



# Recent Advances in Graph Neural Network Robustness

Johannes Lutzeyer


Data Science and Mining Team, Laboratoire d'Informatique (LIX),  
École Polytechnique, Institut Polytechnique de Paris

May 15, 2024

## Today I present work that was done in collaboration with



Sofiane Ennadir  
PhD Student KTH



Yassine Abbahaddou  
PhD Student LIX



Prof. Henrik Boström  
Professor KTH



Prof. Michalis Vazirgiannis  
Distinguished Professor LIX

# Graph Representation Learning

**Overall Goal:** Learn “informative” representations of graph structured data

# Graph Representation Learning

**Overall Goal:** Learn “informative” representations of graph structured data

**What is graph structured data?**


# Graph Representation Learning

**Overall Goal:** Learn “informative” representations of graph structured data

**What is graph structured data?**

It's the combination of

- a graph  $G = (V, E)$ ;




# Graph Representation Learning

**Overall Goal:** Learn “informative” representations of graph structured data

**What is graph structured data?**

It's the combination of

- a graph  $G = (V, E)$ ;
- node-features  $X = [x_1, \dots, x_n]^T$ .




# Graph Representation Learning

**Overall Goal:** Learn “informative” representations of graph structured data

**What is graph structured data?**

It's the combination of

- a graph  $G = (V, E)$ ;
- node-features  $X = [x_1, \dots, x_n]^T$ .



US political weblogs  
(Adamic & Glance, 2005)

**Where does it arise?**


# Graph Representation Learning

**Overall Goal:** Learn “informative” representations of graph structured data

**What is graph structured data?**


It's the combination of

- a graph  $G = (V, E)$ ;
- node-features  $X = [x_1, \dots, x_n]^T$ .



US political weblogs  
(Adamic & Glance, 2005)

**Where does it arise?**



Caffeine molecule  
(Bronstein, 2021)


# Graph Representation Learning

**Overall Goal:** Learn “informative” representations of graph structured data

**What is graph structured data?**

It's the combination of

- a graph  $G = (V, E)$ ;
- node-features  $X = [x_1, \dots, x_n]^T$ .




US political weblogs  
(Adamic & Glance, 2005)

**Where does it arise?**



Caffeine molecule  
(Bronstein, 2021)



Deezer artists  
(Salha-Galvan, 2022)


# Graph Representation Learning

**Overall Goal:** Learn “informative” representations of graph structured data

**What is graph structured data?**

It's the combination of


- a graph  $G = (V, E)$ ;
- node-features  $X = [x_1, \dots, x_n]^T$ .




US political weblogs  
(Adamic & Glance, 2005)

**Where does it arise?**

It's ubiquitous!



Caffeine molecule  
(Bronstein, 2021)



Deezer artists  
(Salha-Galvan, 2022)


# Graph Representation Learning

**Overall Goal:** Learn “informative” representations of graph structured data

**What is graph structured data?**

It's the combination of

- a graph  $G = (V, E)$ ;
- node-features  $X = [x_1, \dots, x_n]^T$ .



US political weblogs  
(Adamic & Glance, 2005)


**Where does it arise?**

It's ubiquitous!



Caffeine molecule  
(Bronstein, 2021)

**What can we learn from it?**



Deezer artists  
(Salha-Galvan, 2022)


# Graph Representation Learning

**Overall Goal:** Learn “informative” representations of graph structured data

**What is graph structured data?**

It's the combination of

- a graph  $G = (V, E)$ ;
- node-features  $X = [x_1, \dots, x_n]^T$ .



US political weblogs  
(Adamic & Glance, 2005)

**Where does it arise?**


It's ubiquitous!



Caffeine molecule  
(Bronstein, 2021)

**What can we learn from it?**

- Node and Graph Classification



Deezer artists  
(Salha-Galvan, 2022)


# Graph Representation Learning

**Overall Goal:** Learn “informative” representations of graph structured data

**What is graph structured data?**

It's the combination of

- a graph  $G = (V, E)$ ;
- node-features  $X = [x_1, \dots, x_n]^T$ .



US political weblogs  
(Adamic & Glance, 2005)

**Where does it arise?**


It's ubiquitous!



Caffeine molecule  
(Bronstein, 2021)

**What can we learn from it?**

- Node and Graph Classification
- Node and Graph Regression



Deezer artists  
(Salha-Galvan, 2022)


# Graph Representation Learning

**Overall Goal:** Learn “informative” representations of graph structured data

**What is graph structured data?**

It's the combination of

- a graph  $G = (V, E)$ ;
- node-features  $X = [x_1, \dots, x_n]^T$ .



US political weblogs  
(Adamic & Glance, 2005)

**Where does it arise?**


It's ubiquitous!



Caffeine molecule  
(Bronstein, 2021)

**What can we learn from it?**

- Node and Graph Classification
- Node and Graph Regression
- Link Prediction



Deezer artists  
(Salha-Galvan, 2022)


## Graph Neural Networks

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are neural networks that take graph-structured data as input.

## Graph Neural Networks

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are neural networks that take graph-structured data as input.

In this talk we will only see a specific type of GNN, the Message Passing Neural Networks.




# Graph Neural Networks

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are neural networks that take graph-structured data as input.

In this talk we will only see a specific type of GNN, the Message Passing Neural Networks.

$$m_v^{(k)} = M^{(k)} \left( \left\{ h_w^{(k-1)} : w \in \mathcal{N}(v) \right\} \right),$$

$$m_2^{(1)} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d_2}} \sum_{i \in \{1, 4, 7\}} \frac{x_i}{\sqrt{d_i}}$$



E.g., the Graph Convolutional Network (GCN,  
Kipf and Welling, 2017)

$$\tilde{A}X.$$

# Graph Neural Networks

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are neural networks that take graph-structured data as input.

In this talk we will only see a specific type of GNN, the Message Passing Neural Networks.


$$m_v^{(k)} = M^{(k)} \left( \left\{ h_w^{(k-1)} : w \in \mathcal{N}(v) \right\} \right),$$

$$h_v^{(k)} = U^{(k)} \left( h_v^{(k-1)}, m_v^{(k)} \right).$$

E.g., the Graph Convolutional Network (GCN, Kipf and Welling, 2017)

$$H^{(1)} = \text{ReLU} \left( \tilde{A} X W^{(1)} \right).$$

$$h_2^{(1)} = \sigma \left( \left( \frac{x_2}{d_2} + m_2^{(1)} \right) W \right)$$



# Graph Neural Networks


Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are neural networks that take graph-structured data as input.

In this talk we will only see a specific type of GNN, the Message Passing Neural Networks.

$$m_v^{(k)} = M^{(k)} \left( \left\{ h_w^{(k-1)} : w \in \mathcal{N}(v) \right\} \right),$$
$$h_v^{(k)} = U^{(k)} \left( h_v^{(k-1)}, m_v^{(k)} \right).$$

E.g., the Graph Convolutional Network (GCN, Kipf and Welling, 2017)

$$H^{(1)} = \text{ReLU} \left( \tilde{A} X W^{(1)} \right).$$



Iteratively performing the message-passing and update computations allows us to build 'deep' learning models, e.g., a 3-layer GCN

$$\hat{y} = \sigma \left( \tilde{A} \text{ReLU} \left( \tilde{A} \text{ReLU} \left( \tilde{A} X W^{(1)} \right) W^{(2)} \right) W^{(3)} \right).$$

## Academic and Industrial Success of GNNs

### Empirical and Theoretical Research:

- expressivity analysis of GNNs  
(Xu et al., 2019; Geerts and Reutter, 2022);

## Academic and Industrial Success of GNNs

### Empirical and Theoretical Research:

- expressivity analysis of GNNs  
(Xu et al., 2019; Geerts and Reutter, 2022);
- bottlenecks, e.g., oversmoothing and oversquashing (Alon and Yahav, 2020; Deac et al., 2022)

# Academic and Industrial Success of GNNs

## Empirical and Theoretical Research:

- expressivity analysis of GNNs  
(Xu et al., 2019; Geerts and Reutter, 2022);
- bottlenecks, e.g., oversmoothing and oversquashing (Alon and Yahav, 2020; Deac et al., 2022)
- robustness to adversarial attacks and noise (Günnemann, 2022; Zhou et al., 2020; Seddik et al., 2022, AISTATS).

## Academic and Industrial Success of GNNs

## **Empirical and Theoretical Research:**

- expressivity analysis of GNNs (Xu et al., 2019; Geerts and Reutter, 2022);
  - bottlenecks, e.g., oversmoothing and oversquashing (Alon and Yahav, 2020; Deac et al., 2022)
  - robustness to adversarial attacks and noise (Günnemann, 2022; Zhou et al., 2020; Seddik et al., 2022, AISTATS).



## Successful Applications of GNNs:

- Google Maps (Lange and Perez, 2020);


# Academic and Industrial Success of GNNs

## Empirical and Theoretical Research:

- expressivity analysis of GNNs (Xu et al., 2019; Geerts and Reutter, 2022);
- bottlenecks, e.g., oversmoothing and oversquashing (Alon and Yahav, 2020; Deac et al., 2022)
- robustness to adversarial attacks and noise (Günnemann, 2022; Zhou et al., 2020; Seddik et al., 2022, AISTATS).

## Successful Applications of GNNs:


- Google Maps (Lange and Perez, 2020);
- Twitter (Bronstein, 2020);



# Academic and Industrial Success of GNNs

## **Empirical and Theoretical Research:**

- expressivity analysis of GNNs (Xu et al., 2019; Geerts and Reutter, 2022);
  - bottlenecks, e.g., oversmoothing and oversquashing (Alon and Yahav, 2020; Deac et al., 2022)
  - robustness to adversarial attacks and noise (Günnemann, 2022; Zhou et al., 2020; Seddik et al., 2022, AISTATS).



## Successful Applications of GNNs:

- Google Maps (Lange and Perez, 2020);
  - Twitter (Bronstein, 2020);
  - Amazon, Alibaba, Pinterest & Uber Eats (Virinchi et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2018; Ying et al., 2018; Jain et al., 2019);

# Academic and Industrial Success of GNNs

## Empirical and Theoretical Research:

- expressivity analysis of GNNs (Xu et al., 2019; Geerts and Reutter, 2022);
- bottlenecks, e.g., oversmoothing and oversquashing (Alon and Yahav, 2020; Deac et al., 2022)
- robustness to adversarial attacks and noise (Günnemann, 2022; Zhou et al., 2020; Seddik et al., 2022, AISTATS).



## Successful Applications of GNNs:

- Google Maps (Lange and Perez, 2020);
- Twitter (Bronstein, 2020);
- Amazon, Alibaba, Pinterest & Uber Eats (Virinchi et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2018; Ying et al., 2018; Jain et al., 2019);
- Discovery of two *new antibiotics* (Stokes et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2023);



# Academic and Industrial Success of GNNs

## Empirical and Theoretical Research:

- expressivity analysis of GNNs (Xu et al., 2019; Geerts and Reutter, 2022);
- bottlenecks, e.g., oversmoothing and oversquashing (Alon and Yahav, 2020; Deac et al., 2022)
- robustness to adversarial attacks and noise (Günnemann, 2022; Zhou et al., 2020; Seddik et al., 2022, AISTATS).



## Successful Applications of GNNs:

- Google Maps (Lange and Perez, 2020);
- Twitter (Bronstein, 2020);
- Amazon, Alibaba, Pinterest & Uber Eats (Virinchi et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2018; Ying et al., 2018; Jain et al., 2019);
- Discovery of two *new antibiotics* (Stokes et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2023);
- LinkedIn (Borisuk et al., 2024).




# Bounding the Expected Robustness of Graph Neural Networks Subject to Node Feature Attacks

Abbahaddou\*, Ennadir\*, Lutzeyer, Vazirgiannis & Boström (2024, ICLR)

## (Graph) Adversarial Attacks


**Goal:** Adversarial attacks apply a *small* change to the input to achieve a *large* change in the output of our model.



(Goodfellow et al., 2015)

## (Graph) Adversarial Attacks

**Goal:** Adversarial attacks apply a *small* change to the input to achieve a *large* change in the output of our model.




(Goodfellow et al., 2015)

To quantify the robustness of a function processing graph structured data, i.e.,  
 $f : (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{X}) \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$  we need:

## (Graph) Adversarial Attacks

**Goal:** Adversarial attacks apply a *small* change to the input to achieve a *large* change in the output of our model.



(Goodfellow et al., 2015)


To quantify the robustness of a function processing graph structured data, i.e.,  $f : (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{X}) \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$  we need:

- a distance on the input space

$$d_2^{\alpha, \beta}([G, X], [\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}]) = \min_{P \in \Pi} \left( \alpha \|A - P\tilde{A}P^T\|_2 + \beta \|X - P\tilde{X}\|_2 \right),$$

## (Graph) Adversarial Attacks

**Goal:** Adversarial attacks apply a *small* change to the input to achieve a *large* change in the output of our model.



(Goodfellow et al., 2015)

To quantify the robustness of a function processing graph structured data, i.e.,  $f : (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{X}) \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$  we need:

- a distance on the input space



$$d_2^{\alpha, \beta}([G, X], [\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}]) = \min_{P \in \Pi} \left( \alpha \|A - P\tilde{A}P^T\|_2 + \beta \|X - P\tilde{X}\|_2 \right),$$

- and a distance on the output space

$$d_1(f(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}), f(G, X)) = \|f(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}) - f(G, X)\|_1.$$

## (Graph) Adversarial Attacks

**Goal:** Adversarial attacks apply a *small* change to the input to achieve a *large* change in the output of our model.



(Goodfellow et al., 2015)

To quantify the robustness of a function processing graph structured data, i.e.,  $f : (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{X}) \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$  we need:

- a distance on the input space

$$d_2^{\alpha, \beta}([G, X], [\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}]) = \min_{P \in \Pi} \left( \alpha \|A - P\tilde{A}P^T\|_2 + \beta \|X - P\tilde{X}\|_2 \right),$$

- and a distance on the output space

$$d_1(f(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}), f(G, X)) = \|f(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}) - f(G, X)\|_1.$$

## (Graph) Adversarial Attacks

**Goal:** Adversarial attacks apply a *small* change to the input to achieve a *large* change in the output of our model.

To quantify the robustness of a function processing graph structured data, i.e.,  $f : (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{X}) \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$  we need:

- a distance on the input space

$$d_2^{\alpha, \beta}([G, X], [\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}]) = \min_{P \in \Pi} \left( \alpha \|A - P\tilde{A}P^T\|_2 + \beta \|X - P\tilde{X}\|_2 \right),$$

- and a distance on the output space

$$d_1(f(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}), f(G, X)) = \|f(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}) - f(G, X)\|_1.$$

### Expected Adversarial Robustness

Let the *expected vulnerability* of a graph function  $f$  be defined as

$\text{Adv}_{\epsilon}^{\alpha, \beta}[f] = \mathbb{P}_{(G, X) \sim \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{X}}}[(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}) \in B^{\alpha, \beta}(G, X, \epsilon) : d_{\mathcal{Y}}(f(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}), f(G, X)) > \sigma],$   
with  $B^{\alpha, \beta}(G, X, \epsilon) = \{(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}) : d^{\alpha, \beta}([G, X], [\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}]) < \epsilon\}$  for any budget  $\epsilon \geq 0$ .

## (Graph) Adversarial Attacks

**Goal:** Adversarial attacks apply a *small* change to the input to achieve a *large* change in the output of our model.

To quantify the robustness of a function processing graph structured data, i.e.,  $f : (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{X}) \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$  we need:

- a distance on the input space

$$d_2^{\alpha, \beta}([G, X], [\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}]) = \min_{P \in \Pi} \left( \alpha \|A - P\tilde{A}P^T\|_2 + \beta \|X - P\tilde{X}\|_2 \right),$$

- and a distance on the output space

$$d_1(f(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}), f(G, X)) = \|f(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}) - f(G, X)\|_1.$$

### Expected Adversarial Robustness

Let the *expected vulnerability* of a graph function  $f$  be defined as

$\text{Adv}_{\epsilon}^{\alpha, \beta}[f] = \mathbb{P}_{(G, X) \sim \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{X}}}[(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}) \in B^{\alpha, \beta}(G, X, \epsilon) : d_{\mathcal{Y}}(f(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}), f(G, X)) > \sigma],$   
with  $B^{\alpha, \beta}(G, X, \epsilon) = \{(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}) : d^{\alpha, \beta}([G, X], [\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}]) < \epsilon\}$  for any budget  $\epsilon \geq 0$ .

Then, a graph function  $f : (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{X}) \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$  is  $((d^{\alpha, \beta}, \epsilon), (d_{\mathcal{Y}}, \gamma))$ -robust if its vulnerability  $\text{Adv}_{\epsilon}^{\alpha, \beta}[f]$  can be upper-bounded by  $\gamma$ , i.e.,  $\text{Adv}_{\epsilon}^{\alpha, \beta}[f] \leq \gamma$ .

## Problem Set-Up & Theoretical Results

Recall, Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) take both a graph  $A$  and node features  $X$  as input.

## Problem Set-Up & Theoretical Results

Recall, Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) take both a graph  $A$  and node features  $X$  as input.

**Problem:** Most defense approaches for GNNs defend structural attacks altering  $A$ . There exists very little work on how to defend against attacks on the node features  $X$ .

## Problem Set-Up & Theoretical Results

Recall, Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) take both a graph  $A$  and node features  $X$  as input.

**Problem:** Most defense approaches for GNNs defend structural attacks altering  $A$ . There exists very little work on how to defend against attacks on the node features  $X$ .

### Upper Bound on GCN Vulnerability

We consider node-feature attacks on the input graph  $(A, X)$ , with a budget  $\epsilon$  and  $L$ -layer GCNs with weight matrices  $W^{(i)}$   $i \in \{1, \dots, L\}$ .

Then, the vulnerability of GCNs is upper bounded by

$$\gamma = \prod_{i=1}^L \|W^{(i)}\|_1 \frac{\epsilon \sum_{u \in \mathcal{V}} \hat{w}_u}{\sigma},$$

with  $\hat{w}_u$  denoting the sum of normalized walks of length  $(L - 1)$  starting from node  $u$ .

## Problem Set-Up & Theoretical Results

Recall, Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) take both a graph  $A$  and node features  $X$  as input.

**Problem:** Most defense approaches for GNNs defend structural attacks altering  $A$ . There exists very little work on how to defend against attacks on the node features  $X$ .

### Upper Bound on GCN Vulnerability

We consider node-feature attacks on the input graph  $(A, X)$ , with a budget  $\epsilon$  and  $L$ -layer GCNs with weight matrices  $W^{(i)}$   $i \in \{1, \dots, L\}$ .

Then, the vulnerability of GCNs is upper bounded by

$$\gamma = \prod_{i=1}^L \|W^{(i)}\|_1 \frac{\epsilon \sum_{u \in \mathcal{V}} \hat{w}_u}{\sigma},$$

with  $\hat{w}_u$  denoting the sum of normalized walks of length  $(L - 1)$  starting from node  $u$ .

**Insight:** Our upper bound on the vulnerability of a GCN is **smaller for small  $\prod_{i=1}^L \|W^{(i)}\|_1$**  yielding a **more robust GCN**.

## Methodology

**Fact:** Orthonormal matrices have norm 1.

⇒ According to our bound a GNN with orthonormal weight matrices should be more robust.

## Methodology

**Fact:** Orthonormal matrices have norm 1.

⇒ According to our bound a GNN with orthonormal weight matrices should be more robust.

### Björk Orthonormalisation Algorithm

Given a weight matrix  $W$  we iteratively alter it to approximate the closest orthonormal matrix  $\hat{W}$ . When  $\hat{W}_0 = W$ , we recursively compute

$$\hat{W}_{k+1} = \hat{W}_k \left( I + \frac{1}{2} \left( I - \hat{W}_k^T \hat{W}_k \right) + \dots + (-1)^p \binom{-1/2}{p} \left( I - \hat{W}_k^T \hat{W}_k \right)^p \right).$$

## Methodology

**Fact:** Orthonormal matrices have norm 1.

⇒ According to our bound a GNN with orthonormal weight matrices should be more robust.

### Björk Orthonormalisation Algorithm

Given a weight matrix  $W$  we iteratively alter it to approximate the closest orthonormal matrix  $\hat{W}$ . When  $\hat{W}_0 = W$ , we recursively compute

$$\hat{W}_{k+1} = \hat{W}_k \left( I + \frac{1}{2} \left( I - \hat{W}_k^T \hat{W}_k \right) + \dots + (-1)^p \binom{-1/2}{p} \left( I - \hat{W}_k^T \hat{W}_k \right)^p \right).$$

**Proposed Solution:** In our *GCORN* model we propose the inclusion of several Björk Orthonormalisation iterations in each forward pass during the training of a GCN, **yielding weight matrices that approach orthonormality and thereby a more robust GNN**.

# Results

**Table:** Node classification accuracy ( $\pm$  standard deviation) for feature-based attacks.

Attack	Dataset	GCN	GCN-k	AirGNN	RGCN	ParsevalR	GCORN
Random $(\psi = 0.5)$	Cora	68.4 $\pm$ 1.9	69.2 $\pm$ 2.6	73.5 $\pm$ 1.9	71.6 $\pm$ 0.3	72.9 $\pm$ 0.9	<b>77.1 <math>\pm</math> 1.8</b>
	CiteSeer	57.8 $\pm$ 1.5	62.3 $\pm$ 1.2	64.6 $\pm$ 1.6	63.7 $\pm$ 0.6	65.1 $\pm$ 0.8	<b>67.8 <math>\pm</math> 1.4</b>
	PubMed	68.3 $\pm$ 1.2	71.2 $\pm$ 1.1	70.9 $\pm$ 1.3	71.4 $\pm$ 0.5	71.8 $\pm$ 0.8	<b>73.1 <math>\pm</math> 1.1</b>
	CS	85.3 $\pm$ 1.1	86.7 $\pm$ 1.1	87.5 $\pm$ 1.6	88.2 $\pm$ 0.9	87.6 $\pm$ 0.6	<b>89.8 <math>\pm</math> 1.2</b>
	OGBN-Arxiv	68.2 $\pm$ 1.5	52.8 $\pm$ 0.5	66.5 $\pm$ 1.3	63.8 $\pm$ 1.9	68.3 $\pm$ 1.9	<b>69.1 <math>\pm</math> 1.8</b>
Random $(\psi = 1.0)$	Cora	41.7 $\pm$ 2.1	46.3 $\pm$ 2.8	53.7 $\pm$ 2.2	52.8 $\pm$ 1.6	55.3 $\pm$ 1.2	<b>57.6 <math>\pm</math> 1.9</b>
	CiteSeer	38.2 $\pm$ 1.3	45.3 $\pm$ 1.4	49.8 $\pm$ 2.1	43.7 $\pm$ 2.2	51.2 $\pm$ 1.2	<b>57.3 <math>\pm</math> 1.7</b>
	PubMed	60.1 $\pm$ 1.7	62.3 $\pm$ 1.3	62.4 $\pm$ 1.2	61.9 $\pm$ 1.2	61.3 $\pm$ 1.7	<b>65.8 <math>\pm</math> 1.4</b>
	CS	69.9 $\pm$ 1.3	73.2 $\pm$ 0.9	76.7 $\pm$ 2.8	76.2 $\pm$ 1.4	78.7 $\pm$ 1.2	<b>81.3 <math>\pm</math> 1.6</b>
	OGBN-Arxiv	66.4 $\pm$ 1.9	46.6 $\pm$ 0.6	62.7 $\pm$ 1.6	63.0 $\pm$ 2.4	66.1 $\pm$ 0.7	<b>67.3 <math>\pm</math> 2.1</b>
PGD	Cora	54.1 $\pm$ 2.4	58.3 $\pm$ 1.6	68.2 $\pm$ 1.8	62.5 $\pm$ 1.2	68.6 $\pm$ 1.7	<b>71.1 <math>\pm</math> 1.4</b>
	CiteSeer	52.3 $\pm$ 1.1	59.6 $\pm$ 1.6	59.3 $\pm$ 2.1	61.9 $\pm$ 1.1	62.1 $\pm$ 1.5	<b>65.6 <math>\pm</math> 1.4</b>
	PubMed	66.1 $\pm$ 2.1	67.3 $\pm$ 1.3	70.8 $\pm$ 1.7	69.5 $\pm$ 0.9	68.9 $\pm$ 2.1	<b>72.3 <math>\pm</math> 1.3</b>
	CS	71.3 $\pm$ 1.1	74.1 $\pm$ 0.8	76.3 $\pm$ 2.1	76.6 $\pm$ 1.2	77.3 $\pm$ 0.6	<b>79.6 <math>\pm</math> 1.2</b>
	OGBN-Arxiv	67.5 $\pm$ 0.9	49.9 $\pm$ 0.7	55.7 $\pm$ 0.9	63.6 $\pm$ 0.7	67.6 $\pm$ 1.2	<b>68.1 <math>\pm</math> 1.1</b>
Nettack	Cora	60.9 $\pm$ 2.5	64.2 $\pm$ 5.2	66.7 $\pm$ 3.8	63.4 $\pm$ 3.8	67.5 $\pm$ 2.5	<b>68.3 <math>\pm</math> 1.4</b>
	CiteSeer	55.8 $\pm$ 1.4	71.7 $\pm$ 1.4	67.5 $\pm$ 2.5	70.8 $\pm$ 3.8	69.2 $\pm$ 3.8	<b>77.5 <math>\pm</math> 2.5</b>
	PubMed	60.0 $\pm$ 2.5	65.8 $\pm$ 2.9	69.2 $\pm$ 1.4	<b>71.7 <math>\pm</math> 3.8</b>	68.3 $\pm$ 1.4	70.8 $\pm$ 1.4
	CS	55.8 $\pm$ 1.4	71.6 $\pm$ 1.4	76.7 $\pm$ 1.4	71.7 $\pm$ 2.9	75.8 $\pm$ 2.8	<b>78.3 <math>\pm</math> 1.4</b>
	OGBN-Arxiv	49.2 $\pm$ 2.9	53.3 $\pm$ 1.4	<b>56.7 <math>\pm</math> 1.4</b>	52.6 $\pm$ 2.5	55.8 $\pm$ 1.4	55.8 $\pm$ 1.4

- Our **GCORN model often outperforms** existing defense approaches when subject to feature based attacks.

## Results

**Table:** Node classification accuracy ( $\pm$  standard deviation) for structure-based attacks.

Attack	Dataset	GCN	GCN-Jaccard	RGCN	GNN-SVD	GNN-Guard	ParsevalR	GCORN
Mettack	Cora	73.0 $\pm$ 0.7	75.4 $\pm$ 1.8	69.2 $\pm$ 0.3	73.6 $\pm$ 0.9	74.4 $\pm$ 0.8	71.9 $\pm$ 0.7	<b>77.3 <math>\pm</math> 0.5</b>
	CiteSeer	63.2 $\pm$ 0.9	69.5 $\pm$ 1.9	68.9 $\pm$ 0.6	65.8 $\pm$ 0.6	68.8 $\pm$ 1.5	68.3 $\pm$ 0.8	<b>73.7 <math>\pm</math> 0.3</b>
	PubMed	60.7 $\pm$ 0.7	62.9 $\pm$ 1.8	65.1 $\pm$ 0.4	82.1 $\pm$ 0.8	<b>84.8 <math>\pm</math> 0.3</b>	69.5 $\pm$ 1.1	71.8 $\pm$ 0.4
	CoraML	73.1 $\pm$ 0.6	75.4 $\pm$ 0.4	77.1 $\pm$ 1.1	71.3 $\pm$ 1.0	76.5 $\pm$ 0.7	76.9 $\pm$ 1.3	<b>79.2 <math>\pm</math> 0.6</b>
PGD	Cora	76.7 $\pm$ 0.9	78.3 $\pm$ 1.1	72.0 $\pm$ 0.3	71.6 $\pm$ 0.4	75.0 $\pm$ 2.0	78.4 $\pm$ 1.2	<b>79.9 <math>\pm</math> 0.4</b>
	CiteSeer	67.8 $\pm$ 0.8	70.9 $\pm$ 1.0	62.2 $\pm$ 1.8	60.3 $\pm$ 2.4	68.9 $\pm$ 2.2	70.6 $\pm$ 1.0	<b>73.1 <math>\pm</math> 0.5</b>
	PubMed	75.3 $\pm$ 1.6	73.8 $\pm$ 1.3	78.6 $\pm$ 0.4	81.9 $\pm$ 0.4	<b>84.3 <math>\pm</math> 0.4</b>	77.3 $\pm$ 0.7	77.4 $\pm$ 0.4
	CoraML	76.9 $\pm$ 1.2	75.0 $\pm$ 2.4	77.5 $\pm$ 0.3	73.1 $\pm$ 0.5	75.5 $\pm$ 0.8	81.3 $\pm$ 0.4	<b>84.1 <math>\pm</math> 0.2</b>
DICE	Cora	74.9 $\pm$ 0.8	76.9 $\pm$ 0.9	79.6 $\pm$ 0.3	72.2 $\pm$ 1.4	75.6 $\pm$ 1.1	<b>79.7 <math>\pm</math> 0.8</b>	78.9 $\pm$ 0.4
	CiteSeer	64.1 $\pm$ 0.5	66.0 $\pm$ 0.6	68.7 $\pm$ 0.5	62.6 $\pm$ 1.2	65.5 $\pm$ 1.1	68.9 $\pm$ 0.4	<b>74.6 <math>\pm</math> 0.4</b>
	PubMed	79.4 $\pm$ 0.4	78.3 $\pm$ 0.2	<b>79.8 <math>\pm</math> 0.4</b>	76.6 $\pm$ 0.5	77.8 $\pm$ 0.7	79.2 $\pm$ 0.3	78.1 $\pm$ 0.6
	CoraML	78.3 $\pm$ 0.6	77.5 $\pm$ 0.3	80.1 $\pm$ 0.4	58.7 $\pm$ 0.4	77.5 $\pm$ 0.2	80.5 $\pm$ 1.3	<b>81.1 <math>\pm</math> 0.8</b>

- Our **GCORN model often outperforms** existing defense approaches when subject to feature based attacks.
- GCORN is also effective against **structure-based, as well as combined structure and feature attacks.**

# A Simple and Yet Fairly Effective Defense for Graph Neural Networks

Ennadir, Abbahaddou, Lutzeyer, Vazirgiannis & Boström (2024, AAAI)

## Problem Set-Up

**Problem:** Available defense methods often have high computational complexity and training time (often increasing with increasing graph size).

## Problem Set-Up

**Problem:** Available defense methods often have high computational complexity and training time (often increasing with increasing graph size).

**Solution Approach:** We propose a GNN, called the *NoisyGNN*, in which **hidden states are perturbed** by random noise following a normal distribution  $\mathbf{N} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \beta I)$ , i.e., our GNNs are of the form

$$\hat{y} = \sigma \left( \tilde{A} \text{ReLU} \left( \tilde{A} X W^{(1)} + \mathbf{N} \right) W^{(2)} \right).$$

## Theoretical Results

### Upper Bounds on GNN Vulnerability

We consider structural perturbations of the input graph  $(A, X)$ , with a budget  $\epsilon$  and 2-layer GNNs with 1-Lipschitz continuous activation functions and weight matrices  $W^{(1)}, W^{(2)}$ .

- Then, the vulnerability of GCNs is upper bounded by

$$\frac{2(\|W^{(2)}\|\|W^{(1)}\|\|X\|\epsilon)^2}{\beta};$$

- Then, the vulnerability of GINs is upper bounded by

$$\frac{(\|W^{(2)}\|\|W^{(1)}\|\|X\|\epsilon(2\|A\|+\epsilon))^2}{2\beta}.$$

## Theoretical Results

### Upper Bounds on GNN Vulnerability

We consider structural perturbations of the input graph  $(A, X)$ , with a budget  $\epsilon$  and 2-layer GNNs with 1-Lipschitz continuous activation functions and weight matrices  $W^{(1)}, W^{(2)}$ .

- Then, the vulnerability of GCNs is upper bounded by

$$\frac{2(\|W^{(2)}\|\|W^{(1)}\|\|X\|\epsilon)^2}{\beta};$$

- Then, the vulnerability of GINs is upper bounded by

$$\frac{(\|W^{(2)}\|\|W^{(1)}\|\|X\|\epsilon(2\|A\|+\epsilon))^2}{2\beta}.$$

Insight: Our upper bound on the vulnerability of a GNN is **smaller for large  $\beta$**  yielding a **more robust GNN**.

## Experimental Results

Dataset	Attack Budget	GCNGuard	GCN-Jaccard	GCN-SVD	RGNN	NoisyGCN
Cora	Clean	$77.5 \pm 0.7$	$80.9 \pm 0.7$	$80.6 \pm 0.4$	<b><math>83.5 \pm 0.3</math></b>	$83.2 \pm 0.4$
	Budget (5%)	$75.8 \pm 0.6$	$78.9 \pm 0.8$	$78.4 \pm 0.6$	$78.3 \pm 0.6$	<b><math>81.2 \pm 0.7</math></b>
	Budget (10%)	$74.7 \pm 0.4$	<b><math>76.7 \pm 0.7</math></b>	$71.5 \pm 0.8$	$70.7 \pm 0.8$	$74.5 \pm 0.6$
CiteSeer	Clean	$70.1 \pm 1.5$	$71.2 \pm 0.7$	$70.7 \pm 0.4$	<b><math>72.3 \pm 0.5</math></b>	$71.9 \pm 0.4$
	Budget (5%)	$69.9 \pm 1.1$	$70.3 \pm 2.3$	$68.9 \pm 0.7$	$70.6 \pm 0.7$	<b><math>72.3 \pm 0.6</math></b>
	Budget (10%)	$70.0 \pm 1.5$	$67.5 \pm 2.1$	$68.8 \pm 0.6$	$68.7 \pm 1.2$	<b><math>70.4 \pm 0.8</math></b>
PubMed	Clean	$84.5 \pm 0.6$	$85.0 \pm 0.5$	$82.7 \pm 0.3$	<b><math>85.1 \pm 0.8</math></b>	$85.0 \pm 0.6$
	Budget (5%)	<b><math>84.3 \pm 0.9</math></b>	$79.6 \pm 0.3$	$81.3 \pm 0.6$	$81.1 \pm 0.7$	$81.8 \pm 0.4$
	Budget (10%)	<b><math>84.1 \pm 0.3</math></b>	$67.4 \pm 1.1$	$81.1 \pm 0.7$	$65.2 \pm 0.4$	$73.3 \pm 0.6$
PolBlogs	Clean	$93.1 \pm 0.6$	-	$86.5 \pm 0.8$	$94.9 \pm 0.3$	<b><math>95.2 \pm 0.4</math></b>
	Budget (5%)	$72.8 \pm 0.8$	-	<b><math>85.1 \pm 1.6</math></b>	$76.0 \pm 0.8$	$79.7 \pm 0.6$
	Budget (10%)	$68.7 \pm 1.0$	-	<b><math>84.8 \pm 2.3</math></b>	$69.2 \pm 1.2$	$73.4 \pm 0.5$

Table: Node classification accuracy ( $\pm$  standard deviation) when subject to Mettack.

- Our NoisyGCNs **sometimes outperform** other defense methods.

## Experimental Results

**Table:** Mean training time analysis (in s) of the NoisyGNN in comparison to other baselines for both the GCN and GIN instances.

Dataset	GCNGuard	GCN-Jaccard	RGCN	GCN-SVD	NoisyGCN
Cora	28.52	1.93	1.16	1.39	1.29
CiteSeer	36.04	1.58	1.23	1.12	1.24
PubMed	731.26	12.27	34.19	4.60	2.41
PolBlogs	18.17	5.17	0.96	0.80	0.65

Dataset	GINGuard	GIN-Jaccard	RGCN	GIN-SVD	NoisyGIN
Cora	48.93	3.12	1.31	1.51	1.93
CiteSeer	58.45	3.78	1.44	2.20	2.76
PubMed	963.58	16.28	41.09	6.33	7.86
PolBlogs	43.7	5.52	0.95	3.71	3.16

- Our NoisyGCNs **sometimes outperform** other defense methods.
- NoisyGNNs are **faster to train** than most other defense methods.

## Experimental Results

**Table:** Classification accuracy ( $\pm$  standard deviation) of combining defense methods with the proposed noise injection on different benchmark datasets.

Method	Cora	CiteSeer	PolBlogs
GINGuard	$61.8 \pm 0.5$	$55.6 \pm 1.8$	$82.7 \pm 0.6$
+ Noisy	<b><math>66.2 \pm 1.3</math></b>	<b><math>58.3 \pm 1.9</math></b>	<b><math>83.6 \pm 0.8</math></b>
GIN-Jaccard	$70.4 \pm 1.1$	$61.2 \pm 2.3$	-
+ Noisy	<b><math>72.9 \pm 0.8</math></b>	<b><math>64.9 \pm 1.8</math></b>	-
GCNGuard	$69.5 \pm 0.7$	$66.2 \pm 0.6$	$64.7 \pm 0.8$
+ Noisy	<b><math>72.4 \pm 1.2</math></b>	<b><math>68.9 \pm 0.9</math></b>	<b><math>65.8 \pm 1.3</math></b>
GCN-Jaccard	$66.7 \pm 0.5$	$61.2 \pm 1.1$	-
+ Noisy	<b><math>69.6 \pm 0.9</math></b>	<b><math>63.1 \pm 0.6</math></b>	-

- Our NoisyGCNs **sometimes outperform** other defense methods.
- NoisyGNNs are **faster to train** than most other defense methods.
- When **combined with other defense methods**, best performance is achieved.

## Other Topics We Have Been Working On

- Analysed the Expressive Power of a GNN Operating on Paths in a Graph  
(Michel et al., 2023, ICML)
- Designed a GNN able to capture Neighbourhood Interaction Effects  
(Chatzianastasis et al., 2023, AAAI)
- Studied GNNs for Text Classification  
(Abbahaddou et al., 2023, NeurIPS Workshop)
- Graph Autoencoders for Joint Community Detection and Link Prediction  
(Salha-Galvan et al., 2022, Neural Networks Journal)
- Antibiotic Resistance Prediction Using GNNs  
(Qabel et al., 2022, NeurIPS Workshop)
- Improving GNNs at Scale: Approximate PageRank and CoreRank  
(Ramos Vela et al., 2022, NeurIPS Workshop)
- Sparsifying Weight Matrices in GNNs  
(Lutzeyer et al., 2022, ICLR Workshop)
- Analysing the Robustness of GNNs to Structural Noise  
(Seddik et al., 2022, AISTATS)
- Optimised Graph Shift Operators in GNNs for optimal graph representation  
(Dasoulas et al., 2021, ICLR)

## Conclusions

- Graph Representation Learning is a highly active area of research at the moment gaining both academic and industrial interest.

## Conclusions

- Graph Representation Learning is a highly active area of research at the moment gaining both academic and industrial interest.
- Graph Neural Networks are a versatile and powerful tool, that you may want to consider using.

## Conclusions

- Graph Representation Learning is a highly active area of research at the moment gaining both academic and industrial interest.
- Graph Neural Networks are a versatile and powerful tool, that you may want to consider using.

Specifically, with regards to the presented project

- Both the introduction of noise and the orthonormalisation of weight matrices are viable avenues towards more robust Graph Neural Networks.

# Thank you for your attention!



## References

- Y. Abbahaddou, J. F. Lutzeyer & M. Vazirgiannis, "Graph Neural Networks on Discriminative Graphs of Words," *NeurIPS New Frontiers in Graph Learning Workshop*, 2023.
- Y. Abbahaddou, S. Ennadif, J. F. Lutzeyer, M. Vazirgiannis & H. Boström, "Bounding the Expected Robustness of Graph Neural Networks Subject to Node Feature Attacks," *International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR)*, 2024.
- L. A. Adamic & N. Glance, "The political blogosphere and the 2004 US election: divided they blog," In *Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Link Discovery*, pp. 36–43, 2005.
- H. Abdine, M. Chatzianastasis, C. Bouyioukos & M. Vazirgiannis, "Prot2Text: Multimodal Protein's Function Generation with GNNs and Transformers," *Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)*, 2024.
- U. Alon & E. Yahav, "On the Bottleneck of Graph Neural Networks and its Practical Implications," In: *International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR)*, 2020.
- F. Borisyuk, S. He, Y. Ouyang, M. Ramezani, P. Du, X. Hou, C. Jiang, N. Pasumarthy, P. Bannur, B. Tiwana, P. Liu, "LiGNN: Graph Neural Networks at LinkedIn," *arXiv:2402.11139*, 2024.
- M. Bronstein, "Graph ML at Twitter," *Twitter Engineering Blog Post*, [https://blog.twitter.com/engineering/en\\_us/topics/insights/2020/graph-ml-at-twitter](https://blog.twitter.com/engineering/en_us/topics/insights/2020/graph-ml-at-twitter), 2020.

- M. Bronstein, "Geometric Deep Learning: The Erlangen Programme of ML," *Keynote Talk at The International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2021.
- M. Chatzianastasis, J. F. Lutzeyer, G. Dasoulas & M. Vazirgiannis, "Graph Ordering Attention Networks," *Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)*, 2023.
- A. Deac, M. Lackenby & P. Veličković, "Expander Graph Propagation," *arXiv:2210.02997*, 2022.
- B. Doerr, A. Dremaux, J. F. Lutzeyer & A. Stumpf, "How the move acceptance hyper-heuristic copes with local optima: drastic differences between jumps and cliffs," In: *Proceedings of the Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference (GECCO)*, 2023.
- G. Dasoulas, J. F. Lutzeyer & M. Vazirgiannis, "Learning Parametrised Graph Shift Operators," In: *International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR)*, 2021.
- S. Ennadir, Y. Abba'haddou, J. F. Lutzeyer, M. Vazirgiannis & H. Boström, "A Simple and Yet Fairly Effective Defense for Graph Neural Networks," *Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)*, 2024. 2017.
- M. N. Hamid & I. Friedberg, "Transfer Learning Improves Antibiotic Resistance Class Prediction," *biorxiv:10.1101/2020.04.17.047316*, 2020.
- F. Geerts & J. L. Reutter, "Expressiveness and Approximation Properties of Graph Neural Networks," *International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR)*, 2022.
- J. Gilmer, S. S. Schoenholz, P. F. Riley, O. Vinyals & G. E. Dahl, "Neural message passing for Quantum chemistry," *Proceedings of the 34th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)*, 2017.
- I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, & C. Szegedy, "Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples," *International Conference of Learning Representations (ICLR)*, 2015.
- S. Günnemann, "Graph Neural Networks: Adversarial Robustness," *Graph Neural Networks: Foundations, Frontiers, and Applications*, pp. 149–176, 2022.
- A. Jain, I. Liu, A. Sarda & P. Molino, "Food Discovery with Uber Eats: Using Graph Learning to Power Recommendations," *Uber Engineering Blog Post*, <https://eng.uber.com/uber-eats-graph-learning/>, 2019.
- J. Jumper, R. Evans, A. Pritzel, T. Green, M. Figurnov, O. Ronneberger, K. Tunyasuvunakool, R. Bates, A. Žídek, A. Potapenko, A. Bridgland, C. Meyer, S. A. A. Kohl, A. J. Ballard, A. Cowie, B. Romera-Paredes, S. Nikолов, R. Jain, J. Adler, T. Back, S. Petersen, D. Reiman, E. Clancy, M. Zielinski, M. Steinegger, M. Pacholska, T. Berghammer, S. Bodenstein, D. Silver, O. Vinyals, A. W. Senior, K. Kavukcuoglu, P. Kohli & D. Hassabis, "Highly accurate protein structure prediction with AlphaFold," *Nature*, pp. 583–589, 2021.

- Thomas N. Kipf & M. Welling, "Semi-supervised classification with graph convolutional networks," *International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR)*, 2017.
- O. Lange & L. Perez, "Traffic prediction with advanced Graph Neural Networks," *DeepMind Research Blog Post*, <https://deepmind.com/blog/article/traffic-prediction-with-advanced-graph-neural-networks>, 2020.
- Z. Lin, H. Akin, R. Rao, B. Hie, Z. Zhu, W. Lu, A. dos Santos, Costa, M. Fazel-Zarandi, R. Sercu, S. Candido & A. Rives, "Language Models of Protein Sequences at the Scale of Evolution Enable Accurate Structure Prediction," *biorxiv:10.1101/10.1101/2022.07.20.500902v1*, 2022.
- G. Liu, D. B. Catacutan, K. Rathod, K. Swanson, W. Jin, J. C. Mohammed, A. Chiappino-Pepe, S. A. Syed, M. Fragis, K. Rachwalski, J. Magolan, M. G. Surette, B. K. Coombes, T. Jaakkola, R. Barzilay, J. J. Collins, J. M. Stokes, "Deep learning-guided discovery of an antibiotic targeting *Acinetobacter baumannii*," *Nature Chemical Biology*, pp. 1–9, 2023.
- J. Lutzeyer, C. Wu & M. Vazirgiannis, "Graph Neural Network Simplification: Sparsifying the Update Step," *ICLR Workshop on Geometrical and Topological Representation Learning*, 2022.
- G. Michel, G. Nikolentzos, J. Lutzeyer & M. Vazirgiannis, "Path Neural Networks: Expressive and Accurate Graph Neural Networks," *Proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)*, 2023.
- C. Morris, M. Ritzert, M. Fey, W. L. Hamilton, J.E Lenssen, G. Rattan & M. Grohe, "Weisfeiler and Lehman Go Neural: Higher-order Graph Neural Networks," *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, pp. 4602–4609, 2019.
- G. Nikolentzos, M. Vazirgiannis, C. Xypolopoulos, M. Lingman & E. G. Brandt, "Synthetic Electronic Health Records Generated With Variational Graph Autoencoders," *NPJ Digital Medicine*, 2023.
- A. Qabel, S. Ennadir, G. Nikolentzos, J. F. Lutzeyer, M. Chatzianastasis, H. Boström & M. Vazirgiannis, "Structure-Aware Antibiotic Resistance Classification Using Graph Neural Networks," *NeurIPS AI for Science Workshop*, 2022.
- A. R. Ramos Vela, J. F. Lutzeyer, A. Giovanidis & M. Vazirgiannis, "Improving Graph Neural Networks at Scale: Combining Approximate PageRank and CoreRank," *NeurIPS New Frontiers in Graph Learning Workshop*, 2022.
- G. Salha-Galvan, J. F. Lutzeyer, G. Dasoulas, R. Hennequin & M. Vazirgiannis, "Modularity-Aware Graph Autoencoders for Joint Community Detection and Link Prediction," *arxiv:2202.00961*, 2022.
- G. Salha-Galvan, *Contributions to Representation Learning with Graph Autoencoders and Applications to Music Recommendation*, PhD thesis: École Polytechnique, Institut Polytechnique de Paris, 2022.

- M. E. A. Seddik, C. Wu, J. F. Lutzeyer & M. Vazirgiannis, "Node Feature Kernels Increase Graph Convolutional Network Robustness," *International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics (AISTATS)*, 2022.
- J. M. Stokes, K. Yang, K. Swanson, W. Jin, A. Cubillos-Ruiz, N. M. Donghia, C. R. MacNair, S. French, L. A. Carfrae, Z. Bloom-Ackermann, V. M. Tran, A. Chiappino-Pepe, A. H. Badran, I. W. Andrews, E. J. Chory, G. M. Church, E. D. Brown, T. S. Jaakkola, R. Barzilay & J. J. Collins, "A Deep Learning Approach to Antibiotic Discovery," *Cell*, pp. 688–702, 2020.
- L. Sun, Y. Dou, C. Yang, J. Wang, P. S. Yu & B. Li, "Adversarial attack and defense on graph data: A survey," *arXiv:1812.10528*, 2020.
- S. Virinchi, A. Saladi & A. Mondal, "Recommending Related Products Using Graph Neural Networks in Directed Graphs," In: *European Conference on Machine Learning and Principles and Practice of Knowledge Discovery in Databases (ECML PKDD)*, 2022.
- J. Wang, P. Huang, H. Zhao, Z. Zhang, B. Zhao & Dik Lun Lee, "Billion-scale Commodity Embedding for E-Commerce Recommendation in Alibaba," In Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining (KDD), pp. 839–848, 2018.
- K. Xu, W. Hu, J. Leskovec & S. Jegelka. "How powerful are graph neural networks?", *International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR)*, 2019.
- R. Ying, R. He, K. Chen, P. Eksombatchai, W. L. Hamilton & J. Leskovec, "Graph Convolutional Neural Networks for Web-Scale Recommender Systems," In Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining (KDD), pp. 974–983, 2018.
- Y. Zhou, H. Zheng & X. Huang, "Graph Neural Networks: Taxonomy, Advances and Trends," *arXiv:2012.08752*, 2020.