## FIXED COST MODELS

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# **OUTLINE**

- Introduction
- 2 BASELINE FC MODEL

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### FIXED COST MODELS

- Lots of behavior at the micro level is lumpy: buying houses, cars, setting prices, investment, information acquisition.
- Fixed cost models naturally give rise to such lumpiness.
- Fixed cost models are hard to solve because they are non-convex, non-differentiable, and in GE have to carry distribution around.
- But lots of interesting economics: state-dependence, size-dependence, policy targeting.
- Today we will see how to solve these models within SSJ routines.

## FIXED COST MODELS: EXAMPLES

• Does lumpy price setting behavior matter? lots from Alvarez-Lippi; Auclert, Rigato, Rognlie, Straub (2024).

 Do fixed cost frictions matter? Kahn-Thomas, Winberry (2021), Koby-Wolf (2020), Bailey-Blanco (2021).

 Lumpy durables and monetary transmission: McKay and Wieland (2021, 2022).

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## **ENVIRONMENT**

- Liquid assets a
- Durable stock d
- Nondurable consumption c
- Income y
- Real rate r
- ullet Depreciation rate  $\delta$
- Fixed cost f

## **CONSTRAINTS**

Budget constraint if adjusting:

$$\frac{a'}{1+r} + c' + pd' = a + (1-\delta)(1-f)pd + y \equiv x_{adj}$$

• Budget constraint if not adjusting with  $d' = (1 - \delta)d$ 

$$\frac{a'}{1+r} + c' = a + y \equiv x_{noadj}$$

Borrowing constraint

$$a' \geq 0$$

### VALUE FUNCTIONS

Let the value function be

$$V(y,d,a,\varepsilon) = \max\{V^{adj}(y,d,a) + \varepsilon^{adj}, V^{noadj}(y,d,a) + \varepsilon^{noadj}\}$$

•  $\varepsilon^i$  are drawn from a Gumbell distribution with standard deviation  $\sigma_V \frac{\pi}{\sqrt{\varepsilon}}$ , 1.

Define the post-adjustment value function as

$$W(y, d', a') \equiv E_v \tilde{V}(y', d', a')$$

Value from adjusting and not adjusting:

$$V^{adj}(y,d,a) = \max_{c'+d'+rac{a'}{1+r} \leq x_{adj}} [\psi \ln c' + (1-\psi) \ln d' + W(y,d',a'), \ V^{noadj}(y,d,a) = \max_{c'+rac{a'}{1+r} \leq x_{noadj}} [\psi \ln c' + (1-\psi) \ln (1-\delta)d + W(y,(1-\delta)d)]$$

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>https://eml.berkeley.edu/choice2/ch3.pdf

## ADJUSTMENT PROBABILITIES AND EXPECTED VALUES

• The probability of adjustment is

$$adjust(y,d,a) = \frac{\exp\{(V^{adj}(y,d,a) - V^{noadj}(y,d,a))/\sigma_V\}}{1 + \exp\{(V^{adj}(y,d,a) - V^{noadj}(y,d,a))/\sigma_V\}}$$

 $\bullet$  The distribution of V is

$$\begin{split} Prob[V \leq x] &= Prob[\varepsilon^{adj} \leq x - V^{adj}(y,d,a)] \\ &\times Prob[\varepsilon^{noadj} \leq x - V^{noadj}(y,d,a)] \\ &= \exp\{-\exp[-(x - \sigma_V \log\{\exp[V^{adj}(y,d,a)/\sigma_V]\} + \exp[V^{noadj}(y,d,a)/\sigma_V]\})/\sigma_V]\} \end{split}$$

• The expected value is,

$$ilde{V}(y,d,a) \equiv E_{\varepsilon}V(y,d,a,\varepsilon)$$

$$= V^{noadj}(y,d,a) - \sigma_V \log noadjust(y,d,a) + \sigma_V \gamma$$
where  $\gamma \approx 0.5772$  is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. If  $\sigma_V \to 0$ , then
$$ilde{V}(y,d,a) = \max\{V^{adj}(y,d,a), V^{noadj}(y,d,a)\}$$

#### NO ADJUSTMENT PROBLEM

- Break up into sequential problem of choosing c', a' given d'. Then choose d'.
- For given choice of d':

$$V^{noadj}(y,n,m) = \max_{c',a'} [\psi \ln c' + (1-\psi) \ln d' + \beta W(y',d',a')]$$
  $d'=n$   $a'=[m-c']$   $a'>0$ 

where  $m \ge 0$ .

• First order conditions:

$$\begin{split} V_m^{noadj}(y,n,m) &= \beta \, W_a(y',d',a') + \zeta \\ V_n^{noadj}(y,n,m) &= \frac{\left(1-\psi\right)}{d'} + \beta \, W_d(y',d',a') \\ \frac{\psi}{c'} &= \beta \, W_a(y',d',a') + \zeta \end{split}$$

## **EGM**

- We are given an initial guess  $W_a(y', d', a')$ .
- ullet First, assume borrowing constraint is not binding and solve for c' in

$$\frac{\psi}{c'} = \beta W_{\mathsf{a}}(y', d', \mathsf{a}')$$

Then calculate implied cash on hand

$$m = c' + a'$$

- The problem is not necessarily concave, so there may be multiple combinations of (c', a') that map into the same grid point m.
  - In this case we have to check which solution yields highest utility and discard the others.
  - ► The "func\_upper\_envelop.py" function performs this task.

## **EGM**

- Interpolate the decision rules from the *m* grid onto the grid for *a*.
- Then check if implied solution for a' violates the borrowing constraint. If so implement borrowing constrained solution a' = 0 and c' = m.
- Combining the two solutions yields the policy functions

$$c^{noadj}(y, n, m), a^{noadj}(y, n, m)$$

ullet The no adjustment solutions use  $n=(1-\delta)d$  and m=a+y

$$c^{noadj}(y,(1-\delta)d,m)$$
 $a^{noadj}(y,(1-\delta)d,m)$ 
 $d^{noadj}=(1-\delta)d$ 

#### ADJUSTMENT PROBLEM

Given some amount of cash on hand x:

$$V^{adj}(y,x) = \max_{d'} V^{noadj}(y,d',m')$$
$$m' = x + y - pd'$$
$$m' \ge 0$$

FOC

$$\begin{split} V_{x}^{adj}(y,x) &= V_{m}^{noadj}(y,d',m') + \kappa \\ V_{n}^{noadj}(y,d',m') &= pV_{m}^{noadj}(y,d',m') + \kappa \end{split}$$

- Constraint will never be binding so  $\kappa = 0$ .
- Combine with keep FOC to get

$$p\frac{\psi}{c^{noadj}(y,d',m')} = \frac{1-\psi}{d'} + \beta W_d(y,d',a')$$

Again must solve for upper envelope given non-concavity.

#### ADJUSTMENT SOLUTION

• This yields adjustment solutions

$$c^{adj}(y,x), a^{adj}(y,x), d^{adj}(y,x)$$

and a value function

$$V^{adj}(y,x) = \psi \ln c^{adj}(y,x) + (1 - \psi) \ln d^{adj}(y,x) + \beta W(y', d^{adj}(y,x), a^{adj}(y,x))$$

• We interpolate onto the existing grid using  $x = a + (1 - \delta)(1 - f)pd$  to get

$$c^{adj}(y,d,a), a^{adj}(y,d,a), d^{adj}(y,d,a)$$

and value function

$$V^{adj}(y,d,a) = \psi \ln c^{adj}(a,d,y) + (1-\psi) \ln d^{adj}(a,d,y) + \beta W(y',d^{adj}(a,d,y)) + \beta W(y'$$

### COMBINED PROBLEM

• Get policy functions by combining adjust and no-adjust solutions.

$$c'(y,d,a) = adjust(a,d,y)c^{adj}(a,d,y) + (1 - adjust(a,d,y))c^{noadj}(a,d,y)$$

$$a'(y,d,a) = adjust(a,d,y)a^{adj}(a,d,y) + (1 - adjust(a,d,y))a^{noadj}(a,d,y)$$

$$d'(y,d,a) = adjust(a,d,y)d^{adj}(a,d,y) + (1 - adjust(a,d,y))d^{noadj}(a,d,y)$$