it would have been in the past. This helps low productivity firms to survive whilst raising returns to scale.¹ Conversely, a rise in fixed costs which increases returns to scale reduces the number of low-productivity firms because they are not able to pay the fixed cost to operate. Therefore, two factors that contribute positively to returns to scale have different implications for productivity. We use this insight to identify the importance of span of control for observed macroeconomic outcomes.

We develop a heterogeneous firm model with endogenous returns to scale, and test

¹In many services-based industries, the cost of an additional employee is similar to the last employee, and significantly less than it would have been in the past. Today a new employee does not need desk-space, physical hard disk memory, machine-specific software licenses, portable USB drives. These innovations are all enabled by cloud-computing. This also helps organizational factors such as staff performance monitoring and staff training, which are closer to Lucas original interpretation of returns to scale in variable inputs as manager's span of control. This is what we have in mind when we talk about returns to scale in variable production, or span of control.

the model predictions against estimated returns to scale and productivity for a panel of U.K. firms. Our theoretical findings show that returns to scale and productivity are negatively related if endogenously higher returns to scale are driven by span of control, whereas there is no relationship between endogenous returns to scale and productivity through changing fixed costs. Our empirical evidence shows a negative relationship between returns to scale and productivity, and we show that overall returns to scale in the UK have increased whilst productivity has declined. Given our theoretical implications, we conclude that this relationship can only be driven by returns to scale based on broadening span of control.

Why does broadening span of control (i.e. raising returns to scale in variable production) cause overall returns to scale to rise whilst productivity falls? Rising returns in variable production from broadening span of control raises overall returns to scale directly, but reduces average productivity by allowing less productive firms to survive. The key mechanism is that span of control improvements make survival easier: wage-denominated fixed costs are easier to pay. Conversely, fixed cost increases make survival harder. This occurs because higher scale economies in variable production reduce expected profits, discouraging entry, which lowers aggregate output and hence wages. Lower wages reduce labour-denominated fixed costs which increases survival of low-productivity firms and decreases average productivity. This also implies a rise in span of control leads to declining business dynamism (less entry and exit).

To measure returns to scale and productivity, we estimate firm-level production functions using a methodology developed by Akerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015). This methodology overcomes endogeneity issues caused by unobserved productivity at the firm level. The sum of coefficients on factors of production from these regressions yield returns to scale and the residuals yield productivity. Our main dataset is the Annual Business Survey (ABS) which is a representative sample of roughly 60,000 firms in the U.K. each year 1998-2014 covering two-thirds of aggregate value-added. A well-known application of the dataset is Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005).

Related Literature

Several recent papers link technological improvements to current macroeconomic trends such as rising markups, rising economic profits, declining business dynamism, increasing concentration and declining labour shares (e.g. Bessen [2020](#); Foster, Haltiwanger, and Tuttle [2022](#)). A seminal paper is Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenen ([2017](#)) which assesses the empirical implications for market concentration and the labour share of changing technologies that create ‘superstar firms’. We attempt to theoretically characterise new technologies through the lens of returns to scale, and we find evidence for the crucial role of broadening span of control. An important paper for our hypothesis is Bloom, Garicano, Sadun, and Van Reenen ([2014](#)). They show that information technology developments have broadened span of control. We have similar innovations in mind when we analyse the theoretical implications of broadening span of control.

Using endogenous growth frameworks, Aghion, Bergeaud, Boppart, Klenow, and Li ([2019](#)) and De Ridder ([2019](#)) show that changing technology affects firm cost structures, which in turn explains low productivity growth and other trends. De Ridder ([2019](#)) models intangible inputs, such as software, as reducing marginal costs and raising fixed costs, whilst Aghion, Bergeaud, Boppart, Klenow, and Li ([2019](#)) posit a fixed cost that increases with the number of product lines a firm operates. As technology improves, for example through cloud infrastructure, firms become less sensitive to the number of product lines they operate. Our model complements these papers by formally linking changing cost structures to returns to scale and consequently productivity. Consistent with this work, we show that falling marginal costs generate lower productivity, and in addition we show how this can occur concurrently with rising returns to scale.

Empirical evidence for France and Spain supports our model implications and empirical evidence for the UK. Lashkari, Bauer, and Boussard ([2019](#)) study returns to scale with French data, and, like us, they develop a framework with endogenous returns to scale. They present a non-homothetic CES production function with IT and

non-IT inputs. Non-homotheticity in the production function causes firm-level returns to scale to decrease in IT-input cost share. Larger firms invest a higher share of sales in IT, leading them to have lower returns to scale, whereas smaller firms have higher returns to scale. García-Perea, Lacuesta, and Roldan-Blanco (2021) show that in Spain smaller firms have larger markups driven by higher average costs. Average costs are higher due to higher labour overhead cost shares for smaller firms. This implies smaller firms have higher fixed costs and higher returns to scale.

Our model is a one-sector neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous firms based on Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011), Barseghyan and DiCecio (2016), Collard and Licandro (2021), and Licandro (2022). We extend this framework to distinguish different sources of endogenous scale economies and we present analytical results for a Pareto distribution. Our theoretical formulation of returns to scale is similar to Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), J. Kim (2004), Atkeson and P. J. Kehoe (2005), and D. Kim (2021). These authors recognise the same sources of *internal returns to scale* that we focus on: fixed costs and span of control. They also recognise *external returns to scale* from aggregation which we include for completeness. Recent work by Bilbiie and Melitz (2020), Baqaee, Farhi, and Sangani (2021), and Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2021) recognises the importance of external returns to scale – often called love-of-variety in a consumption aggregator – for the welfare implications of firm entry and exit.

Several recent papers provide estimates of returns to scale in the U.S. economy. Gao and Kehrig (2021) estimate returns to scale of 0.96 overall in U.S. manufacturing firms, and returns to scale across 4-digit industries, ranging from 0.86 to 1.3. Ruzic and Ho (2019) use similar US manufacturing data, and find a decline in returns to scale from 1.2 in 1982 to 0.96 in 2007. Lashkari, Bauer, and Boussard (2019) find returns to scale ranging from 0.75 to 1.06 for the universe of corporations in France. The most recent estimates of returns to scale in the U.K. economy are Oulton (1996), Harris and Lau (1998), and Girma and Görg (2002). These studies document constant or slightly decreasing returns to scale for manufacturing firms.

1 Model

The household side of the model follows a standard neoclassical growth setup. The production side of the economy has firm entry and exit, monopolistic competition, and production functions which have different sources of returns to scale. There are two stages to the firm problem. First, a firm decides whether to pay a fixed, output-denominated, entry cost based on the expected profits they would receive from optimal production decisions. Second, given a firm has entered, it makes optimal production decisions. Upon entering, the firm receives a productivity draw at which point it decides whether to produce or not, and if so how much to produce. The decision to produce or not is based on whether producing output will generate enough revenue to cover a fixed, period-by-period, labour-denominated, overhead cost. At the end of the period all firms die exogenously.

1.1 Households

A representative household maximizes lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{C_t, K_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \quad & \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{C_t^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma}, \quad \beta \in (0, 1), \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & C_t + I_t = r_t K_t + w_t L^s + \Pi_t + T_t \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

$$I_t = K_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)K_t. \quad (2)$$

Households own all firms in the economy and receive profit Π_t . T_t is a lump-sum transfer from the government which will equal to the entry fees paid by firms. Households supply a fixed amount of labour that is not time-varying, we normalize this to one:

$$L^s = 1. \quad (3)$$

Households own the capital stock and rent it to firms at a rental rate r_t , hence the capital investment decision is part of the household problem. The household optimization

problem satisfies the following condition

$$\left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t}\right)^\sigma = \beta(r_{t+1} + (1 - \delta)). \quad (4)$$

plus a transversality condition and the resource constraint.

1.2 Firms

1.2.1 Final goods producer

The final goods aggregator is

$$Y_t = N_t^{1+\epsilon} \left[\frac{1}{N_t} \int_0^{N_t} y_t(\iota)^{\frac{1}{\mu}} d\iota \right]^\mu. \quad (5)$$

There are N_t intermediate producers on the interval $\iota \in (0, N_t)$ and $\mu \in (1, 1 + \nu \min(\alpha, 1 - \alpha))$ captures product substitutability. It will turn out that μ is the price markup that monopolistically competitive firms charge. The $1 + \epsilon$ term captures external returns to scale, also known as agglomeration economies or love of variety when introduced in a consumption aggregator. If $1 + \epsilon = \mu$, then the aggregator is a standard CES which has implicit love of variety. If $1 + \epsilon = 1$, then there is no love of variety.

The maximization problem of the final goods producer is

$$\Pi_t^F = \max_{y_t(\iota)} Y_t - \int_0^{N_t} p_t(\iota) y_t(\iota) d\iota \quad (6)$$

$$\text{s.t. } Y_t = N_t^{1+\epsilon} \left[\frac{1}{N_t} \int_0^{N_t} y_t(\iota)^{\frac{1}{\mu}} d\iota \right]^\mu \quad (7)$$

The firm is infinitesimal so firm level output does not affect Y_t . The first-order condition with respect to $y_t(\iota)$ gives the inverse-demand for a firm

$$p_t(\iota) = N_t^{\frac{1+\epsilon-\mu}{\mu}} \left(\frac{y_t(\iota)}{Y_t} \right)^{\frac{1-\mu}{\mu}}. \quad (8)$$

1.2.2 Intermediate goods producer

The timeline for the intermediate goods producer is that the firm pays cost κ to enter. It receives a productivity draw $j \in (0, 1)$ then decides whether to produce which incurs a fixed overhead cost. If the firm does not produce it remains inactive which we refer to as endogenous exit. All firms, active and inactive, exit exogenously at the end of one period.

The production function for firm with productivity j is given by

$$y(j) = A(j)^{1-\nu} \left[k(j)^\alpha \ell(j)^{1-\alpha} \right]^\nu, \quad \nu \in [0, 1]. \quad (9)$$

The parameter $\nu \in [0, 1]$ captures diminishing returns in variable production (i.e. upward sloping marginal cost curve) or ‘span of control’. As $\nu \rightarrow 1$ the marginal cost curve flattens which raises returns to scale – span of control broadens – and as $\nu \rightarrow 0$ the marginal cost curve steepens implying stronger decreasing returns in variable production (span of control weakens). The labour employed to produce output is:

$$\ell_t(j) = \ell_t^{\text{tot}}(j) - \phi, \quad (10)$$

where $\ell_t^{\text{tot}}(j)$ represents the total labour employed by the firm, and ϕ is a labour-denominated fixed overhead cost. Both ϕ and ν determine returns to scale at the firm level. The productivity term $A(j)$ is the inverse of the CDF of the productivity distribution. In the Appendix we illustrate this using the Pareto distribution.

The firm solves the following profits maximization problem:

$$\max_{k_t(j), \ell_t(j), y_t(j), p_t(j)} p_t(j)y_t(j) - r_t k_t(j) - w_t(\ell_t(j) + \phi) \quad (11)$$

subject to the production function (9) and inverse demand function (8). The optimal-

ity conditions imply

$$\frac{r_t}{p_t(j)} = \frac{\nu}{\mu} \alpha \frac{y_t(j)}{k_t(j)} \quad (12)$$

$$\frac{w_t}{p_t(j)} = \frac{\nu}{\mu} (1 - \alpha) \frac{y_t(j)}{\ell_t(j)}. \quad (13)$$

1.2.3 Ratio of firm size

The inverse demand condition and factor price equilibrium conditions imply that for any two firms i, j revenue and input choice are proportional to scaled productivity:

$$\frac{p_t(j)y_t(j)}{p_t(i)y_t(i)} = \frac{k_t(j)}{k_t(i)} = \frac{\ell_t(j)}{\ell_t(i)} = \frac{a(j)}{a(i)}, \quad \forall i, j, \quad \text{where} \quad a(j) \equiv A_t(j)^{\frac{1-\nu}{\mu-\nu}}. \quad (14)$$

1.2.4 Zero-profit firm

We assume there is a threshold productivity level $J_t \in (0, 1)$ characterised by zero profits. If a firm receives a productivity draw below the threshold productivity level they would make negative profits from production. Consequently, they prefer to produce zero and make zero profits. Therefore we define profits and characterise the threshold productivity as follows:

$$\pi_t(j) = p_t(j)y_t(j) - r_t k_t(j) - w_t \ell_t(j) + \phi \quad (15)$$

$$\pi_t(J_t) = 0. \quad (16)$$

A helpful reduced-form expression for profits combines the profit condition with equilibrium factor prices, with the zero-profit condition and with the ratio of revenues to scaled productivity (see appendix for details):

$$\pi_t(j) = \phi w_t \left(\frac{a(j)}{a(J_t)} - 1 \right). \quad (17)$$

Profits are rising in fixed costs and relative productivity of the firm.

1.2.5 Free Entry

All firms die after one period. A firm only produces if it makes positive profits, hence firm value is given by

$$v_t(j) = \max\{\pi_t(j), 0\}. \quad (18)$$

We assume a free entry condition which implies that the expected value from entering equals to the entry cost κ :

$$\mathbb{E}[v_t(j)] = \kappa. \quad (19)$$

Combining (18) and (19) with our reduced-form profit expression (17) yields

$$\phi w_t(1 - J_t) \left[\frac{\bar{a}(J_t)}{a(J_t)} - 1 \right] = \kappa. \quad (20)$$

We use bar notation to represent the mean value of a function.² The mean of scaled productivity $a(j)$ over the interval $(J_t, 1)$ is

$$\bar{a}(J_t) = \frac{1}{1 - J_t} \int_{J_t}^1 a(j) dj. \quad (21)$$

1.3 Entry

Operating firms N_t are the subset of firms who decide to produce once receiving their productivity draw. Entrants E_t are all firms who pay the entry cost.

$$N_t = \int_0^{N_t} d\iota = E_t \int_{J_t}^1 dj = E_t(1 - J_t). \quad (22)$$

We can interpret the productivity cut-off J_t as the fraction of entering firms who choose to produce 0 after receiving their productivity draw.

²The mean value of f on $[a, b]$ is defined as

$$\bar{f}(x) \equiv f(\bar{x}) = \frac{1}{b-a} \int_a^b f(x) dx.$$

1.4 Aggregation

To get aggregate output and aggregate inputs, note that the integral over the index of operating firms $(0, N_t)$ is equivalent to entering firms E_t constrained over the region of operation $(J_t, 1)$.

1.4.1 Aggregate Factor Inputs

Aggregate labour is comprised of production labour and non-production labour

$$K_t = \int_0^{N_t} k_t(i) di = E_t \int_{J_t}^1 k_t(j) dj \quad (23)$$

$$L_t = \int_0^{N_t} [\ell_t(i) + \phi] di = E_t \int_{J_t}^1 [\ell_t(j) + \phi] dj. \quad (24)$$

We define u_t as the fraction of aggregate labour that goes to production

$$u_t \equiv \frac{E_t \int_{J_t}^1 \ell(j) dj}{L_t} \quad (25)$$

$$1 - u_t = \frac{E_t(1 - J_t)\phi}{L_t} = \frac{N_t\phi}{L_t}. \quad (26)$$

1.4.2 Aggregate Output

In the appendix we present a derivation of aggregate output.

$$Y_t = N_t^{1+\epsilon-\nu} \bar{a}(J_t)^{\mu-\nu} \left[K_t^\alpha (u_t L_t)^{1-\alpha} \right]^\nu. \quad (27)$$

Using the expression for labour used in non-production, we can remove $N_t = \frac{1-u_t}{\phi} L_t$, which yields aggregate output as a Cobb-Douglas function of *aggregate* inputs

$$Y_t = \text{TFP}_t K_t^{\alpha\nu} L_t^{1+\epsilon-\alpha\nu} \quad \text{where} \quad \text{TFP}_t \equiv \left(\frac{1-u_t}{\phi} \right)^{1+\epsilon-\nu} u_t^{(1-\alpha)\nu} \bar{a}(J_t)^{\mu-\nu}. \quad (28)$$

The pre-multiplying term represents aggregate total factor productivity. That is, it captures changes in aggregate output that are not accounted for by changes in aggregate inputs. TFP is not the Solow residual because the exponents of aggregate capital

and labour do not correspond to aggregate factor shares.

1.4.3 Aggregate Factor Market Equilibrium

The wage, rental rate on capital and zero profit condition are

$$r_t = \alpha \frac{\nu}{\mu} \frac{Y_t}{K_t} \quad (29)$$

$$w_t = (1 - \alpha) \frac{\nu}{\mu} \frac{Y_t}{u_t L_t} \quad (30)$$

$$\frac{w_t(1 - u_t)L_t}{Y_t} = \left(1 - \frac{\nu}{\mu}\right) \frac{a(J_t)}{\bar{a}(J_t)} \quad (31)$$

1.5 Government Budget Constraint and Resource Constraints

The resource constraint is

$$Y_t = C_t + I_t. \quad (32)$$

The government rebates entry fees to households. The government budget constraint equates taxes to government expenditure

$$T_t = E_t \kappa. \quad (33)$$

Profits and labour markets clear

$$\Pi_t = \Pi_t^F \quad (34)$$

$$L_t = L^S. \quad (35)$$

1.6 Equilibrium Definition

An equilibrium is a sequence of prices $\{r_t, w_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$; firm capital and labour demands $\{\ell_t(j), k_t(j)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$; firms' operating decisions, measures of entry and operation $\{E_t, N_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$; consumption and capital $\{C_t, K_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, such that

1. households choose C and K optimally by solving problem (1);

2. firms compete under monopolistic competition and decide optimally whether to produce or remain dormant, and factor demands satisfy (11);
3. the free entry condition holds (19);
4. markets clear for aggregate labour (24), aggregate capital (23), goods market (32), labour market (35) and aggregate profits (34);
5. the government budget constraint is satisfied (33).

2 Model Analysis

In this section we apply the assumption of a Pareto productivity distribution $A(j)$ in order to obtain analytical expressions for productivity and returns to scale in terms of parameters and the productivity cut-off J_t . We analyse the steady-state of the model and discuss the implications of changing parameters on our outcomes of interest.

2.1 Average Productivity with Pareto Distribution

If we assume a Pareto distribution, scaled productivity is given by

$$a(j) = A(j)^\Gamma = \frac{1}{(1-j)^{\frac{\Gamma}{\vartheta}}}. \quad (36)$$

The term $\Gamma \equiv \frac{1-\nu}{\mu-\nu} \in (0,1)$ is the productivity scaling exponent and ϑ is the Pareto tail parameter. Average productivity is a linear function of the productivity level of the cut-off firm:

$$\frac{a(J_t)}{\bar{a}(J_t)} = 1 - \frac{\Gamma}{\vartheta}. \quad (37)$$

We can express average productivity as:

$$\bar{A}(J_t) = \frac{\vartheta}{\vartheta-1} (1-J_t)^{-\frac{1}{\vartheta}} \quad (38)$$

Changes to the productivity cut-off J_t determine average productivity.

2.2 Returns to Scale

Heterogeneous productivity leads to heterogeneous firm output, and in turn heterogeneous returns to scale because the fixed cost is the same for all firms. In addition to returns to scale from the fixed cost, firms also have decreasing returns to variable inputs (upward sloping marginal cost curves). If a firm has low productivity, it will be small and the fixed cost will dominate the decreasing returns in variable production leading to increasing returns to scale. If the firm has high productivity, it will be large and the decreasing returns in variable inputs will dominate the increasing returns from the overhead, so overall the firm has decreasing returns.

2.2.1 External Returns to Scale

From equation (28), the degree of returns to scale in the aggregate economy is:

$$\text{External RTS} \equiv \frac{\partial \ln Y_t}{\partial \ln K_t} + \frac{\partial \ln Y_t}{\partial \ln L_t} = 1 + \epsilon.$$

2.2.2 Internal Returns to Scale

From equations (9) and (10), the responses of firm output to a change in each variable input are as follows:

$$\frac{\partial \ln y_t(j)}{\partial \ln k_t(j)} = \nu\alpha, \quad \frac{\partial \ln y_t(j)}{\partial \ln \ell_t(j)} = \nu(1 - \alpha).$$

Therefore, changing capital or changing production labour have constant effects on output regardless of firm size. Returns to scale in variable production measures the response of firm output to variable inputs:

$$\text{Variable RTS} \equiv \frac{\partial \ln y_t(j)}{\partial \ln k_t(j)} + \frac{\partial \ln y_t(j)}{\partial \ln \ell_t(j)} = \nu.$$

The effect of a change in total labour input, which is what we can measure in the data, is decreasing in firm size:

$$\frac{\partial \ln y_t(j)}{\partial \ln \ell_t^{\text{tot}}(j)} = v(1 - \alpha) \left(1 + \frac{\phi}{\ell_t(j)} \right) \in (v(1 - \alpha), \mu - \alpha v).$$

The lower bound is reached by the largest firm $\ell_t(j) \rightarrow \infty$ and the upper bound is reached by the zero-profit firm which has the largest overhead to production labour ratio, given by

$$\frac{\phi}{\ell_t(J_t)} = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \left(\frac{\mu}{v} - 1 \right).$$

In sum, the response of firm output to total labour is smaller for larger firms. To get an intuition for this result, consider a firm that has 10 total labour units, where 9 go to overheads and 1 goes to production, total labour increases by 10% to 11, overhead labour remains at 9 therefore production labour increases 100% to 2, hence output responds to the 100% increase in production labour rather than the 10% increase in total labour. Thus, at a small scale an increase in total labour has a big effect on output. Conversely, consider a firm that has 9 units of overhead labour and 991 units of production labour, a 10% increase in total labour from 1,000 to 1,100 also raises production labour by 10% from 991 to 1,091 and correspondingly output responds the same as if production labour were directly increased.


Overall returns to scale at the firm-level is the response of firm output to a change in all inputs:

$$\text{RTS}_t(j) \equiv \frac{\partial \ln y_t(j)}{\partial \ln k_t(j)} + \frac{\partial \ln y_t(j)}{\partial \ln \ell_t^{\text{tot}}(j)} = v \left(1 + (1 - \alpha) \frac{\phi}{\ell_t(j)} \right) = v + (\mu - v) \frac{a(J_t)}{a(j)}. \quad (39)$$

This expression for returns to scale is endogenous. It depends on the non-production to production labour ratio and this will differ by firm according to their productivity draw. Returns to scale are bounded between variable returns to scale and the markup $\text{RTS}_t(j) \in (v, \mu)$. Figure 1 plots firm-level returns to scale as a function of $a(j)$. More productive firms have lower returns to scale. The cut-off firm $a(j) = a(J_t)$ has the high-

est level of returns to scale which is equal to the markup, and returns to scale converge on variable returns to scale ν for large firms as the fixed cost becomes negligible.

Figure 1: Firm-level Returns to Scale



Plot shows returns to scale of a firm given its productivity draw. In the shaded region firms are inactive and the dashed line shows their hypothetical returns to scale if they were to produce. The horizontal lines show the bounds on returns to scale of active firms $RTS(j) \in (\nu, \mu)$ and the average returns to scale of active firms given in equation (40). The $RTS(j)$ plot corresponds to equation (39) where parameter values are $\phi = 0.5$, $\nu = 0.9$, $\mu = 1.1$, $\vartheta = 1.3$, and we specify the endogenous cut-off to $J = 0.1$ which is the steady-state equilibrium value of the cut-off that we solve for numerically in our main exercise.

2.2.3 Average RTS

If we consider returns to scale of the firm with average productivity $\bar{a}(J_t)$, under Pareto productivity distribution, then

$$RTS(\bar{j}) = \mu - \frac{1 - \nu}{\vartheta}. \quad (40)$$

Returns to scale of the average firm tends towards the markup (which is the returns to scale of the smallest, zero-profit, firm) as ϑ gets large. This is because a higher Pareto shape parameter implies a higher density in the left-hand side of the distribution and a thinner right-hand tail. This implies a higher share of low-productivity firms which have high RTS, close to the markup.

2.3 Reducing the model

We can reduce the model to two dynamic equations in two unknown variables $\{C_t, K_t\}$. With a Pareto distribution on $A(j)$, labour utilized for production u is a function of exogenous parameters, consequently we drop the time subscript on utilization in the model under Pareto:

$$u = \left[1 + \frac{\mu - \nu}{\nu(1 - \alpha)} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\vartheta} \left(\frac{1 - \nu}{\mu - \nu} \right) \right) \right]^{-1}. \quad (41)$$

With utilization in terms of exogenous parameters, then TFP is a function of exogenous parameters and J_t :

$$TFP_t(J_t) = \left(\frac{1 - u}{\phi} \right)^{1 + \epsilon - \nu} u^{(1 - \alpha)\nu} \bar{a}(J_t)^{\mu - \nu} \quad (42)$$

$$= \left(\frac{1 - u}{\phi} \right)^{1 + \epsilon - \nu} u^{(1 - \alpha)\nu} \left(\frac{\vartheta}{\vartheta - \Gamma} \right)^{\mu - \nu} (1 - J_t)^{-\frac{1 - \nu}{\vartheta}}. \quad (43)$$

In turn aggregate output is a function of (J_t, K_t) :

$$Y_t(J_t, K_t) = TFP_t(J_t) K_t^{\alpha\nu}. \quad (44)$$

If we combine labour demand which determines wage with free entry which equates entry cost to expected profit, and then use the expression for aggregate output $Y_t(J_t, K_t)$, then we can derive a relationship between the productivity cut-off J_t and capital K_t :

$$1 - J_t = \left[\frac{\kappa \mu u^{1 - (1 - \alpha)\nu} (\vartheta - \Gamma)^{1 - \nu + \mu}}{\phi^{\nu - \epsilon} \nu (1 - \alpha) \Gamma (1 - u)^{1 + \epsilon - \nu} \vartheta^{\mu - \nu} K_t^{\alpha\nu}} \right]^{\frac{\vartheta}{\vartheta - (1 - \nu)}} \quad (45)$$

Using this expression, TFP can be expressed in terms of capital and in turn aggregate output can be expressed as $Y_t(K_t)$. Using these expressions gives the rental rate as a function of capital:

$$r_t = \alpha \frac{\nu}{\mu} \frac{Y_t(K_t)}{K_t}. \quad (46)$$

Therefore the system reduces to a two-dimensional dynamical system:

$$Y_t(K_t) - C_t = K_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)K_t \quad (47)$$

$$\left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t}\right)^\sigma = \beta(r_{t+1}(K_{t+1}) + (1 - \delta)). \quad (48)$$

2.4 Steady state

A steady-state equilibrium is an equilibrium in which prices, quantities, entry and firm productivity are constant. Tilde notation represents a variable in steady state. In steady state, denoted with a tilde, the consumption Euler equation implies that

$$\tilde{r} = \frac{1}{\beta} + (1 - \delta). \quad (49)$$

In turn the rental rate equation yields a steady state expression for capital \tilde{K} which leads to a steady state level of consumption from the capital accumulation equation. With $\{\tilde{C}, \tilde{K}\}$ all other endogenous model variables are determined in steady state. We can show that the cut-off level of productivity is:

$$1 - \tilde{f} = \left[\mu \left(\frac{\kappa}{1 - \nu} \right)^{1 - \alpha \nu} \left(\frac{\tilde{r}}{\alpha \nu} \right)^{\alpha \nu} \left[\frac{\mu - \nu}{\nu(1 - \alpha)\vartheta} \right]^{(1 - \alpha)\nu} (\vartheta - \Gamma)^{\mu - \alpha \nu} \phi^{\epsilon - (1 - \alpha)\nu} (1 - u)^{-\epsilon} \vartheta^{1 - \mu + (1 - \alpha)\nu} \right]^{\frac{\vartheta}{\vartheta(1 - \alpha \nu) - (1 - \nu)}} \quad (50)$$

This is a function of $\mu, \nu, \alpha, \beta, \delta, \kappa, \phi, \vartheta$, and Γ, u, \tilde{r} are defined above.

3 Comparative Statics

3.1 Comparative Statics – Average Returns to Scale

Average returns to scale are the relevant object that we measure in the data. In the empirical exercise we pool together all firm and time observations and divide by industry. We then estimate a production function for each industry, hence measured RTS is the average of the firm-time observations that we pool.


3.1.1 The Effect of Fixed Costs on Returns to Scale

Average returns to scale of operating firms is independent of the overhead fixed cost ϕ . Although changes in the fixed cost ϕ affect firm-level returns to scale, $RTS(j)$, on average returns to scale do not change as J_t adjusts. For example, a higher fixed cost raises selection J_t such that surviving firms have a higher level of production labour, hence the overhead cost to production labour ratio in (39) remains unchanged. In other words, the overhead labour to production labour ratio is independent of the fixed cost:

$$\frac{\phi}{\ell(\bar{j})} = \frac{\vartheta(\mu - \nu) - (1 - \nu)}{\nu(1 - \alpha)\vartheta}.$$

The impact of a rise in the fixed cost ϕ on firm-level and average returns to scale is plotted in Figure 2. Higher ϕ raises returns to scale for all incumbents, but increased selection (higher J) eliminates the least-productive firms, with the highest returns to scale. Hence average returns to scale $RTS(\bar{j})$ is unchanged.

Figure 2: Firm-level Returns to Scale, Change in ϕ



Plot shows returns to scale of a firm given its productivity draw from a Pareto distribution. In the shaded region firms are inactive and the dashed line shows their hypothetical returns to scale if they were to produce. The horizontal lines show the bounds on returns to scale of active firms $RTS(j) \in (\nu, \mu)$ and the average returns to scale of active firms given in equation (40). The $RTS(j)$ plot corresponds to equation (39) where parameter values are $\nu = 0.9$, $\mu = 1.1$, $\vartheta = 1.3$. We solve for the endogenous productivity cut-offs $a(J_1), a(J_2)$ when $\phi_1 = 0.5, \phi_2 = 0.75$.

3.1.2 The Effect of Span of Control on Returns to Scale

Although invariant to fixed costs, average returns to scale are increasing in variable returns to scale ν :


$$\frac{dRTS(\bar{j})}{d\nu} = \frac{1}{\vartheta} > 0.$$

A rise in span of control ν increases average returns to scale, but the effect on firm-level returns to scale depends on the productivity draw. This result is presented in Figure 3 and can be shown by differentiating the expression for firm-level returns to scale in Equation (39):

$$\frac{d \ln RTS(j)}{d \ln \nu} = 1 - \frac{d \ln \ell(j)}{d \ln \nu} \left(\frac{RTS(j) - \nu}{RTS(j)} \right) \quad (51)$$

For individual firms, the elasticity of overall returns to scale to ν depends on the two channels in Equation (51). The first channel directly raises returns to scale. The second channel expands the size (and optimal factor inputs) of firms with a given productivity draw. This lowers the fixed cost share in production labour $\frac{\phi}{\ell(j)}$. This channel depends on the elasticity of production labour to ν , which is always positive. It is also scaled by the relative gap between overall returns to scale of firm j and variable returns to scale ν . Therefore, the response of firm-level returns to scale to changes in span of control depends on the size of the firm. When firms are very large, their returns to scale converge to ν , so the second channel shrinks towards zero. Overall, returns to scale of large firms rises with ν , while that of small firms falls in ν . Figure 3 highlights this at the intersection of the two lines representing returns to scale of incumbents, for different values of ν . The firm at that intersection experiences no change in returns to scale, where its production labour elasticity is equal to exactly $\frac{RTS(j)}{RTS(j) - \nu}$.

Figure 3: Firm-level Returns to Scale, Change in ν



Plot shows returns to scale of a firm given its productivity draw. In the shaded region firms are inactive and the dashed line shows their hypothetical returns to scale if they were to produce. The horizontal lines show the bounds on returns to scale of active firms $RTS(j) \in (\nu, \mu)$ and the average returns to scale of active firms given in equation (40). The $RTS(j)$ plot corresponds to equation (39) where parameter values are $\phi = 0.5$, $\mu = 1.1$, $\vartheta = 1.3$. We solve for the endogenous productivity cut-offs $a(J_1), a(J_2)$ when $\nu_1 = 0.5, \nu_2 = 0.75$.

3.2 Comparative Statics – Productivity

How does average productivity respond to changes in exogenous technical parameters? Changes in exogenous parameters such as ν and ϕ , denoted x below, affect average productivity through the degree of selection:

$$\frac{d \ln \bar{A}(\tilde{j})}{d \ln x} = \frac{\partial \ln \bar{A}}{\partial \ln(1 - \tilde{j})} \times \frac{d \ln(1 - \tilde{j})}{d \ln x} = -\frac{1}{\vartheta} \times \frac{d \ln(1 - \tilde{j})}{d \ln x}. \quad (52)$$

The first term captures that greater selection ($1 - \tilde{j} \rightarrow 0$) always increases average productivity. This follows from equation (38). The second term captures how selection (50) responds to a change in an exogenous parameter.³

³We also present an analysis of ϕ . It has an ambiguous effect on selection and therefore productivity. The ambiguity depends on the degree of external returns to scale ϵ . For common restrictions (CES and no external returns), fixed costs increase selection and raise average productivity.

3.2.1 Span of Control

How does selection respond to a change in span of control (variable returns to scale)? The steady-state expression of (inverse) selection $1 - \tilde{f}$ is nonlinear in ν . We cannot provide a closed-form result. Figure 4 shows the steady-state productivity cut-off \tilde{f} for values of ν from 0.75 to 0.90. Exogenous parameters are set as in Table 1.

Table 1: Parameter Values for Comparative Statics

	Parameter	Value	Target
μ	Markup estimate	1.1	ONS (2022)
α	Capital share	0.25	ABS (authors' calculations)
ϵ	External RTS	0.05	Gouel and Jean (2021)
κ	Entry cost	0.1	Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011)
β	Discount rate	0.96	Real interest rate
δ	Depreciation rate	0.08	Office for National Statistics
ϑ	Pareto shape	1.3	Match firm distribution
ϕ	Overhead cost	0.5	Match share active firms

The markup estimate matches evidence from the UK, as in ONS (2022). The value of α implies a capital share of 0.25ν , to obtain values close to our calculations in the ABS. The value of κ follows Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011). External returns to scale ϵ is set to a value from Gouel and Jean (2021). The depreciation rate δ is based on a weighted average from ONS data. The discount factor β is chosen to match the average real interest rate of 2.08 over the period, from the equation $\tilde{r} = \frac{1}{\beta} + 1 - \delta$.⁴ The Pareto shape ϑ is calibrated to match the firm size distribution, as in Table 15 in the Appendix. The overhead cost ϕ is set such that the proportion of active and inactive firms (\tilde{f}) is empirically plausible.

⁴Data on UK long-term government bond and inflation used to compute the real interest rate from FRED database: <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IRLTLT01GBM156N> and <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FPCPIT0TLZGGBR>.

Figure 4: Cut-off Productivity \tilde{J} and Variable Returns to Scale ν




Figure 4 shows that the cut-off productivity is declining in variable returns to scale ν . This occurs because the wage is declining in ν , such that payments to overheads $w_t\phi$ are falling in ν , therefore less productive firms can pay the fixed cost and survive with higher ν . The negative relationship between the equilibrium wage and ν occurs because it reduces firm entry which in turn lowers the wage. Specifically, a higher ν reduces expected profits, which decreases entry E_t and consequently the the number of operating firms N_t falls.⁵ This lowers aggregate output, which decreases the equilibrium wage.

What is the relationship between average returns to scale and average productivity? Figure 6 plots average productivity and average returns to scale for ν between 0.75 and 0.90. A rise in ν lowers average productivity, but raises average returns to scale. As ν rises, the returns to scale of the average firm increases, given Equation (40). However there is *less* selection with higher ν , so average productivity falls as in Figure

⁵The number of operating firms $N = \frac{1-u}{\phi}$. A rise in ν will lower $1-u$, by Equation (41). Hence the number of operating firms falls in ν .

5. This gives a negative relationship between returns to scale and productivity across industries characterised by variation in ν .

Figure 5: Average Productivity $\bar{A}(\bar{j})$ and Variable Returns to Scale ν





Figure 6: Labelled scatter plot of average productivity and average returns to scale



3.2.2 Mechanism for rising span of control reducing selection

The span of control ν reduces selection. This general equilibrium channel goes through expected profits, influencing entry, then aggregates, and finally the equilibrium wage which affects payments to overheads. It produces testable implications on business dynamism.

Consider the profit of cost-minimising firm with productivity draw j

$$\pi(j) = \left(1 - \frac{\nu}{\mu}\right) p(j)y(j) - w\phi$$

The fraction $\frac{\nu}{\mu}$ determines the share of gross revenue that firms earn as profit. This fraction determines the strength of the ‘selection effect’ - the property of heterogeneous firm models that only a subset of firms survive due to the free-entry condition. Dividing the above profit equation by revenue $p(j)y(j)$, it is easy to see that the sum of profit shares and fixed cost shares is $1 - \frac{\nu}{\mu}$. Higher span of control ν reduces the sum of these shares *for all firms*. Hence, higher ν lowers expected profits.

A fall in expected profits reduces entry. This result is shown by noting that entry cost payments $E_t \kappa$ must be equal to expected profits in equilibrium, so the number of entrants E_t falls. In equilibrium the number of operating firms N_t decreases because $N_t = \frac{1-u}{\phi}$ which is declining in ν . The number of firms N_t is equal to the share of entrants that choose to operate $(1 - J_t) E_t$. We show in the simulation that selection falls for higher ν , so $(1 - J_t)$ rises. Then it must be that $\frac{E_t}{N_t}$ falls as ν rises. In sum, higher span of control ν allows less productive firms to survive, *and* there are fewer firms competing in equilibrium, due to an even larger fall in entrants. Model simulations for the effect of ν on entrants and incumbents are presented in the Appendix.

The reduction in the number of competing firms will reduce aggregate output since $Y_t = N_t^{1+\epsilon} \bar{y}_t$. The relationship between aggregate output and the span of control ν is non-linear, but is confirmed by simulations. Given a fall in N_t , the only channel that could boost aggregate output is average firm-level output \bar{y}_t , but this also falls due to less selection. Reduced aggregate output puts downwards pressure on wages $w_t = \frac{\nu(1-\alpha)}{\mu} \frac{Y_t}{u}$. It is clear that span of control ν affects the wage through multiple channels. It directly boosts the wage, but indirectly lowers the wage via Y_t and u .


$$\frac{d \ln w_t}{d \ln \nu} = 1 + \frac{d \ln Y_t}{d \ln \nu} - \frac{d \ln u}{d \ln \nu}$$

The elasticity of wages to changes in the span of control depends on a direct channel, an aggregate output channel, and a utilisation channel. Given $u = \frac{\nu \vartheta(1-\alpha)}{\nu(1-\vartheta\alpha) + \mu \vartheta - 1}$, we can show $\frac{d \ln u}{d \ln \nu} = \frac{\mu \vartheta - 1}{\nu(1-\vartheta\alpha) + \mu \vartheta - 1} \in (0, 1)$. Therefore the elasticity of the wage to ν depends on $\frac{d \ln Y_t}{d \ln \nu}$.

Lower equilibrium wages reduce the payments to overheads $w_t \phi$, which allows less productive firms to survive. This is clear from inspecting the reduced-form profit equation. Simulating the model with a range of ν 's, we show that the wage is declining in ν . Therefore, for the free-entry condition to continue to hold when ν goes up, $1 - \tilde{f}$ must rise, so \tilde{f} falls. In other words, a rise in variable returns to scale is associated with a reduced selection effect, as more low productivity firms survive. This is due to a reduction in the required labour overhead payments when the wage falls, as in

Figure 7.

Figure 7: Scatter plot of steady-state wage and variable returns to scale ν



3.2.3 Fixed Costs

How does selection respond to a change in fixed costs? Equation (50) shows that the response of (inverse) selection $1 - \tilde{f}$ to ϕ is log-linear:

$$\frac{d \ln(1 - \tilde{f})}{d \ln \phi} = \frac{\epsilon - \nu(1 - \alpha)}{\vartheta(1 - \alpha\nu) - (1 - \nu)} \gtrless 0 \iff 1 + \epsilon \gtrless 1 + \nu(1 - \alpha). \quad (53)$$

Given our restrictions on parameters, the denominator is always positive. The numerator is positive or negative depending on the size of external returns to scale $1 + \epsilon$. The numerator is negative if $1 + \epsilon < 1 + (1 - \alpha)\nu$. Then inverse selection $1 - \tilde{f}$ is decreasing in the fixed cost ϕ , so overall the effect on productivity is positive. The intuition is that ϕ increases selection so that only more productive firms survive. This outcome occurs for two commonly imposed parameter restrictions. First, no external returns to scale $1 + \epsilon = 1$ and second external returns to scale implicit in a standard CES aggregator $1 + \epsilon = \mu$. The first case follows immediately, whereas the second case relies on the pa-

parameter restriction $\mu \in (1, 1 + \nu \min(\alpha, 1 - \alpha))$ that we impose for profit maximization.

A rise in fixed cost ϕ can reduce selection if it decreases labour overhead payments. The free-entry condition $\kappa = \tilde{w}\phi(\frac{\Gamma}{\Gamma-\vartheta}(1-\tilde{f}))$, where steady-state wage depends on ϕ , shows that if steady-state overhead payments, $\tilde{w}\phi$, decrease then \tilde{f} must fall to maintain equality. A rise in ϕ decreases wages if it reduces aggregate output sufficiently. A fall in aggregate output occurs if expected profits decline, reducing entry and therefore the number of operating firms, in reduced-form $N = (1-u)/\phi$. A fall in the number of operating firms will have a large negative effect on aggregate output if $1+\epsilon$ is large because $Y = N^{1+\epsilon}y(\tilde{f})$.

3.3 Testable Implications

Variation in the overhead cost ϕ does not affect average returns to scale. An increase in ϕ increases returns to scale for all incumbents, but it strengthens selection so only larger firms with lower returns to scale survive. It cannot be the driver of any relationship between average returns to scale and average productivity. The fixed cost ϕ does affect expected profits $\tilde{w}\phi\frac{\Gamma}{\Gamma-\vartheta}(1-\tilde{f})$ through one direct channel, and two equilibrium channels (wage and productivity cut-off). Equation (53) shows that very high external returns to scale $1+\epsilon$ is required for ϕ to reduce selection. In general, we expect ϕ to raise selection and reduce the number of operating firms $N = \frac{1-u}{\phi}$. The range of returns to scale across firms is unaffected by ϕ , as returns to scale $\in [\nu, \mu]$.

Variation in ‘span of control’ ν affects average returns to scale. In addition, a rise in ν will raise returns to scale for large firms, while reducing returns to scale for small firms. Large firms will converge to a higher ν , while small firms experience a direct boost which is more than offset by an indirect fall in the overhead share in production labour. Higher ν also lowers expected profits, lowers entry and the number of incumbents, and reduces selection. This means that ν is negative related to average productivity. Finally, higher ν implies both less entry and less exit in our model (i.e. declining business dynamism). Therefore, the model predicts that business dynamism is lower where returns to scale is higher.

4 Data & Estimation

We use data from the UK’s annual production survey the ARDx 1998-2014. This is a firm-level panel dataset that covers all large firms and a representative sample of small firms stratified by size, sector, region. Large firms are surveyed annually, whereas small firms are surveyed for a fixed number of years. The data contains 60,000 firms each year, 11 million workers and two-thirds of gross value added. Firms report a range of production data, our main interest is output, labour, materials, and investment which we use to construct capital. For output, we observe both value-added and gross output. We focus on value-added in our primary analysis, but use gross output for robustness checks with other production function estimation strategies.

In the appendix we provide details of our data cleaning, deflation, capital construction, SIC code matching and summary statistics for regression data.

4.1 Production Function Estimation

To stay close to our theory section, we estimate Cobb-Douglas production functions on value-added output. Our main analysis uses the Akerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) (ACF) estimation methodology, and for robustness we provide results for Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP) and Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2020) (GNR). All these estimation methodologies address the problem in production function estimation that there is omitted variable bias: input variables are correlated with unobserved firm-level productivity. With Cobb-Douglas production functions we obtain a single, time-invariant, coefficient for each input in the production function. This coefficient represents the elasticity of firm output to an input for the average firm in the panel over the period we estimate.⁶

⁶In Kariel, Mainente, and Savagar (2022) we provide a comprehensive, reduced-form, empirical study of returns to scale in the UK economy. We consider the various choices involved in estimating production functions, such as functional form (translog or Cobb-Douglas), output measure (gross output or value-added) and estimation technique. This is an extensive exercise beyond the scope of this paper. In this paper our main goal is to be as consistent with our theoretical model.

4.2 Mapping Model Production Function to the Data

In the data we observe the following variables at the firm-level: revenue $p_t(j)y_t(j)$, capital $k_t(j)$ and total labour $\ell_t^{\text{tot}}(j)$. We cannot distinguish between production labour $\ell_t(j)$ and overhead labour ϕ . Hence, we cannot estimate the firm-level production function (9) directly. If we were able to do this, then the sum of the coefficients would give us the response of revenue to variable inputs. Instead, we estimate the response of revenue to a change in all inputs. That is, we estimate the following regression:

$$\ln p_t(j)y_t(j) = \beta_1 \ln k_t(j) + \beta_2 \ln \ell_t^{\text{tot}}(j) + \varepsilon_t(j). \quad (54)$$

4.2.1 Estimated Revenue Elasticity

The coefficients β_1 and β_2 represent the elasticity of firm-level revenue to firm-level capital and firm-level total labour, respectively. The coefficients are treated as common across all $j = 1 \dots N$ within each industry and common across time. The coefficients are

$$\beta_1 = \frac{\partial \ln p_t(j)y_t(j)}{\partial \ln k_t(j)} = \frac{\nu}{\mu} \alpha \quad (55)$$

$$\beta_2 = \frac{\partial \ln p_t(j)y_t(j)}{\partial \ln \ell_t^{\text{tot}}(j)} = \frac{\nu}{\mu} (1 - \alpha) \left(1 + \frac{\phi}{\ell(\bar{j})} \right) = \frac{1}{\mu} \left(\mu - \nu \alpha - \frac{1 - \nu}{\vartheta} \right). \quad (56)$$

Where $\ell(\bar{j})$ reflects that pooling firms within an industry and time will yield average firm production labour. If we had true output measures rather than revenue then there would be no $1/\mu$ on the right-hand side of both equations. If we had a measure of production labour then there would be no $\left(1 + \frac{\phi}{\ell(\bar{j})} \right)$ in Equation (56). Therefore the sum of the regression coefficients give revenue elasticity which is the change in output from a change in all inputs (output elasticity) divided by the markup:

$$\beta_1 + \beta_2 = \frac{\nu}{\mu} \left(1 + (1 - \alpha) \frac{\phi}{\ell(\bar{j})} \right) = \frac{1}{\mu} \left(\mu - \frac{1 - \nu}{\vartheta} \right) = 1 - \frac{1 - \nu}{\mu \vartheta}. \quad (57)$$

4.2.2 Estimated Technical Efficiency

We label the *revenue function residual* $\varepsilon_t(j)$ for firm j in year t as revenue total factor productivity $\ln TFPR_t(j)$:

$$\ln TFPR_t(j) = \ln p_t(j)y_t(j) - \hat{\beta}_1 \ln k_t(j) - \hat{\beta}_2 \ln \ell_t^{\text{tot}}(j). \quad (58)$$

Hat notation represents our estimated values. Specifically, $\hat{\beta}_1, \hat{\beta}_2$ are the estimated coefficients (revenue elasticities) for an average firm in the industry we run the regression on and $\ln TFPR_t(j)$ is the estimated revenue function residual for a specific firm given their capital, labour and revenue, teamed with industry average revenue elasticity coefficients. Our $\ln TFPR_t(j)$ measure is a good proxy of firm technical efficiency $A(j)$, if overhead costs are small and if we purge the residual of industry-specific fixed effects which represent demand shocks. We provide a detailed discussion in the Appendix. Our main analysis focuses on variation across industries in average $\ln TFPR(\iota)$ and $\hat{\beta}_1(\iota) + \hat{\beta}_2(\iota)$ where ι indexes an industry. The arithmetic average across all the firm-year residuals in an industry is

$$\ln TFPR = \frac{\nu}{\mu}(1 - \alpha) \left[\ln \ell_t(\bar{j}) - \frac{\ell_t^{\text{tot}}(\bar{j})}{\ell_t(\bar{j})} \ln \ell_t^{\text{tot}}(\bar{j}) \right] + \frac{1 - \nu}{\mu} \ln A(\bar{j}) + \frac{\mu - 1}{\mu} \ln Y_t + \frac{1 + \epsilon - \mu}{\mu} \ln N_t. \quad (59)$$

By studying differences in $TFPR$ across industries as a proxy for differences in \bar{A} (which is what we study in our model) across industries, we are implicitly assuming the average labour component and two demand shocks are constant across industries.⁷ In Appendix D, we show that $\ln TFPR$ in our model is declining in ν , and that this is mostly driven by falling true average productivity \bar{A} . Therefore, $\ln TFPR$ is a good proxy for $\ln \bar{A}$.

⁷We also run a regression specification to control for industry-specific shocks, and the main finding is unchanged.

4.2.3 Residual RTS correlation

We then seek to understand the relationship between the industry average $\ln TFPR$ and the sum of the estimated coefficients, which represent returns to scale. To do this we run the regression:

$$\ln TFPR(i) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 [\hat{\beta}_1(i) + \hat{\beta}_2(i)] = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \left[1 - \frac{1 - \nu(i)}{\mu\vartheta} \right]. \quad (60)$$

for $i = 1 \dots M$ where there are M 2-digit industries. We estimate the γ_1 coefficient to be negative which implies that a firm with higher $\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_2$ has lower TFPR on average. We have shown in our theory that only an increase in ν can both raise $\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_2$ and also decrease TFPR. Therefore the negative $\hat{\gamma}_1$ identifies ν as the parameter that changes across firms to drive the negative relationship between returns to scale and productivity.

5 Empirical Results

Our model makes two predictions. First, average returns to scale of operating firms are invariant to fixed costs but positively related to variable costs. Second, overall returns to scale are negatively related to productivity. Our results confirm these predictions.

In this section, we present results on revenue elasticity in the UK economy between 1998 and 2014. These estimates are computed by summing the estimated coefficients from the production function estimation. We will refer to our estimates as ‘returns to scale’, although technically they are revenue elasticities. Given our model assumes CES demand and monopolistic competition, markups are constant across firms and over time, so revenue elasticity variation is proportional to returns to scale variation. Our main findings are:

1. On average returns to scale in the UK are slightly above constant.
2. Returns to scale is heterogeneous across sectors (0.53 - 1.52).
3. Returns to scale in the UK has risen over time.

4. Returns to scale and TFPR are negatively related across industries.

5.1 Returns to Scale Levels

Firstly, we present the estimates of returns to scale over the whole period.

Table 2: Returns to Scale: Cobb-Douglas production function, 1998 - 2014

	Olley and Pakes (1996)	Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)	Akerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015)	Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2020)
<i>Economy-wide</i>				
RTS	1.018	1.137	1.051	1.024
N	303,069	449,484	527,813	527,813
<i>Manufacturing</i>				
RTS	1.252	1.121	1.143	1.034
N	95,424	123,552	120,712	120,712
<i>Construction</i>				
RTS	1.025	0.805	1.192	1.044
N	22,123	50,172	51,784	51,784
<i>Wholesale/Trade/Transport</i>				
RTS	1.027	1.009	0.926	1.016
N	74,988	129,043	181,985	181,985
<i>Services</i>				
RTS	1.021	0.938	1.067	1.015
N	77,209	146,717	173,332	173,332

Table 2 presents estimates of average returns to scale for the whole economy and macro sectors, across different estimation methods. The underlying coefficients are contained in Table 9 in the Appendix. Estimates of average returns to scale in the U.K. from 1998 - 2014 are reasonably close in magnitude given the methodological differences and underlying assumptions on firm behaviour. Each estimate suggests returns to scale exceed one. This suggests that, on average, firms operate to the left of

the *minimum efficient scale*, as average costs exceed marginal costs.

We favour the ACF and GNR results as the former deals with the identification issue on labour, and the latter sidesteps this issue with use of the first-order condition on materials. ACF matches more closely to the Cobb-Dogulas value-added production function in our theory so this is our primary methodology. These estimates suggest that average returns to scale in the UK from 1998 - 2014 is greater than unity, in the range of 1.02 - 1.05.

Table 2 also presents estimates of returns to scale at the sectoral level. We find that returns to scale is greatest in the UK in Manufacturing, and lowest in Services. The estimates following ACF and GNR show a clear split between returns to scale in Manufacturing and Construction compared to Wholesale/Trade/Transport and Services: the former sectors have higher scale than the latter. This is less clear with OP and LP estimates, although these methods indicate that Manufacturing has greater returns to scale than Services.

We also estimate returns to scale at the 2-digit industry level. These results are contained in Table 10 in the Appendix, and show a wide range of scale economies, from 0.54 to 1.52. The industry with the lowest returns to scale is Sewerage Services, while that with the highest is Furniture Manufacturing.

Finally, we split the sample of firms into (approximately) the bottom and top quintiles by employment. Equation (39) highlights that returns to scale must be bounded between variable returns to scale ν and the markup μ . Estimating returns to scale on these two groups gives an approximation of these two parameters.⁸ We find that the largest employment quintile of firms has returns to scale equal to 1.31, while the smallest employment quintile has returns to scale of 0.97. Table 14 includes further information on the number of firms, average employment statistics, and estimated $\ln TFPR$.

⁸We estimate returns to scale on a large enough set of firms such that we get precise estimates. However, naturally we include firms that are not large/small enough to actually have returns to scale at the boundary conditions. Therefore our estimates will be smaller/larger than the true boundary conditions.

5.2 Rises in Returns to Scale

We estimate production functions on four shorter sub-periods, in order to track changes in returns to scale over time. Table 3 presents these estimates of returns to scale following ACF. Underlying coefficients are found in Table 11. Estimates with GNR are provided in the Appendix Table 12.

On aggregate, there is some evidence of a rise in scale economies over time. Estimates in the late 1990s suggest returns to scale below unity, but by the 2010s we find returns to scale above one.

Returns to scale has also increased across all macroeconomic sectors, although the rise has not been consistent. Table 3 also presents returns to scale in each sub-period, for each macro sector. Average returns to scale is higher in each sector when estimated between 2010 - 2014, compared to 1998 - 2001. The greatest rise in returns to scale is found in Construction and Services, from 0.91 and 1.02 to 1.29 and 1.11 respectively.

Table 3: Changing Returns to Scale, 1998 - 2014.


	1998 - 2001	2002 - 2005	2006 - 2009	2010 - 2014
<i>Economy-Wide</i>				
RTS	0.988	1.081	1.046	1.061
N	153,874	144,465	108,619	120,855
<i>Manufacturing</i>				
RTS	1.11	1.24	1.10	1.15
N	41,572	36,074	24,280	21,626
<i>Construction</i>				
RTS	0.91	0.87	1.08	1.29
N	13,050	13,180	9,797	14,145
<i>Wholesale/Trade/Transport</i>				
RTS	1.13	1.04	1.00	1.17
N	32,792	31,360	27,476	37,415
<i>Services</i>				
RTS	1.02	1.03	1.02	1.11
N	34,698	34,241	32,070	45,708

All estimates follow Akerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) with a value-added Cobb-Douglas production function.

The rise in returns to scale over time is more apparent when we estimate at the 2-digit industry level. Figure 8 plots a comparison of returns to scale in 1998 - 2001, compared to 2010 - 2014, across sectors, using the ACF estimation.⁹ GNR estimates are provided in Figure 21 in the Appendix. Most industries experienced an increase in returns to scale, as the majority of points sit above the 45 degree line.

⁹We remove industries where estimated factor elasticities are below zero or above one.

Figure 8: Changing Returns to Scale by 2-digit SIC, ACF Estimation.



Comparison of returns to scale at 2-digit SIC level, from 1998 - 2001 to 2010 - 2014. Line is 45 degree line: points above that line are consistent with a rise in returns to scale.

5.3 Returns to Scale & Productivity

We estimate TFPR using control function methods. Figure 9 presents average log TFPR across all firms in each year, when the production function is estimated following Akerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015). We see a rise in productivity until 2004, followed by a faster rise until 2009. It falls sharply before recovering somewhat over the following years. This result is robust across estimation methods (Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers 2020), although the levels differ slightly (see Figure 16 in the Appendix).




Figure 9: Aggregate TFPR (ACF)

At the aggregate level, both returns to scale and productivity have risen over time. We want to investigate the relationship across industries, as in our theoretical framework. Figure 10 contains a scatter plot of returns to scale and average log TFPR across 2-digit sectors for ACF estimation. We obtain the same general result with GNR estimation, plotted in Figure 22 in the Appendix.




Figure 10: Relationship between Revenue Elasticity and TFP, ACF

This evidence shows that industries with higher returns to scale have lower productivity. This is consistent with our model, which characterises different industries by varying levels of ν .

Table 4 contains estimates from a regression of returns to scale on average log TFPR across 2-digit sectors. We separate the sample into sub-periods to understand how this relationship has changed over time. Our results suggest there is a strong negative relationship between returns to scale and productivity, and that this negative relationship has strengthened over time.

Table 4: Regression: Returns to Scale and Productivity at Industry Level

<i>Dependent variable: Returns to Scale</i>				
	1998 - 2001	2002 - 2005	2006 - 2009	2010 - 2014
Mean log TFPR	-0.143*** (0.015)	-0.164*** (0.014)	-0.234*** (0.048)	-0.245*** (0.037)
<i>N</i>	60	60	62	62

*Note: Returns to scale estimated with a value-added Cobb-Douglas production function following Akerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015), estimated at the 2-digit SIC level. Estimates statistically significant at levels of 1%: ***, 5%: **, 10%: *. Number of sectors is determined by those for which a production function can be estimated in the sub-period, with estimated elasticities between zero and one.*

According to Section 4.2, our measure of TFPR contains both the average of true firm-level productivity and a sector-specific demand shock. In order to control for such sector-specific shocks, we run a regression of returns to scale on log TFPR with fixed-effects for the sector and time period. Effectively, we are combining the observations used for the regressions in each column of Table 4, and running a fixed-effects regression. The results are presented in Table 5. Column (1) presents an estimated coefficient from a simple pooled regression. The other three columns introduce weights (the number of firms used for estimation in each sector \times period), 2-digit sector fixed-effects, and then period fixed-effects. The negative relationship between returns to scale and log productivity is negative and strongly statistically significant across all

specifications. This provides evidence that sector-specific shocks are not driving our results.

Table 5: Regression: Returns to Scale and Productivity at Industry Level

	<i>Dependent variable: Returns to Scale</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mean log TFPR	−0.135*** (0.009)	−0.143*** (0.010)	−0.150*** (0.017)	−0.165*** (0.008)
Weighted (# firms)		✓	✓	✓
2-digit SIC FE			✓	✓
Period FE				✓
N	214	214	214	214
R ²	0.614	0.647	0.808	0.926

*Note: Returns to scale estimated with a value-added Cobb-Douglas production function following Akerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015), estimated at the 2-digit SIC level. Estimates statistically significant at levels of 1%: ***, 5%: **, 10%: *. Weighted by the number of firms used to estimate returns to scale and TFPR in each sector \times period. Periods are: 1998 - 2001, 2002 - 2005, 2006 - 2009, 2010 - 2014. Number of sectors is determined by those for which a production function can be estimated in the sub-period, with estimated elasticities between zero and one.*

In sum, we provide estimates of returns to scale in the UK and find that they are slightly above constant on average. There is significant sectoral heterogeneity, with higher returns to scale in Manufacturing than Services. We find that returns to scale has increased between 1998 and 2014, with the greatest rise occurring in the early 2000s, and driven by an increase in Construction and Services. This rise has occurred across the vast majority of 2-digit sectors. Finally, we show a strong negative relationship between returns to scale and TFPR, which has become stronger over time, and holds even when we control for sectors and time periods.

6 Conclusion

We show that considering both marginal and fixed costs drivers of returns to scale is important for productivity outcomes. Our theory implies that rising returns to scale in variable production ('span of control') can lead to a negative relationship between returns to scale and productivity, whereas changing fixed costs cannot cause this outcome. Using data for the UK from 1998 - 2014, we estimate firm-level returns to scale and productivity. We document a negative relationship between the two variables which is consistent with our theory. Overall, our results suggest a channel to explain the puzzling observation that in many advanced economies returns to scale are rising whilst productivity is stagnating. This is difficult to understand in many models as typically greater returns to scale increases selection of high productivity firms leading to rising returns to scale and rising productivity. We stress that the source of returns to scale matters to overturn this result.

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Appendix

A Data

We use the Annual Respondents Database (ARD). Specifically, we use a version called the ARD_x, where the ‘x’ suffix denotes that it is the time-series version of the ARD, rather than an independent annual release. The bulk of variables in the ARD come from the Annual Business Survey (ABS) which is an annual, mandatory, survey of firms in the UK economy. The ARD differs slightly from the ABS as the ONS add additional information from other surveys to the basic ABS data. Additional information is available at [Annual Respondents Database, 1973-2008](#) and [Annual Respondents Database X, 1998-2014](#).¹⁰ However, for us the most important documentation regards the ABS which is a core ONS product used in the construction of national accounts, and consequently well-documented. The [Annual Business Survey \(ABS\) Quality and Methodology Information report](#) provides more information on limitations of the data and comparisons to related data. There is also an [ABS Methodology](#) web page which links to an [ABS Technical Report](#).

A.1 Capital Construction

The Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) allows construction of firm-level capital stocks when such data is unavailable, but investment data is present. The method here follows Martin (2002) and Hwang, Savagar, and Kariel (2022). The PIM is constructed using the following equation:

$$K_t = (1 - \delta)K_{t-1} + I_t.$$

K_t is the capital stock in period t , and I_t is investment in period t . However, to use this method, we need K_0 – the initial capital stock of a firm – which is not in this

¹⁰Specifically, the ARD is a dataset constructed for researchers, rather than for national accounts purposes. It brings together the ABS and BRES, and prior to 2009 it brought together the two parts of the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI).

survey. To construct this series, each firm's K_0 is a revenue-weighted share of the industry-level capital stock in the first year that firm appears in the panel. Capital stock is then constructed for all future years with the above equation, with missing investment data interpolated. The depreciation rate is taken to be 18.195%, which is a weighted average of ONS depreciation rates for the three different capital categories: Building, Vehicles, Other.

A.1.1 Deflating

We convert firm gross output into real values using the ONS industry deflators.¹¹ Material inputs are deflated with the ONS producer price inflation data.¹² The capital stock is deflated with the ONS gross fixed capital formation deflator.¹³

A.1.2 Cleaning

For the purpose of our production function estimation, we exclude sectors: Agriculture, Public Sector, Finance & Insurance, Education, and Health.¹⁴ We set out rules for SIC re-coding to ensure compatibility pre- and post-2007, when the classification is changed. For SIC codes post-2007, we divide the number by 1000 to match with pre-2007 codes. To reduce the influence of outliers, which may represent measurement or recording errors in the surveys, we winsorize firms with the top and bottom 0.1% of factor shares in revenue (M/Y , K/Y , L/Y) in each year. Table 6 contains number of firms at each stage of the data cleaning process, along with the final number of observations for estimation.

¹¹<https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/datasets/experimentalindustrydeflatorsuknonseasonallyadjusted>

¹²<https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/datasets/producerpriceindex>

¹³<https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/timeseries/ybfu/ukeya>

¹⁴Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 2007 codes: A, K, O, P, Q. These sectors were excluded from the survey after 2012. K,O,P were fully excluded and A,Q had various subsectors excluded.

Table 6: Data Cleaning: Firms Dropped

	# Firms
All ARD firms	854,732
Drop if no 2-digit sector	852,424
Drop if < 100 firms in sector	852,331
Drop non-market sectors	761,348
Take logs of regression variables	539,368
Drop outlier factor shares	527,813

A.2 Summary Statistics

Table 7 and 8 present descriptive statistics of the variables used in our regression analysis. It provides these for different broad industry groups, but we estimate the production function regressions at the 2-digit level.

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables for Full Sample

	Mean	SD	p10	p50	p90	No. Obs
Revenue	39,736	675,183	92	1,458	42,797	527,813
Labour	224	2,213	2	20	349	527,813
Capital	7,696	150,007	22	351	7,915	527,813
Materials	29,651	636,176	32	703	26,255	527,813
Materials Share	0.55	-	0.17	0.58	0.87	527,813
Labour Share	0.26	-	0.04	0.23	0.52	527,813
Capital Share	0.27	-	0.06	0.19	0.60	527,813

Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables by Broad Sector

	Mean	SD	p10	p50	p90	No. Obs
Manufacturing						
Revenue	36,005	235,437	336	4,294	58,896	125,737
Labour	192	576	8	54	431	125,737
Capital	10,362	75,776	148	1,498	16,154	125,737
Materials	24,954	178,528	122	2,400	38,999	125,737
Materials Share	0.57	-	0.30	0.58	0.81	125,737
Labour Share	0.28	-	0.11	0.27	0.47	125,737
Construction						
Revenue	17,812	108,789	111	1,414	48,782	51,784
Labour	103	395	2	11	214	51,784
Capital	2,309	41,523	11	104	2,210	51,784
Materials	12,467	89,027	18	343	16,896	51,784
Materials Share	0.51	-	0.17	0.52	0.81	51,784
Labour Share	0.25	-	0.00	0.24	0.49	51,784
Trade, Wholesale, Transport						
Revenue	62,673	1,102,305	111	1,414	48,782	182,814
Labour	256	3,404	2	14	244	182,814
Capital	7,092	103,075	20	245	5,667	182,814
Materials	52,666	1,044,112	61	929	26,219	182,814
Materials Share	0.69	-	0.37	0.74	0.92	182,814
Labour Share	0.16	-	0.02	0.13	0.35	182,814
Services						
Revenue	25,276	284,335	65	728	28,673	179,028
Labour	249	1,627	2	17	403	179,028
Capital	8,821	228,905	20	218	5,435	179,028
Materials	14,417	209,297	15	242	11,263	179,028
Materials Share	0.41	-	0.09	0.38	0.77	179,028
Labour Share	0.34	-	0.06	0.32	0.68	179,028

B Returns to Scale Estimates

Table 9: Elasticity Estimates: Cobb-Douglas production function, 1998 - 2014

	Olley and Pakes (1996)	Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)	Akerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015)	Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2020)
<i>Economy-Wide</i>				
β_l	0.497	0.635	0.545	0.329
β_k	0.521	0.501	0.505	0.181
β_m	-	-	-	0.514
N	303,069	449,484	527,813	527,813
<i>Manufacturing</i>				
β_l	0.681	0.573	0.789	0.297
β_k	0.571	0.547	0.421	0.148
β_m	-	-	-	0.590
N	95,424	123,552	120,712	120,712
<i>Construction</i>				
β_l	0.574	0.473	0.826	0.328
β_k	0.451	0.332	0.388	0.224
β_m	-	-	-	0.493
N	22,123	50,172	51,784	51,784
<i>Wholesale/Trade/Transport</i>				
β_l	0.631	0.592	0.669	0.198
β_k	0.396	0.417	0.343	0.130
β_m	-	-	-	0.688
N	74,988	129,043	181,985	181,985
<i>Services</i>				
β_l	0.618	0.598	0.681	0.446
β_k	0.402	0.339	0.384	0.215
β_m	-	-	-	0.354
N	77,209	146,717	173,332	173,332

Table 10 contains returns to scale estimates by industry, at the 2-digit SIC level. The number of firms on which estimation was computed is included. If the factor elasticity

on labour, capital, or materials was outside the range of $[0,1]$, then the RTS was not computed.

SIC	ACF	GNR	N
10	1.033	1.039	12,495
11	1.187	1.092	1,724
13	1.186	1.020	4,981
14	-	0.996	3,355
15	1.019	1.115	841
16	1.244	1.057	3,478
17	1.335	1.012	4,184
18	1.156	1.054	7,521
19	1.097	-	506
20	1.418	1.016	5,733
21	1.164	1.061	986
22	1.173	1.026	7,776
23	-	1.016	5,616
24	-	1.001	4,776
25	-	1.019	15,597
26	1.085	1.036	7,648
27	1.117	1.011	4,913
28	1.289	1.023	10,899
29	-	1.181	1,633
30	1.440	1.091	1,973
31	-	1.050	4,060
32	1.350	1.055	5,020
33	1.244	1.065	4,997
41	1.102	1.067	12,216
42	0.918	1.038	12,554
43	1.330	1.059	27,014
45	1.018	1.036	24,639
46	0.756	1.041	68,969
47	1.010	1.061	66,171

SIC	ACF	GNR	N
49	1.214	1.046	11,501
50	0.972	1.094	1,306
51	1.045	1.107	807
52	1.140	1.066	8,103
53	1.270	1.429	489
55	1.517	1.011	8,549
56	1.394	0.971	25,219
58	1.128	1.032	6,802
59	1.151	1.008	2,547
60	1.292	1.086	693
61	1.062	1.131	1,062
62	-	1.103	9,061
63	1.066	1.119	1,224
69	0.538	1.045	10,295
70	1.004	1.053	10,274
71	-	1.032	11,953
72	0.888	1.022	2,323
73	0.944	1.054	5,168
74	1.010	1.079	4,769
75	1.315	0.987	1,482
77	1.006	1.041	6,195
78	1.090	1.010	9,842
79	1.145	1.094	4,136
80	1.076	1.072	1,926
81	1.143	1.042	6,472
82	0.975	1.109	9,624
90	0.846	0.936	3,111
91	-	-	1,722
92	1.127	1.030	1,248
93	1.066	1.025	7,853
94	1.264	1.045	6,086
95	-	1.117	1,889
96	1.064	0.979	11,807

Table 10: Estimates of returns to scale across 2-digit SICs, following the Akerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) and Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2020) approaches with a Cobb-Douglas production function. Missing sectors have estimated coefficients on labour, capital, or materials that are negative or greater than one.

Table 11: Changing Elasticity Estimates, 1998 - 2014.

	1998 - 2001	2002 - 2005	2006 - 2009	2010 - 2014
<i>Economy-Wide</i>				
β_l	0.422	0.608	0.656	0.719
β_k	0.566	0.474	0.389	0.342
N	153,874	144,465	108,619	120,855
<i>Manufacturing</i>				
β_l	0.577	0.743	0.743	0.773
β_k	0.537	0.498	0.353	0.375
N	41,572	36,074	24,280	21,626
<i>Construction</i>				
β_l	0.706	0.633	0.845	0.673
β_k	0.205	0.238	0.234	0.621
N	13,050	13,180	9,797	14,145
<i>Wholesale/Trade/Transport</i>				
β_l	0.680	0.612	0.623	0.730
β_k	0.449	0.432	0.376	0.441
N	32,792	31,360	27,476	37,415
<i>Services</i>				
β_l	0.583	0.607	0.637	0.809
β_k	0.434	0.419	0.382	0.300
N	34,698	34,241	32,070	45,708

All estimates follow Akerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) with a value-added Cobb-Douglas production function.

Table 12: Changing Elasticity Estimates, 1998 - 2014.

	1998 - 2001	2002 - 2005	2006 - 2009	2010 - 2014
<i>Economy-Wide</i>				
β_l	0.265	0.313	0.367	0.390
β_k	0.121	0.106	0.194	0.245
β_m	0.609	0.610	0.471	0.391
N	153,874	144,465	108,619	120,855
<i>Manufacturing</i>				
β_l	0.265	0.313	0.367	0.390
β_k	0.121	0.106	0.194	0.245
β_m	0.609	0.610	0.471	0.391
N	39,876	34,678	24,011	27,070
<i>Construction</i>				
β_l	0.249	0.245	0.444	0.391
β_k	0.149	0.123	0.205	0.306
β_m	0.619	0.644	0.443	0.365
N	13,484	13,416	10,210	13,269
<i>Wholesale/Trade/Transport</i>				
β_l	0.148	0.173	0.222	0.294
β_k	0.073	0.088	0.194	0.217
β_m	0.788	0.813	0.619	0.542
N	53,814	50,631	37,906	40,965
<i>Services</i>				
β_l	0.388	0.457	0.482	0.445
β_k	0.183	0.132	0.234	0.290
β_m	0.412	0.421	0.327	0.271
N	46,700	45,740	36,492	39,551

All estimates follow Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2020) with a gross-output Cobb-Douglas production function.

C Returns to Scale and Fixed Costs

We proxy average fixed costs at the 2-digit SIC industry level with *disposal of buildings, vehicles, and other assets*. We show in Figure 11 that there is no correlation between returns to scale and fixed costs across industries. This matches our theoretical prediction.




Figure 11: Relationship between Revenue Elasticity and Fixed Costs




Figure 12: Relationship between Revenue Elasticity (GNR) and Fixed Costs

D Model TFPR Decomposition

We follow Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2020, p. 3, 961) and classify our revenue function residual ($TFPR_t(j)$) in equation (54) as a composite of two shocks: true technical efficiency and a demand shifter. To observe this, note that revenue is the product of the inverse demand function $p_t(j) = N_t^{\frac{1+\epsilon-\mu}{\mu}} \left(\frac{Y_t}{y_t(j)} \right)^{\frac{\mu-1}{\mu}}$ and the production function $y_t(j) = A_t(j)^{1-\nu} [k_t(j)^\alpha \ell_t(j)^{1-\alpha}]^\nu$, thus:

$$p_t(j)y_t(j) = N_t^{\frac{1+\epsilon-\mu}{\mu}} Y_t^{\frac{\mu-1}{\mu}} y_t(j)^{\frac{1}{\mu}} = N_t^{\frac{1+\epsilon-\mu}{\mu}} Y_t^{\frac{\mu-1}{\mu}} A_t(j)^{\frac{1-\nu}{\mu}} [k_t(j)^\alpha \ell_t(j)^{1-\alpha}]^{\frac{\nu}{\mu}}. \quad (61)$$

Taking logs yields:

$$\ln p_t(j)y_t(j) = \alpha \frac{\nu}{\mu} \ln k_t(j) + (1-\alpha) \frac{\nu}{\mu} \ln \ell_t(j) + \frac{1-\nu}{\mu} \ln A_t(j) + \frac{\mu-1}{\mu} \ln Y_t + \frac{1+\epsilon-\mu}{\mu} \ln N_t. \quad (62)$$

Therefore the revenue function residual is:

$$\ln TFPR_t(j) = \frac{\nu}{\mu} (1-\alpha) \left[\ln \ell_t(j) - \frac{\ell_t^{\text{tot}}(j)}{\ell_t(j)} \ln \ell_t^{\text{tot}}(j) \right] + \frac{1-\nu}{\mu} \ln A_t(j) + \frac{\mu-1}{\mu} \ln Y_t + \frac{1+\epsilon-\mu}{\mu} \ln N_t. \quad (63)$$

For small ϕ the first term is negligible. The $\frac{1-\nu}{\mu} \ln A_t(j)$ term represents true firm-level technical efficiency. The $\frac{\mu-1}{\mu} \ln Y_t + \frac{1+\epsilon-\mu}{\mu} \ln N_t$ term represents a demand shock. This is demand $p_t(j)$ once it is purged of individual effects. Hence, it is the logarithm of $p_t(j)y_t(j)^{\frac{\mu-1}{\mu}} = N_t^{\frac{1+\epsilon-\mu}{\mu}} Y_t^{\frac{\mu-1}{\mu}}$.

Under a standard CES aggregator, external returns to scale (love of variety) are $1+\epsilon=\mu$. In this case N_t disappears from $\ln TFPR_t(j)$. Therefore, the demand shifter is equal to $\frac{\mu-1}{\mu} \ln Y_t$, or scaled industry output. Under a no external returns to scale assumption, $\epsilon=0$, the demand shifter is scaled average output per firm $\frac{\mu-1}{\mu} \ln \frac{Y_t}{N_t}$.

Equation (59) provides a decomposition of $\ln TFPR$ into three components. The first component $\frac{\nu}{\mu} (1-\alpha) \left[\ln \bar{\ell} - \left(1 + \frac{\phi}{\bar{\ell}} \right) \ln (\bar{\ell} + \phi) \right]$ is a function of exogenous parameters. The second component $\frac{1-\nu}{\mu} \ln A(j)$ represents true average firm technical efficiency. The final term $\frac{\mu-1}{\mu} \ln Y_t + \frac{1+\epsilon-\mu}{\mu} \ln N_t$ is a demand shock. Each of these components

varies by industry as ν changes.

Figure 13 plots the contribution of each component to $T\bar{F}PR$ respectively for ν from 0.75 to 0.90. It's clear that $T\bar{F}PR$ is declining in ν , so even the inclusion of terms unrelated to true average productivity \bar{A} does not overturn our key result. The majority of the variation in $T\bar{F}PR$ is driven by the changes to \bar{A} . Figure 14 presents the percentage contribution of each component to $T\bar{F}PR$ for different values of ν . While \bar{A} contributes almost 50% for $\nu < 0.76$, it makes up under 40% of $T\bar{F}PR$ when $\nu = 0.90$.

Figure 13: Contribution of each component to $T\bar{F}PR$ for range of ν 's.




Figure 14: Percentage contribution of each component to $T\bar{F}PR$ for range of ν 's.





Figure 15: Industry equilibrium average technical efficiency and implied TFPR



E TFPR and Returns to Scale

The structural expression for $\ln TFPR$ in Equation (59) can be written such that we have $\ln TFPR$ on the left-hand side and $R\bar{T}S$ on the right-hand side. This is a structural interpretation of the key regression we run across 2-digit industries in Equation (60). We use the definition for labour employed by the average firm $\bar{\ell} = \frac{\nu(1-\alpha)\phi\vartheta}{\vartheta(\mu-\nu)-(1-\nu)}$ and average returns to scale $R\bar{T}S = \mu - \frac{1-\nu}{\vartheta}$.

$$\begin{aligned}\ln TFPR &= \frac{\nu}{\mu}(1-\alpha)\left[\ln \ell(\bar{j}) - \frac{\ell_t^{\text{tot}}(\bar{j})}{\ell(\bar{j})} \ln \ell^{\text{tot}}(\bar{j})\right] + \frac{1-\nu}{\mu} \ln A(\bar{j}) + \frac{\mu-1}{\mu} \ln Y + \frac{1+\epsilon-\mu}{\mu} \ln N \\ &= -\left(\frac{\ln(\bar{\ell} + \phi)}{\mu}\right) R\bar{T}S + \frac{\alpha\nu}{\mu} \ln(\bar{\ell} + \phi) + \frac{\nu(1-\alpha)}{\mu} \ln \bar{\ell} + \frac{1-\nu}{\mu} \ln A(\bar{j}) + \frac{\mu-1}{\mu} \ln Y + \frac{1+\epsilon-\mu}{\mu} \ln N \\ &= \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 R\bar{T}S + \gamma_2 \ln \bar{\ell} + \gamma_3 \ln Y + \gamma_4 \ln N.\end{aligned}$$

where $\gamma_0, \gamma_2, \gamma_3 > 0$ and $\gamma_1, \gamma_4 < 0$.

We use our estimates for $\ln TFPR, R\bar{T}S$ by 2-digit sector, along with average log employment obtained from the ABS. For revenue and number of firms by 2-digit sector, we take the average from 2008 - 2014 obtained from the ONS.¹⁵ The regression specification is run as above, but we cannot control for $A(\bar{j})$ which is unobserved. The results are presented in Table 13. The estimated coefficients for $\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \gamma_3, \gamma_4$ have the correct sign and are statistically significant at the 1% level. The estimated coefficient for γ_2 has the wrong sign but is not statistically significant.

¹⁵<https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/business/businessservices/datasets/uknonfinancialbusinesseconomyannualbusinesssurveysectionsas>. We would prefer data from 1998, but this dataset begins in 2008.

Table 13: Regression: Productivity and Returns to Scale at Industry Level, with Controls

<i>Dependent variable: $\ln TFPR$</i>					
	Intercept	Returns to Scale	Average log L	Log Y	Log N
Coefficient	12.245***	−9.000***	−0.138	0.265***	−0.290***
Standard Error	(1.568)	(0.556)	(0.203)	(0.103)	(0.099)

*Note: Number of observations = 52. Adjusted R-squared = 0.851. Returns to scale estimated with a value-added Cobb-Douglas production function following Akerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015), estimated at the 2-digit SIC level. Estimates statistically significant at levels of 1%: ***, 5%: **, 10%: *. Number of sectors is determined by those for which a production function can be estimated, with estimated elasticities between zero and one.*

F Productivity Estimates

Figure 16 shows the steady rise in productivity up to 2008, followed by the plateauing from the late 2000s. The estimate provided follows Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2020).




Figure 16: Aggregate TFPR (GNR)

G Wages and TFPR

Section 3 describes the general equilibrium effect which causes the relationship between variable returns to production ν and the productivity cut-off J_t . According to the model, an increase in ν decreases wage, which in turn reduces average productivity because low-productivity firms can pay the labour-denominated fixed cost more easily. Therefore, the model predicts that when ν increases, w decreases and \bar{A} decreases. Thus, there is a positive relationship between the equilibrium wage and average productivity in a sector.

We obtain data on median annual full-time wages by 2-digit SIC from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.¹⁶ We combine this with our annual productivity estimates at the industry level $\ln TFPR$. Figure 17 presents a scatter plot of each year \times 2-digit SIC for $\ln TFPR$ against \ln wage. The line of best fit is weighted by the number of firms in each observation.¹⁷




Figure 17: Scatter of annual log wage and log TFPR by 2-digit SIC

¹⁶<https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/datasets/regionbyindustry2digitsicashetable5>

¹⁷A weighted log-log regression of $TFPR$ on the wage with year fixed-effects yields a coefficient of 0.319 with a year-clustered standard error of 0.084.

H Further Figures & Tables

Figures 18 and 19 show results from the calibrated model simulation from the main paper. We plot the number of operating firms N and entrants E as ν varies. The following follows from $N = \frac{1-u}{\phi}$ and $N = (1-J)E$.





Figure 19: ν and N 

Table 14 shows the returns to scale estimates and summary statistics when we estimate production functions on sub-samples of large (top quintile of employment) and small (bottom quintile of employment) firms. The results confirm an important prediction of our model that large firms have lower returns to scale and smaller firms have higher returns to scale. This implicitly provides estimates of ν and μ since large firms returns to scale converge on ν and small firms returns to scale converge on μ .

Table 14: Returns to Scale for Top vs Bottom Employment Quintile

	RTS	$\ln TFPR$	L	N
Bottom Quintile	1.310	1.531	2.312	100,702
Top Quintile	0.967	3.573	1078.8	106,724

Firms are split into quintiles by employment. These are approximate due to integer constraints. The bottom quintile contains 18.8% of firms in the data, while the top contains 19.7% of firms.

Table 15 compares the share of firms and employment within five bins of firm size, both in the UK data and the calibrated model. For example, the first row shows that

around 66% of firms are non-employers (i.e. they have one self-employed worker), comprising almost 40% of total employment. By contrast, the model has almost 75% of such firms, employing 17% of workers.

Table 15: UK Firm Distribution: Data & Model

Firm Size	Firm Share		Employment Share	
	Model	Data	Model	Data
1	0.7467	0.6571	0.1683	0.3926
2 - 9	0.2079	0.2275	0.1561	0.2457
10 - 49	0.0377	0.0577	0.1524	0.1031
50 - 249	0.0064	0.0354	0.1288	0.0979
250+	0.0014	0.0223	0.3944	0.1607

Data from the ONS: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/business-population-estimates-2021/business-population-estimates-for-the-uk-and-regions-2021-statistical-release-html>.

Figure 20 plots the negative relationship between returns to scale and the number of firms for each 2-digit SIC over 1998 - 2014. The elasticity is -0.0476 with a standard error of 0.0219, and a p-value of 0.0344.

Figure 20: N and RTS by 2-digit SIC





Figure 21: Changing Returns to Scale by 2-digit SIC, GNR Estimation.



Comparison of returns to scale at 2-digit SIC level, from 1998 - 2001 to 2010 - 2014. Line is 45 degree line: points above that line are consistent with a rise in returns to scale.




Figure 22: Relationship between Revenue Elasticity and TFP, GNR

I Productivity Distribution

We obtain a measure of productivity $A(j)$ from a random draw on the unit interval $j \in [0, 1]$ using inverse transform sampling. The Pareto CDF is given by

$$F(A; \vartheta) = 1 - \left(\frac{h}{A}\right)^\vartheta ; \quad A \geq h > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \vartheta > 0.$$

If $\mathcal{J} \sim \text{Uniform}(0, 1]$, then for $j \in \mathcal{J}$, we have

$$1 - \left(\frac{h}{A}\right)^\vartheta = j$$

Therefore

$$A(j) = h(1 - j)^{-\frac{1}{\vartheta}}.$$

Typically we set the scale parameter, which is the minimum possible value of A , to $h = 1$. Calibrations of the shape parameter (tail index) vary, for example $\vartheta = 1.15$ in Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011) and $\vartheta = 1.06$ in Luttmer (2007) and $\vartheta = 6.10$ in Asturias, Hur, T. J. Kehoe, and Ruhl (2022). These estimates are set to match the firm size distribution in terms of employment since in the model productivity is roughly proportional to employment.




Figure 23: Productivity with Pareto Distribution, $h = 1, \vartheta = \{1.06, 1.15\}$

I.1 Log-Normal Distribution

We also consider the model with a log-normal productivity distribution. The log-normal CDF is given by:

$$F(A; \mu, \sigma) = \Phi\left(\frac{\ln A - \mu}{\sigma}\right); \quad A \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \sigma > 0.$$

where Φ is the CDF of the standard normal distribution.

The PDF takes the equation:

$$f(A; \mu, \sigma) = \frac{1}{A\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left(-\frac{(\ln A - \mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}\right)$$




Figure 24: Log-normal distribution.

We cannot obtain closed-form solutions for expected profits as is possible with a Pareto distribution. Instead we use the following result to obtain the expectation of profits, conditional on the (scaled) productivity draw being above the cut-off a^* .

$$E[a \mid a \geq a^*] = e^{\mu + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}} \cdot \frac{\Phi\left[\frac{\mu + \sigma^2 - \ln(a^*)}{\sigma}\right]}{1 - \Phi\left[\frac{\ln(a^*) - \mu}{\sigma}\right]}$$

With this expression, the free-entry condition is written:

$$\kappa = w\phi \left(\frac{E[a \mid a \geq a^*]}{a^*} - 1 \right)$$

However, note that the wage w is an equilibrium object which depends on the productivity cut-off a^* . We choose a^* to solve the free-entry condition, recomputing the wage which depends on a^* at each iteration. With a solution to the productivity cut-off, we obtain average productivity $E[a \mid a \geq a^*]$ and average returns to scale $\nu + (\mu - \nu) \frac{a^*}{a}$. In addition, we compute firm-level returns to scale $\nu + (\mu - \nu) \frac{a^*}{a(j)}$ for any (scaled) productivity draw $a(j)$.

Figures 25 and 26 show how changing ϕ affects average productivity and average returns to scale when productivity is log-normally distributed. Average productivity is rising in ϕ , as a higher fixed cost increases the productivity cut-off. In addition, average returns to scale rises in ϕ .

Figure 25: Average Productivity $a(\bar{j})$ and Fixed Cost ϕ






Figure 26: Average returns to scale $RTS(\bar{j})$ and Fixed Cost ϕ



As shown in Figure 26, when productivity is log-normally distributed, it is no longer the case that average returns to scale is independent of fixed cost ϕ . In the Pareto case, although higher ϕ raises returns to scale for all incumbents, the associated higher productivity cut-off J eliminates the firms with the highest returns to scale. Overall, these two effects offset one another. For log-normal productivity, the former effect dominates, as shown in Figure 27 for $\phi_1 = 0.25, \phi_2 = 0.75$.

Figure 27: Firm-level Returns to Scale



Plot shows returns to scale of a firm given its productivity draw from a log-normal distribution. In the shaded region firms are inactive and the dashed line shows their hypothetical returns to scale if they were to produce. The horizontal lines show the bounds on returns to scale of active firms $RTS(j) \in (\nu, \mu)$ and the average returns to scale of active firms given in equation (40). The $RTS(j)$ plot corresponds to equation (39) where parameter values are $\nu = 0.9$, $\mu = 1.1$, $\vartheta = 1.3$. We solve for the endogenous productivity cut-offs $a(J_1), a(J_2)$ when $\phi_1 = 0.25, \phi_2 = 0.75$.