# 9. The Stochastic Growth Model

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### Production Is Back

- ▶ In previous lectures, we analyzed optimal behavior under uncertainty in the context of a pure exchange economy with stochastic endowments
- ► Today, we consider a simple production economy with stochastic technology
- ► We study the stochastic neoclassical growth model, also referred to as the real business cycle (RBC) model
- ▶ This is the last of four lectures on complete markets

### Lecture Outline

- 1. Model Setup
- 2. Central Planner
- 3. Time Zero Trading: Arrow-Debreu
- 4. Implied Wealth Dynamics
- 5. Sequential Trading: Arrow
- 6. Equivalence of Allocations

- 7. Financing the Firms
- 8. Recursive Formulation
- 9. Recursive: Central Planner
- 10. Recursive: Sequential Trading
- 11. Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
- 12. Exercise

Main Reference: Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2018, Recursive Macroeconomic Theory, Fourth Edition, Chapter 12

# 1. Model Setup

### The Stochastic Growth Model

- ▶ The environment resembles that of the standard neoclassical growth model
- ► The key difference is that technology is now stochastic
- ▶ We also make two minor changes
- 1. The labor supply is not inelastic anymore, leading to labor supply decisions
- 2. We introduce a second type of firm that builds capital, so as to induce more trades among agents and price more items, in particular the capital stock

# Stochastic Event

- ▶ In each period  $t \ge 0$ , there is a realization of a stochastic event  $s_t \in S$
- $\triangleright$  The stochastic event  $s_t$  is an aggregate, or economy-wide, state variable
- ▶ Let the history of events until t be  $s^t = [s_0, s_1, \ldots, s_t]$
- ightharpoonup The history  $s^t$  is publicly observable

# **Probabilities**

- As usual, the unconditional probability of observing a particular sequence of events  $s^t$  is given by probability measure  $\pi_t(s^t)$
- ► For  $t > \tau$ , the probability of observing  $s^t$  conditional on the realization of history  $s^\tau$  is  $\pi_t(s^t|s^\tau)$
- Again, the initial state  $s_0$  in period 0 is nonstochastic, ie  $\pi_0(s_0) = 1$

## Households

A representative household has preferences over streams of consumption  $c_t(s^t)$  and leisure  $\ell_t(s^t)$ 

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u[c_t(s^t), \ell_t(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t), \qquad \beta \in (0, 1)$$

u satisfies the usual Inada conditions

$$u(0,\ell) = u(c,0) = 0 \qquad \lim_{c \to 0} u_c(c,\ell) = \lim_{\ell \to 0} u_\ell(c,\ell) = \infty$$

$$u_c, u_\ell > 0, \ u_{cc}, u_{\ell\ell} < 0 \qquad \lim_{c \to \infty} u_c(c,\ell) = \lim_{\ell \to 1} u_\ell(c,\ell) = 0$$

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# Work or Chill

▶ In each period, the household is endowed with one unit of time that can be either devoted to leisure  $\ell_t(s^t)$  or labor  $n_t(s^t)$ 

$$1 = \ell_t(s^t) + n_t(s^t)$$

- ▶ If the utility function did not depend on leisure,  $u[c(s^t)]\pi_t(s^t)$ , the household would choose  $\ell_t(s^t) = 0$  and  $n_t(s^t) = 1$  for all t, ie an inelastic labor supply
- ▶ Here, because households value leisure, they end up choosing  $n_t(s^t) < 1$

# Why Do We Have a Representative Household?

- As soon as we assume complete markets, which is the case in this model, we can rationalize the representative household construct as follows
- Assume there are I consumers named  $i=1,2,\ldots,I$ , and all consumers have the same utility function  $u^i[c_t^i(s^t),\ell_t^i(s^t)]=u[c_t^i(s^t),\ell_t^i(s^t)]$
- ▶ Each consumer receives idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks  $e_t^i(s^t)n_t^i(s^t)$ , but optimally trades state-price securities to insure the risk away
- ▶ In sum, there is no idiosyncratic risk in this economy, only aggregate risk

### **Production Function**

Output is produced according to the production function

$$A_t(s^t)F[k_t(s^{t-1}), n_t(s^t)]$$

- Notice capital in period t depends on the state in period t-1
- $ightharpoonup A_t(s^t)$  is a stochastic process of Harrod-neutral technology shocks
- ▶ *F* satisfies the standard assumptions

$$F(0,n) = F(k,0) = 0 \qquad \lim_{k \to 0} F_k(k,n) = \lim_{n \to 0} F_n(k,n) = \infty$$

$$F_k, F_n > 0, \ F_{kk}, F_{nn} < 0 \qquad \lim_{k \to \infty} F_k(k,n) = \lim_{n \to \infty} F_n(k,n) = 0$$

▶ Write the function in intensive form:  $F(k,n) \equiv nf(\hat{k})$  where  $\hat{k} \equiv \frac{k}{n}$ 

### **Constraints**

Output goods are consumption and investment goods

$$c_t(s^t) + i_t(s^t) \le A_t(s^t) F[k_t(s^{t-1}), n_t(s^t)]$$

Capital accumulates according to

$$k_{t+1}(s^t) = (1 - \delta)k_t(s^{t-1}) + i_t(s^t)$$

▶ Capital  $k_{t+1}(s^t)$ , to be used in production in t+1, is built in advance in t

### **Consolidated Constraint**

- ▶ The investment good  $i_t(s^t)$  can take negative values, meaning the capital stock is reversible, ie it can be freely reconverted into consumption
- ► Consumption, however, cannot be negative
- ▶ Plug the law of motion of capital into the resource constraint

$$c_t(s^t) + k_{t+1}(s^t) - (1 - \delta)k_t(s^{t-1}) \le A_t(s^t)F[k_t(s^{t-1}), n_t(s^t)]$$

# 2. Central Planner

### Problem of the Central Planner

- ▶ The planner chooses an allocation  $\{c_t(s^t), \ell_t(s^t), i_t(s^t), n_t(s^t), k_{t+1}(s^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  to maximize the utility function, subject to
  - ► The time constraint
  - ► The resource constraint
  - ightharpoonup The initial capital stock  $k_0$
  - ▶ The stochastic process for the level of technology  $A_t(s^t)$

# Lagrangian

Write a Lagrangian, in which we directly plug the time constraint

$$\mathcal{L} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t \pi_t(s^t) \left\{ u[c_t(s^t), 1 - n_t(s^t)] + \mu_t(s^t) \left[ A_t(s^t) F[k_t(s^{t-1}), n_t(s^t)] + (1 - \delta) k_t(s^{t-1}) - c_t(s^t) - k_{t+1}(s^t) \right] \right\}$$

 $ightharpoonup \mu_t(s^t)$  is a process of Lagrange multipliers on the resource constraint

# **First-Order Conditions**

 $\blacktriangleright$  For each t and  $s^t$ , the first-order conditions are

$$c_t : u_c(s^t) = \mu_t(s^t)$$

$$n_t : u_\ell(s^t) = u_c(s^t) A_t(s^t) F_n(s^t)$$

$$k_{t+1} : \pi_t(s^t) u_c(s^t) = \beta \sum_{s^{t+1} \mid s^t} u_c(s^{t+1}) \pi_{t+1}(s^{t+1}) [A_{t+1}(s^{t+1}) F_k(s^{t+1}) + 1 - \delta]$$

### Notation

▶ In the FOC for capital, note that


$$\sum_{s^{t+1}} = \sum_{s^t} \sum_{s^{t+1}\mid s^t}$$

where the summation over  $s^{t+1}|s^t$  means we sum over all possible histories  $\tilde{s}^{t+1}$  such that  $\tilde{s}^t=s^t$ 

Summations over histories and events are different

$$\sum_{s^{t+1}|s^t} \neq \sum_{s_{t+1}}$$

# **Summing Over Histories**




# **Summing Over Events**

$$t-2$$

$$t-1$$

t trading period

$$t+1$$




$$\sum_{s_{t+1}}$$

# 3. Time Zero Trading: Arrow-Debreu Securities

# Three Types of Agents

- Let's solve the competitive equilibrium with time 0 trading of a complete set of dated- and history-contingent Arrow-Debreu securities
- ► Trades occur among three representative agents
- 1. The representative household
- 2. A representative goods producer, which we call type I firm
- 3. A representative capital producer, which we call type II firm

# Model Diagram



### Actions

- ▶ Households own the initial capital stock  $k_0$ , sell it to capital producers at date 0, rent out labor services to and buy goods from goods producers
- Goods producers rent labor from households, rent capital from capital producers, produce, sell output goods to households and capital producers
- ightharpoonup Capital producers buy initial  $k_0$  from households, buy investment goods from goods producers, produce capital, rent out capital to goods producers

### Problem of the Household

The household maximizes

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u[c_t(s^t), 1 - n_t(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t)$$
 
$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} q_t^0(s^t) c_t(s^t) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} w_t^0(s^t) n_t(s^t) + p_{k0} k_0$$

- $lackbox{ } q_t^0(s^t)$  is the price of one unit of output/consumption contingent on history  $s^t$
- $lackbox{ }w_t^0(s^t)$  is the price of one unit of labor contingent on history  $s^t$
- $ightharpoonup p_{k0}$  is the price of one unit of the initial capital stock

# Interpretation

- ▶ We are at time 0, markets open, and all trading takes place
- At time 0, the consumer sells her entire lifetime income stream, made of labor income  $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} w_t^0(s^t) n_t(s^t)$  and a one-off capital sale  $p_{k0}k_0$
- ▶ The consumer sells her labor to firm I and her capital to firm II
- With the proceeds, the consumer buys an infinite sequence of consumption claims  $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} q_t^0(s^t) c_t(s^t)$  from firm I, the goods producer
- ▶ At the end of period 0, when trading is complete, markets close forever

# Lagrangian

► Write a Lagrangian

$$\mathcal{L} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u[c_t(s^t), 1 - n_t(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t)$$

$$+ \eta \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} w_t^0(s^t) n_t(s^t) + p_{k0} k_0 - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} q_t^0(s^t) c_t(s^t) \right]$$

 $ightharpoonup \eta$  is the unique Lagrange multiplier on the time 0 budget constraint

### **First-Order Conditions**

► The first-order conditions are

$$c_t(s^t): \quad \beta^t u_c(s^t) \pi_t(s^t) = \eta q_t^0(s^t)$$
  
 $n_t(s^t): \quad \beta^t u_\ell(s^t) \pi_t(s^t) = \eta w_t^0(s^t)$ 

# Goods Producer – Firm of Type I

- ► The goods producer, or firm I, operates the production technology
- ▶ At time 0, the firm enters into state-contingent contracts for each t and each  $s^t$  to rent capital  $k_t^I(s^t)$  and labor services  $n_t(s^t)$  and sell output  $y_t(s^t)$
- ▶ It trades with households over labor services  $n_t(s^t)$  and goods  $c_t(s^t)$  and it trades with capital producers over capital services  $k_t^I(s^t)$  and goods  $i_t(s^t)$

## Problem of the Goods Producer

► The goods producer maximizes

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \left\{ q_t^0(s^t) [c_t(s^t) + i_t(s^t)] - r_t^0(s^t) k_t^I(s^t) - w_t^0(s^t) n_t(s^t) \right\}$$
subject to 
$$c_t(s^t) + i_t(s^t) \le A_t(s^t) F[k_t^I(s^t), n_t(s^t)]$$

- $ightharpoonup r_t^0(s^t)$  is the price for renting capital, ie the rental rate
- $\blacktriangleright$  Note that all variables in this problem are conditioned on the history  $s^t$

### **First-Order Conditions**

▶ Plug the constraint into the objective

$$\max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s,t} \left\{ q_t^0(s^t) A_t(s^t) F[k_t^I(s^t), n_t(s^t)] - r_t^0(s^t) k_t^I(s^t) - w_t^0(s^t) n_t(s^t) \right\}$$

► The first-order conditions are

$$k_t^I(s^t): q_t^0(s^t)A_t(s^t)F_k(s^t) = r_t^0(s^t)$$
  
 $n_t(s^t): q_t^0(s^t)A_t(s^t)F_n(s^t) = w_t^0(s^t)$ 

# Capital Producer – Firm of Type II

- ► The capital producer operates a technology to transform output goods (ie investment goods) into capital goods
- $\triangleright$  At time 0, it enters into state-contingent contracts for each t and each  $s^t$
- ▶ It purchases initial capital  $k_0$  from households and builds new capital  $k_{t+1}^{II}(s^t)$  by purchasing investment goods  $i_t(s^t)$  from goods producers
- lacktriangle It earns revenues by renting out capital  $r_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})k_{t+1}^{II}(s^t)$  to goods producers

# Problem of the Capital Producer

► The capital producer maximizes profit

$$\begin{split} -p_{k0}k_0^{II} + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \left\{ r_t^0(s^t)k_t^{II}(s^{t-1}) - q_t^0(s^t)i_t(s^t) \right\} \\ \text{subject to} \qquad k_{t+1}^{II}(s^t) = (1-\delta)k_t^{II}(s^{t-1}) + i_t(s^t) \end{split}$$

Note that some variables are conditioned on  $s^{t-1}$ , others on  $s^t$ 

### Who Bears the Risk?

- ▶ Capital in period 0  $k_0^{II}$  is bought without any uncertainty about the rental price  $r_0^0(s_0)$  in that period
- ▶ But for any future period t, investment in capital  $k_t^{II}(s^{t-1})$ , conditioned on  $s^{t-1}$ , is made without knowing the rental price  $r_t^0(s^t)$ , conditioned on  $s^t$
- ➤ So firm II must deal with the risk associated with capital being assembled one period prior to becoming an input for production and yielding a return
- Firm I, on the other hand, can choose how much capital  $k_t^I(s^t)$  to rent in period t conditioned on history  $s^t$ , ie it faces no risk at all

# Problem of the Capital Producer

Plug the capital accumulation constraint into the objective and rearrange

$$k_0^{II} \left\{ -p_{k0} + r_0^0(s_0) + q_0^0(s_0)(1-\delta) \right\}$$

$$+ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} k_{t+1}^{II}(s^t) \left\{ -q_t^0(s^t) + \sum_{s^{t+1}|s^t} [r_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1}) + q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})(1-\delta)] \right\}$$

- ▶ Profit is a linear function of investments in capital  $k_0^{II}$  and  $k_{t+1}^{II}(s^t)$
- ▶ What must happen to the two terms in curly brackets {...}?

# Details of the Computation

$$-p_{k0}k_{0}^{II} + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{t}} \left\{ r_{t}^{0}(s^{t})k_{t}^{II}(s^{t-1}) - q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})k_{t+1}^{II}(s^{t}) + q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})(1-\delta)k_{t}^{II}(s^{t-1}) \right\}$$

$$= -p_{k0}k_{0}^{II} + r_{0}^{0}(s_{0})k_{0}^{II} + q_{0}^{0}(s_{0})(1-\delta)k_{0}^{II} + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{t}} -q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})k_{t+1}^{II}(s^{t})$$

$$+ \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{t}} \left\{ r_{t}^{0}(s^{t})k_{t}^{II}(s^{t-1}) + q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})(1-\delta)k_{t}^{II}(s^{t-1}) \right\}$$

$$= k_{0}^{II} \left\{ -p_{k0} + r_{0}^{0}(s_{0}) + q_{0}^{0}(s_{0})(1-\delta) \right\} + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{t}} -q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})k_{t+1}^{II}(s^{t})$$

$$+ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{t}} \sum_{s^{t+1}|s^{t}} \left\{ r_{t+1}^{0}(s^{t+1})k_{t+1}^{II}(s^{t}) + q_{t+1}^{0}(s^{t+1})(1-\delta)k_{t+1}^{II}(s^{t}) \right\}$$

$$= k_{0}^{II} \left\{ -p_{k0} + r_{0}^{0}(s_{0}) + q_{0}^{0}(s_{0})(1-\delta) \right\}$$

$$+ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{t}} k_{t+1}^{II}(s^{t}) \left\{ -q_{t}^{0}(s^{t}) + \sum_{s^{t+1}|s^{t}} [r_{t+1}^{0}(s^{t+1}) + q_{t+1}^{0}(s^{t+1})(1-\delta)] \right\}$$

### Perfect Competition Means Zero Profit

- lacksquare If the terms in curly brackets are positive, the firm wants infinite  $k_0^{II}, k_{t+1}^{II}$
- lacksquare If the terms in curly brackets are negative, the firm wants zero  $k_0^{II}, k_{t+1}^{II}$
- ▶ In equilibrium: 1) perfect competition implies zero profits; 2) supply equals demand, meaning capital cannot be zero or infinite,  $0 < k_0^{II}, k_{t+1}^{II} < \infty$
- ► We conclude that the two terms in curly brackets from the firm's profit equation must be equal to zero: this is the zero-profit condition

#### First-Order Conditions

Based on the preceding, equilibrium prices satisfy

$$p_{k0} = r_0^0(s_0) + q_0^0(s_0)(1 - \delta)$$

$$q_t^0(s^t) = \sum_{s^{t+1}|s^t} [r_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1}) + q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})(1 - \delta)]$$

### **Summary of Necessary Conditions**

Households

$$\beta^t u_c(s^t) \pi_t(s^t) = \eta q_t^0(s^t)$$
$$\beta^t u_\ell(s^t) \pi_t(s^t) = \eta w_t^0(s^t)$$

Goods producer or firm I

$$q_t^0(s^t)A_t(s^t)F_k(s^t) = r_t^0(s^t)$$
  

$$q_t^0(s^t)A_t(s^t)F_n(s^t) = w_t^0(s^t)$$

Capital producer or firm II

$$p_{k0} = r_0^0(s_0) + q_0^0(s_0)(1 - \delta)$$

$$q_t^0(s^t) = \sum_{s^{t+1}|s^t} [r_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1}) + q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})(1 - \delta)]$$

# Equilibrium

- ▶ In equilibrium, markets clear, ie supply equals demand
- Let's compute the equilibrium price and quantities in the three markets
- 1. Labor market
- 2. Capital market
- 3. Goods market

### Labor Market Equilibrium

- ▶ Labor supply is set by the household's FOC for labor
- ► Labor demand comes from the goods producer's (firm I) FOC for labor
- Combine the two

$$\beta^t u_\ell(s^t) \pi_t(s^t) = \eta q_t^0(s^t) A_t(s^t) F_n(s^t)$$

### Capital Market Equilibrium

- Capital supply comes from the capital producer's (firm II) FOC
- ▶ Capital demand comes from the goods producer's (firm I) FOC for capital
- ► Combine the two

$$q_t^0(s^t) = \sum_{s^{t+1}|s^t} q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1}) [A_{t+1}(s^{t+1}) F_k(s^{t+1}) + 1 - \delta]$$

#### Goods Market Equilibrium

- Supply of goods comes from the goods producer (firm I)
- ▶ Demand for goods comes from households and capital producers (firm II)
- By Walras' law, or by virtue of the resource constraint at equality, the goods market is in equilibrium

$$A_t(s^t)F[k_t(s^{t-1}), n_t(s^t)] = c_t(s^t) + i_t(s^t)$$

### Consumption—Labor Choice

▶ Plug the household's consumption FOC into the labor market equilibrium equation

$$\frac{u_{\ell}(s^t)}{u_c(s^t)} = A_t(s^t)F_n(s^t) = w_t(s^t)$$

- ► This is the intratemporal labor supply—consumption decision
- The marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between leisure and consumption  $\frac{u_{\ell}(s^t)}{u_c(s^t)}$  equals the relative price of leisure, ie the wage  $w_t(s^t)$

### **Euler Equation**

▶ Plug the household's consumption FOC into the capital market equilibrium equation

$$\pi_t(s^t)u_c(s^t) = \beta \sum_{s^{t+1}|s^t} u_c(s^{t+1})\pi_{t+1}(s^{t+1})[A_{t+1}(s^{t+1})F_k(s^{t+1}) + 1 - \delta]$$

- ► This is the intertemporal consumption—saving decision, the Euler equation
- ► The MRS between consumption today and tomorrow  $\frac{u_c(s^t)}{\beta E_0 u_c(s^{t+1})}$  equals the relative price of consumption, ie the (expected) interest rate

# Equivalence

- ► The previous two expressions are identical to the central planner's first-order conditions
- ► The allocation in the competitive equilibrium with time 0 trading is the same as the Pareto efficient allocation

# 4. Implied Wealth Dynamics

### Change the Numeraire

- ► In the Arrow-Debreu world, trades are only executed at time 0
- ▶ We can still compute how the household's wealth evolves over time
- For this we need to express all prices, wages, and rental rates in terms of time t, history  $s^t$  consumption goods
- ▶ In other words, we change the numeraire

# Deflating

► We obtain

$$q_{\tau}^{t}(s^{\tau}) \equiv \frac{q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau})}{q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})} = \beta^{\tau - t} \frac{u_{c}(s^{\tau})}{u_{c}(s^{t})} \pi_{\tau}(s^{\tau}|s^{t})$$

$$w_{\tau}^{t}(s^{\tau}) \equiv \frac{w_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau})}{q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})}$$

$$r_{\tau}^{t}(s^{\tau}) \equiv \frac{r_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau})}{q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})}$$

Notice that

$$q_t^t(s^t) = \frac{q_t^0(s^t)}{q_t^0(s^t)} = 1$$

#### Wealth

- ▶ In lecture 7, we computed households' financial wealth as total wealth minus the present value of current and future endowment streams
- ▶ Here, we subtract the present value of current and future labor income
- ▶ Household wealth, or the value of all current and future net claims, in time t, history  $s^t$  consumption goods is

$$\Upsilon_t(s^t) \equiv \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^t} \left\{ q_{\tau}^t(s^{\tau}) c_{\tau}(s^{\tau}) - w_{\tau}^t(s^{\tau}) n_{\tau}(s^{\tau}) \right\}$$

### **Rewriting Wealth**

$$\Upsilon_t(s^t) \equiv \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{\tau=t} \left\{ q_{ au}^t(s^{ au}) c_{ au}(s^{ au}) - w_{ au}^t(s^{ au}) n_{ au}(s^{ au}) 
ight\}$$

$$= \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} \left\{ q_{\tau}^{t}(s^{\tau}) \left[ A_{\tau}(s^{\tau}) F[k_{\tau}(s^{\tau-1}), n_{\tau}(s^{\tau})] + (1-\delta) k_{\tau}(s^{\tau-1}) - k_{\tau+1}(s^{\tau}) \right] - w_{\tau}^{t}(s^{\tau}) n_{\tau}(s^{\tau}) \right\}$$

$$= \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s=t} \left\{ q_{\tau}^{t}(s^{\tau}) \left[ A_{\tau}(s^{\tau}) \left[ F_{k}(s^{\tau}) k_{\tau}(s^{\tau-1}) + F_{n}(s^{\tau}) n_{\tau}(s^{\tau}) \right] + (1-\delta) k_{\tau}(s^{\tau-1}) - k_{\tau+1}(s^{\tau}) \right] - w_{\tau}^{t}(s^{\tau}) n_{\tau}(s^{\tau}) \right\}$$

 $= \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau} \mid s^{t}} \left\{ r_{\tau}^{t}(s^{\tau}) k_{\tau}(s^{\tau-1}) + q_{\tau}^{t}(s^{\tau}) \left[ (1-\delta) k_{\tau}(s^{\tau-1}) - k_{\tau+1}(s^{\tau}) \right] \right\}$ 

$$= r_t^t(s^t)k_t(s^{t-1}) + q_t^t(s^t)(1-\delta)k_t(s^{t-1}) + \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau-1}|s^t} \left\{ \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{\tau-1}} \left[ r_{\tau}^t(s^{\tau}) + q_{\tau}^t(s^{\tau})(1-\delta) \right] - q_{\tau-1}^t(s^{\tau-1}) \right\} k_{\tau}(s^{\tau-1})$$

$$= \left[ r_t^t(s^t) + 1 - \delta \right] k_t(s^{t-1})$$

Second line: resource constraint; Third: Euler's theorem; Fourth: firm's FOCs; Fifth: rearrange; Sixth:  $q_t^t(s^t) = \frac{q_t^0(s^t)}{\sigma^0(s^t)} = 1$  and zero-profit condition implying curly bracket terms equal zero

#### Wealth Is Capital

We find that the wealth of the representative household, excluding its labor income, is

$$\Upsilon_t(s^t) = \left[ r_t^t(s^t) + 1 - \delta \right] k_t(s^{t-1})$$

- Households invest all their wealth in the capital stock
- ► The entire capital stock is held by households

# 5. Sequential Trading: Arrow Securities

# **Sequential Trading**

- ▶ We now study the same economy with sequential trading
- ▶ All markets reopen in each period
- 1. Goods market
- 2. Labor market
- 3. Capital market

#### Households

- ▶ At each date  $t \ge 0$  after history  $s^t$ , the household brings in assets  $\tilde{a}_t(s^t)$ , ie claims to time t consumption that it bought in period t-1
- ▶ In addition, the household earns new labor income  $\tilde{w}_t(s^t)n_t(s^t)$  by selling labor services to goods producers
- ▶ It uses these revenues to buy consumption goods  $\tilde{c}_t(s^t)$  and claims to time t+1 consumption whose payment is contingent on the realization of  $s_{t+1}$

### **Budget Constraint**

▶ The household faces a sequence of budget constraints; the time t, history  $s^t$  budget constraint is

$$\tilde{c}_t(s^t) + \sum_{s^{t+1}} \tilde{a}_{t+1}(s_{t+1}, s^t) \tilde{Q}_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) \le \tilde{w}_t(s^t) \tilde{n}_t(s^t) + \tilde{a}_t(s^t)$$

- $\tilde{Q}_t(s_{t+1}|s^t)$  is the pricing kernel: the price of one unit of consumption at time t+1 contingent on the realization  $s_{t+1}$  at t+1 when history at t is  $s^t$
- ▶  $\{\tilde{a}_{t+1}(s_{t+1}, s^t)\}$  is a vector of claims on time t+1 consumption, ie there is one element of the vector for each value of time t+1 realization of  $s_{t+1}$

#### No Ponzi Scheme

- ► To rule out Ponzi schemes, we must impose borrowing constraints on the household's asset position
- ▶ Without these borrowing constraints, the household would find it optimal to borrow as much as possible and roll over debt forever
- What is the maximal amount the household can repay?

#### Natural Debt Limit

▶ Let's compute the state-contingent natural debt limit

$$\sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} \tilde{w}_{\tau}^{t}(s^{\tau}) \tilde{n}_{\tau}^{\max}(s^{\tau})$$

- The maximum the agent could earn and repay is if she promises to work  $\tilde{n}_{\tau}^{\max} = 1$  for all  $\tau$  and  $s^{\tau}$  if necessary
- ▶ But this is not credible as  $\tilde{\ell}_{\tau} = 0$  would ruin her utility

### **Arbitrary Borrowing Constraint**

- ▶ We can impose that indebtedness in any state next period  $-\tilde{a}_{t+1}(s_{t+1}, s^t)$  is bounded by some arbitrary constant
- ► As long as the budget constraint is bounded, equilibrium forces ensure that the household holds the market portfolio
- Let's impose  $\tilde{a}_{t+1}(s_{t+1}, s^t) \geq 0$ , ie wealth can never be negative

#### Problem of the Household

► The household maximizes

$$\begin{split} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u[\tilde{c}_t(s^t), 1 - \tilde{n}_t(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t) \\ \text{subject to} \quad \tilde{c}_t(s^t) + \sum_{s^{t+1}} \tilde{a}_{t+1}(s_{t+1}, s^t) \tilde{Q}_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) \leq \tilde{w}_t(s^t) \tilde{n}_t(s^t) + \tilde{a}_t(s^t) \\ \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{a}_{t+1}(s_{t+1}, s^t) \geq 0 \end{split}$$

# Lagrangian

Write a Lagrangian

$$\mathcal{L} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \left\{ \beta^t u [\tilde{c}_t(s^t), 1 - \tilde{n}_t(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t) + \eta_t(s^t) \left[ \tilde{w}_t(s^t) \tilde{n}_t(s^t) + \tilde{a}_t(s^t) - \tilde{c}(s^t) - \sum_{s_{t+1}} \tilde{a}_{t+1}(s_{t+1}, s^t) \tilde{Q}_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) \right] + \nu_t(s^t, s_{t+1}) \tilde{a}_{t+1}(s^{t+1}) \right\}$$

- $ightharpoonup \eta_t(s^t)$  are multipliers on the flow budget constraint
- $ightharpoonup 
  u_t(s^t,s_{t+1})$  are multipliers on the borrowing constraint

#### **First-Order Conditions**

► The FOCs are

$$\tilde{c}_{t}(s^{t}) : \beta^{t} u_{c}[\tilde{c}_{t}(s^{t}), 1 - \tilde{n}_{t}(s^{t})] \pi_{t}(s^{t}) - \eta_{t}(s^{t}) = 0$$

$$\tilde{n}_{t}(s^{t}) : -\beta^{t} u_{\ell}[\tilde{c}_{t}(s^{t}), 1 - \tilde{n}_{t}(s^{t})] \pi_{t}(s^{t}) + \eta_{t}(s^{t}) \tilde{w}_{t}(s^{t}) = 0$$

$$\{\tilde{a}_{t+1}(s_{t+1}, s^{t})\}_{s_{t+1}} : -\eta_{t}(s^{t}) \tilde{Q}_{t}(s_{t+1}|s^{t}) + \nu_{t}(s^{t}, s_{t+1}) + \eta_{t+1}(s_{t+1}, s^{t}) = 0$$

▶ They hold for all  $s_{t+1}, t, s^t$ 

### Nonbinding Borrowing Constraint

- ▶ We conjecture that the arbitrary debt limit is not binding
- ▶ As a result, the Lagrange multipliers  $\nu_t(s^t, s_{t+1})$  are all equal to zero
- Let's rewrite the FOCs with  $\nu_t(s^t, s_{t+1}) = 0$

# Rewriting the First-Order Conditions

▶ The optimal static consumption—labor choice is

$$\tilde{w}_t(s^t) = \frac{u_{\ell}[\tilde{c}_t(s^t), 1 - \tilde{n}_t(s^t)]}{u_c[\tilde{c}_t(s^t), 1 - \tilde{n}_t(s^t)]}$$

The optimal dynamic consumption—saving choice is

$$\tilde{Q}_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) = \beta \frac{u_c[\tilde{c}_{t+1}(s^{t+1}), 1 - \tilde{n}_{t+1}(s^{t+1})]}{u_c[\tilde{c}_t(s^t), 1 - \tilde{n}_t(s^t)]} \pi_t(s^{t+1}|s^t)$$

# Goods Producer – Firm of Type I

▶ At each date  $t \ge 0$  after history  $s^t$ , the goods producer solves the usual static problem

$$\max_{\tilde{n}_{t}(s^{t}), \tilde{k}_{t}^{I}(s^{t})} \left\{ A_{t}(s^{t}) F[\tilde{k}^{I}(s^{t}), \tilde{n}_{t}(s^{t})] - \tilde{r}_{t}(s^{t}) \tilde{k}_{t}^{I}(s^{t}) - \tilde{w}_{t}(s^{t}) \tilde{n}_{t}(s^{t}) \right\}$$

#### **First-Order Conditions**

► The FOCs are

$$\begin{split} \tilde{k}_t^I(s^t) : \quad \tilde{r}_t(s^t) &= A_t(s^t) F_k(s^t) \\ \tilde{n}_t(s^t) : \quad \tilde{w}_t(s^t) &= A_t(s^t) F_n(s^t) \end{split}$$

- ▶ The firm makes zero profit and its size is indeterminate
- ► The firm is willing to produce any quantity of output that the market demands so long as the two FOCs are satisfied

# Capital Producer – Firm of Type II

- ► The capital producer's problem is a two-period problem
- 1. At the end of period t after history  $s^t$ , the firm decides how much capital  $\tilde{k}_{t+1}^{II}(s^t)$  to produce and store; the cost of one unit of  $\tilde{k}_{t+1}^{II}(s^t)$  is 1
- 2. In the next period t+1, the firm earns a stochastic rental revenue  $\tilde{r}_{t+1}(s^{t+1})\tilde{k}_{t+1}^{II}(s^t)$  and a deterministic liquidation value  $(1-\delta)\tilde{k}_{t+1}^{II}(s^t)$
- ▶ To finance its operations, the firm issues Arrow securities to households
- $lackbox{ We use prices } \tilde{Q}_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) ext{ to express future income streams in today's value}$

### Problem of the Capital Producer

▶ At each date  $t \ge 0$ , the capital producer solves

$$\max_{\tilde{k}_{t+1}^{II}(s^t)} \tilde{k}_{t+1}^{II}(s^t) \left\{ -1 + \sum_{s_{t+1}} \tilde{Q}_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) \left[ \tilde{r}_{t+1}(s^{t+1}) + 1 - \delta \right] \right\}$$

- ▶ The price of one unit of capital today in terms of today's output goods is one
- ► The zero-profit condition is

$$1 = \sum_{s_{t+1}} \tilde{Q}_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) \left[ \tilde{r}_{t+1}(s^{t+1}) + 1 - \delta \right]$$

# 6. Equivalence of Allocations

### Equivalence of Allocations

▶ Time 0 trading and sequential trading are equivalent if

$$\{c_t(s^t), \ell_t(s^t), n_t(s^t), i_t(s^t), k_{t+1}(s^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty} = \{\tilde{c}_t(s^t), \tilde{\ell}_t(s^t), \tilde{n}_t(s^t), \tilde{i}_t(s^t), \tilde{k}_{t+1}(s^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$$

➤ To show the equivalence of allocations, we employ the guess and verify method used in lecture 7; this is left as an exercise

### Guess and Verify

▶ The trick is to guess that the prices in the sequential equilibrium satisfy

$$\tilde{Q}_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) = q_{t+1}^t(s^{t+1})$$
$$\tilde{w}_t(s^t) = w_t(s^t)$$
$$\tilde{r}_t(s^t) = r_t(s^t)$$

▶ We also guess that the household chooses the following asset portfolios

$$\tilde{a}_{t+1}(s_{t+1}, s^t) = \Upsilon_{t+1}(s^{t+1})$$
 for all  $s_{t+1}$  and  $t$ 

### **Initial Capital**

- ▶ We have to show that the agent can afford these asset portfolios
- ▶ In doing that, we will find that the required initial wealth is

$$\tilde{a}_0 = [r_0^0(s_0) + 1 - \delta]k_0 = p_{k0}k_0$$

- ➤ The household starts out at time 0 owning the initial capital stock
- ▶ This is different from lecture 7 where initial wealth  $\tilde{a}_0^i$  was zero for all i

## 7. Financing the Firms

## Financing the Goods Producer

- ► In each period, the goods producer must remunerate workers and capital owners, ie capital producers
- ► The goods producer finances these expenses by selling output in the very same period to consumers and capital producers
- ightharpoonup The firm makes zero profit or loss for all t and  $s^t$
- ► Thus it does not need to issue debt to finance its operations

## Financing the Capital Producer

- ▶ By contrast, the capital producer finances its purchases of capital by issuing Arrow securities, ie one-period-ahead state-contingent claims, to households
- ▶ To produce  $\tilde{k}_{t+1}^{II}(s^t)$  units of capital today in period t, firm II issues claims that promise to pay  $[\tilde{r}_{t+1}(s^{t+1}) + 1 \delta]\tilde{k}_{t+1}^{II}(s^t)$  goods tomorrow in state  $s_{t+1}$
- Express these payouts in units of today's time t good

$$\sum_{s_{t+1}} \tilde{Q}_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) \left[ \tilde{r}_{t+1}(s^{t+1}) + 1 - \delta \right] \tilde{k}_{t+1}^{II}(s^t)$$

## Zero Profit, Zero Net Worth

- ► The capital producer makes zero profit, implying that it breaks even by issuing these claims and then repaying them next period with interest
- ► It follows that the capital producer has zero net worth, or zero equity, and is entirely financed by debt; in other words, it has infinite leverage

#### Positive Wealth

► The household's wealth is given by

$$\tilde{a}_t(s^t) = \Upsilon_t(s^t) = [\tilde{r}_t(s^t) + 1 - \delta]\tilde{k}_t(s^{t-1})$$

- ► The wealth of the household is equal to the value of firm II, ie the value of the capital stock
- ▶ The capital producer is entirely owned by its unique creditor, the household

## Nonbinding Constraint

- ► The household willingly holds the capital stock
- ► Equilibrium prices entice the household to enter each period with a strictly positive net asset level
- ► We confirm the correctness of our conjecture that the zero debt limit is never binding

## **Unique Creditor**

▶ The household is the only creditor of the capital producer

$$\tilde{a}_{t}(s^{t}) = [\tilde{r}_{t}(s^{t}) + 1 - \delta]\tilde{k}_{t}(s^{t-1})$$

$$\sum_{s_{t+1}} \tilde{a}_{t+1}(s_{t+1}, s^{t})\tilde{Q}(s_{t+1}|s^{t}) = \underbrace{\sum_{s_{t+1}} [\tilde{r}_{t+1}(s^{t+1}) + (1 - \delta)]\tilde{Q}_{t}(s_{t+1}|s^{t})}_{= 1 \text{ by firm II's FOC}} \tilde{k}_{t+1}(s^{t})$$


Thus the household budget constraint can be written as

$$\tilde{c}_{t}(s^{t}) + \sum_{s^{t+1}} \tilde{a}_{t+1}(s_{t+1}, s^{t}) \tilde{Q}_{t}(s_{t+1}|s^{t}) \leq \tilde{w}_{t}(s^{t}) \tilde{n}_{t}(s^{t}) + \tilde{a}_{t}(s^{t})$$
$$\tilde{c}_{t}(s^{t}) + \tilde{k}_{t+1}(s^{t}) \leq \tilde{w}_{t}(s^{t}) \tilde{n}_{t}(s^{t}) + [\tilde{r}_{t}(s^{t}) + 1 - \delta] \tilde{k}_{t}(s^{t-1})$$

## **Useless Capital Producer**

- ► The capital producer is entirely owned by the household and there is no financing friction between the two agents
- ► Therefore, the household can play the role of the capital producer by renting out the capital stock directly to the goods producer (firm I)
- ► In other words, we can get rid of the capital producer without changing anything to the equilibrium conditions

## Equivalent Model Diagram



## 8. Recursive Formulation

## Equivalence

- ▶ We established identical equilibrium allocations in the
- 1. Complete-market Arrow-Debreu economy with all trading at time 0
- 2. Complete-market Arrow economy with sequential trading

## **Arbitrary Process**

- ► The finding holds for any arbitrary technology process
- $ightharpoonup A_t(s^t)$  is a measurable function of the history of events  $s^t$
- ► These events  $s^t$ , in turn, are governed by some arbitrary probability measure  $\pi_t(s^t)$

## **Huge State Space**

- ▶ In this general setup, all prices  $\{\tilde{Q}_t(s_{t+1}|s^t), \tilde{w}_t(s^t), \tilde{r}_t(s^t)\}$  and quantities  $\{k_{t+1}(s^t), c_t(s^t), \ell_t(s^t)\}$  depend on the entire history of events  $s^t$
- ▶ They are time-varying functions of all past events  $\{s_{\tau}\}_{\tau=0}^{t}$
- ➤ To obtain a recursive formulation, we need to make further assumptions on the exogenous process for technology

#### The Stochastic Event Is Markov

The first assumption we make is that the stochastic event  $s_t$  is governed by a Markov process,  $[s \in S, \pi(s'|s), \pi_0(s_0)]$ 

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_0(s_0) &= 1 \\ \pi_t(s^t) &= \pi(s_t|s_{t-1})\pi(s_{t-1}|s_{t-2})\dots\pi(s_1|s_0)\pi_0(s_0) \\ \pi_t(s^t|s^\tau) &= \pi(s_t|s_{t-1})\pi(s_{t-1}|s_{t-2})\dots\pi(s_{\tau+1}|s_\tau) \quad \text{for } t > \tau \end{aligned}$$

## Technology Is a Time-Invariant Function

▶ The second assumption is that aggregate technology is a time-invariant function of its level in the last period and the current stochastic event  $s_t$ 

$$A_t(s^t) = A[A_{t-1}(s^{t-1}), s_t]$$

► Let's consider the multiplicative version

$$A_t(s^t) = s_t A_{t-1}(s^{t-1}) = s_0 s_1 \dots s_t A_{-1}$$

### **State Variables**

▶ What are the state variables?

#### State Variables

- ▶ What are the state variables?
- ► There are two exogenous aggregate state variables
- 1. The current value of the stochastic event s
- 2. The current technology level A
- ► There is one endogenous aggregate state variable
- 3. The beginning-of-period capital stock K

## Aggregate State of the Economy

- ▶ Thanks to our two assumptions, the state vector  $X \equiv \begin{bmatrix} K & A & s \end{bmatrix}$  is a complete summary of the economy's current position
- ▶ It is all that is needed for a planner to compute an optimal allocation
- ▶ It is all that is needed for the "invisible hand", ie households and firms, to call out prices and implement the first-best allocation

# 9. Recursive Formulation: Central Planner

#### Problem of the Central Planner

- Let C, N, K denote objects in the planning problem that correspond to c, n, k in the decentralized economy
- ightharpoonup The central planner chooses C, N, K' to maximize the utility function of the representative household

## **Bellman Equation**

► The Bellman equation writes

$$v(K, A, s) = \max_{C, N, K'} \left\{ u(C, 1 - N) + \beta \sum_{s'} \pi(s'|s) v(K', A', s') \right\}$$

subject to

$$K' + C \le AF(K, N) + (1 - \delta)K$$
$$A' = As'$$

## **Policy Functions**

▶ Using the definition of the state vector  $X \equiv \begin{bmatrix} K & A & s \end{bmatrix}$ , we denote the optimal policy functions as

$$C = \Omega^{C}(X)$$
$$N = \Omega^{N}(X)$$
$$K' = \Omega^{K}(X)$$

Equation A' = As' and the Markov transition density  $\pi(s'|s)$  induce a transition density  $\Pi(X'|X)$  on the state X

#### **First-Order Conditions**

Define for convenience

$$U_c(X) \equiv u_c[\Omega^C(X), 1 - \Omega^N(X)] \qquad F_k(X) \equiv F_k[K, \Omega^N(X)]$$
  
$$U_\ell(X) \equiv u_\ell[\Omega^C(X), 1 - \Omega^N(X)] \qquad F_n(X) \equiv F_n[K, \Omega^N(X)]$$

► The first-order conditions are

$$U_{\ell}(X) = U_{c}(X)AF_{n}(X)$$

$$1 = \beta \sum_{X'} \Pi(X'|X) \frac{U_{c}(X')}{U_{c}(X)} [A'F_{K}(X') + 1 - \delta]$$

# 10. Recursive Formulation: Sequential Trading

## **Endogenous State**

- ▶ Relative to lecture 8, we now have an endogenous state variable, namely the aggregate capital stock  $K_t$
- ▶ How do we deal with this in a competitive economy?
- ightharpoonup We use a "Big K, little k" device

#### Price Taker vs Price Maker

- So far we have assumed that each individual firm and household is a price taker, ie each acts as if their decisions do not affect current or future prices
- $\triangleright$  In sequential market setting, prices depend on the state, of which  $K_t$  is part
- ▶ But of course, in the aggregate, agents choose the motion of capital  $K_t$ , and so trough their combined actions they determine prices, ie are price makers
- ▶ "Big K, little k" is a device that makes them ignore this fact when they solve their individual decision problem

## Big K, Little k

- ▶ Big *K* is an endogenous state variable, useful to forecast prices, but which agents regard as beyond their control
- ▶ Small *k* is chosen by firms and consumers
- ▶ In the equilibrium, after firms and consumers have optimized, we set

$$K = k$$

## Price System

- ▶ We specify price functions (prices are functions of the aggregate state *X*)
  - ightharpoonup r(X) is the rental price of capital
  - $\blacktriangleright$  w(X) is wage rate for labor
  - ightharpoonup Q(X'|X) is the price of a claim to one unit of consumption next period when next period's state is X' and this period's state is X
- ▶ All are measured in units of this period's consumption good

#### Perceived Law of Motion

 $\blacktriangleright$  We take as given an arbitrary perceived law of motion for K

$$K' = G(X)$$

- ► This equation together with A' = As' and a given subjective transition density  $\hat{\pi}(s'|s)$  induce a subjective transition density  $\hat{\Pi}(X'|X)$  for state X
- ▶ The perceived law of motion of K and the transition probability  $\hat{\Pi}(X'|X)$  describe the beliefs of the household

#### Household Problem

▶ Let *J* be the value function; the Bellman equation writes

$$J(a, X) = \max_{c, n, \bar{a}(X')} \left\{ u(c, 1 - n) + \beta \sum_{X'} J[\bar{a}(X'), X'] \hat{\Pi}(X'|X) \right\}$$

subject to

$$c + \sum_{X'} Q(X'|X)\bar{a}(X') \leq w(X)n + a \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{a}(X') \geq 0$$

- ▶  $X \equiv \begin{bmatrix} K & A & s \end{bmatrix}$  is the vector of state variables
- ▶ *a* is the household's individual wealth in units of current goods
- $lacktriangleq \bar{a}(X')$  is next period's wealth in units of next period's consumption goods

#### First-Order Conditions

The first-order conditions are

$$\bar{u}_{\ell}(a, X) = \bar{u}_{c}(a, X)w(X)$$
$$Q(X'|X) = \beta \frac{\bar{u}_{c}[\sigma^{a}(a, X; X'), X']}{\bar{u}_{c}(a, X)}\hat{\Pi}(X'|X)$$

where the household's optimal policy functions are

$$c = \sigma^c(a, X);$$
  $n = \sigma^n(a, X);$   $\bar{a}(X') = \sigma^a(a, X; X')$ 

and for convenience

$$\bar{u}_c(a, X) \equiv u_c[\sigma^c(a, X), 1 - \sigma^n(a, X)]$$
  
$$\bar{u}_\ell(a, X) \equiv u_\ell[\sigma^c(a, X), 1 - \sigma^n(a, X)]$$

#### Problem of the Goods Producer

▶ The static problem of the goods producer writes

$$\max_{k,n} \{ AF(k,n) - r(X)k - w(X)n \}$$

► The zero-profit conditions are

$$r(X) = AF_k(k, n)$$
$$w(X) = AF_n(k, n)$$

## Problem of the Capital Producer

▶ The problem of the capital producer writes

$$\max_{k'} k' \left\{ -1 + \sum_{X'} Q(X'|X)[r(X') + 1 - \delta] \right\}$$

► The zero-profit condition is

$$1 = \sum_{X'} Q(X'|X)[r(X') + 1 - \delta]$$

## 11. Recursive Competitive Equilibrium

## Equilibrium

- So far we have taken the price functions r(X), w(X), Q(X|X'), the perceived law of motion K' = G(X), and  $\hat{\Pi}(X'|X)$  as given arbitrarily
- ▶ We now impose equilibrium conditions on these objects and make them outcomes in the analysis; we impose

$$K = k$$

Imposing equality afterward makes the household and firms be price takers

## Debt Supply and Debt Demand

► The supply of state-contingent debt issued by the capital producer must be equal to the demand for debt coming from the household

$$\bar{a}(X') = [r(X') + 1 - \delta]K'$$

Beginning-of-period assets must also satisfy

$$a(X) = [r(X) + 1 - \delta]K$$

### Rewriting the Budget Constraint

▶ Plug the previous conditions into the household's budget constraint

$$\sum_{X'} Q(X'|X)[r(X') + 1 - \delta]K' = [r(X) + 1 - \delta]K + w(X)n - c$$

▶ Use the capital producer's FOC  $\sum_{X'} Q(X'|X)[r(X') + 1 - \delta] = 1$  and the fact that K' is predetermined when entering next period

$$K' = [r(X) + 1 - \delta]K + w(X)n - c$$

### Rewriting the Budget Constraint

Plug in the equilibrium prices

$$K' = [AF_k(k, n) + 1 - \delta]K + AF_n(k, n)n - c$$

▶ Set K = k,  $N = n = \sigma^n(a, X)$ ,  $C = c = \sigma^c(a, X)$ , and use Euler's theorem

$$K' = AF[K, \sigma^n(a, X)] + (1 - \delta)K - \sigma^c(a, X)$$

▶ Use the equilibrium condition  $a = [r(X) + 1 - \delta]K$ 

$$K' = AF\{K, \sigma^{n}([r(X) + 1 - \delta]K, X)\} + (1 - \delta)K - \sigma^{c}([r(X) + 1 - \delta]K, X)$$

#### **Actual Law of Motion**

▶ We have expressed K' only as a function of the current aggregate state  $X = \begin{bmatrix} K & A & s \end{bmatrix}$ 

$$K' = AF\{K, \sigma^{n}([r(X) + 1 - \delta]K, X)\} + (1 - \delta)K - \sigma^{c}([r(X) + 1 - \delta]K, X)$$

▶ This is the actual law of motion of K' that is implied by the household's and firms' optimal decisions

#### Perceived Law of Motion

▶ Remember the perceived law of motion of capital

$$K' = G(X)$$

- ▶ We want *G* not to be arbitrary but to be an outcome
- ▶ We want to find an equilibrium perceived law of motion

#### **Rational Expectations**

► For this we impose rational expectations: we require that the perceived and actual laws of motions be identical, by equating the previous two equations

$$G(X) = AF\{K, \sigma^{n}([r(X) + 1 - \delta]K, X)\} + (1 - \delta)K - \sigma^{c}([r(X) + 1 - \delta]K, X)$$

- ▶ The perceived law of motion G affects decisions  $\sigma^c$  and  $\sigma^n$  via the problem of the household, therefore the right side is itself an implicit function of G
- ▶ In turn, *G* and prices imply an actual law of motion of capital
- lacktriangle Mathematically, G is a fixed point: the equation maps a perceived G and a price system into an actual G

#### **Rational Expectations**

- ► Rational expectations mean that the agent's perception is consistent with the equilibrium outcome
- ▶ The previous equation requires that the perceived law of motion for the capital stock G(X) equal the actual law of motion
- ► The actual law is determined jointly by the decisions of the household and the firms in a competitive equilibrium

### Recursive Competitive Equilibrium

A recursive competitive equilibrium with Arrow securities is a price system r(X), w(X), Q(X'|X), a perceived law of motion K' = G(X) and associated induced transition density  $\hat{\Pi}(X'|X)$ , a borrowing limit  $\bar{a}(X')$ , a household value function J(a,X), and decision rules  $\sigma^c(a,X)$ ,  $\sigma^n(a,x)$ ,  $\sigma^a(a,X;X')$  such that

- 1. Given r(X), w(X), Q(X'|X),  $\hat{\Pi}(X'|X)$ , the functions  $\sigma^c(a,X)$ ,  $\sigma^n(a,X)$ ,  $\sigma^a(a,X;X')$  and the value function J(a,X) solve the household's problem
- 2. For all X, r(X) and w(X) solve the goods producer's problem

$$r(X) = AF_k \{ K, \sigma^n([r(X) + (1 - \delta)]K, X) \}$$
  

$$w(X) = AF_n \{ K, \sigma^n([r(X) + (1 - \delta)]K, X) \}$$

# Recursive Competitive Equilibrium

3. Q(X'|X) and r(X) satisfy the zero-profit condition

$$1 = \sum_{X'} Q(X'|X)[r(X') + 1 - \delta]$$

4. G(X), r(X),  $\sigma^c(a, X)$ ,  $\sigma^n(a, X)$  satisfy the law of motion of capital  $G(X) = AF\{K, \sigma^n([r(X) + 1 - \delta]K, X)\} + (1 - \delta)K - \sigma^c([r(X) + 1 - \delta]K, X)$ 

5. The perceived transition density equals the actual one

$$\hat{\pi} = \pi$$

#### Remarks

- ► Item 1 enforces optimization by the household, given the prices it faces and its expectations
- ► Item 2 requires that the goods producer break even at every capital stock and labor supply chosen by the household
- ▶ Item 3 requires that the capital producer break even
- ► Market clearing is implicit when item 4 requires that the perceived and actual laws of motion of capital be equal
- ▶ Item 5 and the equality of perceived and actual G imply that  $\hat{\Pi} = \Pi$
- ▶ Thus, items 4 and 5 impose rational expectations

### Solving the System

- ► One could attack directly the fixed point problem at the heart of the equilibrium definition
- ▶ Instead we guess a candidate *G* and a price system
- ► Then we verify that they form an equilibrium

# Using the Planning Problem

- ▶ Which candidates should we pick?
- ► Remember the welfare theorems: a competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient
- ightharpoonup Thus as our candidates for G and prices we turn to the planning problem

### Using the Planning Problem

▶ For G we choose the planner decision rule for K'

$$K' = \Omega^K(X)$$

▶ For prices we also choose those of the planner

$$r(X) = AF_k(X)$$

$$w(X) = AF_n(X)$$

$$Q(X'|X) = \beta \Pi(X'|X) \frac{U_c(X')}{U_c(X)} [A'F_K(X') + 1 - \delta]$$

# Equivalence

▶ In equilibrium the household's decision rules for consumption and labor matches those of the planner

$$\Omega^{C}(X) = \sigma^{c}([r(X) + 1 - \delta]K, X)$$
  
$$\Omega^{N}(X) = \sigma^{n}([r(X) + 1 - \delta]K, X)$$

► The key to verifying the guesses is to show that the FOCs for firms and the household are satisfied at these guesses; we leave this as an exercise

#### Conclusion

- Economic phenomena are dynamic and uncertain
- ▶ We have studied two ways to model these phenomena
- ► The first way is to use Arrow-Debreu or Arrow general equilibrium structures and search for optimal actions
- ► These optimal actions are conditional on the sequence of realizations of all past and present random variables

#### Conclusion

- ► The second way is to use recursive methods and search for equilibrium decision or policy rules
- ► These rules specify current actions as a function of a limited number of state variables that summarize all the necessary information
- ► Lucas and Prescott (1971) and Mehra and Prescott (1980) introduced the notion of recursive competitive equilibrium
- ▶ It is widely used today in macroeconomics and finance

# 12. Exercise

# Exercise – Equivalence of Allocations

- 1. Prove the equivalence of allocations of Section 6 between the time 0 trading and sequential trading equilibria.
- 2. Verify that the guesses in Section 11 are correct, ie that the recursive competitive equilibrium with sequential trading matches the recursive equilibrium of the central planner.