- Not everybody has an inner voice: Behavioral consequences of anendophasia
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Author Note

- All experiment data, experiment code, and analysis code are available on GitHub:
- 7 https://github.com/johannenedergaard/anendophasia.
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Abstract

It is commonly assumed that inner speech – the experience of thought as occurring in a 12 natural language – is a human universal. Recent evidence, however, suggests that the 13 experience of inner speech in adults varies from near constant to non-existent. We 14 propose a name for a lack of the experience of inner speech – anendophasia – and report 15 four studies examining some of its behavioral consequences. We found that adults who 16 report low levels of inner speech (N = 46) have lower performance on a verbal working 17 memory task and have more difficulty performing rhyme judgments compared to adults 18 who report high levels of inner speech (N = 47). Task switching performance - previously 19 linked to endogenous verbal cueing - and categorical effects on perceptual judgments were 20 unrelated to differences in inner speech. 21

Statement of Relevance

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Most adults report experiencing an inner voice, and believe that it plays an important role in their daily lives. However, others report that they do not experience such an inner voice. Although these differences are stable, we do not know whether they have any consequences for how people solve problems and act in the world. In this article, we found that adults with less inner speech differed from adults with more inner speech on some tasks that we thought would involve inner speech, but not others. It is important to understand such individual differences in inner speech use because it has consequences for how we discuss the role of inner speech generally in human life.

Keywords: inner speech, rhyme judgments, categorization, task switching, verbal working memory, individual differences

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- experiment code, materials, data, and analysis scripts can be accessed at
- 42 https://github.com/johannenedergaard/anendophasia. The studies were not
- 43 preregistered.

1 Introduction

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Everyone, it is often said, has an inner voice: 'Daily, human beings are engaged in a 45 form of inner dialogue, which enables them to [engage in] high-level cognition, including 46 self-control, self-attention and self-regulation.': (Chella & Pipitone, 2020, p. 287); 'We all hear a voice inside our brain, commonly called "inner voice", "inner speech" or referred to 48 as "verbal thoughts" '(Perrone-Bertolotti, Rapin, Lachaux, Baciu, and Loevenbruck (2014), p. 22). Most people do report experiencing inner speech (Alderson-Day & 50 Fernyhough, 2015; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; Morin, Duhnych, & Racy, 2018) and 51 because we often assume that our experiences mirror those of others, the majority 52 experience comes to be viewed as universal (Lupyan, Uchiyama, Thompson, & Casasanto, 53 2023). The assumption that everyone has an inner voice has served as a stepping stone 54 for research into the functions of inner speech – if everyone has it, it must be important. 55 Speculations have ranged from the idea that natural language constitutes (at least some 56 types of) thought (Bermúdez, 2007; Carruthers, 2002; Clark, 1998; Frankish, 2018; 57 Gauker, 2011) or is necessary for self-awareness (Morin, 2018) to investigations of 58 connections between inner speech and specific processes such as cognitive control 59 (Alderson-Day & Fernyhough, 2015; Cragg & Nation, 2010; e.g., Emerson & Miyake, 2003; 60 Morin et al., 2018), behavioral control (e.g., Nedergaard, Christensen, & Wallentin, 2023), 61 and planning and problem-solving (Lidstone, Meins, & Fernyhough, 2010; e.g., Morin et 62 al., 2018; Wallace, Peng, & Williams, 2017)¹. But not everyone experiences inner speech. 63 This is attested by personal narratives such as 'What it's like living without an inner 64 voice' (Soloducha, 2020) and 'People With No Internal Monologue Explain What It's Like

¹ We use the terms "inner speech" and "inner voice" interchangeably, but we are not committed to the view that inner speech has all the same auditory and articulatory features as overt speech (Fernyhough & Borghi, 2023, for a recent overarching review; Langland-Hassan, 2018). Importantly, inner speech displays variation both in terms of its form (e.g., dialogic vs. condensed) and modality (e.g., inner speech as hearing a voice vs. experiencing the imagined articulation of speech) (Alderson-Day, Mitrenga, Wilkinson, McCarthy-Jones, & Fernyhough, 2018; Grandchamp et al., 2019; Gregory, 2016; Perrone-Bertolotti et al., 2014). There is evidence that the different modalities of inner speech involve different neural and cognitive mechanisms (e.g., Nalborczyk et al., 2023; Tian, Zarate, & Poeppel, 2016).

In Their Head' (Felton, 2020), as well as more systematic investigations both targeting variation in inner speech (Alderson-Day et al., 2018; Brinthaupt, 2019; Hurlburt, Heavey, & Kelsey, 2013) and auditory imagery, which has sometimes been used as a proxy for inner speech (Dawes, Keogh, Andrillon, & Pearson, 2020; Hinwar & Lambert, 2021).

1.1 The Present Study

We recruited participants differing in subjectively reported inner speech and tested 71 them on four behavioral tasks. These tasks were chosen based on prior theoretical claims that suggested performance on them may differ as a function of inner speech. First, just 73 as visual imagery has been predicted (and sometimes found) to be linked to visual memory, we tested whether inner speech predicted memory for verbal material. We focused on memory for sets of words that were either phonologically similar and orthographically different or orthographically similar and phonologically different. Less 77 inner speech was predicted to be associated with poorer overall memory for verbal material, but to the extent that phonological similarity creates memory confusion 79 (Baddeley, 1966; Murray, 1968), less inner speech may be associated with a reduced phonological similarity effect. Second, participants completed a rhyme judgment task: 81 participants saw pairs of images and needed to indicate whether their names rhymed or not. We reasoned that although participants with low inner speech would have no trouble 83 naming the objects, a reduced reliance on inner speech would make it harder to compare the names in memory – necessary for making a rhyme judgment (Geva, Bennett, 85 Warburton, & Patterson, 2011; Langland-Hassan, Faries, Richardson, & Dietz, 2015). Third, there is substantial evidence that inner speech is often recruited for behavioral 87 control when participants have to switch between different tasks (Baddeley, Chincotta, & 88 Adlam, 2001; Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Laurent et al., 2016; Miyake, Emerson, Padilla, 89 & Ahn, 2004). For example, when asked to switch between adding and subtracting numbers, participants show a selective impairment if they undergo articulatory suppression, but no such impairment is found if the cues are exogenously provided, e.g., a 92 symbol or color cue is used to inform participants whether they should add or subtract

(see Nedergaard, Wallentin, & Lupyan, 2022, for a systematic review of verbal interference effects). We reasoned that people who do not habitually use inner speech might be selectively impaired when they have to rely on self-generated cues to keep track 96 of which task they should be doing. On the other hand, it is possible that they have learned to rely on other strategies in which case no difference would be found. Our fourth 98 task involved examining category effects in perception. There is considerable evidence that language induces more categorical representations from basic perception onward 100 (Forder & Lupyan, 2019; Perry & Lupyan, 2014; e.g., Winawer et al., 2007). In a study 101 examining the effects of conceptual categories, Lupyan, Thompson-Schill, and Swingley 102 (2010) showed that - controlling for visual differences - people's ability to tell whether two 103 stimuli were physically the same was affected by the categorical status of those stimuli. 104 For example, it took longer to distinguish two cats than an equally visually similar cat 105 and dog. We wondered whether such category effects, insofar as they may be in part 106 induced by feedback from verbal labels, may be reduced in people with less inner speech. 107 For all four experiments, we were also interested in whether performance differed by 108 whether participants reported talking out loud during the task. 109

2 Open Practices Statement

The experiment code, materials, data, and analysis scripts can be accessed at https://github.com/johannenedergaard/anendophasia. The studies were not preregistered.

3 Methods

115 3.1 Measurement of inner speech

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We measured subjectively experienced inner speech using a previously developed and validated Internal Representations Questionnaire (IRQ) (Roebuck & Lupyan, 2020). This questionnaire is broadly similar to other surveys of inner-speech (e.g., the General Inner Speech Questionnaire: Racy, Morin, & Duhnych, 2020; the Self-Talk Scale: Brinthaupt, Hein, & Kramer, 2009; the Varieties of Inner Speech Questionnaire:

McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough, 2011), and its verbal factor is most closely related to 121 dialogic inner-speech as measured by the Varieties of Inner Speech Questionnaire $(r\sim.7)$. 122 Two advantages of the IRQ are that its inner speech questions are more inclusive than 123 those on the other scales and the same instrument can be used to assess other individual differences such as visual and orthographic imagery. As is true of other scales, the IRQ 125 measures propensities rather than abilities. Geva and Warburton (2019) suggested that inner speech could be objectively measured using behavioral tasks like silent-rhyme 127 judgments, however the authors did not actually show whether differences in inner speech 128 are associated with differences in performance on silent-rhyme judgment tasks - a 129 limitation we address in the current work. 130

3.2 Participants

Prior to beginning the study, we had administered the IRQ to university 132 undergraduates and crowdworkers on Amazon Mechanical Turk as part of unrelated 133 studies. From this original pool of 1037 participants, we contacted participants with 134 scores ≤ 3.5 (bottom 30%-ile) or ≥ 4.25 (top 20%-ile) on the Verbal factor of the 135 questionnaire which is largely centered on propensity to experience and rely on inner speech. For example, one item with a high loading on the Verbal factor was 'I think 137 about problems in my mind in the form of a conversation with myself'. One item with a 138 high loading on the Visual factor was 'I often enjoy the use of mental pictures to 139 reminisce' (see Supplemental Materials for all verbal factor items). The percentile cut-offs 140 were asymmetric because the distribution in verbal scores on the IRQ is negatively 141 skewed. Recruiting for example the top and bottom quartiles would have resulted in a 142 "low inner speech" group who had moderate amounts of reported inner speech. The final sample included participants from the bottom 20%-ile and the top 29%-ile (see histogram 144 with cutoff values in Supplemental Materials).² We received ethical approval from the Institutional Review Board at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Ten participants

² Due to a recruiting error, three participants recruited for the more inner speech group had verbal scores slightly below 4.25 (4.17).

were excluded for responding randomly, missing at least one experiment, or clearly not 147 complying with task instructions. Our final sample included 47 participants with 148 relatively high verbal factor scores on the IRQ and 46 participants with relatively low 149 verbal factor scores. The two groups were balanced in terms of age, gender, education level, dyslexia, and first language. See Table 1. Due to a technical error, demographic 151 data for one participant in the low inner speech group was missing. We were interested in detecting medium-to-large effects. Our sample size allows us to detect effect sizes of 153 approximately .6 at 80% power or .7 at 91% power (two-tailed t-test of mean difference 154 between two independent groups). Power is lower for the reported interactions and so we 155 urge caution in interpreting them. 156

157 3.3 Method: Verbal working memory

3.3.1 Materials and procedure. We used word sets from Baddeley (1966) 158 which were designed to vary in phonological and orthographic similarity, while holding 159 constant other psycholinguistic factors. The phonologically-similar set contained the 160 words "bought", "sort", "taut", "caught", and "wart". The orthographically similar set 161 contained the words "rough", "cough", "through", "dough", and "bough". The control set 162 contained the words "plea", "friend", "sleigh", "row", and "board". On a given trial, 163 participants saw five written words in random order from one of the sets. The words were 164 presented sequentially, see Figure 1. After the last word, participants were asked to type 165 the five words they just saw in the order they saw them. Participants began the task by 166 completing two practice trials with full feedback (correct/incorrect and the stimulus 167 words – drawn from a different set than the ones used in the real experiment – shown in 168 order). Participants then performed 24 trials in total with eight trials from each of the 169 three word sets. The order of both set type and words within a trial were randomized. 170 There was no limit to how long participants could spend on reproducing the words on a 171 given trial. 172

173 3.4 Method: Rhyme judgments

Materials and procedure. We constructed a set of rhyme pairs with 20 174 orthographic pairs (e.g., "sock" and "clock") and 20 non-orthographic pairs (e.g., "drawer" 175 and "door"). See Supplemental Materials for the full set of images, associated words, and 176 name agreement scores. The images were selected from the MultiPic database 177 (Duñabeitia et al., 2018) and from Rossion and Pourtois (2004) because those image sets 178 contained simple images (objects with no background) that had relatively high name 179 agreement. On each trial, participants saw two images of items presented simultaneously 180 and were asked to judge whether the names of the items rhymed or not. Participants 181 completed 60 rhyme judgments in randomized order (20 orthographic rhymes, 20 182 non-orthographic rhymes, and 20 no-rhyme control trials). There was a 5000 ms response 183 deadline. See Figure 2. 184

185 3.5 Method: Task switching

Materials and procedure. On each block, participants were shown 30 3.5.1186 randomly selected integers between 13 and 96 and asked to add or subtract 3 from each. 187 All participants completed five blocks beginning with blocked addition or blocked 188 subtraction, followed by (in a counterbalanced order) a block where problems alternated 189 between addition and subtraction with the operation marked by color (red/blue), marked 190 with a symbol (+/-), or not marked. The unmarked block required participants to 191 remember which operation they had just done. In the switching conditions, a response 192 counted as correct if it was the correct arithmetic and if the operation was switched from 193 the previous trial (from addition to subtraction or vice versa). See Figure 3. 194

195 3.6 Method: Same/different judgments

3.6.1 Materials and procedure. This experiment used three different black silhouettes of cats and three different black silhouettes of dogs. Participants completed two blocked conditions: making physical identity judgments (same means physically identical) and making category judgments (same means same category). We are only interested in the physical identity judgments here. Participants completed 200 total trials and received feedback after incorrect responses ('incorrect' in red font). See Figure 4.

202 3.7 Method: Questionnaire

After completing the four experiments, participants answered a series of questions 203 about their experience with inner speech (e.g. 'How often do you have songs stuck in your 204 head?' and 'Do you ever rehearse a conversation before you have it in real life where you 205 simulate what you will say and how the other person will respond?') and completed the 206 Varieties of Inner Speech Questionnaire-Revised (VISQ-R) (Alderson-Day et al., 2018). 207 The VISQ-R measures the extent to which inner speech is experienced as dialogic (e.g., 'I 208 talk back and forward to myself in my mind about things') and condensed (e.g. 'My 209 thinking in words is shortened compared to my normal out-loud speech') as well as 210 whether the participant experiences the voices of other people. The questionnaire also 211

measures the perceived functions of inner speech through asking about inner speech as an evaluative and regulatory tool (e.g., 'I think in inner speech about what I have done, and whether it was right or not'). See Supplemental Materials for the full set of custom questions.

216 3.8 Data analysis

All analyses were conducted in R version 4.1.3 (R Core Team, 2022). Participants 217 and items (where appropriate) were modeled as random intercepts; random slopes were 218 included for within-subject factors unless it prevented convergence. All predictors were 219 centered. Reaction times were log-transformed to yield a more normal distribution. Accuracies were modeled using logistic regression. For ease of interpretation, the figures 221 show the two inner speech groups as distinct, but all the statistical models use verbal 222 score (average score on the verbal representation items on the Internal Representations 223 Questionnaire) as a continuous predictor. Error bars on all figures represent 224 within-participant 95% confidence intervals around the mean (adjusted for repeated 225 measures). All four experiments were conducted using custom-written software with the 226 JavaScript package is Psych version 6 (De Leeuw, 2015), and data and code can be found at https://github.com/johannenedergaard/anendophasia.

229 4 Results

230 4.1 Verbal working memory

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In the verbal working memory experiment, we tested whether the number of words
that participants were able to correctly recall (the dependent variable) was predicted by
participants' verbal score on the IRQ and the type of word set (control set, orthographic
similarity set, phonological similarity set).

4.1.1 Descriptive statistics by group: Verbal working memory.

Participants with more inner speech recalled more words correctly. This advantage was
evident both when we scored only correctly ordered responses as correct as well as when
we scored correctly recalled items regardless of their position (see Table 2 and Figure 5).

4.1.2Statistical models: Verbal working memory. Participants remembered phonologically similar words significantly worse (M = 3.22) than orthographically-similar words (M = 3.62) (β = -0.72; SE = 0.08; t = -8.84; p < .001; 241 standardized $\beta = -0.22$ [-0.33,-0.11]) which were in turn remembered worse than the dissimilar words (M = 3.94) (β = -0.33; SE = 0.08; t = -3.98; p < .001; standardized β 243 (effect size) = -0.47 [-0.57,-0.36]). Collapsing across the three types of word lists, greater inner speech was associated with better performance ($\beta = 0.27$; SE = 0.10; t = 2.60; p = 245 .011; standardized β (effect size) = 0.17 [0.04,0.31]). This effect remained significant when we ignore the recalled order of the words, counting only whether they recalled the 247 correct words ($\beta = 0.19$; SE = 0.08; t = 2.57; p = .012; standardized β (effect size) = 248 0.18 [0.04, 0.32]). There were no interaction effects (all p > .10), although numerically, the 249 effect of inner speech was smallest for orthographically similar words (see Figure 5). Strategies: Verbal working memory. The groups with more and less 251 inner speech were similar in their reported use of talking out loud as a strategy for remembering the words: 10 out of 47 in the group with more inner speech; 13 out of 46 in 253 the group with less inner speech ($\chi^2(1) = 0.29$, p = .59). Nevertheless, talking out loud was associated with performance in different ways between the two groups (see Figure 6). 255 As the figure indicates, there was an interaction effect between talking out loud and verbal score on recall ($\beta = -0.50$; SE = 0.23; t = -2.19; p = .031; standardized β (effect size) = 257 -0.14 [-0.26,-0.01]). Participants with less inner speech who reported using overt language during the task performed similarly to participants with more inner speech, suggesting 259 that what mattered for performance was the use of speech, either covert or overt.

Rhyme judgments 4.2

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In the rhyme judgment experiment, we tested whether the speed and accuracy with 262 which participants made rhyme judgments (the dependent variables) were predicted by 263 participants' verbal score on the IRQ and the type of rhyme (orthographic rhyme, non-orthographic rhyme, and no rhyme). We also tested whether participants' rhyme 265 judgment performance differed by whether they reported talking out loud to remember 266

the words. Five image pairs of rhyming objects – bin/chin, cab/crab, rake/cake,
wave/cave, and park/shark – were incorrectly judged to not rhyme on at least half the
trials. This was most likely because participants did not name one or both of the images
with the intended names (mean agreement rating for these 10 images = 0.58; range =
0.05 to 1). We therefore excluded these trials from further analysis. In addition, we
trimmed reaction times below 200 ms (68 trials, 1.4%).

- 4.2.1 Descriptive statistics by group: Rhyme judgments. Participants
 who reported having more inner speech were numerically both faster and more accurate
 than participants who reported having less inner speech on all three types of trials, see
 Table 3, and Figure 7.
- 4.2.2Statistical models: Rhyme judgments. Participants took longer to 277 make rhyme judgments on no-rhyme trials (M = 1981) compared to orthographic trials 278 (M = 1730) ($\beta = 0.12$; SE = 0.04; t = 3.01; p = .005; standardized β (effect size) = 0.1 279 [0.04,0.17]). Non-orthographic trials (M = 1823) did not differ significantly from orthographic trials ($\beta = 0.05$; SE = 0.04; t = 1.18; p = .27; standardized β (effect size) = 281 0.04 [-0.03,0.11]). Higher name agreement was associated with faster RTs ($\beta = -0.04$; SE 282 = 0.02; t = -2.22; p = .029; standardized β (effect size) = -0.03 [-0.06,0]). Reported inner 283 speech had no effect on speed of correct rhyme judgments ($\beta = -0.02$; SE = 0.02; t = 284 -0.82; p = .42; standardized β (effect size) = -0.01 [-0.05,0.02]). There were no 285 interactions between rhyme type and inner speech (both p's > .29) or between inner 286 speech and the effect of name agreement on accuracy (p > .97). 287

Participants were more accurate when judging no-rhyme trials as not rhyming (M 288 = 97.03%) than on orthographic rhyme judgments (M = 88.28%) (β = 1.67; SE = 0.32; z 289 = 5.15; p < .001; standardized β (effect size) = 1.67 [1.04,2.31]) and were less accurate 290 on non-orthographic rhyme judgments (M = 80.8%) than on orthographic rhyme 291 judgments ($\beta = -0.59$; SE = 0.28; z = -2.07; p = .038; standardized β (effect size) = -0.59 292 [-1.14, -0.03]). Importantly, a higher verbal score was associated with greater accuracy (β 293 = 0.34; SE = 0.12; z = 2.81; p = .005; standardized β (effect size) = 0.34 [0.1,0.58]). 294 Name agreement did not affect accuracy (p > .12). There were no significant interactions 295

between rhyme type and inner speech (both p > .21) or between inner speech and effect of name agreement on accuracy (p = .58).

Strategies: Rhyme judgments. Asked about their strategies, similar 298 proportions of participants in both groups reported naming the pictures out loud: 23 out 299 of 47 in the higher inner speech group and 21 out of 46 in the lower inner speech group 300 $(\chi^2(1) = 0.01, p = .91)$. We observed a similar interaction here as with the memory task 301 (compare Figure 6 and Figure 8). For people who did not report speaking out loud, less 302 habitual inner speech was associated with lower accuracy; for people who did, it was not 303 (orthographic rhymes: $\beta = -0.78$; SE = 0.36; z = -2.19; p = .028; standardized β (effect 304 size) = -0.39 [-0.74,-0.04]; non-orthographic rhymes: $\beta = -0.75$; SE = 0.34; z = -2.24; p = 305 .025; standardized β (effect size) = -0.37 [-0.7,-0.05]), suggesting once again that speech 306 use - whether covert or overt - is associated with higher accuracy.

308 4.3 Task switching

In the task switching experiment, we tested whether the speed and accuracy of 309 performing simple arithmetic operations (adding and subtracting) were predicted by 310 participants' reported inner speech (verbal score on the IRQ) as a function of how they 311 were cued to alternate between two operations: addition and subtraction when cued to 312 the correct operation by a symbol, by a color, or having to rely on their memory of which 313 operation they just did. We excluded trials with RTs over 10 seconds (0.5 % of trials). 314 We also recalculated the accuracy measure so that a failure to switch did not render all 315 subsequent trials incorrect as long as the participant proceeded to switch appropriately 316 and obtain the arithmetically correct answer. 317

- 4.3.1 Descriptive statistics: Task switching. As can be seen from Table 4 and Figure 9, accuracy was high in all conditions, and reaction times were comparable across the two groups of participants.
- 4.3.2 Statistical models: Task switching. Participants responded less accurately in the symbol-cued switch condition (M = 97.2%), in the color-cued switch condition (M = 95.4%), and in the un-cued switch condition (M = 93.9%) compared to the blocked addition condition (M = 98.1%) (addition versus symbol-cue: β = -0.42; SE

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_{325} = 0.18; z = -2.32; p = .020; standardized \beta (effect size) = -0.42 [-0.77,-0.07]; addition
versus color-cue: \beta = -0.97; SE = 0.17; z = -5.84; p < .001; standardized \beta (effect size) =
-0.97 [-1.3,-0.65]; addition versus un-cued: \beta = -1.27; SE = 0.16; z = -7.92; p < .001;
standardized \beta (effect size) = -1.27 [-1.59,-0.96]). Accuracy did not differ between
blocked subtraction (M = 97.7%) and blocked addition (p = .24). More inner speech was
not associated with different accuracy (p = .55) and there were no interaction effects
between inner speech and block-type (all p's > .07). Numerically, verbal score interacted
with the un-cued condition and cancelled out the very slight (non-significant) reaction
time advantage of a higher verbal score.
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Participants responded faster in the blocked addition condition (M = 2300 ms) 334 compared to the subtraction condition (M = 2550 ms) (β = 0.09; SE = 0.01; t = 8.41; p 335 < .001; standardized β (effect size) = 0.08 [0.06,0.1]), the symbol-cued switch condition 336 $(M = 2601 \text{ ms}) (\beta = 0.12; SE = 0.01; t = 9.69; p < .001; standardized \beta (effect size) =$ 337 0.1 [0.08,0.13]), the color-cued switch condition (M = 2778 ms) (β = 0.19; SE = 0.02; t = 338 12.23; p < .001; standardized β (effect size) = 0.17 [0.14,0.19]), and the un-cued switch 339 condition (M = 2694 ms) (β = 0.15; SE = 0.02; t = 9.39; p < .001; standardized β (effect size) = 0.13 [0.11,0.16]). More reported inner speech did not predict reaction times (p = 341 .81), and there were no interaction effects (all p's > .51).

4.3.3 Strategies: Task switching. There was no significant difference between how many participants with more inner speech (20 out of 47) and how many participants with less inner speech (13 out of 46) reported that they had talked to themselves out loud during the task switching experiment ($\chi^2(1) = 1$, p = .32). There were no obvious differences between the effects that talking out loud had on these two groups (see accuracy and reaction time Figure 10).

4.4 Same/different judgments

In the same/different judgment experiment, we tested whether the speed with
which participants made correct same/different judgments was predicted by participants'
verbal score on the IRQ and the type of judgment (same category of animal or same

image). We excluded trials with RTs above 5 seconds (0.7 %) and below 200 ms (0.07 %).

Overall accuracy was high, 95.53, and did not differ between the two inner speech groups

(95.58 %) and the group with less inner speech (95.48 %). In subsequent RT analyses, we

only include correct trials.

- 4.4.1 Statistical models: Same/different judgments. The key test for this 357 experiment was whether the two groups behaved differently when giving correct 358 'DIFFERENT' responses on identity trials when the two images belonged to the same 359 category. That is, we expected participants with more inner speech to be slower to make 360 correct 'DIFFERENT' responses when both stimuli where from the same category but 361 physically different (i.e., dog_1 versus dog_2). Within-category trials were generally 362 associated with significantly slower reaction times (M = 923 ms) than between-category 363 trials (M = 843 ms) (β = -0.08; SE = 0.01; t = -7.71; p < .001; standardized β (effect 364 size) = -0.09 [-0.11,-0.06])). See Figure 11. However, there was no interaction between 365 level of inner speech and category-type: (interaction effect: $\beta = 0.00$; SE = 0.01; t = -0.06; p = .95; standardized β (effect size) = 0 [-0.02,0.02]). 367
- 4.4.2 Strategies: Same/different judgments. There was no significant difference between how many participants with more inner speech (9 out of 47) and how many participants with less inner speech (4 out of 46) reported that they had talked to themselves out loud during the task ($\chi^2(1) = 1.33$, p = .25). There were no differences between the effects that talking out loud had on these two groups.

3 4.5 Intertask correlations

In addition to finding (or not finding) differences in task performance as a function of inner speech, it is often informative to see whether correlations between tasks and conditions show a different pattern in people with more vs. less inner speech (Keogh, Wicken, & Pearson, 2021). See Figure 12 for a visualization of how performance on the tasks correlated within the participant groups with more or less inner speech. The dark-blue clusters near the diagonal show that for both groups performance within tasks (e.g., RTs on the different types of task-switch trials) was strongly correlated, and

similarly so for both groups. When it comes to relationships between tasks, however, we found several intriguing differences: Participants with less inner speech showed a positive correlation between verbal recall accuracy and non-orthographic rhyme accuracy (r=.48). This group also showed moderate correlations (r's between .3 and .5) between uncued task-switch accuracy and various measures of verbal recall accuracy. In contrast, participants with more inner speech showed weaker relationships between these measures (r's between .16 and .30).

388 4.6 Questionnaire measures

Responses to many of the included questions differed substantially as a function of 389 inner speech³. For reasons of space, however, we only report a few selected ones here (see 390 Supplemental Materials for further correlations). The questions with the clearest 391 differences concerned rehearing and revising conversations where the participants with 392 more inner speech reported doing so much more often than the participants with less 393 inner speech did (revise past conversation: t(87.95) = 5.93; p < .001; practice future 394 conversation: t(89.33) = 5.33; p < .001). Of the VISQ factors, the IRQ verbal 395 representation score was mostly related to the dialogicality of inner speech (r(90) = .70; p 396 < .001). 397

Participants who reported more inner speech estimated that more people experience their thoughts in the form of a conversation with themselves ($\beta = 5.08$; SE = 2; t = 2.55; p = .013; standardized β (effect size) = 0.26 [0.06,0.46]) and that more people hear words in their "mind's ear" when they read ($\beta = 5.09$; SE = 2.07; t = 2.46; p = .016; standardized β (effect size) = 0.25 [0.05,0.45]). They did not, however, estimate that more people were able to see vivid images in their "mind's eye" ($\beta = 1.17$; SE = 2.25; t = 0.52; p = .61; standardized β (effect size) = 0.05 [-0.15,0.26]).

5 Discussion

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Our study is, to our knowledge, the first to conduct a systematic investigation of
whether differences in inner speech have behavioral consequences. Participants who
report experiencing less inner speech (our sample targeted those at < 20%ile of the verbal
score on the Internal Representations Questionnaire) performed worse when judging
whether the names of two images rhymed, and they had poorer verbal working memory.
Interestingly, in both the rhyming experiment and the verbal working memory
experiment, performance differences between the two groups disappeared when

³ Data from one participant was missing so we report questionnaire data from 47 participants with more inner speech and 45 participants with less inner speech.

participants reported talking out loud to solve the problems, suggesting that the efficacy 413 of using covert and overt speech in these cases were equivalent. Inner speech differences 414 did not predict performance in task switching, indicating that while inner speech can be 415 used as a behavioral self-cue, other and equally effective strategies may be available. Lastly, categorical effects on perceptual discrimination were similar for the two groups, 417 suggesting either that the categorical effects in such tasks are not language-based, or that the speeded nature of such tasks lessens reliance on inner speech (and language more 419 generally). Examination of intertask correlations indicated that participants with less inner speech were more likely to rely on a common mechanism when performing rhyme 421 judgments, verbal recall, and task switching without an extrinsic cue (requiring them to 422 remember what they just did). Our finding of stronger intertask correlations for 423 participants with less inner speech is conceptually similar to Keogh et al. (2021)'s finding of stronger relationships between different visual working memory tasks in participants 425 with aphantasia compared to those with typical visual imagery.

427 5.1 Anendophasia: A Lack of Inner Speech

People's self-reports cannot always be taken at face value (Heavey & Hurlburt, 428 2008; Hurlburt, 2011; Hurlburt et al., 2013). But when people report that they rarely or 429 never experience inner spech, they are not just confabulating. This is evident both in the 430 consistency of their subjective responses (Roebuck & Lupyan, 2020), and, as we report here, differences in objective performance. When investigating unusual human 432 experiences, it helps to have a label. For example, the coining of "aphantasia" to the lack 433 of visual imagery (Zeman et al., 2010) is both helpful for research – providing a useful 434 keyword – and for self-identification; its introduction led to the creation of an online 435 community with over 50,000 members (r/aphantasia). We would therefore like to propose 436 a name for the phenomenon of a lack of inner speech: **anendophasia**: an (lack) + endo437 (inner) + phasia (speech). This term was developed in consultation with individuals who 438 identify as lacking inner speech and has the benefit of including the familiar Greek root 439 phasia (aphasia, paraphasia, etc.). Furthermore, "endophasia" has precedent in being 440

used to refer to inner speech (Bergounioux, 2001; Loevenbruck et al., 2018). The term
also avoids subsuming inner speech under "aphantasia" (Monzel, Mitchell, Macpherson,
Pearson, & Zeman, 2022) because inner speech is both auditory and articulatory in
nature (whether it is better termed "inner hearing" or "inner speaking" is debated) and
because the linguistic properties of inner speech are likely not reducible to auditory and
articulatory features. For these reasons, we also do not believe the previously proposed
term "anauralia" is appropriate (Hinwar & Lambert, 2021).

Relations to Visual Imagery, Auditory Imagery and "Unsymbolized" Thought

Can anendophasia be thought of simply as a lack of auditory imagery? We think 450 not. First, many who lack inner speech report being able to engage in musical imagery 451 (although they report "earworms" - intrusive musical imagery - less often than people 452 with typical levels of inner speech). Second, although inner speech is often experienced as 453 having phonological features – one of the reasons people often perceive it as speech 454 (Langland-Hassan, 2018) – it can also involve an articulatory-motor dimension (Geva, 455 2018; Perrone-Bertolotti et al., 2014). The current work was not designed to investigate 456 the separate contributions of auditory and articulatory dimensions. Paradoxically, some 457 people also claim to experience "wordless" inner speech akin to a series of tip of the 458 tongue states (Hurlburt et al., 2013). 459

When asked to reflect on what form their thoughts take, people who score low on 460 both inner speech and visual imagery claim that they "think in concepts". What it means 461 to "think in concepts" without relying on language is not clear. Beyond informal 462 self-reports, the existence of such non-verbal and non-perceptual phenomenal experiences 463 is supported by Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; 464 Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006). When participants are probed at random times and asked to 465 report on their mental states, ~22\% of the time their reports are consistent with what 466 Hurlburt and colleagues have called "unsymbolized thinking". In such episodes, people 467 feel that they think 'a particular, definite thought without awareness of that thought 468

being conveyed as words, images, or any other symbols' (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008, p. 802). Unsymbolized thinking is a slippery construct that tends to be defined in terms of what it is not. For example, Hurlburt and Akhter (2008) describe it as 'a thinking, not a feeling, not an intention, not an intimation, not a kinesthetic event, not a bodily event' (p. 1366). A telling example is a participant wondering if her friend will arrive in a car or pickup truck, but not experiencing any words or images; rather, the question is experienced as a single undifferentiated whole.

It is possible that such "unsymbolized thinking" is subserved by the same processes 476 as inner speech, but simply lacks conscious auditory or articulatory features of inner 477 speech (Vicente & Martinez-Manrique, 2016). Alternatively, it may correspond to a genuinely different form of experience in which people entertain more abstract conceptual 479 representations which are less accessible to people with higher levels of inner speech and 480 imagery. Anendophasia as we define it pertains to the subjective experience of inner 481 speech. Our current measurements cannot distinguish whether differences in the experience of inner speech are due to a difference in the cognitive processes subserving 483 inner speech, or a difference in the metacognitive awareness of generated phonetic or articulatory features. 485

486 5.3 Limitations

One limitation of our work is its reliance on wholly subjective questions for measuring inner speech. Considering that our focus is on differences in phenomenology, 488 this is appropriate. At the same time, there is reason to be skeptical of people's 489 assessments of their inner experiences. People can be wrong about what they think they 490 experience (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2011). It would be therefore helpful to supplement 491 subjective assessments with objective ones of the sort becoming possible for differences in 492 visual imagery (Kay, Keogh, Andrillon, & Pearson, 2022). Relatedly, since inner speech is 493 known to vary not just between people, but also across situations (Fernyhough, 2004; 494 Grandchamp et al., 2019; Oppenheim & Dell, 2010), it is worth examining whether 495 people who report having little inner speech experience more of it if placed in situations 496

that, e.g., benefit from verbal rehearsal. We believe our results generalize across age,
gender, and educational status, but it is an open question whether any of the
relationships we report are specific to English speakers or Westerners.

Another limitation is the remaining possibility that differences we ascribe to inner 500 speech come from third factors such, e.g., a general difference in introspection and/or 501 conscientiousness. Although we cannot rule out all such possible confounds, it is worth 502 noting that differences in inner speech, while correlated with e.g., visual imagery, are 503 dissociable from it. There is also no evidence that inner speech was associated with 504 across-the-board differences in performance. Our effects were specific to certain task and 505 condition combinations. That said, to obtain greater confidence in the specific causal role 506 of inner speech on performance, it may be possible to manipulate it via interference or by 507 instructing participants to use it in specific ways. 508

A further limitation is that our measurement of inner speech does not distinguish between its prevalence in one's conscious experience and one's ability to control its deployment. In ongoing work, we have found that people who report experiencing more inner speech (measured as in the present studies) report having a harder time shutting it off (anecdotally, one reported benefit of mindfulness meditation is precisely this ability; for someone with less inner speech to begin with, there is less to shut off). At the same time, we suspect that there is a wide range in ability to regulate one's inner speech, perhaps related to more domain-general differences in cognitive control.

Lastly, while the term "anendophasia" connotes *lack* of inner speech, many of the participants in our "low inner speech" group reported having *some* inner speech.

Screening a larger group to identify people who do not endorse having *any* inner speech would help in knowing whether the cognitive consequences of having less inner speech are continuous with having none.

522 6 Conclusion

Some people report not experiencing an inner voice, and these reports appear to be 523 related to measurable differences in behavior. We proposed a name for a lack of inner 524 speech: anendophasia. We found that people who experience less inner speech were worse 525 at making rhyme judgments in response to images and remembering lists of words. Task 526 switching performance was not, however, either slower or less accurate, and there were no 527 differences in category effects on perceptual discrimination. Taken together, our 528 experiments suggest that there are real behavioral consequences of experiencing less or 529 more inner speech, and that these differences may often be masked because people with 530 anendophasia use alternate strategies to achieve similar overall performance. 531

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Table 1

Comparisons of demographic characteristics of the group with more inner speech and the group with less inner speech.

Measure	More inner speech	Less inner speech	Test for difference	
Age	Mean = 36.91; Median =	Mean = 37.56; Median =	t(88.43) = -0.19; p = .85	
	37; range = 18-67	39; range = 18-70		
Gender	22 female, 25 male	19 female, 26 male	$\chi^2(1) = 0.05; p = .82$	
Native English-speaker	47 native speakers, 0	41 native speakers, 4	$\chi^2(1) = 2.49; p = .11$	
	non-native speakers	non-native speakers		
Dyslexia	46 non-dyslexic, 1	44 non-dyslexic, 1	$\chi^2(1) < 0.01; p > .99$	
	self-diagnosed	self-diagnosed		
Education level	12 high school diploma, 14	1 less than high school, 14	t(84.46) = -0.23; p = .82	
	some college - no degree, 6	high school diploma, 8		
	associate's degree, 14	some college - no degree, 7		
	bachelor's degree, 1	associate's degree, 11		
	master's degree	bachelor's degree, 2		
		master's degree, 2 PhD,		
		law, or medical degree		

Table 2

Descriptive statistics by group in the verbal working memory experiment.

Group	Word set	Score	95% CI	Score	95% CI
		(item and	(item and	(item	(item
		position)	position)	only)	only)
More inner speech	Control set	4.19	± 0.13	4.51	± 0.08
More inner speech	Orthographic similarity set	3.72	± 0.14	4.18	± 0.1
More inner speech	Phonological similarity set	3.43	± 0.16	4.11	± 0.1
Less inner speech	Control set	3.69	± 0.15	4.17	± 0.11
Less inner speech	Orthographic similarity set	3.52	± 0.15	4.10	± 0.11
Less inner speech	Phonological similarity set	3.02	± 0.15	3.81	±0.11

Table 3

Descriptive statistics on rhyming accuracy and reaction time by group and by rhyme type.

Group	Type of rhyme trial	Reaction time (ms)	95% CI (reaction time)	Accuracy	95% CI (accu- racy)
More inner speech	Non-orthographic rhyme	1853	±51	83.75	±2.81
More inner speech	No rhyme	1931	± 53	98.45	± 1.13
More inner speech	Orthographic rhyme	1719	± 55	91.99	± 2.37
Less inner speech	Non-orthographic rhyme	1976	± 54	77.75	± 3.19
Less inner speech	No rhyme	2027	±60	95.57	± 1.65
Less inner speech	Orthographic rhyme	1859	±60	84.48	±3.16

Table 4

Descriptive statistics of reaction time and accuracy on the task switching experiment.

Group	Condition	Mean reaction time (ms)	95% CI (reaction time)	Accuracy	95% CI (accu- racy)
More inner speech	Blocked addition	2287	± 47	97.94	± 0.83
More inner speech	Color-cued switch	2775	± 62	95.64	± 1.16
More inner speech	Blocked subtraction	2528	± 54	97.65	± 0.89
More inner speech	Symbol-cued switch	2564	± 54	97.72	± 0.86
More inner speech	Un-cued switch	2679	± 59	94.59	± 1.29
Less inner speech	Blocked addition	2312	± 46	98.32	± 0.76
Less inner speech	Color-cued switch	2781	± 63	95.08	± 1.26
Less inner speech	Blocked subtraction	2573	± 55	97.80	± 0.88
Less inner speech	Symbol-cued switch	2640	± 56	96.72	± 1.03
Less inner speech	Un-cued switch	2710	± 64	93.19	± 1.47




Figure 1. A schematic of the procedure, showing a trial with phonologically-related words. Each trial had five words.




Figure 2. A sketch of a rhyme judgment trial. The stimuli here exemplify an orthographic rhyme – "bone" and "cone" – and the correct answer would therefore be "Rhyme".




Figure 3. A sketch of the three switched conditions in the task switching experiment. Figure A shows four color-cued switch trials with correct answers, Figure B shows four symbol-cued switch trials with correct answers, and Figure C shows four un-cued switch trials with correct answers.




Figure 4. A sketch of the two conditions of the category judgment experiment. On Figure A, we see a correct category judgment trial where the participant responds that the cat and dog silhouettes represent different animals. On Figure B, we see an incorrect identity judgment trial where the participant responds that the two dogs are identical.




Figure 5. Score on the verbal working memory task by word set.






Figure 6. Verbal working memory performance by whether participants reported talking out loud to help them remember or not.




Figure 7. Reaction time and accuracy across groups by rhyme type.






Figure 8. Reaction time and accuracy by whether participants indicated that they had talked out loud to make the rhyme judgments.




Figure 9. Reaction time and accuracy across conditions in the task switching experiment.




Figure 10. Reaction time (ms) and accuracy in the task switching experiment by whether participants reported talking out loud to remember the correct rule or not.




Figure 11. Reaction time on identity trials where the correct response was 'DIFFERENT' either because the two silhouettes were from different categories or different images from the same category.




Figure 12. Intertask correlations. The upper triangle shows correlations for the group with more inner speech; the lower triangle shows correlations for the group with less inner speech. Colored squares represent significant correlations at p < .01 (|r| > .38 given the sample size).