




# PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS, META-CAUSATION AND DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING CASUAL POWERS & TIME PASSAGE

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



Notes: This poster extends previous work reported in refs A.  
For the causal-power aspect, ask me:  
not explicit in this poster.

## Skeleton of the Ideas



### CAUTION ON TERMINOLOGY:

Meta-causation in this work has also been called  
Iterated causation [refs D: Ehring]  
Higher order causation [refs D: Koons]  
Meta-causation in this work is NOT other things that have been labelled as meta-causation, e.g.:  
Forms of top-down causation, or setting of parameters of causal models, or as in meta-causal powers [refs F: Ellis]



## References

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For objections to the idea of pre-reflective self-consciousness, see e.g.:  
De Francesco, M., Marzella, M. & Panerai, A. (2016). *The self and its absence: From psychodynamics to cognitive science*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
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Koons, R.C. (1998). Teleology in higher-order causation: A situation-theoretic account. *Mind and Machines*, 8, 559-585.  
[E] Maudlin, T. (2007). *The metaphysics within physics*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
[F] Ellis, B. (2013). The power of agency. In Groff & Gross (2013), pp.186-206.  
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Miller, K. (2013). Presentism, eternalism, and the growing block. In D. Byrne & A. Baron, (Eds.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Time*, pp. 345-65. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.  
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Acknowledgment  
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