



# Identity & Access Management Authentication & Authorization

# Agenda

- Authentication in AWS IAM
- Federated access to AWS
- Authorization in AWS IAM
- Cross Account Access
- AWS Organizations Service Control Policies
- AWS IAM Permission Boundaries

# Goals

- Understand AWS IAM policy language
- Understand when and where to use AWS IAM
- Discover identity federation options
- Understand options for roles and responsibilities
- Discover AWS Organizations Service Control Policy options
- Discover appropriate use of Permission Boundaries

# Outcomes

- Decision on the AWS access model (IAM users vs federated access)
- Agreed upon basic set of roles and/or policies
- Decision on the use of AWS Organizations and SCP's
- Decision on the use of Permission Boundaries

# Authentication in AWS IAM

AWS Identity & Access Management  
Authentication & Authorization



# Authentication

## Username/Password

- Console access
- Can set an IAM Password Policy

Minimum password length:

Require at least one uppercase letter [i](#)

Require at least one lowercase letter [i](#)

Require at least one number [i](#)

Require at least one non-alphanumeric character [i](#)

Allow users to change their own password [i](#)

Enable password expiration [i](#)

Password expiration period (in days):

Prevent password reuse [i](#)

Number of passwords to remember:

Password expiration requires administrator reset [i](#)

# Authentication

## Access Key

- CLI/API access
- Used to sign requests without sending the Secret on the network
- Not retrievable from AWS again – you lose it, generate a new pair

Identifier **ACCESS KEY ID**

AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE


Secret **SECRET KEY**

UtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY

# Authentication

## Multifactor Authentication (MFA)

- Helps prevent anyone with unauthorized knowledge of your credentials from impersonating you.
- Virtual, Hardware, U2F
- Works with
  - Root credentials
  - IAM Users
  - Application
- Integrated into
  - AWS API
  - AWS Management Console
  - Key pages on the AWS Portal
  - S3 (Secure Delete)



# Keys or Password?

Depends on how your users will access AWS

- Console → Password
- API, CLI, SDK → Access keys

In either case, make sure to rotate credentials regularly


- Use Credential Report to audit credential rotation
- Configure password policy
- Configure policy to allow access key rotation

# Federated Access to AWS


AWS Identity & Access Management  
Authentication & Authorization



# Federation - access patterns



**AWS IAM  
federation**  
External IdP



**AWS SSO  
federation**  
AWS SSO



**AWS SSO  
federation**  
External IdP


# Federation – AWS IAM federation

## IdP configuration



External IdP

Configure the relying party



User Directory




Cloud builder

Create matching groups

Add users to groups


## AWS configuration



Create IdP

Create Roles

# Federation – SAML2.0



# Federation – AWS SSO




Centrally manage Single Sign-On access

- Flexible directory options
- Manage AWS account access at scale
- SSO for AWS integrated applications
- SSO for business applications


# Federation – AWS SSO

## AWS configuration



# Federation – AWS SSO

## Permission Sets are Role definitions



# Federation – AWS SSO with external IdP

## IdP configuration



Configure the relying party  
*Configure SCIM provisioning*

Create matching groups

Add users to groups

## AWS configuration



Set identity source as an *external IdP*

*Enable automatic provisioning*


Create Permission Sets

Assign groups to AWS Accounts

# Federation - access patterns


Access pattern	Identity provider	User directory source	Credentials	AWS Organizations support	AWS IAM management	Immutable AWS IAM Roles	Group to Role mapping	CLI Support	Pattern maturity
AWS IAM federation	External	External	External	No	Decentralized	With SCPs	1-1	Open source / homegrown	Leader
AWS SSO federation	AWS SSO	AWS SSO / AD	AWS SSO	Yes	Centralized	Inherent	Flexible	AWS CLI integration	Trending
AWS SSO federation	External & AWS SSO	External	External	Yes	Centralized	Inherit	Flexible	AWS CLI integration	Trending

# Federation – Cognito (for applications)



# Authorization in AWS IAM

AWS Identity & Access Management  
Authentication & Authorization



# Authorization

Permissions are to specify

Who can access to AWS resources

What action can be performed on those AWS resources

How is it done?

- Organized in **Policies (JSON)**

# Authorization

## Identity-Based Permissions

### User: Brian

Can Read, Write, List

On Resource X

### Group: Admins

Can Read, Write, List

On Resource XYZ

### Group: Developers

Can Read, List

On Resource YZ

## Resource-Based Permissions

### Resource X

Brian: Read, Write, List

Admins: Read, Write, List

Developers: List

### Resource Y

Brian: Read, Write, List

Bob: List

Iris: Read


### Resource Z

Admins: Read, Write, List

Developers: Read

# Authorization – Identity-Based Permissions

- Are built in Policies
- Attached to an IAM user, group, or role
- Enable you specify what that user, group, or role can do
- User-based policies: **managed** or **inline**



# Authorization – Identity-Based Permissions

- Managed Policies
  - AWS managed policies
  - Customer managed policies
  - Reusable
  - Versioning
- Inline Policies
  - Embedded into a user, group or role
  - Disposable / Temporary

The screenshot shows the AWS IAM Policies page with a list of AWS Managed Policies. The policies are listed in descending order of creation date. A red box highlights the 'Versioning' section on the right, which contains three bullet points: 'Track changes', 'Enables rollback', and 'Keep up to five versions'.


Policy Name	Attached Entities	Created
AdministratorAccess	0	2011-07-20
AmazonAppStreamFullAccess	0	2012-07-20
AmazonAppStreamReadOnlyAccess	0	2012-07-20
AmazonDynamoDBFullAccess	0	2014-07-20
AmazonDynamoDBFullAccess	0	2015-07-20
AmazonDynamoDBReadOnlyAccess	0	2015-07-20
AmazonEC2FullAccess	0	2014-07-20
AmazonEC2ReadOnlyAccess	0	2014-07-20
AmazonEC2ReportsAccess	0	2014-07-20
AmazonEC2RoleforDataPipeline	0	2014-07-20
AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole	0	2014-07-20
AWSLambdaPowerUserExecutionRole	0	2014-07-20
AWSLambdaFullAccess	0	2014-07-20
AWSLambdaVPCAccessExecutionRole	0	2014-07-20

**Versioning**

- Track changes
- Enables rollback
- Keep up to five versions

# Authorization – Resource-Based Permissions

- Are built in Policies
- Attached to a resource
- Resources include:
  - Amazon S3 buckets
  - Amazon Glacier vaults
  - Amazon SNS topics
  - Amazon SQS queues
  - VPC Endpoints
  - AWS Key Management Service encryption keys
- Specify who has access to the resource and what actions they can perform on it
- Resource-based policies : inline only



# Authorization – Resource-Based Permissions

- JSON-formatted documents
- Contain a statement (permissions) that specifies:
  - Which actions a principal can perform
  - Which resources can be accessed

```
{  
  "statement": [  
    {  
      "Effect": "effect",  
      "Principal": "principal",  
      "Action": "action",  
      "Resource": "arn",  
      "Condition": {  
        "condition": {  
          "key": "value" }  
      }  
    }  
  ]  
}
```

**Principal**  
**Action**  
**Resource**  
**Condition**

You can have multiple statements and each statement is comprised of PARC.

# Authorization – Policies

## Identity-Based versus Resource-Based

```
{  
  "Statement": [  
    {"Effect": "effect",  
     "Action": "action",  
     "Resource": "arn",  
     "Condition": {  
       "condition": {  
         "key": "value" }  
     }  
   ]  
}
```

```
{  
  "Statement": [  
    {"Effect": "effect",  
     "Principal": "principal",  
     "Action": "action",  
     "Resource": "arn",  
     "Condition": {  
       "condition": {  
         "key": "value" }  
     }  
   ]  
}
```

Principal  
Action  
Resource  
Condition

## Identity-based Policy

## Resource-based Policy

# Authorization – Policies

```
{  
  "version": "2012-10-17",  
  "Statement": {  
    "Effect": "Allow",  
    "Action": "s3>ListBucket",  
    "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::example_bucket"  
  }  
}
```

You can attach this policy to an IAM user or group. If that's the only policy for the user or group, the user or group is allowed to perform only this one action (ListBucket) on one Amazon S3 bucket (example\_bucket).

# Authorization – Amazon Resource Name (ARN)


arn:partition:service:region:account-id:resource

arn:partition:service:region:account-id:resourcetype/resource

arn:partition:service:region:account-id:resourcetype:resource

- **Partition:** For standard AWS regions, the partition is aws.
- **Service:** The service namespace (example: iam)
- **Region:** The region the resource resides in (example: us-west-2)
- Note that the ARNs for some resources do not require a region, so this component might be omitted.
- **Account-id:** Example: 123456789012

# Authorization – Amazon Resource Name (ARN)



# Authorization – Principals

```
<!-- Everyone (anonymous users) -->
```

```
"Principal":"AWS":"*.*"
```

```
<!-- Specific account or accounts -->
```

```
"Principal": {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root" }
```

```
"Principal": {"AWS": "123456789012"}
```

```
<!-- Individual IAM user -->
```

```
"Principal": "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/username"
```

```
<!-- Federated user (using web identity federation) -->
```

```
"Principal": {"Federated": "www.amazon.com"}
```

```
"Principal": {"Federated": "graph.facebook.com"}
```

```
"Principal": {"Federated": "accounts.google.com"}
```

```
<!-- Specific role -->
```

```
"Principal": {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/rolename"}
```

```
<!-- Specific service -->
```

```
"Principal": {"Service": "ec2.amazonaws.com"}
```

Replace with  
your AWS  
account  
number

# Authorization – Actions

```
<!-- EC2 action -->
```

```
"Action":"ec2:StartInstances"
```

```
<!-- IAM action -->
```

```
"Action":"iam:ChangePassword"
```

```
<!-- S3 action -->
```

```
"Action":"s3:GetObject"
```

```
<!-- Specify multiple values for the Action element -->
```

```
"Action":["sqS:SendMessage","sqS:ReceiveMessage"]
```


```
<-- Use wildcards (*) or (?) as part of the action name. This would cover  
Create/Delete/List/Update -->
```

```
"Action":"iam:*AccessKey*"
```

# Authorization – NotAction

```
{  
  "version": "2012-10-17",  
  "Statement": [ {  
    "Effect": "Allow",  
    "NotAction": "iam:*",  
    "Resource": "*"  
  }]  
}
```

Is there a difference?





```
{  
  "version": "2012-10-17",  
  "Statement": [ {  
    "Effect": "Allow",  
    "Action": "*",  
    "Resource": "*"  
  },  
  {  
    "Effect": "Deny",  
    "Action": "iam:*",  
    "Resource": "*"  
  }]  
}
```

# Authorization – NotAction

```
{  
  "version": "2012-10-17",  
  "Statement": [ {  
    "Effect": "Allow",  
    "NotAction": "iam:*",  
    "Resource": "*"  
  }]  
}
```

This is not a **Deny**. A user could still have a separate policy that grants **IAM:\***




```
{  
  "version": "2012-10-17",  
  "Statement": [ {  
    "Effect": "Allow",  
    "Action": "*",  
    "Resource": "*"  
  },  
  {  
    "Effect": "Deny",  
    "Action": "iam:*",  
    "Resource": "*"  
  }]  
}
```

If you want to prevent the user from ever being able to call IAM APIs, use an **explicit deny**.

# Authorization – Conditions

Restricting access to a time frame and IP address

```
"Condition" : {  
    "DateGreaterThan" : {"aws:CurrentTime" : "2015-10-08T12:00:00Z"},  
    "DateLessThan": {"aws:CurrentTime" : "2015-10-08T15:00:00Z"},  
    "IpAddress" : {"aws:SourceIp" : ["192.0.2.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24"]}  
}
```

**AND** {  } OR 

Allows a user to access a resource under the following conditions:

- The time is after 12:00 P.M. on 10/8/2015 **AND**
- The time is before 3:00 P.M. on 10/8/2015 **AND**
- The request comes from an IP address in the 192.0.2.0 /24 **OR** 203.0.113.0 /24 range

All of these conditions must be met in order for the statement to evaluate to TRUE.

# Authorization – Conditions

## Examples:

- aws:CurrentTime
- aws:EpochTime
- aws:MultiFactorAuthAge
- aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent
- aws:SecureTransport
- aws:UserAgent
- aws:PrincipalOrgID
- aws:PrincipalType
- aws:Referer
- aws:RequestedRegion
- aws:RequestTag/*tag-key*
- aws:ResourceTag/*tag-key*
- aws:SourceAccount
- aws:SourceArn
- aws:SourceIp
- aws:SourceVpc
- aws:SourceVpce
- aws:TagKeys
- aws:TokenIssueTime
- aws:userid
- aws:username

# Authorization – Policy Variables

- Predefined variables based on service request context
  - **Global** keys (aws:SourceIP, aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent, etc.)
  - **Principal-specific** keys (aws:username, aws:userid, aws:PrincipalType)
  - **Provider-specific** keys (graph.facebook.com:id, www.amazon.com:user\_id)
  - **SAML** keys (saml:cn, saml:edupersonassurance)
  - See documentation for service-specific variables
- Benefits
  - Simplify policy management
  - Reduce the need for hard-coded, user-specific policies

# Authorization – Policy Variables

Applicable to Brian:

```
{  
  "Version": "2012-10-17",  
  "Statement": [  
    {  
      "Action": ["iam:*AccessKey*"],  
      "Effect": "Allow",  
      "Resource": ["arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/Brian"]  
    }  
  ]  
}
```

Applicable to all users:

```
{  
  "version": "2012-10-17",  
  "Statement": [  
    {  
      "Action": ["iam:*AccessKey*"],  
      "Effect": "Allow",  
      "Resource": ["arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/${aws:username}"]  
    }  
  ]  
}
```

# Authorization – Policy Variables

Grants a user access to a home directory in S3 that can be accessed programmatically

```
{  
  "version": "2012-10-17",  
  "Statement": [  
    {"Effect": "Allow",  
     "Action": ["s3>ListBucket"],  
     "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::myBucket"],  
     "Condition":  
       {"StringLike":  
         {"s3:prefix": ["home/${aws:username}/*"]}}},  
    {"Effect": "Allow",  
     "Action": ["s3:*"],  
     "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::myBucket/home/${aws:username}",  
                "arn:aws:s3:::myBucket/home/${aws:username}/*"]}  
  ]  
}
```


The diagram illustrates three types of policy variables:

- Version is required**: Points to the `"version": "2012-10-17"` field.
- Variable in conditions**: Points to the `s3:prefix` condition in the first statement's `StringLike` block.
- Variable in resource ARNs**: Points to the `aws:username` placeholder in the `Resource` ARN of the second statement.


# Authorization – Session Policies

## Session Policies

- Can be passed as a parameter for programmatically created sessions.
- Effective permissions come from:
  - Identity-based permissions
  - Resource-based permissions
  - Session-based based permissions




# IAM Evaluation Logic




# AWS Organizations

AWS Identity & Access Management  
Authentication & Authorization



# AWS Organizations





- Manage/control multiple AWS accounts centrally
- Enable multi-account functionality for AWS services


## Key features:

- Simplified creation of new AWS accounts
- Logically group AWS accounts for management convenience
- Apply organizational policies to control AWS services
- Consolidate billing and usage across all accounts into one bill


# AWS Organizations – In the beginning...



# AWS Organizations – Today



# AWS Organizations – Hierarchy and Policies




**Service Control Policies use the IAM policy language**


# AWS Organizations – Hierarchy and Policies



# AWS Organizations – Hierarchy and Policies




# IAM Evaluation Logic



# AWS IAM Access Analyzer

AWS Identity & Access Management  
Authentication & Authorization




# AWS IAM Access Analyzer

## Access Analysis

- Prescriptive guidance (more than 100 checks) about authoring error-free policies.
- Generate fine-grained policies based on access activity found in CloudTrail.
- Validate account access before deploying permissions changes.
- Tighten permissions for IAM principals by using access history.
- Identify Secrets Manager secrets that can be accessed publicly or from other accounts or organizations.

# AWS IAM Access Analyzer

## Getting to the right permissions



# AWS IAM Access Analyzer

## Set permissions: policy generation with Access Analyzer

- Access Analyzer helps you get to the right permissions more quickly by analyzing your access activity in CloudTrail and generating policies.
- Includes action-level policies for more than 50 popular services—with more on the way.
- Guides you to set least privilege because policies include resource-level templates.
- Supports organization trails.

# AWS IAM Access Analyzer

## Set permissions: policy validation with Access Analyzer

- Makes it easier to author secure and functional policies with more than 100 checks.
- Validation performed during policy authoring in the IAM console or via API.
- Each check includes guidance for resolving issues.

The screenshot shows the AWS IAM Access Analyzer's JSON editor interface. At the top, there are two tabs: "Visual editor" (disabled) and "JSON" (selected). The main area displays a JSON policy document:

```
1 {  
2   "Version": "2012-10-17",  
3   "Statement": [  
4     {"Effect": "Allow",  
5      "Action": [  
6        "iam:GetRole",  
7        "iam:PassRole"  
8      ],  
9      "Resource": "*"  
10    }]  
11 }
```

Below the policy, a summary bar indicates:

- Security: 1
- Errors: 0
- Warnings: 0
- Suggestions: 0

A search bar at the bottom allows you to "Search security warnings" and a "Learn more" link is available.

A specific warning is highlighted:

**Ln 7, Col 12** **PassRole With Star In Resource:** Using the iam:PassRole action with a star (\*) in the Resource field is overly permissive because it allows iam:PassRole access to all resources. You can specify resource ARNs or add the iam:PassRole action to a resource-based policy.

# AWS IAM Access Analyzer

## Refine permissions with Access Analyzer

- Public and cross-account findings with Access Analyzer guide you to ensure that the existing access meets your intent.
- Access Analyzer uses provable security to analyze all access paths and provide comprehensive analysis of external access to your resources.
- You can create an analyzer at the account or AWS Organization level. Access Analyzer continuously monitors for new or updated resource permissions to help you identify external access.
- Using this same analysis, Access Analyzer makes it easier to review and validate public and cross-account access before deploying permissions changes.


# Permission Boundaries

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# Permissions Boundaries

- limit the maximum permissions that a principal can have
- Can be used to delegate IAM tasks but limit the permissions granted to the IAM principals they create
- Use the same policy language as regular IAM policies



# Permissions Boundaries – Use Case

- **IAM Administrator:** Principal responsible for provisioning user, roles, and policies for the enterprise.
- **Delegated IAM Administrator:** Principal with delegated responsibility to provision users, roles, and policies for their business unit, team, or workload.
- **Business unit, team, or workload member:** Principal interacting with AWS to accomplish their business unit, team, or workload goals.

# Permissions Boundaries – Tasks

1. IAM Administrator creates MyAppPermissionsBoundary.
2. IAM Administrator creates Delegated IAM Administrator role.
3. IAM Administrator creates Delegated IAM Administrator Permissions Boundary and Permissions Policy.
4. Attach permissions boundary and policy to role.

# Permissions Boundaries – How does it work?

```
"Effect": "Allow",
  "Action": [
    "iam:DetachRolePolicy",
    "iam:DeleteRolePolicy",
    "iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary",
    "iam:CreateRole",
    "iam:AttachRolePolicy",
    "iam:PutRolePolicy"
  ],
  "Resource": "arn:aws:iam:::role/apps/my_app/*",
  "Condition": {
    "StringEquals": {
      "iam:PermissionsBoundary": "arn:aws:iam::<account>:policy/MyAppPermissionsBoundary"
    }
  }
}
```


# Permissions Boundaries – How do I enforce?

```
{  
    "Sid": "DenyDeletePermBoundary",  
    "Effect": "Deny",  
    "Action": [  
        "iam:DeletePolicy",  
        "iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary"  
    ],  
    "Resource": [  
        "arn:aws:iam::<account>:policy/MyAppPermissionsBoundary",  
        "arn:aws:iam::::policy/apps/my_app/DelegatedPermissionsBoundary",  
        "arn:aws:iam::*:role/*"  
    ]  
}
```

# Permissions Boundaries

## Resource-based Policies


- Boundaries do not effect permissions granted through resource-based policies.
- Effective permissions consist of everything that is allowed by the resource-based policy and everything that is allowed by both the permissions boundary and the identity-based policy.



# Permissions Boundaries

## Organizations SCP's


- SCP's do not grant any permissions to a principal.
- SCP's only limit the operations in an account and apply to all principals.
- Effective permissions consist of any operations that is allowed by any of the three policies.



# Permissions Boundaries

## Session Policy


- Session policies are applied per session when a session is created.
- Effective permissions consist of any operation that is allowed by the session policy and either the identity-based policy of the principal that created the session, or an applicable resource-based policy.




# Permissions Boundaries

## Session Policy with Permissions Boundary

- A permission boundary limits both the identity-based policy and the session policy.
- Effective permissions consist of any operation that is allowed by all of the three policies (and the SCP applied if applicable).



# IAM Evaluation Logic




# **Attribute-based access control (ABAC)**

Authentication & Authorization



# Recall Role-based Access Control (RBAC)



**Developers**

**Permissions**

**Resources**

# ABAC - A little bit about attributes


Attributes are a **key** or a **key and value** pair

Pre-defined by a provider or custom

Examples




**UserID = ziggy**  
**Team = Unicorns**  
**Project = Pickles**



**Project = Pickles**  
**Env = Development**  
**CreatedBy = ziggy**

# ABAC - A scalable permissions model based on attributes



# Benefits of ABAC

Permissions scale with innovation

Teams move fast as permissions automatically apply

Granular permissions without a permission update for every item

Audit attributes to determine access


# Examples of attribute-based permissions

- ⚡ Grant developers read and write access to their project resources
- ⚡ Require developers to assign their project to new resources
- ⚡ Grant developers read access to resources common to their team
- ⚡ Manage only the resources I own

# Steps to implement ABAC




Create identities with access control attributes




Require attributes for new resources



Set permissions based on developer attributes



Create new resources



Permissions automatically apply to Developers as workloads scale

# ABAC best practices

1. Reserve a subset of attributes used for access control
2. Only approved entities can set or modify attributes
3. Tag everything during creation so that permissions apply immediately
4. Rely on attributes to grant permissions to manage resources
5. Periodically audit to ensure that resources are tagged appropriately

# Roles & Responsibilities

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# Roles & Responsibilities

What roles are needed?

- Human roles are needed for human operators to assume into the AWS account to use services.
- System roles may be needed for your applications running on EC2 instances or for AWS services to utilize your AWS resources.

# Roles & Responsibilities

What roles are needed?

- Consider the current roles in your organization, and compare to the end-goal job roles your organization wants to achieve (i.e. DevOps).
- Consider increasing business agility by removing operational blockers
- Consider separation of duties and least privilege

# Roles & Responsibilities

What roles are needed?

- Administrator
- IAMAdmin
- NetworkAdmin
- SystemOperator
- Developer
- SecurityOperator
- ReadOnlyAnalyst
- FinanceAdmin
- ComplianceAnalyst
- StarPortalWebTier
- StarPortalAppTier
- StarPortalDataTier
- ApplicationDelivery

# Authorization – Identity Recap

Govern your AWS environment **with** AWS accounts and AWS Organizations

Centralize identity management **with** AWS SSO

Rely on short-term credentials **with** federation and application roles

Organize your resources **with** tags and resource groups

Establish a data perimeter **with** policies and conditions

Journey to least privilege **with** AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies and IAM Access Analyzer

# Authorization – Permission Quiz



Service control policies (SCPs)

Restrict powerful actions except for admins



Permissions boundaries



IAM permissions policy

Grant only the actions your role uses



Scoped-down policies

Developers can manage roles safely



Resource-based policies



Endpoint policies

Grant direct, cross-account access

# Authorization – Use the right permissions tool



Service control policies (SCPs)



Restrict powerful actions except for admins



Permissions boundaries



IAM permissions policy



Grant only the actions your role uses



Scoped-down policies



Developers can manage roles safely



Resource-based policies



Grant direct, cross-account access




Endpoint policies





# Questions



# Appendix A – Example IAM Naming Convention

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# Example IAM User Naming Convention

## IAM User Names

- Syntax
  - [<organization/business unit short name>][<team/project name>]<product/technology>
  - <user alias>
- Examples
  - TeamASecMonitoring
  - TeamBSecMonitoring
  - AppMonitoring
  - JohnDoe

# Example IAM Group Naming Convention

## IAM Group Names

- Syntax
  - [<organization/business unit short name>][<team/project name>]<function name>
- Examples
  - CompanyTeamEngineering
  - Developers
  - Admins

# Example IAM Role Naming Convention

## IAM Role Names

- Syntax
  - [<organization/business unit short name>]<team/project name><entity name>
  - [<organization/business unit short name>]<team/project name><app name><app tier>
- Examples
  - CompanyTeamDevelopers
  - Developers
  - TeamAStarPortalWebTier
  - StartPortalAppTier

# Appendix B –IAM Best-Practices

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# IAM Best-Practices

- Lock away your AWS account (root) access keys
- Create individual IAM users
- Use groups to assign permissions to IAM users
- Grant least privilege
- Configure a strong password policy for your users
- Enable MFA for privileged users

# IAM Best-Practices

- Use roles for applications that run on Amazon EC2 instances
- Delegate by using roles instead of by sharing credentials
- Rotate credentials regularly
- Remove unnecessary credentials
- Use policy conditions for extra security
- Monitor activity in your AWS account

More info: <http://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html>

# Appendix C – AWS Services

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# AWS Services That Work With IAM

The following webpage describes the IAM permission types each service supports, specifically:

- Action-level permissions
- Resource-level permissions
- Resource-based policies
- Tag-based authorization
- Requests via temporary security credentials
- Service-linked roles

[http://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference\\_aws-services-that-work-with-iam.html](http://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_aws-services-that-work-with-iam.html)