CORRUPTION, MACHINE POLITICS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE*

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The study of political influence in the West has for the most part focused on the process by which interest groups affect the content of legislation; hence, the input process has occupied the center of attention.

Students of politics in the new states of Africa and Asia who have adopted this perspective, however, have been struck by the relative weakness both of interest structures to organize demands and of institutionalized channels through which such demands, once organized, might be communicated to decision-makers. The open clash of organized interests is often conspicuously absent during the formulation of legislation in these nations. To conclude from this, however, that the public has little or no effect on the eventual "output" of government would be completely unwarranted. Between the passage of legislation and its actual implementation lies an entirely different political arena that, in spite of its informality and particularism, has a great effect on the execution of policy.

Much of the expression of political interests in the new states has been disregarded because Western scholars, accustomed to their own politics, have been looking in the wrong place. A large portion of individual demands, and even group demands, in developing nations reach the political system, not before laws are passed, but rather at the enforcement stage. Influence before legislation is passed often takes the form of "pressure-group politics"; *influence at the enforcement stage often takes the form of "corruption" and has seldom been treated as the alternative means of interest articulation which in fact it is.*[1] The peasants who avoid their land

[1] This process of influence, the groups which are likely to benefit from it most, and related issues are treated in much greater detail in my "The Analysis of Corruption Developing Nations. "*Comparative Studies in Society and History* (June,

taxes by making a smaller and illegal contribution to the disposable income of the Revenue Officer are as surely influencing the outcome of government policy as if they formed a peasant union and agitated for the reduction of land taxes. In a similar fashion, the businessmen who protect their black-market sales by buying protection from a well-placed politician are changing the outcome of policy as effectively as they might by working collectively through chambers of commerce for an end to government price controls.

Competing and complementary explanations for this prevalence of influence at the enforcement stage—usually offered as "causes of corruption"—abound in the expanding literature on this subject.[2] Among the most frequently cited factors contributing to widespread corruption in the new states are: the weak legitimacy of the formal political system compared to the persuasive ties of family or ethnicity, the relative importance of government as a source of employment and social mobility, the existence of wealthy elites denied access to direct, formal influence on policy and in the lack of strong commitments to the rule of general laws by either the elite or populace.

Implicit in each of these causes is the fundamental fact that the nature of most political

demands in transitional nations is such that they are simply not amenable to the legislative process. Family-centered demands—e.g., a family's desire to secure a civil service post for its eldest son—are generally not expressible in legislative terms. When demands are made on behalf of a wider grouping, they are likely to refer to ethnic, linguistic, or regional blocs and can seldom be given legislative form.[3] The problem thus lies less with the weakness of the interest structures at the legislative stage than with the very character of loyalties in a transitional nation and the demands fostered by such loyalty patterns. Couched as it is in universalistic language, legislation is not a suitable vehicle for the expression of particularistic interests.[4] Influence at the enforcement level— whether it meets the legal definition of corruption or not—is, on the other hand, almost exclusively particularistic. It is scarcely surprising, then, that many of the narrow, parochial demands characteristic of new nations should make their weight felt during the implementation of legislation rather than during its passage. Suitable though it may be for the few groups in the modern sector organized along occupational lines, the modern legislative machinery of new nations cannot effectively cope with the host of special pleadings coming from outside the modern sector.

There is one political form that, in spite of these formal obstacles, has not only been able to respond to particularistic interests but has thrived on them. I am, of course, referring to the urban "*machine*," a form that flourished in the United States around the turn of the century. Although now virtually extinct, the machine once managed in immigrant-choked cities to fashion a cacaphony of concrete, parochial demands into a system of rule that was at once reasonably effective and legitimate. What follows is essentially an effort to outline the contours and dynamics of the "machine model" in comparative perspective, an attempt to show that the social context that fostered "machine politics" in the United States is more or less present in many of the new states. After 1) sketching the general character of "machine

politics," the paper 2) suggests a developmental model to account for the machine, 3) indicates how the social context of the machine makes narrow self-interest the crucial bond of political organization, 4) examines the stabalizing or conservative effect of the machine, and 5) analyzes the reasons for the uneven development and instability of the machine in less developed nations.

I. THE MACHINE

To abstract the basic characteristics of a political machine obviously does some violence to the great variety of entrepreneurial talent that was devoted to creating this form. Nevertheless, as all but a few beleaguered machines have succumbed to the forces of "reform," analysis has replaced accusation and the central features of most machines are reasonably clear.[5]

It will be recognized at the outset that the machine form can occur only in certain political settings. At a minimum, the setting of the machine requires:

1. the selection of political leaders through elections
2. mass (usually universal) adult suffrage
3. A relatively high degree of electoral competition over time—usually between parties, but occasionally within a dominant party

These conditions reflect the fact that since machine politics represents a distinctive way of mobilizing voters, it arises only in systems where getting out the vote is essential to gaining control of the government. While these conditions are necessary for machine style politics, they are by no means sufficient, as we shall see below.

Always applied to a political party in power, the term "machine" connotes the reliable and repetitive control it exercises within its jurisdiction. What is distinctive about the machine, however, is not so much its control as the nature of the organizational cement that makes such control feasible. The machine is not the disciplined, ideological party held together by class ties and common programs that arose in continental Europe. Neither is it typically a

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[3] Malaysia, for example, is an instance where one ethnic group, the Malays, is given explicit, constitutional preference in access to certain bureaucratic posts. Similarly, the *harijan* castes in India are accorded preferential treatment with respect to education and government employment.

[4] "Pork-barrel" legislation catering to regional interests is an exception to this rule and is discussed at greater length below.

[5] Some of the more successful efforts at careful description and analysis include: V. O. Key, Jr., *The Techniques of Political Graft in the United States* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Libraries, 1936); Seymour J. Mandelbaum, *Boss Tweed's New York* (New York: Wiley, 1965); Edward C. Banfield and James A. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

charismatic party, depending on a belief in the almost superhuman qualities of its leader to insure internal cohesion. The machine is rather a non-ideological organization interested less in political principle than in securing and holding office for its leaders and distributing income to those who run it and work for it.[6] It relies on what it accomplishes in a concrete way for its supporters, not on what it stands for. A machine may in fact be likened to a business in which all members are stockholders and dividends are paid in accordance with what has been invested.[7]

"Patronage," "spoils," and "corruption" are inevitably associated with the urban machine as it evolved in the United States. As these terms indicate, the machine dealt almost exclusively in *particularistic, material rewards* to maintain and extend its control over its personnel. Although pork-barrel legislation provided inducements for ethnic groups as a whole, the machine did most of its favors for individuals and families. The very nature of these rewards and favors naturally meant that the machine became *specialized in organizing and allocating influence at the enforcement stage*. The corruption it fostered was not random greed but was finely organized and articulated to maximize its electoral support.

The machine is thus best characterized by the nature of the cement binding leaders and followers. Ties based on charisma, coercion, or ideology were occasionally minor chords of machine orchestration; the 'boss" might take on some heroic proportions, he might use hired toughs or the police now and again to discourage opposition, and a populist ideological aura might accompany his acts. Such bonds were, for the machine, definitely subsidiary to the concrete, particularistic rewards that represented its staple means of political coordination. It is the predominance of these reward networks—the special quality of the ties between leaders and followers—that distinguishes the machine party from the non-machine party.

The vaguely populist image of the machine party was based less on its pronouncements of general policy (which are rare) than on a myriad of acts that symbolized its accessibility, helpfulness, and desire to work for the "little

man." For the rank and file, the machine boss represented a patron of those at the bottom of the social pyramid, and while the court system with its rational justice may have favored property interests, the boss typified for them an empirical justice "that works more consistently in the interests of the poor, for attention is focused upon their concrete needs and deprivations."[8] Hints of municipal corruption and graft were winked at, even applauded, by the machine clientele as the social banditry of an urban Robin Hood in spite of their long-run costs to the city. More than most types of political leaders, then, the boss' image was fashioned largely from concrete acts and only marginally from policy platforms or rhetoric.

Given its principal concern for retaining office, the machine was a responsive, informal context within which bargaining based on reciprocity relationships was facilitated. Leaders of the machine were rarely in a position to dictate because those who supported them did so on the basis of value received or anticipated. The machine for the most part accepted its electoral clients as they were and responded to their needs in a manner that would elicit their support. The pragmatic, opportunistic orientation of the machine made it a flexible institution that could accommodate new groups and leaders in highly dynamic situations.

The applicability of this basic political form to the parties of the new states has been noted by quite a few political analysts.[9] In his perceptive examination of the party states of West Africa, Aristide Zolberg emphasizes the limited authority of the dominant parties and explicitly suggests that they could be usefully described as political machines. "The party," he asserts,

was initially a loose movement which naturally incorporated the characteristics of the society in which it grew; it was eventually transformed into a political machine but continued to reflect the state of complete integration of the territorial society.[10]

[6] Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

[7] This analogy was made by former Liberal Party President, José Avelino of the Philippines in the *Manila Chronicle*, Jan. 18, 1949. Quoted in Virginia Baterina "A Study of Money in Elections in the Philippines." *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review*, XX (March, 1955), 39-86.

[8] Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 118.

[9] See for example, Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 70-71; Henry L. Bretton, *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York: Praeger, 1966)., Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).

[10] Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966). p. 123.

The particular "machine" qualities Zolberg has in mind include the flexible, bargaining character of the party that permits it to adjust to demands from a heterogeneous clientele on the basis of self-interest, its capacity to respond to social change through informal mechanisms, and finally its potential for stability and popularity in a context scarcely hospitable to either.

In the West African context, at least, some allowance must be made for the fact that American political machines were typically electoral machines, whereas the parties Zolberg analyzes have done their best to eliminate their dependence on winning votes. The absence of acute electoral pressures—plebiscites hardly impose equivalent pressures—considerably narrows the scope of the machine pattern; beyond a certain point the regime would then resemble an oligarchy based on coercion more than a machine relying on votes. Judging from Zolberg's analysis, that point was seldom approached in most party states of West Africa.

Describing the ruling parties in the states of India, Myron Weiner also has recourse to the machine model, not only to explain what occurs, but also to recommend the "machine" to Indian politicians as a form to emulate. Like Zolberg, Weiner focuses on the ability of the machine to reconcile competing ethnic and particularistic claims in a manner that, while corrupt, is "a small price to pay for acculturating immigrants into a democratic society."[11]

In India's state of Orissā, for example, the dominant Congress Party came more and more to resemble a machine party as it endeavored, amidst the deterioration of political bonds forged during the nationalist struggle, to win elections. F. G. Baily portrays Congress' local party leaders as machine brokers in a context where "workers and sometimes voters expect some tangible reward, not necessarily a bribe, but assistance of exactly the kind which brokers provide" (jobs, licenses, welfare payments, etc.).[12]

What all three authors have done, in effect, is to construct an analogy between the social context of political parties in Asia and Africa on the one hand, and late 19th-early 20th century urban America on the other. In the U.S., the rapid influx of new populations for whom family and ethnicity were the central identifications, when coupled with the award of important monopoly privileges (traction, electric

power, and so forth) and the public payroll, provided the ideal soil for the emergence of party machines. Developing nations can be viewed as offering a social context with many of the same nutrients. New governments had in many cases only recently acquired control over the disposal of lucrative posts and privileges and they faced electorates that included many poor, newly urbanized peasants with particularistic loyalties who could be easily swayed by concrete, material incentives. The point each writer makes is not only that the machine is a suitable and relatively democratic political form that can manage such a complex environment, but that the social context typical of most new nations tends to encourage the growth of machine-like qualities in ruling parties. For America, Burnham has summarized the argument now being applied to less developed nations.

> If the social context in which a two-party system operates is extensively fragmented along regional, ethnic and other lines, its major components will tend to be overwhelmingly concerned with coalition building and internal conflict management. The need to unite for electoral [broad coalition building] purposes presupposes a corresponding need to generate consensus at whatever level consensus can be found.[13]

Given this sort of social context, so the reasoning goes, the price of effective political cooperation—at least in the short run—involves meeting narrow, particularistic demands, often through the patronage, favors, and corruption that are the hallmarks of machine politics. But why are other forms of association not feasible? What specific changes in the social context promote or undermine different styles of political collaboration? Unless the model is placed in a developmental perspective and considerably sharpened from its presently intriguing but impressionistic form, its explanatory value will remain limited.

II. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF POLITICAL TIES

The schema presented below focuses on changes over time in the nature of loyalty ties that form the basis of political parties. It is tailored to a bargaining—particularly, electoral—context and is less applicable where force or threats of force are the basis of coopera-

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[11] Weiner, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

[12] *Politics and Social Change: Orissā in 1959* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 138–140.

[13] Walter Dean Burnham, "Party Systems and the Political Process," pp. 277–307, in William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (eds.), *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development* (New York: Oxford University Press. 1967), p. 287.

tion. Nothing is intended to be rigidly deterministic about the movement from phase A to B to C. The phases are, however, largely based on the empirical experience of the U.S., England, and the new nations.

Although the phases in Table 1 have been separated for the purpose of conceptual clarity, they are likely to overlap considerably in the empirical experience of any nation. It is thus a question of which loyalty pattern is most common and which less common. Within new nations all three patterns typically co-exist; rural villagers may remain deferential to their tradi-

TABLE 1. DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY
LOYALTY TIES

Phase A[14] Political ties are determined largely by traditional patterns of deference (vertical ties) to establish authorities. Material, particularistic inducements to cooperation play a minor role except among a limited number of local power-holders.[15]

Phase B Deference patterns have weakened considerably in a period of rapid socio-economic change. Vertical ties can only be maintained through a relationship of greater reciprocity.[16] Competition among leaders for support, coupled with the predominance of narrow, parochial loyalties, will encourage the widespread use of concrete, short-run, material inducements to secure cooperation. The greater the competitive electoral pressures, the wider the distribution of inducements is likely to be. Influence at enforcement stage is common.

Phase C New loyalties have emerged in the process of economic growth that increasingly stress horizontal, (functional) class or occupational ties. The nature of inducements for political support are accordingly likely to stress policy concerns or ideology. Influence at the legislative stage becomes more appropriate to the nature of the new political loyalties.

[14] The broad lines of this schema were suggested to me by an analysis of the use of money in elections contained in Arnold Heidenheimer, "Comparative Party Finance: Notes on Practices and Toward a Theory," pp. 790–811 in Richard Rose and Arnold Heidenheimer, eds., *Comparative Studies in Political Finance: A Symposium, Journal of Politics*, 25, 4 (November, 1963), especially pp. 808–809. Changes in the nature of political ties greatly influence the degree to which monetary incentives are successful in electoral campaigns, and I have thus borrowed from that analysis for the broader purpose of this paper.

[15] Traditional ties often allow some scope for bargaining and reciprocity; the ability of clients to flee to another jurisdiction and the economic and military need for a leader to attract and keep a sizable clientele provided subordinates with some leverage. The distinctions made here in the degree of reciprocity are relative, not absolute. See, for example, Herbert P. Phillips, *Thai*

tional leaders, the recent urban migrants may behave more as free agents seeking jobs or cash for their votes, while a small group of professionals, trade union leaders and intellectuals may perhaps be preoccupied with ideological or class concerns. Even fully industrialized nations may contain recalcitrant, usually isolated, pockets where deference patterns have not yielded to more opportunistic modes of political expression.[17]

Prior to fuller treatment below, a brief word is in order about the process of change implied by the model. Movement from Phase A to Phase B involves the shaking loose of traditional deference patterns which can occur in a variety of ways. For the United States, large-scale immigration by basically peasant populations was often the occasion for this change while, for less developed nations, the economic changes introduced by colonial regimes and rapid migration from village to city has provided the catalyst. The social disorganization that resulted was often exacerbated by ethnic, linguistic, or, even caste fragmentation, but similar patterns have arisen in Thailand and the Philippines, amidst comparatively homogeneous populations. Elections themselves have, of course, played a central role in this transformation in that they placed a new political resource of some significance at the disposal of even the most humble citizens.

Movement from Phase B to Phase C would appear to depend on the process of industrialization as new economic arrangements take hold and provide new foci of identification and

Peasant Personality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 89 or George M. Foster, "The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzuntzan, II: Patron Client Relationships," *American Anthropologist*, 65: pp. 1280–1294.

[16] What appears to happen in the transitional situation is that the client is less "locked-in" to a single patron and the need for political support forces patrons to compete with one another to create larger clienteles. For a brilliant analysis of this pattern in Philippine politics see Carl H. Landé, *Leaders Factions, and Parties—The Structure of Philippine Politics*, Monograph No. 6 (New Haven: Yale University—Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), *passim*.

[17] In this context, party labels are deceptive. The existence of parties proclaiming an ideology or class position are often found in rural areas where the labels have been appropriated in toto in a continuation of traditional feuds between powerful families and their respective clienteles. The key is the nature of loyalty patterns, not the name of the organization. See Carlo Levi, *Christ Stopped at Eboli* (New York: Pocket Books, 1965).

loyalty. As the case of the United States illustrates, though, the presence of sharp ethnic and sectional cleavage—the latter reinforced by constitutional arrangements—may considerably dilute the strength of these new bonds.

The duration of Phase B, when the social context is most hospitable to machine style politics, may vary widely. When the social disorganization accompanying urbanization and economic change is particularly severe and of long duration, when it is compounded by deep cultural differences, when competitive elections with a universal suffrage are introduced early, the pressures toward machine politics will be vastly greater than when demographic change is gradual and less severe, when it occurs with a minimum of cultural cleavage, and when the electorate is restricted. The historical circumstances of both the U.S. and most new nations have been, in this sense, quite conducive to the development of machine politics as opposed, say, to the Western European experience.

Political parties must generally offer inducements of one kind or another to potential supporters. The pressures to enlist adherents is obviously greatest when the party faces a competitive electoral struggle but, in the absence of battles for votes, merely the desire to establish a broad following among the populace may create analogous pressures.

The sort of incentives most likely to "move" people is contingent, as the phase model clearly implies, on the kinds of loyalty ties that are most salient to the potential client. In the short-run, at least, parties that need supporters are more apt to respond to the incentives which motivate their clientele then to transform the nature of those incentives. Elaborating on this relationship between loyalty bonds and party

inducements, the table below suggests the actual empirical patterns likely to occur.

Parties in the real world commonly confront all four patterns of loyalty simultaneously and fashion a mix of inducements that corresponds to the mix of loyalties.[20] Inducements, moreover, are not unifunctional; public works usually carry with them a host of jobs and contracts that can be distributed along more particularistic lines while patronage can be wielded in such a way as to actually favor an entire community or ethnic group.

With these qualifications in mind, I am suggesting that, given pressure to gain support, a party will emphasize those inducements that are appropriate to the loyalty patterns among its clientele. Material inducements are as characteristic of occupational or class loyalties as they are of local or family loyalties; what is different is simply the scope and nature of the group being "bribed" by the party, not the fact of "bribery." In the case of occupational and class loyalties, the inducements can be offered as general legislation (and rationalized by ideology, too), whereas inducements at the individual or family level must often be supplied illegally ("corruptly") at the enforcement stage.[21] The classical machine faces a social context in which community and family orientations are most decisive. Responding to its environment, the machine is thus likely to become consumately skilled in both the political distribution of public works through porkbarrel legislation and in the dispensation of

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[18] Charismatic ties naturally involve more symbolic inducements than do ties of traditional deference in which clients are generally assured a certain minimal level of material well-being (security) by their protector or patron in return for their loyalty.

[19] Term borrowed from Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., p. 337.

[20] The importance of one or another pattern can, in addition, be amplified or diminished by structural characteristics of the political system; in the U. S., federalism and local candidate selection tend to amplify geographical ties. See Theodore J. Lowi, "Party, Policy, and Constitution in America," pp. 238–276 in Chambers and Nisbet, eds., op. cit.

[21] Political systems vary significantly in the extent to which favors and patronage can be carried out within the law. In the United States, for example, the traditional use of postmasterships, ambassadorial posts, and a number of state jobs exempt from normal civil service requirements provides a pool of party spoils denied most Indian, Malaysian, or Nigerian politicians.

TABLE 2. INDUCEMENTS AND THE
NATURE OF LOYALTY

Nature of Loyalties	Inducement
1. Ties of traditional deference or of charisma	Mostly symbolic, non-material inducements[18]
2. Community or locality orientation (also ethnic concentration)	Indivisible rewards; public works, schools "pork-barrel" Communal Inducements
3. Individual, family, or small group orientation	Material rewards; patronage, favors, cash payments "corruption" Individual Inducements
4. Occupational or class orientation	Policy commitments tax law, subsidy programs, etc. "general legislation" Sectoral Inducements[19]

jobs and favors through more informal channels.

Historically, the expansion of the suffrage together with the rupture of traditional economic and status arrangements have signalled the rise of particularistic, material inducements. In Robert Walcott's masterful portrait of electoral politics in 18th century England, this transition is vividly depicted in the contrast between the shire constituencies where traditional landholders still commanded the allegiance of a small electorate and the larger urban constituencies where elections

were notoriously venal and turbulent. Wealthy beer-barons with hireling armies of draymen battled for the representation of Southwark: while the mass of Westminster electors were marshalled out, with considerable efficiency, to vote for candidates set up by the court.[22]

Southwark and Westminster, at the time Walcott describes them, were the exception rather than the rule, and English parliamentary politics revolved around coalitions of clique leaders, each of whom was generally accepted as the "natural" representative of his constituency. The transition, however, was underway.

A similar shift from patterns of deference to patterns of short-run material inducements is evident in contemporary Philippine politics. Like the English landed proprietor in the 18th century, the Filippino *haciendero* could, until recently, rely on his tenant laborers and peasants indebted to him to vote as he directed. Increasingly though, the economic arrangements and traditional patron-client ties that undergird this deference are eroding and the peasant now often requires cash or other special inducements.[23] Pork-barrel legislation is still of great electoral significance, but family and individual inducements (to the exclusion of broader sectoral demands) are the real currency of electoral struggles. As Landé describes them,

Political parties in the Philippines, on the whole, find it unnecessary to make categorical choices between programs favoring . . . one or another social class. There are two reasons for this, the

first being that Filippino voters allow their rulers to satisfy their needs particularistically . . . The second reason . . . is that most Filippino voters are not much disturbed by measures that go against the collective interests of their class or category for they have learned to expect that, as individuals, they may escape the effects of these laws.[24]

Furthermore,

The ordinary voter also learns that what he does can have a direct effect upon certain substantive "outputs" of government. He knows that, rather than sell his vote for cash, he can trade it for the promise of a public works job, free medical care in a government hospital, protection against harassment by a local policeman, or exemption from the payment of taxes.[25]

As elsewhere, the decline of deference in the Philippines has encouraged the growth of machine style politics in which a mixture of public works and, above all, more particularistic rewards provide the fuel. The necessary incentives, as the description indicates, are generally arranged by influence at the enforcement stage—reflected in the widespread corruption for which the Philippines is noted. Philippine experience, in this regard, is reminiscent of changes in the conduct of American politics which reached decisive proportions by the mid-19th century. Till then, more oligarchic patterns prevailed which "depended on habits of deference or subordination on the part of voters toward established notables in local communities, who were recognized as natural leaders."[26] Only after such "habits of deference" had receded in the face of economic change and immigration could the machine style of particularistic, material rewards begin to thrive on a large scale.

Changes in modal patterns of loyalty help account for not only the development of machine politics but for its decline as well. In addition to other factors (which are discussed below), the growth of political ties in which family bonds were less important than before and in which occupational and/or class considerations played a more prominent role undercut the very foundation of the machines.[27] The

[22] Robert Walcott, Jr., *English Politics in the Early Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 13. The coincidence between the patterns Walcott describes and contemporary Philippine politics is discussed by Carl Landé, *op.cit.*, pp. 101–107.

[23] David Wurfel, "The Philippines," pp. 757–773 in Rose and Heidenheimer (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 771

[24] Landé, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[26] William Nisbet Chambers, "Party Development and the American Mainstream," pp. 3–32, in Chambers and Burnham (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[27] Family loyalties are always of significance but in the typical machine case narrow family ties become a central factor in the evaluation of

specific inducements which the machine was organized to supply worked their "magic" on a smaller and smaller proportion of party workers and supporters. Instead, as businessmen and laborers each came to appreciate their broader, longer run interest as a sector of society, they increasingly required general legislation that met their interests in return for political support. Here and there a social context tailored to the machine style remained, but the machine either reconciled itself to the new loyalties—becoming less and less a machine in the process—or was the electoral victim of social change. Parties still continued to offer palpable inducements to voters but the new inducements were more typically embodied in general legislation, where previously they had been particularistic and often outside the law. As Banfield and Wilson summarize the transition,

If in the old days specific material inducements were illegally given as bribes to favored individuals, now much bigger ones are legally given to a different class of favored individuals, and, in addition, general inducements are proferred in packages to every large group in the electorate and to tiny but intensely moved minorities as well.[28]

III. THE ECOLOGY OF MACHINE COORDINATION

Historically the distinctive style of political coordination embodied in the machine has occurred in settings where, in addition to rapid social change and a competitive electoral system, a) political power was fragmented, b) ethnic cleavage and/or social disorganization were widespread, and c) most of the population was poor. Drawn mostly from studies of urban machines in the United States, these features of the environment seem applicable to a large degree to the many underdeveloped nations in which political parties have resembled machines.

a) *The Fragmentation of Power*: In accounting for corruption and machine politics in Chicago, Merriam lays particular stress on the multiplicity of urban authorities and jurisdictions that existed within the city. The eight main "governments," each with different powers,

that he describes, created so many jealously guarded centers of power that a mayor faced a host of potential veto groups, any one of which could paralyze him.[29] He could secure cooperation with these authorities only by striking informal bargains—often involving patronage, contracts, franchises—and thus putting together the necessary power piece by piece.

Power was fragmented in yet another sense. Party candidates did not face one electorate but several; each ethnic group had its own special interests and demands and a successful campaign depended on assembling a temporary coalition on the basis of inducements suited to each group. The decentralization of power created by such a heterogeneous environment, meant that the "boss' " control was forever tenuous. His temporary authority rested on his continuing capacity to keep rewards flowing at the acceptable rate.

New York in the era of Boss Tweed strikingly resembles Merriam's picture of Chicago. Inspite of the prodigious manipulations attributed to him, Tweed was not especially powerful and had little control over party branches that could nominate their own candidates for many posts. What he did manage to do, however, was to create, for a time, a centralized, finely articulated coalition. Carefully assessing the nature of Tweed's feat, Seymour Mandelbaum declares:

There was only one way New York could be "bossed" in the 1960's. The lines of communication were too narrow, the patterns of deference too weak to support freely acknowledged and stable leadership. Only a universal payment of benefits—a giant pay-off—could pull the city together in a common effort. The only treasury big enough to support coordination was the public till.[30]

Many leaders of developing nations might well sympathize with Tweed's difficulties. They also face a highly differentiated populace—divided not only along ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional lines but also representing varying stages of incorporation into the modern sector

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government action. Occupational, much less broad civic, sentiments play a marginal or even negligible role. Most immigrants to the U.S., for example, at first "took for granted that the political life of the individual would arise out of family needs. . . ": Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), p. 9.

[28] Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

[29] Charles E. Merriam, *Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1929), pp. 68, 90. Merriam's analysis is especially valuable as he was simultaneously political scientist and politician throughout the period he describes.

[30] Seymour J. Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 58. See also, Edward J. Flynn, *You're the Boss* (New York: Viking Press, 1947), p. 21, for a 20th century account of New York City politics in which a similar argument is made.

and varying degrees of loyalty or hostility in the nation state. Except in those instances where physical coercion is preferred and sufficient to the task, rulers in the new states must reach some accommodation with enough of these interests to govern. Electoral struggles may vastly increase the pressure to reach an accommodation—for competitive elections enhance the value of popular support—but such pressures are in a sense endemic where state authority is weak. More often than not, the price of rule involves paying off each of a variety of interests in their own (usually particularistic) coin. The system of coordination thus comes to resemble machine politics.

b) *Social Fragmentation and Disorganization*: The immigrants who constituted the bulk of the clientele of the American urban machine came largely from the European peasantry. As such, they "required the most extensive acculturation simply to come to terms with urban-industrial existence as such, much less to enter the party system as relatively independent actors."[31] If the fragmentation of power made it advantageous for the politician to offer special inducements for support, the situation of the immigrant made him eager to respond to blandishments that corresponded with his most immediate needs. Machine inducements are thus particularly compelling among disoriented new arrivals who value greatly the quick helping hand extended to them by the party.

The dependence of machine parties on a clientele that is both unfamiliar with the contours of the political system and economically on the defensive, is underscored by the character of the small pockets where vestiges of once powerful machines still exist. One such example is the Dawson machine (really a sub-machine) in Chicago. This machine rests squarely on favors and patronage among the Negro population, most of which has come to Chicago from the rural south within the last generation. Deprived of even this steadily diminishing social base, the machine has elsewhere withered as the populations it assisted became acculturated and could afford the luxury of wider loyalties and longer range political goals.

It is no coincidence then, that machines florished during the period of most rapid urban growth in the U.S., when the sense of community was especially weak, and when social fragmentation made particularistic ties virtually the only feasible means of cooperation. The machine bound its clientele to it by virtue

of the employment, legal services, economic relief, and so forth it supplied for them.

For the lower strata, in return for their votes, it provided a considerable measure of primitive welfare functions, personalized help for individuals caught up in the toils of the law, and political socialization.[32]

With few qualifications, the social context that nourished machines in America matches the conditions in new nations. Rapid urban migration of rural peasantries, especially since W.W. II, when coupled with ethnic fragmentation, economic insecurity and a basic unfamiliarity with the Western governmental forms adopted by most new states, have conspired to create an analogous social context. As in the U.S. at the turn of the century, a large clientele is available that will respond enthusiastically to short-run material incentives and to the party that provides them.

c) *Poverty*: Perhaps the most fundamental quality shared by the mass clientele of machines is poverty. Machines characteristically rely on suffrage of the poor and, naturally, prosper best when the poor are many and the middle-class few. In America, Banfield and Wilson emphasized that

Almost without exception, the lower the average income and the fewer the average years of schooling in a ward, the more dependable the ward's allegiance to the machine.[33]

Poverty shortens a man's time horizon and maximizes the effectiveness of short-run material inducements. Quite rationally he is willing to accept a job, cash, or simply the promise of assistance when he needs it, in return for his vote and that of his family. Attachments to policy goals or to an ideology imply something of a future orientation as well as wide loyalties, while poverty discounts future gains and focuses unavoidably on the here and now.

The attitudes associated with poverty that facilitate machine style politics are not just confined to a few urban centers in less developed nations, but typify portions of the rural population as well.[34] In such circumstances, the jobs, money, and other favors at the disposal of the government represent com-

[32] *Ibid*. Merriam calls the precinct worker "something of a social worker not recognized by the profession," *op. cit.*, p. 173.

[33] Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

[34] For a more extended discussion of these attitudes and their origin, see my *Political Ideology in Malaysia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), Chapter 6.

[31] Burnham, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

pelling inducements. Deployed to best advantage, these incentives are formidable weapons in building coalitions and/or electioneering. The ease with which votes are bought—individually in many urban areas, and in blocs where village or ethnic cohesion is sufficient to secure collaboration—during elections in the new nations is a measure of the power of narrow material rewards in the social context of poverty.[35]

IV. SELF-INTEREST AS POLITICAL CEMENT: THE PATRONAGE

A popular regime is likely to reflect more of the social context in which it arises than a regime that rests primarily on coercion. The quest for broad popular support—whether because of electoral competition or, say, because of the desire to build a following wide enough to forestall potential coups—usually entails being responsive to the kinds of political demands coming from the society. Forging a wide coalition of interests in social contexts that resemble the features of the U.S. at the turn of the century or most new nations today, inevitably means developing a capacity to distribute short-run material incentives among potential clienteles. Few, if any, durable political bonds except that of material self-interest are available to build a large political party among poor, heterogeneous, transitional populations. Self-interest thus provides the necessary political cement when neither a traditional governing elite nor a ruling group based on ideological or class interest is available.

Small wonder, then, that, faced with the environment we have outlined, and with a steady deterioration of the symbolic bonds fashioned during the struggle for independence, parties in the new states have frequently taken on many machine-like traits. An overwhelming concern with the particularistic distribution of rewards to supporters so as to maintain the patchwork of interests uneasily contained within the ruling party and the decline of broader policy goals are the hallmarks of this transformation. The metamorphosis has been most striking in those cases where electoral anxieties have been most intense; e.g., the Philippines,[36]

Ceylon, and, increasingly, India. In nations where a single party faces little competition but has not totally dismantled electoral procedures, machine features are often in evidence, too.[37] Only where the military has taken command has the distributive process been confined to such narrow proportions as to resemble more an oligarchy, or occasionally a dictatorship, than a machine.

Among the specific instruments of coordination available to the machine, the power of patronage is perhaps the most celebrated. The practice of patronage is by no means, however, confined to machine parties—nor is political graft on franchises, contracts, or licenses, for that matter. The court in 18th century England based its ability to create a viable parliamentary coalition on the distribution of public offices to the right people at the right time.[38] Nevertheless, the necessity of generating broad support on a continuing basis has typically meant that machine parties wield the patronage on a scale that is distinctive.

By exploiting the public purse to provide posts that may be dealt out according to political criteria, the machine party gains a staple means of maintaining internal discipline and cohesion. The diverse groups and individuals comprising the party are linked together by such material rewards as patronage, while these posts supply the party with a cadre of political workers who are constantly available to the organization and who will be responsive to commands from the leadership. It is precisely the diversity of groups within the party that renders this pool of available jobs an indispensible basis of organization. The effectiveness of patronage as a means of coordination hinges, of course, on the kind of clientele I have described—a clinetele for whom jobs are of central importance.

The political distribution of patronage was perfected to the point of fine art by the American urban machine. In the heyday of machines the number of posts dispensed by patronage reached prodigious levels. Around the turn of

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[35] Wurfel, for example, claims that 10–20% of Filippino voters *regularly* sell their votes. *Op. cit.*, p. 763. The differences between urban- and rural-based machines in the U.S. and less developed nations is an important subject that I hope to treat in a later article.

[36] Filippino parties resembled machines well before independence due to the powers they exercised within the colonial system and a pattern of early electoral competition.

[37] For single party states, the significance of material incentives has appeared to grow as the leader of the independence movement passed from the scene or as the charisma generated in that period diminished. What had been movements *par excellence* gradually became machine parties. Communist states in underdeveloped areas are, of course, exceptions.

[38] Walcott, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

the century, according to Lincoln Steffens, the Martin machine in Philadelphia had placed 15,000 people in office and "each of these 15,000 persons was selected for office because he could deliver votes, either by organizations, by parties, or by familes."[39] In New York City in the 1930's, the total annual pay for posts exempt from civil service regulations—that is, political jobs—exceeded seven million dollars even after some reforms had been enacted.[40]

While the bastion of patronage in the U.S. has remained at the state and local levels, federal jobs have historically served to knit together national parties as well. The most striking example of this may well be Lincoln's victorious Republican Party of 1860—a hodgepodge of ethnic groups, old Whigs, old Democrats, rural and urban interests, family-based factions, and so forth. As Carman and Luthin describe it, the Republicans

had come together in the recent campaign like Highland clans to battle the common foe, the leaders of these various factions were still jealous of one another and often openly hostile. Lincoln realized that public jobs wisely distributed were the cement he must use to hold the Republican party together.[41]

The need for coordination by patronage resulted in "the most sweeping removal of federal office holders up to that time in American history,"[42] Occupants of roughly twelve hundred of the fifteen hundred posts covered were replaced with the party faithful. As it developed, the distribution of federal jobs not only cemented the party but served to cement a part of the republic itself by keeping some states within the fold during the Civil War. Carman and Luthin conclude that the liberal

use of the patronage was largely responsible for containing secessionist pressures in Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware. Later, during the campaign of 1864, Lincoln also skillfully used the patronage in each state to help ensure his renomination and election. The fact that the distribution of jobs proved such a powerful political factor is due as much to the importance of federal employment in the minds of party workers as to Lincoln's talent for deploying it.

Given the heterogeneous composition of parties in new nations, the nature of their clientele, the scarcity value of government employment in poor nations, the patronage is, if anything, an even more significant adhesive agent than it was in the U.S. The "bandwagon" effect experienced by many ruling parties after independence was partly due to a popular recognition that the party would control the disposal of tangible rewards for some time to come and, conversely, the "negative bandwagon" effect whereby parties that failed to capture at least a local power base often disintegrated, was related to the absence of material rewards to bind their initial following.

Wielding the patronage in the new nations, however, occurs in a markedly different legal context than it did in much of urban America. Saddled with the "very latest" in terms of civil service regulations, politicians in the new nations must regularly resort to practices that are either highly questionable or transparently illegal to find jobs for some of the party workers. In India, the political career of Partap Singh Kairon, Chief Minister of the Punjab, was cut short by a public inquiry that cited him for relatively minor financial peculations and for using his influence to persuade the state Public Service Commission to exclude a few posts from normal civil service requirements.[43] Deprived of open access to the spoils that built strong parties in America or 19th century England, Kairon was indicted for behavior that would scarcely have appeared unseemly in Boss Tweed's day. Congress Party politicians, despite the occasional risks, have increasingly made use of the available patronage (not to mention licenses, contracts, franchises) to maintain their electoral strength, secure party cohesion, and even to help contain mounting secessionist pressures.[44] Especially at the state

[39] Lincoln Steffens, *The Shame of the Cities*. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1963), p. 147. This was the case despite the fact that the Philadelphia machine made use of outright elector fraud as well.

[40] J. K. Pollock, "The Cost of the Patronage System," *The Annals*, 189 (1937, p. 29, quoted in V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Crowell, 1966), p. 353.

[41] Harry J. Carman and Reinhard H. Luthin, *Lincoln and the Patronage* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), p. 10. For an account of patronage in the first few decades after independence, see Sidney H. Aronson, *Status and Kinship in the Higher Civil Service: Standards of Selection in the Administrations of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 331.

[43] *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Matter of Pratap Singh Kairon* (Das Commission) (New Delhi: Government Printer, June 11, 1964), pp. 222, 224, 235.

[44] See, for example, the introduction to the "Santhanam Report," *Report of the Committee*

level, the Congress Party has come to resemble a classical political machine.

A wide variety of economic measures in new nations merit close analysis for their patronage functions. In this respect, programs of nationalization, while they may answer economic and patriotic needs too, are frequently tailored to maximize the number of patronage posts available to the ruling party. Indonesia prior to 1957 provides a striking example of these mixed motives. When a measure permitting only Indonesian firms to handle sea cargo was implemented, each of the major parties then in the cabinet established their own warehousing firms and simply assumed control of the existing facilities and business.[45] These favored enterprises—although formally within the private sector—supplied a source of both income and employment for the ruling parties.[46] Discussing the economic policy of the three cabinets from 1953–57 Herbert Feith concludes,

On the whole, their measures of Indonesianization failed to bring about any increase in the *power* of Indonesian nationals within the economy, a fact which suggests that the patronage function of these measures may have been more important than their policy aspect.[47]

Analogous cases from other new nations could be cited at some length, but the Indonesian example is sufficiently illustrative of the general pattern. Patronage pressures are present in military regimes in new nations too,[48]

but in party dominated regimes these tendencies arise not only from kinship ties and the desire for informal employment fees, but from the need to reward party workers and to maintain or broaden support.[49] The military clique need only secure the acquiescence of a relatively few powerful groups; the party characteristically faces patronage demands of greater scope since it must cultivate a large popular following.

The party's need to put together a broad coalition is often reflected in the structure and operation of development programs as well. Even in Italy, where the ruling Christian Democratic Party depends on votes from the rural south, LaPalombara has written that the Fund for the Development of the South "has become a gigantic *patronage organization* which employs people and awards developmental contracts strictly on the basis of political considerations."[50] Quite apart from its contribution to economic growth in the south, then, the Fund is managed so as to enhance Christian Democratic electoral strength in the "underdeveloped" south.

Rural development programs in many new nations are designed with this duality of function in mind. To mention only one other instance, the activities of Malaysia's Ministry of Rural Development are keyed closely to the electoral requirements of the ruling Alliance Party. The employment, "pork-barrel" funds, and contracts engendered by its programs are carefully distributed among rural Malays who are deemed assets to the party, and the few areas of solid opposition strength naturally receive little or nothing.[51] If anything, the political component of these programs has contributed to their economic success.

The Malaysian and Italian cases each exemplify the effects of machine pressures on development schemes. In fact, where parties in the new nations must build wide support (generally for elections) one would expect to

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on Prevention of Corruption (New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1964); Ronald Segal, *The Crisis of India* (London: Johnathan Cape, 1965), Ch. 6; and Surendranath Dwivedy and G. S. Bhargava, *Political Corruption in India* (Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1967).

[45] Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 478–479. See also pp. 366–384 for a more general discussion.

[46] The multi-party setting of Indonesia at this time resembles less a strong machine party in power than a situation where two or more potential machine parties are vying for power. While a solid machine often looks to its long run interest and limits patronage and graft to moderate levels, the situation where potential machines vie for power is inevitably more hectic and less restrained. In Indonesia, the smaller parties, having few long-term concerns, were the most ravenous.

[47] Herbert Feith, *op. cit.*, p. 557, emphasis in original.

[48] See, for example, Fred W. Riggs, Thailand, *The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), pp. 270–271.

[49] The narrower scope of patronage distribution in military regimes does not preclude its overall volume being greater. If military leaders need not generate broad support in order to rule, neither need they be as concerned about the public reaction at the polls to inordinate official misconduct.

[50] Joseph LaPalombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics* (Princeton: University Press, 1964), p. 344, emphasis mine.

[51] For an example of how the most traditional areas are able to resist machine blandishments, see Manning Nash, "Tradition and Tension in Kelantan," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, I (June, 1966), 310–314.

find greater emphasis placed on broad rural development programs—programs with a capacity to distribute incentives throughout much of the population—than where wide support is of only marginal concern. To some extent, these programs are the functional equivalent of the services American urban machines performed for first generation voters in the cities.

Patronage is but one of the many material incentives that parties aspiring to gain wide support among a "transitional" population must resort to. Graft for party funds, help with the law, and selective non-enforcement are, like patronage, part of the bundle of short-run inducements involving "corrupt" influence at the enforcement stage that serve as the organizational cement for the typical machine party. Where machine pressures are evident in new nations, the development programs pursued are often more amenable to the kind of political analysis indicated here than to an analysis that focuses merely on the economic or nationalistic requirements customarily used to justify such ventures. The choice among development projects and the manner of their execution may depend, for the ruling party, less on criteria of growth or productivity than on the level and quality of inducements they place at the party's disposal. If economic success and political payoffs coincide, so much the better, but a project judged a failure by economic planners may nonetheless have achieved precisely the political effects expected of it.[52]

V. THE MACHINE AS A CONSERVATIVE RESPONSE TO CHANGE

Thriving in periods of rapid social change, machine politics nevertheless represents a conservative response to its dynamic environment.[53] Machine politics is conservative in at

[52] Road-building in Malaysia illustrates this pattern. The present road system is adequate for some time to come and planners have urged a lower priority for this activity. The almost unique capacity of a large road construction program to reach many rural areas with pork-barrel and patronage benefits, however, has led the ruling party to continue to pave its way throughout rural Malaysia at much the same rate as in the past. Similar calculations lie behind road programs in other new nations—and in portions of the U.S. as well.

[53] Some readers may object to the use of the term "conservative" to cover the effects described. If so, each of the separate effects may be considered separately as the term itself is not central to the argument.

least these four respects: a) it represents an alternative to violence in managing conflict, b) it increases the legitimacy of the regime for transitional populations, c) it emphasizes short-run gains at the expense of encouraging long-run transformations, d) it avoids class issues and fosters inter-class collaboration.

It is crucial to specify here that these effects, while they may flow in part from corrupt practices, are attributable to machine politics and not to corruption per se.[54] The central fact about a political "machine" is that it aims at the "political consolidation of the beneficiaries" of the patronage and graft system.[55] Whereas non-machine corruption often has a random and sporadic character or aims only at the consolidation of narrow elites who control wealth or armed force, the machine must remain popular to survive and must consequently meet the demands of a broad stratum. Not all corruption is machine politics and not all machine politics is corrupt.

Avoiding Violence: The social setting of the machine is ordinarily one where ties to the community as a whole are weak and where the potential for violence is great. The capacity of the machine to organize and provide material inducements (often corruptly) operates as a means of solving, for the time being at least, conflicts of interest that might otherwise generate violence. In order to remain popular, the machine must continually make a place for new, ambitious leaders who could potentially threaten its control. By coopting new leaders the machine can be responsive to new demands while simultaneously protecting its own future.[56]

The 1946 presidential election in the Philippines is a striking example of the use of machine inducements to defuse temporarily an economic situation highly charged with a potential for violence. Faced with a "rising tide of peasant labor discontent," the main sugar, banking, and commercial interests contributed enor-

[54] Both Joseph Nye, *op. cit.*, and David H. Bayley, "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation," *Western Political Quarterly*, XIX (December, 1966), 719–732 appear occasionally to treat much corruption as if it were "machine corruption" without specifying the distinction.

[55] Key, *The Techniques of Political Graft in the United States, op. cit.* p. 394.

[56] For an imaginative effort to deal quantitatively with the Congress Party's cooptation of former opponents in Orissā as its majority was threatened, see Baily, *op. cit.*, Ch. 9. The process of cooptation of conservative leaders changed the social base of the party and forced abandonment of much of its original legislative program.

mous funds to the Liberals, whose electoral campaign virtually smothered the revolutionary fires beneath a soft carpet of green.[57]

The Philippine case illustrates the limits of machine conciliation as well. Depending as they do on particularistic, material incentives, machines are only as effective as their inducements. For either the modern sector where broader loyalties and civic sentiments have taken root, or the traditional sector where deference and symbolic goals are common, machine blandishments are likely to fall on barren soil. Machines can, thus, manage conflict best among "transitional" populations and may be unable to alleviate strife—or may actually exacerbate it—in other social contexts.

Creating Legitimacy: Urban American machines have long been credited with wedding the immigrant to the political system by protecting him, meeting his immediate needs, and offering *personal* (particularistic) service. If the new arrival was to be tied to the political system at all, it would have to be by personal, material inducements, and the machine responded since each immigrant represented a vote which it needed. The effectiveness of machine inducements during the Boss Tweed era in New York was underscored by what happened in the short reform period that followed his rule. Within one year, Mandelbaum states, reform mayor Havemeyer "did not have the support of a single mass based political organization."[58] Reform governments, determined to avoid the corrupt practices of the machine, soon discovered that the cost of "clean" government was a marked loss of support.

In India, where ethnic groups are geographically concentrated and thus compound the problem of alienation with that of secession, Weiner claims that only machine style bargaining and benefits can hold the state together.[59] The Congress Party has, in fact, increasingly distributed both particularistic rewards and pork-barrel projects whenever calls for regional autonomy reached threatening proportions, but the success of such efforts has been spotty. Ironically, the desire for regional autonomy was, in part, prompted by a recognition that more civil service posts, more scholarships, and so forth would be available to the local party if regional autonomy were granted than if it were not.

The latent function of building legitimacy served by machine politics is subject to the same qualification that was made for its capacity to settle conflict peacefully. Machine practices may engender support among those for whom material incentives are effective, but may, on the other hand, increase the alienation of the new middle class, military officers, students, and the very traditional. Once again, the *impact of the inducement hinges on the social context.* The support generated by machine rewards is, moreover, based rather tenuously on the continuing distributive capacity of the regime. Lacking either ideological or charismatic foundations, the regime may find its support has evaporated once it can no longer deliver the concrete inducements that serve as the party's social adhesive.

Short-run Goals: The machine must, in a sense, buy its popularity. To the extent that it faces competition, the cost of popularity is raised and the public till may not be sufficient to the demands it must meet. The effect of this "squeeze" in urban America has often forced the machine party not only to raise the city's debt[60] but also to rely increasingly on assistance from businesses with interests in the city. This latter strategy was not without its penalty as licenses and franchises were given to traction and power interests for negligible amounts, as the city accepted sub-standard equipment and materials, and so forth. *Frequently, a three-cornered relationship developed in which the machine politician could be viewed as a broker who, in return for financial assistance from wealthy elites, promoted their policy interests when in office, while passing along a portion of the gain to a particularistic electorate from whom he "rented" his authority.* The substantial long-run costs to the community as a whole were seldom appreciated since the machine controlled an electorate with little sense of community interests and a preference for immediate, personal inducements.

Machines in the new nations have often been impelled to follow a similar course. Although the private sector was occasionally a less significant resource base than in urban America, the machine frequently developed close and occasionally secretive ties with wealthy elites— especially in Southeast Asia and East Africa where minority groups dominate the private sector. Meeting reciprocal obligations to these groups and distributing material incentives for popular support has made the pursuit of longer-run development objectives more dif-

[57] Virginia F. Baterina, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
[58] Seymour Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
[59] Myron Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–72.

[60] Boss Tweed, in four years, raised New York City's indebtedness by a multiple of three while leaving both the tax rate and assessments untouched. Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

ficult.[61] Elsewhere, a dangerous running down of foreign exchange reserves or steeply inflationary deficits have provided fuel for the machine[62]—characteristically followed by a military government presiding over an austerity program.

d) *Non-class Focus:* The fact that the machine stresses family and parochial loyalties to the virtual exclusion of ideology and class politics requires little elaboration, as it is embedded in the definition of a machine.

So long as the public's interest continues to be centered on the scramble for particular benefits for individuals, overt rivalry will tend to be intra-class rather then interclass.[63]

While older elites have typically looked askance at the possibilities for personal mobility provided to those of humble origins by the machine, class issues of the collective nature beyond vague populism have been rare. Machines, by the nature of rewards they offer and personal ties they build into their organization, may well impede the growth of the class and occupational bonds implied by economic change and thus prolong the period during which family and/or ethnic ties are decisive.

VI. THE FAILURE OF THE MACHINE IN NEW NATIONS

Looking at politics in the new nations a scant five years ago, the machine model would have seemed an increasingly practical tool of analysis. The symbolic ties of the nationalist struggle were steadily losing their strength and yet electoral procedures were still enough in evidence to reinforce the efforts of ruling parties to remain genuinely popular. Politicization of the colonial bureaucracy was often underway and many parties were becoming adept at building support by distributing patronage and pork-barrel projects. In spite of these harbingers of machine development, relatively few machine parties actually materialized and those that did were generally short-lived.[64] The task, there-

fore, is to explain why machines failed to develop as they did in urban America. The simplest answer is, of course, that embryonic machines in new nations were generally thrown out by military coups. Beyond this truth, however, there are additional reasons why machines failed to flourish that are based on the social context of new nations and the dynamics of machine politics itself.

The decline of machine politics in America is of only limited use in accounting for what happened to rudimentary machines in the new states. How, after all, does one compare the demise of two machines, one of which (U.S.) appears to die a more or less "natural" death with a machine that is struck down by military force?

Samuel Hays ascribes the atrophy and disappearance of the American urban machine to

certain rather obvious but momentous changes in American life. In the first place, a continually increasing majority of the active American electorate has moved above the poverty line. Most of this electorate is no longer bound to party through the time-honored links of patronage and the machine. Indeed, for a large number of people, politics appears to have the character of an item of luxury consumption. . . .[65]

The services that tied the client to the machine were either no longer necessary or were performed by other agencies than the machine. In a full-employment economy with rising wages, patronage was insufficient cement with which to organize and control a party. With aid to dependent children and old age assistance becoming the formal responsibility of government agencies, "the precinct captain's hod of coal was a joke."[66] The protective and defensive

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ties possess notable machine characteristics, one might include India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and especially Lebanon. In the Ivory Coast and India the ruling parties still retain some of the "mass movement" ideological features that marked their earlier history.

[65] In William Nisbet Chambers, *op. cit.*, p. 305. To my knowledge, no actual empirical tests of hypotheses advanced for the rise or decline of machine politics have been attempted. It would be instructive, for example, to plot the increases and decreases of machine style politics over time in a number of American cities against possible explanatory variables such as rates of in-migration, changes in per-capita income, changes in income distribution, changes in welfare measures, rates of education, and so forth. I am grateful to Garry Brewer for suggesting this general line of inquiry.

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 121.

[61] Where business secures freedom from restrictions via its ties with the machine, economic growth may be speeded but it appears, in most cases, that businesses seek favored, or monopolistic positions free from competitive rigors. See, for example, the *Santhanam Report, op. cit., passim.*

[62] Non-machine rulers often make use of similar income-producing tactics (e.g., Thailand) but, in the case of the machine, its needs are typically greater and its resources are usually destined for wider distribution as well as personal gain of office holders.

[63] Landé, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[64] Among those new nations where ruling par-

function of the machine had simply ceased to be important political incentives.

Viewed from another angle, the machine simply destroyed its own social base. It had flourished among those who were, for one reason or another, "civic incompetents"; so when immigration slackened, when the new citizens gained a secure economic foothold, and when they developed wider loyalties, the central prop of machine politics was destroyed. Here and there, individual politicians managed to adapt to the new style and incentives, but the machine itself disappeared along with its social context.

The failure of machines in the new nations not only differed from the American pattern, but varied somewhat from case to case due to the special circumstances of each nation. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern a number of important factors that appear to have been significant in the demise of many such embryonic machines.

In the first place, the full development of a machine depends on its evolving capacity to create and maintain a large popular following with particularistic inducements. Typically, this capacity has developed best in the context of electoral pressures. Elections in American cities were virtually guaranteed by the fact that the city was a unit in a larger political system which sanctioned elections; machines perfected their techniques in the knowledge that they would always face periodic electoral opposition. Ruling parties in new nations, however, often began with a considerable store of popularity generated in the nationalist period. As this support deteriorated, the dominant party did not necessarily have to fall back on material incentives to retain its wide support; it could alternatively abrogate elections and escape the usual machine pressures. A good many nationalist leaders—having goals of transformation in mind—were increasingly discouraged at the growth of particularistic demands from all quarters that liberal democratic forms seemed to foist on them. Not having the heart for mediating between a host of what they considered short-sighted parochial demands made of machine bosses, many concluded that liberal democracy stood in the way of long-run national goals. Both Nkrumah and Sukarno spoke feelingly in this regard, and both consciously chose to eschew machine politics for more grandiose, symbolic goals.[67]

Another factor that basically altered the character of machines in some cases was the predominant position of a single ethnic group. In urban America it was virtually never possible for a machine to rule without being obliged to knit together a broad ethnic coalition. Where machines could be based on one dominant ethnic group in new nations—e.g. pre-Ne Win Burma and, to a smaller extent, Nigeria—the excluded ethnic groups, which were often geographically concentrated, demanded at the very least more regional autonomy and launched secessionist revolts in some areas.[68] The resulting threat to the territorial integrity of the state was commonly the occasion for military takeovers.

Looking at those nations in which machines have developed with some vigor, the importance of elections and ethnic balance (or homogeneity) is manifest. Lebanon, Malaysia, and India, for example, are balanced ethnically so as to require some form of collaborative rule while the Philippines is relatively homogeneous ethnically; all four have retained electoral forms. Beyond these two factors, however, are two broad obstacles to machine politics relating to the nature of a machine's clientele and its resource base.

Machines in American cities tended to live beyond their means and the evidence suggests that machines in new nations behave similarly.[69] As a form of rule machines are particularly subject to what Zolberg terms "an inflationary process of demand-formation"[70] and naturally thrive best in a buoyant economy that provides them with a continually ex-

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party which "aggregates demands and converts them into legislative policy" and a political machine which "exists almost exclusively to stay in power." The problem, of course, is that many regimes are motivated almost solely to stay in power—e.g., the Thai military, Haiti's Duvalier—but the term machine should be reserved for civilian regimes which rest on a popular base. The CPP, until about 1960, might profitably be seen as a machine party, but thereafter coercion and symbolic goals dominated. "Military Coups and Political Development: Some Lessons from Ghana and Nigeria," *World Politics*, XX (January, 1968), 179-193.

[68] For an excellent discussion of ethnic configurations and their political implications, see Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press, 1963).

[69] This fact may indicate that machine politics is not a stable form of rule.

[70] Aristide R. Zolberg, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

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[67] In an otherwise perceptive article, Edward Feit characterizes, I think mistakenly, Nkrumah's CPP before the military coup as a political machine. He distinguishes between a political

panding store of material incentives to distribute. It is perhaps no coincidence that the high-water mark of machine politics in the new nations occurred in the mid-1950's when Korean War boom prices for primary exports underwrote high rates of growth. In addition, there were a large number of "one-time-only" rewards available to ruling parties after independence. Foreign businesses could be nationalized, new franchises and licenses could be let, older civil servants could be replaced by loyal party workers, but the supply of such material incentives was soon exhausted in the absence of economic expansion. Of the later cabinets before martial law was imposed in Indonesia, Feith claims,

. . . perhaps most fundamentally, the weakness of these later cabinets stemmed from their shortage of disposable rewards . . . Moreover, the number of material rewards and prestige roles which government was expected to provide did not decrease . . . In sum, then, those cabinets were almost as poorly equipped to reward as to punish.[71]

It is reasonable to suppose that the Indonesian case is not unique. The material rewards were, finally, not sufficient to the task and, amidst the ruling party's loss of support, the military —which, if it could not reward, could at least restrain and punish—stepped in.

The line of reasoning developed above suggests that perhaps the machine flourishes best at the sub-national level where it was confined in the U.S. That is, *the durability of this political form is maximized where there is an external guarantor of the electoral process, where the machine is a part of a larger growing economy that can afford its expensive habits, and where its bosses do not have a monopoly of coercive authority.* A large measure of the instability of machines in developing nations may derive

[71] Herbert Feith, *op. cit.*, p. 572.

from their national rather than local character.[72]

Finally, in those nations where demand-inflation was not the key factor, there was some question of how well suited the social context was to machine politics. On the one hand, the machine faced opposition from a small but strategically-placed middle class of civil servants, professionals, students, and, above all, army officers, which was less amenable to material incentives and was, like its American counterparts, profoundly alienated by machine corruption and patronage. On the other hand, the machines, particularly in Africa, faced large numbers of quite traditional folk for whom religious and cultural issues were still important[73] and whose leaders realized that the machine threatened the ascriptive basis of their power. These populations by and large remained outside the scope of the machine and represented, at a minimum, a latent challenge to the machine's authority. Bastions of tradition were often found in areas of "indirect rule" where social and political change had been less severe, while the machine won support especially among urban migrants and in areas (often "directly" ruled) where folk ways had been decisively uprooted by colonialism. The *transitional* population on which the machine relied was, in these cases, simply not large enough to sustain this form of government when it was menaced by widespread traditional recalcitrance and a powerful middle class with military allies. Macines require not only an economy that performs tolerably well but a social context that corresponds to the inducements it can give; only where both conditions have been satisfied have machines managed to survive and grow.

[72] I am indebted to Professor Henry Hart for suggesting this.
[73] To stretch a point, one might link them with the forces in American politics that felt strongest about Sunday laws, prohibition, and so forth.