Quadratic Cost Sharing Model

A consumer that consumes x of the sharing good has utility:

```
u[x_{-}] := 2 * \alpha * x - x^{2};
```

The parameter α determines how much the consumer values consuming the good. In the absence of rental costs, α is the amount consumed by that user, conditional upon purchasing. Note that a Cobb-Douglas style utility function does not "work" as everyone consumes at least a little of the good. We also need a money-metric utility function so that we can accomodate rental income and rental expenses.

Consumer purchase decision

A consumer must decide whether to purchase the good at a price p or go without. Everyone with an α greater than the square root of the price purchases the good.

Solve[p = v[
$$\alpha$$
], α]
$$\left\{ \left\{ \alpha \to -\sqrt{p} \right\}, \left\{ \alpha \to \sqrt{p} \right\} \right\}$$

Four Consumer possibilities:

- 1) Everyone buys: $\alpha L > \sqrt{p}$ (think tootbrush)
- 2) High types buy but low types do not: $\alpha H > \sqrt{p} > \alpha L$ (think vacation homes)
- 3) No one buys : $\alpha \rm{H}~<~\sqrt{p}~$ (mainframe computers in the 1950 s)

When P2P renting is possible

Let us define the short-run as the period of time before anyone can revise their purchase decisions. The consumer's new optimization problem is:

Optimal usage in the presence of renting (for renters):

In[19]:=
$$uR[x_] := 2 * \alpha * x - x^2 - r * x;$$

 $solR = Collect[Solve[uR'[x] == 0, x], \alpha]$
Out[20]= $\left\{\left\{x \rightarrow -\frac{r}{2} + \alpha\right\}\right\}$

Note that for the renter to consume any of the good, $2 \alpha > r$.

Optimal usage in the presence of renting (for owners):

```
ln[39] = u0[x_] := 2 * \alpha * x - x^2 + (1 - x) * r;
          sol0 = Collect[Solve[u0'[x] = 0, x], \alpha]
Out[40]= \left\{ \left\{ x \rightarrow -\frac{r}{2} + \alpha \right\} \right\}
 ln[11]:= xstar2[r_, \alpha_] = x /. solR[[1]]
Out[11]= -\frac{r}{2} + \alpha
```

Existence and Uniqueness of a P2P Rental Equilibrium

So long as there is not a glut (i.e., the comined consumption of the two types is greater than 1) a market clearing P2P rental equilibrium exists.

```
ln[71] = Solve[1 - xstar2[r, \alpha H] = xstar2[r, \alpha L], r]
Out[71]= \{ \{ r \rightarrow -1 + \alpha H + \alpha L \} \}
```

Indirect Utility for Both Types (assuming no product market changes)

For renters:

$$ln[41]:= vR[\alpha_{,} r_{,}] = uR[xstar2[r, \alpha]] // FullSimplify$$

$$Out[41]:= \frac{1}{4} (r - 2 \alpha)^{2}$$

Comparative Statics

$$ln[45] = D[vR[\alpha, r], \alpha]$$
Out[45] = $-r + 2\alpha$

A renter's surplus is increasing in their valuation parameter α .

$$\label{eq:local_local_local} $$ \ln[49]:= $$ Resolve[ForAll[\{\alpha,\,r\},\,2\,\alpha>r,\,D[vR[\alpha,\,r],\,\alpha]>0]]$$ Out[49]= True$$

A renter's surplus is decreasing in the rental rate, r.

```
In[50] = D[vR[\alpha, r], r]
\label{eq:local_local_local} $$ \ln[52]:= Resolve[ForAll[\{\alpha,\,r\},\ 2\star\alpha>r,\ D[vR[\alpha,\,r],\,r]<0]]$ $$
Out[52]= True
```

Change in indirect utility for owners

$$In[53]:= vO[\alpha_, r_] = uO[xstar2[r, \alpha]] - p // FullSimplify$$

$$Out[53]= -p + r + \frac{r^2}{4} - r \alpha + \alpha^2$$

A owner's surplus is increasing in their valuation parameter.

In[64]:=
$$D[vR[\alpha, r], \alpha]$$

Out[64]= $-r + 2 \alpha$

A owner's surplus is increasing in the rental rate.

```
In[62]:= D[vO[\alpha, r], r]
Out[62]= 1 + \frac{r}{2} - \alpha
 \label{eq:constraint} \begin{split} & \text{ln}[63] = \text{Resolve}[\text{ForAll}[\{\alpha,\,r\},\,\,\alpha > 0 \text{ \&\&}\,\alpha \,<\,1 \text{ \&\&}\,\,2 \star \alpha > r \text{ \&\&}\,r > 0\,,\,\,D[\text{vO}[\alpha,\,r]\,,\,r] \,>\,0\,]] \end{split}
Out[63]= True
```

Change in Utility Verus the Status Quo (with no product market changes)

 $ln[65] = conditions := \alpha > 0 \&\&\alpha < 1 \&\& 2 * \alpha > r \&\&r > 0$

 $ln[44] = vO[\alpha, r] - v[\alpha] // FullSimplify$

Owner utility increases with the possibility of P2P rental

Resolve[ForAll[$\{\alpha, r\}$, conditions, $vO[\alpha, r] - v[\alpha] > 0$]]


Out[67]= True

A renter's utility increases with the possibility of P2P rental

ln[69]:= Resolve[ForAll[{ α , r}, conditions, $vR[\alpha, r] > 0$]]

Out[69]= True

Plot[{xstar2[0.1, α], xstar2[0.2, α]}, { α , .1, 1}]



Solve[$(1 - xstar[r, \alpha H]) = xstar[r, \alpha L], r] // FullSimplify$ $\{ \{ r \rightarrow -1 + \alpha H + \alpha L \} \}$

Equilibrium Rental Rate

$$\{ \{r \rightarrow -1 + \alpha H + \alpha L\} \}$$

Comment: If either the high or low types value the good more, the rental rate increases. An increase in α H reduces supply, whereas an increase in α L reduces demand.


Solve $[-1 + \alpha H + \alpha L = \alpha H^2, \alpha H]$ // FullSimplify

$$\left\{ \left\{ \alpha H \rightarrow \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \sqrt{-3 + 4 \alpha L} \right) \right\}, \left\{ \alpha H \rightarrow \frac{1}{2} \left(1 + \sqrt{-3 + 4 \alpha L} \right) \right\} \right\}$$


```
g1 = RegionPlot[\alphaH^2 > p && \alphaH > \alphaL /. p \rightarrow 0.5, {\alphaL, 0, 1},
     \{\alpha \text{H}, \ 0, \ 1\}, PlotLegends \rightarrow "Expressions", MeshFunctions \rightarrow \{\#1 + \#2 \ \&\},
     Mesh \rightarrow \{Range[-2 Pi, 2 Pi, Pi / 50]\}, PlotStyle \rightarrow None];
g2 = RegionPlot[\alphaL^2 \alphaH > \alphaL /. p \rightarrow 0.5, {\alphaL, 0, 1},
     \{\alpha H, 0, 1\}, PlotLegends \rightarrow "Expressions",
     \texttt{MeshFunctions} \rightarrow \{ \texttt{\#1} - \texttt{\#2} \ \& \}, \ \texttt{Mesh} \rightarrow \{ \texttt{Range}[-\texttt{Pi}, \ \texttt{Pi}, \ \texttt{Pi} \ / \ \texttt{50}] \}, \ \texttt{PlotStyle} \rightarrow \texttt{None}] ;
gCombo = Show[{g1, g2}]
0.6
                                                                                 0.4
0.2
   0.0
                 0.2
                                0.4
                                              0.6
                                                            0.8
```

Export["../writeup/images/three_parts.pdf", gCombo]

../writeup/images/three_parts.pdf



Manipulate[RegionPlot[$\{\alpha H^2 > \alpha L, \alpha L^2 > \alpha H\}, \{\alpha L, 0, 1\},$ $\{\alpha H, 0, 1\}$, PlotLegends \rightarrow "Expressions"], $\{\{p, 0.5\}, 0, 1\}$]



Jevon's Paradox

As a function of the product market price, what is the fraction of:

- all buy/no buy/high and lows buy

Product Market Demand

 $ln[72] = d[p] := If[p > \alpha H^2, 0, If[p > \alpha L^2, 1, 2]]$

 $\ln[74]:= \text{Plot[d[p] /. } \{\alpha\text{H} \rightarrow 0.8, \ \alpha\text{L} \rightarrow 0.7\}, \ \{\text{p, 0, 1}\}]$

