1. ENEL 592 - Final Report

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1.2. Introduction

The aim of my ENEL 592 final project is to insert a set of security bugs into an System-on-Chip (SoC) design, and create associated testbenchs and firmware that demonstrate their implications. This is the culmination of my two previous assignments, where I surveyed hardware security verification and open-source SoC designs. The bugs should be as "realistic" as possible; they should resemble bugs found in-the-wild and be impactful.

Next semester, I will build on this project and approach the problem from the other side of the coin -- bug detection and/or correction. The resulting SoC will also serve as a good benchmark for this future work.

1.3. System-on-Chip Platform

The SoC I used for bug injection is the OpenTitan SoC, which I detailed in assignment 2. An excerpt of assignment 2 describing the OpenTitan SoC can be found in the appendix A.

1.4. Bug Selection

The inserted bugs should be impactful and representative of those found in the wild. They should also be "distributed" and affect different parts of the SoC while still being security-critical. I relied on the Hardware

CWEs to gain inspiration for candidate bugs. The hardware CWEs is a list of common weaknesses found in hardware designs. They are not bugs themselves, but are often found in designs as a result of bugs.

The 2021 CWE Most Important Hardware Weaknesses contains the most important hardware CWEs of 2021, evaluated using the following criteria:

1. How frequently is this weakness detected after it has been fielded?
2. Does the weakness require hardware modifications to mitigate it?
3. How frequently is this weakness detected during design?
4. How frequently is this weakness detected during test?
5. Can the weakness be mitigated once the device has been fielded?
6. Is physical access required to exploit this weakness?
7. Can an attack exploiting this weakness be conducted entirely via software?
8. Is a single exploit against this weakness applicable to a wide range (or family) of devices?
9. What methodologies do you practice for identifying and preventing both known weaknesses and new weaknesses?

This list is as a valuable starting point because it provides insight into industry and the challenges currently faced. My intuition is that analyzing and implementing bugs that fall within these CWEs should fulfill the desired criteria (realism and impact) and provide the most value for future benchmark uses.

The list contains 12 CWEs:

1. CWE-1189: Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC)
2. CWE-1191: On-Chip Debug and Test Interface With Improper Access Control
3. CWE-1231: Improper Prevention of Lock Bit Modification
4. CWE-1233: Security-Sensitive Hardware Controls with Missing Lock Bit Protection
5. CWE-1240: Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation
6. CWE-1244: Internal Asset Exposed to Unsafe Debug Access Level or State
7. CWE-1256: Improper Restriction of Software Interfaces to Hardware Features
8. CWE-1260: Improper Handling of Overlap Between Protected Memory Ranges
9. CWE-1272: Sensitive Information Uncleared Before Debug/Power State Transition
10. CWE-1274: Improper Access Control for Volatile Memory Containing Boot Code
11. CWE-1277: Firmware Not Updateable
12. CWE-1300: Improper Protection of Physical Side Channels

All of these 12 CWEs are all applicable to bug insertion at the RTL. They can all get introduced during the implementation phase, as noted on their CWE pages, which is the development phase I am focusing on. Some do not appear applicable at first glance, but are fairly open to intepretation because they are so generic. For example, CWE-1240: Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation mainly mentions the use of "weak" cryptographic primitives (e.g., weak algorithms like MD5), but this can also be understood as the incorrect implementation of a strong algorithm. The latter may be suitable for this project depending on how much modifification to the original design is required.

To narrow down the list of CWEs to implement, I further classified them by CWE Category, the highest level of the CWE hierarchy. Again, the goal is to develop a distributed set of bugs and classifying them by category will allow me to gain the most functional variety. The CWE categories and their summaries were obtained from the CWE list.

CWE-1196 - Security Flow Issues: weaknesses in this category are related to improper design of full-system security flows, including but not limited to secure boot, secure update, and hardware-device attestation.

- CWE-1274: Improper Access Control for Volatile Memory Containing Boot Code

CWE-1198 - Privilege Separation and Access Control Issues: weaknesses in this category are related to features and mechanisms providing hardware-based isolation and access control (e.g., identity, policy, locking control) of sensitive shared hardware resources such as registers and fuses.

- CWE-1189: Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC)
- CWE-1260: Improper Handling of Overlap Between Protected Memory Ranges

CWE-1199 - General Circuit and Logic Design Concerns: weaknesses in this category are related to hardware-circuit design and logic (e.g., CMOS transistors, finite state machines, and registers) as well as issues related to hardware description languages such as System Verilog and VHDL.

- CWE-1231: Improper Prevention of Lock Bit Modification
- CWE-1233: Security-Sensitive Hardware Controls with Missing Lock Bit Protection

CWE-1205 - Security Primitives and Cryptography Issues: weaknesses in this category are related to hardware implementations of cryptographic protocols and other hardware-security primitives such as physical unclonable functions (PUFs) and random number generators (RNGs).

- CWE-1240: Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation

CWE-1206 - Power, Clock, Thermal, and Reset Concerns: weaknesses in this category are related to system power, voltage, current, temperature, clocks, system state saving/restoring, and resets at the platform and SoC level.

- CWE-1256: Improper Restriction of Software Interfaces to Hardware Features

CWE-1207 - Debug and Test Problems: weaknesses in this category are related to hardware debug and test interfaces such as JTAG and scan chain.

- CWE-1191: On-Chip Debug and Test Interface With Improper Access Control
- CWE-1244: Internal Asset Exposed to Unsafe Debug Access Level or State
- CWE-1272: Sensitive Information Uncleared Before Debug/Power State Transition

CWE-1208 - Cross-Cutting Problems: weaknesses in this category can arise in multiple areas of hardware design or can apply to a wide cross-section of components.

- CWE-1277: Firmware Not Updateable

CWE-1388 - Physical Access Issues and Concerns: weaknesses in this category are related to concerns of physical access.

- CWE-1300: Improper Protection of Physical Side Channels

For each category, I chose a representative CWE that I believe will require the most minimal amount of modification to the design to demonstrate how easily they can introduced and to make them as "stealthy" as possible, theoretically making them more challenging to detect. Then, I filtered it down to a final set of 5 CWEs to implement. The criteria for this filter was simply personal interest.

The final set of CWEs I chose consists of:

1. CWE-1231: Improper Prevention of Lock Bit Modification/CWE-1233: Security-Sensitive Hardware Controls with Missing Lock Bit Protection
2. CWE-1244: Internal Asset Exposed to Unsafe Debug Access Level or State
3. CWE-1260: Improper Handling of Overlap Between Protected Memory Ranges
4. CWE-1272: Sensitive Information Uncleared Before Debug/Power State Transition
5. CWE-1277: Firmware Not Updateable

Even though I am interested in side-channel and cryptographic weaknesses, I ultimately chose to forgo them because developing exploits for these weaknesses are involved tasks. They both typically require many inputs to statistically piece together secure information but this would be cumbersome to demonstrate in a testbench setting. They are also generally harder to introduce through the small implementation bugs that I will be doing here.

I also decided to implement two of the three weaknesses in the CWE-1207 - Debug and Test Problems category because I believe that they touch fundamentally different aspects of debug and test behaviour. CWE-1244: Internal Asset Exposed to Unsafe Debug Access Level or State is related to the access that the Debug and Test Interface provides and protecting secure data through appropriate access control mechanisms while the other is related to the pre/post debug clean-up.

I will continue this section by analyzing these CWEs in detail. I will discuss how we can generally characterize these CWEs such as where they can occur and how bugs *may* manifest in hardware designs to introduce these weaknesses. It is important to mention that I am not trying to develop a definitive set of bugs for any CWE, rather I am attempting to demonstrate how a bug can introduce a CWE.

Since I am operating at the RTL implementation stage, the characteristics under consideration are the functional locations (both inter-and-intra-modular) where they can get introduced, the sequence of logical operations involved, and errors in these logical operations that result in CWEs. These characteristics were chosen because they give meaningful insight into the bug insertion process and provide a formalized way to introduce bugs. The characteristics of possible bugs such as the # of lines modified will be discussed in a later section.

1.4.1. CWE-1231 / CWE-1233

1.4.2. CWE-1244

Hardware designs contain debug infrastructure meant to assist in post-silicon validation and quality-control. This debug infrastructure typically consists of an access port (e.g., JTAG) and a scan chain that allows for easy shift in and out of registers. This is the closest to "white-box" access possible post-silicon and can expose secure assets if not designed properly. There is a rich body of literature available exploring this topic but at the very least, it is not "standard" knowledge that debug ports must be protected. CWE-1244 is related to this debug port protection and can be considered the "next step" of CWE-1191. Where CWE-1191 is the lack of debug access control mechanisms to protect assets, CWE-1244 is the improper use of available access control. The example present on its page delivers the "intent" behind this CWE quite well. Consider a scenario where an attacker has physical access to a device and JTAG port. There is an access control bit that enables and disables the JTAG debugger, `JTAG_SHIELD`. However this bit is not set on boot-up, instead, it is set when control is transferred over to user-level software. This leaves the system vulnerable during the boot-up period, when `JTAG_SHIELD` is in some unknown state, and may allow the attacker to read or write secure assets. For

example, they could modify the instructions in memory to modify the boot flow. From this, we can intuitively understand not only this specific scenario, but the CWE in general.

This CWE can manifest in any IP block which stores or uses control and status registers related to debug access control. While this is likely to be in debug-related modules it is not necessarily the case. For example, consider the code snippet from the Hack@DAC 2021 OpenPiton SoC shown in Figure 1. This snippet was taken from the top-level of an AES accelerator. We can deduce that debug_mode_i is a debug-related access control signal that denies read access to the keys when in debug mode. However, one of the keys in not protected -- a security bug that can lead to the leakage of that key. I consider this to be part of this CWE because there is an access control mechanism in place, it was just used incorrectly. The point is that debug-related bugs do not always appear in debug-related modules (although it does a great job of illustrating that one CWE can manifest in many different ways when considered with the previous scenario). This specific CWE, however, **can only appear in modules where there is a debug access control signal**. This is a key intuition that can guide both its insertion for this project and any future detection/correction work.

```
assign key_big0    = debug_mode_i ? 192'b0 : {key0[0], key0[1], key0[2], key0[3], key0[4], key0[5]};
assign key_big1    = debug_mode_i ? 192'b0 : {key1[0], key1[1], key1[2], key1[3], key1[4], key1[5]};
assign key_big2    = {key2[0], key2[1], key2[2], key2[3], key2[4], key2[5]};
```

Figure 1: Hack@DAC 2021 Debug AES Keys Access Control Bug

The sequence of logical operations involved for this CWE are relatively simple, as it must all be related to reads/writes to the aforementioned debug access control signal. The challenging part is determining all appropriate time where these operations (read/write) must happen. In cases where (if?) there are multiple debug access levels, the value being read/written is also important. The first scenario I discussed presented a situation where access control was written too late, the second scenario presented a situation where it was not read when it should have been. It follows that any modification to these reads or writes could introduce this CWE. Considering the two scenarios again, this could mean removing the reset value of the register storing the bit and removing an access control check (as is shown in the snippet), respectively.

1.4.3. CWE-1260

CWE-1260 is related to the overlapping of memory ranges. Memory in computer systems is organized into ranges that are controlled by software and enforced by a Memory Management Unit (MMU) or a Memory Protection Unit (MPU). There are also physical memory regions enforced by the Physical Memory Management (PMP) unit, meant to separate physical memory space for each hardware thread (or *hart*). For example, the RISC-V privileged specification contains a PMP implementation. The software-controlled address ranges are typically software-configurable to allow for dynamic change during operation.

1.4.4. CWE-1272

1.4.5. CWE-1277

1.5. Bug Insertion

1.5.1. Bug 1:

1.5.2. Bug 2:

1.5.3. Bug 3:

1.5.4. Bug 4:

1.5.5. Bug 5:

1.6. Conclusion

1.7. Appendix A: OpenTitan

The OpenTitan SoC homepage can be found here, the documentation here, and the GitHub repository containing all source code here. OpenTitan is an open-source Root-of-Trust (RoT) SoC maintained by lowRISC and Google. It is the only open-source RoT currently available, making it an interesting case study for this assignment as it contains extensive security features and documentation. It implements various cryptographic hardware, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), HMAC, KMAC, and security countermeasures like access control to ensure the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) of its functions.

OpenTitan Earl Grey Features

- RV32IMCB RISC-V "Ibex" core:
  - 3-stage pipeline, single-cycle multiplier
  - Selected subset of the bit-manipulation extension
  - 4kB instruction cache with 2 ways
  - RISC-V compliant JTAG DM (debug module)
  - PLIC (platform level interrupt controller)
  - U/M (user/machine) execution modes
  - Enhanced Physical Memory Protection (ePMP)
  - Security features:
    - Low-latency memory scrambling on the icache
    - Dual-core lockstep configuration
    - Data independent timing
    - Dummy instruction insertion
    - Bus and register file integrity
    - Hardened PC

- Security peripherals:
  - AES-128/192/256 with ECB/CBC/CFB/OFB/CTR modes
  - HMAC / SHA2-256
  - KMAC / SHA3-224, 256, 384, 512, [c]SHAKE-128, 256
  - Programmable big number accelerator for RSA and ECC (OTBN)
  - NIST-compliant cryptographically secure random number generator (CSRNG)
  - Digital wrapper for analog entropy source with FIPS and CC-compliant health checks
  - Key manager with DICE support
  - Manufacturing life cycle manager
  - Alert handler for handling critical security events
  - OTP controller with access controls and memory scrambling
  - Flash controller with access controls and memory scrambling
  - ROM and SRAM controllers with low-latency memory scrambling

- Memory:
  - 2x512kB banks eFlash
  - 128kB main SRAM
  - 4KB Always ON (AON) retention SRAM
  - 32kB ROM
  - 2kB OTP

- IO peripherals:
  - 47x multiplexable IO pads with pad control
  - 32x GPIO (using multiplexable IO)
  - 4x UART (using multiplexable IO)
  - 3x I2C with host and device modes (using multiplexable IO)
  - SPI device (using fixed IO) with TPM, generic, flash and passthrough modes
  - 2x SPI host (using both fixed and multiplexable IO)

- Other peripherals:
  - Clock, reset and power management
  - Fixed-frequency timer
  - Always ON (AON) timer
  - Pulse-width modulator (PWM)
  - Pattern Generator

- Software:
  - Boot ROM code implementing secure boot and chip configuration
  - Bare metal applications and validation tests

Figure 1: OpenTitan Features

The OpenTitan project has well defined and documented threat models and countermeasures. They outline the secure assets, adversary, attack surfaces, and attack methods. The assets are mainly centered around the cryptopgraphic keys, with other loosely defined statements such as "Integrity and authenticity of stored data".

The adversaries they consider are (i) a bad actor with physical access to the device during fabrication or deployment, (ii) a malicious device owner, (iii) malicious users with remote access.

1.7.1. Architecture

The OpenTitan SoC's architecture follows the standard Network-on-Chip (NoC) design paradigm, with various IP cores interconnected a high-speed communication protocol allowing them to communicate with one another. The processor is able to configure and use the pheripherals by writing and reading to memory-mapped IO registers.

The interconnect responsible for connecting all IP cores is a TileLink Uncached Lightweight (TL-UL) crossbar which is autogenerated using a custom crossbar generation tool. The top-level module dubbed *Earl Grey*, is also auto-generated using a top generation tool. Both tools are configured by using hjson files that are scattered throughout the project.


Figure 2: OpenTitan EarlGrey Top

The memories are integrated in the chip with configurable size and address. By default, the instruction ROM is 32 kB, the flash is 1024 kB, and SRAM is 128 kB. The processor core used is the RISC-V Ibex core which we discuss here. As seen in Figure 1, the SoC is seperated into high speed and peripheral domains, with many of its critical functions residing in the high speed domain.

It also provides bebug functionality by way of the RISC-V debug specification 0.13.2 and the JTAG TAP specification.

1.7.2. Security Features

As a RoT, the OpenTitan SoC implements various security features. Outside of its secure cryptopgraphic functions, it also provides a secure boot flow that integrates multiple memory integrity checks, various access control measures such as lock bits for pheripheral configuration registers and memory regions, an integrity scheme integrated into the TL-UL crossbar, and security alerts that are triggered under defined conditions that suggest suspicious behaviour.

There is curently no detailed documentation for the secure boot flow available, but at a high level, on boot-up the hard-coded instructions in the ROM memory are used for platform checking and memory integrity checking. At this stage, the integrity of the full contents of the non-hard-coded bootloader in the Flash memory is checked by an RSA-check algorithm.

Another fundamental piece of memory which is not directly mentioned in the secure boot process is the one time programmable (OTP) memory. An OTP controller is provided but the OTP IP (fuse memory) must be source externally. Together, they provide secure one-time-programming functionality that is used throughout the life cycle (LC) of a device. The OTP is broken up in partitions responsible for storing different attributes of the device. The specific attributes for each partition (and the partition themselves) are configurable and will likely vary widely for different applications. Critical data stored in the OTP include the root keys used to derive all other keys for cryptographic functions and memory scrambling.

The end-to-end cross integrity scheme consists of additional signals embedded into the interconnect that ensures the integrity of data as it travels through the SoC. There is no detailed documentation on its operation yet. From what is available -- the integrity scheme is an extension of the TL-UL specification and consists of 2 additional `SystemVerilog buses` that carry the "integrity" of the data, which is checked by the consumer. From inspecting the design, the integrity scheme utilizes uses Hsiao code (modified version of Hamming code + parity) as its error-detection code.

On the cryptographic side, the relevant IPs comprise of the Key Manager, KMAC, HMAC, AES, the Entropy source, EDN, and CSRNG. The key manager is responsible for generating the keys used for all cryptographic operations and identification. On reset, it rejects all software requests until it is initialized again. Initialization consists of first loading in random values from the entropy source then the root key from the OTP. This ensures that the hamming delta (the difference in hamming weights between the random number and the root key) are non-deterministic and the root key is thus not susceptible to power side-channel leakage **(This is my interpretation, I am probably wrong)**. The key manager interatively completes KMAC operations using the KMAC IP to progress to different states and generate different keys. The states transistions of the Key Manager are illustrated in Figure 3. The Key manager implements various security countermeasures such as sparse FSM encoding, and automatic locking of configuration registers during operation.

The Keccak Message Authentication Code (KMAC) IP core is a Keccak-based message authentication code generator to check the integrity of an incoming message and a signature signed with the same secret key. It implements the NIST FIPS 202 SHA-3 standard. The secret key length can vary up to 512 bits. The KMAC generates at most 1600 bits of the digest value at a time which can be read from the STATE memory region. It also implements masked storage and Domain-Oriented Masking (DOM) inside the Keccak function to protect against 1st-order SCA attacks. As mentioned earlier, the KMAC core is used extensively by the key manager. Its security countermeasures include sparse FSM encoding, counter redundancy, and lock bits to ensure configuration registers are not written during operation.

The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) IP Core implements the SHA256 hashing algorithm. It achieves similar functions to the KMAC core but is not hardened against power side-channels. It is meant as a

faster alternative to the KMAC core. It does not contain any security countermeasures other than the bus integrity scheme present in all IP.

The final cryptographic core is the AES accelerator responsible for all encryption/decryption operations of the SoC. It implements NIST's Advanced Encryption Standard. It supports multiple standard block modes of operation (ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB, CTR) and 128/192/256-bit key sizes. The accelerator implements the same masking scheme as the KMAC core to protect itself against 1st order side-channel attacks. It also implements many other security countermeasures: lock bits, clearing of sensitive registers after operation, sparse FSM and control register encoding, and logic rail redundancy for FSMs.


Figure 3: Key Manager State Transitions

Finally, the ROM, SRAM, and Flash controllers manage accesses to memory. They integrate multiple security features.

The ROM controller contains a startup checker which verify the integrity of its contents by utilizing the KMAC IP to hash all but the 8 top words of its data. The hash received from the KMAC operation is then compared to the 8 top words. The read addresses are passed through a substitution and permutation (S&P) block then passed to the ROM memory and a PRINCE cipher in parallel. The pre-scrambled data read from the ROM is also passed through an S&P block, and XOR from the results of the PRINCE cipher to obtain the final read data.

The data in the SRAM is also scrambled in similar fashion to the ROM, and additionally contains 7 integrity bits for each 32 bit word. It also provides a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) block to feature that can overwrite the entire memory with pseudorandom data via a software request.

The flash controller provides also optional memory scrambling and integrity bits. It also provides up to software-configurable 8 memory regions with configurable access policies.

1.7.3. Collateral

The OpenTitan SoC provides extensive collateral. Collateral in this context, refers to any additional information that describes the functionality of a design and its components. The collateral for this SoC consists of the documentation for all of its IP and contains its security features, interfaces, interactions with software, testplans, and block diagrams. Unique to this SoC are the hjson files that describe all of an IP's parameters, registers, security countermeasures, etc. This is extremely useful to obtain designer context behind the design. For example, from the AES hjson file, we can understand the function of parameter `SecMasking`, as shown in figure 4.

```
{ name:    "SecMasking",
  type:    "bit",
  default: "1'b1",
  desc:    '''
    Disable (0) or enable (1) first-order masking of the AES cipher core.
    Masking requires the use of a masked S-Box, see SecSBoxImpl parameter.
  ...

  local:   "false",
  expose:  "true"
},
```

Figure 4: AES SecMasking .hjson snippet

Another aspect of collateral is the test environment provided. OpenTitan currently provides automated Dynamic Verification (DV) for all IP which perform simulate the IP and perform automated checks using a Golden Reference model. They also an FPV test suite using SystemVerilog Assertions which mainly verify the compliance to the TL-UL protocol. The SoC was setup locally with relative ease, thanks to the detailed instructions and reliable scripts, and the UVM tests were successful run using Verilator.

*[SoC]: System-on-Chip