

## **Unit 4 Seminar: Threat Modelling Exercises**

### **Scenario: A Large International Bank Based in the UK**

#### **Introduction**

Threat modelling is a systematic approach to identifying, analysing, and mitigating potential security risks. For this exercise, the focus is on a large international bank in the UK, a critical infrastructure organisation requiring robust protections due to its exposure to cyberattacks, fraud, and insider threats. The STRIDE, DREAD, Attack Trees, and ATT&CK libraries will be used, along with insights from the Threat Modelling Manifesto (2020), OWASP Threat Modelling Cookbook (2021), and Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) critiques.

#### **Threat Modelling Approach:**

This exercise will utilise a combination of methodologies, drawing from Shostack (2018), Spring et al. (2021), the Threat Modelling Manifesto, the OWASP Threat Modelling Cookbook, and the ATT&CK framework.

### **1. Approach to Threat Modelling**

#### **STRIDE Framework**

STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privileges) is used to analyse threats in each system component (Shostack, 2018):

1. **Spoofing:** Unauthorised access to customer accounts through phishing or credential stuffing.
2. **Tampering:** Manipulation of transaction data in the core banking systems.
3. **Repudiation:** Lack of audit trails for administrative actions in banking systems.
4. **Information Disclosure:** Breaches leading to exposure of sensitive financial information.
5. **Denial of Service (DoS):** Attacks on online banking platforms disrupting services.
6. **Elevation of Privileges:** Exploitation of internal system vulnerabilities by attackers or malicious insiders.

#### **DREAD Model**

The DREAD model evaluates and prioritises threats based on their:

1. **Damage potential:** Impact of fraudulent transactions or customer data breaches.
2. **Reproducibility:** Ease of replicating attack vectors, such as SQL injection or phishing.
3. **Exploitability:** Vulnerabilities in outdated software or weak configurations.
4. **Affected users:** The large number of customers relying on online banking platforms.
5. **Discoverability:** The likelihood of attackers discovering vulnerabilities through automated tools or reconnaissance.

## Attack Trees

Attack trees are used to visualise potential attack paths, starting with the root goal and branching into sub-objectives:

- **Goal:** Compromise customer financial accounts.
  - Sub-goals:
    - Gain access to customer credentials.
      - Methods: Phishing, brute force, or social engineering.
    - Exploit vulnerabilities in online banking APIs.
      - Methods: Injection attacks or session hijacking.

## 2. Threat Libraries and OWASP Integration

### ATT&CK Libraries

The MITRE ATT&CK framework informs the model by identifying tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by threat actors. Relevant techniques include:

- **Credential Dumping (T1003):** Extracting credentials from memory.
- **Data Exfiltration (T1041):** Transferring sensitive data outside the organization.

- **Privilege Escalation (T1068):** Exploiting vulnerabilities to gain higher permissions.

## **OWASP Threat Modelling Cookbook**

The OWASP Threat Modelling Cookbook (2021) provides a practical guide for implementing the STRIDE framework. It highlights the importance of continuously validating the model with stakeholders and integrating mitigations into the software development lifecycle (SDLC).

### **3. Critiques and Improvements Using CVSS Insights**

Spring et al. (2021) discuss limitations of the CVSS, particularly its inability to capture complex, multi-stage attacks. This critique reinforces the need for a more contextualised risk scoring approach, such as:

- Combining STRIDE and DREAD for a comprehensive analysis.
- Integrating real-world attack scenarios using ATT&CK techniques.
- Considering business impact metrics alongside technical severity.

### **Key Assets and Threats:**

- **Customer Data:**
  - **Threats:**
    - **Information Disclosure:** Credential theft through phishing. Data breaches (e.g., phishing, social engineering, malware) leading to the exposure of sensitive customer information (financial details, personal data).
    - **Tampering:** Unauthorised modification or deletion of customer data, potentially impacting financial transactions or personal records.
    - **Spoofing:** Identity theft and fraudulent transactions using stolen credentials.
  - **Mitigation:**
    - Strong authentication mechanisms (multi-factor authentication, biometrics).
    - Data encryption both in transit and at rest.

- Regular security awareness training for employees and customers.
- Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS).
- **Financial Transactions:**
  - **Threats:**
    - **Denial of Service:** Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks disrupting online banking services, impacting customer access and financial operations.
    - **Tampering:** Manipulation of financial transactions, including unauthorised transfers or fraudulent payments.
    - **Repudiation:** Disputed transactions due to unauthorised access or system vulnerabilities.
  - **Mitigation:**
    - Fraud detection systems based on machine learning and behavioural analysis.
    - Secure transaction processing protocols (e.g., SSL/TLS).
    - Regular system monitoring and vulnerability assessments.
- **System Integrity:**
  - **Threats:**
    - **Elevation of Privilege:** Attacks exploiting system vulnerabilities to gain unauthorised access to critical systems and data.
    - **Denial of Service:** Attacks targeting critical infrastructure, disrupting core banking operations.
    - **Tampering:** Malicious software infiltrating systems and compromising system integrity.
  - **Mitigation:**
    - Regular security patches and updates.
    - Secure system configurations and access controls.

- Network segmentation and isolation of critical systems.

### **Threat Modelling Process:**

1. **Define Scope:** Clearly define the scope of the threat model, focusing on the online banking platform and its key components (e.g., customer portal, mobile app, backend systems).
2. **Identify Assets:** Determine the critical assets within the defined scope, including customer data, financial transactions, and system infrastructure.
3. **Threat Identification:** Utilise STRIDE to systematically identify potential threats across each category.
4. **Threat Analysis:** Employ DREAD and CVSS to score and prioritise identified threats based on their severity and potential impact.
5. **Attack Tree Analysis:** Develop attack trees to visualise potential attack paths and identify vulnerabilities at different levels of the system.
6. **Mitigation Strategies:** Develop and implement appropriate mitigation strategies based on identified threats and vulnerabilities.
7. **Continuous Monitoring and Review:** Regularly review and update the threat model to reflect changes in the threat landscape, system architecture, and business requirements.

### **Mitigation Strategies and Recommendations**

- **Regular Penetration Testing:** Identify and address vulnerabilities proactively.
- **Zero-Trust Architecture:** Limit implicit trust and enforce continuous verification.
- **Employee Training:** Reduce phishing risks through awareness campaigns.
- **Incident Response Planning:** Prepare for swift mitigation of successful attacks.

### **Tools and Technologies:**

- **OWASP Threat Dragon:** A popular open-source tool for visual threat modelling.
- **MITRE ATT&CK Navigator:** A knowledge base and interactive visualisation tool for cyber adversary emulation.

- **Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems:** For centralised log management and threat detection.

## **Conclusion:**

By employing a comprehensive threat modelling approach, incorporating insights from Shostack (2018), Spring et al. (2021), the Threat Modelling Manifesto, the OWASP Threat Modelling Cookbook, and the ATT&CK framework, organisations can proactively identify and mitigate cyber threats to their online banking platforms, ensuring the security and resilience of their critical systems and protecting customer data and financial assets.

## **References:**

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