

A Survey of Advancements in Green Security Games

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Abstract

Lorem ipsum foo bar etc

1 Introduction

1.1 Stackelberg Security Games

See [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]

2 Methods/Theory

3 Discussions

4 Conclusions

5 References

[1] F. Fang, P. Stone, and M. Tambe, “When security games go green: Designing defender strategies to prevent poaching and illegal fishing,” in *Proceedings of the 24th international conference on artificial intelligence*, 2015, pp. 2589–2595.

[2] Y. Qian, C. Zhang, B. Krishnamachari, and M. Tambe, “Restless poachers: Handling exploration-exploitation tradeoffs in security domains,” in *Proceedings of the 2016 international conference on autonomous agents & multiagent systems*, 2016, pp. 123–131.

[3] F. Fang and T. H. Nguyen, “Green security games: Apply game theory to addressing green security challenges,” *SIGecom Exch.*, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 78–83, Sep. 2016, doi: 10.1145/2994501.2994507.

- [4] Y. Wang *et al.*, “Deep reinforcement learning for green security games with real-time information,” in *Proceedings of the thirty-third aaai conference on artificial intelligence*, 2019, pp. 1401–1408.
- [5] S. Gholami, A. Yadav, L. Tran-Thanh, B. Dilkina, and M. Tambe, “Don’t put all your strategies in one basket: Playing green security games with imperfect prior knowledge,” in *Proceedings of the 18th international conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems*, 2019, pp. 395–403.