

# Descriptive or Partisan Representation? Examining Trade-Offs for Asian Americans\*

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## **Abstract**

Do voters want representatives who share their race, ethnicity, or partisanship? We examine this question with a focus on Asian Americans who face trade-offs between descriptive (i.e., Asian American or “pan-ethnic”) and partisan representation, as well as trade-offs involving “co-ethnic” (e.g., Korean for Korean) and “cross-ethnic” (e.g., Indian for Korean) descriptive representation. We find that when Asian Americans are asked about collective representation in Congress, they prioritize increased co-ethnic and pan-ethnic legislators over co-partisan legislators. However, in a competitive electoral setting, they often trade off race/ethnicity for partisanship. Further analysis shows that Asian Americans are sometimes willing to cross party lines to vote for a co-ethnic candidate but never for a cross- or pan-ethnic candidate. These findings shed light on the importance of considering heterogeneous preferences along ethnicities within the same racial “in-groups,” such as Asian Americans, a heavily understudied and heterogeneous group in American politics.

**Keywords:** descriptive representation, Asian Americans, conjoint analysis, survey experiment

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# 1 Introduction

The question of how racial/ethnic minorities vote is central to the study of representative democracy. Given the long history of excluding minority voices from the political process (Griffin and Flavin 2011; Kroeber 2018; Young 2002), improving descriptive representation—representatives sharing demographic characteristics with their constituents—has substantial benefits for minority voters individually and for the health of democracy collectively. Existing studies suggest that descriptive representation can increase policy responsiveness (Yeung 2023), contact with representatives (Gay 2002), voter turnout (Barreto, Segura and Woods 2004; Barreto 2007; Griffin and Keane 2006), political activism (Bobo and Gilliam 1990), group consciousness (Junn and Masuoka 2008), the sense of political efficacy (Merolla, Sellers and Fowler 2013; Pantoja and Segura 2003), and political knowledge (Tate 2004).

Group-based identities are, however, complex because the same individuals may have more than one salient identity (e.g., based on not only race/ethnicity but also gender). Therefore, it is unclear how voters with multiple identities choose candidates with multiple attributes (Dovi 2002). Furthermore, voters may also prioritize partisan representation over any demographic considerations. As the emotional and psychological division between different partisan groups—a phenomenon known as affective polarization—has become more profound in American politics, partisanship may overpower the relevance of shared racial/ethnic identity (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Mason 2016, 2018). In this context, even when racial/ethnic minority voters are conscious of and struggle with the under-representation of their groups in the policy-making process, they may trade off descriptive representation for partisan representation. For example, Hispanic voters who are increasingly more conservative may prefer non-Hispanic Republican candidates over Hispanic Democratic candidates.

When such identities are in conflict, do voters want representatives who share their race, ethnicity, or partisanship? How do they vote when candidates share one of these identities but not all? We examine these fundamental questions about the politics of groups and identities using the case of Asian Americans. The phenomenon of constituents voting for

co-racial (and co-partisan) representatives has long been studied in the context of African Americans and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Latinos (see, e.g. Barreto, Segura and Woods 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Judis and Teixeira 2004; Tate 2004). However, much less is understood about Asian Americans, despite the fact that they are the fastest growing racial/ethnic group in the United States (Budiman and Ruiz 2021a).

Classic studies of social identity theory suggest that identities are constructed by dividing people into in-groups and out-groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979). The reality is often more complicated because, as we noted above, the same individuals can have *multiple* group identities that interact with each other (Roccas and Brewer 2002). We do not clearly understand which of these identities for voters become salient and relevant in everyday politics. In particular, it is unclear how they make choices when facing difficult trade-off situations where they must choose among these identities in elections.

The study of Asian Americans is crucial for addressing gaps in the literature because their experiences highlight the blurred lines between in- and out-group constructions, as well as the weak connections between race/ethnicity and political affiliations for this group. This ambiguity arises because “Asian American” is a pan-ethnicity—a racial category based on consolidating different ethnic groups from varying cultures and national origins. Because of these weak partisan ties, they can face a unique trade-off between descriptive (i.e., Asian American) and partisan representation, as well as trade-offs involving “co-ethnic” (e.g., Korean for Korean) and “cross-ethnic” (e.g., Indian for Korean) descriptive representation.

To untangle such complicated preferences regarding descriptive and partisan representation among Asian Americans, we designed two studies. First, we measure their preferences for collective representation in Congress, which is the extent to which an entire legislative body represents its collective constituents (e.g., how many Asian Americans there should be in Congress). Second, we investigate the preferences for dyadic representation in a competitive election setting using a conjoint experiment, in which survey respondents are asked to choose one of the two hypothetical candidates.

We find that when Asian Americans are asked about who they want in the legislature, they claim to prefer descriptive representation over partisan representation. That is, they report that they would prefer more Asian Americans overall in Congress rather than more representatives who share their partisan affiliation. However, when asked to select between two candidates, Asian Americans generally prefer partisan representation over descriptive representation. Further in-depth analysis shows that Asian Americans are sometimes willing to cross party lines to vote for a co-ethnic candidate when the opponent is a co-partisan but Black or Hispanic candidate, but this phenomenon never occurs for a cross- or pan-ethnic candidate.

Through these two studies, we aim to contribute to the broader literature on the political preferences and voting behavior of racial/ethnic minorities. Specifically, we shed light on the importance of considering heterogeneity within “in-groups” to improve our general understanding of descriptive representation. Asian Americans are not a monolith, and they feel competition not only against non-Asian Americans (“out-groups”) but also among Asian Americans (“in-group”) (Liu and Carrington 2021). We also document specific findings about Asian Americans and point out their challenge in organizing and aggregating their interests in policy-making processes.

## 2 Groups, Identities, and Representation

In this section, we discuss two types of political representation—*descriptive* and *partisan* representation.<sup>1</sup> After discussing possible trade-offs between descriptive and partisan representation, we discuss another dimension to categorize the types of political presentation—collective versus dyadic representation.

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<sup>1</sup>We acknowledge that there are some other types of political representation that political scientists are often concerned about. In particular, *substantive* representation, the extent to which elites advocate on behalf of constituents (see, e.g. Sabl 2015), is often discussed in the context of party politics. As we discuss below, however, both descriptive and partisanship representation could bring substantive benefits to constituents (Mansbridge 1999). Therefore, we do not use *partisan* representation and *substantive* representation interchangeably.

## 2.1 Descriptive Representation

Descriptive representation occurs when there are shared (demographic) characteristics between legislators and constituents (Pitkin 1972). Although any number of characteristics may qualify as a “shared identity” between legislators and constituents, the most relevant forms of descriptive representation revolve around salient identities, such as gender and race/ethnicity. These forms of representation produce both symbolic and substantive benefits to constituents (Mansbridge 1999). Descriptive representation enables lawmakers to cultivate a sense of empathy and trust among voters who share similar identities (Fenno 1977), yielding symbolic benefits for constituents. At the same time, descriptive representation can also result in substantive benefits for constituents through better communication and greater insight into the interests of marginalized groups (Mansbridge 1999; Pitkin 1972). This way, descriptive representatives may more readily advocate for the interests of their constituents in all parts of the policy-making processes (Lowande, Ritchie and Lauterbach 2019).

There is considerably less research, however, on what factors drive voters’ *demand* for descriptive representation. Some scholars find that the desire for descriptive representation based on race/ethnicity is influenced by constituents’ racial/ethnic identities, feelings of linked fate, or perceptions of discrimination (Manzano and Sanchez 2010; Schildkraut 2013; Wallace 2014). Therefore, the desire for descriptive representation may be a strong consideration, particularly for minority voters, including Asian Americans.<sup>2</sup> As a group severely underrepresented in government and historically marginalized and discriminated against, Asian Americans may, *ceteris paribus*, vote for candidates who share their racial/ethnic identities (Leung 2022; Sadhwani 2022b). The effect of race/ethnicity on Asian Americans’ vote choice, however, is mediated by the strength of their racial/ethnic identity (Schildkraut 2013).

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<sup>2</sup>Although most studies are designed specifically to examine descriptive representation for minority voters, as white racial identities have coalesced in recent years (Jardina 2019), desire for descriptive representation has also extended to white voters (English, Pearson and Strolovitch 2019; Schildkraut 2017)

## 2.2 Partisan Representation

Partisan representation can imply a variety of issues relevant to the relationship between parties and voters—a form of collective presence and overall party control (Hurley 1989), or substantive concerns about in-party responsiveness (Kastellec et al. 2015). Theoretically, voters want their party to have control of the government to advance their party’s platform, which is based on supporters’ preferences. Given this, partisan representation is often discussed in the context of competition over policies. However, as partisanship becomes expressive as well as instrumental (Huddy, Mason and Aarøe 2015; Maxwell, Pérez and Zon-szein 2023), the partisan affiliation of a candidate is a consideration for voters, on its own, besides substantive policy positions that the candidate (or the candidate’s party) takes.

Regarding voters’ *demand* for partisan representation, a growing literature on affective polarization is suggestive (see, e.g., Iyengar et al. 2019, for a review of earlier studies). Existing studies show that voters exhibit *affective* partisanship, or emotional attachment toward one’s in-party and against one’s out-party, which fuels motivations for partisan representation (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012). Partisanship has become an ever-increasingly important part of American voters’ social identities, rising in prominence compared to, and intertwining with, other social identities (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Mason and Wronski 2018). Therefore, regardless of whether people desire substantive benefits or a more symbolic feeling of being represented (Ruckelshaus 2022), voters may have a strong preference for partisan representation, just as they do for descriptive representation.

## 2.3 Trade-offs between Descriptive and Partisan Representation

While existing research investigates how descriptive or partisan representation operates by itself, there is less work on how they work in conjunction with each other. When partisan and descriptive characteristics are in alignment, voters’ multiple group identities do not introduce conflicts. For example, it is natural for an Asian American Democrat (Republican) to vote for an Asian American Democratic (Republican) candidate. When candidates present cross-

cutting identities along the lines of race/ethnicity and partisanship, however, voters have to make trade-off decisions between these two identities (Miller, Brewer and Arbuckle 2009; Roccas and Brewer 2002).

Of course, trade-offs in political decision-making are not uncommon in the real world (see, e.g., Hayes and Hibbing 2017; White, Laird and Allen 2014). Nevertheless, little research specifically examines trade-offs between descriptive (in particular, racial/ethnic) and partisan representation. Some studies show that Black and Latino voters generally prioritize representatives sharing partisan over racial/ethnic identities (Ansolabehere and Fraga 2016; Casellas and Wallace 2015; Velez 2023). Based on a simple factorial survey experiment, Cuevas-Molina and Nteta (2023) investigate Latino voting behavior for a hypothetical representative who is aligned on ethnic and partisan characteristics, finding that Latino voters are willing to vote for co-ethnic representative even when they are of the opposite party.

Regarding trade-off behavior for Asian Americans, the existing literature is more limited. Sadhwani (2022b) and Leung (2022) use observational data to examine whether Asian Americans choose candidates based on candidates' race/ethnicity in various California elections in 2018 and 2020. In both studies, Asian Americans are substantially more likely to vote for candidates of their national origin. While these studies provide important initial insights, it is difficult to determine whether these patterns would generalize to other electoral contexts. More importantly, these observational studies do not tell us convincingly what the causal relationship is between race, ethnicity, partisanship, and vote choice.

## 2.4 Collective and Dyadic Representation

In addition to the different types of representation based on group identities, the existing literature discusses another dimension of political (specifically, legislative) representation—collective and dyadic representation (Weissberg 1978). Collective representation is the extent to which an entire legislative body represents its *collective* constituents (e.g., how many Asian Americans there are in Congress). Dyadic representation is the one-to-one relationship



between a representative and an *individual* constituent (e.g., whether an Asian American voter has an Asian American member of Congress). Studies on voters’ preferences find that people generally prefer more collective representation, as compared to dyadic representation, for their racial/ethnic and partisan groups (Casellas and Wallace 2015; Harden and Clark 2016).

Trade-offs are increasingly relevant in American politics for voters in making their vote choices, as we discussed above. Voters also consider trade-offs between descriptive and partisan representation at the level of collective representation, yet a direct examination of trade-offs at this level remains lacking. Casellas and Wallace (2015) examine survey respondents’ views of descriptive representation at both the dyadic and collective level. They find that descriptive representation at both levels is significantly less important for Latino Republican respondents than Latino non-Republican respondents. Given that racial minorities are typically perceived to be Democrats, Casellas and Wallace’s (2015) finding may suggest that those who have cross-cutting identities (i.e., Latinos *but* Republicans) are hesitant to trade off partisan representation for descriptive representation.

### 3 The Case of Asian Americans

Amid the “blue wave” in 2018, Gil Cisneros, a Latino Democratic candidate, narrowly defeated Young Kim, a Korean American Republican candidate, in the CA-39 district. Two years later, Kim won the rematch against the incumbent Cisneros by just over 4,000 votes. Despite the difficulty of challenging an incumbent in a district that ended up going for Biden by 10.2 points, Kim could swing the district in her favor (Godwin 2022). Split ticket voting by the Asian American community in this district helped contribute to Kim’s victory. Many Korean Americans split their ticket in voting for Kim, a Republican, while simultaneously voting for Democrats in other electoral races (Leung 2022; Staggs, Wheeler and Robinson 2020).

The election between Kim and Cisneros is an illustrative example of situations where Asian American voters are cross-pressured. Their vote decisions, like in this case, are expected to become more salient in American politics as the nation becomes more racially diverse. Although Asian Americans are currently the most politically underrepresented group in the U.S.,<sup>3</sup> they now make up a substantial minority of the United States. They are also the fastest-growing racial group, projected to surpass 46 million by 2060 (Budiman and Ruiz 2021a). Because around 60% of Asian Americans are foreign-born and immigrated to the U.S., a significant portion of the Asian American population in the U.S. is ineligible to vote (Budiman and Ruiz 2021a). Over time, however, more and more Asian Americans have become citizens and obtained voting rights, and this trend is expected to accelerate. Furthermore, they are active participants in electoral processes when eligible: When controlling for citizenship, 87% of registered Asian Americans voted in the 2016 election (Masuoka et al. 2018). Asian American voters now make up significant minorities in certain swing states such as Georgia, Nevada, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Texas, setting them up to play a pivotal role in electoral politics (Sadhvani 2022a).

Beyond their underrepresentation in politics, there are several reasons why examining Asian American voting behavior is important for the study of partisan and descriptive trade-offs. First, for Asian Americans, partisanship may not be as crystallized as for other racial/ethnic groups. Because most Asian American voters are recent immigrants to the United States, their partisan identities do not necessarily develop in their homes through parental socialization over many generations (Kuo, Malhotra and Mo 2017; Raychaudhuri 2018, see, e.g.,). Historically, Asian Americans tend to vote Democratic (Hopkins, Kaiser and Perez 2023; Masuoka et al. 2018).<sup>4</sup> However, there is no guarantee that this trend will continue. As Raychaudhuri (2018) points out, certain demographic characteristics of Asian

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<sup>3</sup>As of 2021, Asian Americans make up 6.1% of the U.S. population, but only 0.9% of elected officials in the country (Reflective Democracy Campaign 2021).

<sup>4</sup>Asian Americans are generally more likely to prefer liberal policies (Kim 2021; Zheng 2019). They are also more likely to associate with a diverse group of peers and live in urban areas surrounded by other Democrats (Raychaudhuri 2018, 2020).

Americans align more closely with the Republican Party, such as their high socio-economic status and religion. Overall, Asian Americans have weaker attachments to political parties compared to other minority groups (Hajnal and Lee 2011; Wong et al. 2011).<sup>5</sup> This unique situation offers opportunities for other social identities to be considered.

Moreover, studying desires for descriptive representation among minorities who have varied national origin groups, such as Asian Americans, sheds new light on how voters consider trade-offs more generally (see, e.g. Junn and Masuoka 2008; Clayton, Crabtree and Horiuchi 2023; Wu 2022). Descriptive representation for these groups is particularly complicated because of differences between ethnicity (based on place of national origin, e.g., Korea) and pan-ethnicity (based on race, e.g., Asian) (Lu 2020; Cuevas-Molina and Nteta 2023). Unlike a co-ethnic representative, a cross-ethnic representative (e.g., Indian for Korean) may have no shared background, culture, language, or phenotypical features, which may make them less likely to be perceived as a descriptive representative. Some scholars show that Asian Americans are more likely to associate with their co-ethnic rather than their pan-ethnic identities (Lien, Conway and Wong 2003; Wong et al. 2011). Others demonstrate that this nuanced racial/ethnic identity can extend to vote choice, with certain Asian American subgroups more likely to vote for co-ethnics who share their national origin (Uhlener and Le 2017). While any given election context can give us some understanding of how Asian Americans weigh co-ethnic, cross-ethnic, pan-ethnic, and co-partisan candidates (e.g. Sadhwani 2022b), systematic evidence on the causal effects of these different, and sometimes conflicting, shared characteristics is lacking.

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<sup>5</sup>The fluidity of one’s partisan identity increasingly applies to other racial/ethnic minorities, as their partisan preferences are also changing. While the growth of non-white voters in the U.S. allegedly explains the growth of Democratic supporters from the 1970s to the 1990s (Judis and Teixeira 2004), the presence of non-white voters may not be a solid foundation for the Democratic Party in more recent elections (Scott 2022).

## 4 Study Designs

To examine how Asian Americans evaluate descriptive and partisan representation, we conduct two separate pre-registered studies from an original survey fielded on Asian Americans.<sup>6</sup> The first study examines Asian Americans’ preferences for shared representation in Congress, which is about collective presence in the legislature. In the second study, we asked respondents about their dyadic preferences for shared representation in candidates, which more closely models a competitive election setting.

We fielded our survey from February 26 to March 21, 2022, on Lucid Marketplace, an online survey firm.<sup>7</sup> The sample consists of respondents who identified as Asian or Asian American only, with the total number of respondents being 2,362.<sup>8</sup> Our sample reflects the nationwide distribution of ethnic groups (Budiman and Ruiz 2021b) with 23% Chinese American (excluding Taiwanese Americans), 20% Indian American, 19% Filipino American, 10% Vietnamese American, 8% Korean American, 7% Japanese American, and 13% Other (all other Asian ethnic groups in the United States). Regarding partisanship, our sample consists of 65% Democrats and 35% Republicans, including leaners, but exclude true independents from our analysis since they do not have “co-” or “out-partisans” to consider (Keith et al. 1986).

### 4.1 Study 1: Preferences for Shared Representation in Congress

For Study 1, we designed survey questions to measure how Asian Americans prefer partisan and/or descriptive representation when asked outright about the makeup of Congress. These questions are modeled after the 2016 National Asian American Survey, or NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018). Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with five different

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<sup>6</sup>The pre-registration is available at the OSF (<https://osf.io/k4sp5>) and in the Appendix A. This project was approved by the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at Dartmouth College (No. STUDY00032474).

<sup>7</sup>Lucid tracks well with other convenience sampling platforms like Amazon Mechanical Turk as well as national benchmarks (Coppock and McClellan 2019).

<sup>8</sup>We exclude observations that Qualtrics flagged as potential bots.

statements in the following format: “*We need more [type of representatives] in Congress*” (on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree”). We split questions into “low” and “high” information categories because the absence/presence of information may change how voters weigh race/ethnicity and partisanship (Crowder-Meyer, Gadar-ian and Trounstin 2020; Kirkland and Coppock 2018). Low-information questions simply ask about the one and only characteristic—race/ethnicity or partisanship—while high-information questions give information about both. While the NAAS survey only includes the low information items (asking just about a preference for more shared race/ethnicity *or* party representatives), we modify their questions to understand preferences for both descriptive *and* partisan representation when they are intertwined with one another.

Respondents were randomly split across two research designs: Co-Ethnic Design and Pan-Ethnic Design (Table 1). In the former design, we asked them questions about co-ethnicity (e.g., “We need more Japanese Americans in Congress” for Japanese respondents). In the latter design, we asked them questions about race or pan-ethnicity (e.g., “We need more Asian Americans in Congress”). In both designs, the partisan questions are the same (e.g., “We need more Republicans in Congress” for Republican respondents).

The “high information” questions include statements about *both* race and partisanship (e.g., “We need more Asian American Democrats in Congress”). Overall, each respondent indicated agreement with 5 items about shared presence in Congress: (1) Race or ethnicity shared, (2) Party shared, (3) Race or ethnicity shared and Party shared, (4) Race or ethnicity shared and Party not shared, 5) Race or ethnicity not shared and Party shared. The questions are outlined in Table 1.

The last two rows of Table 1 in each design indicate the trade-off questions. Under the Co-Ethnic Design, the trade-off questions involve out-partisan but co-ethnic representatives (e.g., more Chinese Republicans in Congress for a Chinese American who is a Democrat) and co-partisan but not co-ethnic representatives (e.g., more Democrats who are not Chinese in Congress for a Chinese Americans who is a Democrat). Under the Pan-Ethnic Design,

Table 1: Study 1 Survey Design

Conditions	“We need more ... in Congress.”
<i>Co-Ethnic Design:</i>	
Ethnicity shared (LI)	<b>[co-ethnics]</b>
Party shared (LI)	[co-partisans]
Ethnicity shared, Party shared (HI)	<b>[co-ethnic]</b> [co-partisans]
Ethnicity shared, Party not shared (HI)	<b>[co-ethnic]</b> [out-partisans]
Ethnicity not shared, Party shared (HI)	[co-partisans] who are not <b>[co-ethnics]</b>
<i>Pan-Ethnic Design:</i>	
Race shared (LI)	<b>Asian Americans</b>
Party shared (LI)	[co-partisans]
Race shared, Party shared (HI)	<b>Asian American</b> [co-partisans]
Race shared, Party not shared (HI)	<b>Asian American</b> [out-partisans]
Race not shared, Party shared (HI)	[co-partisans] who are not <b>Asian Americans</b>

*Note:* Respondents would fill in the information in the brackets that correspond to their own racial and ethnic identity. (LI) refers to low information, (HI) refers to high information. The key differences between the two designs are highlighted in bold. The “co-ethnics” include Chinese American, Indian American, Filipino American, Vietnamese American, Korean American, and Japanese American.

respondents are similarly asked about preferences, except with regard to “Asian American” rather than “Chinese American,” for example.

## 4.2 Study 2: Preferences for Shared Representation in Candidates

In Study 2, we aim to understand voters’ choices in electoral settings; particularly when they face trade-off situations. While some scholars examine how voters react to cross-pressures in actual elections (Graves and Lee 2000; Michelson 2005), using actual election data is often insufficient to understand trade-off choices. One reason is that having Asian American Republican candidates in electoral competitions is still a relatively new phenomenon. To gain a more coherent understanding of how Asian Americans make vote choices with cross-pressures, an experiment that can randomly manipulate multiple characteristics of a

hypothetical candidate is needed.

Conjoint analysis is a useful experimental method to understand such multidimensional preferences underlying such choices (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014). In a conjoint experiment, respondents rate or choose from a set of hypothetical profiles that vary on a set of attributes of interest chosen by researchers. This approach is particularly useful for us to study trade-off preferences between two different candidates while averaging over various combinations of other attributes.

## Questions

Specifically, respondents were shown two hypothetical candidates side-by-side in a tabular format. We then asked, “*Consider the following two hypothetical candidates for Congress. Which candidate are you most likely to vote for? Even if you are not entirely sure, please indicate which of the two you would be more likely to prefer.*”<sup>9</sup> This task was repeated ten more times for 11 total tasks, with the last task being exactly the same as the first task. This repeated question is used to measure the intra-respondent reliability (IRR), which is helpful to accurately measure marginal means after correcting measurement-error-induced biases (Clayton et al. 2023).

## Attributes and Levels

Each candidate has seven attributes. Each attribute has multiple levels, one of which is randomly assigned to each hypothetical candidate (see Table 2).<sup>10</sup> The main attributes of our interest are *Race/Ethnicity* and *Party*. Other attributes include *Advances Favorable Legisla-*

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<sup>9</sup>Additionally, we asked respondents their *likelihood* to vote (i.e., a rating) for each candidate.

<sup>10</sup>Each level had an equal chance of appearing, with the exception of the race/ethnicity (for over-sampling purposes) and the education attributes (to improve external validity (de la Cuesta, Egami and Imai 2022)). For race/ethnicity, Asian Americans were weighted 50% (for the Ethnic American condition, each Ethnic American was weighted around 8%), white was weighted at 30%, Black was weighted at 10%, and Hispanic was weighted at 10%. Education levels were distributed 68% to professional degrees and 32% to Bachelor’s degrees, which correspond to the approximate distribution in Congress. Data about the educational makeup of Congress was taken from the Congressional Research Service’s website (<https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mis/R45583.pdf>, last accessed on November 29, 2023).

Table 2: Study 2 Survey Design

Attribute	Levels
<i>Co-Ethnic Design:</i>	
Race/Ethnicity	<b>Chinese American/Indian American/ Filipino American/Vietnamese American/ Korean American/Japanese American/ White/Black/Hispanic</b>
Party	Democrat/Republican
Legislative Effectiveness	Sometimes/Often/Always
Sex	Male/Female
Education	Bachelor’s degree/Professional degree
Votes with Party	Sometimes/Often
Was Born in the U.S.	Yes/No
<i>Pan-Ethnic Design:</i>	
Race/Ethnicity	<b>Asian American/ White/Black/Hispanic</b>
Party	Democrat/Republican
Legislative Effectiveness	Sometimes/Often/Always
Sex	Male/Female
Education	Bachelor’s degree/Professional degree
Votes with Party	Sometimes/Often
Was Born in the U.S.	Yes/No

*Note:* In the experiments, the exact label for *Legislative Effectiveness* is “Advances Favorable Legislation for District Constituents.” We shorten it here for the presentation. The key differences between the two designs are highlighted in bold.

*tion for District Constituents, Sex, Education, Votes with Party, and Was Born in the U.S.*

We conducted a pre-test ( $n = 1,042$ ) to validate attributes that are perceived to be associated with Asian American candidates and, thus, should be included in our conjoint design (see Appendix D for details). The order of attributes was randomized across respondents to reduce order effects but fixed within respondents to avoid the cognitive burden.

Similar to Study 1, respondents were split into two design conditions: Co-Ethnic Design and Pan-Ethnic Design. In the Co-Ethnic Design, for *Race/Ethnicity*, in addition to “White,” “Black,” and “Hispanic,” we prepared six levels corresponding to Asian Americans’



varying countries of origin: “Chinese American,” “Indian American,” “Filipino American,” “Vietnamese American,” “Korean American,” and “Japanese American.” These six ethnic groups compose around 87% of Asians in the United States. In the Pan-Ethnic Design, the levels assigned include “Asian American,” “White,” “Black,” and “Hispanic.” This is a standard way to study the relevance of race/ethnicity in candidate experiments.<sup>11</sup> With these two designs, we can test how three different types of descriptive representation affect Asian Americans’ vote choice: co-ethnic (from the same Asian country of origin), cross-ethnic (from a different Asian country of origin), and pan-ethnic (Asian American, no country of origin specified).

## Statistical Methods

We hereby report some deviations from our pre-registration. First, we exclude “ties” (both profiles having the same level (e.g., “Black”) for the attribute of interest (e.g., *Race/Ethnicity*) in calculating marginal means. We pre-registered that we would measure a profile-level marginal mean (Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley 2020) for each attribute-level. This profile-level marginal mean measures the probability of choosing a profile that includes the level of interest (e.g., “Asian American”) for the attribute of interest (e.g., *Race/Ethnicity*) averaged over (1) all the levels for this attribute (including the level of interest) in another profile, (2) all possible combinations of other attributes in both profiles and (3) all respondents. However, including profile pairs with “ties” automatically attenuates the estimates toward 0.5 in the case of binary choices, producing the biased estimates of the marginal means (Clayton et al. 2023; Ganter 2023).

The second deviation from pre-registration is that we measure marginal means corrected for possible measurement-error-induced bias (Clayton et al. 2023). Conjoint questions are quite complicated compared to standard survey questions. As a result, respondents’ attention

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<sup>11</sup>See Appendix E for a list of candidate conjoint experiments that include Asian Americans as a level in the attribute for race and ethnicity, in which we find that no previous conjoint experiment breaks down the Asian American attribute into specific ethnicities.

to every detail within a conjoint table may be limited. A new method proposed by Clayton et al. (2023) addresses this concern and improves the accuracy of estimates by using the IRR that we measure in our survey.

The third deviation is that we calculate choice-level, rather than profile-level, marginal means (Clayton et al. 2023). We are specifically interested in how respondents make choices when they encounter trade-offs. Along the lines of the case of the CA-39 district introduced earlier, we are interested, for example, in whether a Korean Democrat prefers a Korean Republican candidate or a Latino Democratic candidate. To examine such choices, it is more natural to treat each choice as a unit of analysis. The standard method of analyzing conjoint data (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014; Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley 2020) treats each profile as an independent observation and, thus, ignores the comparison between the two profiles. This independence assumption is not justifiable for our analysis of trade-off decisions.

## Direct Measures of Social Identities

At the end of the survey, respondents were asked to answer three sets of questions measuring their sense of co-ethnic, pan-ethnic, or partisan identity (see Appendix B for details.) We used Huddy, Mason and Aarøe’s (2015) four-item measure of partisan identity for respondents who affiliate with, or lean toward, one of the two major parties. Following Mason (2016), we adapt the questions to measure the strength of racial and ethnic identity as well. For example, for one of the partisan identity items, we asked respondents to answer the following question: “*To what extent do you think of yourself as being a [Democrat/Republican]?*” on a 4-point scale. A question corresponding to measure co-ethnic identity is: “*To what extent do you think of yourself as being a [Chinese/Indian/Filipino/Vietnamese/Korean/Japanese] American?*” Similarly, a question to measure pan-ethnic identity is: “*To what extent do you think of yourself as being an Asian American?*”




Figure 1: Mean response to more collective representation. *Note: We measure whether a respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement, “We need more... in Congress,” ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree). The responses are treated as continuous. The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*

## 5 Results

We first present the results of measuring Asian Americans’ preferences for collective representation. We then present the results of our conjoint analysis with a focus on the analysis of trade-offs.

### 5.1 Study 1: Preferences for Shared Representation in Congress

Figure 1 shows the responses to various questions with this format: “We need more [one of the five groups corresponding with the respondent social identity shown in the vertical axis of Figure 1] in Congress” with the five-point Likert responses ranging from “Strongly agree”

(5) to “Strongly disagree” (1). Each dot corresponds to the average, and the vertical line shows the 95% confidence interval.<sup>12</sup> The results of subgroup comparisons are presented in Appendix C.2.<sup>13</sup>

## Low-information settings

The first two rows for each design correspond to the average responses in low-information settings, where only one piece of information is given, either party (“Own-party members”) or race/ethnicity (“Co-ethnic Asian Americans” or “Pan-ethnic Asian Americans”). In this setting, there are no clear differences between the desire for more descriptive or partisan representation. For each design, the average preference for partisanship representation is 4.22 or 4.21, and the average preference for descriptive representation is 4.20 or 4.24. There is also no meaningful difference between the average response to a question about Asian Americans sharing their ethnicity (Co-Ethnic Design, mean response 4.20) and the average response to a question about “Asian Americans” in general (Pan-Ethnic Design, mean response 4.24).

Overall, respondents have moderate to strong agreement that there should be more legislators in Congress who share their party or their race/ethnicity. One possible interpretation is that voters genuinely prefer to have more own-party and co-ethnic members of Congress without having stronger weights on one over another. However, because mean responses are clustered around this upper limit, another possibility is that this common way of measuring voters’ preference for collective representation struggles with a “ceiling effect,” making it hard to distinguish between genuine preferences between party and race/ethnicity.

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<sup>12</sup>The estimated means in Figure 1 are based on an intercept-only OLS regression for each question and for each design. In accordance with our pre-registered analysis plan, we also run two OLS regressions (corresponding to the two designs) with indicators for question types. The standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. The results are presented in Table C.1. and C.2.

<sup>13</sup>Additionally, the results presented and discussed in this section do not differ by respondent ethnicity, as we see no consistent differences from the mean response by different ethnic groups (Figure C.5). We also see that results are robust when we take into account only those who pass the attention check (Figure C.6) and speeders (Figure C.7).

## High-information settings

Additional information may change reactions to collective representation. We first look at the average responses when respondents are given a second piece of information that aligns with either their partisan or ethnic/racial identity (third row): “Co-ethnic Asian American and Own-party members” or “Pan-ethnic Asian American and Own-Party members.” As we reported above, the mean agreement for more co-ethnic Asian Americans (a low information setting, Co-Ethnic Design) is 4.20. The mean agreement for more co-ethnic Asian Americans *who share their partisan affiliation* does not increase: It is almost the same (4.21). The pattern is the same for the Pan-Ethnic Design.

There are two possible interpretations for the similarity in mean responses for the top three estimates in each panel. The first interpretation is, once again, the issue of a ceiling effect. However, the lack of additional increase in agreement may suggest that respondents consider *both* ethnicity/race and party even when they receive only one piece of information. Specifically, when respondents receive information about the race/ethnicity (e.g., “Asian American”) of the hypothetical legislature, they may make an assumption about the party (e.g., “Democrat”).<sup>14</sup>

The last two high-information items in Figure 1 show how respondents feel about trade-off situations—the increased presence of legislators who share their race or ethnicity but not their party (fourth row in both panels) and the increased presence of legislators who share their party but not their race or ethnicity (fifth row in both panels). Respondents seem to view shared race/ethnicity as more important than shared partisanship when considering trade-offs in collective representation in Congress. For example, when legislators in Congress are co-ethnics but of the opposite party, the mean agreement drops to around 3.29 points.

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<sup>14</sup>Peterson (2017) also finds that the effect of partisan cueing is highest in low-information environments, with race/ethnicity and party most closely linked together. Our subgroup analysis by respondents’ partisanship (Figures C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix) also suggests cue-taking in low-information settings, as Republicans tend to disfavor descriptive representation compared to Democrats. As minority candidates are typically perceived to be more liberal (McDermott 1998; Sigelman et al. 1995), Republican respondents may assume that these candidates are less likely to be their own party members.

When legislators are not co-ethnics but of the same party, agreement drops even further to 2.98 points. We observe an almost identical pattern in the mean responses for the Pan-Ethnic Design. Overall, respondents are least likely to agree with supporting more co-partisans in Congress who are explicitly *not* of their shared race/ethnicity.

## Discussion about Trade-offs

One explanation for the preference for trading off partisan representation for descriptive representation is that respondents generally have stronger pan-ethnic and co-ethnic social identities than partisan social identities. To examine this mechanism, we measure the heterogeneity in the mean agreement by respondents’ strength in racial, ethnic, and partisan identities. A “strong” social identity is one that has a score in the top tercile, while “medium” and “weak” social identities correspond to the middle and bottom terciles (see Appendix B for question wordings). The results are presented in Appendix C.2.

Figure C.3 shows that those with especially strong co-ethnic identities (Co-Ethnic Design) and pan-ethnic identities (Pan-Ethnic Design) most prefer legislatures who have shared race/ethnicity over shared partisanship. Specifically, for each design, the difference between the fourth item (“Co-ethnic [or Pan-ethnic] Asian American but Opposite-party members”) and the fifth item (“Not co-ethnic [or Pan-ethnic] Asian American but Own-party members”) is the largest among respondents with the strong racial/ethnic identity, while it is the smallest among respondents with the weak racial/ethnic identity.

We do not observe a similar pattern of heterogeneity in respondents’ strength of partisan identity. Although we see clear differences in the mean agreement between the fourth item and the fifth item among respondents with strong co-ethnic and pan-ethnic identity (Figure C.3), the differences are small and insignificant among respondents with strong partisan identity (Figure C.4). On the other hand, the mean agreement between the fourth and fifth items is quite different among respondents with weak partisan identity. They prefer more “Co-ethnic [or Pan-ethnic] Asian American but Opposite-party members” than more “Not

co-ethnic [or Pan-ethnic] Asian American but Own-party members.” These results suggest that respondents, regardless of the strength in partisan identity, are not willing to sacrifice shared racial/ethnic descriptive representation for the sake of partisan representation.

## 5.2 Study 2: Preferences for Shared Representation in Candidates

Study 1 suggests that respondents prefer descriptive representation along ethnic/racial lines over partisan representation when the questions are about *collective* representation. However, their preferences can be different when they are asked about *dyadic* representation for two reasons. First, in a competitive election, it is more likely that feelings of group threat are activated (Huddy, Mason and Aarøe 2015). Second, the findings from Study 1 may be partly due to the direct questioning about partisanship and race/ethnicity. Respondents may feel that they are expected to report their preferences for more co-ethnic or pan-ethnic legislators because there are so few Asian Americans in Congress.

While directly asking about collective representation is a first step in understanding how Asian Americans weigh partisanship and race/ethnicity, we need a better research design so that we can measure voters’ honest preferences when they make more explicit trade-off decisions between two candidates with varying characteristics, like in an election. Conjoint analysis is suitable for this purpose because we can present difficult-to-choose trade-off options to respondents and ask them which one they would prefer. It is also known to mitigate social desirability bias (Horiuchi, Markovich and Yamamoto 2022), which is a matter of possible concern in Study 1.

### Marginal means

First, we look at the marginal mean of each of the two attributes of interest—*Party* and *Race/Ethnicity*—before we examine specific trade-off behavior. As we introduced in Section 4.2, we measure *choice-level* marginal means (with bias-correction) proposed by Clayton et al. (2023). The unit of analysis is a profile pair. Therefore, the marginal mean of choosing an

“Own-party candidate” is the probability of choosing an “Own-party candidate” *when it is compared with an “Out-party candidate”* (i.e., excluding the cases in which two profiles have the same levels). What is an “own-party” is defined by each respondent’s partisanship and the party of a hypothetical candidate presented in conjoint tables. For the *Race/Ethnicity* attribute, to measure the marginal means for the levels relevant to Asian Americans, we focus on profile pairs for which one profile contains the level of interest—(1) “Co-ethnic (e.g., Korean for Korean) Asian American candidate,” (2) “Cross-ethnic (e.g., Indian for Korean) Asian American candidate” in the Co-Ethnic Design and (3) “Pan-ethnic (non-specific) Asian American candidate in the Pan-Ethnic Design—and the other profile contains either “White,” “Black,” or “Hispanic.” This means that we intentionally exclude pairs with the same level, such as Black vs. Black or Asian American vs. Asian American (e.g., Korean American vs. Indian American) pairs, as we also do to measure the marginal means of partisanship. As with partisanship, co-, cross-, and pan-ethnicities are defined by each respondent’s race/ethnicity and the race/ethnicity of a hypothetical candidate presented in conjoint tables. In all of these marginal means, the levels of other attributes are randomly assigned. Thus, the means are *marginal* in that they are averaged across the combinations of all the other attributes in profile pairs.<sup>15</sup>

The results of the estimation are presented in Figure 2, which show some notable patterns. First, we find that partisanship is by far the most important factor for vote choice for candidates in a competitive electoral setting. The marginal mean of choosing “Own-party candidate” is 0.89 when evaluating co-ethnic candidates and 0.91 when evaluating pan-ethnic candidates. Therefore, if one of the two candidates in an election shares the same party as a respondent, the respondent will vote for that candidate with an approximately

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<sup>15</sup>For all of our analyses, we report the measurement-error corrected binary vote choice marginal means (Clayton et al. 2023) as our main findings, which is a deviation from our original pre-analysis plan. The results from the original pre-analysis plan using OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level can be found in Table C.3 for binary vote choice and Table C.4 for the rating. We also report the uncorrected vote choice and the rating marginal means for every main analysis. For example, alternative measurements for the marginal means of the main attributes in Figure 2 are presented in Figures C.8 and C.9. None of the various estimation strategies changes the interpretation of our results.






Figure 2: Marginal means on binary vote choice (main attributes). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The comparison level is “Out-party candidate” for the marginal mean of choosing “Own-party candidate” and either “White,” “Black” or “Hispanic” for the marginal mean of choosing a co-ethnic, cross-ethnic, or pan-ethnic Asian American candidate.*

90% probability.

Second, unlike in Study 1, in Study 2, respondents do not favor shared partisanship and race/ethnicity equally. The marginal means for “Co-ethnic Asian American candidate,” “Cross-ethnic Asian American candidate,” and “Pan-ethnic Asian American candidate” are substantially smaller than the marginal mean for “Own-party candidate.”

Third, Asian American respondents are the most likely to select candidates that share one’s own origin, or co-ethnics, with a 76% probability. When ethnicity is not specified, and candidates are just described as “Asian American,” or pan-ethnics, the probability of selection drops to 69%. When the Asian American candidate is specified as having a different national origin as the respondent, or cross-ethnics, the likelihood of voting for that candidate drops even further to 59%. However, all three marginal means of choosing Asian American candidates are greater than 0.5, implying that any Asian American candidate, regardless of their particular ethnicity, would be favored in an election compared to a white, Black, or

Hispanic candidate for Asian American respondents.<sup>16</sup>

In sum, first, respondents are most likely to choose similar party candidates over similar race/ethnicity candidates. Second, among similar race/ethnicity candidates, respondents are most likely to choose an Asian American candidate with their own ethnic origin, followed by an Asian American candidate with no ethnicity specified, and finally, an Asian American candidate who does not share their ethnic origin. Even so, some form of racial cross-affinity exists for all three types of Asian American candidates: co-ethnic, cross-ethnic, and pan-ethnic. What is more important is that the Asian American (cross-ethnic) candidate is distinct from the co-ethnic and pan-ethnic candidates. Asian Americans (cross-ethnic) are members of a respondent’s *ethnic out-group* but *racial in-group*, meaning they occupy a space between in-group and out-group status that is still more preferable than the white, Black, or Hispanic candidates.<sup>17</sup> It appears that there are important nuances in how Asian American voters evaluate descriptive representatives beyond the binary of “co-ethnic” and “pan-ethnic.”

We also examine whether the estimated marginal means are asymmetrical by respondents’ partisan affiliation and the strength of their racial, ethnic, and partisan identities and find no major heterogeneity (see Figures C.12, C.14, and C.15 in the Appendix). A notable finding is that unlike Study 1, respondents with high co-ethnic and pan-ethnic identities still continue to prioritize candidates who share their party over their race/ethnicity.<sup>18</sup>

## Trade-offs

Finally, we analyze respondents’ decisions in trade-off pairs to examine whether Asian Americans are more likely to sacrifice descriptive representation for partisan representation. Figure

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<sup>16</sup>We also examine whether these marginal means change based on the race of a candidate for comparison (i.e., a “white,” “Black,” or “Hispanic” candidate. The results are presented in Figures C.10 and C.11. We find no differences according to whether the other candidate is white, Black, or Hispanic.

<sup>17</sup>Our finding differs from that of Cuevas-Molina and Nteta (2023) in that Latino voters prefer cross-ethnic candidates to pan-ethnic ones.

<sup>18</sup>We also conduct robustness checks by analyzing separately those who passed the attention check (Figure C.16) and speeders (Figure C.17) and find that our results hold.




Figure 3: Marginal means on binary vote choice (trade-offs). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*

3 shows how often Asian Americans vote for candidates who are aligned on one characteristic but not aligned on another. That is, we choose profiles in which respondents compare an Asian American candidate (aligned on *Race/Ethnicity*) who is an opposite party member (not aligned on *Party*) and a white, Black, or Hispanic candidate (not aligned on *Race/ethnicity*) who is an own party member (aligned on *Party*).

In these trade-off situations, Asian American respondents continue to prioritize shared partisanship, as they consistently choose an own-party candidate who is white, Black, or Hispanic more than 50% of the time over an Asian American candidate who is from the opposite party. This finding does not vary based on whether the Asian American opposite party candidate is a co-ethnic (e.g., a Korean American Republican candidate for Korean American Democrats), cross-ethnic (e.g., an Indian American Republican candidate for Korean American Democrats), or a pan-ethnic (an unspecified Asian American Republican candidate). When facing trade-off decisions that involve shared partisanship or shared race/ethnicity, Asian American respondents are always more willing to vote for the candidate who shares their party.

While race/ethnicity may be less important than partisanship in determining vote choice in trade-offs, there is, again, interesting variation within descriptive representation itself. Asian American respondents are more likely to vote for co-ethnics who are of the opposite party (36%) than those who are described as pan-ethnics or cross-ethnics. When candidates are just described as “Asian American,” the probability of vote choice drops to 21%. When the Asian American candidate is specified as not having the same national origin as the respondent, however, the probability of voting for that candidate drops even further to 13%.

One benefit of using *profile pairs* as the unit of analysis is that we can look at differences in trade-offs by the race/ethnicity of the other candidate for comparison. While keeping the Asian American, opposite-party candidate fixed, we examine whether respondents react differently when their own party candidate is either white, Black, or Hispanic. The results are presented in Figure 4. While the pattern follows for white candidates (top row), there are important differences when Asian American respondents evaluate a Black or Hispanic own-party candidate versus a co-ethnic and opposite-party candidate. We see that Asian American respondents are willing to cross party lines to vote for an opposite-party, co-ethnic member *only if* their own-party candidate is a Black (second row) or Hispanic (third row). Therefore, there seems to be a racial penalty extended to Black and Hispanic members that does not manifest for white own-party members. Unlike previous results, Asian Americans will vote for the opposite party candidate 52% of the time if the other candidate is Black and 46% of the time if the other candidate is Hispanic, neither of which are statistically significantly different than 50%. However, this behavior does not apply when the Asian American opposite-party candidate is either a cross-ethnic or pan-ethnic candidate. In these instances, respondents revert to the previous pattern: they will vote for their own-party candidate regardless of whether or not they are a white, Black, or Hispanic candidate.

We examine the heterogeneity in trade-off choices among various subgroups of respondents, which are presented in the Appendix C.5. First, Democrats and Republicans follow much of the same patterns as the main results (see Figures C.20 and C.21). Second, Figure




Figure 4: Marginal means on binary vote choice by race of other candidate (trade-offs).  
*Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*

C.22 shows the results for first-generation immigrants, who tend to have a weaker partisan identity. We find that they, indeed, have stronger preferences for a co-ethnic candidate of the opposite party compared to second and third-generation immigrants. The probability of voting for such a candidate is almost the same as the probability of voting for a white, Black, or Hispanic candidate of the respondents' party. However, these patterns are not seen for second and third-generation immigrants. Finally, we again look at the differences in marginal means by respondents' partisan, co-ethnic, and pan-ethnic social identities (see Figures C.23 and C.24). Just as expected, we find that respondents with the highest partisan identities are more likely to penalize all Asian American opposite-party candidates, while those with the lowest partisan identities are equally likely to vote for co-ethnic opposite-party candidates and white, Black, or Hispanic own-party candidates. Regarding the heterogeneity by respondents' ethnic identity, we see a less clear pattern in Figure C.24. Those with the highest and lowest levels of co-ethnic identities are again equally likely to vote for either the co-ethnic opposite-party or the white, Black, or Hispanic own-party candidate.<sup>19</sup> However, those with a medium level of co-ethnic identity are significantly more likely to choose a white, Black, or Hispanic own-party candidate

Overall, Asian Americans are almost always willing to trade off their descriptive representation for partisan representation in a competitive electoral setting. However, Asian Americans seem to be willing to trade off their partisan representation for descriptive representation in one circumstance only—when a co-ethnic Asian American opposite-party candidate competes against a Black or Hispanic own-party candidate. The descriptive representation must be on the terms of *co-ethnicity*.

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<sup>19</sup>This relationship does not extend to those with high pan-ethnic identities, as they only vote for an opposite-party Asian American candidate 24% of the time, even though it is still higher than those with low pan-ethnic identities.

## 6 Conclusion

Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we contribute to the broader literature on voters’ preferences for descriptive and partisanship representation. We find that the narrative of “partisan primacy,” as commonly discussed in American politics, is much more nuanced when considering racial “in-groups,” in our case, Asian American voters. When asked outright about preferences for collective representation in Study 1, Asian Americans claim to prioritize descriptive representation. But when it comes to voting for a specific candidate in Study 2, they are willing to trade off descriptive representation for partisan representation. Asian Americans also weigh different forms of “descriptive representation” depending on how candidates are described and what level of information about ethnicity is given. They will vote for any candidate described as Asian American (co-ethnic, cross-ethnic, and pan-ethnic) more often than the candidates who are not Asian Americans (i.e., white, Black, and Hispanic). These results suggest that there is still a shared affinity for candidates who are Asian Americans compared to non-Asian American candidates, regardless of whether or not these candidates are of the same ethnicity as respondents. Perhaps most notably, if Asian American respondents encounter a co-ethnic candidate of the opposite party, they are just as likely to vote *against* their own party if their only in-party alternative is a Black or Hispanic candidate.

With these nuanced findings, we claim another contribution to the literature on the politics of race and ethnicity. Specifically, our findings provide crucial revelations about pan-ethnic groups in studying race/ethnicity and identities. Asian Americans are often grouped as a monolith even though they differ in ethnic, cultural, religious, and phenotypical backgrounds (Junn and Masuoka 2008; Sadhwani 2022a). We find that Asian American candidates who are explicitly *not* of the same origin as the survey respondents (i.e., cross-ethnic) are penalized compared to Asian American candidates described in pan-ethnic terms. For example, Chinese Americans are more likely to vote for a candidate described as an “Asian American” than a candidate described as a “Korean American,” even considering

other characteristics. This finding offers a richer understanding of Asian American political attitudes and paves the way for further research on heterogeneity among different *ethnic* groups within the broader *racial* group.

At the same time, our results suggest a troubling finding for the potential for multiethnic and multiracial coalitions (see, e.g., Pérez et al. 2022; Pérez, Vicuña and Ramos 2023)—the third literature to which our study contributes. *Among* Asian Americans, there should be continued challenges to organize and aggregate their interests and influence policy processes because they do not necessarily support Asian American candidates who are of a different ethnic origin, depending on their partisanship and the opponent’s race/ethnicity. Furthermore, the difficulty in organizing diverse coalitions might extend beyond one’s own race for Asian Americans. The penalty that we find applied to Black and Hispanic candidates, even when they are of one’s own party, suggests that racial animus may be at play. However, since we do not measure any levels of racism or racial resentment in our survey, it is difficult to determine the mechanism behind this finding fully. Future studies on this topic should include a racial resentment or other symbolic racism scale to see if this penalty is a result of prejudice or something else altogether.

We acknowledge several other limitations of our research design and ways this work can be extended. First, while examining shared pan-ethnicity reveals important insights about the type of descriptive representation Asian Americans value, it is difficult to imagine a “pan-ethnic” but otherwise ethnically *ambiguous* candidate in the real world. One reason why we find that the probability of choosing an Asian American (pan-ethnic) candidate is higher than the probability of choosing an Asian American (cross-ethnic) candidate may be because respondents infer that Asian Americans without a specified ethnicity are indeed co-ethnics. In real life, while a candidate may campaign as an “Asian American” without reference to a specific identity, the distinctiveness of a national origin surname and some phenotypical features should give voters some clues to the ethnicity of that candidate.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, even as

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<sup>20</sup>This strategic ambiguity may be a much more viable strategy for Latino candidates, a fact that Cuevas-Molina and Nteta (2023) utilizes by just describing the name “Jose Martinez” without reference to a specific



“Asian American” as a category retains ambiguity in our studies (and almost all the existing studies; see Appendix E) with regard to national origins, it may be difficult to implement this ambiguity *in practice*. At the same time, candidates may certainly frame themselves as an “Asian American” to increase their appeal to other Asian American constituents with whom they do not share a common ethnicity. Even though some informed Asian American voters can discern ethnicity, the effectiveness of this framing strategy on its own is worth considering (see, e.g., Boudreau, Elmendorf and MacKenzie 2019; Hurst 2023; Wu 2023). Further research is needed in order to determine what the relative effects of these pan-ethnic Asian American and more specific ethnic American (e.g., Korean American) frames are when combined with more information about the candidates, such as last names and phenotypes.

Additionally, we remain agnostic regarding perceptions of substantive representation and mechanisms for why respondents may select a co-partisan or co-ethnic/racial candidate.<sup>21</sup> Respondents may choose to vote for a co-partisan because they feel particularly negatively about the opposite party or because they believe that a co-partisan will bring them the most substantive benefits (Costa et al. 2022). They may also vote for a co-ethnic candidate similarly for substantive gains. Scholars could extend our research design to interact with other cues about substantive representation with the demographic or partisan characteristics.

There are additional opportunities to extend our research to other minority groups. Indeed, some scholars recognize the connection between Asian American and Latino experiences in the United States as being composed mostly of immigrant populations (Cuevas-Molina and Nteta 2023; Schildkraut 2013). Other racial minority groups beyond Latinos also have some form of pan-ethnic identities, even if they are not typically perceived in this way, such as African Americans and African immigrants (Gooding 2021) or pan-Indianism for Native Americans (Herrick and Mendez 2019). Although Asian Americans are a worthwhile case to study, the interaction between race, ethnicity, and party continues to grow in

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ethnicity for the pan-ethnic condition.

<sup>21</sup>See Footnote 1 about the concept of substantive representation, in comparison to the concepts of descriptive and partisan representations.

importance for other groups as a central organizing feature of American politics.

Finally, while we only look at the case of Asian Americans in this paper, future research should examine Asian co-, cross- and pan-ethnic identities and the interplay between representation based on racial/ethnic and partisan identities in contexts beyond the United States. Major democracies, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, have substantial Asian diaspora populations who are beginning to influence political processes (see, e.g., [Martin and Blinder 2021](#); [Pietsch 2017](#)). As the Asian diaspora is the largest non-white racial group in those countries, Asians will only continue to play an increasingly larger role in the future of multicultural democracies, along with the potential backlash to this racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious diversification.

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# Supplementary Materials

## Descriptive or Partisan Representation? Examining Trade-Offs for Asian Americans

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## A Pre-Registration

We used the [AsPredicted.org](https://osf.io/k4sp5)'s template and registered the analysis plan at the Open Science Framework (<https://osf.io/k4sp5>). Except for some typos, our original pre-registration is presented in this section. Note, however, that the order of studies has been switched. In our manuscript, we refer to our conjoint experiment to Study 2 and another experiment to Study 1.

### Data collection

Have any data been collected for this study already? Note: 'Yes' is a discouraged answer for this preregistration form.

- No, no data have been collected for this study yet.

### Hypothesis

How do Asian Americans vote for political candidates when concerns about descriptive and partisan representation come into conflict with each other?

Do they seek co-partisan representatives over co-ethnic or pan-ethnic representatives?

- (H1) Partisan representation has a larger effect than descriptive representation.
- (H2) Within vote choice for descriptive representation, the co-ethnic frame has a larger effect than the pan-ethnic frame.
- (H3) There are heterogeneous effects by partisanship, as the effect size is smaller for Asian American Republicans.
- (H4) The effect of partisan and descriptive representation on vote choice is conditional on the strength of partisan, ethnic, and racial identification of the respondent.
- (H5) There is a tradeoff between descriptive and partisan representation. The magnitude of the effect of co-ethnicity and pan-ethnicity is conditional on co-partisanship.

### Dependent variable

#### Study 1

We have two main dependent variables for Study 1. The first two dependent variables come from a conjoint experiment where respondents are asked about two hypothetical candidates for Congress with randomly assigned levels for each attribute. First, respondents are asked about their (DV1) binary vote choice between two hypothetical candidates with randomly ordered attributes. (Note: The order of attributes is randomized across respondents but fixed for each respondent.) Second, respondents are asked about their (DV2) likelihood to vote for Candidate 1 and Candidate 2. Likelihood to vote is measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “very likely” to “very unlikely.”

## Study 2

In Study 2, respondents are asked about their (DV3) representation agreement. DV3 is measured with a 5-point Likert scale on how much they agree with a series of statements asking about (1) co/pan-ethnicity, (2) co-partisanship, (3) co/pan-ethnicity co-partisanship, (4) co/pan-ethnicity non co-partisanship, and (5) non co/pan-ethnicity co-partisanship representation in Congress.

## Conditions

How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?

- Participants will be assigned to one of two frames. The first is an Asian American frame, in which participants will be asked questions about candidates who are described simply as “Asian American” without reference to their specific ethnicity or national origin. Participants assigned to this frame see questions about their pan-ethnicity in both Study 1 and Study 2.
- The second is an Ethnic American frame, in which participants will be asked questions about candidates who are described in terms of their ethnicity/national origin (i.e. Korean American, Chinese American, Indian American, etc.) Participants assigned to this frame see questions about co-ethnicity in both Study 1 and Study 2.

## Study 1

Seven attributes will be fully randomized for each candidate profile across the following levels:

### **Asian American Conjoint:**

- Race/Ethnicity: Asian American/White/Black/Hispanic
- Party: Democrat/Republican
- Advances Favorable Legislation for District Constituents: Sometimes/Often/Always
- Sex: Man/Woman
- Education: Bachelor’s degree/Professional degree
- Votes with the Party: Sometimes/Often
- Was Born in the U.S.: Yes/No

### **Ethnic American Conjoint:**

- Race/Ethnicity: Chinese American/Indian American/Filipino American/Vietnamese American/Korean American/Japanese American/White/Black/Hispanic
- Party: Democrat/Republican
- Advances Favorable Legislation for District Constituents: Sometimes/Often/Always
- Sex: Man/Woman
- Education: Bachelor’s degree/Professional degree

- Votes with the Party: Sometimes/Often
- Was Born in the U.S.: Yes/No

## Study 2

The two frames for Study 2 are pan-ethnic representation or co-ethnic representation:

### Asian American Descriptive/Partisan Representation

1. We need more Asian Americans in Congress.
2. We need more [co-partisans] in Congress.
3. We need more Asian American [co-partisans] in Congress.
4. We need more Asian American [out-partisans] in Congress.
5. We need more [co-partisans] who are not Asian Americans in Congress

### Ethnic American Descriptive/Partisan Representation

1. We need more [co-ethnics] in Congress.
2. We need more [co-partisans] in Congress.
3. We need more [co-ethnic] [co-partisans] in Congress.
4. We need more [co-ethnic] [out-partisans] in Congress.
5. We need more [co-partisans] who are not [co-ethnics] in Congress.

## Analyses

### Study 1

#### (Hypothesis 1 and 2)

First, we will look at the average marginal component effects (AMCE) and the marginal means (MM) for each attribute using the “cregg” package. We will use the subgroups of respondents who see co-ethnics and pan-ethnics in the analysis to see the differences in MMs between those two conditions. (Note that in the following, the prefix “C” indicates candidate characteristics, while the prefix “R” indicates respondent characteristics.)

- Dependent variable: Binary vote choice
  - Main attributes of our research interest: Co/Pan-ethnicity, Co-partisanship
  - Other attributes: CNativeBorn, CFemale, CEducation, CLegislatorEffectiveness, CPartyStrength
- Dependent variable: Likelihood of vote choice]
  - Main attributes of our research interest: Co/Pan-ethnicity, Co-partisanship
  - Other attributes: CNativeBorn, CFemale, CEducation, CLegislatorEffectiveness, CPartyStrength



### **(Hypothesis 3 and 4)**

Then, we will conduct similar heterogeneous analyses by partisanship and index measures of co-ethnic, pan-ethnic, and co-partisan identification, looking at the MM for each attribute to see if there are significant differences between subgroups.

### **(Hypothesis 5)**

Finally, we will examine a three-way interaction of co/pan-ethnicity, co-partisanship, and respondent party and other covariates on both vote choice variables. This will be a differences-in-differences test of co/pan-ethnicity and co-partisanship between Democratic and Republican respondents.

- Dependent variable: Binary vote choice
  - Main attributes of our research interest: Co/Pan-ethnicity, Co-partisanship, RParty, Co/Pan-ethnicity:Co-partisanship, Co/Pan-ethnicity:RParty, Co-partisanship:RParty, Co/Pan-ethnicity:Co-partisanship:RParty
  - Other attributes: CNativeBorn, CFemale, CEducation, CLegislatorEffectiveness, CPartyStrength
- Dependent variable: Likelihood of vote choice
  - Main attributes of our research interest: Co/Pan-ethnicity, Co-partisanship, RParty, Co/Pan-ethnicity:Co-partisanship, Co/Pan-ethnicity:RParty, Co-partisanship:RParty, Co/Pan-ethnicity:Co-partisanship:RParty
  - Other attributes: CNativeBorn, CFemale, CEducation, CLegislatorEffectiveness, CPartyStrength

## **Outliers and Exclusions**

- We use two attention check questions. The first will be asked at the beginning of the survey, and those who fail the first attention check will be terminated from the survey and not allowed to answer any more questions.
- The second attention check question is asked at the end of the survey. Those who fail this attention check will still be marked as “complete.” Analysis will be conducted with both the inclusion and exclusion of those who failed the second attention check as part of the robustness checks.
- We also exclude respondents who do not agree to participate in our study, who are marked as potential fraudulent respondents (according to Qualtrics’ standard settings), and who do not report their racial/ethnic identity as Asian American.

## **Sample Size**

There will be approximately 1,500-2,500 responses collected using Lucid Marketplace, all of whom will identify as Asian or Asian American (including multiracial Asian/Asian Americans). The sample will be 23% Chinese American (excluding Taiwanese Americans), 20% Indian American, 19% Filipino American, 10% Vietnamese American, 8% Korean American,

7% Japanese American, and 13% all other Asian ethnic groups in the US. The sample will also have partisanship quotas, with 44% Democrat, 23% Republican, 33% Independent.

## Other

1. An exploratory question for both studies is:

- RQ1: How does national origin affect vote choice for co-partisan, co-ethnic, and pan-ethnic candidates?

We will conduct heterogeneous analyses by respondent ethnicity to see how differences in one's ethnicity affects desire for representation.

2. Specifically for Study 2, two additional exploratory questions are:

- RQ2: How does specifying partisan information of a candidate affect the desire for a co/pan-ethnic representative?
- RQ3: How does specifying the ethnic/racial information affect desire for a co-partisan representative?

We will compare the differences between high-information and low-information settings on desire for descriptive representation by comparing the effect on each statement on the dependent variable, but especially focusing on comparing the (3) and (4) statements to the (1) statement and the (3) and (5) statements to the (2) statement.

3. For both studies, we will also conduct heterogeneous analyses by each respondent covariate for each of the three dependent variables.
4. We will conduct robustness checks using measures of inter-coder reliability (vote choice and/or likelihood answers are the same between the 1st and 11th conjoint task), attention check success, and the duration of the survey (the top and bottom 25th percentile will be excluded). The inter-coder reliability is used to interpret the magnitude of the estimated coefficients.

## Name

Tradeoff Decisions for Asian Americans Voters: Choosing between Co-Ethnic and Co-Partisan Representation

## Finally

Survey

## Other

*No response*

## B Questionnaire

This section introduces the questionnaire used for this research. The parts in bold (block titles and question names) or “display logic,” “explanation” or “embedded field” in parentheses are not shown to respondents.

### Consent

**intro** We are a team of researchers at Dartmouth College conducting research on attitudes of Asians or Asian Americans in the United States. We invite you to participate in a survey on politics. It should take approximately 10 minutes to complete this survey.

No identifying information will be retained by researchers with your survey responses. Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you are free to withdraw from the study at any time. However, please note that any online interaction carries some risk of being accessed.

Questions about this study may be directed to:

**consent1** This survey is specifically targeted at those who identify themselves as Asians or Asian Americans (including those who have multiracial identities). Do you consider yourself as an Asian or an Asian American?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

**consent2** Do you consent to participate in this survey?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

### Screener 1

**screener1** “Build” is most associated with...

- Commander (1)
- Find (2)
- Assemble (3)
- Understand (4)

### Demographics - Gender/Race

**instruction** Thank you. To begin, please answer some questions about yourself.

**gender** Which gender do you most identify with?

- Man (1)
- Woman (2)
- Non-binary (3)
- Other (Please specify): (4)

**race1** Are you of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic origin and descent?

- Yes (1)

- No (2)
- race2** What racial or ethnic groups best describe you? Please select all that apply.
- White (1)
  - Black or African American (2)
  - American Indian or Alaska Native (3)
  - Asian or Asian American (4)
  - Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (5)
  - Middle Eastern (6)
  - Other (Please specify): (7)
- countryorigin** (display logic: if **race2** is 4) From which country or region do you trace your heritage or ancestry?
- Cambodia (1)
  - China (2)
  - Philippines (3)
  - India (4)
  - Indonesia (5)
  - Japan (6)
  - Korea (7)
  - Laos (8)
  - Pakistan (9)
  - Taiwan (10)
  - Thailand (11)
  - Vietnam (12)
  - No country in particular (13)
  - I am not of Asian heritage (14)
  - Other (Please specify): (15)

## Demographics - Other

**age** What is your age?

- 18-25 (1)
- 26-34 (2)
- 35-42 (3)
- 43-50 (4)
- 51-57 (5)
- 58-65 (6)
- 65+ (7)

**education** What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed?

- Did not graduate from high school (1)
- High school graduate (2)
- Some college, but no degree (yet) (3)
- 2-year college degree (4)
- 4-year college degree (5)
- Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.) (6)

**income** Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?

- Less than 10k (1)
- 10k - 20k (2)
- 20k - 30k (3)
- 30k - 40k (4)
- 40k - 50k (5)
- 50k - 60k (6)
- 60k - 70k (7)
- 70k - 80k (8)
- 80k - 100k (9)
- 100k - 120k (10)
- 120k - 150k (11)
- 150k+ (12)
- Prefer Not to Answer (13)

**immigrationm** Now we'd like to know just a bit about your background and family history.

Was your mother born in the United States?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

**immigrationf** And was your father born in the United States?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

**immigrationr** And were you born in the United States?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

**immigrationr\_country** (display logic: if **immigrationr** is 2) What country were you born in outside of the US?

- Cambodia (1)
- China (2)
- Philippines (3)
- India (4)
- Indonesia (5)
- Japan (6)
- Korea (7)
- Laos (8)
- Pakistan (9)
- Taiwan (10)
- Thailand (11)
- Vietnam (12)
- I was born in the United States (13)
- Other country (Please specify): (14)

## Demographics - Political

**party** Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...?

- Democrat (1)
- Republican (2)
- Independent (3)
- Other (4)
- Not Sure (5)

**partyD** (display logic: if **party** is 1) Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?

- Strong Democrat (1)
- Not very strong Democrat (2)

**partyR** (display logic: if **party** is 2) Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?

- Strong Republican (1)
- Not very strong Republican (2)

**partyI** (display logic: if **party** is 3, 4, or 5) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or Democratic Party?

- Republican Party (1)
- Democratic Party (2)
- Neither (3)
- Not sure (4)

**ideology** In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?

- Very liberal (1)
- Liberal (2)
- Moderate (3)
- Conservative (4)
- Very conservative (5)
- Not sure (6)

## Conjoint (Asian)

**conjoint\_instruction** On each of the following 11 pages, you will be given descriptions for two hypothetical candidates running for Congress. Please read each description carefully and select the candidate that you most prefer.

**asianam1\_conjoint** [Task 1/11] Consider the following two hypothetical candidates for Congress. Which candidate are you most likely to vote for? Even if you are not entirely sure, please indicate which of the two you would be more likely to prefer.

(Explanation: Conjoint table is displayed here.)

*Note: If you are using a mobile device, please turn your device to landscape mode to view the table in its entirety.*

**asianam1\_vote** Which candidate are you most likely to vote for?

- Candidate 1 (1)
- Candidate 2 (2)

**asianam1\_cand1pref** Looking at just Candidate 1, how likely are you to vote for this candidate for Congress?

- Very likely (1)
- Somewhat likely (2)
- Neither likely nor unlikely (3)
- Somewhat unlikely (4)
- Very unlikely (5)

**asianam1\_cand2pref** Looking at just Candidate 2, how likely are you to vote for this candidate for Congress?

- Very likely (1)
- Somewhat likely (2)
- Neither likely nor unlikely (3)
- Somewhat unlikely (4)
- Very unlikely (5)

(Explanation: Similar sets of tasks are presented ten more times. The eleventh set of tasks is exactly the same as the first set of tasks.)

## Conjoint (Ethnic)

(Explanation: Similar sets of tasks are presented eleven times. The eleventh set of tasks is exactly the same as the first set of tasks.)

## Representation – Transition

**representation\_text** Think about the next Congress and who should be elected. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

## Pan-Ethnic (Asian)

**panE** We need more Asian Americans in Congress.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

## Co-Partisan (Asian)

**panP** We need more (embedded field: respondent's party)s in Congress.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

## **Pan-Ethnic Co-Partisan (Asian)**

**panEpanP** We need more Asian American (embedded field: respondent's party)s in Congress.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

## **Pan-Ethnic Out-Partisan (Asian)**

**panEoutP** We need more Asian American (embedded field: respondent's party)s in Congress.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

## **Out-Ethnic Co-Partisan (Asian)**

**outEpanP** We need more (embedded field: respondent's party)s who are not Asian American in Congress.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

## **Co-Ethnic (Ethnic)**

**coE** We need more (embedded field: respondent's ethnicity) Americans in Congress.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

## **Co-Partisan (Ethnic)**

**coP** We need more (embedded field: respondent's party)s in Congress.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat disagree (4)



- Strongly disagree (5)

## Co-Ethnic Co-Partisan (Ethnic)

**coEcoP** We need more (embedded field: respondent's ethnicity) American (embedded field: respondent's party)s in Congress.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

## Co-Ethnic Out-Partisan (Ethnic)

**coEoutP** We need more (embedded field: respondent's ethnicity) American (embedded field: respondent's opposite party)s in Congress.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

## Out-Ethnic Co-Partisan (Ethnic)

**outEcoP** We need more (embedded field: respondent's party)s who are not (embedded field: respondent's ethnicity) American in Congress.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

## Social Identity – Transition

**transition** Finally, please answer some remaining questions about yourself.

## Social Identity – Partisanship

**partisanID1** How important is being a (embedded field: respondent's party) to you?

- Extremely important (1)
- Very important (2)
- Not very important (3)
- Not important at all (4)

**partisanID2** How well does the term (embedded field: respondent's party) describe you?

- Extremely well (1)
- Very well (2)
- Not very well (3)
- Not at all (4)

**partisanID3** When talking about (embedded field: respondent's party)s, how often do you use "we" instead of "they"?

- All of the time (1)
- Most of the time (2)
- Some of the time (3)
- Rarely (4)
- Never (5)

**partisanID4** To what extent do you think of yourself as being a (embedded field: respondent's party)?

- A great deal (1)
- Somewhat (2)
- Very little (3)
- Not at all (4)

## **Social Identity – Coethnic**

**coethnicID1** How important is being a (embedded field: respondent's ethnicity) American to you?

- Extremely important (1)
- Very important (2)
- Not very important (3)
- Not important at all (4)

**coethnicID2** How well does the term (embedded field: respondent's ethnicity) American describe you?

- Extremely well (1)
- Very well (2)
- Not very well (3)
- Not at all (4)

**coethnicID3** When talking about (embedded field: respondent's ethnicity) Americans, how often do you use "we" instead of "they"?

- All of the time (1)
- Most of the time (2)
- Some of the time (3)
- Rarely (4)
- Never (5)

**coethnicID4** To what extent do you think of yourself as being a (embedded field: respondent's ethnicity) American?

- A great deal (1)
- Somewhat (2)

- Very little (3)
- Not at all (4)

## Social Identity – Panethnic

**panethnicID1** How important is being an Asian American to you?

- Extremely important (1)
- Very important (2)
- Not very important (3)
- Not important at all (4)

**panethnicID2** How well does the term Asian American describe you?

- Extremely well (1)
- Very well (2)
- Not very well (3)
- Not at all (4)

**panethnicID3** When talking about Asian Americans, how often do you use “we” instead of “they”?

- All of the time (1)
- Most of the time (2)
- Some of the time (3)
- Rarely (4)
- Never (5)

**panethnicID4** To what extent do you think of yourself as being an Asian American?

- A great deal (1)
- Somewhat (2)
- Very little (3)
- Not at all (4)

## Debrief

**feedback** Thank you for the time that you spent taking the survey. Are there any comments or feedback you want to give about the survey content or structure?

**thanks** Thank you for participating in our study.

This research is not intended to support or oppose any policy or political candidate. It has no affiliation with any political candidate or campaign and has received no financial support from any political candidate or campaign. To protect the integrity of this study, please do not share information on the questions or your responses with other potential participants.

## C Additional Results

### C.1 Study 1 (All Respondents)

Table C.1: Study 1 Regression Results

Variable	Co-Ethnic Design	Pan-Ethnic Design
(Intercept)	4.123*** (0.098)	3.784*** (0.111)
Co-ethnic AAs	−0.034 (0.031)	
Co-ethnic AA and Own-party members	−0.021 (0.028)	
Co-ethnic AA but Opposite-party members	−0.943*** (0.048)	
Not co-ethnic AAs but Own-party members	−1.259*** (0.040)	
Pan-ethnic AAs		0.034 (0.030)
Pan-ethnic AA and Own-party members		0.057* (0.027)
Pan-ethnic AA but Opposite-party members		−0.916*** (0.047)
Not Pan-ethnic AA but Own-party members		−1.268*** (0.041)
Number of observations	5,353	5,520
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.233	0.254
RMSE	0.98	0.97

*Note:* The dependent variable is the 5-point Likert scale (treated as continuous) measuring whether a respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement, “We need more... in Congress,” ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree). The number of observations (questions) per respondent is five in each of the four regressions. The model includes 10 additional respondent-level variables as controls. “AA” in this table refers to “Asian American.” The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors where the clusters are at the level of respondents. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.001$  (two-sided).

Table C.2: Study 1 Regression Results, Additional Research Questions

Variable	Co-Ethnic Design	Pan-Ethnic Design
<i>Preference for Asian American members of Congress:</i>		
(Intercept)	4.197*** (0.024)	4.238*** (0.024)
Own Party	0.009 (0.019)	0.019 (0.019)
Opposite Party	-0.911*** (0.037)	-0.953*** (0.036)
Number of respondents	3,399	3,546
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.166	0.184
RMSE	0.96	0.96
<i>Preference for Own-Party Members of Congress:</i>		
(Intercept)	4.197*** (0.024)	4.238*** (0.024)
Own Ethnicity	0.009 (0.019)	0.019 (0.019)
Not Own Ethnicity	-1.219*** (0.042)	-1.310*** (0.042)
Number of observations	3,399	3,546
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.273	0.302
RMSE	0.94	0.94

*Note:* The dependent variable is the 5-point Likert scale (treated as continuous) measuring whether a respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement, “We need more... in Congress,” ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree). The number of observations (questions) per respondent is three in each of the four regressions. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors where the clusters are at the level of respondents. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.001$  (two-sided).

## C.2 Study 1 (Subgroup Comparisons)




Figure C.1: Mean response to more collective representation by respondents' partisanship. *Note: We measure whether a respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement, "We need more... in Congress," ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree). The responses are treated as continuous. The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*




Figure C.2: Difference in mean response to more collective representation by respondents' partisanship. *Note: We measure whether a respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement, "We need more... in Congress," ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree). The responses are treated as continuous. The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*




Figure C.3: Mean response to more collective representation by respondents' co-ethnic and pan-ethnic identities. *Note: We measure whether a respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement, "We need more... in Congress," ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree). The responses are treated as continuous. The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*






Figure C.4: Mean response to more collective representation by partisan identity. *Note:* We measure whether a respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement, “We need more... in Congress,” ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree). The responses are treated as continuous. The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.




Figure C.5: Mean response to more collective representation by ethnicity. *Note: We measure whether a respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement, “We need more... in Congress,” ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree). The responses are treated as continuous. The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*




Figure C.6: Mean response to more collective representation by whether respondents passed an attention check. *Note: We measure whether a respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement, “We need more... in Congress,” ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree). The responses are treated as continuous. The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*




Figure C.7: Mean response to more collective representation by whether respondents passed a duration check. *Note: We measure whether a respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement, “We need more... in Congress,” ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree). The responses are treated as continuous. The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*

### C.3 Study 2 (All Respondents)

Table C.3: Study 2 Profile-level Regression Results (Vote Choice)

Variable	Co-Ethnic Design	Pan-Ethnic Design
Baseline (White, Opposite Party Member)	0.324*** (0.011)	0.293*** (0.011)
Co-ethnic (e.g., Korean for Korean) American	0.230*** (0.013)	
Cross-ethnic (e.g., Indian for Korean) American	0.065*** (0.007)	
Pan-ethnic (not-specific Asian) American		0.125*** (0.007)
Own Party Member	0.303*** (0.008)	0.323*** (0.008)
(C) Native born = Yes	0.042*** (0.007)	0.037*** (0.006)
(C) Sex = Male	-0.040*** (0.006)	-0.032*** (0.007)
(C) Education = Professional degree	0.039*** (0.007)	0.031*** (0.007)
(C) Legislative effectiveness = Often	-0.036*** (0.008)	-0.040*** (0.008)
(C) Legislative effectiveness = Sometimes	-0.099*** (0.009)	-0.108*** (0.008)
(C) Partisan Strength = Weaker	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.006)
Number of observations	23,520	23,580
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.118	0.131
RMSE	0.47	0.47

*Note:* The dependent variable is whether or not a respondent would vote for a candidate. The number of observations per respondent is 20 (10 tasks  $\times$  2 profiles) in each of the four regressions. Each regression model includes a set of dichotomous variables for the other attributes, which are not our interest (indicated by “(C)”). See Table 2 for all the attributes and levels specified in our experiment. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors where the clusters are at the level of respondents. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.001$  (two-sided).

Table C.4: Study 2 Profile-level Regression Results (Vote Preference)

Variable	Co-Ethnic Design	Pan-Ethnic Design
Baseline (White, Opposite Party Member)	2.888*** (0.032)	2.863*** (0.034)
Co-ethnic (e.g., Korean for Korean) American	0.375*** (0.030)	
Cross-ethnic (e.g., Indian for Korean) American	0.107*** (0.017)	
Pan-ethnic (not-specific Asian) American		0.181*** (0.016)
Own Party Member	0.793*** (0.030)	0.905*** (0.031)
(C) Native born = Yes	0.045** (0.014)	0.041** (0.015)
(C) Sex = Male	−0.034* (0.014)	−0.040** (0.015)
(C) Education = Professional degree	0.068*** (0.015)	0.025 (0.016)
(C) Legislative effectiveness = Often	−0.034 (0.018)	−0.026 (0.018)
(C) Legislative effectiveness = Sometimes	−0.121*** (0.019)	−0.110*** (0.018)
(C) Partisan Strength = Weaker	−0.008 (0.015)	−0.011 (0.016)
Number of observations	23 520	23 580
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.131	0.153
RMSE	1.07	1.09

*Note:* The dependent variable is the 5-point Likert scale (treated as continuous) measuring the likelihood of voting, ranging from 5 (very likely) to 1 (very unlikely). The number of observations per respondent is 20 (10 tasks  $\times$  2 profiles) in each of the four regressions. Each regression model includes a set of dichotomous variables for the other attributes, which are not our interest (indicated by “(C)”). See Table 2 for all the attributes and levels specified in our experiment. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors where the clusters are at the level of respondents. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.001$  (two-sided).




Figure C.8: Marginal means (uncorrected) on binary vote choice (main attributes). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The comparison level is “Out-party candidate” for the marginal mean of choosing “Own-party candidate” and either “White,” “Black” or “Hispanic” for the marginal mean of choosing a co-ethnic, cross-ethnic, or pan-ethnic Asian American candidate.*




Figure C.9: Marginal means on ratings (main attributes). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The comparison level is “Out-party candidate” for the marginal mean of choosing “Own-party candidate” and either “White,” “Black” or “Hispanic” for the marginal mean of choosing a co-ethnic, cross-ethnic, or pan-ethnic Asian American candidate.*




Figure C.10: Marginal means on binary vote choice by race of other candidate (main attributes). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The comparison level is “Out-party candidate” for the marginal mean of choosing “Own-party candidate” and either “White,” “Black” or “Hispanic” for the marginal mean of choosing a co-ethnic, cross-ethnic, or pan-ethnic Asian American candidate.*






Figure C.11: Marginal means on rating by race of other candidate (main attributes). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The comparison level is “Out-party candidate” for the marginal mean of choosing “Own-party candidate” and either “White,” “Black” or “Hispanic” for the marginal mean of choosing a co-ethnic, cross-ethnic, or pan-ethnic Asian American candidate.*

## C.4 Study 2 (Subgroup Comparisons)




Figure C.12: Marginal means on binary vote choice by party (main attributes). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*




Figure C.13: Marginal means on rating by party (main attributes). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*




Figure C.14: Marginal means on binary vote choice by co-ethnic and pan-ethnic identity (main attributes). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*




Figure C.15: Marginal means on binary vote choice by partisan identity (main attributes). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*




Figure C.16: Marginal means on binary vote choice by passed attention check (main attributes). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The comparison level is “Out-party candidate” for the marginal mean of choosing “Own-party candidate” and either “White,” “Black” or “Hispanic” for the marginal mean of choosing a co-ethnic, cross-ethnic, or pan-ethnic Asian American candidate.*




Figure C.17: Marginal means on binary vote choice by passed duration check (main attributes). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The comparison level is “Out-party candidate” for the marginal mean of choosing “Own-party candidate” and either “White,” “Black” or “Hispanic” for the marginal mean of choosing a co-ethnic, cross-ethnic, or pan-ethnic Asian American candidate.*

## C.5 Study 2 (Trade-Offs)




Figure C.18: Marginal means (uncorrected) on binary vote choice (trade-offs). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*




Figure C.19: Marginal means on ratings (trade-offs). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*




Figure C.20: Marginal means on binary vote choice by party (trade-offs). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*




Figure C.21: Marginal means on ratings by party (trade-offs). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*






Figure C.22: Marginal means on binary vote choice by immigration generation (trade-offs).  
*Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*




Figure C.23: Marginal means on binary vote choice by partisan identity (trade-offs). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*




Figure C.24: Marginal means on binary vote choice by co-ethnic and pan-ethnic identity (trade-offs). *Note: The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*

## D Pre-Test of Asian American Candidates

Since the estimates in the conjoint analysis are conditional on the conjoint design itself, it is important to include the attributes and levels that are “relevant” to the purpose of each study. For this purpose and some other purposes (not relevant to this study), we fielded a pre-test to measure the perceptions of Asian American candidates on Lucid Marketplace from August 3 to August 31, 2021. Our sample of 1,042 respondents includes 411 white and 631 Asian American respondents. For the purposes of this study, we only look at the Asian American respondents. Asian American respondents were over-sampled according to their national distribution in the United States. Specifically, in this study, 142 respondents are Chinese, 112 are Indian, 130 are Filipino, 47 are Vietnamese, 59 are Korean, and 141 are other Asian.

Respondents were asked, “How likely is this [ASIAN-ETHNIC AMERICAN] candidate to be...” with a series of demographic and political characteristics. Each respondent was asked about various attributes of three candidates—two cross-ethnic candidates and one co-ethnic candidate. The demographic characteristics are gender (male/female), education (have/not have a college degree), nativity (native born/foreign-born), and income (bottom 10% of income in the US/top 10% of income in the US). The political characteristics are partisanship (Democrat/Republican), strength of partisanship (weak partisan/strong partisan), and ideology (conservative/liberal). Based on their responses and on our theoretical interests in race, ethnicity, and gender, we decided on a set of attributes for our conjoint analysis.

## E Review of American Candidate Conjoint Studies

We look at existing candidate conjoint experiments that include race as an attribute to see how Asian Americans are described in the conjoint literature. We focus only on experiments conducted in the U.S. since Asian diaspora candidates are most common in the United States. This list takes the existing literature review ([Abramson, Koçak and Magazinnik 2022](#)) on election conjoint experiments published from 2015 to 2020 and supplements it for studies published between 2020 and 2023. Candidate conjoint experiments in the U.S. that do not include race as an attribute, such as [Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth \(2018\)](#), are not included in this list.

We observe that while most (80%) conjoint experiments with race as an attribute do include Asian Americans as a level, there is no study that breaks out Asian American ethnicities as part of the level.

Table E.1: Literature Review of American Candidate Conjoint Experiments

Authors	Journal	Asian American	Asian Ethnicity
Atkeson and Hamel (2020)	<i>Political Behavior</i>		
Bansak et al. (2018)	<i>Political Analysis</i>	✓	
Carey et al. (2022)	<i>JEPOP</i>		
Carnes and Lupu (2016)	<i>APSR</i>		
Costa (2021)	<i>AJPS</i>	✓	
Crowder-Meyer et al. (2020)	<i>Political Behavior</i>	✓	
Crowder-Meyer, Gadarian and Trounstein (2020)	<i>Urban Affairs Review</i>	✓	
Doherty, Dowling and Miller (2019)	<i>Journal of Politics</i>	✓	
Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014)	<i>Political Analysis</i>	✓	
Henderson et al. (2022)	<i>Journal of Politics</i>		
Kirkland and Coppock (2018)	<i>Political Behavior</i>	✓	
Leeper and Robison (2020)	<i>Political Behavior</i>	✓	
Lemi (2021)	<i>Perspectives on Politics</i>	✓	
Magni and Reynolds (2022)	<i>Political Behavior</i>	✓	
Magni and Reynolds (2021)	<i>Journal of Politics</i>	✓	
Manento and Testa (2021)	<i>Political Behavior</i>	✓	
Ono and Burden (2019)	<i>Political Behavior</i>	✓	
Peterson (2017)	<i>Political Behavior</i>	✓	
Sances (2018)	<i>Political Behavior</i>	✓	
Sung (2023)	<i>Political Research Quarterly</i>	✓	

*Note:* The “Asian American” column refers to whether the article included “Asian” or “Asian American” as a level of the “Race” attribute. The “Asian Ethnicity” column refers to whether the article included any mention of Asian American ethnicity as a level of the “Race” attribute. JEPOP, APSR, and AJPS refer to the Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, American Political Science Review, and American Journal of Political Science.

## F APSA Principles and Guidance

This appendix section attests that we adhere to the APSA Principles and Guidance for human subjects research, with details on specific precautions we took to minimize risks to respondents in our surveys.

### Power Differentials

We took the following measures to protect the well-being of participants and consider the power differential between the researchers and participants:

- We confirm that the risks to respondents in our survey are minimal, and are further minimized by not collecting any *potentially* identifiable information (e.g., IP address). We also use procedures, such as storing data in a private Dropbox folder to which only the authors have access, to reduce risk as much as possible. We do not record any identifying information or ask about any confidential or protected information during the study.
- We use Lucid Marketplace, which has contracts with many panel providers in the U.S. We do not collect any identifiable information from Lucid Marketplace. All participants can be identified only by their respondent IDs, and their survey responses are kept anonymous. The targeted population was adult citizens of Asian Americans in the United States. It is impossible to individually identify respondents based on any combination of demographic attributes, i.e., their covariate profile.
- Though the online nature of this survey means that it is impossible to eliminate any risk of information compromise completely, we explain this explicitly in the consent form and have no reason to believe that any such compromise happened during or after survey implementation.
- The Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at the authors' institutions approved the study.
- Participants were compensated for their time taking our online survey through Lucid Marketplace. Respondents were paid above minimum wage.
- Participants were able to opt out of the experiment at any time and were informed before beginning the survey that they were free to do so (see Consent section for more details).

### Consent

We took the following measures to maintain our participants' voluntary and informed consent:

- Though the online nature of this survey means that it is impossible to eliminate any risk of information compromise completely, we explain this explicitly in the consent form.
- The first page of each survey included the following information to obtain consent from participants:

*We are a team of researchers at Dartmouth College conducting research on attitudes of Asians or Asian Americans in the United States. We invite you to participate in a survey on politics. It should take approximately 10 minutes to complete this survey.*

*No identifying information will be retained by researchers with your survey responses. Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you are free to withdraw from the study at any time. However, please note that any online interaction carries some risk of being accessed.*

*Questions about this study may be directed to:*

*John J. Cho <John.J.Cho.22@dartmouth.edu>*

*Mia Costa <Mia.Costa@dartmouth.edu>*

*Yusaku Horiuchi <Yusaku.Horiuchi@dartmouth.edu>*

- Respondents were then asked two questions, “*This survey is specifically targeted at those who identify themselves as Asians or Asian Americans (including those who have multiracial identities). Do you consider yourself as an Asian or an Asian American?*” “*Do you consent to participate in this survey?*” Participants who click “Yes” to both questions are directed to the next screen.
- The concluding page of each survey included the following message to debrief the participants: “*This research is not intended to support or oppose any policy or political candidate. It has no affiliation with any political candidate or campaign and has received no financial support from any political candidate or campaign. To protect the integrity of this study, please do not share information on the questions or your responses with other potential participants.*”

## Deception

Respondents were explicitly asked to express their preferences for hypothetical parties, so there was no deception. We show the following introduction: “*On each of the following 11 pages, you will be given descriptions for two hypothetical candidates running for Congress. Please read each description carefully and select the candidate that you most prefer.*”



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